

The Collected Works of
LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, VOL. II.1

Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi
A Commentary (*Cheng Weishi Lun*) on
Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* by XUANZANG

Various Introductions
First Part of English Translation



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Translated from Chinese into French and Annotated by
LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

English translation by
GELONG LODRÖ SANGPO
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with the assistance of
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to all the Masters
of the Yogācāra*

VOLUME II.1
OF
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

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INTRODUCTION TO
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN

by

DAVID SEYFORT RUEGG

Louis de La Vallée Poussin (January 1, 1869 – February 18, 1938)

Louis de La Vallée Poussin was a pre-eminent member of the second generation in modern academic Buddhist studies. He was born at Liège in Belgium in a distinguished family that had produced several well-known men of science and letters. His family was French-speaking and had close ties with France. As was usual at the time, he received a classical education in the western humanities. But he soon turned to indology, and within this discipline he developed a special interest in Buddhist studies. These he pursued with great application first in Belgium and then in Paris. From the time of the indologist Eugène Burnouf (1801–1852), and also of the tibetologist Philippe Édouard Foucaux (1811–1894), Paris had indeed been a major centre of Indo-Buddhist studies, and it remained so in La Vallée Poussin's time. There he attended lectures by Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935), with whom he was to develop a close but not uncomplicated scholarly relation. Whereas Lévi considered himself essentially a philologist and historian of India with a strong interest in Buddhism, but averred that he was no philosopher, his colleague from Belgium, also a philologist and historian, soon turned to the exploration of Indian Buddhist thought. La Vallée Poussin perfected his knowledge of Buddhist philology with the indologist Hendrik Kern (1833–1917) at Leiden in the Netherlands. His publications show that he felt a special intellectual affinity with Auguste Barth (1834–1916) and Émile Senart (1847–1928), different from him though these senior French scholars were in many respects.¹

¹ For the life and work of Louis de La Vallée Poussin, see the “Nécrologie” by É. Lamotte in: *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient* 38 (1938), pp. 479–483; and the same author's “Notice sur Louis de La Vallée Poussin” in the *Annuaire* for 1965 of the Académie Royale de Belgique, pp. 145–168. Lamotte was a personal disciple of La Vallée Poussin. A bibliography of La Vallée Poussin's writings was published by M. Lalou in *Bibliographie bouddhique* Fascicule Annexe XXIII bis (Paris, 1955), pp. 3–37. Information on La Vallée Poussin's work is also found in J.W. de Jong, *A brief history of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America* (“Unified Edition”, Tokyo, 1997), who provided the outline of a periodization of the history of Buddhist studies in the west. Sylvain Lévi's

At a critical point in the modern history of Indian and Buddhist studies, La Vallée Poussin and Lévi both came to realize the need for a good knowledge not only of Sanskrit, Pali and other Indian languages but also of Chinese and Tibetan, these being the main languages in which Buddhist canonical texts have been transmitted and in which major works of classical Buddhist thought have been preserved along with their commentaries. The latter tongues were also the languages in which Chinese and Tibetan scholar-pilgrims composed valuable records of their travels and studies in India.

La Vallée Poussin's monumental French translation of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* – a compendium of Buddhist philosophy and psychology composed originally in Sanskrit – was a product of a grand project he and Lévi planned for the investigation of this major treatise on Buddhist thought. This plan they developed together with Theodore Stcherbatsky, the renowned Petersburg specialist in Indian and Buddhist philosophy. Even before the original Sanskrit text of the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Bhāṣya* had become available to scholars, their plan was to undertake the publication of this treatise in its Tibetan version together with its large Sanskrit subcommentary by Yaśomitra. Translations into European languages of Vasubandhu's work were also to be published. At the time, Stcherbatsky's pupil (and future colleague in St Petersburg) Otto Rosenberg was engaged in investigating Chinese and Japanese sources on Abhidharma, on which he was soon to publish an important philosophical study and a glossary of the technical vocabulary. Stcherbatsky was a scholar with whom La Vallée Poussin was later to develop a lively scholarly debate revolving around the interpretation and the rendering in European languages of crucial concepts and terms in Buddhist thought, matters about which these two great scholars often entertained quite contrasting views.

From 1894 to 1929, with an interruption during the First World War when he took refuge in England and was based in Cambridge, La Vallée Poussin was a professor at the University of Ghent (Gand/Gent) in Belgium. Flemish linguistic and cultural policies introduced at his university made him decide to move in 1929 to Brussels, where he was the moving spirit behind the Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises. In the

disclaimer of the quality of philosopher is found on p. *27 of the introduction to his translation of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (Paris, 1911).

Some confusion has been caused for bibliographers and librarians by the fact that our subject's name was written sometimes as Louis de la Vallée Poussin (especially in his earlier publications), and therefore placed under the letter "V", and sometimes as Louis de La Vallée Poussin, and therefore placed under the letter "L". Unaccountably, he has been cited in Britain (e.g. by the Edinburgh indologist A. B. Keith) under the truncated moniker of "Poussin"!

Belgian capital he founded and edited until his death the renowned *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, one of the most significant periodicals ever to be devoted to the scientific study of Buddhism in all its aspects. For this publication he regularly wrote major articles and numerous scholarly reviews and notices on new publications. This activity continued work that he had earlier carried out first for the *Muséon* and then in his “Notes bouddhiques” in the *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres* of the Royal Academy of Belgium.

In February 1938 La Vallée Poussin passed away suddenly at his Brussels residence, in the midst of his scholarly work. His best-known disciple was Étienne Lamotte, an eminent scholar of Buddhism who had been his student for a decade.

La Vallée Poussin was thus one of the leading founders of modern Buddhist studies. Indian studies and with them Buddhist studies had of course already been attracting the attention of good scholars and of the educated public. And much very significant work had been done in these fields by pioneering scholars in India and Europe beginning already in the eighteenth century. But it was in his generation living towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the earlier part of the twentieth century that Buddhist studies became established as a major specialism within indology, sinology and japonology, and in what was once known as Oriental (or Asian) Studies. His richly documented and annotated French translations from Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese and Tibetan have been models for succeeding generations of scholars.

Intellectually, his interests naturally reflected concerns and preoccupations typical of his period, and sometimes they may perhaps appear to have been overtaken by more recent work and to be out of phase with large sectors of contemporary thinking. This is, of course, because studies in philosophy and religion together with Buddhist studies themselves have developed greatly since La Vallée Poussin’s time. But even if his outlook might on occasion appear a trifle old-fashioned today, he was addressing perennial questions. And his historical-philological approach to his subject constituted a major contribution that has lost none of its relevance and importance today.

La Vallée Poussin as a Historian of India

To begin with, mention can be made of La Vallée Poussin as a historian and the author of a history of pre-classical and classical India in three volumes which were published successively in 1924 (*Indo-européens et Indo-iraniens, L’Inde jusque vers 300 avant J.-C.*; second ed., Paris, 1936), in 1930 (*L’Inde au temps des Mauryas et des Barbares*) and in

1935 (*Dynasties et histoire de l'Inde depuis Kanishka jusqu'aux invasions musulmanes*). In this work he reviewed and analysed relevant archaeological, inscriptional and literary evidence from earliest times until towards the end of the first millennium of the Christian era. And in his exposition he sifted and weighed the main interpretations of this documentation that had been proposed by various scholars. He was well equipped to exploit both classical western sources relating to India and ones in Chinese written by Chinese scholar-pilgrims in that land. This history is among the relatively few to have allotted due attention to the place held by Buddhists in India and the contribution of Buddhism to Indian civilization.² Although it differs from other histories of India, and from the forms of historiographical writing on India that have been customary, his exploration of India's cultural and political history retains its value as a detailed critical survey of what was known (or perhaps only surmised) by scholars at the time. La Vallée Poussin himself was not insensible to the unusualness of a specialist in the philosophy of Buddhism writing a history of India; he explained that he did this at the urgent request of Eugène Cavaignac, a historian of Europe and the editor of the series in which his work appeared.³

Translation and Other Work on Buddhist Doctrine, Ritual and Philosophy

La Vallée Poussin is no doubt best known today as a scholar of Indian Buddhist thought and as a translator from Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan of Buddhist philosophical texts

² In his "Nécrologie", pp. 482–483, and in his "Notice", p. 165, Lamotte has cited the self-description of La Vallée Poussin in his *Indo-européens et Indo-iraniens: L'Inde jusque vers 300 avant J.-C.*, p. 345: "[E]n ce qui concerne les grandes questions, de solution difficile ou impossible, je m'enferme volontiers dans le rôle de secrétaire-rapporteur; je goûte le mélancolique plaisir de noter les hypothèses ingénues, l'injurieuse suffisance de certains 'sociologues', les rapprochements imprévisibles et bizarres qui s'imposent à quelques indianistes. – Pourquoi tenterais-je au loin des courses inutiles en pays inconnu et accidenté quand certaines provinces de notre philologie offrent de sûrs asiles à une étude modeste mais qui satisfait l'esprit?" [Concerning grand questions difficult or impossible to resolve, I gladly confine myself to being a recording secretary; I relish the melancholy pleasure of noting simplistic hypotheses, the offensive self-importance of certain "sociologists", the unexpected and bizarre comparisons that gain acceptance with some indologists. – Why would I attempt useless errands afar, in unknown and rough terrain, when certain areas of our philology offer a secure asylum for a modest study that satisfies the mind?] His history of India was apparently intended by its author to be as much a work of philology as of modern narrative historiography.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 105–106.

of Indian origin. He was amongst the first to explore in detail earlier Madhyamaka thought and what he called “Nāgārjunism”, editing the Sanskrit texts of Nāgārjuna’s *magnum opus*, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* along with Candrakīrti’s great commentary on it (the *Prasannapadā*, 1903–1913), the Tibetan text of Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamaka-avatāra* together with the author’s own commentary (1907–1912), and the Sanskrit texts of Śāntideva’s *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatara* together with Prajñākaramati’s extensive commentary on it (1901–1914). During this very fertile period in his researches he also published fluent translations in French of Candrakīrti’s last named work (1907–1911, incomplete) and of Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (1907).

During his stay in England during the First World War, La Vallée Poussin published a book on the subject of Buddhist *nirvāṇa*. At the same time he also published, in association with E.J. Thomas, his two-volume edition of the *Mahāniddeśa* (1916–1917), a canonical commentary on part of the *Suttanipāta* included in the Pali Suttaṭṭakā. Also in England he compiled his *Catalogue of the Tibetan books in the India Office Library*, a pioneering work devoted to Aurel Stein’s collection of Dunhuang manuscripts that was unfortunately to be published only posthumously some forty-five years later (in 1962).

The translation for which he is probably best known today is, as already noted, his rendering of the Indian master Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa*, a manual on Abhidharma connected with the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādin school of the Buddhist Śrāvakayāna. This imposing French version was published between 1923 and 1931 in five volumes with a sixth containing a long historical introduction and a detailed index. La Vallée Poussin based his work on materials of Indian origin, including Vasubandhu’s autocommentary (the *Bhāṣya*) – one of our main sources also for the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism accessible at the time only in Chinese and Tibetan translations –, and Yaśomitra’s extensive Sanskrit commentary; on Paramārtha’s sixth-century and (above all) on Xuanzang’s (Hsüan-tsang’s) seventh-century Chinese renderings of Vasubandhu’s work; and on further important materials mainly in Chinese, including the *Mahāvibhāṣā* and Saṃghabhadra’s work on Abhidharma. When La Vallée Poussin made his translation, the complete text in the original Sanskrit of Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)* was not yet available, and his work was therefore based in large part on Chinese and Tibetan materials.

The *Abhidharmakośa* and its autocommentary (the *Bhāṣya*) are widely recognized as one of the great monuments of the classical philosophy of Indian Buddhism. It became the object of study also in East Asia. And while founded on Śrāvakayānist (Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika) materials, it has formed part of the curriculum of monastic seminaries

in Tibet, a Mahāyānist country, a fact that testifies to its importance for Mahāyānists too. La Vallée Poussin's translation may be found somewhat less fluent than his earlier renderings of Madhyamaka works had been; and in it he often wove together the Abhidharma's original technical terminology in Sanskrit with his French rendering. This so to speak "Indo-European" linguistic complexity was of course attributable to the highly technical vocabulary of the philosophical material with which he had to deal in his work of translation. For the purpose of his great undertaking, La Vallée Poussin informs us in his foreword to the first volume of his translation that he was introduced to "Abhidharma Chinese" by H. Ui, a Japanese scholar then working with him. Thanks to this ground-breaking work of translation-and-commentary, La Vallée Poussin soon became widely regarded as the greatest scholar of Abhidharma to have lived outside Asia. The context in which this translation was planned has already been referred to in the first part of this article. It was published under the auspices of the Belgian Society of Oriental Studies, a learned organization founded by La Vallée Poussin himself in 1921 and destined to be housed in the Musée du Cinquenaire in Brussels, which, he hoped, would become a sort of counterpart to the original plan for the French Musée Guimet established some decades earlier, first in Lyon and then in Paris, as a centre for the study of Asian religions.⁴

A second ground-breaking translation of his from Chinese, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiu-an-tsang*, is a two-volume rendering (1928–1929) of Xuanzang's seventh-century compendium of Vijñānavāda doctrine, an extensive exposition based in the first place on Vasubandhu's writings on the subject. This work also includes extensive exegetical material drawn from explanations provided by the great Indian masters Sthiramati and Dharmapāla – the heads respectively of the so-called Valabhī and Nālandā schools of the Buddhist "Consciousness only" (*cittamātra*) or "Representation Only" (*vijñaptimātra*) system – as well as by Paramārtha, the important Indian scholar of the sixth century who worked in China and exercised great influence there on the understanding of Vijñānavāda. This Chinese exegetical material remains one of the main sources for our knowledge of this Indian (and Indo-Sinitic) school of thought.

In the exploration of Vijñānavāda, La Vallée Poussin's immense contribution ran parallel to Sylvain Lévi's editions and translations of foundational works of the same school, which were being published at about the same time.⁵

⁴ See Royal Belgian Academy, *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres* for 1921, p. 86.

⁵ At this time the problem of the identity of the Vijñānavādin Vasubandhu, the brother of Asaṅga, and the Ābhidharmika Vasubandhu, the Kośakāra, was already being discussed. The dating has still not been conclusively established, but the Kośakāra's date has been

La Vallée Poussin's work as translator and explicator thus shed light in a masterly fashion on three of the principal schools of classical Indian Buddhist thought, one (the Abhidharma) belonging to the "Lesser Vehicle" of the Auditor (the Śrāvakayāna, also known as Hīnayāna, in its Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika versions) and the other two (the Madhyamaka and the Vijñānavāda) to the "Great Vehicle" (Mahāyāna).

Another strand of Buddhism, the Mantranaya or Vajrayāna – often referred to as Buddhist Tantrism – was not entirely neglected by La Vallée Poussin. Some of his earliest publications dating from the middle of the 1890s were in fact concerned with this less well-explored branch of Buddhism. They included the publication of the *Ādikarmapradīpa* and the *Pañcakrama*. The attention he thus very properly accorded to Vajrayāna called forth a very unfavourable reaction from the Cambridge historian E.J. Rapson published in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* in 1898 – a poorly informed reception that reflected little but the ignorance and prejudice that have been widely prevalent concerning the subject. In the following year La Vallée Poussin replied in the same journal. But he was seemingly himself not uninfluenced by the reception of his work. At all events, he quickly abandoned the subject and turned to the study of the three great classical Buddhist philosophical traditions detailed in the paragraphs above. He later returned on occasion to the subject of Tantra; but remarks he then made about its being "decadent" and "distressing", and a mixture of what he termed shamanism and theosophy, indicate that his own view on the matter was not altogether untypical of his time and contemporaries. These remarks added little to the understanding of the significance of this development in Buddhism that combines ritual with religious, philosophical and psychological exploration in difficult territory. Buddhist studies – and indology more generally – were seemingly not yet ready for this stage in

provisionally placed in the fifth century; if identical with Asaṅga's brother, he would have to be placed earlier. – Résumés and syntheses of La Vallée Poussin's translations of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* and on Xuanzang's "*Siddhi*" were very rapidly made available to a wider western public through René Grousset's *Les philosophies indiennes* (2 volumes; Paris, 1931). Grousset dedicated this work to La Vallée Poussin, writing "en témoignage de respectueuse affection, je restitue ces pages, en si grande partie siennes". For these résumés see vol. i, pp. 138 ff., and ii, pp. 80 ff., 404 ff. of Grousset's work, which was an example of "haute vulgarisation" in the better sense of this expression and appeared in Desclée De Brouwer's "Bibliothèque française de philosophie, Nouvelle série". In the same publication Grousset also provided résumés of La Vallée Poussin's translations of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* and Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, as well as of translations of other Madhyamaka texts by M. Walleser, T. Stcherbatsky, G. Tucci, and S. Yamaguchi.

the history of Buddhism and Indian religion to be studied effectively and without preconception and prejudice.

In summary, La Vallée Poussin's writings all display great learning and a fairly nuanced approach to his subject; and his earlier translations from Sanskrit and Tibetan – those intended for a wider readership as well as for specialists – are notable for joining faithfulness with fluency. His later translations – made from Chinese as well as from Sanskrit or Tibetan and intended largely for specialists – were written in a “macaronic” style combining French renderings with Buddhist terminology in Sanskrit, and on occasion also in Pali, Chinese and Tibetan. This style doubtless led to his being sometimes regarded as a difficult translator.⁶ But for good reason his style of translation has not fallen entirely out of favour.

Writings Destined for an Educated but Non-Specialist Public

In order to present Buddhism in terms that he hoped would be accessible and meaningful for an educated but non-specialized readership, La Vallée Poussin wrote a number of books in which he addressed central themes in Buddhist thought. As titles for his books he chose *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire et la dogmatique* (1925), *Le dogme et la philosophie du bouddhisme* (1930), *La morale bouddhique* (1927), or simply *Nirvāṇa* (1925). The latter topic was the subject on which he had lectured at Oxford in 1916 and on which he had already published a small volume in English entitled *The way to Nirvāṇa* (1917); and this was a subject to which he was to return again and again throughout his life. These books related to matters that were attracting interest at the time represented their author's effort to engage with problems in Buddhist thought in more widely understandable terms. As attempts to make Buddhist thought more easily accessible, they remain of interest today.

⁶ In his “Nécrologie” of La Vallée Poussin, p. 481, Lamotte observed that his subject's works presented themselves as renderings that were half French and half Sanskrit, and which could thus be disconcerting for the uninitiated, but very convenient for the specialist. Lamotte called attention also to the differences in translation technique between La Vallée Poussin, Lévi and Stcherbatsky. Concerning this matter, see the present writer's “La traduction de la terminologie technique de la pensée indienne et bouddhique depuis Sylvain Lévi”, in: L. Bansat-Boudon and R. Lardinois (ed.), *Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935)*, Bibliothèque de l'École des Hautes Études, Sciences Religieuses, Volume 130 (Turnhout, 2007), pp. 145–171.

If La Vallée Poussin was perhaps not always entirely successful in reaching the non-specialized public he had in mind – or indeed on occasion even certain of his colleagues – this was no doubt due less to a lack of effort on his part than to the problems and difficulties inherent in complex topics requiring treatment in very specialized terms before they can be meaningfully submitted to generalization and popularization – to “haute vulgarisation” to use the French expression. These books probably represent the most controversial and least enduring parts of his immense scholarly legacy. Since his time Buddhist studies have indeed made very considerable progress, and the instruments of intellectual analysis with which the study of Buddhism can now be undertaken have evolved very significantly. It should now be possible to present Buddhism as less exotic, arcane or impenetrable than it may have seemed some 75 or 100 years ago when La Vallée Poussin was writing his books intended for an educated general public.

La Vallée Poussin’s style of writing was supple and subtle, often humourous, sometimes glancing and even playful. It was marked not so much by figures of style as it was, so to say, by figures of thinking. His expository manner was doubtless determined by the complexity – historical, philological, religious and philosophical – of the subjects on which he was writing. When necessary, he was careful to offer his reader more than just one view of a difficult topic or a single solution for a complex historical or theoretical issue. This was probably why he so often juxtaposed and critically examined what he described as “opinions” on the issues he was examining. Buddhist traditions are indeed historically many-faceted and conceptually complex. They may display internal tensions, and some aporias, all of which, however, are not necessarily just logical inconsistencies or contradictions.

It has already been mentioned that, in his later translations, La Vallée Poussin often used a combination of the target language (usually French) and the source language (mainly Sanskrit, but sometimes also Tibetan and Chinese). In his books written for a non-specialized public, however, he generally chose to employ European translation-equivalents. The rationale for this choice is of course understandable and defensible; but it could not fail to raise the difficult – and still not entirely resolved – question of how best to translate the technical vocabulary of Buddhism. The attempt to use “plain” European renderings in order to avoid “translationese” may embroil one in the inextricable semantic and expository thickets of approximation and paraphrase, and in the infidelity resulting from this. Here there lurks a dilemma which La Vallée Poussin, notwithstanding all his great mastery of the subject and his balanced judgement, was not always able entirely to overcome.

Specialized Later Articles and Monographs

Among La Vallée Poussin's articles and monographs – usually written in French but on occasion also in English – destined chiefly for a specialized audience, and therefore more technical in expression than his books just named, mention should first be made of his series of shorter “Notes bouddhiques”, papers in which he investigated a large variety of topics and which were published initially in the journal *Le Muséon* and later in the *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres* of the Royal Belgian Academy of Sciences.

There followed a five-part series of major articles entitled “Documents d'Abhidharma” and published in the *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient* in 1930 and in the *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* between 1932 and 1937. The articles on Abhidharma complemented La Vallée Poussin's translation of Vasubandhu's *Kośa* and addressed individual topics in this system of Buddhist thought on the basis of source texts in Sanskrit and Chinese. A major article of his on Vijñānavāda was the “Note sur l'*ālaya-vijñāna*” published in the third volume of the *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* (1934–1935). Special mention should be made too of his ground-breaking monograph published one year earlier in the same journal entitled “Réflexions sur le Madhyamaka” (1932–1933). Nāgārjuna and the Madhyamaka had always been of special interest to him; and this article was one of the earliest western attempts to present early Madhyamaka (what he called “Nāgārjunism”) thought historically and philosophically. To it he appended an article on the important sixth-century Mādhyamika master Bhā(va)viveka, a leading commentator on Nāgārjuna.

Towards the very end of his life, in the *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* for 1937, La Vallée Poussin published a pair of noteworthy articles: “Le bouddhisme et le yoga de Patañjali” and “Musīla et Nārada: Le chemin du Nirvāṇa”. In the first he considered *yoga* as something fundamental in Indian religion, and in Buddhism in particular, a theme he had already explored several times in earlier writings. He there examined links between Buddhist Abhidharma and Vyāsa (the author to whom the basic commentary on the *Yogasūtras* is attributed) and Patañjali (to whom the *Yogasūtras* themselves are ascribed). For La Vallée Poussin, this *yoga* was originally neither philosophy nor religion strictly speaking; rather, it was a discipline or “asceticism”, a regimen or “diet”. It was not confined to the Yogadarśana taught in the *Pātañjala-Yogasūtras*, nor of course limited to the bodily gymnastics and postural exercises so popular nowadays under the name of Haṭhayoga. He also considered that Buddhism was originally not a “gnosis” at all; according to him, it was characterized by what he termed “ecstasy” (*dhyāna*) and by contemplation (“recueillement”, *samāpatti*). (What he called “ecstasy”, i.e. “ek-stasis, might perhaps be better termed “enstasis”.) In the second of this pair of articles, he drew attention to

two religious and psychological types identifiable in Buddhist tradition, namely the person who cognizes reality relying on discriminative or analytical knowledge (*prajñā*), and the person who would instead contact it “in the body”, that is, directly and immediately. (It is to be recalled that, in Buddhism, “contact” or “touch” – Skt. *sprś-*, Tib. *reg pa* – can, in certain contexts, denote direct and conceptually unmediated cognition, being thus connected with the idea expressed by Skt. *sākṣātkr-* “realize”; *kāyasākṣin/kāyasakṣhin* is the name of a type of person on the Path of liberation). This matter raised the important question of “mysticism” in Buddhism.

One of his very last articles, “Buddhica”, published in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 3 (1938), was the outcome of exchanges and interchanges of views between himself and Stcherbatsky (and their younger colleague S. Schayer). In the course of this discussion, La Vallée Poussin appeared to alter his position on Madhyamaka when he declared (p. 148):

“J’ai longtemps cru (divers articles de l’*Encyclopédie* de Hastings, *Nirvāṇa, Dogme et philosophie*) que le Madhyamaka était ‘nihiliste’, niait l’Absolu, la chose en soi. [...] Dans un mémoire ‘Madhyamaka’ (*Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, 2), je glisse vers une solution moins catégorique. Enfin, dans la présente note, je me dispose à admettre que le Madhyamaka reconnaît l’Absolu.” [I long believed (in diverse articles in Hastings’ *Encyclopaedia of religion*, and in the books *Nirvāṇa, Dogme et philosophie*) that Madhyamaka was “nihilistic”, denied the Absolute, the thing in itself. (...) In my monograph “Madhyamaka” (in *MCB* 2), I slide towards a less categorical solution. Lastly, in the present note, I am disposed to accept that Madhyamaka does accept the Absolute.]

Yet it is noteworthy that, in his “Notice sur Louis de la Vallée Poussin” published in the *Annuaire pour 1965* of the Royal Belgian Academy, his disciple É. Lamotte regarded this last view as not truly representative of La Vallée Poussin’s final and mature understanding of the matter, explaining (p. 162):

“Ce dernier [La Vallée Poussin], lassé d’être mal lu et mal compris,⁷ et déjà

⁷ In his bibliographical note in the *Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres* of the Royal Belgian Academy for the year 1929 welcoming the appearance of the *Bibliographie bouddhique*, La Vallée Poussin deplored the frightening discord and mutual ignorance prevalent among scholars of Buddhism (p. 366: Quiconque connaît l’effrayante discordance et la réciproque ignorance de savants qui fouillent, dans tous les pays et dans toutes les langues, les innombrables champs du Bouddhisme ... [Whoever knows the frightening discord and the mutual ignorance between scholars researching, in all countries and all languages, the fields of Buddhism (...)]

miné par la maladie, sembla faire machine arrière [...]. Mais je persiste à croire que ses 'Réflexions sur le Madhyamaka' [...] demeurent l'interprétation la plus exacte de la pensée nâgârjunienne." [The latter (La Vallée Poussin), tired of being misread and misunderstood, and already undermined by illness, seemed to reverse himself. (...) I persist in thinking that his "Reflections on Madhyamaka" remain the most exact interpretation of Nâgârjuna's thinking.]⁸

This debate would seem to have hinged, in part at least, on differences in the use of European expressions such as "Absolute" and "nihilism", with La Vallée Poussin seemingly equating the Absolute and the "thing in itself" (la chose en soi, das Ding an sich).⁹ In other words, the discussion appears to turn as much around European expressions selected to describe or define concepts and terms in Madhyamaka thought as around the uses and definitions of the original terms and ideas in the Sanskrit and other sources. Attention could consequently stray from the fundamentals (which these scholars indeed knew so well), namely the fact that Madhyamaka is a "philosophy of the Middle" that steadfastly refuses to hypostatize a "Reality" called "Middle", be it positive or negative, and proceeds by means of a deconstructive analysis of all concepts to which a *svabhāva* "self-existence" might be imputed, without ever positing a reified "Absolute" on the level of *paramārtha*. These sometimes heated scholarly debates were left unresolved with the deaths first of La Vallée Poussin (shortly before the outbreak of the second World War) and then of Stcherbatsky (soon after the beginning of that war).

As already observed above, La Vallée Poussin's understanding of Buddhism was very naturally influenced by ideas and currents of thought prevalent in his times and intellectual milieu. His publications intended for a non-specialist readership reflect these interests and concerns. And, very naturally again, La Vallée Poussin's more specialized publications reflect the state in his time of academic Indian and Buddhist studies. Even

⁸ Compare the (alas very brief) remarks made by J.W. de Jong, "Emptiness", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1972), p. 2 ff.; and *A brief history of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America* (as in n. 1), p. 44. The discussion between La Vallée Poussin and Stcherbatsky on the nature of *nirvāṇa* was addressed by G. Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and its Western interpreters* (Chicago, 1968); regarding Welbon's treatment de Jong observed (p. 9): "The usefulness of this book is diminished by the fact that the author was not sufficiently equipped for this difficult task".

⁹ Kantian terminology was often adopted by Stcherbatsky in his translations and expositions of Buddhist thought. This issue has been discussed by J. May, "Kant et le Mādhyamika", *Indo-Iranian Journal* 2 (1959), pp. 102–111; cf. D. Chattopadhyaya's introduction to H. C. Gupta (ed.), *Papers of Th. Stcherbatsky* (Calcutta, 1969), pp. i and xxiv.

though Buddhist studies have made very significant progress since his time, this state of affairs has probably not been entirely outgrown even today. Buddhists and professionals of academic Buddhist studies are increasingly engaged in attempted dialogue with other religious and philosophical traditions. But they find themselves confronted overwhelmingly with preoccupations prevailing in the institutions, academic or otherwise, with which they are connected – especially since, in the academy, Buddhist studies are now being increasingly located in university departments of Theology or Divinity.¹⁰ Questionable presuppositions and pre-judgements abound; and very often academic fashion is too much in evidence. The outcome is often little short of a dialogue of the deaf because the theoretical and terminological groundwork was not well laid for true interchange.

Engaging with Perennial Issues in the History of Buddhist Thought

Let us consider very briefly some of the difficulties and problems to be encountered in the study and exposition of Buddhism with which La Vallée Poussin had to grapple.

If a European rendering of a Buddhist technical term or concept is taken as the starting point – e.g. “pain” for *duḥkha*, “faith” for *śraddhā*, “self” for *ātman* and “selfless” for *anātman*, “seed of buddhahood” for *tathāgatagarbha*, “Void(ness)” (“le Vide, la Vacuité”) for *śūnyatā*, and so on – discussion may very soon, and almost inescapably, become caught up in a number of semantic thickets and in aporias that are conceptual as well as logical. Even the precise and contextually meaningful rendering of the word *dharma* can raise immense difficulties: its meanings, and hence its possible renderings, range from “religion” through “doctrine” to “phenomenon”.

A stumbling-block – and a true *skándalon* – has been the vexed question as to whether Buddhism is a religion or a philosophy. Nowadays the issue of theism vs. atheism/

¹⁰ University Departments of Religious Studies will, of course, differ appreciably depending upon their academic origin and inspiration, their location, and their membership. Some will be more aware of, and more sensitive to, the specific and the “emic” in Buddhism, while others, maybe less aware and sensitive to this and intent more on the comparative and the “etic”, may be prone to believing that all that might be classified as “religion” is reducible to common methodologies, templates, and analytical categories. This last attitude may then become an insuperable barrier for, and indeed the bane of, any intended dialogue, and for the effective academic study of Buddhism.

non-theism may be viewed rather differently from the way it was in La Vallée Poussin's time: simply to label Buddhism "atheistic" or even "non-theistic" is known to provide little in the way of clarifications or solutions and, instead, to raise still further questions.¹¹ There has existed a long discussion as to whether Buddhism is a religion, a philosophy, ethics, a "gnosis", or something else, such as an "ascesis", "regimen" or "diet" (as thought by La Vallée Poussin). Its followers would no doubt say that Buddhism joins ethical and spiritual practice (*caryā*, praxis) and theory (*darśana*, theōria).

An example of the kind of problem being considered was and remains, then, the old question whether Buddhism – which is non-theistic (and sometimes atheistic) in terms at least of the monotheistic conception of religion in the Abrahamic traditions – can be regarded at all as a religion. The upshot of this uncertainty is that certain current definitions of religion might be in need of reconsideration and reconfiguration – an endeavour that, of course, cannot but be useful when appropriately executed. The danger ever remains, however, that Buddhism will find itself being forced under the steam-roller of preconceptions, pre-judgements and prejudices that may be current among scholars of Theology and Divinity, and even some unwary scholars of "world religions", but which fit Buddhism very poorly if at all. In recognition of this danger, an alternative to seeing Buddhism as a religion has been to regard it as being some form of ancient philosophical thinking (which it was), or as ethics (which it also is). But this change of viewpoint hardly extricates us from our difficulties of description and definition: the word "philosophy" has come to acquire in English usage so specific a set of meanings among professionals of the subject that the term may hardly fit Buddhism as a historical entity. And substituting "faith" for "religion" is of little help in the matter. With some reason, La Vallée Poussin often preferred to see Buddhism as what he called a "discipline" (something which it clearly and incontestably also is). But even his view that it is an "ascesis", "regimen" or "diet" does not altogether dispose of the problems encountered when describing and defining it.

¹¹ It is noteworthy that the original German version of H. von Glasenapp's book *Buddhismus, eine atheistische Religion* (1966) was issued in English translation under the title of *Buddhism, a non-theistic religion*. But this change of term does not truly resolve the difficulty that besets speaking of theism in the context of Buddhism: Buddhism was both "theistic" in a special sense (namely that of admitting divinities, celestials and numina at a certain level) and "non-theistic" (in the sense of not recognizing a Supreme Creator God or a God providentially determining men's destinies). The Śākyamuni Buddha is famous for having disclaimed the status of a god.

Related to this question are the function in Buddhism of *śraddhā*, usually rendered “faith”, and the relation in it between reasoning (*yukti*) and tradition or scripture (*āgama*). In Buddhism, the last two factors have usually been regarded as complementary rather than as opposed.

A further issue raised from time to time with regard to Buddhism has been that of shamanism. Linking Buddhism – the way of the Buddhist *Samāṇa*/*Śramaṇa* or ascetic monk – and shamanism was suggested, at least in part, by the assonance between the two words. But shamanism is itself in need of precise definition before the concept can acquire heuristic and explanatory power in the context of defining Buddhism – the more so since, as a technique, it has been considered to be “ek-static” whereas Buddhist meditational practices can be better described as “en-static”.

Another topic that was much debated in La Vallée Poussin’s time – especially by older scholars as different as É. Senart and H. Kern – was whether the Buddha Śākyamuni was a historical personage or a mythic being (perhaps a solar hero or divinity). And those writers who accepted that the Śākyamuni was a real historical personage often involved themselves in the rather tricky exercise of demythologizing his figure as it appears in the Buddha Legend of the sources – stripping it of what they held, more or less subjectively, to be fabulous and mythical features with the intention of revealing the true historical Śākyamuni. This method – which La Vallée Poussin called the method of subtraction (a sort of “onion peeling” where little of substance may remain at the end of the exercise) – could hardly yield satisfactory results, historical or otherwise.¹² The fact was perhaps lost sight of that, in Buddhism, the word *buddha* (meaning “awakened”) has been used to designate both a historical *individual* recognized by Buddhist tradition – namely Gautama/Gotama, the sage of the Śākya people (Śākya-muni), who lived in northern India several centuries before the start of the Christian era and was associated with historical places which became sacred geographical centres of Buddhist pilgrimage – and the spiritual *type* of the “Awakened One” defined by the

¹² The views of several scholars on this matter have been summarized by J.W. de Jong, *A brief history of Buddhist studies in Europe and America* (as in n. 1), pp. 28–31. The question was discussed in more detail by É. Lamotte, “La légende du Buddha”, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 134 (1947/8), pp. 37–71. There three possible kinds of interpretation of the “legend” are distinguished: the mythic (including those of Senart and Kern), the euhemerist and rationalist (represented in particular by H. Oldenberg), and the pragmatic. La Vallée Poussin at the end of his career is placed by Lamotte (p. 41) in the second group, with M. Winternitz; but he adds that his teacher had earlier expressed reservations on the subject.

attainment of *nirvāṇa* or (*sam*)*bodhi* “Awakening”. An interplay took place between what is archetypal and what is historical.

It is worth recalling, by the way, that, in Buddhist thought, the question whether a *tathāgata* exists after death is counted as an “undetermined matter” (*avyākṛtavastu*) about which any proposition, unless very carefully framed in soteriologically and semantically precise terms and under appropriate ontic presuppositions, is bound to be indeterminable and hence unanswerable. In his writings, La Vallée Poussin fully recognized the complexity of the Buddha figure in Buddhist traditions.

Other topics that were in his time attracting attention in relation to the Buddha and his teaching were magic, thaumaturgy and theurgy, concepts which La Vallée Poussin also evoked from time to time.

A very significant concept that was (and sometimes still is) a topic for discussion is so-called Buddhist pessimism. There has existed a protracted discussion as to whether Buddhism is “world affirming” and positive in its outlook or “world negating” and pessimistic, the latter description having been a not uncommon (mis)representation of it. This was due in large part to the fact that the first of the four Noble Verities (*āryasatya*) of Buddhism is *duḥkha*, a factor conventionally translatable (as mentioned above) by “suffering” or “pain” (the rendering “unsatisfactoriness” has attempted to circumvent the problem). But this understanding has tended to lose sight of the fact that, in Buddhist thought, this “pain” is a complex factor that, in addition to what is scholastically termed the “painfulness of pain” (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*), includes the “painfulness of change (or decay)” (*vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā*) and the “painfulness of causal conditioning” (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*). Following a well-attested formulation, the presence of the chain of twelve constituent factors (*aṅga*) of (internal) conditioned origination in dependence (*ādhātṃmika-pratītyasamutpāda*) – beginning with ignorance (*avidyā* “nescience”), the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) and consciousness (*viññāna*) and ending with old age, death and sorrow – is what makes for the origin of the entire aggregate of *duḥkha* (*duḥkhaskandhasya samudayaḥ*); and, conversely, it is the stoppage (*nirodha*) of this mechanism that makes for the stoppage of the entire aggregate of *duḥkha*. Buddhism and Buddhists cannot, then, be represented simplistically as being “world negating” rather than “world affirming”: both characterizations can be misleading and are in fact well-nigh meaningless as descriptions of Buddhism. Because it regards well-being and happiness (*hita-sukha*) as worthy and noble ends, Buddhism could probably be described as eudaimonist, even though it considers all conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) things to be transitory and hence potentially subject to *duḥkha*.

In philosophy, both the apagogic (i.e. the negative *prasaṅga*-type) critical reasoning of the Mādhyamikas and the more positivist epistemology-cum-logic (*pramāṇavidyā*) of the Buddhist epistemologists are becoming better understood in their history, methods and aims. And the place in Buddhist thought of an apophatic approach beside a positive or cataphatic one is now better known. Not unconnected with the issue of the apophatic and the cataphatic is the problem of the interrelation between “negative” Buddhist theories of Emptiness of self-existence (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*, *rañ stoṇ*) and the “positive” Buddhist concepts of Buddha-nature (*tathāgatarbha*) and “Emptiness of the heterogeneous” (*gṛān stoṇ*). Were these two theories radically incompatible and contradictory, or were they perhaps complementary (and possibly convergent), at least in certain stages in the history of Buddhist thought? La Vallée Poussin never examined the last point in any detail, but he did not fail to allude on occasion to the *tathāgatarbha* doctrine.

Legitimate questions as to what a Buddhist concept or term signified historically, and what it may imply or connote systemically and in context, have become entangled in the processes of labelling and pigeon-holing, when a European rendering or paraphrase has been allowed to define a Buddhist concept or term and thus to colour or even distort its interpretation. An interesting example has been the question – to which La Vallée Poussin returned repeatedly – whether *nirvāṇa* represents nihilistic nothingness (“le néant” as opposed to “l’être” or “l’existant”) or a positive, and perhaps “mystical”, state of deathlessness. A debate took place between him and Stcherbatsky as to whether what La Vallée Poussin called Nāgārjunism was nihilistic or absolutist and monistic (see above, p. 11). Either way, however, such an interpretation risks falling into one of the doctrinal extremes (*anta*) of view (*drṣṭi*) explicitly repudiated by Buddhists, and by Mādhyamikas in particular, such as the twin extremes of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*) and annihilationism (*ucchedānta*), or those of reifying *nirvāṇa* as a hypostatized absolute to be posited as either a positive entity (*bhāva*) or a negative one (*abhāva*), a conceptual and linguistic opposition that was in fact analysed and deconstructed by Nāgārjuna himself.

Further examples of this kind of situation are provided by discussions as to whether Buddhists (and the Buddha himself) were being agnostic or perhaps just pragmatic when admitting a number of undetermined matters (*avyākṛtavastu*), and also by the problem of the cognitive (and perhaps performative) significance of “Noble silence” (*ārya-tūṣṇībhāva*). To postulate here only pragmatism or agnosticism – or perhaps indifferentism – is very likely to be a step too far. Moreover, was *śraddhā* “faith” – not to speak of *bhakti* “devotion” – ever a true substitute for reasoning (*yukti*) in Bud-

dhism? These are questions that cannot be decontextualized or simplified reductionistically.

Discussions of the old canonical description of *nirvāṇa* as an immortal, or deathless, realm (*amataadhātu*, *amṛtadhātu*) – together with certain other Buddhist concepts such as a *viññāṇa/vijñāna* (translatable as “consciousness”) having the status of a sixth *dhātu* and the *prabhāsvara citta* “luminous mind” – were to lead to some scholars seeking what came to be called “Precanonical Buddhism”. La Vallée Poussin’s researches may have helped to prepare the way for this discussion, which reached its climax in the 1930s. But he always pointed to the great diversity of what he called the “philosophemes” or “philosophoumena” found in the Buddhist canons; and he did not himself postulate and attempt to reconstruct a Buddhism that was “precanonical”. He realized the immense methodological difficulties, historical and philological, in the way of doing so on the basis of reconstructions, which are necessarily founded on canonical textual materials that are appreciably later than the postulated “precanonical” stage.¹³

¹³ The hypothesis of a “precanonical” – sometimes also called “pre-Hīnayāna” or even “pristine” (“primitif”) – Buddhism was summed up in C. Regamey, “Le problème du bouddhisme primitif et les derniers travaux de Stanisław Schayer”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 21 (1957), pp. 37–58. Regamey emphasized (p. 49) that it is not concordance between canonical texts and their doctrines that guarantees the precanonical status of a given concept or doctrine (which might indeed be the result of innovation common to the Buddhist schools and their canons) but, rather, the basically “aberrant”, or exceptional, character of a concept or doctrine. Schayer also searched for “pre-āryan” elements in Buddhism; see his “Pre-Aryan elements in Indian Buddhism”, *Bulletin international de l’Académie polonaise des Sciences et des Lettres* 1–3 (1934), pp. 55–65. This article was soon followed by his “Pre-canonical Buddhism”, *Archiv Orientalni*, 7 (1935), pp. 121–132, and then by his “New contributions to the problem of pre-Hīnayānist Buddhism”, *Polski Biuletyn Orientalistyczny* 1 (1937), pp. 8–17. Mention can also be made of his note “Is *tathāgata* an Āryan word?” in “Notes and queries on Buddhism”, *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 11 (1936), pp. 211–213. (These papers by Schayer have been reprinted in M. Mejer [ed.], *On philosophizing of the Hindus: Selected papers* [of S. Schayer], Warsaw, 1988.) (In more recent years discussions of “Precanonical Buddhism” have been largely replaced by research into what is now termed “Early Buddhism”.) What might be described as the “methodology of the vestigial” and the search for linguistic or cultural substrates doubtless raise interesting problems. But textual Higher Criticism has in-built limitations which have not always been recognized clearly enough; and in the quest for eventual precanonical “dialectical” deviations from a common canonical stock, and for presumed non-āryan or precanonical elements in our canonical documentation, methodology in the history of Buddhism cannot easily follow in the wake of Indo-European studies with their reconstructed Proto-Indo-European

Once dressed in (etic) garb borrowed from the repertoire of western concepts, premises and terminology, Buddhist thought can hardly do otherwise than fall prey to unresolvable conceptual and logical aporias. And this outcome will inevitably become grist for the mill of sceptical aporetics. For the student of Buddhist thought, however, the avenue must always remain open for gathering and attentively examining the uses and definitions of (emic) terms and concepts attested in the Buddhist texts. And when a European term needs to be employed as a translation-equivalent, it must, once selected, be used and defined no longer in accordance with some meaning listed in a dictionary of English, French, German, etc., but in conformity with the usage(s) of the original Buddhist sources. That is, the translation-equivalent will itself become a technical expression, a “term of the art”; and the criteria for defining and explaining it are, then, its uses and definitions as attested in original Buddhist texts.

Thus, in any attempt to explain, e.g., *nirvāṇa* in terms defined by exogenous presuppositions and pre-judgements there may lurk the insidious danger of seeking to interpret an *explanandum* by means of an *explanans* without true pertinence in the context, and hence of stretching the (emic) *explanandum* out on the proverbial Procrustean bed of ready-made and ill-fitting (etic) concepts and paraphrase. Understanding of what has been said in the sources can then only be choked off. And this blockage will constitute an insuperable obstacle in the way of the understanding of Buddhism – one that remains with us even today in so far as representations of Buddhism and the Buddha still to be met with have been framed in what are, in terms of the Buddhist traditions, interpretations that are so inappropriate as to be well-nigh meaningless. Such reductionism falls little short of a more or less unwitting cultural colonialism far removed from genuine historical-philological analysis and understanding.

* * *

Such were the problems and complexities with which La Vallée Poussin had to engage in the course of his scholarly investigations. He sought to reveal the many-sidedness of his subject not only as a historical entity called Buddhism but also as something represented, individually or collectively, by persons called Buddhists. He wrote extensively and discerningly on Buddhist teachings, on what he termed their “philosophemes” or “philosophoumena”, on Buddhist concepts and their interpretations, and on what he

Ursprache together with its postulated dialects, or of the search for “non-āryan” linguistic substrates in Old and Middle Indo-Aryan.

called the opinions of those who undertook to speculate on them, all the while noting the diversity – and indeed the weaknesses or contradictoriness – of certain of these “opinions”. His own interpretations he sought to keep balanced. He was well aware of the fact that continuing study would reveal ever renewed, improved or corrected perspectives, and that a given stage in research cannot necessarily be regarded as the last word but forms part of work in progress. On occasion, his approach might possibly be described as a kind of scholarly agnosticism.¹⁴ His treatment of many a complex issue could also be seen as a kind of scholarly maieutics. Alternatively, it might even be per-

¹⁴ In his “Notice”, p. 165, Lamotte has mentioned his subject’s having been reproached for his “latent irony” and “agnosticism”. In the same place he wrote of La Vallée Poussin’s “doubt”, describing this as not only methodical but congenital. Lamotte cited certain criticisms (pp. 164–165):

“D’aucuns crièrent au scandale: ‘Pourquoi, demandaient-ils, un tome entier pour dire qu’il n’y a rien à dire? Il y a dans ce défilé d’opinions discordantes une ironie latente et une leçon pratique d’agnosticisme dont le présent n’a en vérité guère besoin.’” [Some cried: “Scandal! Why, they asked, a whole volume to say that there is nothing to say? In this parade of discordant opinions there is found a latent irony and a practical lesson of agnosticism that are in truth hardly needed at the present time.”]

Lamotte also cited his subject’s self-description as a “secrétaire-rapporteur” (quoted in n. 2 above). In his “Nécrologie”, p. 483, Lamotte gave his view of his teacher’s scholarly career, writing:

“Le travail philologique à doses massives [...] avait développé chez lui jusqu’à l’hypertrophie le sens critique. Ceux qui lui ont reproché d’avoir étudié le Bouddhisme avec plus de curiosité que de sympathie n’ont pas vu que cette attitude doit être attribuée à son esprit critique bien plus qu’à ses croyances.” [Philological work in massive doses (...) had developed in him a critical spirit to the point of hypertrophy. Those who have reproached him for studying Buddhism with more curiosity than sympathy did not perceive that this attitude is to be ascribed to his critical turn of mind much more than to his beliefs.]

Mgr. Lamotte, himself an ecclesiastic and a professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, thus minimized the possibility that La Vallée Poussin’s Catholic faith had unduly influenced him. This was not to deny the influence on him of his intellectual milieu, which was both European and Christian, and Catholic in particular. From time to time La Vallée Poussin delivered lectures at a Catholic institution or contributed to a Catholic publication. Those of his books destined for a general readership mostly appeared in the series “Etudes sur l’Histoire des religions” published by Gabriel Beauchesne, a firm which also published volumes by Catholic writers. In his “Notice”, p. 151, Lamotte deplored the fact that, after La Vallée Poussin’s early departure from his professorship in Ghent, no place was found for him as a professor at the Catholic University of Louvain.

ceived as a kind of indeterminism – one possibly recalling, for the indologist, Jaina aspectualism (*nayavāda*) – which was in truth neither unphilosophical nor mere indifference. Still, as already observed and notwithstanding his best efforts, views that La Vallée Poussin expressed could on occasion hardly escape becoming entwined in problems of conceptualization, description, terminology and interlingual translation. These largely concerned matters that were the focus of attention and debate in his time and milieu. Many of them still have to be engaged with by the student of Buddhism today.¹⁵ But even if one or the other of his views might seem overtaken by more recent work in Buddhist studies, his writings, and his translations in particular, possess an enduring value that attests to the breadth of his explorations in Indian and Buddhist history, religion and philosophy.

Relevance of the Present Publication


Louis de La Vallée Poussin deserves to be remembered and consulted as a historian of India and one of the foremost modern scholars of Buddhism, as a student of fundamental Buddhist works in Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan and Chinese, as the editor, translator, annotator and interpreter of major treatises belonging to three of the main schools of Buddhist philosophy in India, and as an author who made an effort to reach an educated, but non-specialist, readership by setting out the main themes in Buddhist thought in a way that, he hoped, would be intelligible and meaningful for this public. Interpretative templates – *grilles de lecture* – as well as presuppositions imposed on (so-called) “foreign/alien” documents have not always been appropriate for their full and correct understanding. Yet, whatever might be the limitations of some expression, concept or category that La Vallée Poussin called upon, his contributions deal with perennial issues, humanistic and scholarly, which continue to be very much alive at the present time. His contribution to the study of Buddhism can be said to have set a standard that

¹⁵ Much energy and ingenuity are nowadays expended on seeking to determine whether, for example, a given religion or system of thought is free-thinkingly “innovative” and “progressive”, or whether it is on the contrary unchanging and “conservative”. Tradition and innovation are thus presupposed to be antithetical and mutually exclusive things. In order to remain viable, however, a living tradition surely needs to embrace both: in time change is inevitable even in tradition. The issue will then be to discover how a tradition is historically able to maintain an identity through change in time and also in geographical (and inter-cultural) space. This is true in particular for a world religion like Buddhism with a long history in several parts of the world.

has not been surpassed. This is reason enough to make his writings readily available once again, this time in an English version.

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INTRODUCTION TO *THE CHENG WEISHI LUN*

by

BHIKKHU KL DHAMMAJOTI

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1. *Composition of the Cheng Weishi Lun: its background and features*

The *Cheng Weishi Lun* (= CWSL; T no. 1585), purporting to be a composite commentary on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, is a translation-compilation by Xuanzang 玄奘 (600–664 CE) with the assistance of his pupil Kuiji 窥基 (632–682 CE). Xuanzang's main mission in this endeavour appears to be twofold: (i) the establishment and elucidation of the thesis of *vijñaptimātra*, and this predominantly on the basis of Dharmapāla–Śīlabhadra's expositions (see section 3); (ii) the harmonization of the hitherto Yogācāra doctrinal interpretations, and in so doing also the definitive establishment of the superiority of the Mahāyāna *bodhisattva* ideal (see discussion below).

Towards the end of CWSL, we are told that “this treatise demonstrates *vijñaptimātratā* in three parts. Therefore it is named ‘Treatise on the Demonstration of *Vijñaptimātratā*’ (成唯識論; *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*). It is also named ‘Puri-

fier of *Vijñaptimātratā*’ (淨唯識; **Vijñaptimātratā-viśodhakā* 毘若底摩呾刺多毘輪度迦),¹ as it shows the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* most clearly”.²

On the “three parts” constituting the structure of this treatise, Kuiji mentions three views:³

1. The first twenty-four stanzas expound the characteristics of the consciousnesses (*paratantra*). The twenty-fifth stanza expounds the nature of *vijñaptimātratā* (*pariniṣpanna*). The last five stanzas expound the stages of progress of *vijñaptimātratā* (the thirteen *sthiti* — viz., the thirteen stages of a *bodhisattva* progressing from the cause-stage to the stage of perfect buddha-hood. These are subsumed under five stages).
2. The first one and a half stanzas briefly show that no *ātman* or *dharma* exists outside of thought. This is to underscore the purpose of the treatise and explain what *vijñaptimātratā* entails. The next twenty-three and a half stanzas expound in detail the characteristics and nature of *vijñaptimātratā*, and answer various objections. The last five stanzas expound the stages of progress of *vijñaptimātratā*.
3. There is no specific description of this threefold division. But they may be taken as follows: The first twenty-five stanzas expound the objects of *vijñaptimātratā*. The next four stanzas expound the path of practice of *vijñaptimātratā*. The last stanza expounds the fruit of *vijñaptimātratā*.

CWSL may be said to be one of the most precious gems in the whole of the Chinese *Tripitaka*. In the preface to his *Shuji*, Kuiji eulogizes CWSL thus:

This treatise purifies true cognition (真識). Its expositions include the provisional as well as the ultimate teachings, going far beyond the early teachings of the historical Buddha. Its doctrines penetrate into the subtlest. They catch hold of the *Prajñāpāramitā* tenets and ride on their colourful brilliance. The treatise summarizes the essential teachings of the *sūtra*-s, seeking out their hidden teachings and assimilating their purposes. It further incorporates the best of all the *śāstra*-s, gathering up the most wonderful. With its powerful tools of Buddhist logics, the heretics and the Hīnayāna come to be defeated.⁴

Kuiji was individually tutored by Xuanzang on the doctrines in CWSL, as a result of which he produced four important sub-commentaries:

1. *Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji* (成唯識論述記; T no. 1830);

2. *Cheng Weishi Lun Shuyao* (成唯識論樞要; T no. 1831);
3. *Cheng Weishi Lun Biechao* (成唯識論別抄; X 43, no. 808)
4. *Cheng Weishi Lun Liaojian* (成唯識論料簡).

Of particular importance is his *Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji* (= *Shuji*) in 20 fascicles; it is in this text that the particular Indian masters or schools of thought holding a particular view mentioned in CWSL are specifically identified. His *Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji* and *Cheng Weishi Lun Shuyao*, together with the *Cheng Weishi Lun Liaoyi Deng* (成唯識論了義燈; T no. 1832) by Huizhao 慧沼 (650–714 CE), who was a pupil of Kuiji, but had also studied with Xuanzang, came to be regarded as the three fundamental sub-commentaries on CWSL. Since the time of its compilation, CWSL has been widely studied and highly regarded in China and Japan as one of the most authoritative Yogācāra texts.

After Xuanzang's return from his pilgrimage to India (629–645 CE), he spent some 19 years translating a total of 75 Buddhist texts in more than 1,330 fascicles (卷). In the first six years of his translation career, the most important achievement was the translation of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* (= YBŚ; T no. 1579) into 100 fascicles. The Chinese tradition, in fact, tells us that it was owing to the inspiration he had derived from the *Seventeen-stage Treatise* (十七地論) translated by Paramārtha that he became motivated to study YBŚ in India. But this translation actually covers only what corresponds to the first two stages (*bhūmi*-s) of the complete YBŚ. However, from this small portion alone, it is difficult to see how Xuanzang could have arrived at an understanding of the magnanimous nature and profound doctrinal importance of YBŚ. Thus, what probably truly motivated his resolve to study the YBŚ was his meeting with Prabhāmitra 波頗密多羅, a scholarly monk from Nālandā,⁵ who came to China in 626 CE. It appeared that Xuanzang was much impressed by him. From him, he heard about the glory of Nālandā and about the great Buddhist master Śīlabhadra 戒賢 (529–645 CE) who was lecturing on the YBŚ. He also must have learnt from this Prabhāmitra that the complete YBŚ was encyclopedic, encompassing the whole of Buddhist teachings. He hoped that on the basis of this text he would be able to find answers to his various doubts and questions regarding the diverse and often contradictory views of the various Chinese Buddhist schools to which he had been exposed. This motivated his travel to India. We could therefore say that he went to India mainly in search of YBŚ which he studied several times under Śīlabhadra.

After his return, Xuanzang's concern was to "rectify the errors of the past" (糾正舊失) and to "complement what had been overlooked and omitted" (補充疏漏). Against this background, we can also understand why in the first period of his translation career, his translation work seemed to have been influenced by his doctrinal affiliation with YBŚ. Against this backdrop, it is noteworthy for us to know that he began translating CWSL immediately after completing the translation of YBŚ in 648, which seems to suggest that he probably intended to present a summary conclusion of the Yogācāra doctrines with this treatise.

As for the doctrinal basis of CWSL, Kuiji, in his *Shuji*, enumerates six *sūtra*-s and eleven *śāstra*-s, in the following order.⁶ The six *sūtra*-s are:

1. *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* (華嚴經; T no. 278, no. 279, no. 293);
2. *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* (解深密經; T no. 675, no. 676, no. 677, no. 678);
3. **Tathāgatotpāda-puṇyālaṃkāra-sūtra* (? 如來出現功德莊嚴經; not translated into Chinese);
4. *[Mahāyāna]-abhidharma-sūtra* (大乘阿毘達磨經; not translated into Chinese);
5. *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (楞伽經; T no. 670, no. 671, no. 672);
6. *Ghanavyūha-sūtra* (厚嚴經; not translated into Chinese).

Of these, the third and fourth are extant neither in Chinese nor in Tibetan translation, although some content of the fourth can be known through a few Sanskrit fragments. Now even though only six *sūtra*-s are listed here, in actual fact, several other *sūtra*-s are also cited in CWSL, including the *Buddha-bhūmi-sūtra*, *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra* and *Śrīmālā-siṃhanāda-sūtra*.

The eleven *śāstra*-s are:

1. *Yogācārabhūmi* (瑜伽 = 瑜伽師地論; T no. 1579);
2. *Xian-yang Sheng-jiao Lun* (顯揚 = 顯揚聖教論; T no. 1602);
3. *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra* (莊嚴 = 大乘莊嚴經論; T no. 1604);
4. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (集量; not translated into Chinese);
5. **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (攝論 = 攝大乘論; T no. 1592, no. 1593, no. 1594);
6. *Daśabhūmika* (十地 = 十地經論; T no. 1522);
7. **Yogavibhāga* (分別瑜伽; not translated into Chinese);
8. *Ālambanapratyaya-parīkṣā* (觀所緣緣; T no. 1624);

9. *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* (二十唯識; T no. 1590; earlier tr.: 1588 and 1589);
10. *Madhyāntavibhāga* (辨中邊; T no. 1600; earlier tr.: 1599);
11. *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (集論 = 阿毘達磨集論; T no. 1605).

These eleven texts are also described as constituting “one fundamental with ten subsidiaries” (一本十支),⁷ the “fundamental” being the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, Huizhao enumerates a slightly different list of the “subsidiaries”.⁸

On the features of CWSL, Kuiji explains:⁹

This text is a compilation containing the ten individual commentaries [on Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*] which are herewith collected together and translated in detail in a single text. It takes into consideration [the linguistic differences of] the Chinese and Sanskrit languages. [With respect to the doctrinal issues,] it first deliberates and then expounds them according to their importance (i.e., emphasizing the more important and leaving out the improper or trivial ones, etc.). Collating and synthesizing the diverse interpretations, it results in the [present] form [as if it had been] composed by a single master.

The “ten individual commentaries” mentioned above refer to those by the following ten Indian Yogācāra masters:

1. Dharmapāla (達磨波羅 = 護法);
2. Guṇamati (婁拏末底 = 德慧);
3. Sthiramati (悉耽羅末底 = 安慧);
4. Bandhuśrī (畔徒室利 = 親勝);
5. Nanda (難陀 = 歡喜);
6. Śuddhacandra (戌陀戰達羅 = 淨月);
7. Citrabhānu (質咀羅婆拏 = 火辨);
8. Viśeṣamitra (毘世沙蜜多羅 = 勝友);
9. Jinaputra (辰那弗多羅 = 勝子);
10. Jñānacandra (若那戰達羅 = 智月).

Of these, Bandhuśrī and Citrabhānu were Vasubandhu's contemporaries. The eighth, ninth and tenth masters were Dharmapāla's pupils. Sthiramati is identified as Dharmapāla's senior contemporary, the author/compiler of *Za-ji* (雜集) (= *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*) and author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-ṭīkā Tattvārthā* “who defended the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* and refuted the

**Nyāyānusāra* master (糲雜集, 救俱舍論破正理師)". Guṇamati was Sthiramati's teacher. Nanda was the initial teacher of Jayasena (under whom Xuanzang studied for two years — see above). Śuddhacandra (and also Nanda) was Sthiramati's contemporary. Viśeṣamitra, Jinaputra and Jñānacandra were Dharmapāla's disciples.¹⁰

In another commentary on CWSL, Kuiji relates the process leading to Xuanzang's decision to make this synthetic compilation-translation: Originally, Xuanzang's intention was to translate all the ten commentaries one by one, and four of his pupils — Shenfang (神昉), Jiashang (嘉尚), Puguang (普光) and Kuiji — were assigned to different aspects of the translation project. However, a few days later, Kuiji made a counter-proposal to Xuanzang, arguing that rather than spending a long time translating all the ten commentaries whose diverse interpretations could, moreover, cause confusion for the ordinary reader, it would be better to present their various views synthetically in a single volume, ascertaining their correctness or otherwise. After pondering on the matter for some time, Xuanzang acceded to Kuiji's suggestion. He then kept Kuiji alone for the project as his main assistant, sending away the other three pupils.¹¹

The result of this project is CWSL in 10 fascicles (卷). According to Kuiji, CWSL particularly highlights the views of Dharmapāla whom he considered to be the most learned and most outstanding of all.¹² To some extent, then, in spite of its purporting to be a compilation containing the ten individual commentaries, CWSL is, in actual fact, on the whole a work centered on the views of Dharmapāla (530–561). This said, however, the views of Sthiramati, Nanda and Citrabhānu are frequently discussed, and occasionally those of Dignāga and Candrapāla are also cited. Thus, for example, on the theory of seeds, CWSL cites Candrapāla's views that all seeds are inborn and none is perfumed into existence, and on the theory of "cognitive divisions" (*bhāga*), Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* is cited by name to present its view that there are three such divisions, corresponding to the "object to be cognized" (*prameya*) which is the "image division" (*nimitta-bhāga*), the "means of cognition" (*pramāṇa*) which is the "seeing-division" (*darśana-bhāga*), and the "cognition-result" (*pramāṇa-phala*) which is the "reflexive consciousness cognitive division" (*saṃvitti-bhāga*).

2. *The question of Xuanzang's contribution to CWSL*

Kuiji's remark on the centrality of Dharmapāla's views in CWSL might have been somewhat exaggerated. However, it seems reasonable to assume that Xuanzang, via his background of training under Śīlabhadra at Nālandā, was essentially doctrinally affiliated to the positions of Dharmapāla. We know that Xuanzang studied for five years under Śīlabhadra who was considered by his contemporaries to be a direct pupil of Dharmapāla. We likewise know that Xuanzang also studied several works for two years under Jayasena (勝軍) who had been a student of both Śīlabhadra and Sthiramati.¹³ In particular, he was said to be able to clarify many important doctrinal issues of Yogācāra from Jayasena's exposition of the **Vijñaptimātratā-viniścaya* (唯識抉擇論).¹⁴ In brief, Xuanzang studied extensively under various Indian Yogācāra masters, some holding different views, but was particularly inclined towards Dharmapāla–Śīlabhadra's doctrines under the guiding principle of which he attempted to synthesize the diverse and sometimes partially contradictory views.¹⁵ And he is certainly on the whole quite successful in this endeavour. Thus, given Xuanzang's background of solid training in the Dharmapāla–Śīlabhadra tradition, his inclination towards Dharmapāla's interpretations is understandable.

However, it has been observed that CWSL's expositions are largely in agreement with those in Sthiramati's commentary extant in Sanskrit (TVB). Moreover, the four-*bhāga* theory, endorsed in CWSL and prominently ascribed to Dharmapāla, is not attested in the extant works of Dharmapāla. Accordingly, an important issue that deserves further investigation is the following: In CWSL — besides Xuanzang's masterly translation of the commentarial views of the Indian masters — to what extent is it a contribution of Xuanzang, a great Yogācārin who has a background of extensive training in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra (and Mahāyāna tenets in general)?

In what follows, I shall attempt to provide a couple of examples that I believe serve to illustrate his contribution in addition to being a skilled compiler or translator of CWSL.

2.1. *Xuanzang's at times interpretive translation of the Triṃśikā*

The background of Xuanzang's own mastery of the Yogācāra doctrines and the doctrinal influence from the Dharmapāla–Śīlabhadra tradition does apparently

sometimes result in his interpretative translation — which could of course be either a merit or a demerit — of some of the contents of the *Triṃśikā*. A case in point is his translation of the following important verse of the *Triṃśikā*:¹⁶

viññānapariṇāmo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate |

tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ viññaptimātrakam || (verse 17)

This is an important stanza in connection with the exposition of the *viññapti-mātratā* doctrine. Xuanzang translates as follows:

This development of consciousness is conceptualization and that which is conceptualized.

On that account, that (*ātman* and *dharma*-s) does not exist. Hence all that is mere-cognition.¹⁷

Thus, Xuanzang takes “*vikalpo yad vikalpyate*” as predicate to “*viññānapariṇāmaḥ*”. Accordingly, in his prose commentary, it is explained thus: “*viññānapariṇāma*” refers to the three consciousnesses that develop (*ālayaviññāna*, *manas* and the six consciousnesses) as well as their *caitta*-s. “*Vikalpa*” refers to the *darśana-bhāga* developed from consciousness, and “*vikalpyate*” refers to the *nimitta-bhāga* developed from consciousness. No real entity exists outside the two *bhāga*-s. Hence, none, whether conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) or unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), exist outside consciousness.

In contrast, Sthiramati punctuates after *vikalpa* (conceptualization), yielding the following different interpretation:

This development of consciousness is conceptualization. That which is conceptualized by it (*vikalpyate tena*) does not exist. Hence all that is mere-cognition.

Accordingly, Sthiramati's comments are different from Dhamapāla–Xuanzang's: The threefold *viññānapariṇāma* is *vikalpa*; it is the *citta-caitta*-s pertaining to the triple spheres. What is conceptualized by the threefold *vikalpa* — consisting of the store (*ālaya-viññāna*), the defiled mind (*kliṣṭa-manas*) and the six activity-consciousnesses (*pravṛtti-viññāna*) — does not exist. Thus, *viññānapariṇāma* is called *vikalpa*.¹⁸

In brief: Xuanzang's reading of the first part of the stanza leads to the stress that *viññānapariṇāma* consists in the *darśana-bhāga* (= *vikalpa*) and the *nimitta-bhāga*. On the other hand, Sthiramati's interpretation leads to the stress that

viññāna-pariñāma is *vikalpa*. However, the difference in their interpretations notwithstanding, the final conclusions derived from the two interpretations are essentially the same: External objects do not exist; all is *viññaptimātra*. (For further discussion on this stanza, see section 3 below).

This example also suggests that, in the translation and expositions in CWSL, Xuanzang probably was not simply fully basing himself on a single source of interpretations, be it Dharmapāla, Sthiramati, or any other master. While apparently much inclined towards Dharmapāla's perspectives, he must have also been guided by his own understanding and convictions.

2.2. Critical synthesis of Yogācāra doctrines, as illustrated in the exposition of the *bhāga* theory

Xuanzang's skillful presentations of the prominent views on a particular doctrinal topic, and then the criticizing or subsuming of them in such a way as to bring out the correctness or greatest desirability of Dharmapāla's view (generally presented as the last alternative view), this has clearly to be considered as a significant contribution. As an illustration of Xuanzang's critical synthesis of the Yogācāra doctrines in accordance with Dharmapāla's and Śīlabhadra's views, we shall first examine CWSL's discussion on the important *bhāga*-theory. This theory is expounded under the discussion of the third *pariñāma*, i.e., the *ālaya-viññāna*.¹⁹ It purports to establish that the seeming "subject" and "object" — manifesting as *ātman* and *dharma*-s — experienced by us when a consciousness arises is nothing but a development (*pariñāma*) of consciousness into its perceiving and perceived aspects, and hence all is cognition-only (*viññaptimātra*).

Xuanzang's exposition here begins by asserting that when a with-outflow consciousness arises, it necessarily develops into the *nimitta-bhāga* (the apprehended aspect, *grāhya*) and the *darśana-bhāga* (the apprehending aspect, *grāhaka*); both are real, being other-dependent (*paratantra*). Kuiji explains, in his *Shuji*, that this is the initial statement affirming the later position of CWSL and of Dharmapāla, in contrast to the earlier or old position of "Sthiramati and other ancient Mahāyāna masters who mostly assert that the *saṃvitti-bhāga* alone is real and not the *nimitta-bhāga* and *darśana-bhāga*".²⁰ Kuiji informs us that there are four different *bhāga*-theories held by the different Indian masters:

Sthiramati proposes that there is only one *bhāga*. Nanda proposes that there are two *bhāga*-s. Dignāga proposes that there are three *bhāga*-s. Dharmapāla proposes that there are four *bhāga*-s.²¹

Historically, Nanda, whose theories are generally described as belonging to the old school of thought, may be credited as being the first proposer of the *nimitta-bhāga* and *darśana-bhāga*. For him, however, the *nimitta-bhāga* is conceptually constructed (*parikalpita*), hence unreal, while the *darśana-bhāga* is *paratantra*, having as it does the capability of conceptualization (*parikalpa*). Dignāga asserts the existence not only of these two *bhāga*-s but also that of the *saṃvitti-bhāga* which for him makes possible the resulting apprehension — this latter is the reflexive knowledge in a cognition. Sthiramati is often described as being associated with the aforementioned old school of thought, but he seems also to have been influenced by Dignāga's three-*bhāga* theory. But while speaking of the three *bhāga*-s, he regards both the *darśana-bhāga* and *nimitta-bhāga* as *parikalpita*. For him, the *saṃvitti-bhāga* alone is existent, being *paratantra* — and his theory thus reduces to the one-*bhāga* theory.

In the above mentioned discussion of the *bhāga*-theory, CWSL begins by asserting the necessity of the *darśana*- and *nimitta-bhāga*; and in so doing, it also effectively refutes Sthiramati's one-*bhāga* theory. It then proceeds to present Dignāga's three-*bhāga* theory, which is clearly accepted; but then, it goes further to claim that “if one analyses the *citta-caitta*-s minutely, there ought to be four *bhāga*-s”.²² The rationale for this fourth, i.e., the “self-reflexive consciousness cognitive division” (*svasaṃvitti-bhāga*), is that the *darśana*- and *nimitta-bhāga* pertain to the relatively “outer” level of the cognition, while the *saṃvitti*- and *svasaṃvitti-bhāga* pertain to the “inner” level of the cognition (see quotation below), corresponding to the apprehended and the apprehending aspect, respectively. Xuanzang writes:

[Question:] – In the absence of this [*svasaṃvitti-bhāga*], by what is the third [*bhāga*] recognized (*saṃ-√vid*)?

[Answer:] – [Just like the *darśana-bhāga* which requires the *saṃvitti-bhāga* as a self-reflexive recognition, the *saṃvitti-bhāga*, in turn,] being likewise a *citta-bhāga*, ought also to have a [reflexive] recognition (i.e., a *saṃvitti*) (心分既同, 應有證故). Moreover, there [otherwise] ought not to be a [*pramāṇa*-] *phala*, for a *pramāṇa* must have a fruit. The *darśana-bhāga* cannot be the fruit of the third [*bhāga*], since [if it were its fruit, it would always cognize

by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)], and yet the *darśana-bhāga* is at times not a *pramāṇa* (i.e., it can sometimes be erroneous). Thus, the *darśana-bhāga* does not recognize the third, since what recognizes itself (is reflexively aware) [— in this case, the *saṃvitti-bhāga* —] and is necessarily a direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

Among these four *bhāga*-s, the former two are outer, the latter two are inner:

1. The first (*nimitta-bhāga*) is only an *ālambana* (i.e., a cognized object). The latter may be either [that which cognizes or that which is cognized].
2. The second *bhāga* (*darśana-bhāga*) takes the first alone as cognitive object; it may either be a *pramāṇa* (i.e., being non-erroneous) — in which case it is either a direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or an inference (*anumāna*) — or an *apramāṇa* (i.e., being erroneous).
3. The third can take both the second and the fourth as cognitive objects.
4. The [fourth, the] *svasaṃvitti-bhāga*, takes only the third as its cognitive object. It does not take the second as its object as this would be futile, [since the *saṃvitti-bhāga* has already taken the second as object].

The third and the fourth are of the nature of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

Thus, the *citta-caitta*-s are constituted of four *bhāga*-s, properly comprising the object and the subject, without there being the fallacy of infinite regression (*anavasthā*). [These four *bhāga*-s] are neither identical with one another, [possessing, as they do, different functions]; nor are they separate, [since they pertain to the same consciousness-entity] —and the doctrine of *viññaptimātratā* is thus established.²³

In this way, Xuanzang critically synthesizes all the doctrines on the *bhāga*-s up to his time, in the process establishing the four-*bhāga* doctrine as the most desirable within the doctrinal frame of the *viññaptimātratā* theory. According to Kuiji, the four-*bhāga* theory was that of Dharmapāla. But as mentioned above, it is not attested in at least the extant works of Dharmapāla. Could it be possible that it was Xuanzang's own interpretation along the line of Dharmapāla's reasoning, and at the same time being partly influenced by his own background training in the Abhidharma tradition?

The doctrinal inheritance or influence on this four-*bhāga* mechanism can clearly be traced to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma which asserts the necessity of the disjoined conditionings (*viprayukta-saṃskāra*) called “acquisition-acquisition” (*prāpti-prāpti*) and “production-production” (*jāti-jāti*).

When a *dharma* arises, a force known as “production” (*jāti*) makes possible its generation. But *jāti* itself is a *dharma* that in turn needs another force for its arising. This function is ascribed to *jāti-jāti* which specifically generates *jāti* alone, and in this way the fallacy of infinite regression (*jāti-jāti-jāti- ...*) is avoided.

Likewise, the acquisition of a *dharma* by a person is made possible by a force called “acquisition” (*prāpti*) which, in turn, is acquired by, and only by, another force, namely, *prāpti-prāpti* — avoiding the infinite regression *prāpti-prāpti-prāpti- ...*.

The role of the *svasaṃvitti-bhāga* is clearly comparable. In addition, we should also note here the influence of the Sautrāntika doctrine of the reflexive nature of consciousness on Dignāga’s and Dharmapāla’s (and also Sthiramati’s) *bhāga* theories. Xuanzang, too, must have been similarly influenced.

2.3. *Exposition of āśraya-parāvṛtti: Another illustration of syncretic integration of diverse Yogācāra doctrines to definitively distinguish the bodhisattva ideal and its path from those of the two yāna-s*

It is in this manner that CWSL, or Xuanzang, inherits the highly developed Abhidharma-Yogācāra legacy, and is thus well equipped to synthesize — albeit critically — the complex and at times partially contradictory doctrines developed up to Xuanzang’s time to arrive at a most complete and comprehensive doctrinal edifice that is most distinctively Mahāyāna, both in terms of theory and praxis.

It is, of course, true that such syntheses were possible only based on the important ground-work done by the Indian masters, i.e., (1) based on the ontological and epistemological Abhidharma doctrines, particularly those of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, which had been the inspiration for the doctrines in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* (and as we have mentioned above, Xuanzang’s determination to study in India was said to be largely motivated by his desire to seek a clear and complete understanding of this text), and (2) based on the doctrines

in the Maitreya-Asaṅga texts, Vasubandhu's works, doctrines of Dharmapāla, Śīlabhadra, Jayasena, *et al.* Other important sources for Xuanzang's syncretic presentation include the well articulated doctrines in the Mahāyāna *sūtra*-s on the *bodhisattva* path and spiritual attainments, such as the *pāramitā*-s, the ten stages (*bhūmi*-s), the *trikāya*, absolute reality (*tathatā*) as the support-basis (*āśraya*) for both *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, the non-abiding *nirvāṇa* (*apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*), etc.

But it was through Xuanzang's translation-compilation of CWSL that many diverse Yogācāra views came, for the first time, to be syncretically presented in such a way as to definitively distinguish the *bodhisattva* ideal and its path from those of the two *yāna*-s.

We shall illustrate this here with the example of CWSL's exposition on the transformation of the support-basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), a central Yogācāra doctrine. Its very comprehensive treatment of this doctrine is undoubtedly one of its major achievements. At the earlier stage, Asaṅga's expositions contributed significantly to this Yogācāra doctrine. But it was only through the hands of Dharmapāla and Bandhuprabha that it came to be fully articulated. The Xuanzang school inherited the developed form of this doctrine. CWSL expounds it in great detail, and, in this way, skillfully establishes important distinctions between the Mahāyāna *bodhisattva* and the two *yāna*-s.

In this developed form of exposition, CWSL explains that the support-basis (*āśraya*) can be understood from two perspectives:

- a. It refers to *ālaya-vijñāna* qua the support-basis of pollution (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*):

Because it holds the seeds of the defiled and the pure *dharma*-s, it serves as the support-basis of both the defiled and the pure *dharma*-s. The noble path (i.e., pure knowledge) transforms it so that it relinquishes the defiled and acquires the pure.²⁴

- b. It is absolute reality (*tathatā*) qua the support-basis of delusion (i.e., *saṃsāra*) and enlightenment (*nirvāṇa*). The former is phenomenal existence, the latter, the underlying ultimate reality:

Because it serves as the root of delusion and enlightenment, it is in dependence on it that the defiled and pure *dharma*-s come to arise. The noble path transforms it so that it relinquishes the defiled and acquires the pure.²⁵

As support-basis, absolute reality serves as both the condition of dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*) and the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*).

Accordingly, the transformation of the support-basis can be understood as being twofold:

- a. It is the transformation of the *ālaya-vijñāna* from its defiled aspect into its pure aspect. This results in a two-fold fruition:
 - i. transforming-relinquishing (轉捨) defilements and acquiring *mahā-parinirvāṇa* — absolute quiescence transcending all forms of unsatisfactoriness;
 - ii. transforming-relinquishing the cognitive hindrance and acquiring supreme enlightenment (*mahā-bodhi*).
- b. It is the transformation of the *tathatā* as experienced in the form of phenomena of delusion into the *tathatā* as experienced as the realm of enlightenment. From this perspective, the resulting two-fold fruition is:
 - i. transforming-ceasing (轉滅) the *tathatā*-dependent (reality-based) *saṃ-sāra* (依如生死);
 - ii. transforming-realizing (轉證) the *tathatā*-dependent *nirvāṇa*.

CWSL describes this doctrine of the transformation of the support-basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) in these words:

[1] “*Āśraya*” refers to that which is based upon; i.e., it is the *paratantra*, as it serves as the support-basis for both the defiled and pure *dharma*-s. “Defiled”, that is, the false, the conceptually constructed (*parikalpita*); “pure”, that is, the true, the fully perfected (*pariniṣpanna*).

“*Parāvṛtti* (transformation)” refers to the two aspects: [a] “transformation-relinquishing” and [b] “transformation-acquisition”.

As a result of the repeated cultivation of the non-conceptualizing knowledge (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*), the grossness (*daṣṭhūlya*) of the twofold hindrance (*kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*) in the root-consciousness (*mūla-vijñāna*) comes to be abandoned. Accordingly, the *parikalpita* [aspect] in the *paratantra* is transformed-relinquished (or, relinquished through transformation; 轉捨) and the *pariniṣpanna* [aspect] in the *paratantra* is transformed-acquired (轉得).

Through the transformation[-relinquishment] of the defilements, the *mahā-parinirvāṇa* is acquired; through the transformation[-relinquishment] of the

jñeyāvaraṇa, the supreme enlightenment (*anuttarā bodhi* = *mahā-bodhi*) is realized. The purpose of establishing *viññaptimātratā* is so that sentient beings realize-acquire these two fruits of the transformation of the support-basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*).

[2] Or rather, “*āśraya*” refers to the *viññaptimātra* qua reality (*viññaptimātra-tathatā*), for it is the support-basis (*āśraya*) of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.

Ordinary worldlings are topsy-turvy and deluded about this absolute reality (*tathatā*). They accordingly experience suffering in *saṃsāra* from beginning-less time. [On the other hand,] the noble ones are freed from topsy-turviness and are enlightened into this *tathatā*. They accordingly acquire the absolute bliss of *nirvāṇa*.

As a result of the repeated cultivation of the non-conceptualizing knowledge, they eradicate the grossness of the twofold hindrance in the *mūla-vijñāna*, and are thus able to transform-cease the *tathatā*-dependent (依如; **tathatā-āśrita*) *saṃsāra* and transform-realize the *tathatā*-dependent *nirvāṇa*. This is none other than the *tathatā* being freed from the defiled nature. Although *tathatā* is pure in its very nature, its phenomenal appearance is one of pollution (*saṃkleśa*; 如雖性淨, 而相雜染 — Xuanzang seems here, as also in some other places, to contrast 性 and 相 in a rather “Chinese manner”). For this reason, when it is freed from pollution, one speaks metaphorically of a “new purity”. This very “new purity” is what is known as the transformation of the support-basis.²⁶

Following Asaṅga's **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, CWSL elucidates the transformation of the support-basis as being of six types:

- a. transformation (*parāvṛtti*) in the sense of weakening the force of the defiled seeds and strengthening the efficacies of the pure seeds (損力益能轉);²⁷
- b. *pravedha-parāvṛtti* (通達轉);
- c. *bhāvanā-parāvṛtti* (修習轉);
- d. *phalapariṇipūri-parāvṛtti* (果圓滿轉);
- e. *hīna-parāvṛtti* (下劣轉);
- f. *vipula-parāvṛtti* (廣大轉).²⁸

The above-summarized doctrine is said to be the vast transformation (*vipula-parāvṛtti*) of the *bodhisattva*, which results from the relinquishing of the two-fold grossness — viz., the seeds of the two-fold hindrance, defilement-hindrance (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). This is elaborated as follows:

The *vipula-parāvṛtti* refers to the Mahāyāna stage. For the sake of benefiting others, [the *bodhisattva*] advances towards *mahā-bodhi*. He is neither disgusted with *samsāra* nor does he aspire for *nirvāṇa*. He penetrates reality (*tathātā*) [revealed by] the two-fold emptiness [of Self and *dharma*-s], and abandons the seeds of both the *jñeya*- and *kleśa-āvaraṇa*, realizes at once supreme *bodhi* and *nirvāṇa*, and possesses excellent aptitude (有勝堪能; **karmanya*). The name *vipula-parāvṛtti* is given on account of the fact that it is realized by abandoning the two-fold grossness (*dausṭhulya*).²⁹

This is in contrast to the inferior transformation (*hīna-parāvṛtti*), described as follows:

The inferior transformation (*hīna-parāvṛtti*) refers to the stage of the two *yāna*-s. They exclusively seek their own benefit, are disgusted with unsatisfactoriness (*duḥkha*) and aspire for quiescence. They are capable only of penetrating reality (*tathātā*) [revealed by] the emptiness of a living being (*jāta-sūnyatā* = *pudgala-sūnyatā/pudgala-nairātmya*), they abandon the defilement-seeds and realize the true cessation through deliberation (*pratisamkhyā-nirodha*). They do not possess excellent aptitude.³⁰ (According to Kuiji: this means that they do not possess all-knowledge, etc.³¹).

In addition to the articulation on the nature of the support-basis and its transformation, CWSL further extensively elaborates on the *bodhisattva* path, with its progressive stages of attainment, that leads to the *vipula-parāvṛtti*, the ultimate *āśraya-parāvṛtti*. In this regard, it provides great details, through the progression of the ten stages (*bhūmi*), on the cultivation of the ten *pāramitā*-s, the abandonment/overcoming of the types of hindrances, and the realization of the ten aspects of *tathātā*. “As a result of this [extensively prescribed path], one comes to realize the two-fold *āśraya-parāvṛtti* — [namely, *nirvāṇa* and *mahā-bodhi*]”.³²

Thus, through a detailed exposition of this doctrine of *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, CWSL is able to provide a sufficient distinction — articulately formulated with regard to their spiritual perfection and the paths leading thereto — of the Mahāyāna *bodhisattva* from the two *yāna*-s who are said to achieve only the inferior trans-

formation (*hīna-parāvṛtti*). In this exposition of *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, as in many other instances, we see how CWSL inherits, and often builds on, the Yogācāra doctrines expounded in previous Indian works.

As described above, the consummate fruition of the spiritual transformation of the *bodhisattva* is two-fold:

- a. supreme enlightenment;
- b. great *parinirvāṇa*.

The exposition on both of these, in fact, incorporates the most developed Mahāyāna conceptions that properly distinguish the *bodhisattva* ideal from the ideal of the two *yāna*-s.

a. Firstly, supreme enlightenment is perfect Buddhahood which is attained only when the *jñeyāvaraṇa* is eradicated, the eradication of which has to occur in addition to the eradication of the *kleśāvaraṇa*; and only a Buddha can eradicate the *jñeyāvaraṇa*. Such a doctrine was already seen in the Abhidharma, at least around the time of the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā*. But the early Mahāyānists, particularly the Yogācāras, came to claim that its eradication can result from the Mahāyāna *bodhisattva* path. The Yogācāras speak of this as one aspect of the twofold fruition of *āśraya-parāvṛtti*.

b. The eradication of the *jñeyāvaraṇa* also results in the second aspect of the two-fold fruition: the *mahā-parinirvāṇa*. This undoubtedly refers to the Mahāyānistic non-abiding (*apraṭiṣṭhita*) *nirvāṇa*. As we have seen above, in regard to the *vipula-parāvṛtti* of the Mahāyāna *bodhisattva*, it is said that “he is neither disgusted with *saṃsāra* nor does he aspire for *nirvāṇa*”. This is also described as the last of the four types of *nirvāṇa*, said to be attained only by a Buddha:

... The non-abiding *nirvāṇa* (*apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*). This is the reality (*tathatā*) emerging from the *jñeyāvaraṇa*. [In this state,] being always assisted by great compassion and *prajñā*, one abides in neither *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*. While exercising its function of benefitting sentient beings till the end of time, it is eternally quiescent [in respect of its nature] (利樂有情窮未來際, 用而常寂); hence it is called *nirvāṇa*.³³

CWSL's exposition of *āśraya-parāvṛtti* is clearly influenced by that in Asaṅga's **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. Like the latter, CWSL also expounds the doctrine in terms of the three natures: *parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *pariniṣpanna*. The *ālaya-vijñāna* qua the support-basis is said to be *paratantra*, which ensures the pos-

sibility of transformation. It is conceived as comprising both the pollution (i.e., the *parikalpita*) and the purity (i.e., the *pariniṣpanna*) aspects — and this further ensures that the defiled aspect can be transformed-relinquished and the pure aspect can be transformed-realized. In fact, all the essentials of CWSL's exposition of *āśraya-parāvṛtti* — including the six types of the transformation of the support-basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), the explanations in terms of the three natures, the notion of the non-abiding *nirvāṇa* (*apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*), the *mahā-bodhi* consisting of the mental attributes conjoined with the Buddha's four knowledges, viz, the “mirror-like knowledge” (*ādarśa-jñāna*), the “equality-knowledge” (*saṃatā-jñāna*), the “knowledge of thorough reflection” (*pratyaवेक्षण-jñāna*) and the “action-performance knowledge” (*krtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna*), etc. — can be found in the **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*.

As an illustration of Xuanzang's indebtedness in this connection to the **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, we may consider the following exposition in the latter:

How should the abandonment (*prahāṇa*) of the fruit (i.e., the fruit qua abandonment; *phala-prahāṇa*; 'bras bus pangs pa) [of the threefold training] be seen?

The abandonment (*prahāṇa*) of the *bodhisattva*-s is the non-abiding *nirvāṇa* (*apraṭiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*). It has as its characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) the *āśraya-parāvṛtti* of that on which are based both the abandoning of defilement and the non-relinquishment of *saṃsāra*.³⁴ Herein, *saṃsāra* is subsumed in the pollution aspect of the *paratantra*; *nirvāṇa* is subsumed in the purity aspect of the *paratantra*. The support-basis (*āśraya*) for both refers to the *paratantra* which comprises these two aspects. Transformation of the support-basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) is the “transforming away” (*vy-ā-√vṛt; 轉捨) of the pollution aspect and the “transforming-acquiring” of the purification aspect, at the time of the arising of the counteragent to the *paratantra-svabhāva*.³⁵

But Xuanzang's exposition of the doctrine is not a mere borrowing from the **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*. He selectively and harmoniously synthesizes these essentials while also consulting the commentaries by Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva, presenting a purportedly complete account.

2.4. The influence of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma on Xuanzang and his own doctrinal contribution

Prior to his study in India, Xuanzang had already understood the importance of the Abhidharma doctrines and their contribution to the Yogācāra doctrines. The various Abhidharma texts he had studied in this period included the **Miśraka-hṛdaya*, the *Jñāna-prasthāna*, the **Satyasiddhi-śāstra* and the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*. In India, he then devoted much effort to mastering the Abhidharma. After his return, we saw him spending much of his time and effort translating and expounding the Abhidharma texts, producing among his pupils such Abhidharma experts as Puguang (普光), Fabao (法寶) and others. This background of interest and mastery in, and appreciation of, the Abhidharma inheritance of the Yogācāra was likely to have at least some impact on him in his synthetic presentation of the Yogācāra doctrines in CWSL.

In addition, during his stay in India, through his studies with Śīlabhadra, he was further exposed to the connection or influence of the Abhidharma doctrines in Dharmapāla's views on the Yogācāra doctrines. As we have shown above, Dharmapāla's (or CWSL's) "four-*bhāga*" theory shows clear signs of influence from the Abhidharma tenets, of both Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika. As another example in this connection: Dharmapāla claims that direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*) are the two valid *pramāṇa*-s, and this on the ground that *dharma*-s have the two characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*-s), i.e., specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and common characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) — a fundamental Abhidharma proposition.

Moreover, the influence of the Abhidharma doctrines and of Dharmapāla on Xuanzang can also be seen in CWSL's theory on the seeds. The Basic Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, as well as Maitreya-Asaṅga's works like the *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga* and the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra*, all teach that the seeds are newly perfumed. And Asaṅga's **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which in many ways influenced the doctrines of CWSL, also holds the same view. On the other hand, it is well known that CWSL does not follow these texts and instead favours Dharmapāla's view that the seeds are both innate and newly perfumed. This latter view seems to be influenced by the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma "*dharma*-s" which are indeed in a sense like "original seeds" — since their *svabhāva*-s are asserted to have been always in existence — from which temporal instantiations issue.

We shall discuss below a further important example in this connection. This relates to Xuanzang's epistemological doctrine on the perception of *tathatā*, the absolute reality.

On stanza 29 of the *Triṃśikā*,³⁶ CWSL comments that *tathatā* is realized through the repeated cultivation of the non-conceptualizing knowledge (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) which is free from the duality of the apprehended (*grāhya*) and the apprehender (*grāhaka*). This repeated cultivation results in *āśraya-parāvṛtti*. This brings up the following interesting epistemological issue of *nirākārā vijñaptimātratā* versus *sa-ākārā vijñaptimātratā*, which we will pursue in more detail and from the point of view of trying to determine if we can indeed discern with sufficient clarity here Xuanzang's own doctrinal contribution:

In the yogi's direct perception of *tathatā*, the perceiving insight is non-conceptualizing. This is not knowledge in the ordinary sense — in the sense of a distinct cognizing agent (the apprehender) cognizing a distinct object (the apprehended) outside of it. Thus, it ought not to involve a mentally constructed form/mode (*ākāra*). This is the position of *nirākārā vijñaptimātratā*.

But in that case, how is *tathatā* cognized at all?

In contrast to the position of *nirākārā vijñaptimātratā*, CWSL holds the position of *sa-ākārā vijñaptimātratā*: this cognition of *tathatā* does involve *ākāratā* (帶相).

Xuanzang's exposition on this issue offers an example that is likely a case of his own doctrinal contribution — or at least a case of his own interpretation of what was probably essentially a Dharmapāla-Śīlabhadra doctrine. In this connection, Kuiji's commentary must also be given credit for its elucidation of Xuanzang's explanation.

In the section dealing with *dharma-grāha*, CWSL argues that the seemingly external object is not the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of a sensory consciousness. In reality, the condition qua object is the *nimitta-bhāga* which is a semblance of *rūpa*, etc., developed (*pari-√nam*) from one's own consciousness within. It states here that it constitutes a condition qua object

... because the *darśana[-bhāga]* arises with it (qua the *nimittabhāga-pratibimba*) as the support; and the resultant consciousness carries its *ākāra* (見託彼生, 帶彼相故).³⁷

That is to say: this *nimitta-bhāga* constitutes the *ālambana-pratyaya* inasmuch as it satisfies the two-fold requirement of being an *ālambana-pratyaya*: (i) It constitutes a *pratyaya* (a causal condition) because it is capable of generating a sensory consciousness — being an existent *dharma* of the nature of *paratantra*. (ii) It constitutes an *ālambana* because it is capable of inducing a form/mode of itself in the resultant consciousness. It may be noted that this two-fold requirement is, in fact, the same as that stated in Dignāga's *Ālambanapratyaya-parikṣā*:

Although there is no external object-domain, there exists an internal *rūpa* manifesting as a semblance of the external object-domain. This constitutes the *ālambana-pratyaya*, as it is acknowledged that it satisfies the two-fold signification: A sensory consciousness, visual, etc., arises with its form/mode (帶彼相起; more literally: “arises carrying its form” — similar to the CWSL statement above), and is generated from it.³⁸

On the above statement in CWSL, *Shuji* comments:

This is to indicate that [the *nimitta-bhāga* so developed] satisfies the signification of a condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*): When an original or archetype (本質; *bimba*) — whether an existent or non-existent *dharma* — is taken as an object, there is necessarily a [corresponding] image (*prati-bimba*; 影像) within the *citta*.

This being an existent entity, a *darśana[-bhāga]* arises in dependence on it — this is the signification of a condition (*pratyaya*).

But when the *citta* arises, it does so carrying with it the form/mode of understanding (*ākāra*) of that [image] (帶彼相起) — [that *ākāra* (= that corresponding internal image)] is said to be a cognitive object (*ālambana*); “carrying” (帶) is in the sense of directly carrying along with it (挾帶逼附).

Since it entails this two-fold signification, [such an understanding] differs from that of the Hīnayāna (see below).

Although when the non-conceptualizing [knowledge] takes *tathatā* as its object, there is not a form (相) of a seeming object-domain (似境), *tathatā* itself (真如體; the “substance” of *tathatā*) is carried along with it (挾帶); and [*tathatā*] is thus said to be the *ālambana-pratyaya*. This is like the *saṃvitti-bhāga* [taking the *darśana-bhāga* as object without the need of consciousness first developing a *nimitta-bhāga* of the latter]. ... [In such a case,] what is the form/mode?

It is what is called the “substance-form (體相)”. The *tathatā* does not have a conceptualized (遍計所執; *parakalpita*) form, and is thus said to be “without a form (無相; **nirākāra*)”; but it still has a substance-form ...³⁹

In the above commentary, the doctrinal position is clear that in any cognition, including that of absolute reality, there must be an *ākāra*. In other words: the position of CWSL is that a direct or immediate cognitive object (親所緣緣) is always necessary for any cognition to occur, even though there may or may not be a corresponding remote cognitive object (疏所緣緣) — an external archetype on the basis of which the corresponding immediate cognitive object is generated within the consciousness concerned.⁴⁰ In the case of a non-conceptualizing knowledge cognizing absolute reality, while there is no *nimitta-bhāga* that is developed from consciousness — there is nevertheless an immediate cognitive object: There is necessarily a mode of understanding (*ākāra*; [行]相) which, in this case, is the “substance-form” of *tathatā*.

In this connection, according to Kuiji, it was Xuanzang who offered a new interpretation of the above mentioned notion of *dai-xiang* (帶相; *ākāratā*), “carrying/making a form” (see below). In the above passage, we saw that the first character of 帶相, i.e., *dai* (帶) “carrying/making”, was interpreted by Kuiji as *jia-dai* (*/xie-dai*; 挾帶), “carrying along with”: i.e., not mentally constructing an image or form, but the cognizing consciousness arising together with it — i.e., directly bringing it out.⁴¹

In regard to stanza 28 of the *Triṃśikā*⁴² which discusses the *darśana-mārga* and *pravedha-avasthā*, CWSL comments:

When the *bodhisattva* apperceives (*upa-√labh*) neither the cognitive object nor the non-conceptualizing knowledge, ... he then ... realizes *tathatā*. The [non-conceptualizing] knowledge and *tathatā* are exactly on a par, being free from both the modes of the apprehender and the apprehended ...⁴³

It then proceeds to present three views on the non-conceptualizing knowledge. The third, by Dharmapāla, is as follows:

This knowledge has the *darśana-bhāga*, but not the *nimitta-bhāga*. ... Although it has the *darśana-bhāga*, it is non-conceptualizing. It is said to be not an apprehender; but it is not that it is altogether devoid of apprehension. Although it does not have a *nimitta-bhāga*, it can nonetheless be said to arise with the

mode [qua intrinsic nature] of *tathatā* (帶如相起), since it is not apart from *tathatā*.

Just as the case of the *saṃvitti-bhāga*: when it takes the *darśana-bhāga* as its cognitive object (緣自證分; **darśana-bhāgam ālambhate*), it does so without developing (變) [into an image of the *darśana-bhāga*] (i.e., it does not have a *nimitta-bhāga*).

The same is true in this case [of the non-conceptualizing knowledge]. If it cognizes (takes as cognitive object) [the *tathatā*] by developing [into an image of it], then it would not be a case of direct realization (*sākṣāt-karaṇa*). It would be like the subsequently acquired knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*) [knowing the *tathatā*], and that would be conceptualizing. Hence, it should be acknowledged that [this knowledge] has a *darśana-bhāga* but not a *nimitta-bhāga*⁴⁴

On the statement “although it does not have a *nimitta-bhāga*, it can nonetheless be said to arise with the mode of *tathatā*, since it is not apart from *tathatā*”, Kuiji comments:

This [non-conceptualizing] knowledge, in cognizing *tathatā*, arises carrying along with it (挾帶) the substance-form (體相); [the *tathatā*] is thus said to be its *ālambana*. [This knowledge] is not said to cognize *tathatā* in the manner that it arises carrying with it its image (影像; *pratibimba*) as the *nimitta-bhāga*, as it is not apart from *tathatā*.⁴⁵

Elsewhere, when commenting on CWSL's definition of the “condition qua object” (*ālambana-pratyaya*), Kuiji explains that in the *ākāratā* doctrine (*dai-xiang* 帶相) — that cognition of an object is necessarily mediated with an *ākāra* of the object — the Hīnayāna speaks of “*ākāra*” as a form/mode of the object, and this pertains to the cognizing consciousness (能緣體攝); in contrast, for the Yogācāra, this pertains to the *nimitta-bhāga* of the consciousness. To such a doctrine, the Sāṃmitīya master Prajñāgupta objects that in the case of the direct realization of *tathatā* — since the non-conceptualizing knowledge does not make any mental construction, and hence does not arise as a semblance of *tathatā* — it ought not to be an *ālambana-pratyaya*.⁴⁶

According to Kuiji,⁴⁷ Xuanzang's refutation is as follows:

You do not understand what we mean.

“*dai*” 帶 [in *dai-xiang* 帶相] means “*jia-dai*” (挾帶; “carries along with it” or “directly brings out together with it”).

“*xiang*” 相 means “*ti-xiang*” (體相; “substance-form” or “form qua nature/substance”); not *xiang-zhuang* (相狀; “appearance-form” or form in the sense of an appearance).

That is to say: when perfect knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), etc., is born, it arises bringing together with it (*jia-dai*) the substance-form of *tathatā*. It is neither identical with nor different from *tathatā*, and it is neither a form nor not a form (非相, 非非相). ...⁴⁸

Comparing this exposition to Dharmapāla’s view cited above in CWSL’s commentary on stanza 28 of the *Triṃśikā*, we can see that Xuanzang’s interpretation of *jia-dai* is either derived from Dharmapāla-Śīlabhadra’s tradition, or it is a fine-tuned interpretation based on it. It is noteworthy that in Kuiji’s account here (as in other instances in his *Shuji*), he explains the key terms involved — *dai-xiang*, *jia-dai*, *xiang-zhuang*, *ti-xiang* — by either splitting the two Chinese characters which together correspond to a single Sanskrit term (e.g., *dai-xiang* which most likely corresponds to *ākāratā*), or combining a character from such a splitting with another Chinese character (e.g., *jia* added to *dai*, to form *jia-dai*) and then interprets the resulting split-out word joined with another character (e.g., *xiang* from *dai-xiang* is joined with *zhuang* and interpreted as *xiang-zhuang*) in a very “Chinese manner”. While Kuiji’s exposition of Xuanzang’s view in this context does seem to tally with what we see in CWSL — and is very helpful in our understanding of the often rather brief wording in CWSL — there is no evidence in Xuanzang’s *Datang Xiyu Ji* (大唐西域記) that Xuanzang himself actually uses such Chinese terms or explains in such a Chinese manner.⁴⁹

In this connection, it may be observed that Xuanzang’s position — that the yogi’s direct insight of absolute reality entails an *ākāra*, although this *ākāra* is not a mental fabrication — could well have been inspired by the earlier Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma doctrine of direct realization (*abhisamaya*). For the Sarvāstivādins, there is necessarily an *ākāra* in any mental cognition. In the case of an ordinary mental cognition, the *ākāra* is a mentally constructed one, and it may be either proper or erroneous. In the situation of direct realization (*abhisamaya*), however, the *ākāra* — of *duḥkhatā*, *śūnyatā*, *anityatā* and *nairātmya* — is the exact nature of the true existent (the *dharma*). It is then a case of directly cognizing the entity itself in its aspects as cognized by spiritual insight. In brief, as we have stated elsewhere,⁵⁰ for the Sarvāstivādins:

[I]n the case of spiritual realization — “realization-knowledge” (證智; *pratyakṣa-buddhi*, **pratyakṣa-jñāna*, *adhigama-jñāna*) — the meditator apprehends directly, truly as they are, the universal characteristics of all *dharma*-s. The modes of activity (*ākāra*) in this case differ not the slightest from the true nature of the *dharma*-s being examined. This is a case of direct perception *par excellence* (真現量; **bhūta-pratyakṣa*, **tattva-pratyakṣa*)⁵¹ — without any conceptualization, even though *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* is involved. For this reason, the Sarvāstivāda identifies the sixteen *ākāra*-s pertaining to the Four Noble Truths with *prajñā* — operating as spiritual insight. The *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* states that “outside the sixteen *ākāra*-s, there is no other outflow-free *prajñā*”. “The *prajñā*-s not subsumed under the sixteen *ākāra*-s mostly discern *svalakṣaṇa*-s, the *prajñā*-s subsumed under the sixteen *ākāra*-s discern only *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*-s”.⁵²

3. *The doctrine of vijñaptimātratā in CWSL*

As its title — and for that matter, those of the *Triṃśikā* and TVB — suggests, the central concern of this treatise is to establish the thesis of *vijñaptimātratā*. As a matter of fact, the treatise begins by paying homage to those who attained complete or partial purity in *vijñaptimātratā*. It then proceeds to state the three reasons or purposes of Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, proposed by three different masters:⁵³

- I. According to Sthiramati *et al.*: In order that those, who have not acquired understanding or who are unascertained with regard to the twofold emptiness (*pudgala-nairātmya* and *dharma-nairātmya*), can generate proper understanding and hence overcome the twofold hindrances (*kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*) and obtain liberation and *mahā-bodhi*.
- II. According to Citabhānu *et al.*: In order to instruct those who erroneously cling to the *ātman* and *dharma*-s and who are unable to understand *vijñaptimātratā* — making them penetrate into the twofold emptiness and know truly the principle of *vijñaptimātratā*.
- III. According to Dharmapāla *et al.*: “Among those who have not understood and are unascertained with regard to the principle of *vijñaptimātratā*: some hold that external object-domains, just like consciousness, are not non-existent; others hold that the internal consciousness, just like the [external] objects, is non-existent; others hold that the various consciousnesses, while differing in their functions, are identical in substance; others hold that no distinct *caitta* exists outside the *citta*. In order to refute these diverse views and enable them to acquire true understanding in the profound principle of *vijñaptimātratā*, this treatise was composed.”⁵⁴

From the above statements, it is at once clear that the major motivation for composing the *Triṃśikā* is chiefly the need to truly understand *vijñaptimātratā*. This is especially clear in the comparatively greater details of Dharmapāla's statement. This, no doubt, also represents Xuanzang's own mission in composing CWSL.

Inasmuch as CWSL is a composite commentary on the *Triṃśikā*, it seems appropriate here to pause for a brief appreciation of Vasubandhu's doctrinal con-

tribution in this connection, before we proceed to examine in more detail the *viññaptimātratā* doctrine presented in CWSL.

In his Foreword (in Chinese) to Wei Tat's English translation of CWSL, Venerable Yin Shun discusses Vasubandhu's contribution on the basis of Asaṅga's exposition. The latter stressed that the totality of phenomenal manifestation into its *darśana* and *nimitta* aspects originate solely from the *ālaya-vijñāna* comprising all seeds. Such a perspective of a one-source manifestation could easily lead to the unwanted philosophical implication of a single-cause doctrine.

In contrast to that, Vasubandhu was able, in his *Triṃśikā*, to rectify this probable pitfall with the exposition of the three-fold development of consciousness — i.e., three species of *viññāna-pariṇāma* — and to bring the Yogācāra doctrinal system to a more advanced or complete stage of development. However, as Yin Shun shows, this threefold-development perspective is quite in keeping with early Yogācāra doctrines in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* and such texts as the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*:

The way Asaṅga established *viññaptimātratā* is to take the *ālaya* qua seed-consciousness (阿賴耶種子識) as the basis from which the *viññapti*-s qua the perceived and the *viññapti*-s qua the perceiving come into manifestation — very much as if everything is manifested from a single *citta*. This could very well lead to the wrong track of a single-cause doctrine. For this reason, Vasubandhu — in the *Triṃśikā Viññaptimātratā*, composed in his old age — based his exposition on [the doctrine of] the three species of *viññāna-pariṇāma*, stressing the manifestation of the *ālaya-vijñāna* which sustains seeds.

This is the tradition of the *Sandhinirmocana-sūtra* and the original meaning in Maitreya-nātha's doctrines. Thus, the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* takes the *abhūta-parikalpa* as *paratantra*; “the *citta-caitta*-s of the triple sphere are the *abhūta-parikalpa*” — *paratantra* is not confined to the *ālaya-vijñāna*. As to *viññāna-pariṇāma*, [it states:] “consciousness arises appearing as the *artha*, sentient beings, the self and the cognitions [(*artha-sattvātma-viññapti-pratibhāsaṃ prajāyate viññānam ...*)]. ... This agrees with the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* which states:

In brief there are four types of function (*karma*):

1. the function of cognizing the receptacle (*artha*);
2. the function of cognizing the support-basis (*āśraya*) (the bodies with the *indriya*-s of *sattva*-s);

3. the function of cognizing the self;
4. the function of cognition (cognizing specific object-domains).

These different cognitions operate simultaneously in each moment. Hence, it is illogical that a single consciousness can have these distinctively different functions in one and the same moment.

The *ālaya-vijñāna* cognizes the *bhājana-loka* and the bodies [with their] *indriya*-s; *manas* cognizes (clings to) the self; the six consciousnesses discern the six-fold object-domains — the [development-]manifestation [of consciousness] and cognition are explained in terms of three species of consciousness. Thus, whether one speaks of the manifestation of everything on the basis of the *ālaya-vijñāna*, or of that on the basis of the *citta-caitta*-s — it is, in actual fact, equally [a doctrine] of “specific [things] arising from their corresponding seeds”. The *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine that [claims] the non-divorceability from consciousness is distinctively different from the single-cause doctrine.

In the *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine of Asaṅga, there is the emphasis on the *ālaya-vijñāna* and *manas* — this is an important point requiring demonstration. The *Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* inherited the *Yogācārabhūmi* tradition of expounding the five sensory consciousnesses and the *mano-bhūmi* from five doctrinal perspectives — intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), support-basis (*āśraya*), cognitive object (*ālambana*), companionship (*sahāya*) and *karma*. It synthesizes the essence of Asaṅga’s doctrines, and expounds the *ālaya-vijñāna*, *manas* and the sixfold consciousnesses from ten doctrinal perspectives, etc. [With its composition], the *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine of Yogācāra-Mahāyāna reached a stage of being a more perfect system.⁵⁵

On CWSL’s exposition of *vijñaptimātratā*, we may first revert to our discussion on stanza 17, in section 2.1 above. In that context, we see that, according to Sthiramati, the reason for calling *vijñāna-parimāṇa vikalpa* (conceptualization) is that the *ālambana* is non-existent (*asat*). And we know that the *ālambana* is a non-existent from the fact that consciousness can arise with such non-existent objects as a dream, a magical illusion, etc. Consequently, since what is *vikalpyate* by *vikalpa* is non-existent, all is *vijñaptimātra*. Sthiramati’s whole argument here is as follows:

What is conceptualized by the threefold conceptualization (*vikalpa*), having as its nature the *ālaya-vijñāna*, the defiled *manas* and the activity-consciousnesses,

together with their conjunctions (*caitta*) — viz., the receptacle [world], the Self, entities comprising the *skandha*-s, *dhātu*-s, *āyatana*-s, *rūpa*, *śabda*, etc. — does not exist. Hence, the *vijñāna-pariṇāma* is called conceptualization because its cognitive object (*ālambana*) is non-existent.

How is it known that its cognitive object is non-existent? Because [a *dharma*] which has a certain efficient cause arises from that [cause] when [the latter] is intact and unobstructed, not from another. But consciousness arises even if the cognitive object — such as a magical illusion, a *gandharva*-city, a dream or an illusory image owing to an optical disease — is non-existent. And if the arising of a consciousness were dependent on an [existent] cognitive object, then on account of the absence of an object (*artha*), no consciousness arises in the magical illusion, etc. Therefore, consciousness arises from a previous consciousness of the same species that has ceased, not from the external object — since there is its occurrence even when the [external object] is non-existent. ...

Therefore, on account of its being of the form of superimposition, it is to be understood that the cognitive object of conceptualization is non-existent. With this, having thus far avoided the extreme of superimposition, wishing to avoid the extreme of denial, [the *Triṃśikā*, verse 17, fourth quarter-verse,] says:

therefore it is all cognition-only.

“Therefore”: because what is conceptualized by that conceptualization, which is *vijñāna-pariṇāma* in nature, does not exist. Therefore, owing to there being no object-domain, all is mere-cognition. “All” refers to what pertains to the triple spheres as well as the unconditioned. The word “mere” is for the purpose of excluding any object additional to it.⁵⁶

That consciousness does not arise directly and necessarily from an external object (like in Sthiramati’s description) is tantamount to epistemological idealism. Sthiramati’s argument that the arising of consciousness of an object is independent of the necessity of an existent *ālambana* and instead arises from the preceding moment of the mental flow, is essentially similar to the Sautrāntika explanation. In terms of the *vijñāptimātratā* theory, it is a necessary premise. But, of course, unlike the Sautrāntikas, Sthiramati, advocating *vijñāptimātratā* as he does, would not proceed to propose that the existence of the external object is thereby inferable (*anumeya*) — as do the Sautrāntikas. However, such an explanation is distinctively different from that of Dharmapāla which asserts the

simultaneous bifurcation of each moment of consciousness into the *nimitta*- and *darśana-bhāga*-s. For Dharmapāla, these two *bhāga*-s are relatively real (*paratantra*); for Sthiramati, they are unreal (*parikalpita*).⁵⁷ To that extent, Sthiramati's argument is essentially epistemological and bears a certain resemblance to a Sautrāntika explanation.

In this connection, it may also be noted that, answering the question as to how, without an external object, consciousness arises with a form of an object (*artha-ākāramutpadyate*), Sthiramati states that the sensory consciousnesses are *saṃcitāmbanāḥ*, i.e., have a collected whole as cognitive object.⁵⁸ — again, a view known to be held by the Sautrāntikas. We know, for instance, that prior to the composition of Sthiramati's *Abhidharmakośaṭīkā Tattvārthā*, the Sautrāntika leader Śrīlāta had maintained that the cognitive object of a sensory perception was necessarily past and consisted of a conceptualized whole of the atoms.⁵⁹ Once again, while this could well constitute another instance suggesting possible Sautrāntika influence on Sthiramati's doctrinal exposition, he clearly goes a step further to conclude that “without an external object, consciousness arises with the image/mode of a collected whole”.⁶⁰ In the corresponding discussion in CWSL, it is also stated that “a sensory consciousness, visual, etc., takes only a collected whole as its cognitive object, since it [arises] with a mode of that [collected whole]”. (Kuiji ascribes this view to the Sautrāntikas).

All this, of course, is not to say that Sthiramati thereby commits himself necessarily to nothing more than epistemological idealism. But it is Dharmapāla's assertion of the simultaneous bifurcation of consciousness into the two *bhāga*-s that *explicitly* ensures a sufficient condition of ontological idealism. This is because: given the two premises — (a) the simultaneity of the apprehending and the apprehended aspects in a cognition, and (b) these two aspects having equally arisen from within consciousness — one can validly, and persuasively, claim the position of *viññaptimātratā*. Moreover, proposing that the *nimitta-bhāga* is *paratantra* — existent inasmuch as it is manifested by consciousness — it at once avoids the nihilistic implication of the utter non-existence of the objects of our experience and at the same time explicitly affirms that they are necessarily consciousness-dependent (*viññaptimātra*). For this reason, CWSL opts to adopt Dharmapāla's interpretation. As we have seen above (section 2.1), in the *Trīṃśikā* (verse 17), Xuanzang, in fact, takes “*vikalpo yad vikalpyate*” as predicate to

vijñānapariṇāmaḥ — *vikalpa* referring to the *darśana-bhāga* developed from consciousness, and *vikalpyate* referring to the *nimitta-bhāga*.

The *Trimśikā* begins with the statement that the metaphorical expressions of the *ātman* and *dharma*-s which operate in diverse forms are merely development of consciousness. Both TVB and CWSL accordingly begin with an exposition refuting the realities of external objects — all the cognizables (*vijñeya*) comprising the various appearances of the *ātman* and *dharma*-s.

TVB states that these objects are completely mental superimpositions in their nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) and do not exist as real entities (*vastutas*).⁶¹ In contrast, the cognizing consciousness exists as a real entity, being co-arisen from conditions (*pratītyasamutpannatvād dravyato 'sti*) — being a development of consciousness.⁶² But:

How is it to be understood that without an external object, consciousness alone arises with an appearance of the object?

[Answer:] An external object (so-called) is considered as the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of consciousness in respect to its generating a consciousness with an image of itself (*svābhāsavijñāna-janakatvena*), and not merely in respect to its being causally efficacious.⁶³

The corresponding refutation of *ātman* and *dharma*-s in CWSL is very much longer. At the outset, it is stated that the diverse forms of *ātman* and *dharma*-s are mere designations resulting from the development of consciousness (依識所變; *vijñāna-pariṇāme*). “Development” refers to the bifurcation of consciousness itself — the *saṃvitti-bhāga* — in its arising, into the *nimitta*- and *darśana-bhāga*-s. This explanation is ascribed by Kuiji to Dharmapāla:

According to Dharmapāla *et al.*: Consciousness itself is the *saṃvitti-bhāga*. It arises developing in resemblance to the *nimitta*- and *darśana-bhāga*. This view is that consciousness itself is of the nature of *paratantra* [and thus existent]. The two *bhāga*-s in resemblance to the *nimitta* and *darśana* are also not non-existent, being also *paratantra*.⁶⁴

CWSL also articulates the contrasting existential status of consciousness with that of the conceptualized external object-domain in terms of conventional and absolute existence. In so doing, it also intends to establish *vijñāptimātratā* as a middle-way doctrine:

The real *ātman* and real *dharma*-s as imagined by the ignorant are completely non-existent. They are said to be conceptual because they are solely designation based on imagination.

The semblances of *ātman* and *dharma*-s developed from internal consciousness (i.e. the *nimitta*- and *darśana-bhāga*-s), though existent, are not real *ātman* and *dharma*-s in their nature. They are thus said to be conceptual inasmuch as they manifest resembling them (*ātman* and *dharma*-s).

The external object-domains, being designations based on imagination, are not existent in the manner of consciousness. The internal consciousness, arisen necessarily in dependence on causal conditions (i.e. on the *bīja*-s),⁶⁵ is not non-existent in the manner of the [external] object-domains. Accordingly, the two extremes of superimposition (*samāropa*) and denial (*apavāda*) are refuted.

[In other words:] The object-domains are conceptualized in dependence on internal consciousness; they are thus merely conventionally existent (*samvṛti-sat*). Consciousness is the supporting basis of the conceived object-domains; it is thus also absolutely existent (*paramārtha-sat*).⁶⁶

Commenting on this middle-way principle of *vijñaptimātratā*, Kuiji further highlights the soteriological function of the doctrine:

Accordingly, internal consciousness is not non-existent in its essential nature, and the *ātman* and *dharma*-s outside the mind are not existent in their essential nature. In this way, it refutes the outsiders' view that superimposes the object-domains as real existents apart from the mind. It also refutes the view — of those who hold false views and wrongly apprehend (*durgrhīta*) and deny *śūnyatā* — that consciousness is likewise non-existent. Thus, it expounds the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* by steering clear of [the erroneous and extreme views of] emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and existence (*astitā*). [Indeed, clinging to the view] that *dharma*-s exist outside consciousness (心外), one revolves in *saṃsāra*. Realizing that consciousness alone [exists], one comes to relinquish *saṃsāra* absolutely — this is the supreme middle-way principle.⁶⁷

While the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* in CWSL unambiguously denies the existence of any real object-domain outside consciousness, it does not preach a form of solipsism. A plurality of mental serial continuities is acknowledged. But such

a mind of another being is not discerned directly (*sākṣāt*) as an object outside one's own consciousness. Rather, it serves as a remote cognitive object: What is immediately or directly discerned — i.e., what serves as the corresponding immediate cognitive object — is an image which is a semblance of that mind of another developed within one's own consciousness.⁶⁸

In this context, CWSL states explicitly that the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* does not teach that only a single consciousness exists. Indeed, if such were the doctrine, the Buddha-dharma and spiritual struggle would have been utterly in vain: no distinction would exist between an enlightened being and an ordinary worldling or between causes and effects, etc. Who would expound the *Dharma*? For whom would its exposition be intended? ...⁶⁹

Thus, the word *vijñaptimātratā* has a profound meaning (意趣; *abhiprāya*). The word “*vijñapti*” summarily indicates that every sentient being possesses [i] eight consciousnesses, [ii] six types of thought-concomitants (*caitta*), [iii] *nimitta*- and *darśana*-[*bhāga*-s], [iv] specific modalities (/stages; *avasthā-viśeṣa*), and [v] the *tathatā* manifested by the principle of *śūnyatā* — these [five categories] are correspondingly: [i] what is consciousness in their nature, [ii] what is conjoined with consciousness, [iii] what is developed [from the consciousnesses and the thought-concomitants], [iv] what is the modalities [of the preceding categories], and [v] what is the true nature [of the preceding four categories].

All these *dharma*-s are not apart from consciousness and are summarily designated as “*vijñapti*”. The word “*mātra*” merely excludes *rūpa*, etc., which are held by the ignorant as definitely existing and truly apart from consciousness.

If one understands in this way the meaning of the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā*, one will be able to be well equipped, without topsy-turviness (*aviparyasta*), with the requisites for the swift penetration into *dharma-śūnyatā* and attain supreme enlightenment, and uplift sentient beings from *samsāra*. Such an end cannot be accomplished by those who totally deny each and every existent, wrongly apprehending *śūnyatā* and contradicting scriptures (*āgama*) and logical reasoning (*yukti*). Hence, one should definitely believe that all is mere-cognition.⁷⁰

The universe, called the receptacle-world (*bhājana-loka*), which sentient beings inhabit, is also *vijñaptimātra*. Although we collectively experience it in the same

or similar manner, and as existing objectively outside us, it is, in actual fact, manifested individually from the common seeds (共相種, **sādhāraṇa-bīja*) — effectuated by collective, or more correctly, common *karma*⁷¹ — within each inhabitant's *ālaya-vijñāna*. CWSL explains this with the simile of lamps:

Although [the consciousness] of each of the sentient beings develops in an individually distinct manner, the image [so developed] is mutually similar and occurs in the same locality. This is like the case of a multitude of lamps — the illumination of each of which pervades [the same locality] — appearing as if it is a single illumination.⁷²

This is not to say that the inhabiting sentient beings collectively project a single universe. Properly speaking, the common seeds in each individual's consciousness mature into an individual universe in a similar manner — hence a proposition within the scope of *vijñaptimātratā*. However, as Kuiji explains, such “common fruits (共果; **sādhāraṇa-phala*) [from common seeds], existing as they do in the same locality, do not impede one another.”⁷³ He elaborates further:

It is understood that “*vijñaptimātra*” signifies that what is developed by each individual is individually distinct. However, [since the image of the universe developed from those seeds] entails similarity and shared experience, [these seeds] are said to be “common”. In reality, it is not the case that what is developed by [the consciousness of] oneself can be experienced by others [without a process of development in their own consciousnesses]. For, if it were capable of being so experienced, one must call it a case of taking a *dharma* outside the mind as cognitive object! Rather, [what happens here is that,] this thing [developed by the consciousness] of mine serves as condition of dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*), enabling a multitude of people [— each, relying on this, through a process of developing a similar image in his own consciousness —] to experience it in a common manner. Hence, they are said to be “common”.⁷⁴

For Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma too, the universe is the result of the inhabitants' collective *karma*. But, not being a *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine, it importantly differs from CWSL in teaching that the universe is a collective contribution: all inhabitants, by virtue of their collective *karma*, experience one and the same universe. It further stipulates that since it is not a karmic result specific to a

single individual, it is not called a “retribution-fruit” (*vipāka-phala*), but a “fruit of dominance” (*adhipati-phala*).⁷⁵

The *Shuji* discusses a few issues related to the above CWSL doctrine. One is: In the lamp analogy, how can it be ascertained that each lamp is distinct, and is it not a case of a multitude of lamps combining into a single illumination? The main part of the answer is that: this can be ascertained since, when one lamp is removed, the illumination is still pervasive. Moreover, the individual illuminations mutually penetrate without impeding one another; this is why they are perceived as if they were a single illumination.⁷⁶

This leads to other questions. For example:

If this is the case, then why — just as the trees and stones [developed] in a person’s mind are mutually separated, being obstructive (*sapratigha*) *dharma*-s — is it that the mountains, rivers, the earth, etc., developed [in the consciousnesses] of each of a multitude of people, reside in one and the same place without impeding one another?

Answer: Because *karma*-s are either similar or dissimilar. — [What is developed in the consciousnesses of a multitude of people by virtue of their common *karma*-s that are similar is mutually non-obstructive. The trees, stones, etc., which are developed in an individual’s consciousness from his own *karma*-s that are dissimilar, are mutually obstructive.] ...⁷⁷

Another related issue discussed in CWSL is as follows: When the receptacle-world is about to disintegrate when no sentient being remains therein, or, at the commencement of its formation when it is not yet inhabited, whose retribution-consciousness (*vipāka-vijñāna*) is it that develops the receptacle world? The answer is that, even in such situations, the receptacle-world would still continue to exist as an image developed in the consciousnesses of other sentient beings residing in other universes, belonging to the same evolutionary stage (*bhūmi*) — e.g., the consciousnesses of other beings of the *kāma-dhātu* stage, though residing in some other universe, can develop an image of the *kāma-dhātu* of this universe. The reason is as follows:

A land (receptacle-world) is developed in order to serve as support and means of subsistence (受用; **paribhoga*) for the material body. Thus, [the consciousness of a sentient being] will develop [as an image of a land] if that [land]

can serve the [sentient being's] body as a support and means of subsistence. Accordingly, even if [a sentient being] is born at a specific evolutionary stage [of, say *kāma-dhātu*,] in another land (universe), his consciousness can still develop into [an image of that corresponding stage of] this land.⁷⁸

In this connection, Zhizhou, a grand pupil of Kuiji, discusses an interesting issue that serves as an interesting illustration of the type of inter-subjectivity envisageable in the *viññaptimātratā* doctrine which permits common experiences based on common developments of many sentient beings' consciousnesses:

Question: Consider the case of a tree, commonly developed (共變) by sentient beings, being cut down by a single sentient being for his use. Is [this tree] one that has been developed by his own [consciousness] or one that has also been developed by others' consciousnesses?

If it is one that has been developed from his own [consciousness] alone, then what has been developed from [the consciousnesses of] others should still remain alive (intact) — but then why is the tree [now] seen?

If it is one that has also been [commonly] developed from others' [consciousnesses], then why is it said to be *viññaptimātra* [— being clearly a case of the existence of an object outside one's own consciousness]?

Answer: Trees, etc., being produced from common seeds, are all mutually conforming, mutually augmentative (皆相隨順 · 互有增益). That which has been developed from [the consciousness of] a given sentient being serves directly (*sākṣāt*) for him as a cognitive object. That which has been developed from [the consciousness of] another constitutes a condition of dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*) for that which has been developed from his own [consciousness]; it [thus] also serves remotely as a cognitive object. Taken together, their mutual relation is thus: what is [developed from] one's own [consciousness] is that which is conformed to; what is [developed from] another's [consciousness] is that which conforms to. When what is conformed to is absent, then what conforms to also comes to cease accordingly. Hence, the case of the destruction of a tree is also *viññaptimātra*.⁷⁹

Not only is the universe, which is experienced by us, *viññaptimātra*, but all the pure lands of the Buddhas too are development of their knowledges (their pure consciousnesses) — and hence not outside the mind. Moreover, the practitioners can experience a Buddha in his spiritual dimension and interact with

him only when there is a corresponding development in their own consciousnesses as *nimitta-bhāga*. Thus:

The pure consciousness associated with [a Buddha's] *ādarśa-jñāna*, from the time of attaining Buddhhood till the end of futurity, continuously develops into a pure buddha-land. This results from the maturation of the outflow-free (*anāsrava*) causes and conditions for a pure buddha-land, cultivated in the past for his own benefits (*ātma-hita*). ...

[A Buddha's] *samatā-jñāna*, by virtue of Great Compassion, develops into a pure land in conformity to the need of the bodhisattvas abiding in the ten *bhūmi*-s. This results from the maturation of the outflow-free causes and conditions for a pure buddha-land which were cultivated in the past for others' benefits (*para-hita*). ...

[A Buddha's] *kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna*, by virtue of Great Compassion, creates a buddha-land — pure or impure, small or big, subject to modification — in conformity to the need of those sentient beings who have not yet ascended the stages (*bhūmi-ākrānta*). This results from the maturation of the outflow-free causes and conditions for a pure or impure buddha-land, cultivated in the past for others' benefits.⁸⁰

The common and non-common developments of mental images in the case of the Buddhas, and the type of spiritual interaction between the Buddhas and those to be guided (*vineya*-s; 所化) in keeping with the *vijñāptimātratā* doctrine, is well illustrated in the following description:

[The *sambhogakāya*-s and *nirmāṇakāya*-s] with their lands developed by the Tathāgatas may be either common or non-common, depending on the sentient beings to be guided (*vineya*) by them.

[I.] Where one sentient being is to be guided by several Buddhas (the *vineya* is common; 所化共者) [with whom he has been karmically connected and on whom he is thus dependent for guidance]: Each of the Buddhas simultaneously develops, in the same location, a body and a land — all resembling one another in appearance, mutually non-impeding and comingling to serve as condition of dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*) which makes the *vineya*'s own consciousness develop [into an image of a particular body of the Buddha in a particular land]: He experiences that, in that particular land, there is that particular Buddha-body displaying supernormal powers and preaching the Dharma for his benefit.

[II.] Where numerous sentient beings are to be guided by a single Buddha (the *vineya*-s are non-common; 於不共者): A single Buddha alone develops a body and a land [to be experienced by these sentient beings who have been karmically connected with him and hence are necessarily dependent on his guidance].⁸¹

In summary: In keeping with the fundamental Buddhist position that nothing arises from a single cause, this *viññaptimātratā* doctrine of CWSL does not claim that there is only a common single consciousness from which everything is “developed”. Rather, it teaches that:

- I. Epistemologically, every act of cognition necessarily involves a cognitive object in the form of a mental image developed from within consciousness itself. There is no cognitive object that exists outside consciousness.
- II. Ontologically, only mental entities exist. Absolute reality, *tathatā*, being the real nature of consciousness, is also *viññaptimātra*.
- III. Every sentient being is constituted of eight types of consciousness, each associated with a set of thought-concomitants (*caitta*-s). All conscious and unconscious acts, together with their experiences of the complex of phenomenal activities, ultimately have their sources in the *ālaya-vijñāna*, the most subliminal consciousness.
- IV. The universe in which sentient beings inhabit, although experienced as an objectively existing common universe, is, in fact, individually projected from the common seeds — collective *karma* — in each inhabitant’s *ālaya-vijñāna*. The pure lands of the Buddhas too, are also a development from their pure knowledges (*jñāna*) — hence also in keeping with the principle of *viññaptimātratā*.
- V. With an articulate theory of the “immediate/direct cognitive object” and “remote cognitive object”, a doctrine consistent with *viññaptimātratā* is developed purporting to explain our common-sense experience of a commonly experienced universe of complex inter-subjectivity, as well as the spiritual experiences of the interaction between the *vineya* and the Buddhas.

Abbreviations

- CWSL *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論 T31, no. 1585.
- La Siddhi* Louis de La Vallée Poussin (tr.), *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang*. Tome I & II (Paris, 1928).
- Shuji* *Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji* 成唯識論述記 T43, no. 1830.
- TVB *Triṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣya*. In: Lévi, S. (ed.), *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Deux Traités de Vasubandhu*. (Paris, 1925).
- TVB(T) Teramoto, Enga (ed.), *Sthiramati's Triṃśikā-bhāṣyaṃ (Sum-Cu-paḥi ḥGrel-pa) A Tibetan Text* (Kyoto, 1933).
- YBŚ *Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra* 瑜伽師地論 T30, no. 1579.

Endnotes:

- ¹ The Chinese transliteration is given by Kuiji in his 《成唯識論掌中樞要》 T43, no. 1831, 608c26–27: 或毘若底摩呾刺多毘輪度迦(淨也)奢薩咀羅。應言“識唯淨論”; 今云“淨唯識論”。
- ² CWSL, 59a17–19.
- ³ *Shuji*, 237b3–c18. Of these three views, Kuiji discusses the first at relatively greater length, possibly suggesting that he himself favours this view.
- ⁴ *Shuji*, 229a21–26: 淨彼真識, 成斯雅論; 名曰成唯識論, 或名淨唯識論。義苞權·實; 陵鷲嶽而飛高。理洞希夷; 拚龍宮而騰彩。總諸經之綱領, 索隱涵宗。括眾論之菁華, 掇奇提異。風飛三量, 而外道靡旗; 泉涌二因, 則小乘亂轍。
- ⁵ See *Selected Works of Lü Cheng*. Vol I–V. (Beijing, 1991) 呂澂佛學論著選集, 2931 f.
- ⁶ *Shuji*, 229c28–230a4.
- ⁷ Cf. In his preface to his *Shuji*, Kuiji speaks of the *Triṃśikā* as being one of the ten subsidiaries (*Shuji*, 229a12–13).
- ⁸ T43, no. 1832, 666a26–b10:
 1. 百法明門論 *Mahāyāna-śatadharma-prakāśamukhaśātra*;
 2. 五蘊論 *Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa*;
 3. *Xian-yang Sheng-jiao Lun*;
 4. **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*;
 5. 雜集論 **Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya*;
 6. *Madhyānta-vibhāga*;
 7. *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*;
 8. *Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*;
 9. *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra*;
 10. **Yogavibhāga*.
- ⁹ *Shuji*, 229b17–19: 斯本彙聚十釋群分。今總詳譯糅為一部。商摧華·梵, 徵詮輕·重, 陶甄諸義之差, 有叶一師之製。
- ¹⁰ *Shuji*, 231c6–232a6.
- ¹¹ 《成唯識論掌中樞要》 T43, no. 1831, 608b29–c14: 初功之際, 十釋別翻。... 久而遂許, 故得此論行焉。大師理遣三賢, 獨授庸拙。
- ¹² *Shuji*, 232a8–12: 製此釋者雖十論師, 於中, 護法聲德獨振。故此論題, 特以標首。此師所說, 最有研尋; 於諸義中, 多為南指邪徒失趣正理得方。迥拔眾師, 穎超群聖者, 其惟一人乎。
- ¹³ 《大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳》 T50, no. 2053, 244a7–11.
- ¹⁴ 《大唐大慈恩寺三藏法師傳》 T50, no. 2053, 244a7–23.
- ¹⁵ Cf. *Selected Works of Lü Cheng* Vol. I–V, 2932–2935.
- ¹⁶ See also La Vallée Poussin's discussion in *La Siddhi*, 416 f.

- 17 CWSL, 38c16–17: 是諸識轉變，分別、所分別。由此彼皆無。故一切唯識。
- 18 TVB: *tena trividhena vikalpenālayavijñānakliṣṭamanahpravṛttivijñānasvabhāvena saṣaṃ-prayogeṇa yadvikalpyate ... tannāstīyataḥ sa vijñānapariṇāmo vikalpa ucyate* |
- 19 CWSL, 10a17–c12.
- 20 *Shuji*, 317b30–c4.
- 21 *Shuji*, 320c20–22.
- 22 CWSL, 10b17.
- 23 CWSL, 10b18–28.
- 24 CWSL, 55a11–12: 由此能持染淨法種，與染淨法俱為所依。聖道轉令捨染得淨。
- 25 CWSL, 55, a14–15: 由此能作迷悟根本，諸染淨法依之得生。聖道轉令捨染得淨。
- 26 CWSL, 51a3–16.
- 27 **durbalīkaraṇa-vardhana-parāvṛtti* | **upaghāta-vardhana-parāvṛtti* (?). The Tibetan version of the **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* gives “*nyam cung bar byed cing rgyas par gyur pa*”. La Vallée Poussin’s *La Siddhi* suggests “*balodghāta-prabhāvavardhana-parāvṛtti*”.
- 28 CWSL, 54c1–22. Sthiramati’s TVB enumerates only two types of *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, i.e., *sottarā* and *niruttarā*, apparently corresponding to the *hīna*- and *vipula-āśrayaparāvṛtti* here.
- 29 CWSL, 54c18–22: 廣大轉，謂大乘位。為利他故，趣大菩提。生死涅槃俱無欣厭。具能通達二空真如，雙斷所知煩惱障種，頓證無上菩提涅槃，有勝堪；名廣大轉。此中意說廣大轉依；捨二麁重而證得故。
- 30 CWSL, 54c16–18: 下劣轉，謂二乘位。專求自利，厭苦欣寂。唯能通達生空真如，斷煩惱種，證真擇滅，無勝堪能；名下劣轉。
- 31 *Shuji*, 593c15c–16: 無勝堪能者，無一切智等故。
- 32 CWSL, 51a20–21: 云何證得二種轉依？謂十地中，修十勝行，斷十重障，證十真如。二種轉依，由斯證得。
- 33 CWSL, 55b16–19.
- 34 This is a probable reading of Xuanzang’s translation. The Tibetan seems to mean: “It has as its characteristic the *āśraya* for both the abandoning of defilement and the non-relinquishment of *samsāra*, viz, the *āśraya-parāvṛtti*.”
- 35 **Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (G. Nagao’s edn): *spong ba’i khyad par ji ltar blta zhe na* | *byang chub sems dpa’ rnam kyī spong ba ni mi gnas pa’i mya ngan las ‘das pa gang yin pa’o* || *de’i mtshan nyid ni* | *gang nyon mongs pa yongs su btang ba dang bcas pa* | *‘khor ba yongs su mi gtong ba’i gnas te gnas gyur pa’o* || *de la ‘khor ba ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de kun nas nyon mongs pa’i char gtogs pa’o* || *mya ngan las ‘das pa ni de nyid rnam par byang ba’i char gtogs pa’o* || *gnas ni de nyid gnyi ga’i char gtogs pa ste* | *gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid do* || *gzhan gyur pa ni gang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de nyid kyī gnyen po skyes na gang kun nas ngon mongs pa’i cha ldog cing rnam par byang ba’i char gyur pa’o* ||
- Cf. T31, no. 1594, 148c13–18. See also Vasubandhu’s commentary, T31, no. 1598, 434c26–435a10.

³⁶ *acitta 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca | āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulya-hānitah ||*

³⁷ CWSL, 4b26.

³⁸ 《觀所緣緣論》T31, no. 1624, 888c17–20:

內色如外現，為識所緣緣：許彼相在識，及能生識故。

外境雖無，而有內色，似外境現，為所緣緣：許眼等識帶彼相起，及從彼生；具二義故。

³⁹ *Shuji*, 271c22–272a2:

論：見託彼生帶彼相故。

述曰：顯具所緣・緣義。若緣本質有法・無法，心內影像定必須有。此既有體，見託彼生——即是緣義。然心起時，帶彼相起，名為所緣。帶，是挾帶逼附之義。由具二義，與小乘別。雖無分別緣真如時無有似境相，而亦挾帶真如體起；名所緣緣。如自證分 ... 相者是何？所謂體相。真如無遍計所執相，名無相；仍有體相。故經言：“一切諸相共同一相，所謂無相”。

⁴⁰ See CWSL, 40, c19–21: 親所緣緣，能緣皆有；離內所慮託必不生故。疎所緣緣，能緣或有；離外所慮託，亦得生故。

⁴¹ The 16th century master Zhixu (智旭, 1599–1655) speaks of the difference between “carrying through developing it” (*bian-dai* 變帶) and “carrying along with it” (*jia-dai* 挾帶), and between “substance-form” (*ti-xiang* 體相) and “appearance-form” (*xiang-zhuang* 相狀): “When the *mūla-jñāna* (the non-conceptualizing knowledge) takes *tathatā* as object, it does so by carrying along with it (挾帶) the substance-form, which is its condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*). ... When the *darśana-bhāga* of a *sāsrava citta-caitta* or the *anāsrava prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna* takes an object, it does so by developing its form (變相而緣) — whether there is a *bimba* or not, it is the appearance-form [which the cognizing consciousness carries through developing it] that is called the *ālambana-pratyaya*.” (《成唯識論觀心法要》CBETA, X51, no. 824, 402a16–23: 帶有二義：一者挾帶，二者變帶。相亦二義：一者體相，二者相狀。若根本智緣真如，是挾帶體相而緣，是所緣緣 ... 若有漏心心所及無漏後得智見分緣境之時，變相而緣；不論有質無質，皆是變帶相狀，名所緣緣。...)

⁴² *yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ naivopalabhate tadā | sthitaṃ vijñānamātratre grāhyābhāve tadagahāt ||*

⁴³ CWSL, 49c18–21.

La Vallée Poussin's reading (*La Siddhi* 585 f.) is somewhat different: “*Quand le Bodhi-sattva obtient, à l'endroit de l'objet (ālambana-artha), le Nirvikalpakañjāna qui n'a pas d'upalabhya parce qu'il ne prend pas les nānāprapañcanimittas, alors le Bodhisattva ...*”.

⁴⁴ CWSL, 49c27–50a4.

⁴⁵ *Shuji*: 569b24–26: 此緣真智，挾帶真如之體相起，故名所緣。非帶彼相。

分影像而起名緣於如，不離如故。

⁴⁶ *Shuji*, 500c6–7: 無分別智不似真如相起，應非所緣緣。

⁴⁷ *Shuji*, 500c7–9.

⁴⁸ *Shuji*, 500c9–12: 汝不解我義。帶者，是挾帶義。相者，體相；非相狀義。謂：正智等生時，

- 挾帶真如之體相起。與真如不一不異；非相非非相。 See also *La Siddhi*, p. 445.
- 49 It is of course quite possible that he could have orally explained it in such a manner to Kuiji privately.
- 50 KL Dhammajoti, “Ākāra and Direct Perception: Vaibhāṣika versus Sautrāntika”. In: *Buddhist Studies (Bukkyō Kenkyū)*, Vol. XXXV, 2007: 23.ĀĀhhhh
- 51 Saṃghabhadra (T29, 684a) speaks of the insight arising in *satyābhisamaya* as the 真現量證智.
- 52 T27, no. 1545, 219a.
- 53 The names of the three respective masters are specified in *Shuji*.
- 54 CWSL, 1a14–18.
- 55 Wei Tat, *Cheng Wei-shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere Consciousness* (Hong Kong, 1973), xii–xiii.
- 56 TVB, 35 f.: *tena trividhena vikalpenālayavijñāna-kliṣṭamanah-pravṛttivijñāna-sva-bhāvena sasamprayogeṇa yad vikalpyate bhājanam ātmā skandha-dhātv-āyatana-rūpa-śabdādikaṃ vastu tan nāstīyataḥ sa vijñānapariṇāmo vikalpa ucyate | asadālabhana-tvāt | katham punar etad vijñāyate tadālabhanam asaditi | yaddhi yasya kāraṇam tasmin samagre cāviruddhe ca tadutpadyate nānyataḥ | vijñānam ca māyā-gandharvanagara-svapna-timirādāv asaty ālabhane jāyate | yadi ca vijñānasyālabhanapratibaddha ut-pādaḥ syāt | evaṃ sati māyādiṣv arthābhāvān na vijñānam utpadyate | tasmāt pūrvakān niruddhāt tajjātiyavijñānād vijñānam utpadyate | na bāhyād arthāt | tasminn asaty api bhāvāt | ... tasmāt adhyāropitarūpatvād vikalpasyālabhanam asaditi pratipattavyaṃ | anena tāvat samāropāntaṃ parihṛtya apavādāntaparijihīṣayā āha |*
tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakaṃ
iti | ... yāsmāt pariṇāmātmakena vikalpena yad vikalpyate tena tannāsti | tasmād viśayābhāvāt sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakaṃ | sarvamiti traidhātukaṃ asaṃskṛtaṃ ca | mātra-śabdā tadadhikaviśayavyavacchedārthaḥ |
- 57 For Sthiramati's view, see *Shuji*, 241b7–9: 安惠解云：變謂識體轉似二分。二分體無，遍計所執。
- 58 TVB: *kathametad gamyate vinā bāhyenārthena vijñānamevārthākāramutpadyata iti | ... saṃcitālabhanāśca pañcavijñānakāyāstadākārātvāt | ... tasmād vinaiva bāhyenārthena vijñānam saṃcitākāramutpadyate | ...*
- 59 KL Dhammajoti, “Abhidharma Debate on the Nature of the Objects of Sensory Perception”. In: *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. X (Colombo, 2012), 204 f.
- 60 TVB: *tasmād vinaiva bāhyenārthena vijñānam saṃcitākāramutpadyate |*
- 61 TVB(T): *don dam par yod pa ma yin pas ...* — They do not exist from the absolute point of view.
- 62 TVB: *sarvaṃ vijñeyaṃ parikalpitasvabhāvatvād vastuto na vidyate | vijñānam punaḥ pratītyasamutpannatvād dravyato'stiyabhyupeyaṃ | pratītyasamutpannatvaṃ punar vijñānasya pariṇāmaśabdena jñāpitam |*
- 63 TVB: *kathametad gamyate vinā bāhyenārthena vijñānamevārthākāramutpadyata iti |*

bāhyo hyarthaḥ svābhāsavijñānanakatvena vijñānasyālabhanapratyaya iṣyate nu tu kāraṇatvamātreṇa ... |

Cf. TVB(T): *phyi rol gyi don med par rnam par zes pa nyid don gyi rnam par 'byung ba 'di ji ltar zes par rung she na | phyi rol gyi don ni bdag snang ba'i rnam par zes pa bskyed pa'i phyir rnam par zes pa'i dmigs pa'i rkyen du 'dod kyi byed rgyu tsam du 'dod pa ni ma yin de* | ...

- 64 CWSL, 1a29–b2: 變謂識體轉似二分。相見俱依自證起故。依斯二分，施設我法。

Shuji 241a2–5: 護法等云：謂諸識體即自證分，轉似相見二分而生。此說識體是依他性。轉似相見二分非無；亦依他起。

For Sthiramati, the two *bhāga*-s are non-existent, being of the nature of *parikalpita*. Cf. *Shuji*, 487a8–10: 轉變者，變現義。即識自體，現似二相。實非二相；其實二相，即所執故，即遍計所執。似依他有，理實無也。

- 65 Cf *Shuji*, 243b24–26: 由內識體是依他故，必依種子因緣所生。非體是無，如遍計境；彼實我法猶如龜毛。

- 66 CWSL, 1b7–13: 愚夫所計實我實法，都無所有；但隨妄情而施設，故說之為假。內識所變似我似法，雖有而非實我法性；然似彼現，故說為假。外境隨情而施設故，非有如識。內識必依因緣生故，非無如境。由此，便遮增減二執。境依內識而假立故，唯世俗有；識是假境所依事故，亦勝義有。

- 67 *Shuji*, 243c2–7: 由此，內識體性非無；心外我法體性非有。便遮外計離心之境實有增執，及遮邪見惡取空者撥識亦無損減空執。即離空有說唯識教。有心外法，輪迴生死；覺知一心，生死永棄。可謂無上處中道理。

- 68 CWSL, 39c10–14: 誰說他心非自識境？但不說彼是親所緣。謂：... 但如鏡等，似外境現，名了他心。非親能了。親所了者，謂自所變。

- 69 CWSL, 39c17–28: 豈唯識教，但說一識？不爾如何？汝應諦聽！若唯一識，寧有十方凡聖尊卑因果等別？誰為誰說？何法何求？

- 70 CWSL, 39c21–28: 豈唯識教但說一識？不爾如何？汝應諦聽！若唯一識，寧有十方凡聖尊卑因果等別？誰為誰說？何法何求？故唯識言，有深意趣。識言總顯：一切有情各有八識·六位心所·所變相見·分位差別及彼空理所顯真如——識自相故，識相應故，二所變故，三分位故，四實性故。

如是諸法，皆不離識，總立識名。唯言但遮愚夫所執，定離諸識實有色等。

若如是知唯識教意，便能無倒善備資糧，速入法空，證無上覺，救拔含識生死輪迴。非全撥無惡取空者，違背教理，能成是事。故定應信一切唯識。

- 71 *Shuji*, 321b9–11: 且諸種子總有二種：一是共相；二不共相。何者為共相？多人所感故。（“There are two types of seeds: one, common/shared; the other, non-common/unshared. What are common seeds? They are those effectuated by a multitude of people.”）

- 72 CWSL, 10c14–16: 雖諸有情所變各別，而相相似，處所無異。如眾燈明，各遍似一。

- 73 *Shuji*: 321c16: 此釋共果，同在一處，不相障礙。

- 74 *Shuji*, 321b11–15: 雖知人人所變各別，名為唯識；然有相似共受用義，說名共相。實非自變，他能用之。若能用者，此即名緣心外法故。然，我此物為增上緣，令多人可共受用，名共相。

- ⁷⁵ See KL Dhammajoti, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Hong Kong, 2009), 426 f.
- ⁷⁶ *Shuji*, 321c18–21.
- ⁷⁷ *Shuji*, 321c21–25: 問曰：若爾，且如一人心上木、石，更互相隔，以是障礙有對法故；何故眾多各變山河及大地等，不相障隔，同在一處？ 答：由業相似、不相似故。...
- ⁷⁸ CWSL, 10c28–11a1: 所變土，本為色身依持受用。故若於身可有持用，便變為彼。由是，設生他方自地，彼識亦得變為此土。
- ⁷⁹ 《成唯識論演秘》T43, no. 1833, 867c13–21: 問：且如一樹，有情共變；而一有情，伐用之時，為用自變？為兼用他？若唯自者：餘人變者，應存不亡——樹何不見。若亦用他：何名唯識？ 答：樹等既是共相種生，皆相隨順，互有增益。彼一有情自所變者，所緣親用；他所變者，與自所變為增上緣，亦疎緣用。一切相望：自為所順，他為能順。由所順無，能順亦滅。由斯，樹喪唯識亦成。 In this context, Zhizhou cites the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* and the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* (see T30, 597c28–598a9) in support of his explanations.
- ⁸⁰ CWSL, 58b29–c16.
- ⁸¹ CWSL, 58c17–26.

Remarks by the Translators

After publishing the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu with Motilal Banarsidass in 2012, we were requested by Motilal to continue translating and publishing Louis de La Vallée's work within what is now known as *The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin*.

Thus, the *Abhidharmakośa* (in 4 parts) will be Volume I of these *Collected Works* and the present *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* (in 3 parts) will be Volume II of the *Collected Works*. Volume II will be followed by three further volumes:

Volume III: Abhidharma, Yogācāra and Madhyamaka

Volume IV: Tantra – Vinaya – Hastings articles – Buddhist notes;

Volume V: Miscellaneous writings.

The Advisory Board for this publication series consists of Ernst Steinkellner, David Seyfard Rugg, Lambert Schmithausen and Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti.

The General Editor is Gelong Lodrö Sangpo.

In the following, the reader will find a few comments in regard to the three parts of Volume II:

As for part 1 of Volume II, since the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* and the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* are now included within *The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin*, we have requested Professor David Seyfard Rugg to do the honors of writing an introduction to *The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin* which, of course, would be better located in Volume I of the *Collected Works*. But due to our “belated start”, his introduction is now included in our present Volume II. This new introduction covers the following topics:

1. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (January 1, 1869 – February 18, 1938)
2. La Vallée Poussin as a historian of India
3. Translation and other work on Buddhist doctrine, ritual and philosophy
 - a. Writings destined for an educated but non-specialized public
 - b. Specialized later articles and monographs
 - c. Engaging with perennial issues in the history of Buddhist thought
4. Relevance of the present publication

Rugg concludes that La Vallée Poussin's “contribution to the study of Buddhism can be said to have set a standard that has not been surpassed”.

We have further requested Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti, who wrote the general introduction to the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (Volume I), to also write the introduction to the *Cheng Wei-shi Lun*. His new introduction covers the following topics:

1. Composition of the *Cheng Wei-shi Lun*: its background and features
2. The question of Xuanzang's contribution to CWSL
 - 2.1. Xuanzang's at times interpretive translation of the *Triṃśikā*
 - 2.2. Critical synthesis of Yogācāra doctrines, as illustrated in the exposition of the *bhāga* theory
 - 2.3. Exposition of *āśraya-parāvṛtti*: Another illustration of syncretic integration of diverse Yogācāra doctrines to definitively distinguish the *bodhi-sattva* ideal and its path from those of the two *yāna*-s
 - 2.4. The influence of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma on Xuanzang and his own doctrinal contribution
3. The doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* in CWSL.

The above two introductions are placed at the beginning of Part 1 of Volume II. They are followed by the *Remarks of the Translators*, a list of abbreviations used in our English translation, the table of contents of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* and the first part of the main translation, i.e., the English translation of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* by Xuanzang.

Part 2 of Volume II continues with the second part of the English translation of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* followed by La Vallée Poussin's appendix, which in turn is followed by a newly added appendix: *One Hundred Dharmas in Yogācāra* by Vasubandhu. This in turn is followed by La Vallée Poussin's index which was published in 1948. The original index of La Vallée Poussin was completed by Étienne Lamotte but consists of only a general Sanskrit index plus an index of proper names. Please note that we have added many new entries to the original index and enlarged it to a General Sanskrit-English Index-Glossary with the hope that it will be helpful to the general reader.

Part 3 of Volume II is entitled: *Tools for the Study of Louis de La Vallée Poussin's Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi (Cheng Wei-shi Lun)*. Part 3 is entirely the work of Professor Alexander Leonhard Mayer. In his Preface he writes:

The goal of this volume is to make La Vallée Poussin's translation as transparent as possible. In order to allow to unequivocally identify passages and freely move back and forth between them, we have adopted the traditional system of internal referencing, the "Exegetic Map" (*kepan* 科判) (F) going back to Kuiji and well es-

established in East Asia. For this Map we have been working on the basis of Saeki Jōin's 佐伯定胤 (1867–1952) *Shindō Jō yuishiki ron* 新導成唯識論 (1941), which in turn is based on Saeki Kyoguga's 佐伯旭雅 (1826–1889) *Kandō* edition (1888). This *Kandō* edition is La Vallée Poussin's master-text. Our Exegetic Map is here combined with the parsing of the *Cheng weishi lun* in Kuiji's *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記, which is (together with the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*) the single most important source informing La Vallée Poussin's interpretation of the *Cheng weishi lun*. ...

The present “Tools” volume provides four concordances. The first three use our Exegetic Map as pivot. The way how the traditional Exegetic Map works will be explained at the beginning of the section (F).

The first of the concordances (B.) serves the purpose to navigate between the Western translations indebted to La Vallée Poussin.

The second concordance (C.) draws together nine major modern or early modern Chinese and Japanese editions of the *Cheng weishi lun* and the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* in order to allow this present translation to be studied in the context of and in conjunction with other scholarly endeavors.

The third (D.) concordances the editions of the two main texts used by La Vallée Poussin: for the *Cheng weishi lun* the *Kandō* edition and for Kuiji's *Cheng weishi lun shuji* the Kyōto edition. Both are referenced with the respective Taishō editions (T.31.1585, T.43.1830). Additionally, within the translation itself, I have tried to identify in the Taishō edition (to the extent possible) many passages quoted by La Vallée Poussin from works in editions no longer widely used.

The fourth concordance (E.) addresses (to the extent feasible) the issue of La Vallée Poussin's many references to the *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya*.

The corner-stone of this “Tools” volume consists in the Exegetic Map (F) together with the arranged Chinese text of the *Cheng weishi lun* mapped on this *Kepan* map.

In the introductory chapter (A.), I have outlined some major aspects of Xuanzang's life and scholarly career as well as of the place of the *Cheng weishi lun* within his scholarly work and in 20th century East Asia.

Alexander's work will, of course, be greatly appreciated by scholars, but the more general reader of the translation will also greatly benefit (although maybe more unnoticed) since the insertion of the *Kepan* referencing into the English translation of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, as well as the insertions of the countless bracketed Chinese characters into the English translation (which were not part of the French translation), allowed our

English translation to become much clearer since the reader is now able to trace things back quickly to the Chinese terms used in the original Chinese text and to other further clarifying passages within the entire *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*. In other words, these tools allow the general reader to be one step closer to the original Chinese text without having to be able to read Chinese.

Since so much has already been said in the two introductions by Professor David Seyfort Ruegg and Professor Dhammajoti, as well as by Alexander Mayer's "Tools" volume, there is not much need to add more here, apart from a few words about our general "translation approach" and a few words of thanks to people who were instrumental for this translation.

As for our translation approach, it is obvious that any translation within *The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin* would need to aspire to stay as close as possible, or to be justifiable, in terms of Louis de La Vallée's thought. On the other hand, every translation is of course a translation and there is always some leeway and some ambiguity when moving from one language to another, in particular in a situation where the French is a translation from the Chinese (Xuanzang). In such a situation, an English translation obviously also needs to aspire to stay as close as possible to the Chinese. This then obviously sometimes leads to the dilemma of "which master to follow", i.e., La Vallée Poussin or Xuanzang.

In this context, we must also consider that Western Buddhist philosophy did not stand still since La Vallée Poussin. We nowadays also have the advantage of using "electronic means", for example, to quickly search a text to immediately identify the passages where a particular term shows up and which could thus be quickly consulted in order to clarify a specific issue.

Besides these general translation issues and the advance in Western Buddhist philosophy, we also had to contend with the issue addressed by which Professor Ruegg in his *Introduction*, namely, La Vallée Poussin's own particular style of translating his "*Siddhi*":

His later translations – made from Chinese as well as from Sanskrit or Tibetan and intended largely for specialists – were written in a "macaronic" style combining French renderings with Buddhist terminology in Sanskrit, ...

In general, in his translation of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, La Vallée Poussin provides a translated French term for a Sanskrit term at the first occurrence of the Sanskrit term, but this is often not the case in his *Siddhi*, where, not infrequently, he uses only Sanskrit terms and often, later, he simply repeats these Sanskrit terms without providing a translation. In addition, where he uses Chinese transliterations, they are ren-

dered in the French (EFEO) transliteration system, which of course makes things difficult for the modern reader who is not proficient enough with Sanskrit terms or not familiar with the EFEO system.

To solve these issues and to open up the text to a more general readership, we thought it would be best to provide the following strategies:

As for Chinese transliteration, Alexander Mayer transferred all EFEO renderings into Pinyin renderings. Alexander also provided the Taishō text references for many of the “older” editions used by La Vallée Poussin which are now no longer widely used.

As for the Sanskrit renderings, in general, we tried translating the Sanskrit terms but preserved the latter in brackets. In addition, we added many of the original Chinese terms in Chinese characters. As for the Sanskrit terms, they are often La Vallée Poussin’s own renderings based on his sources or are his reconstructions. As for our added Chinese terms, they are, of course, based on Xuanzang’s original text of the *Cheng weishi lun* or on the respective works quoted..

Thus, in some sense, we made things a little more complex but more precise for scholars, on the other hand, we have tried to make the translated text also more accessible to the general reader or the non-initiate.

While inserting Chinese characters into the English translation and in the process of proof reading some passages against the Chinese original text, we also noticed that La Vallée Poussin sometimes simplified or omitted certain passages or added phrases or passages (mostly based on Kuiji’s commentary: *Shuji*) but did not mark them as inserts. We therefore sometimes “filled in” (using < > angle brackets) these simplified or omitted passages, or we “bracketed” phrases or passages that La Vallée Poussin added based on commentaries. However, we did the latter often only when they were somewhat longer.

Occasionally, we also noticed that La Vallée Poussin moved an entire paragraph to a new location. We took therefore sometimes the liberty to reinsert a paragraph into its original location.

When doing so, we, in general, “footnoted” the “relocation”.

Occasionally, we also noticed that “some unintended mishap” must have occurred in the French translation. Unless it was too overt, we simply footnoted these “mishaps”.

In general, our approach mainly was to stay “faithful” to La Vallée Poussin’s thought and translation, while at the same time “keeping an eye open” for what the original Chinese text had to offer. In most cases, these two considerations were easy to combine. In case we were not able to find a solution, we simply footnoted the issue. But in

most cases, the French translation and the Chinese original text were agreeing just fine. As for thanking people who were instrumental for this translation, the first thank you has to go to my co-translator, Gelongma Migme Chödrön. There is simply no way to really thank her enough because, without her, this translation would never have taken place, since more than ten years ago, I had asked her to provide me with a “draft translation” for my own personal use, which she then not only provided within a year, but then also proceeded to proof check with the ample and able help of my French friend Tsültrim Palmo (Danielle Lamoureux) who checked the entire translation against the French.

And, of course, Migme Chödrön has been an indispensable help to me for over thirty years, tirelessly trying to free the world from my “Germanisms”.

Another person, without whose help this translation would never have seen the light of day, is, of course, Alexander Mayer, since without his excellent Chinese linguistic skills I would never have dared to undertake publishing an English translation of La Vallée Poussin’s French translation from the Chinese. It is somewhat rare to openly and frankly being able to discuss topics over many years, and this often a few times daily via e-mail. As pointed out above, he brought a whole new dimension into this translation project.

Well, it seems that nothing more needs to be said besides thanking our Advisory Board, namely, Ernst Steinkellner, David Seyfort Ruegg, Lambert Schmithausen and Bhikkhu KL Dhammajoti for words of encouragement at the right time to deservedly honor Louis de La Vallée Poussin for his great contribution to Western Buddhist scholarship via this publication series of *The Works of Louis de la Vallée Poussin*, plus Motilal Banarsidass for requesting us to translate and edit his works.

Lodrö Sangpo

Fall River, January 1, 2016
(birthday of Louis de La Vallée Poussin)

Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi

The *Siddhi* of Xuanzang

Translated and annotated

by

Louis de La Vallée Poussin

Preface

The treatise entitled *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (T.31.1585)¹ is presented in the form of a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Thirty Stanzas* (*Trimśikā*), the latter being published (1925) by S. Lévi [*Trentaine*] with the commentary by Sthiramati. This treatise, translated by Xuanzang, has as its authors "Dharmapāla and the nine other commentators of the *Trimśikā*"; this is the assertion of Kuiji, a disciple of Xuanzang. Indeed, we have a compilation from the hand of Xuanzang who, in his own way, has placed into the framework provided by the *Trimśikā* extracts from numerous commentators of the *Trimśikā* (Dharmapāla, Guṇamati, Sthiramati, etc.), extracts from numerous treatises of Asaṅga, Dignāga, Vasubandhu, etc., not to speak of the Sūtras. Xuanzang has, in that way, established a "Summary" which until today remained the classical work of the school of the

¹ *Editors: Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論, *Vidyāmātrasiddhi(-śāstra)*. Compiled by the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla and (nine) others. Translated by Xuanzang 玄奘, A.D. 659, of the Tang dynasty, A.D. 618–907. 10 fasciculi [*juan*]. This is the famous commentary on the *Trimśikā* (T.31.1586), but the Sanskrit text is said to have consisted of ten commentaries on the same text, by as many authors. This translation is an abstract of the ten commentaries mixed together, which was made by the translator, Xuanzang. See the preface by Chen Xuanming 沈玄明, a contemporary of the translator. "In the Tibetan Catalogue, *Cheng weishi lun* (T.31.1585) is said to agree with the Tibetan version, but the latter is not found." Cf. *Kaiyuan lu* (T.55.2154.0609b08).

Weishi sanshi lun song 唯識三十論頌 (T.31.1586). Composed by the Bodhisattva Vasubandhu. Translated by Xuanzang, A.D. 648, of the Tang dynasty. 6 leaves. It consists of 30 verses explained in *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論. It agrees with Tibetan. Cf. *Kaiyuan lu* (T.55.2154.0609b05).

“Dharmalakṣaṇa”, the Hossō-shū school (法相宗), the Vijñānavādin or “Idealist” school. — The *Siddhi* is, for this school, what the *Abhidharmakośa* is for the Sarvāstivāda school. Moreover, it depends closely on the *Kośa*, being only a new interpretation of the “facts” studied and classified in the *Kośa*.

Kuiji 窥基 (632–681), one of the great disciples of Xuanzang, has written an extensive commentary on the *Siddhi*, the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 (T.43.1830) which is as important for the doctrine as it is for its history. Several Chinese and Japanese scholars have added glosses. The recent edition, [i.e., the 1888 edition] of Saeki Kyo-kuga 佐伯旭雅 (1828-1891) (in ten fascicles [*juan*]) contains the best of these notes and —without dispensing the translator from the reading of Kuiji and the many sources of Xuanzang—has rendered him the greatest of services.

The book, which is a commentary on the *Triṃśikā*, is not divided into chapters. Nevertheless, various parts of unequal length can be distinguished in it:

1. Refutation of the false doctrines on the self (*ātman*) and *dharma*s by non-Buddhists and by the Little Vehicle;
- 2–4. the three kinds of cognition (*vijñāna*): store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), cogitation (*manas*), the six cognitions (*vijñānas*) of the Little Vehicle;
5. the *vijñapti-mātratā*;
6. causality;
7. the three natures and the threefold emptiness;
8. the path of salvation and buddhahood.

Abbreviations

AKB	<i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i>
AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i>
AKB(C)	<i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i> (Chinese edition, T.29.1558)
<i>Aṅguttara</i>	<i>Aṅguttara-nikāya</i>
<i>BEFEO</i>	<i>Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient</i> , Paris
cf.	(Latin: <i>confer</i>) compare
Chin.	Chinese
CWSL	<i>Cheng weishi lun</i>
<i>Dīgha</i>	<i>Dīgha-nikāya</i>
<i>Douze Causes</i>	La Vallée Poussin:
e.g.	(Latin: <i>exempli gratia</i>) for example
E.R.E.	Hasting's <i>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics</i>
etc.	(Latin: <i>et cetera</i>) and the rest
F	French page number
f.	following
ff.	following (several)
fn.	footnote
i.e.	(Latin: <i>id est</i>) that is
<i>JPTS</i>	<i>Journal of the Pali Text Society</i> , London
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland</i> , London
<i>Kandō</i>	Saeki Kyokuga's 佐伯旭雅 <i>Kandō</i> edition [<i>Kandō zōho Jō yuishiki ron</i> 冠導增補成唯識論] (1888–1890)
<i>Laṅkā</i>	<i>Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra</i> (T.16.0671; T.16.0672)
LVP	Louis de La Vallée Poussin
<i>Madhyānta</i>	<i>Madhyānta-vibhāga</i>
<i>Majjhima</i>	<i>Majjhima-nikāya</i>
<i>Milinda</i>	<i>Milinda-pañha</i>
MS.	manuscript
MVŚ	<i>Madhyānta-vibhāga-śāstra</i>
<i>Muséon</i>	<i>Le Muséon</i> (Revue d'études orientales)
<i>Nirvāṇa</i>	La Vallée Poussin <i>Nirvāṇa</i> (1925)

p.	page
pp.	pages
r.	<i>recto</i>
<i>Samgraha</i>	<i>Mahāyāna-saṃgraha</i>
<i>Samuccaya</i>	<i>Abhidharma-samuccaya</i> or <i>Samuccaya-śāstra</i> (T.31.1606)
<i>Samyutta</i>	<i>Samyutta-nikāya</i>
<i>Shuji</i>	Kuiji's <i>Cheng weishi lun shuji</i> (T.43.1830)
<i>Siddhi</i>	<i>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i> – La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang. Traduite et annotée par Louis de La Vallée Poussin (1928). But see also <i>Symbols and Customs</i> , i.e., when <i>Siddhi</i> is joined with a French page number.
Skt.	Sanskrit
T.	Taishō edition (1924–1932)
Tib.	Tibetan
<i>Trentaine</i>	<i>Triṃśikā</i> , with Sthiramati's commentary, S. Lévi (1925)
<i>Triṃśikā</i>	<i>Thirty Stanzas of Vasubandhu</i> , basis of the CWSL
v.	<i>verso</i>
<i>Vibhāṣā</i>	<i>Mahā-vibhāṣā</i> (T.31.1545)
<i>Vikhyāpana</i>	<i>Xianyang shengjiao lun</i> (T.31.1602)
<i>Visuddhi</i>	<i>Visuddhimagga</i> by Buddhaghosa
<i>Viṃśatikā</i>	<i>Weishi ershi lun</i> (T.31.1590)
vol.	volume
<i>Vyākhyā</i>	<i>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā</i> by Yaśomitra
<i>Vyutpatti</i>	<i>Mahā-vyutpatti</i>
WOG	<i>Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā</i> by Yaśomitra. Edited by Unrai Wogihara, Professor of Sanskrit in Taishō College
YBh	<i>Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra</i> (T.31.1579)
ZDMG	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft</i> , Leipzig, later Wiesbaden.

Symbols and Customs

⟨... ...⟩	new insert based on Chinese text
<35>	throughout the translation, the original French page numbers are inserted into angled brackets, e.g., <35> referring to page 35 of La Vallée Poussin's French translation of the <i>Siddhi</i>
{1/1v.}	throughout the translation, the Kandō page numbers of the CWSL are inserted into curly brackets: {...}: e.g., {3/3r.} for <i>juan</i> 3, page 3, recto; or {4/5v.} for <i>juan</i> 4, page 5, verso.
[... ...]	square brackets indicate text added either by LVP or the translators/editors.
(... ...)	round brackets indicate text added either by LVP or the translators/editors.
#xxxx	we have divided the whole text of the CWSL into exegetic steps, from #0001 to #3400. This division (<i>kepan</i> 科判) is based on the <i>Shindō</i> edition, which ultimately goes back to Kuiji's <i>Cheng weishi lun shuji</i> (T43.1830).
(#xxxx)	references to, e.g., #1061, point either to a topic discussed within section #1061 or to a topic discussed from section #1061
<i>Siddhi</i> F 2	this sample reference refers to LVP's commentary to the CWSL on French page 2 of La Vallée Poussin's French translation of the <i>Siddhi</i> , i.e., in general, not to the translation of the CWSL itself.
small caps	throughout the translation, small-capped text indicates terms from Vasubandhu's root stanzas and generally indicates the beginning of Xuanzang's discussion of these terms, which Xuanzang, in general, discusses according to the sequence of occurrence.
<i>Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma</i> , 2009: 129	– this example book reference refers to page 129 of Dhammajoti's book <i>Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma</i> , published in 2009.
AKB ii, F 240	this example refers to the <i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i> , chapter ii, French page number 240
AKB 30/7v.10	this example refers to the Kandō edition of the <i>Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya</i> , <i>juan</i> 30, page 7 verso, line 10
YBh, 54	this example refers to <i>juan</i> 54 of the <i>Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra</i>
T43.1830.0233a19	this example refers to Taishō volume 43, number 1830, page 233, column a, line 19

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成唯識論

Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi

成唯識論

Treatise Demonstrating *Vijñapti-mātratā*

by

Xuanzang (玄奘)

I. *STANZA OF HOMAGE*

#0003

稽首唯識性・滿分清淨者・
我今釋彼說・利樂諸有情・

I pay homage (稽首) to the [noble] beings who are completely (滿) or partially (分) purified (清淨) in *vijñapti-mātratā* (唯識性).

For the benefit and happiness (利樂) of sentient beings (諸有情), I will explain now what has been said (我今釋彼說).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

I. At first sight, we understand: “I pay homage to the [noble] beings in whom *vijñapti-mātratā* is completely or partially purified”. But according to the glosses of Kuiji, *Shuji* (1A/17r.2, 21r.4–5), the word *vijñapti-mātratā* is in the locative, the word “purified” is in the dative.

A. *Vijñapti-mātra* = “merely *vijñapti*”. All things (*dharma*s)—real (e.g., color), fictive (e.g., pitcher), imaginary (e.g., a second moon)—are only mind: *vijñapti* or *vijñāna* or *citta*. This is the thesis of our book which is entitled: *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*, “demonstration of the fact that all things are merely *vijñapti*, demonstration of the quality (-*tā*) that things have of being *vijñapti-mātra*”.

B. But *vijñapti-mātratā* also means “the nature of that which is merely *vijñapti*, the nature of the mind”. This “nature”—called *bhūta-tathatā* (something like “true essence” [or “true suchness”]; *zhenru* 真如) and *dharma-dhātu* (for more precision, #0326, #2853)¹—is, as one might say, the “substrate” of the mind (and where everything is mind or development of the mind): this nature is perfectly pure among *buddhas* who have cast off all the hindrances (*āvaraṇa*) that prevent the seeing of true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*); it is partially pure among *bodhisattvas* (and *arhats*). — One could say that the *buddhas* and *bodhisattvas* are purified in true suchness, i.e., are purified in the absolute and direct knowledge they have of *bhūta-tathatā-vijñapti-mātratā*.²

¹ *Editors:* We have divided the whole text of the CWSL into exegetic steps, from #0001 to #3400. This division (*kepan* 科判) is based on the *Shindō* edition, which ultimately goes back to Kuiji's *Cheng weishi lun shuji* (T.43.1830). A more detailed explanation will be given in Vol. 3 (“Tools”), p. 1350.

² *Editors:* Since in our translation, we leave *vijñapti-mātra* and *vijñapti-mātratā* mostly untranslated (as does La Vallée Poussin), we add here Kuiji's (T.33.1710.0526c05) explanation of the notion of *vijñapti-mātra* 唯識 (translation by Alexander Mayer):

“Sole” (*mātra* 唯) serves the purpose of negatively excluding (遮) that there are grasped (所執) [phenomena] such as selfhood and *dharma*s existing apart from the mind (唯言·為遮所執我法離心而有).

“Cognitive framing” (*vijñapti* 識) serves the purpose of positively declaring (表) that the nature of *dharma*s (法性) [as arising according] to causes and conditions is not apart from the mind (識言·為表因緣法性皆不離心).

Thus, by the name “sole cognitive framing” (唯識) is shown that *dharma*s apart from the mind definitively do not exist (顯·法離心決定非有·名為唯識), but this is not to say that everything is solely one conscious mind (唯一識心), without there being anything else such as “a friend in the good”, “a friend in the bad”, the diverse

II. It is likely that the Sanskrit stanza allows only one interpretation of the first two quarter-verses (*pādas*); but the Chinese commentators differ over their meaning as follows.

A. The author pays homage [i] to *dharma* only, [ii] not to persons (*pudgalas*) (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/16r. [T.43.1830.0232c08]).

i. *Dharma* is of two kinds:

1. the *dharma* which is teaching (*deśanā-dharma* 教);
2. the *dharma* as <2>³ “principle” (*dharma-naya* 理).⁴

ii. The stanza speaks of complete[ly purified] and incomplete[ly purified] persons (*pudgalas*), but it has in mind only the teaching of the *dharma* (or *vijñapti-mātratā*) and *vijñapti-mātratā* itself (*vijñapti-mātratā-naya*) which are proclaimed and realized by two kinds of persons (*pudgalas*), i.e., (1) complete[ly purified] saints and (2) incomplete[ly purified] saints. – There occurs no homage to [such] persons because the *buddha*(s), as well as their disciples, arise from the *dharma*.

B. Homage [i] to persons (*pudgalas*)—[ii] not to *dharma*. This is proved by the Sanskrit syntax. – The persons are two: Śākyamuni and Vasubandhu, i.e., the author of the *Triṃśikā*, of which the present work is the commentary (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/16v.8, T.43.1830.0232c18).

C. Homage [i] to *dharma* and [ii] to persons (*pudgalas*) (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/17r.8 [T.43.1830.0233a06]):

i. By *dharma*, we should understand true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*, that is to say, *vijñapti-mātratā*), which is the “intrinsic nature” (*svabhāva*, the “substance”) of

fruits and causes, the ultimate and the phenomenal, the true and the ordinary (非謂一切唯一識心·更無餘物,善友惡友諸果諸因理事真俗皆不無故).

³ *Editors*: Throughout the translation, the original French page numbers will be inserted into angled brackets, e.g., <35> referring to page 35 of La Vallée Poussin’s French translation of the *Siddhi*.

⁴ *naya*, hypothetical translation of *li* 理, a difficult word to translate; there is *nyāya*, *yoga*, *yukti*. I prefer *naya* in accordance with the expression *prajñā-pāramitā-naya* (principle of the perfection of understanding).

Later, i.e., *Siddhi* F 2, I will mention the same *li* as the first term of a composite “*li-dharma*” and “*li-dharma-kāya*”. – As we will see at #3351, the *li-dharma-kāya* is not named in the description of the bodies of the *buddha*, but the “self-nature”-*dharma-kāya* (*svābhāvika-dharma-kāya*) of this description (which is true suchness [*bhūta-tathatā*], of which the *dharma* as teaching is the outflow [*niṣyanda*]) is indeed our *li-dharma-kāya*, not distinct from *li-dharma*.

all things (*dharma*).

ii. The completely and partially pure persons are the [noble] beings who “realize” (*sākṣātkar*, etc.) the intrinsic nature of the true suchness of *viññapti-mātratā* (*viññapti-mātratā-bhūta-tathatā*-*svabhāva*).

It is fitting to pay homage to these persons as well as to *dharma*; because, if *dharma* is the “norm” (see #0018), it is these persons who bring it out.

D. Homage [i–iii] to the three jewels (*ratna*) (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/18r.3 [T43.1830.0233a09]):

i. The “completely purified” are the jewel of the *buddha* (*buddha-ratna*), i.e., the *buddhas* or *tathāgatas* who “realize” the *dharma*, who teach *viññapti-mātratā* correctly.

ii. The “partially purified” are the jewel of the community (*saṃgha-ratna*).

iii. As for the jewel of the *dharma* (*dharma-ratna*), it is *viññapti-mātratā* itself.

However, to the three traditional kinds of *dharma* (T43.1830.0233a10):

1. *dharma* which is teaching (*deśanā-dharma* 教);
2. *dharma* which is path or acquisition (*pratipatti-dharma* 行);
3. *dharma* which is fruit (= *nirvāṇa*) (*phala-dharma* 果);⁵

the [Vijñānavāda] School adds:

4. *li-dharma* (理), true *dharma*, *dharma* in itself, which is the *viññapti-mātratā* or true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如).

It is to true suchness that the author pays homage: (1) if the other three *dharma*s exist “in actuality”, it is because true suchness is “realized”; (2) it is the very nature of the other three *dharma*s; (3) it is the root of the saints of the three vehicles. However, in naming *viññapti-mātratā-bhūta-tathatā* (唯識真如性), which is “root” (本), we are also naming the three other *dharma*s which are “branches” (末). And again, *viññapti-mātratā* is, at the same time:

1. *dharma* which is teaching (*deśanā-dharma* 教), because [*viññapti-mātratā*] is “that which manifests” (the *li-dharma-kāya* manifests the teaching);
2. *dharma* which is path or acquisition (*pratipatti-dharma* 行), because *viññapti-mātratā* is “that which makes one achieve”;
3. *dharma* which is fruit (*phala-dharma* 果), because [*viññapti-mātratā*] is “that which is achieved”, namely, *nirvāṇa*.

Kuiji examines and resolves six problems (T43.1830.0233a19):

⁵ AKB iv, F 78; vii, F 91.

1. Why are the jewels not named in order? The Chinese stanza puts [i] the *vijñapti-mātratā* (唯識) = *dharma*, in first place; then [ii] the completely (滿) pure = *buddhas*, [iii] the incompletely (分) pure = *saṃgha*.
2. Why venerate the jewels at the beginning of the book? (four reasons).
3. Is one venerating the jewels of one vehicle or of three vehicles?
4. What are the three jewels? The *dharma* has been explained; the jewel of the *buddha* is the three bodies of the *buddha*; the *saṃgha* is all the saints (*āryas*)—with the exception of the Buddha—including the self-enlightened ones (*pratyeka-buddhas*).
5. Is it a matter of the jewels to be considered in their particular characteristic (*vyasta-lakṣaṇa* 別相) or in their shared characteristic (*samasta-lakṣaṇa* 通相)? (Terms explained #2893 in connection with the perfections [*pāramitās*]).
6. Why venerate only the three jewels? <3>

III. [Xuanzang states:] “I will explain”, literally, “now I will explain”. – According to one source (*Shuyao*, T.43.1831), the author of the stanza is Sthiramati.

“What has been said”, according to Kuiji: “what Vasubandhu has said”, since our book is a commentary on Vasubandhu’s *Thirty Stanzas*.

II. PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

- #0006 1. [According to Sthiramati.⁶] – Vasubandhu wrote the *Thirty Stanzas* (*Trīṃśikā*):
- a. so that those who misunderstand (*vipratipanna* 迷) or deny (*apratipanna* 謬) the two kinds of emptiness (i.e., the emptiness of the person [*pudgala-sūnyatā*] and the emptiness of *dharma*s [*dharma-sūnyatā*]) may acquire a correct understanding (*zhengjie* 正解; #0071) of them [= period of the path of provision (*sambhāra-mārga*) and the path of preparation (*prayoga-mārga*)];⁷
 - b. so that those who possess this correct understanding may abandon the two heavy hindrances (重障) (i.e., the hindrance of defilements [*kleśa-āvaraṇa* 煩惱障] and the hindrance to what is to be known [*jñeya-āvaraṇa* 所知障]) [= period of the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*)];
 - c. the two hindrances arise because of the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執)

⁶ Cf. *Trentaine* (*Trīṃśikā*), with Sthiramati’s commentary, S. Lévi (1925), p. 1 [F 15].

⁷ For the distinction of the periods in the path of liberation and for the disappearance or progressive attenuation of the hindrances (*āvaraṇas*), see #2853.

and because of the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha* 法執);⁸ thus, the realization (*sākṣātkāra* 證) of the two kinds of emptiness, which destroys these two beliefs, has the abandoning (斷) of the two hindrances as its consequence [= period of the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*)];

d. the abandoning of the two hindrances generates [= moment of the adamant concentration (*vajra-upama-samādhi*)] the two excellent fruits (勝果): [i] by abandoning the hindrance of defilements from which proceeds rebirth (*pratisamādhī*) (續生煩惱障), true liberation (真解脫) or *nirvāṇa* is realized (證);⁹ [ii] by abandoning the hindrance to what is to be known (所知障) which obstructs understanding (礙解), great *bodhi* (*mahā-bodhi* 大菩提) is obtained (得).¹⁰ <4>

⁸ *Editors*: LVP leaves *ātma-grāha* often untranslated or translates it variously: croyance à l'Ātman (predominantly), croyance à soi, croyance au moi, adhésion à l'Ātman, concepts de "je", concept d'Ātman, conception d'Ātman, notion d'Ātman.

Likewise, LVP leaves *dharma-grāha* often untranslated or translates it variously: croyance aux Dharma (predominantly), adhésion aux Dharma, concept des Dharma, conception de Dharma.

Likewise, LVP translates *grāha* variously: croyance, conception, concept, prise, adhésion.

We will translate *grāha* either as belief or as conceiving or seizing.

⁹ *Editors*: Based on the Chinese original text, we will insert into chevrons: ⟨...⟩, any words or phrases or passages that were either missed by La Vallée Poussin or not considered to be necessary to be translated (i.e., duplications, etc.). At the same time, we will use these brackets to provide, as alternatives, a more literal translation of some of the Chinese terms.

Square brackets: [...], are used, as usual, to indicate any additions inserted by the translators or editors into the translation which are not found in Xuanzang's CWSL, reflecting mostly additions based on Kuiji and other sources inserted by La Vallée Poussin himself. Since La Vallée Poussin himself had the custom of not bracketing all his inserts, the editors took it upon themselves to bracket them but predominantly only in the case of "longer added phrases".

¹⁰ "Heavy hindrances (重障)" refers to the two *āvaraṇas* (hindrances, obstacles, veils):

1. *kleśa-āvaraṇa*, i.e., the hindrance constituted by the "defilements" (*kleśas*);
2. *jñeya-āvaraṇa*, i.e., the non-defiled (*akliṣṭa*) error that hinders the seeing of the "to-be-known" (*jñeya*), i.e., true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) or things in their true nature.

We know that, for the Mādhyamikas, *jñeya-āvaraṇa* = "the hindrance which the knowable [—admitted as existing—] constitutes".

Or else, by "heavy hindrances (*āvaraṇas*) (重障)", we should understand the two kinds of "belief" ⟨or of conceiving⟩ (*grāhas*).

#0007 2. [According to Citrabhānu and other scholars] – [Vasubandhu wrote the *Thirty Stanzas*] for the instruction of [i] those who wrongly accept (謬執) the reality of a self (*ātman*) and of *dharma*s, of [ii] those who are mistaken (迷) about *viññapti-mātra*, who cannot assimilate the doctrine: “Nothing exists apart from *viññāna*”,¹¹ {1/1v.}¹² so that they may penetrate (達) into the two kinds of emptiness (二空) and may know, in full truth (*yathā-bhūta* 如實), the meaning of *viññapti-mātra* <which is the principle> (唯識理).¹³

#0008 3. [According to Dharmapāla.] – The varieties of scholars who deny or misunderstand the meaning of *viññapti-mātra* <which is the principle> (唯識理):

a. some think that, like cognition (*viññāna* 識), external objects (*bāhya-artha* 外境) are not non-existent (非無) (Sarvāstivādins);

b. others think that, like external objects (境), the internal *viññāna* (內識) is not existent (非有) (Bhāvaviveka);^a

c. others think that the cognitions (*viññānas*), despite the difference (別) of their operations (*kriyā*, *vr̥tti* 用), are, in terms of their substance (體), a single (同) cognition (variety of the Great Vehicle);^b

d. others think that the “associates of the mind” (*caittas* 心所, or “mental factors”) are not separate (別) from the mind (*citta* or *viññāna*).^c

[Vasubandhu wrote the *Thirty Stanzas* (論)] in order to refute (遮) these various wrong opinions (異執) about the meaning of *viññapti-mātra* (唯識), in order to obtain (得), in full truth, an understanding (解) of this beautiful and profound meaning <or principle> (深妙理).

“Heavy” is an epithet for being scorned or being a mistake (?; Fr. mépris).

According to one authority (*Bukkyō Daijiten*), the “heavy hindrances” are of three kinds (as in AKB, iv, F 201):

1. *kleśa-āvaraṇa*, hindrance constituted by the defilements;
2. *karma-āvaraṇa*, hindrance constituted by action (i.e., the five mortal transgressions [*ānantaryas*] and the ten bad paths of action);
3. *vipāka-āvaraṇa*, hindrance constituted by retribution (i.e., the eight inopportune births [*akṣaṇas*]).

¹¹ There are several interpretations of the axiom: “everything is only *viññapti*”. – See below and #2335.

¹² *Editors*: Throughout the translation, the Kandō page numbers of the CWSL will be inserted into curly brackets: { ... } : e.g., { 3/3r. } for *juan* 3, page 3, recto; or { 4/5v. } for *juan* 4, page 5, verso.

¹³ There is *viññapti-mātra-li* 理; *li* must be *-naya*, as in *prajñā-pāramitā-naya*.

- ^a Bhāvaviveka (whom we will meet again: #0919, #0375, #2390, #2416) uses scriptural statements that are “intentional” (*saṃdhā-vacana*), for example, “All *dharmas* are empty”, as an excuse to deny a real nature (*dravya-sat*) to the mind. He says to the Vijñaptimātravādin: “Your internal cognition (*vijñāna*), like the external object, does not exist because, like the external object, you regard it as an object of knowledge (*jñeya*)”. Nevertheless, Bhāvaviveka does not contradict the middle way (*madhyamā pratipad*) because he accepts, on the level of the practical [or conventional] truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*), the existence of external objects. From the absolute point of view (*paramārtha-satya*), however, he says (*Karatala-ratna*, T.30.1578) that the conditioned (*saṃskṛtas*) and the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛtas*) are equally empty (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/36r. [T.43.1830.0236c08]).
- ^b But there are eight cognitions (*vijñānas*). – Kuiji (according to Vasubandhu’s *Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya* [T.31.1596.0285]) cites five scriptural arguments of a *bodhi-sattva* (the first three drawn from Asaṅga’s *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, T.31.1594.0139a):
1. the text on “the mind that goes far alone”; *Dhamma-pada*, 37 (the verse of the *Saṃgraha* is a combination <5> of archaic quarter-verses (*pādas*): *dūraṃgamam ekacaram aniketam guhāśayam | damayan (?) durdamaṃ cittaṃ tam ahaṃ brūmi brāhmaṇam*; see glosses below, #2244);
 2. the text on the domain of the sense-faculties and of the mental sense-faculty (*manas*) (with which the *sūtra* of the six animals conflicts, AKB ix, F 243);
 3. the text according to which the six cognitions (*vijñāna-kāyas*) are mental cognition (*mana-āyatana*) (AKB i, F 32);
- 4–5. the comparisons of *Samdhi-nirmocana*, of YBh, etc.: “just as there are many images in the mirror, many waves in the sea, in the same way the single cognition (*vijñāna*) ...”.
- ^c According to the Sautrāntikas, there exist only three mental factors (*caittas*), namely, (1) sensation (*vedanā*), (2) ideation (*saṃjñā*) and (3) volition (*cetanā*) (= aggregate of formations [*samskāra-skandha*], AKB i, F 28), since the Buddha taught the existence of only five aggregates (*skandhas*, i.e., matter [*rūpa*], cognition [*vijñāna*], the three mental factors).
- Buddhadeva denies the separate existence of the mental factors. He uses the passage *trika-saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ* [“the meeting of the three is contact”] (AKB iii, F 97) and the passage *cittenaiva śaḍdhātukaḥ puruṣaḥ saṃkliśyate* (see #1073) as an excuse to say that mental factors are activities (*kāritra*) of the mind ... (AKB i, F 64; ii, F 150). (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/37r.). <6>

A. *ON THE BELIEF IN A SELF (ĀTMA-GRĀHA) AND THE BELIEF IN DHARMAS (DHARMA-GRĀHA)*^{14, 15}

A.A. Belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), #0040

A.B. Belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*), #0082

A.C. Conclusion; #0363

#0012 [Question:] – If only *viññāna* (識) exists, if nothing exists that is separate from *viññāna*, why do ordinary people (世間) and various noble teachings (聖教) say that the self (*ātman*) and *dharma*s exist?

The stanzas 1–2b say:

ātma-dharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate |
viññāna-pariṇāme 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā || 1
vipāko mananākhyas ca viññaptir viṣayasya ca | 2ab

由假說我法・有種種相轉・|
 彼依識所變・此能變唯三・|| 1
 謂異熟思量・及了別境識・| 2ab

1. [The notions] of self (*ātman* 我) and of *dharma* (法), [besides being conceived very differently,] <evolve (轉) in a great variety of aspects (種種相)>, [but do not depend on a real self and on real *dharma*s]. These [aspects] are [only] due to [an erroneous interpretation or] a figurative attribution (假說) <depending (依) on> the [twofold] development of *viññāna* (識所變).

¹⁴ This title, it seems, is suitable for the first part of the book which contains the commentary on the first three quarter-verses (*pādas*) of the first stanza (*kārikā*) of the *Viṃśatikā* (*Weishi ershi lun*, T31.1590.0074b29):

viññaptimātram evedam asadāthāvabhāsanāt |
yadvat taimirikasyāsat keṣoṇḍukādidarśanam ||1||

<All this is mere cognizing, because the non-existing objects are reflected in it, just as somebody suffering from an eye disease sees non-existing hairs, etc.>

These three quarter-verses summarize the thesis of *viññapti-mātra* (which will be specified at #2335–#2416); but two words, i.e., *ātman* and *dharma*s, are the pretext for the detailed refutation of the incorrect doctrines of self (*ātman*) and *dharma*s (#0036–#0375).

¹⁵ *Kārikas* 1–2b.

The “developing (能變) *vijñāna*” is of three kinds only: {1/2r.}

- 2a–b. (1) *vijñāna* (識) that is retribution (異熟), (2) *vijñāna* that is called cogitating<-reckoning> (*mananā* 思量) and (3) *vijñāna* that is cognizing (了別, that is, *vijñapti*) of objects (境).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Xuanzang translates the first *pariṇāma* [of the *kārikā*] in the passive, *shi suo bian* 識所變, “that which is developed by *vijñāna*”, i.e., being the development of *vijñāna* (*vijñānasya pariṇāmah*); he translates the second *pariṇāma* in the active, *neng bian shi* 能變識, i.e., “the developing *vijñāna*”, something like *pariṇāmi vijñānam*.

Sthiramati explains *pariṇāma* in the sense of “transformation”, “modification”, *anyathātva*, i.e., the classical meaning (AKB, Sautrāntika theory, ii, F 185) which we will encounter again at #0386, #2421: “At the same time as the moment of the series, which acts as cause, ceases, there arises an effect-moment different from the cause-moment: this is *pariṇāma*” (*Triṃśikā* [Sthiramati], ed. Lévi, [1925] p. 2a [F 16]).

But the word has a different meaning here. It refers, not to a transformation, <7> but to a kind of immediate “procession” by means of which *vijñāna*, the pure mind, does not arise without arising as object and, therefore, as subject: it forms two parts (*bhāgas*) which are its twofold development. – See *Siddhi* F 9 and #0536.

#0018 The Treatise (論):

1. Ordinary people and noble teachings say that there is a SELF (*ātman* 我) and DHARMAS¹⁶ (法). These are then not, by nature, real things (*dravya-sat-svabhāva* 實有性), but only due to (由) “imaginary entities” (or figurative designations) (假立).

“*Ātman*” (我) means ruler and controlling (主宰).¹⁷

¹⁶ *Editors:* Throughout the translation, SMALL-CAPPED TEXT will indicate terms from Vasubandhu’s root stanzas and, in general, indicates the beginning of Xuanzang’s discussion of these terms, which Xuanzang, in general, discusses in sequence as mentioned in the stanzas.

¹⁷ The prince is independent (*svatantra*), thus “ruler” (主); he decides and governs (or exercises power), thus “controlling”. The word “ruler” indicates the self (*ātman*) itself; the word “controlling” indicates the self (*ātman*) as being active or indicates that which belongs to the self.

Editors: LVP translates: “*Ātman*, c’est-à-dire roi-empereur”.

“Dharma” (法) means norm and upholding (軌持).¹⁸

#0019 The kinds of conceiving of self and of *dharmas* EVOLVE IN A GREAT VARIETY OF ASPECTS (有種種相轉):¹⁹

i. “In a great variety of aspects in terms of self (*ātman*)” (我種種相) means sentient being (*sattva* 有情), vital principle (*jīva* 命), etc., stream-enterer (*śrota-āpanna* 預流), once-returner (*sakṛd-āgāmin* 一來), etc.

ii. “In a great variety of aspects in terms of *dharmas*” (法種種相) means substance or real entity (*dravya* 實), quality (*guṇa* 德), *karman* (業), etc., aggregate (*skandha* 蘊), sense-sphere (*āyatana* 處), sense-elements (*dhātus* 界), etc.

“Evolves” (轉) means that in this way, due to their [specific] conditions, a variety of different designations (*prajñapti* 施設) constituting a self and *dharmas* are generated.

#0021 2. Thus, if these different aspects (諸相) occur only DUE TO A FIGURATIVE ATTRIBUTION (由假說) [and are designations which do not correspond to things that are in accordance with them, then to what do these designations refer,] what is the *raison d'être* for these designations? <8>

#0023 All of THESE (彼) aspects DEPEND ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF *VIJÑĀNA* (依識所變) (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*), i.e., on the developed *vijñāna* which is their support, (and are figurative designations (而假施設)).

¹⁸ *guichi* 軌持.

1. The etymology for *chi* 持, upholding, is old and mundane, *Attha-sālinī*, pp. 38–40, *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, 304, 3, 457, 1, p. 4. – Puguang: “Carrying its nature: the *dharmas* each uphold their nature, such as, the nature of matter (*rūpa*) is permanent and does not change”.

Dharma is explained as upholding or sustaining (*vidhāraṇa*), *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, loc. cit.

2. The etymology for *gui* 軌, “track” (which is *guifan* 軌範, model) is unknown to me from any Sanskrit source.

Kuiji, *Shuji* (1A/51r. [T43.1830.0239c05]) explains *gui* = *guifan* 軌範 (i.e., *vidhi*, model, norm, *ācāra*) glossed as: *guifan ke sheng wujie* 軌範可生物解, [“that which normatively engenders the excellent liberation in sentient beings”].

Puguang (cited in *Bukkyō Daijiten*, 1590a–b) explains *gui sheng shengjie* 軌生勝解 “that which models-engenders excellent liberation”.

Furthermore, the explanation by *gui* justifies the expressions: the *dharma* of morality (*śīla-dharma*), practicing the *dharma*, etc.

¹⁹ *Editors*: LVP translates here: “idées et noms qui se soutiennent réciproquement” (ideas and names that support one another”).

#0025 3. *VIJÑĀNA* (識) means cognizing (*vijñapti* 了別).^a {1/2v.}

By *vijñāna*, i.e., *citta*, we should (within this treatise) understand mind (*citta*) and also mental factors (*caittas* 心所), for mental factors are definitively associated (相應) with *vijñāna*.

^a *Vijñapti*, i.e., the action, the fact of knowing, is the *ākāra*, i.e., the aspect, the mode [of operation], the “form” (?) of *vijñāna*: see #0512.

#0027 4. Development (變) of *vijñāna*.

There are two theories.

a. [According to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati.]

〈Development (變) means〉 that that which essentially constitutes *vijñāna* itself (識體) (i.e., the awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]) develops “taking the appearance of two parts (*bhāga*)”^a (轉似二分) (i.e., the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga* 見分] and the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga* 相分]), for these two parts arise relying (依) on *vijñāna* itself (i.e., the awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga* 自證]), [like the two horns on a cow’s head].^b

It is these two parts that give rise to, that provide material for, the designations (施設) of a self (*ātman*) and of *dharma*s, since self and *dharma*s have no support outside of these two parts.

b. [According to Nanda, Bandhuśrī, etc.]

#0028 The internal *vijñāna* (內識) develops taking the appearance (轉似) of external things (外境).^c

^a On the “parts” (*bhāgas*), #0535.

“That which essentially constitutes *vijñāna*”, that is to say, the *vijñāna-svabhāva*. The text has *shiti* 識體 = *shi de ti* 識的體. – According to Dharmapāla, it is this “part” of *vijñāna* that is called *svasaṃvitti-bhāga* or *saṃvitti-bhāga* (*zizheng* 自證) (awareness-part, i.e., the third “part”, #0540).

1. *Bhāga* (“part”), in Chinese *fen* 分, which also translates *pradeśa*, *aṅga* (e.g., in *bhava-aṅga*). – But “*bhāga*” is justified by the citations (Dignāga) of the *Sarva-darśana*, p. 17 at bottom: *jñāna-svarūpo 'pi nīlakāro bhrāntyā bahirvad bhedenā pratibhāsate ... tathoktam ... yo 'yam bhāgo bahir iva sthithaḥ | jñānasyābhedino bheda-pratibhāso ...* (also *Śloka-vārtika*, p. 272).

2. *Darśana-bhāga* (seeing-part) seems to be the only possible original for *jianfen* 見分.

3. *Nimitta-bhāga* (image-part) for *xiangfen* 相分. – “*Lakṣaṇa*” has been proposed, but “*nimitta*”, according to the list of the five *dharmas* (*Laṅkāvatāra*, pp. 68–69, #2754, #2795, <9> according to the glosses that say that *xiang* 相 is not simply *xiang*, but means *xiangzhuang* 相狀).
 4. *Samvitti-bhāga* (awareness-part), according to the indicated source, #0536.
- b The tenet of our text covers both opposing theories, that of Dharmapāla and that of Sthiramati (see #2749).

Both accept that *viññāna*, or the “very nature of *viññāna*” (*viññāna-svarūpa*, *viññāna-svabhāva*), is *saṃvitti*, i.e., the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*): this exists because it is brought forth by causes (*pratītyaja*; *paratantra*, as the [Vijñānavāda] School says, see #2719).

But the *viññāna*—except for the case of “knowledge without conceptual figuring (*avikalpaka*)”, #2927, where there is absolute “adhering” of the *viññāna* to its transcendent nature or true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*), #0332, where there is absolute equation of subject and object—always develops into a “seeing (part)” which sees (i.e., *darśana-bhāga*) and into an “image (part)” (*nimitta-bhāga*) which is seen.²⁰

For Dharmapāla, these two “parts” are—like the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*)—brought forth by causes (*paratantra* [i.e., “dependent”]), and are thus real. But, in regard to these two “parts”, fools imagine or conceive the notions of object of cognition (*grāhya*) and of subject of cognition (*grāhaka*) (= notions of a self [*ātman*] and of *dharmas*): these two notions are imagined (*parikalpita*) (#2719) and do not correspond to anything real (Dignāga’s *Madhyānta*, YBh, 71).²¹

For Sthiramati (who will be refuted, #0539, the two “parts” are not dependent (*paratantra*), are not real; for their real existence cannot be accepted without contradicting the doctrine of *viññapti-mātra*; thus, [for Sthiramati, these two parts] are imagined (*parikalpita*).

- c Relying on a passage from the *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0138b03; see #0543), Nanda and Bandhuśrī accept only two “parts”, i.e., the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) and the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), both of which are dependent (*paratantra*). They do not speak of the other two “parts” [i.e., the awareness-part (*svasaṃvitti-bhāga*) and awareness-knowing-part (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga*)]. The image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) is

²⁰ The problem of the “parts” (*bhāgas*) of “pure knowledge”, or knowledge of reality (*tattva-jñāna*), is elucidated in Kuiji, commentary on the *Viṃśatikā* (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, 4/26v; T.43.1834.1007b) in reference to the knowledge of another’s mind (*para-citta-jñāna*).

²¹ The question of the seeds (*bījas*) of the two parts (*bhāgas*) is at length examined by Kuiji.

dependent (*paratantra*), [thus real,] but it is the development of the seeing-part. Thus, this tenet respects the principle of *vijñapti-mātra*. – (1) The image-part resides within, it is not separate from *vijñāna*; but false opinion (*ruci*) takes it to be external (*bahirvat*) whereas it is internal. Although dependent, it appears similar to the imagined (*parikalpita*). In regard to this image-part appearing similar to an external thing, ordinary people and the noble teachings speak of a self (*ātman*) and of factors (*dharma*s). – (2) The seeing-part (見)—as far as it is developing (變似) appearing as *grāhaka* (能取, i.e., subject of cognition)—is comprised in the image-part (見變似能取亦相分攝). [Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/63r./T.43.1830.0242a24, and *Vimśatikā*, 1/16r.1; #2343.]

Sthiramati recognizes only one “part” (*bhāga*) as real (*paratantra*; i.e., his seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*] and image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*] are imagined [*parikalpita*]).

Bandhuśrī and Nanda recognize two “parts”.

Dignāga accepts three “parts”.

Dharmapāla accepts four “parts” (see #0535). <10>

Dream analogy.

Through the power of the “impressions left in the mind” (*vāsanā* 熏習力, #0408) by the figurating (*vikalpa* 分別)²² of a self (*ātman*) and of *dharma*s, the *vijñāna*, at the same time as it arises, develops by taking the appearance (變似) of a self and of *dharma*s.²³ These images (相)²⁴ of a self and of *dharma*s, although they are in the internal *vijñāna* (內識) itself, nevertheless appear,²⁵ by the power of false figurating (*vikalpa*), as if they were external (*bāhya-arthavat*). This is why sentient beings, since beginningless time, conceive (緣此·執為) these images that appear like a self and *dharma*s as if they were a real self and *dharma*s.

This is similar to someone sleeping, when, under the power of a dream, his mind appears (似...現) under the aspect of various external objects, and he imagines or seizes (緣此·執為) these images, which are his own mind, to be real external objects. {1/3r.}

²² According to Sthiramati, the figurating (*vikalpas* 分別) of the [first] seven cognitions (*vijñānas*). According to Dharmapāla, the figurating (*vikalpas* 分別) of the sixth and seventh cognitions.

²³ *ātma-dharma-ākāram, ātma-dharma-nirbhāsam ... ātma-dharmavat pariṇamati.*

²⁴ *xiang* 相 glossed by *xiangzhuang* 相狀.

²⁵ *avabhāsa, nirbhāsa.*

*The two truths.*²⁶

#0031 A real self (*ātman*) and real *dharmas* in which ignorant people believe (計) do all not really exist (無所有). They are then mere designations (*prajñapti* 施設) proceeding from a false opinion (*ruci* 妄情). Thus, it is said that these *ātman-dharmas* are 〈figurative designations (假)〉, i.e., relative or conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*).

But it is different for the internal *viññāna* (namely, for the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*] and for the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) as it develops (所變) as if it were a self (似我) and as if it were *dharmas* (似法): this *viññāna* exists as generated by its causes (it is dependent [*paratantra*], #2719), however, without being really of the nature (性) of a self and of *dharmas*. Nevertheless, [this *viññāna*] appears as if it were (似彼現) a self and *dharmas*. Thus, it is said that it too is 〈a figurative designation (假)〉, i.e., relative or conventional truth.

#0032 In other words, “external objects” (外境) are only designations (施設) proceeding from a false opinion (情); thus, they do not exist (有) as the *viññāna* does (i.e., as seeing-part and image-part); [(external objects) are “imagined” (*parikalpita*), #2723].

The “internal *viññāna*” (內識), on the other hand, necessarily arises (生) due to its <11> causes and conditions; thus, it is not non-existent (無) as the external object; [it is dependent (*paratantra*)].

In this way, we avoid the two extremes of (1) affirmation (*samāropa* 增執), since we do not affirm the real existence of the external object (境), and of (2) negation (*apavāda* 減執), since we do not deny the real existence of *viññāna* (識).

#0033 The external object 〈relies on the internal *viññāna* (依內識) and〉 exists only as a figurative attribution (假立) of the internal *viññāna*: it is, purely and simply (唯), “existent from the point of view of the world” (*loka-saṃvṛti-sat* 世俗有).

The *viññāna* (as seeing-part and as image-part) is what serves as the support (所依事) for “these” figurative attributions, 〈i.e., objects〉 (假境); thus, it is also “existent in real 〈or ultimate〉 truth” (*parama-artha-sat* 勝義有). {1/3v.}

5. [Why figurative attribution (*upacāra*) is possible, see #0367.]

#0036 6. How do we know that there is really no external object, and that only the internal *viññāna* itself arises as if were an external object (似外境)?

²⁶ See #0415, #0332, #2389, #2765, #2828, for the four conventional truths (*saṃvṛtis*) and the four absolute truths (*paramārthas*).

#0037 Because we cannot establish (得) a real existence either of a self (*ātman*) or of a *dharma*.

A.A. *Belief in a self (ātma-grāha)*²⁷

A.A. Three theories of the non-Buddhists, #0040

A.B. Three Buddhist theories; #0049

A.C. General refutation; #0056

A.D. Various kinds of belief in a self (*ātma-grāha-vibhaṅga*); #0062

A.E. Refutation of objections; #0077

#0040 We will examine, in order, the various ways in which a self (*ātman*) and *dharmas* may be conceived (#0043–#0366). <12>

A.A.A. *Three theories of the non-Buddhists*

#0043 Non-Buddhists have, in short (略), imagined three kinds of *ātman* (self).²⁸

First, for the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣikas, the self (*ātman*) is permanent (*nitya* 常), universal (*vyāpaka* or *sarvagata* 周遍, according to the school), of the same extension (量) as space. In accordance with whatever circumstances (隨處), [the self] performs actions and experiences pain and pleasure.

Second, for the Nirgranthas, etc., the self is permanent in itself but of variable extension: depending on whether the body is big or small, it extends or contracts (卷舒), like leather that is made wet or is exposed to the sun.

Third, for the Pāśupatas, Parivrajakas, etc., the self is permanent but utterly subtle (or small) (至細) like an atom (極微), moves hidden (潛轉) in the body, performs actions.

[In all, there are five teachers; the ninety other theories²⁹ of the self (*ātman*) come down to these three.]

#0045 a. The first [of these three] theories is not reasonable. What are the reasons?

1. The self, being permanent, universal, of the same extension as space (虛空), {1/4r.} could not, with reference to the body, experience (受) pain or pleasure.
2. Permanent and universal, it is incapable of movement; with reference to the

²⁷ Belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi*), afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) and adherence to the self (*ātma-abhiniveśa*), virtually synonyms, AKB v, F 15.

²⁸ Cf. the various definitions of *ātman*, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 58–60. – *Madhyamaka-avatāra*, p. 239.

²⁹ Kuiji does not provide any details.

body, how would it act?

3. Is it [i] “common” (同) to all sentient beings or [ii] “distinct” (異) for each sentient being?

In the first hypothesis, i.e., “common”, when one sentient being acts, experiences the fruit of action, obtains deliverance, then all sentient beings would act, experience the fruit of action, obtain deliverance: there is a serious difficulty here.

In the second hypothesis, i.e., “distinct”, the selves (*ātman*s) of all beings, which are all universal, would interpenetrate (相遍): the substance of the self (*ātman*) would thus be mingled (相雜).

Moreover, if the site (處) of all selves is not distinct, the above-formulated objection is not avoided: i.e., when one sentient being acts or <13> experiences the fruit, then all sentient beings would act and experience the fruit.

Someone might answer: – The activity and the experience (of the fruit of the activity) belong to each self separately, (and in this way no such error occurs). {1/4v.}

[Reply:] – This is also not reasonable, because, [if all selves are mingled and reside within one another,] then action, fruit of action, and body are directly connected (合) with the selves of all sentient beings. Then it would be impossible that such-and-such an action belongs (屬) to such-and-such a self (*ātman*) and not to another [self]. When one sentient being would obtain deliverance, then all sentient beings should obtain it, for the practiced and realized (*bhāṇv*, *sākṣāt-kṛ*) *dharmas* (所修證法) would be intimately linked (合) to all selves.

#0046 b. The second of the above three theories is also not reasonable, i.e., does not withstand examination. What are the reasons?

The self (*ātman*) defined as unchanging (常住),³⁰ cannot, with reference to the body where it resides, contract and expand. If it contracts and expands, like the wind in a bellows (橐籥), it is not unchanging.

Moreover, (if the selves would correspond to the bodies, they would be) split up (分析) by the multiplicity of bodies, where is then the unity (體一) [of the self]?

Thus, this theory is but childishness.

#0047 c. The third of the above three theories is also not reasonable. What are the reasons?

³⁰ Literally “constantly abiding” (*nitya-stha*), better “unchangeable” (*kūṭa-stha*; P. *kūṭa-ttha*).

If the self is as exiguous as the atom, how could it, in one moment, fill and move (遍動) the great bodies [of certain gods: thousands of leagues (in height)]? {1/5r.} Supposing that, (even though exiguous,) it moves rapidly in the body, like the brand of the fire-brand wheel (*alāta-cakra* 旋火輪), and that everything occurs as if it occupied and moved the body in one moment: this sacrifices the unchanging characteristic of the self, (i.e., it is neither one nor permanent,) for that which comes and goes is not permanent, is not one.

A.A.B. *Three Buddhist theories*

#0049 From another point of view, from the point of view of the Buddhist doctrine of the aggregates (*skandhas*), the self (*ātman* 我) can also be conceived in three ways:

First theory, [the self is] identical with the aggregates (即蘊).

Second theory, [the self is] separate from the aggregates (離蘊).

Third theory, [the self is] neither identical with nor separate from the aggregates.

#0051 a. (As for the first theory, it is not reasonable) to establish the equivalence: self (*ātman*) = aggregates (*skandhas*), (for if the self would be like the aggregates,) one ends up denying the eternity (常) and unity (一) of the self.

Moreover:

1. Internal (*ādhyātmika*) matter (*rūpa*) (內諸色)—i.e., the five sense-faculties—is definitively not a real self (*ātman*), for it is extended and resistant (*sāvaraṇa* 有質礙)³¹ like external (*bāhya*) matter (*rūpa*) (外諸色) <14> (i.e., the body, with the exception of the sense-faculties, and the external objects). So much for the aggregate of matter (*rūpa-skandha*) of the ten sense-spheres (*āyatana*s).

2. Mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*)³² are also not a real self (*ātman*), for they do not continue in an uninterrupted series (恆相續)³³ and they depend on

³¹ Regarding *sāvaraṇa*, you *zhī'ai* 有質礙, see #0154. — Nobody maintains that external matter (*rūpa*)—without action and without experience [of the fruit of action]—is the self (*ātman*). Thus, we have here a good example.

³² I.e., aggregate of sensation (*vedanā-skandha*), aggregate of ideation (*saṃjñā-skandha*), aggregate of cognition (*viññāna-skandha*), part of the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāra-skandha*).

³³ The store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*) is not discontinuous like the other mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*), (and this is why it is the object of the notion of “I”, #1229); but it is not a self (*ātman*) for it depends on causes and on conditions.

their many causes and conditions (i.e., condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya*]).

3. The other “conditioned [factors]”, i.e., the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayukta-samskāras*) (#0215) and the non-informative *rūpa* (*avijñapti rūpa*; #0185), are also not a real self (*ātman*), for, ⟨like space, etc.⟩ they are not, by nature, intelligence (*bodha-svarūpa* 覺性).³⁴ {1/5v.}

#0052 b. The second theory, ⟨i.e., “the self is separate from the aggregates” (離蘊我), is also not reasonable, for it⟩ clashes with the objection that the self which is separate from the aggregates, like space, cannot be either the agent of action (*kāraka*) or the experiencer of the fruit (*vedaka*).

#0053 c. The third and last theory, ⟨i.e., “the self is neither identical nor separate (俱非) [from the aggregates], is also not reasonable, for it⟩ is that of the Vātsīputrīyas.³⁵ – A real self cannot be seen in this alleged entity which, depending (*upādāya*) on the aggregates, would be neither identical with the aggregates nor separate from the aggregates, like a pitcher (瓶), etc.: the latter is neither identical with the clay nor separate from the clay, but, moreover, has only “nominal existence” or “existence as designation” (*prajñapti-sat*).

Moreover, as one cannot say (*avaktavya* 不可說) that this alleged entity is “conditioned” (*samskrta* 有為) or “unconditioned” (*asamskrta* 無為), <15> so one also cannot say that it is a self or that it is not a self.

³⁴ Cf. *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 244.

³⁵ See AKB ix, especially F 233 (on the meaning of the word *upādāya*) and F 237; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 268; Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031), which indicates several theories of *pudgala* (person). – Kuiji, *Shuji* 1A/66v., has a historical note on the Vātsīputrīyas which does not add anything to his commentary on the *Treatise on the sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji* 異部宗輪論疏述記, X.53.0844).

We should note that the Vātsīputrīya thesis: “neither identical with the aggregates (*skandhas*) nor separate from the aggregates”, does not include a contradiction in terms. – The validity of the expression *li* 離, “separate” (*vyatirekin*), is established #0145, #0323.

“Identical” does not conflict with “separate” but with “different” (*bie* 別, *bhinna*). The Vātsīputrīya asserts that the *pudgala* (person) is different from the *skandhas* (aggregates), as our author asserts that color, etc. (*rūpa-ādi*), is different from the mind (*citta*, *vijñāna*). The Vātsīputrīya denies that the *pudgala* is separate from the aggregates, just as our author denies that matter, etc., (*rūpa-ādi*) is separate from the mind. – Likewise, the world is different from Brahman without being separate from Brahman; the whole (*avayavin*) is different from the part (*avayava*) but is not separate from the parts (*avayavas*). – The relationships of true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) and the *dharmas*, of the nature-of-things (*dharmatā*) and the *dharmas*, are more complicated (#0323).

#0054 <Thus, a real self (*ātman* 實我) as conceived [by these theories] cannot be established.>

A.A.C. *General refutation*

#0056 1. Against the non-Buddhists.

[Question:] – Moreover, [i] does the self (*ātman*) <that is conceived as a> real entity (諸所執實有我體) intellectually operate (有思慮) (Sāṃkhya) or [ii] does it not intellectually operate (無思慮) (Vaiśeṣika)?³⁶

[Answer:] – In the first hypothesis, <if the self intellectually operates, then> it is not permanent, for it does not always (非一切時) intellectually operate (i.e., when the qualities [*guṇas*] are not active).

In the second, <if the self does not intellectually operate, then,> like space (虛空), it neither performs actions, nor does it experience the fruit.

<Thus, both ways to conceive a self (我) are not established in terms of reason.> {1/6r.}

#0057 [Question:] – Moreover, [i] is the self <that is conceived as a real entity> endowed with activity (*sakriya* 有作用)? Or [ii] is this self not endowed with activity (*niṣkriya* 無作用)?

[Answer:] – In the first hypothesis, <if the self is endowed with activity, then,> like the hand, like the foot, it is not permanent.³⁷

In the second, <if the self is not endowed with activity, then,> like the horn of the hare, it is also not a real self.

<Thus, both ways to conceive a self are not established.>

#0058 2. Against the Vātsīputrīyas.

[Question:] – Moreover, [i] is the self (*ātman*) <which is conceived as a real entity> the object of the “afflicted view of a self” (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見), or [ii] is it not the object of the “afflicted view of a self”? [I.e., (i) is the object of the afflicted view

³⁶ The *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas (Kāpilas) is *svayaṃ caitanyātmaka, caitanyaṃ puruṣasya svarūpam iti vacanāt*. – The *ātman* of the Vaiśeṣikas is *nityaḥ sarvagato 'cetanah, cetanāyogāt tu cetanaḥ* (see *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 60).

³⁷ The *puruṣa* enjoys (*bhunkte*) but does not act. However, the action of enjoying can be attributed to it. The argument is thus valid against the Sāṃkhyas. – The example of the hand is valid against the Sāṃkhyas, the example of the foot is valid against the Vaiśeṣikas (Kuiji, *Shuji* 1B/4v.4).

of a self dependent on the self (*ātma-pratyaya-viśaya*) or (ii) is it not dependent on the self?]

[Answer:] – [In the second hypothesis,] if the self is not the object of the afflicted view of a self (我見所緣境), how do you know that there is a real self?

[In the first,] if the self is the object of the afflicted view of a self, it should be that the view of the existence of the self would not belong to the upside-down views (*viparyāsa* 顛倒), like the mind that is aimed at a real thing (color, etc.) does not belong to the upside-down views, (for then the view of a self would be knowledge of what really is).³⁸

If that is the case, how can a Buddhist [like yourself] maintain that the self exists? [Indeed,] authoritative scripture (*āptāgama* 至教) condemns (毀) the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-drṣṭi* 我見), {1/6v.} praises (稱讚) non-self (*nairātmya*), says that by seeing the non-self one realizes (證) *nirvāṇa* (涅槃), that through the belief in and adherence to the self (*ātma-abhiniveśa* 執著我見)³⁹ (one becomes submerged (沈淪) in) *saṃsāra* (生死).

How can one assume that by a false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi* 邪見)—as would be the negation of the self in your tenet—one realizes *nirvāṇa*? Or that by a correct view (*samyag-drṣṭi* 正見) (one becomes submerged (沈淪) in) transmigration, [i.e., *saṃsāra*]? <16>

#0059 Moreover, the following reasonings should be laid down: “None of the afflicted views of a self (*ātma-drṣṭi*) take a real self for their object (*ālamb* 所緣) because they take an object (*sāḷambanatvāt*), just as when the mind takes an object other [than the self] (如緣餘心), e.g., color, etc.”.⁴⁰

And in the same vein: “The object (*ālambana* 所緣) of the afflicted view of self (我見) is certainly not a real self (實我) because [this object], like any other *dharma* (如所餘法), is an object (所緣)”. (See #0112; #0343.)

We can conclude that the afflicted view of a self does not take a real self for its object but just the aggregates (*skandhas*) that are the development (*pariṇāma* 變現) of the internal *vijñāna* (內識). In conformity with the false opinions (*ruci* 妄情) specific to each individual, the afflicted view of self interprets (*parikalp*

³⁸ But the afflicted view of self (*ātma-drṣṭi*) is the fourth upside-down view (*viparyāsa*), AKB v, F 21: [“taking that which is not a self (*anātman*) to be a self (*ātman*)”].

³⁹ Adherence to the self (*ātma-abhiniveśa*), thirst for the self (*ātma-trṣṇā*), AKB v, F 32, afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha*), ix, F 230.

⁴⁰ Something like: *pratyayatvāt | tad-anya-pratyaya-cittavat |*

計度) these aggregates to be various forms of a self (*ātman*).

A.A.D. *Various kinds of belief in a self (ātma-grāha-vibhaṅga)*⁴¹

#0062 A. The belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執) is, in short, of two types:

1. natural or innate (*sahaja* 俱生);
2. figured (*vikalpita* 分別).⁴²

#0066 1. The first, (i.e., the natural or innate belief in a self,) which proceeds solely from (the power of the) internal causes or seeds (*bījas*) (#0077) (*abhyantara-hetu-vaśāt* 內因力)—namely, the trace of the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha-vāsanā*) (#2601), a false trace (*vāsanā* 虛妄熏習) existing since beginningless time (無始時來) (*anādi-kālika-vitatha-vāsanā*)—exists {1/7r.} always together (*saha*) with the body⁴³ (or with the individual) (身); without depending on any false teaching (*mithyā-deśanā* 邪教) or on false figuring (*mithyā-vikalpa* 邪分別), it exists (or evolves) spontaneously (*svarasena* 任運而轉). This is why it is called innate (*sahaja* 俱生).

#0067 This type of belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) is, in turn, of two kinds. <17>

a. Constant (常) and continuous (相續), belonging to the seventh cognition or cogitation (*manas*). As we will see (#1233), cogitation takes the eighth cognition or *ālaya* for its object (*ālambate, pratyeti* 緣); it generates an “image” appropriate for it (起自心相) and conceives (執) this image to be a real self (*ātman*) (#0859).^a

⁴¹ Cf. the *dharma-grāha-vibhaṅga*, #0350.

⁴² The equivalences: *jusheng* 俱生 = *sahaja* and *fenbie* 分別 = *vikalpita*, are given by AKB v, F 41: According to the ancient masters (*pūrva-ācāryas* = Sautrāntikas), the natural or innate (*sahajā*) afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*), which occurs in animals and birds, is non-defined. The figured (*vikalpita*) afflicted view of self is bad. [Likewise, there are two kinds of afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*anta-grāha-drṣṭi*)]

However, in *Laṅkā*, ed. Nanjō, p. 117 (transl. Suzuki): ... *sat-kāya-drṣṭir dvividhā yad uta sahajā ca parikalpitā ca* ... [“There are two kinds of the view of an individual personality; that is, (1) the inborn one and (2) the one due to the false imagination; ...”] (there follows the description of the manner in which the two afflicted views [*drṣṭis*] are excluded). But *Laṅkā* (T.16.0672.0606c27) reads *fenbie* 分別 = *vikalpita* (figured), markedly distinct from *wangji zhizhuo* 妄計執著 = *parikalpita* (imagined), in the following line.

⁴³ At least in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) and in the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu*): we have here *bāhulika-nirdeśa* [i.e., definition referring to the majority of cases].

b. Discontinuous (有間斷), belonging to the sixth cognition or mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*).^b Mental cognition takes, either all together or separately,⁴⁴ the five <“aggregates of attachment”> (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊),⁴⁵ which are the development of cognition (*vijñāna* 識所變), for its object; it generates an image appropriate for it and conceives this image to be a real self.

#0068 Being subtle (細), these two kinds of belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執) are difficult to abandon (難斷) (#0862). It is later—in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga* 修道)⁴⁶—that the *bodhisattva* is able to tame them or abandon them^c (除滅) by repeatedly (*abhiṣṅgam* 數數) practicing the eminent contemplation⁴⁷ of emptiness of the person (*pudgala-sūnyatā* 勝生空觀).⁴⁸ <18>

⁴⁴ Nevertheless, this is not the *sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi* in twenty divisions, which is not “innate”.

⁴⁵ AKB i, F 13. – The author says aggregate of attachment (*upādāna-skandha*) because the innate belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) is not aimed at the pure (*anāsrava*) aggregates (*skandhas*).

Kuiji: The Sarvāstivādins give the name *upādāna* to all the defilements (*kleśas*); the aggregates (*skandhas*) that arise from them or that engender them are named *upādāna-skandhas*; but, in the Great Vehicle, it is the attachment-to-pleasure (*kāma-rāga*) that receives the name *upādāna* ... (opinion of the *Samuccaya* and of the *Daśa-bhūmi*). However, YBh explains the member “grasping” (*upādāna-aṅga*) (#2625) = all the defilements (*kleśas*); and this explanation applies also to the term *upādāna-skandha*.

⁴⁶ “Later”. – We will see that the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) called *vikalpita* (figured) is abandoned by the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) (#2921), the mind of entry (*avatāra-citta*, *praveśa-citta* ?) into the first stage of the *bodhisattva*; later, from the first mind of residing (*vihāra-citta*) on the first stage and up to *bodhi*, the *bodhisattva* practices the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*) (#2977) and abandons the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) called *sahaja* (innate).

⁴⁷ “Contemplation”, *guan* 觀, for which equivalents are not lacking: *yoga*, *vipaśyanā*, *upalakṣaṇā*, *nidhyapti*, *upalakṣaṇā* (Rosenberg), *upaparīkṣā* (#1707).

“Eminent”, *sheng* 勝, i.e., *agra*, *parama*, *viśiṣṭa*, etc.; this is knowledge [“without conceptual figurating” (*avikalpaka*)] (#2921); in contrast with the impure (*sāsrava*) view and in contrast with the pure (*anāsrava*) view of “subsequently acquired knowledge” (*prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna*) which is called *you* 遊 (strolling, studying at leisure), #0358, #2296, #2304: a discursive contemplation which is *savikalpa* [“with figurating”], which cognizes the conventional (*saṃvṛti*).

⁴⁸ “Emptiness of the person (*pudgala*)”. In fact, the *bodhisattvas* also abandon the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) by means of the view of “emptiness of dharmas” (*dharma-sūnyatā*). But the author speaks only of “emptiness of the person” (*pudgala-sūnyatā*), because his definition, expressed in such terms, holds for the three vehicles; and also because the emptiness of the person directly opposes the belief in a self.

^a Cogitation [*manas*] (#1101) “is directed” (*ālambate* 緣) at the store-cognition (*ālaya*) (#0395) insofar as it is the subjective aspect of cognition (i.e., the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]), and not insofar as it develops (*pariṇāma*) as the objective aspect, i.e., the objects, which it cognizes (i.e., the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*], #1233). – But cogitation does not directly reach the store-cognition (*ālaya*): for the cognitions (*viññānas*) (eighth, seventh, sixth, etc.) are as many distinct groups (*kalāpa*) (#0364), closed off from one another. Thus, cogitation—at the same time as it develops as seeing-part (i.e., the cogitation insofar as it cognizes)—develops as image-part, i.e., an internal image, as *svacitta-nimitta*, i.e., an image appropriate for it (see #2468). This image, i.e., a direct object (*sākṣād-ālambana*) of cogitation, has the store-cognition itself (i.e., the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]) as its “archetype” (*benzhi* 本質, *mūla-pratibhū* ?, counterpart): cogitation makes an image-reflection (*prati-bimba*) of it which reproduces (*dai* 帶) the original. Attaining this image of the store-cognition (*ālaya*), cogitation believes to attain a self (*ātman*), i.e., its self (*ātman*).

^b Whereas cogitation (*manas*) takes only the store-cognition (*ālaya*), which is the aggregate of cognition (*viññāna-skandha*), for its object, mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*) (see #1522) is aimed at the five aggregates (*skandhas*)—a development of *viññāna* (i.e., the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*] of the store-cognition)—which are the archetype of an image that mental cognition brings forth for itself. Mental cognition does not manage to adhere (*zhuo* 著) to the archetype and engenders the idea of a self (*ātman*). – Compare #0171.

^c On the one hand, *chu* 除 = *vinodana*, *apanayana*, withdrawing, sometimes glossed as *fu* 伏 which should be *viṣkambhaṇa* (subdue, taming). One tames a defilement (*kleśa*) when, without uprooting it or “abandoning” it, one brings it about that it no longer reappears [either (1) for a (specific) time, when the path is a “mundane path”, or (2) forever, when the path, as here, is “supramundane”].

On the other hand, *mie* 滅 = *nirodha* (cessation), glossed as *duan* 斷, *prahāṇa* (“abandoning”), destroying the seeds (*bījas*). – Taming and abandoning, related to mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*); taming, related to cogitation (*manas*) (see #0356). – For *prahāṇa* in general, #2670.

#0070 2. The second, (i.e., the figured (*vikalpita*) belief in a self,) does not proceed solely from the power of its internal causes; it depends also on (the power of) present external conditions (現在外緣力): thus, it does not always accompany the individual (身). It occurs only because {1/7v.} of a false teaching (邪教) or

false figurating (*vikalpa*) (邪分別). Produced in this way,⁴⁹ it is called figurated (*vikalpita* 分別). It belongs exclusively to the sixth cognition, i.e., mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識).

#0071 This belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) is also of two kinds. <19>

a. [The belief in a self in which the self (*ātman*) is conceived according to the aggregates (*skandhas*): the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*) in twenty divisions, *Vyutpatti*, 268.] Taking as its object the aggregates (蘊相) as taught by a false teaching, mental cognition generates an image appropriate for it and, due to figurating and interpreting (分別計度),⁵⁰ conceives this image to be a real self.

b. [The belief in a self in which the self is conceived of as separate from the aggregates.] Taking as its object the various definitions of self (我相) as taught by a false teaching (*Sāṃkhyas*, etc.), mental cognition generates an image appropriate for it and—due to figurating and interpreting—conceives this image to be a real self.

#0072 Being coarse (麤), these two kinds of belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執) are, consequently, easy to abandon (易斷). As soon as the practitioner acquires the path of insight (*darśana-mārga* 見道)⁵¹ (—as far as the *bodhisattvas* are concerned, the mind of entry into the first stage; #2924—), he contemplates, according to the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-sūnyatā* 生空) (and the emptiness) of all *dharmas* (法空),^a the true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如) and he tames-abandons the belief in a self.

⁴⁹ Following figurating depending on false teaching (*mithyā-deśanā-vikalpa*) or figurating (*vikalpa*) consecutive to a bad speech by someone else (*parato ghoṣa*); following figurating depending on false reflecting (*mithyā-cintanā-vikalpa*) (or *vitatha-cintanā-vikalpa*): an incorrect mental application (*ayoniśo manasikāra*).

⁵⁰ *fenbie jiduo* 分別計度. – *fenbie* = *vikalpa*; *jiduo* = *nitiraṇa*, *nirūpaṇa*. – These expressions are missing in the description of the innate belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) which does not include figurating (*vikalpa*) of *abhinirūpaṇā* (“consisting of examining”; see AKB i, F 60–61).

⁵¹ “As soon as the practitioner acquires ...”: this refers to the path of liberation (*vimukti-mārga*) (which is the second point of the path of insight [*darśanamārga*]), not to the unhindered path (*ānantarya-mārga*) (which is the first point); but it is the path of liberation that abandons the incapacity of the defilement (*kleśa-dauṣṭhulya*) (#3074) and it can be called the “beginning” (*ādi*).

This applies if the path of insight of one moment is considered; if one envisages the path of insight of three moments, then this is like the abandoning of the belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*), #0356.

- ^a Literally: “When he contemplates the true suchness of the emptiness of the person and of all *dharma*s (*sarva-dharma-pudgala-sūnyatā-bhūta-tathatā*)”. – On the true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) as a function of the [two kinds of] emptiness (*sūnyatās*), see #0332.

There are two kinds of “emptiness” (*sūnyatās*), both relating to *dharma*s: (1) no *dharma* is, in any way, a person (*pudgala*) or self (*ātman*) = *pudgala-sūnyatā* (emptiness of the person); (2) no *dharma* is, ultimately, a *dharma* = *dharma-sūnyatā* (emptiness of *dharma*s). (See the theory of the three natures, #2719, and the three kinds of absence of a nature [*niḥsvabhāvatās*], #2835.)

- #0074 B. Thus, in examining these various kinds of belief in a self (*ātma-grāhas*) and their object, we can see that, in some cases, the belief in a self has the aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊) external to the mind (自心外) as its distant object;^a that, in other cases, the belief in a self does not have any aggregate external to the mind^b as its object; that, in all cases (一切皆), the aggregates internal to the mind (自心內) provide material for the belief in a self. <20>

We can thus say that all the beliefs in a self {1/8r.} take the impermanent (無常) five “aggregates of attachment” (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊), which are the internal image (i.e., image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) of the mind, for their object (*ālamb*, *prati-i*, *yuan* 緣) and falsely conceive (妄執) them to be a self (*ātman*).

- #0075 <The images (相) of> these five internal aggregates (蘊) arise from conditions (*pratyaya-ja* 緣生 = dependent [*paratantra*]): thus, they exist, but they exist in the manner of an illusion (*māyā-vat* 幻有, #2770).

As for the <falsely conceived> (妄所執) self, it is merely a false interpretation (橫計度) of the aggregates (like the false interpretation of an illusion), it definitively does not exist (非有).

This is why the Sūtra says:

Know, O *bhikṣus*, that all “views on the self” (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi* 所有我見) of the brahmins and of the mendicants (*śramaṇas*) occur only in relation to the five “aggregates of attachment”.^c

- ^a “Aggregates (*skandhas*) external to the mind”; this refers to what we have called “archetype”.

The second category of the figured belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) is aimed at an alleged self (*ātman*) existing separately from the aggregates: in this case, the belief in a self bears upon nothing that is outside of the mind (just as when the mind con-

ceives of the horn of a hare).

The first category of the figured belief in a self takes the aggregates to be the self: there are aggregates external to the mind, archetypes of the image that one takes to be the self.

In the case of the innate belief in a self, the archetype always exists.

- b This refers to the *bimba* (影像), i.e., the mental object, the immediate object that one takes to be the self (*ātman*). This image exists, for the mind cannot arise without an immediate object, i.e., its image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), which is its condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya* 所緣緣); this image is the aggregate of cognition (*vijñāna-skandha*). Here, according to the words of Dignāga: “No *dharma* can seize any [other] *dharma*”: there is only the mind itself (*svacitta*) which returns to seizing the mind itself. – Thus, every belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) has an aggregate (*skandha*) for its object.
- c Literally: “Everything occurs dependent on the five aggregates of attachment (*pañcopadānaskandhān upādāya*)”. – For other versions of this *sūtra*, *Samyutta*, iii, 46; AKB v, F 17; ix, F 253; iii, F 87.

A.A.E. Refutation of objections⁵²

- #0077 1. The advocates of the self (*ātman*) say: “If a real self does not exist, how are things (事) such as memory (憶),⁵³ cognizing of objects (識), reading of books (誦), meditation on texts (習), helping one’s neighbors (or gratitude) (恩), anger (怨), etc., explained?” <21>

[Answer:] – What is conceived as a real self (所執實我) is assumed as being permanent (常) and immutable (無變). It should exist afterwards as it exists before: thus, things such as memory, etc., would not exist (非有) afterwards. It should exist before as it will exist afterwards: thus, things such as memory, etc., would not be non-existing (非無) before. [This is so] for the substance (體) of the self is not subject to change, (i.e., is, before and after, not different).

If someone will say that although the activity (*kāritra* 用)⁵⁴ of the self is variable (or changes (變易) from state to state (前後)), {8v.} but that its substance (*svabhāva* 體) is immutable (or does not [change from state to state]): this is also

⁵² Objections that are refuted in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, in the *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, xvii, in AKB ix.

⁵³ AKB ix, F 273.

⁵⁴ *yong* 用 = *zuo* 作 = *kāritra*.

not reasonable. The activity is not separable from the substance (用不離體) and should thus be constant (常有). The substance is not separable from the activity and should thus be variable, (i.e., not constant (非常)).

The truth is that every sentient being comprises a root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna* 本識, i.e., the eighth cognition, #0382) which continues as a homogeneous series (一類相續) and is always non-defined (*avyākṛta*);⁵⁵ which holds (任持) the seeds of all pure and impure actual *dharma*s (i.e., mind and mental factors “in action”); which is in a mutual relationship of causality with all of these *dharma*s. Without any self (*ātman*) being necessary, all the aforesaid *dharma*s, from memory and cognizing up to anger, etc., occur by the power of traces (*vāsanā*) or of seeds (*bījas*): the seeds “evolve” into present *dharma*s which, in their turn, generate seeds. (Thus, the mentioned difficulties (難) show faults in your tenet but not in our tenet (宗).)

#0078 2. [Question:] – In the absence of a real self (*ātman*), by whom is the action performed? By whom is the fruit of action experienced?⁵⁶

[Answer:] – But the self (*ātman*), by definition, is immutable (無變易), like space (虛空). How can performing action and experiencing fruits be attributed to it? If the self performs action and experiences fruits, if it is variable or changes (有變易), it is not permanent (*nitya* 常). – In fact, by virtue of the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) {1/9r.} of sentient beings—(by the power of the) conditions qua cause—there is an unbroken series (相續無斷), i.e., performance of the action, experience of the fruit.^a Thus, there is no conflict with reason.

^a It may be translated as: *sattva-citta-caitta-dharma-hetu-pratyaya-vaśāt prabandha-anupacchedaḥ karma-kriyā phala-bhogaś ca*.

Little Vehicle:

- a. Five schools (Vātsīputrīyas, etc.) say that mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) performs the action and experiences the fruit; the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) are not part of this twofold operation;
- b. for the Mahāsāṃghikas, the six cognitions perform the action and experience [the fruit];
- c. for the Sarvāstivādins, mental cognition performs the action and experiences [the fruit], the five cognitions experience [the fruit].

⁵⁵ “Of one type”, AKB ix, F 278.

⁵⁶ Cf. AKB ix, F 292.

Great Vehicle: the first six cognitions perform the action and experience [the fruit], the eighth experiences [the fruit], the seventh neither performs the action nor experiences [the fruit].

However, the phrasing of our text is susceptible to several interpretations: <22> (1) the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) are the seven cognitions “in action” which perfume the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*); (2) the mind and mental factors are the store-cognition which is perfumed; (3) the mind and mental factors are the eight cognitions.

In the first two interpretations, the perpetual series is the eighth cognition “in action” (#0938); in the third, the series should be understood as the “destiny” constituted by the five aggregates (*pañca-skandhikā gati*).

- #0079 3. [Question:] – If there is no real self (*ātman*), then who goes from destiny to destiny (*gati* 趣) in the course of transmigration (*saṃsāra* 生死, #2594)? Who is weary of suffering (厭苦), seeks and obtains *nirvāṇa* (求趣涅槃)?⁵⁷

[Answer:] – A real self, as you claim, would be free of birth and of cessation. How can you say that it could transmigrate (in *saṃsāra*)?

It would be permanent (常), like space (虛空); it would not be tormented by suffering: how could it be weary of suffering, expel suffering, seek and obtain *nirvāṇa*?

Thus, the objection of our opponent turns against himself.

The truth is that sentient beings are continuous series (*saṃtāna* 相續) of physical and mental states (身心) which, by the power of the defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) and of impure (*sāsrava*) actions (業), circle around in the destinies. Tormented and weary by suffering (厭患苦), they seek and obtain *nirvāṇa* (求趣涅槃).

- #0080 Therefore, the [alleged] real self that we have described definitively does not exist. There are only the cognitions (*vijñānas*) which—from beginningless time, the subsequent cognition arising {1/9v.} at the disappearance of the preceding one—form a continuous series of causes and results (seeds – actual *dharmas* – seeds). Because of false traces (*vāsanā* 妄熏習) (i.e., of the perfuming due do false ideas, #2601), [the cognitions] appear (in their seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*] and image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) as if they were a self (似我相現). Foolish people (愚者) recognize (in what is falsely conceived)—i.e., in this pseudo-self—a [real] self. <23>

⁵⁷ Cf. AKB ix, F 271.

A.B. *Belief in dharmas (dharma-grāha)*

B.A. Theories of non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*); #0082

B.B. *Dharmas of the Little Vehicle*; #0145

#0082 [Question:] – Why is it that—separate from *viññāna* (識) (*citta-vyatirekin*)⁵⁸—real *dharmas*, i.e., things in themselves (*dravya-sat*), are not observed (*na upalabhyante*)?

[Answer:] – For the external *dharmas* (外法) of this type, <#0083> which the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道) and <other vehicles (餘乘)>, i.e., the Little Vehicle, assert (執), <#0086> do not exist when they are examined by means of reason (*yuktitas*).

A.B.A. *Theories of non-Buddhist scholars (tīrthikas)*⁵⁹

A.1. *Sāṃkhyas*, #0090

A.2. *Vaiśeṣikas*, #0100

A.3. *Maheśvara*; #0115

A.4. Seven other doctrines of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*); #0119

A.5. The two doctrines of *śabda*; #0121

A.6. *Lokāyatikas*; #0128

A.7. General refutation; #0139

A.B.A.1. *Sāṃkhyas*

#0090 The *Sāṃkhyas* (數論) accept a self (*ātman* 我) which is intelligence (*caitanya-svarūpa*, *cit*, *citi*, *cetanā* 思) and which enjoys (*upabhuḥ* 受用) twenty-three *dharmas* (法; *tattvas* or *padārthas*):⁶⁰ the great one (*mahat* 大), ego (*ahamkāra*), etc.

They hold that these *dharmas* are constituted (所成) by the combination (*sam-*

⁵⁸ On the meaning of this expression, #0053, #0145.

⁵⁹ Thirteen doctrines of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*). – The list of *Bukkyō Daijiten*, 434, 1, according to our text. – The *Sāṃkhya* doctrine is discussed in the *Bodhicarya-avatāra*, ix, 65–68, pp. 127–138.; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 235.

⁶⁰ The *ātman*, i.e., the twenty-fifth *dharma* or *tattva-padārtha*, does not experience the first, the *prakṛti* [“primal nature”], which is the *avyakta* [the “unmanifest”], the *avikṛti* [the “uncreated”]. – For the Chinese equivalents and valuable comments, see the verse (*kārikā*) translated by Takakusu, *BEFEO*, 1904, vol. iv, issue 4.

udaya 合成) of three *guṇas* [constituents]:

1. intelligibility (*sattva* 薩埵);
2. activity (*rajas* 刺闍);
3. restraint or inertia (*tamas* 答摩).

Although constituted by these three things (*vastu* 事), [the twenty-three *dharmas*, i.e.,] (the great one, etc.) are [considered to be] real entities (*tattva* 實), not imaginary entities (*vyāvahārika* 假, of ideal, fictitious, practical existence): consequently, they are known by direct perception (*pratyakṣa* 現量).⁶¹

#0092 This doctrine is not reasonable. <#0093> What are the reasons?

#0095 1. As for these “constituted” [*dharmas*] (*chenghe* 成合):

The *dharmas* (i.e., the great one, etc.)—{1/10r.} being constituted by a multiplicity (多事) (i.e., the three constituents)—are not real (實) but “fictitious” (假), like an army (軍) or a forest (林), etc. How can it be accepted that they are known by direct perception?

⟨Moreover, if the great one, etc.,⟩ are real, then they should not be constituted by the combination (合成) of three things, such as the three fundamental things (本事) themselves ⟨are not so constituted⟩. <24>

#0096 2. As for the constituents [of these *dharmas*], namely, the three constituents (*guṇas*) ⟨intelligibility (薩埵), etc.⟩:

a. Since they are [supposed to be the same as] the *dharmas*, i.e., the great one (*mahat*), etc., then—like the great one, etc.—they should also be constituted by the combination of three things.

Similarly, since they—like the great one, etc.—are “subject to change” (*vikṛti* 轉變) ⟨and are not permanent (非常)⟩, then they are also not permanent.

Moreover, since each of these three “fundamental things” (*mūla-vastu*) has multiple activities (*kāritra* 功能), then their substance (體) is also multiple (多) because activity and substance (*svabhāva*) are one and the same thing.

Since the three constituents are universal (遍), then when they are transformed (*vikṛti* 變) into *dharmas* in one place, they are transformed in the same way elsewhere. Activity (efficacy) and substance are, indeed, one and the same thing.

b. If it is said that the three constituents differ in substance (*svabhāva* 體) and

⁶¹ The “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) of direct perception (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) perceives only the real.

in characteristic (*lakṣaṇa* 相), we ask how, by being combined (和合), they can constitute a *dharma* of single characteristic (一相) (i.e., the great one, blue, etc., whose substance is threefold since they are the constituents, but which have the singular characteristic of the great one or of blue, etc.)? (It cannot be said that by being combined they are able to change into a single characteristic, because their substance is not different from what it was prior to being combined). Indeed, combined or non-combined, {1/10v.} the substance of the constituents does not undergo modification.

If it is said that the three constituents, although different in substance, are not different in characteristic, then one contradicts the doctrine of the school (宗), (i.e., the Sāṃkhya,) which affirms the identity of substance and of characteristic.^a

The substance (體) should thus be like the characteristic (相): having the same characteristic, the substance of the three constituents should “mysteriously” (冥然) be one. [This contradicts the essential thesis of Sāṃkhya.]

The characteristic should be like the substance: having a distinct substance, the characteristic of the three constituents should be “manifestly” (顯然) threefold. [And when they will manifest, they will manifest each in their own way: a hypothesis contradicting the “singular” characteristic of blue, etc.]

Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the three, when combined, constitute singularities (一).

^a Substance = *svabhāva*; characteristic = *lakṣaṇa*. – In the state of darkness [or inertia] (*tamas*), i.e., in the non-evolved state of *prakṛti* (primal nature), the *guṇas* (constituents) have substance and also characteristic, but the characteristic does not manifest. – The Sāṃkhya cannot accept that the constituents, distinct in substance, would have the same characteristic, for the characteristic is a function of the substance, is identical with the substance. <25>

#0097 3. Consideration of the constituents (*guṇas*) and of the *dharmas*:

a. The three constituents are “particular (*bhinna* 別) [entities]”, each having a separate substance. The great one (*mahat*) and the other [real entities or principles (*tattvas*)] are each a “synthetic” (or common) (*sāmānya* 總) [entity],⁶² because each constitutes a single and indivisible *dharma*. However, [according to the Sāṃkhya,] since the great one is the same as the three constituents (just like gold and jewels), that is, since the synthetic [entity] is the particular [entities]

⁶² We have *samuccaya*, *samudita*, *samasta*, *piṇḍa*, *samudāya*, etc.

(總別一), then you must either deny the singularity of the great one or deny the threefoldness of the constituents.

b. If the three constituents—when they are transformed (*vikṛ* 變) in order to constitute the great one—do not combine into (不和合) a single characteristic, i.e., that of the great one, this means that they remain what they were before the transformation (未變). Thus, how can they appear (現見) as singularities (the great one, a single color: blue, etc.)?

If the three constituents combine (和合) (into a single characteristic), they lose (失) their original characteristic that was particular (本別), and, at the same time, they also lose their substance.

c. The Sāṃkhya might say that each of the three constituents (*guṇas*) possesses two characteristics (相): (1) a common (*sāmānya* 總) characteristic and (2) a particular (別) characteristic.

[Reply:] – But these two characteristics should then merge, that is to say, the common characteristic would also be threefold like the particular [characteristic]. {1/11r.} How can we then see things as singular: blue, etc.?

d. The Sāṃkhya might say that the substance of each of the three constituents consists of three characteristics (i.e., the characteristics of the three constituents): we see things as singular (見一) because these characteristics, when amalgamated (和雜), are difficult to know (難知).

But we reply:

1. Since the characteristic is threefold, how can we see things as singular?
2. Again, how can you know that the three things, i.e., constituents (*guṇas*), are different?
3. Why do you insist that *dharmas* are made up by the combination (和合) of three constituents, since each constituent is endowed with three characteristics and since nothing is lacking in them in order to constitute the *dharmas*, i.e., color, etc.?
4. Also, each of the constituents will be threefold in substance since it is threefold in characteristic: for the substance is the same as the characteristic.
5. Moreover, being each constituted by the three combined constituents (*guṇas*), the great one (*mahat*) and the other *dharmas* will not be differentiated (among each other (展轉相望)). The differences (差別) between the cause (因, i.e., the great one) and the fruit (果, i.e., ego [*ahamkāra*]), between the “subtle elements”

(*tan-mātras* 唯量), between the “gross elements” (*mahā-bhūtas* 大), between the faculties (*indriyas* 根) would disappear. If this is so then one faculty <26> would perceive all objects; or, any one object (一境) {1/11v.} would be indiscriminately perceived by all the faculties. – Sentient beings (*sattva* 情) and non-sentient things (*asattva* 非情), the pure (淨) and the impure (穢), etc., direct perception (*pratyakṣa* 現量) and inference (*anumāna* 比量), etc., ... would become mixed up (無異), although ordinary people see their opposition. This would be a big error (大失).

#0098 Thus, the real *dharmas* of the Sāṃkhyas are not established and are only the interpretation (計度) of a false opinion (*ruci* 妄情).

A.B.A.2. *Vaiśeṣikas*⁶³

#0100 The scholars (of the *Vaiśeṣikas* (勝論)) accept many categories (*padārthas* 句義), i.e., the substances (*dravyas* 實), etc., which are real entities (*dravya-sat-svabhāva* 實有性) cognized by direct perception (*pratyakṣa-gamya* 現量所得).

#0102 This doctrine is not reasonable. <#0103> What are the reasons?

i. General refutation of the categories (*padārthas* 句義).

#0105 a. The categories that are defined as permanent and immutable (常住) (namely, the *paramāṇus*, i.e., the father-and-mother-atoms,⁶⁴ of earth, water, fire and wind): (1) if they engender a fruit (生果) (i.e., the son-atom), then they are not permanent, like the fruit which they engender, since you attribute activity (*kāritra* 作用) to them; (2) if they do not engender a fruit (不生果), then they do not have the intrinsic nature of a real entity separate from *vijñāna*, like the horn of a hare (兔角), etc.

b. The categories that are defined as non-permanent (無常) (namely, the son-atoms): (1) if they are resistant (*sāvarāṇa* 有質礙; #0051 (fn.)), then they are extended (方分): {1/12r.} thus, they are divisible (可分析) like an army (軍), a forest (林), etc.; thus, they do not have the nature of real entities; (2) if they are not resistant (無質礙), like the mind and the mental factors, then they do not have the intrinsic nature of real entities separate from the mind and the mental factors.

⁶³ See #0140. – On the *Vaiśeṣika*, see (1) H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, London, 1917; (2) B. Faddegon, *The Vaiśeṣika-System*, described with the help of the oldest texts, Amsterdam, 1918, two very valuable works. See also *Siddhi* F 32, 38.

⁶⁴ On the atoms, see #0128, #0154.

ii. Refutation of the substances (*dravyas* 實) and of the qualities (*guṇas* 德).

#0106 Moreover, earth, water, fire and wind (地水火風) should not be included [by the Vaiśeṣikas] in the category of (material substances (*dravyas*) (實句義)⁶⁵) called resistant (*sāvaraṇa* 有礙), because they are contacted by the tactile (or body) sense-faculty <27> (*kāya-indriya* 身根) just as the qualities (*guṇas*) solidity (*khakkaṭatva* 堅), fluidity (*dravatva* 濕), heat (*uṣṇatva* 煖) and movement (*udīraṇatva* 動) (i.e., the respective qualities of earth, etc.,⁶⁶) [are, in their tenet].

Conversely, the four aforesaid qualities, (i.e., solidity, fluidity, heat and movement), should not [by the Vaiśeṣikas] be included in the category of (qualities (*guṇa* 德)⁶⁷) called non-resistant (*anāvaraṇa* 無礙), because they are contacted by the tactile (or body) sense-faculty, just as [the substances] earth, water, fire and wind [are, in their tenet].

The same criticism for the three [substances] earth, water and fire in their relationship with the colors blue, etc.: all of them being visible to the eye.

It is thus established that earth, water, fire and wind do not have a real substance distinct from solidity, fluidity, etc.; and, also, it is thus established that the eye does not see real earth, real water, real fire.⁶⁸ {1/12v.}

iii. General refutation of the categories (*padārthas* 句義).

#0107 Moreover, among (the category of) substances (*dravyas* 實), there are those that are defined as resistant (*sāvaraṇa* 有礙) and permanent (常) (father-mother-atoms of earth-water-fire-wind, and the *manas*⁶⁹), but being resistant—like coarse earth (son-atom) (麤地), etc.—they are not permanent.

Among the categories (句義), there are *dharmas* that are defined as non-resistant (*anāvaraṇa* 無質礙) and are cognized by the five material sense-faculties (色根) (i.e., among the qualities [*guṇas*]: color, taste, odor, tangible, sound, etc.) but are resistant (有礙) since you say that—like earth, water, fire and wind—they are cognized by material sense-faculties.

Moreover, the categories that are not substances (*dravyas* 實), namely, the quali-

⁶⁵ Editors: LVP has here: "... compris dans la catégorie des *padārthas* ..."

⁶⁶ AKB i, F 22.

⁶⁷ Editors: LVP has here: "... compris dans la catégorie des *padārthas* ..."

⁶⁸ Earth, water and fire are not visible because, like wind, they are included among the categories (*padārthas*, i.e., *dravyas* [substances]).

⁶⁹ H. Ui p. 147, also pp. 142, 145.

ties (*guṇas* 德), etc., do not have, separate from *vijñāna*, a distinct intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 自性), because they—like the child of a barren woman (石女兒)—are not included among the substances.

The substances, etc., that are not “existence” (*sattā* 有) [i.e., the highest universal or genus (*sāmānya*)] do not have, separate from *vijñāna*, a distinct intrinsic nature, because they—like a sky-flower (空花), etc.—are not included in “existence”.

iv. Refutation of [a] existence (*mahā-sattā* 有), [b] substance (*dravyatva* 實性), [c] inherence (和合 *samavāya*), etc.

a. The category “being” or “existence” (有 [*mahā-*]*sattā*⁷⁰), as conceived [by the Vaiśeṣikas], does not have, separate from the substances, etc., a distinct intrinsic nature (別自性), because it is—like the substances (*dravyas* 實), qualities (*guṇas* 德), etc.—accepted (許) <28> as not being non-existent (非無).

If it would be separate from the substances (實), etc., {1/13r.} it cannot be *sattā* (“existence”, 有性) because it would then—like that which does not exist in the absolute sense (*atyanta-abhāva* 畢竟無, the hair of the tortoise), etc.—be accepted as being different from the substances, etc.

Since “existence”, although it exists, does not have to have an “existence” different from itself (無別有性), why do the substances, etc., have to have an “existence” different from themselves (別有性)?

If you accept a *sattā* (有性), i.e., the genre “existence”, as being separate from the *dharmas* that exist (*sad-dharmas* 有法), you must accept an *asattā* (無性), i.e., the genre “non-existence”, as being separate from the *dharmas* that do not exist (無法). Why postulate a genre for the first if you do not do so for the second?

⟨Therefore, such a *sattā* (有性) is only a false interpretation (妄計度).⟩

b. Universals-individuators (*sāmānya-viśeṣa* 同異性).⁷¹

#0110 Moreover, separate (異) from substance (*dravya* 實), quality (*guṇa* 德) and motion (*karman* 業), you accept *dravyatva* (實性), *guṇatva* (德性) and *karmatva* (業性) (i.e., the genre “*dravya*”, etc.). This is definitively not reasonable. Also, do not say that

⁷⁰ *mahā-sattā*, etc. – See #0139 and #0900 – H. Ui, pp. 7, 36–37, 248. – *Sarva-darśana, Muséon*, 1902: 20–23.

⁷¹ See the notes by H. Ui, pp. 66–72, 180–183, where Kuji’s commentary on Śāṅkara-svāmin’s *Yinming ru zhengli lun* 因明入正理論 (T.32.1630) is abundantly quoted. (On this treatise, see M. Tubianski, Académie des Sciences de Russie, Bulletin, Feb. 10, 1926). – *Nyāya-kandalī* in Faddegon, p. 360.

dravyatva is not *dravyatva* (實性) since it is—like *guṇa* and *karman*, etc.—separate (異) from *dravya*, etc.

Moreover, [do not say that] *dravya*, etc., is not included in *dravya*, etc., since it is—like *guṇa*, *karman*, etc.—separate (異) from *dravyatva*, etc.

Furthermore, the relationships of [the genre] “earth” (*pr̥thivīva* 地性), etc.,⁷² with regard to earth (*pr̥thivī* 地), etc.⁷³ {1/13v.} (can be understood according to the above).

[Separate from *dravya*, etc., there are no universals-individuators (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*).] Just as *dravyatva*, *guṇatva* and *karmatva* are not separate from *dravya-āditva* (from the nature of each *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*), in the same way the *dravyas*, etc., are also not separate from *dravyatva*, etc.

If you accept *dravyatva*, *guṇatva* and *karmatva* as being separate from *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*, you should accept *adravyatva*, *aguṇatva* and *akarmatva* as being separate from that which is not *dravya-guṇa-karman* (i.e., for the six other categories [*padārthas*] and the unconditioned [*asaṃskṛtas*]). (Why postulate a genre for the first, if you do not do so for the second?)

We conclude that all these genres and types or universals and individuators (同異性) are only figurative designations (假施設). <29>

c. Inherence (*samavāya*) (*hehe* 和合).⁷⁴

#0111 Moreover, the inherence (that is accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas) is definitively not a real entity, (1) because it is not *sattā* (“existence”), (2) because it is not included among the *dharmas* called *dravyas* (substances), etc., like that which does not exist in the absolute sense (畢竟無).⁷⁵

The Vaiśeṣika claims that the substances (實), etc., are “evident” or cognized by direct perception (*pratyakṣa* 現量). By examining them from the rational point of view, we have determined that they are not real. All the more so, the “inherence” (*samavāya* 和合), which the Vaiśeṣika does not claim to be evident or cognized by direct perception (非現量得), is not real. {1/14r.} In case he claims it to

⁷² H. Ui, p. 182.

⁷³ Our text has *pr̥thivī-xing* 性 = *pr̥thivīva*, and *pr̥thivī-ti* 體 (but Kuiji has simply *pr̥thivī*).

⁷⁴ H. Ui, p. 123.

⁷⁵ The first reason aims at the *samavāya* (inherence) that is single in nature (*samavāya* in general); the second reason aims at the *samavāya* that is multiple in nature (the various cases of *samavāya*).

be evident or cognized by direct perception, one will have to resort to the above reasonings to show that (it still is not a real entity).

- #0112 The nine classes of *dharmas* (substances [*dravyas*]), etc., are not cognized by the knowledge of direct perception (*pratyakṣa-jñāna*) that would be directed at existing real entities themselves (*dravya-sat-svabhāva* 實有自體), existing separately from *viññāna*, because [the nine classes, etc.,] are admitted as being cognized (所知) (—or as “what is to be known” [*jñeya*]: every object of knowledge, indeed, is interior to the mind—), just like the hairs of a tortoise (龜毛), etc.⁷⁶

Conversely, the knowledge (*jñāna* 智) directed towards substances (緣實) is not included in the knowledge of direct perception (現量智) that would be directed at the category substance itself (*dravya*) (實句自體), existing separately from *viññāna* (緣離識實句自體), because [this knowledge directed towards substances] arises from a complex of fictitious causes (假合生),⁷⁷ just like the knowledge of qualities (*guṇas*) (德智), etc.

And likewise, up to:

The knowledge directed towards “inherence” (*samavāya*) (緣和合智) is not included in the knowledge of direct perception (現量智) that would be directed at “inherence” itself (和合自體), existing separately from *viññāna*, because [the knowledge directed towards inherence] arises from a complex of fictitious causes (假合生), just like the knowledge of substances (*dravyas*) (實智), etc.

- #0113 Conclusion: the categories (*padārthas* 句義) (substance, etc.,) of the Vaiśeṣikas (勝論) also exist only as a false opinion (*ruci* 情妄); they are mere designations (施設). <30>

A.B.A.3. *Maheśvara* (supreme lord)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to YBh, 67. – The Buddhist sources on Īśvara are numerous, but have the fault of repeating themselves: *Āṅguttara*, i, 173; AKB ii, F 311; v, F 19 (Pu-guang, AKB ix, 7); *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 119–126; *Īśvarakartṛtva-nirākṛti* by Nāgārjuna (?), ed. Stcherbatski, Zapiski, 1906: 58; *Īśvara-bhaṅga* by Kalyāna Rakṣita;

⁷⁶ See #0059, and #0343. – *Nyāya-kandalī*, Faddegon, p. 416.

⁷⁷ The text has *jiahe sheng gu* 假合生故, glossed as : “It is said that it arises from *jiahe* because it is produced due to several causes”. – The expression *jiahe* (variant *jiahehe* 假和合, in Rosenberg) must be *saṃketa* which is translated by *jia*, AKB 30/2r.9 [ix, F 260] (*dharma-saṃketa*).

“Friendly Letter”, *JPTS*, 1886: 50; *Ṣaḍdarśana-saṃgraha* (ed. Suali) p. 11; *Nyāya-kandalī*, transl. Faddegon, 353, 376; Carpenter, *Theism*, p. 50; Āthalye, *Tarka-saṃgraha*, p. 136.

#0115 According to one opinion, there is one god, i.e., Maheśvaradeva (大自在天), whose substance (體) is real (實), omnipresent (遍), permanent (常), and who engenders (能生) *dharmas* (諸法). (See #1944.)

#0117 〈This doctrine is not reasonable. What are the reasons?〉 {1/14v.}

#0118 We say: that which engenders *dharmas* is necessarily not permanent (for example, earth, water, etc.); everything that is not permanent is necessarily not omnipresent (*vibhu* 遍) (for example, a pitcher); everything that is not omnipresent is not real (真實) (for example, a pot).

If Maheśvara (supreme lord) himself is permanently (常) and universally (遍) endowed with 〈powers or〉 efficacies (*śakti*, *sāmarthya* 功能), then he would engender (生) all *dharmas* at all times (一切時), in all places (一切處) and all at once (頓).

If they would say that, in order to engender [*dharmas*] (能生), he depends on the desire (欲) to engender [these *dharmas*] or on certain conditions (緣), then they would be contradicting the doctrine of the single cause (一因論). [Alternatively, we may say, it is false for them to state—when desire and conditions are present—that it is desire and certain conditions that engender *dharmas* since Maheśvara is supposed to be the eternal cause.]

〈Or else, we may say that desire and certain conditions, too, should arise instantaneously (頓起) since they permanently (常) would have to exist [in Maheśvara] as their cause (因).〉

A.B.A.4. Seven other doctrines of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*)

#0119 Others maintain that there is a great *brahmā* (*mahā-brahmā* 大梵),⁷⁸ a time (*kāla* 時), a space (*diś* 方),⁷⁹ a starting point (*pūrva-koṭi* 本際),⁸⁰ a nature (*svabhāva*

⁷⁸ Kuiji explains: *Brahmā rāja*. – AKB v, F 33, 93.

⁷⁹ The time (*kāla*) and space (*diś*) of the Vaiśeṣikas are permanent but do not generate *dharmas*. – Sarvāstivādins, AKB iv, F 62. – *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārika*, xix. – Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 163.

⁸⁰ *Pūrva-koṭi*. – *koṭi*, *ji* 際, like AKB vii, F 96 (elsewhere, *ji* 際 = *anta*, Rosenberg; *kāṇḍa*, AKB iii, F 60). – *Pūrva*: the original has *mūla*, *ben* 本. But the *Śrīmālā*, cited in *Bukkyō Daijiten*, 1621, 1, says: “*Saṃsāra* rests on the *tathāgata-garbha*, this is why it is said

自然) (?),⁸¹ an ether (*ākāśa* 虛空), <31> a self (*ātman*),⁸² etc., which are each single (一), permanently abiding (常住), of real existence (實有), endowed with (powers or) efficacies (功能), engendering all the *dharmas* (生一切法). These doctrines are refuted just like the doctrine of Maheśvara (supreme lord).

A.B.A.5. *The two doctrines of śabda*⁸³

#0121 According to one opinion, the sound (聲) of the Veda (明論) is permanent (常): {1/15r.} it is the fixed norm (定量) of the *dharmas* and it reveals (表詮) *dharmas*.⁸⁴

According to another opinion (which has two branches⁸⁵), all sounds are permanent; but it is in dependence on conditions that they become manifest (顯) or are brought forth (發) (i.e., the names-phrases-syllables [*nāma-pada-vyañjana*]): then they reveal (詮表).⁸⁶

#0123 These two theses are not reasonable. What are the reasons?

that *benji* 本際 is not cognized = *pubbakoti na paññāyate*” (*Samyutta*, iii, 149).

Kuiji explains: *benji* 本際, beginning (starting point) of the past. At that time then (?), all sentient beings arise from this *benji* 本際, single *dharma*.

⁸¹ *ziran* 自然. We may hesitate between *Svayambhū*, which is the usual version—but what is the difference between *Brahmā* and *Svayambhū*?—and *svabhāva* (*Vyutpatti*, 245, 1091). – I prefer *svabhāva*, because there are *Svabhāvavādins* (*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 117 and elsewhere). – Kuiji has no useful comment: “A certain real and permanent *dharma*”, he says.

⁸² But someone will say that, in this chapter, self (*ātman*) deals with the belief in *dharmas*, not with the belief in a self (*ātman*). – We reply that we have refuted the doctrine of self considered as a real entity; here we will show that the self does not generate *dharmas*.

⁸³ See the discussion of the names, phrases and syllables (*nāma-pada-vyañjana*), #0302–#0317.

⁸⁴ “It is the norm of the *dharmas*”. – Norm = model (*kai* 楷) + measure (*liang* 量 = *māna*). – “What is said to be or not to be the case, all that is determined (*niyata* 決定). Other sounds are not the norm and, consequently, are not permanent (常), quoted from Kuiji, *Shuji* (T.43.1830.0262c24).

“Reveals” = *biao* 表 (*gamayati*, *viññāpayati*) = *quan* 詮 (*abhidhāna*) (Rosenberg; *Bukkyō Daijiten*, 1155).

⁸⁵ According to Kuiji, the author has two schools in mind, that of manifestation and that of generation. The equivalents of “manifested”, “engendered” or “brought forth” are given by AKB ii, F 240: the “word” is manifested, *prakāśya*, *vyaṅgya* (顯), or brought forth, *utpādyā*, *janya* (發), by means of the voice.

⁸⁶ “Pointing out”, *quanbiao* 詮表, same expression at #0302 qualifying names, phrases and syllables (*nāma-pada-vyañjana*). – Kuiji gives lengthy explanations.

- #0125 The sound (聲) of the Veda (明論), if it is accepted that it reveals (能詮), is—like other sounds—not permanent.
- #0126 Other sounds (聲) are also not the permanent substance of sound (常聲體), since—like a pitcher, clothing, etc.—they depend on many conditions (待眾緣). <32>

A.B.A.6. Lokāyatikas

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Bibliography in Farquhar, *Religious Literature*, p. 371; Winternitz, iii, p. 447. – Besides the studies of O. Schrader and of Pizzagalli, first in line is the fine paper by G. Tucci, *Linee di una storia del materialismo indiano*, Lincei, 1924. – Konow, *Chantepie*, 4th ed., p. 85 off-print.

Kuiji: “Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas, these non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*) accept, as the only realities, the four fundamental material elements (*mahā-bhūtas*) from which sentient beings emerge and to which they return. Otherwise, their atomic theory does not differ from that of the Vaiśeṣikas.”

The Lokāyatika-Vaiśeṣika atomic theory is refuted in AKB iii, F 210–214; *Viṃśatikā*, Kuiji *juan* 3 at beginning, stanza (*kārikā*) 11 [T.43.1834.0992a21], S. Lévi, F 6 at bottom; H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 129, using Kuiji’s edition in *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 83, ii, fol. 154b, gives a penetrating analysis of it.

On Indian atomism in general, see Masson-Oursel, “L’atomisme indien” in *Revue Philosophique*, 1925, and *Esquisse d’une histoire de la philosophie indienne*, 1923, passim. – Jacobi, E.R.E. [= Hasting’s *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*], ii, 199. – Charpentier, *Leçyā des Jainas*, Göteborg, 1910. – Handt, *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣika-Philosophie*, 1900. – Suali, *Introduzione*, 1913: 164. – See the excellent book of Āthalye, translation and commentary on the *Tarka-saṃgraha*, Bombay, 1897: 121, often plagiarized; J.Ch. Chatterji, *Hindu Realism*, Allahabad, 1912; A.B. Keith, *Indian logic and atomism*, 1922, and H. Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, London, 1917.

Atoms in the Little Vehicle, see #0154.

- #0128 According to some non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道), i.e., the Lokāyatikas, the atoms (*paramāṇu* 極微) of earth, water, fire and wind—(father-mother-atoms, subtle matter [*sūkṣma-rūpa*], primary matter or cause-matter [*kāraṇa-rūpa*])—are permanent (常) (and real (實)), i.e., existing in the absolute sense. They engender massive matter (*sthūla-rūpa* 麤色)—(that is, secondary matter or effect-matter

[*kārya-rūpa*], i.e., the son-atom). The massive matter thus engendered does not exceed the extension of its causes (因量); although it is not permanent, (nevertheless, its substance (體) is real (實有)), i.e., exists in the absolute sense.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

1. Literally, *janitaṃ sthūla-rūpaṃ kāraṇasya (pitṛ-mātr-paramāṇvoḥ) parimāṇam* (*liang* 量) *nātikrāmati* (*yue* 越). – But the *Viṃśatikā* allows the restoration of the original: *paraspara-avyatirekāt* (true reading of S. Lévi, F 7, line 8) is translated: ... *bu guo liang* 不過量, which is obviously equivalent with *bu yue liang* 不越量. Thus, we have: *janita-sthūla-rūpasya kāraṇa-avyatirekaḥ*.

Kuiji renders the same idea by words which give: *putra-paramāṇoḥ parimāṇam pitṛ-mātr-samānam*. – H. Ui (p. 129): “The products (son-atom) have each exactly the same quantity as the original two atoms (i.e., the production is nothing but the aggregation or combination of the two atoms; there is nothing newly <33> created and added), The terms father-atom, mother-atom, son-atom, are apt to lead to misunderstanding of the process.” – I am led to think that the parent-atoms engender a coarse matter different from themselves, create an *avayavi-rūpa* distinct from themselves, which enters into them like water into sand (see #0134). – Chatterji (p. 27) does not miss the opportunity to compare it with hydrogen, oxygen and water: but the parent-atoms remain what they are, permanent and immutable, under the son-atom.


2. Our text says [#0128]: “The massive matter [thus] engendered does not exceed the dimensions of its causes”: i.e., it remains within the order of the infinitely small. In Vaiśeṣika language, its extension (*parimāṇa*) is “atomicity” (*aṇutva*), like that of the atom (*paramāṇu*). – This entails a contradiction in terms, a contradiction which the author quite wrongly attributes to the Vaiśeṣika.

In order to move from “atomicity” (*aṇutva*) to “largeness” (*mahattva*), from atom to mass, the Vaiśeṣika postulates three terms:

a. *paramāṇu*—the father-mother-atoms of our author—the extension of which is called *pārimāṇḍalya* (and is not an extension for us). Chatterji (p. 30) compares them to a point.

b. *dvyāṇuka*, a “binary”, the result of the cooperation of two *paramāṇus*, the son-atom of our author. It “does not exceed the extension of its causes” (as our author says [#0128]), it is of the order of atomicity (*aṇutva*): also (contrary to what our author says), it is not “massive”, it is foreign to “largeness” (*mahattva*). – Chatterji (p. 30) compares it to a line, i.e., the result of “the unification of two points”.

c. *tryaṇuka*, the result of the cooperation of three binaries (*dvyāṇukas*), which is massive, of the order of largeness. – Chatterji (p. 29) compares it to a prism which results from the “unification of three lines on two planes”.



Our author discusses (#0133) the hypothesis of the aggregation of the son-atoms, i.e., the hypothesis of *tryaṇuka*.

#0130 This doctrine is also not reasonable. What are the reasons?

a. In regard to the *paramāṇus* [parent-atoms] (極微):

1. if they are extended (*dig-vibhāga* 方分)—like a line of ants (蟻行), etc.—then their substance is not real; {1/15v.}
2. if they are not extended—like the mind and mental factors—then they will not, when agglomerated (共聚), engender massive secondary matter (麤果色);
3. if they engender a result (*kārya* 果), then—like the result which they engender—how can it be said that the atoms are permanent (常住) and immutable.

#0133 b. In regard to [the son-atom] or the secondary matter (*kārya*):

1. <The result thus engendered (所生果)> does not exceed the extension of its causes; thus—like the atoms—it cannot be called massive matter (麤色); thus, <this secondary matter (果色)> is not accessible to the material sense-faculties: eye, etc. – To accept these conclusions, this would mean to contradict your own definitions. <34>
2. [Question:] – Would you say that secondary matter (果色) is in an intimate connection with <or inherent in> (*samavāya*, 合) the quality (德) called extension (量; *parimāṇa*⁸⁷), and that, although not massive (非麤), it is “as if it were massive” (似麤 *sthūlavat*) and, consequently, an object for the material sense-faculties?

[Reply:] – A bad explanation! Secondary matter, having the same dimensions <or same extension> as its causes (因量), is not—just as the atoms (*paramāṇus*) are not—in intimate connection (合) with <or inherent in> the quality (*guṇa*) “massive extension <or massiveness>” (*sthaulya* = *mahattva* of the Vaiśeṣikas) (麤德).

⁸⁷ H. Ui, pp. 145–149.

Or else, the atoms themselves—massive secondary matter—are also in intimate connection with the quality “massive extension (or massiveness)”, since their sites (處) are not distinct (無別).

3. Someone may say: Secondary matter stays entirely (*kṛtsnaśas* 遍) within its causes {1/16r.}, i.e., being entirely in each point, in each of its causes. The causes being multiple (非一), it may thus be called massive (麤).

[Reply:] – But, in this hypothesis, secondary matter itself will be “multiple” (*aneka* 非一)—like the causes within which it resides are multiple—since the sites of these causes are distinct (別). Being multiple, secondary matter (果) would not be massive at all, therefore, it will also not be accessible to the (material sense-faculty), i.e., the cognition of the eye, etc.

4. Someone may reply that numerous units (or parts) (多分) of secondary matter (several son-atoms) (果) will pile up (合) to constitute one unit of massive matter (麤).

[Answer:] – But, in this hypothesis, numerous units (or causes) (多因) of piled up (he 合) primary matter (極微) will cease to be subtle (*sūkṣma* 細) and will constitute an object (足成) to the sense-faculties, i.e., the cognition of the eye, etc. – What good would it then do to devise secondary matter (i.e., effect-matter [*kārya-rūpa*]) engendered by primary matter (i.e., cause-matter [*kāraṇa-rūpa*])?

However, that which is constituted by numerous parts (多分), i.e., that which has extension (*parimāṇa*), cannot be considered as a real entity (*dravya-sat*). Your second assertions are thus in contradiction with your first assertions.

#0134 5. Moreover, by examining the relationships of secondary matter (massive matter) and of primary matter (i.e., the atoms), we see that these two forms of matter, (i.e., effect (果) and cause (因),) are mutually impenetrable (*zhiai* 質礙; #0154). <35> Thus, they cannot—like two atoms (*paramāṇus*) [cannot]—occur at the same site (同處).

Someone will reply that secondary matter (果) and primary matter (因) “receive” and “penetrate” one another (相受入), (1) like sand (沙) receives water (水), (2) like the alchemical ingredient (of the *tou* stone) (藥) penetrates molten copper (鎔銅).⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Just as sand does not increase when water penetrates into it, so likewise the *paramāṇus* (i.e., cause-matter [*kāraṇa-rūpa*]) receive the effect-matter [*kārya-rūpa*] without becoming enlarged.

This reply is worthless, for: (1) Who will accept that sand receives water? [The water enters into the empty spaces between the grains of sand, and not into the nature of the sand.] (2) Who will accept that molten copper receives the alchemical ingredient? [The latter does not enter into the atoms of the copper and yet it causes these atoms to be transformed into gold.] {1/16v.}

Nevertheless, if one would accept that your first comparison is conclusive, it would establish that the atoms are not units (非一), since they “receive” (or would be separated) (離); and, according to the second comparison, the atoms would not be permanent (非常), since they are transformed (變) by secondary matter, like the atoms of copper by the ingredient.

6. Finally, if the massive secondary matter itself constitutes a “unity” (一) and not a “multiplicity”, one cannot access one part (一分) without entirely accessing all [other parts] (一切), since the part that one does access and [the parts] that one does not access do not make up a multiplicity.⁸⁹ – If you reject this conclusion, you are contradicting logic (違理); if you accept it, you are contradicting the facts (違事).

Thus, the tenet does not withstand examination. It is an ill-conceived interpretation (虛妄計度) based on pure fantasy.

A.B.A.7. General refutation

#0136 Thus, although there are numerous varieties (*prakāra* 品類) of non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道), nevertheless, there are only four ways of conceiving “entities” (i.e., the *dharmas* that exist [有法 *sad-dharmas*]). <36>

#0139 1. According to the first, i.e., the Sāmkhyas (數論) and others, the *dharmas* that exist (*sad-dharmas* 有法) are in and of themselves definitively identical (一) with the nature of “existence” (有等性), i.e., with *sattā* or *mahā-sattā* (#0108; #0900), etc.⁹⁰

The text has *yao* 藥 = *oṣadhi* = alchemical ingredient which “transforms copper into gold” (Kuiji). – Kuiji: *toushi zhi yao* 鑄石之藥, *tou-stone-oṣadhi*. – Couvreur, p. 961: “mineral which has the appearance of copper and which comes from Persia”.

⁸⁹ Compare *Viṃśatikā*, 15 (*Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0076b01).

⁹⁰ Literally, “are by nature (*ti* 體: substance) one with the *sattā* (‘existence’), etc.” – *sattā* = *mahā-satta*, = “existence”, the great universal called “existence”.

“Etc.” = the secondary universals: matter, color, blue, etc.

“Identical”, “different” = *tattva*, *anyatva*.

This doctrine is not reasonable. What are the reasons?

In this hypothesis, all *dharmas*, by the very fact that they are of the nature of “existence” (有性), all—like the nature of “existence”—would be identical with one another, i.e., would themselves be undifferentiated (體無差別). In this way, the Sāṃkhya is in contradiction (違) with itself since it holds that the three constituents (*guṇas* 三德), the self (*ātman* 我), etc., are entities distinct among each other (體異); {17r.} he is also in contradiction with the worldly (世間) (distinctions of *dharmas*): moreover, if all forms of matter (*rūpas*), etc., are “of the nature of matter” (*rūpatā* 色性), etc., i.e., if all colors are “color”, etc., then blue (青), yellow (黃), etc., would not be distinct (異).

- #0140 2. According to the second, i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas (勝論) and others, the *dharmas* that exist (*sad-dharmas* 有法) are in and of themselves (體) definitively different (異) from the nature of “existence” (*sattā*) (有等性).

This doctrine is not reasonable. What are the reasons?

In this hypothesis, all *dharmas*, by the very fact that they are not of the nature of “existence” (有性)—like some thing that has ceased (and is non-existent) (*pradhvaṃsa-abhāva* 已滅無)—would elude any perception.⁹¹ – In this way, the Vaiśeṣika (is in contradiction (違) with himself), i.e., implicitly denies that his substances (*dravyas* 實) and other categories are real, (i.e., are not non-existent in themselves (自體非無)); he is also in contradiction with the world which sees from obvious facts that things (物) exist. Moreover, if colors, etc., are not of the nature of color, etc., they will not—like sound, etc.—be cognized by the eye, etc., (as objects).

- #0141 3. According to the third, i.e., the Nirgranthas (“Without-shame”, 無慚) and others, the *dharmas* that exist (*sad-dharmas* 有法) are, at the same time, both [i] identical (一) with the nature of “existence” (*sattā*) (有等性), etc. (which is the “nature” of various *dharmas*) and [ii] different (異) from the nature of “existence” (*sattā*) (有等性), etc. (because their aspect is distinct).

This doctrine is not reasonable. What are the reasons? {1/17v.}

⁹¹ One of the five kinds of non-existence (*abhāvas*), says Kuiji in his *Shuji* (1B/89r.3) (T43.1830.0256a04); see H. Ui, p. 183: [1. antecedent non-existence (*prāg-abhāva* 未生無); 2. subsequent non-existence (*pradhvaṃsa-* or *dhvaṃsa-abhāva* 已滅無); 3. reciprocal non-existence (*anyonya-abhāva* 更互無); 4. absolute non-existence (*atyanta-abhāva* 畢竟無); 5. natural non-existence (*samsarga-abhāva* 不會無).] – In fact, the usual list is four, Vyutpatti, 202.

- a. It has the contradictions (過) (of identity (一) and of difference (異)), as each of the preceding theses.
- b. The two characteristics of identity and of difference—like pleasure and suffering—are (mutually) contradictory (相違) and cannot be attributed to one and the same thing, (for they should be different in nature);
- c. Neither identity <37> nor difference could be established (if their nature would be same) (i.e., the identical would not be identical since it is given as different ...).

All *dharmas* would be of the same and common substance (同一體), since it is claimed that contradictory *dharmas* are of the same substance. Or else, your *dharma*, being at once identical (一) with and different (異) from “existence” (*sattā*), would—like a “man-ox”—have only “existence as designation” [or “nominal existence”] (*prajñapti-sat* 假) and would not have real existence (*tātvika* 實), and yet you intend to speak about real *dharmas*. [This doctrine] is definitively not established as being reasonable.

- #0142 4. According to the fourth, i.e., the Ājīvikas (邪命)⁹² and others, the *dharmas* that exist (*sad-dharmas*) are neither identical (非一) with the nature of “existence” (*sattā*) (有等性) nor different (非異) from the nature (性) of “existence”.

This doctrine is not reasonable. What are the reasons?

- a. The “neither identical nor different” doctrine would not be distinguished from the “identical and different” doctrine.
- b. Is the expression “neither identical nor different” affirmative (表) or negative (遮)?
 - i. (If [the expression] is only affirmative (表), then) the double negation (雙非) [of the expression] is unacceptable.
 - ii. (If, however, [the expression] is negative (遮), then) the object of discourse disappears (or then there is nothing upheld) (無所執).
 - iii. Is [the expression] both negative and affirmative (亦遮亦表)? Then it would contradict itself (互相違).

⁹² On the Ājīvikas, “false rules of conduct”, see Hoernle’s entry in Hastings’ *Encyclopaedia*, Vol. I, pp. 259–268. – Hoernle mentions [I, p. 268] the short note by Sadajiro Sugiura, *Hindu Logic*, Philadelphia, 1899: 16, on the ascetic practices of the Nikendabtras (Nirgranthas) and Ashibikas [i.e., “fasting, silence, immovability, and the burying of themselves to the neck”] (to exhaust as soon as possible the bad fruit of action).

iv. Is [the expression] neither affirmative nor negative (非表非遮)? {1/18r.} That is purely verbiage (戲論).

Moreover, this doctrine (of neither identity nor difference) is in contradiction with the opinion of the world (世共) which recognizes that (things are either identical or different), i.e., blue is identical with blue and different from yellow, and is also in contradiction with the tenet of the Ājīvikas itself, because it holds (that *dharmas* that exist, such as) matter (*rūpas*), etc., are definitively real (實).

#0143 Let us therefore conclude that this doctrine is only a vain effort (矯) to avoid the difficulties (過) of other tenets. Wise people (智者) will not accept it. <38>

A.B.B. *Dharmas of the Little Vehicle*

B.1. Matter (*rūpas*); #0145

B.2. Formations dissociated (from mind) (*viprayukta-saṃskāras*); #0215

B.3. Unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*); #0323

B.4. Object (*grāhya*) and subject (*grāhaka*); #0343

B.5. Various kinds of the belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha-vibhaṅga*); #0350

#0145 (The other vehicles (餘乘)), i.e., the Little Vehicle, accept three types of *dharmas* as real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有) separate from mind (*citta*, *viññāna*) (離識) and its associates (*saṃprayuktas*, i.e., mental factors [*caittas*]), namely: (1) forms of matter (*rūpas* 色), (2) dissociated factors (*viprayuktas* 不相應行), (3) unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas* 無為).

[Question:] – How is it that they do not exist?

#0146 [Answer:] – We say that these three categories of *dharmas*, (i.e., matter or material forms, the dissociated factors and the various unconditioned factors, which are accepted by them,) are not real entities separate from cognition (*viññāna*), (for, according to reason, they cannot be said to exist).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

That is to say: “separate from the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) and from their development (*pariṇāma*), i.e., the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) and the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*)”. – The dissociated factors (*viprayuktas*) are not different from *viññāna* and from its development. The forms of matter (*rūpas*) are different but are not separate. The forms of matter are, indeed, the development of *viññāna* (i.e., real development for Dharmapāla, imaginary development for Sthiramati), thus, not separate, but they are different since they are the aggregate of matter (*rūpa-skandha*).

[At least this applies for the forms of matter (*rūpas*) called resistant (*sapratigha*).]

See #0052, #0203 and #0323.

A.B.B.1. *Forms of matter (rūpas)*

- 1.1. Resistant (*sapratigha*) matter (*rūpa*); #0149
- 1.2. Non-resistant (*apratigha*) matter (*rūpa*); #0185

#0149 The Little Vehicle distinguishes two kinds of matter (*rūpa*):

1. the “resistant” (*sapratigha* 有對) matter which consists of atoms (*paramāṇu-māya* 極微), which includes the first ten sense-spheres (*āyatana*s): eye-color ... body-tangible;
2. the “non-resistant” (*apratigha* 無對) matter which does not consist of atoms, which includes one part of the sense-sphere of dharmas (*dharma-āyatana*) (see #0185, #0205).⁹³

In our language, material and immaterial *rūpa*.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

a. For a discussion of the atoms from the *vijñapti-mātratā* point of view, see—besides the *Viṃśatikā*—the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 87, the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* (pp. 30–31 of the French translation, Louvain, 1902) and the footnotes of “*Traité des vingt Ślokas*”, 1902, Louvain, pp. 18, 26.

On the atoms of the Sarvāstivādins, see AKB i, F 51, 89; ii, F 144 (iii, F 177) and footnotes (Saṃghabhadra, etc.).

b. A *dharma* is resistant (*sapratigha*; *youdui* 有對) because it is “with *pratighāta*” (*zhang'ai* 障礙 or *ai* 礙), “with the ability to strike, with the ability to obstruct, with resistance, with the ability to repel” (since *pratigha* = *pratighāta*).

For the two Vehicles (AKB i, F 51; Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/4r., and *Viṃśatikā*, commentary of the text, ed. Lévi [1925], F 7 bottom), obstruction or resistance (*pratighāta*) is of three types; that which gives three types of obstructive or resistant dharmas:

1. obstructive qua obstacle (*āvaraṇa-sapratigha*) (*zhang'ai youdui* 障礙有對; better *zhang youdui*); for example, we would say that the stone and the stone that <39> collide with each other, that repulse each other, “are mutually impenetrable”;
2. obstructive qua object-field (*viśaya-sapratigha*): the sense-faculty and the object,

⁹³ AKB iv, F 16; T.32.1646.0484.

e.g., the eye and color;

3. obstructive qua cognitive object (*ālambana-sapratigha*): mind and its object.

[The Great Vehicle distinguishes two obstructions qua obstacle (*āvaraṇa-pratighātas*), the first is, strictly speaking, the obstruction (*pratighāta*) of impenetrability; the second (*juai* 拘礙; *ju* 拘) includes the other two varieties.]

A.B.B.1.1. *Resistant (sapratigha) matter (rūpa)*

1.1.1. Dilemmas; #0154

1.1.2. Support (*āśraya* 所依) and object (*ālambana* 所緣) of the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) (various schools); #0171

1.1.3. Correct theory of the atoms; #0183

A.B.B.1.1.1. *Dilemmas*

#0154 We definitively cannot admit reality to resistant matter (*rūpa*) (有對色), for the atoms (極微) of which it consists {1/18v.} are not real (非實).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

We must distinguish between the atoms, i.e., subtle matter (*rūpa*), and coarse matter constituted by the atoms, i.e., massive matter.

According to the Sautrāntikas, subtle matter is real, but massive matter, which does not exist separate from subtle matter, is “fictitious” (*saṃvṛta*).

According to the Sarvāstivādins, the two kinds of matter are real.

According to the Ekavyavahārikas, the two kinds of matter are fictitious.

According to the Great Vehicle, massive matter is real (a development of *vijñāna*), subtle matter is fictitious (for the atom is an ideal [or mentally created] division of matter [*rūpa*] cognized by the senses) (see #0183).

[We pose two dilemmas:

1. the atoms are “substantially repelling”, or they are not;
2. the atoms are “(spatially) extended”, or they are not.]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to the Sautrāntikas, the atom is “extended”, it involves spatial division (*dig-bhāga-bheda* or *dig-vibhāga*).

According to the Sarvāstivādins, it is not extended: we would say that it is merely

a point.

The two schools maintain that the atom is *sapratigha*, “being obstructive”, by means of obstruction qua obstacle (*āvaraṇa-pratighāta*): they maintain that one atom cannot occur in the same place where another atom is located.

But, not agreeing on the extension of the atom, the two schools do not understand obstruction qua obstacle in the same way:

1. The Sautrāntikas accept that the atoms touch one another and that they collide with one another due to their extension (*dig-deśa-bheda-pratighāta*).
2. The Sarvāstivādins cannot accept that their atom-points touch one another (AKB i, F 89); they thus attribute to them an obstruction (*pratighāta*) that is called *dizhī'ai* (?) or *zhī'ai* 質礙, which I have not attempted to restore into Sanskrit and which—while waiting for something better—I translate as “substantial repelling” [repelling due to which they collide at a distance and due to which they bring it about that nothing can be introduced between them]. The Sautrāntikas, however, do not accept this *dizhī'ai*.

We have the following equivalences:

Sapratigha = *youdui* 有對. <40>

Pratighāta = *zhang'ai* 障礙 or simply *ai* 礙 (*Viṃśatikā* [Lévi], F 7 and in *dig-bhāga-bheda-pratighāta*).

Āvaraṇa, *āvṛti* = *zhang* 障 and likewise *zhang'ai* 障礙 (in the expression *āvaraṇa-sapratigha*, AKB ii, F 51; #0168).

Dig-bhāga-bheda = *fangfen* 方分, *Viṃśatikā* [Lévi], F 7. (See #0183 [fn.])

Dizhī'ai and *zhī'ai* 質礙 (see #0051, #0105, #0134), doubtful restoration.

Zhangge 障隔, *āvaraṇa*. – [When *āvaraṇa* is] ruled out, see #0183 [fn.]

- #0157 1. If atoms are “substantially repelling” (有質礙), then they are—like the pitcher (瓶), etc.—fictitious (假) (and not real (非實)).
- #0158 If they are not (“substantially repelling”) (無質礙), then they cannot—like that which is not matter (*rūpa*)—accumulate (集) in order to constitute the pitcher, (clothing (衣), etc.).
- #0160 2. If atoms, moreover, are extended (i.e., have spatial division [*dig-deśa-bheda* 方分]), as the Sautrāntikas say, then they can necessarily be divided (可分析) and, therefore, are not real.
- #0163 If [atoms] are not extended (無方分), as the Sarvāstivādins say, then this raises

five difficulties:

- a. Like that which is not matter (*rūpa*), how could agglomerated (*saṃghata* 和合) [atoms] receive light and create a shadow (承光發影)? When the sun (日), at sunrise, lights up a post (柱), etc. (*saṃghāta-rūpa*, i.e., matter of agglomeration), then the two sides—east and west (東西)—appear lit up (光) and in the shadow (影), respectively (光影各現). Since the site (處) where the light is and the site where the shadow is are distinct (不同), the atom should definitively be extended (方分).⁹⁴
- #0164 b. Moreover, when we see (見) or touch (觸) a wall (壁) or some other object (物), we contact only this side and not the other side. But the agglomerated <object> (和合物) {1/19r.} is [the same as] the atoms (諸極微).⁹⁵ <Thus, the atoms are necessarily extended (方分).>
- #0165 c. Moreover, all the atoms—according to the place where they are positioned⁹⁶—are necessarily differentiated (差別) in terms of top and bottom (上下), <and the four directions>, i.e., east, south, west and north.
- In the opposing hypothesis, [i] they could not agglomerate (共) [for: 共聚] (*Vibhāṣā* thesis), or [ii] they could not combine (Neo-Sarvāstivādins) (和集).⁹⁷
- #0166 d. Or else, entering one into the other (相涉入), they could not constitute massive (*sthūla*) matter (*rūpa*). Thus, the atoms are definitively extended. <41>
- #0167 e. You say that resistant matter (*sapratigha rūpa* 有對色) (i.e., matter that creates resistance) is the atoms (諸極微).⁹⁸ If the atoms are not extended (無方分), then the matter (*rūpa*) that you call resistant (*sapratigha*) would not be an “obstacle-separation” (障礙)⁹⁹ (just like non-matter and atoms); if so, then it will not be resistant or obstructive qua obstacle (*āvaraṇa-sapratigha* 障礙有對): [thus, it will not be resistant].

⁹⁴ *Viṃśatikā*, ed. Lévi, F 7 at bottom.

⁹⁵ AKB i, F 92.

⁹⁶ Although they do not touch each other, AKB i, F 89, they are mutually an obstacle to one another. The eastern side which strikes, which repels, is not the western side.

⁹⁷ See #0180.

⁹⁸ There is no resistant matter (*sapratigha-rūpa*) apart from atoms (independently from the atoms that constitute it): *yaḥ paramānūnām saṃghāto na sa tebhyo ṛthāntaram*. *Viṃśatikā*, ad stanza 12 [但諸聚色有相合理有方分故此亦不然, cf. *Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0076a05; Kuiji, *Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1843.0994c11].

⁹⁹ *zhangge* 障礙 (see #0154). – “Your ten sense-spheres (*āyatana*s) are not obstructive qua obstacle (*āvaraṇa-sapratigha*) for they do not cause an obstacle (*anāvaraṇatvāt*), like the mind”.

- #0168 Thus, the atoms accepted by you, etc., are necessarily extended (方分); <and since they are extended,> they can be divided (分析); thus, they definitively are not real entities (*dravya-sat*).
- #0169 We conclude that <the reality of> resistant matter (*sapratigha rūpa* 有對色) is logically inadmissible.

A.B.B.1.1.2. *Support (āśraya) and object (ālambana) of the five cognitions (vijñānas) (various schools)*

- #0171 Someone may say: – How can the five sensory cognitions (i.e., *vijñānas* of the eye, etc.) not have the sense-faculties (*indriya*) that are matter (*rūpa*) as “support” (*āśraya* 所依), not have external things (*artha*) that are matter as object (*ālambana* 緣)?
- #0173 [Answer:] – Although it would be false to say that the support and object {1/19v.} are not matter (無色), nevertheless, this matter is merely the development (*pariṇāma* 變) of *vijñāna* (識). That is to say: when the eight cognitions arise (precisely, the awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*] of the eight cognitions), then the eighth cognition develops (變) into <and appears (似) as images (相) of> the eye (眼), etc., the color (色), etc., by the power of internal causes and conditions (內因緣力) (i.e., condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya*], namely, the seeds [*bījas*] of the sense-faculties and of the external things). In these developments, <i.e., as images (相)>, the five sensory cognitions have a support (所依) and an object (緣).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

By relying on the sense-faculties (*indriyas*) (eye, etc.) which are the development of the eighth cognition, the five cognitions (visual cognition, etc.) take the five “dusts” (color, etc.) which are the development of the eighth [cognition] as their object (*ālamb*). They do not directly contact these “dusts” (archetypes), but they develop as images similar to these “dusts” (images which are their own image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]). Thus, the five cognitions have the five sense-faculties as support, have the five “dusts” of the eighth [cognition] as distant object, and have a replica of these five “dusts” as near object (Kuiji). – Cf. *Siddhi* F 18. <42>

A.B.B.1.1.2.a. *Summary discussion of the support (āśraya)*¹⁰⁰

- #0174 Thus, the sense-faculties (*indriyas* 根), i.e., the eye, etc.—the supports of the cognitions (*vijñānas*)—are not cognized by evidence <or direct perception> (*praty-*

¹⁰⁰ See #1127.

akṣa-pramāṇa 現量¹⁰¹). Their existence is inferred (比知) from their activity: they generate cognition (*viññāna*) (能發識).

As their name *indriya*¹⁰² indicates, they are only “efficacies” (*śakti* 功能),¹⁰³ not external things¹⁰⁴ constituted by matter derived from the four fundamental material elements (*upādāya-rūpa*, *bhautika-rūpa*¹⁰⁵). Resistant (*sapratigha*) matter (*rūpa*) external to the mind (外有對色) is inadmissible, when considered reasonably: thus, the five sense-faculties, like their five objects—in a word, the ten sense-spheres (*āyatana*s)—are merely the development-manifestation (變現) of internal *viññāna* (內識).

However, even though all of this is integrated in the mind or is development of *viññāna*, the activities are distinct: that which generates visual cognition, etc., is called “eye sense-faculty” (*caṣur-indriya* 眼根), etc., for the visual cognition, etc., arises with that as support (所依).

A.B.B.1.1.2.b. *Discussion of the object (ālambana)*¹⁰⁶

#0176 A “condition qua object” (*ālambana-pratyaya* 所緣緣)¹⁰⁷—external (外) to the mind—of the five sensory cognitions, i.e., cognition of the eye, etc., is inadmissible, when considered rationally. Thus, we definitively must accept that the condition qua object of these cognitions is the development (所變) (i.e, image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) of one’s *viññāna* (自識).

A.B.B.1.1.2.b.a. *Definition of the condition qua object (ālambana-pratyaya)*

The scholars of the Little Vehicle, with the exception of the Sāṃmitīyas, give <43> the definition: “That which generates (*nirvartayati* 能引生, brings-about—

¹⁰¹ AKB ix, F 232

¹⁰² AKB ii, F 103.

¹⁰³ The nature of the sense-faculties (*indriyas*), nevertheless, lends itself to controversy, as we will see in the discussion of the support (*āśraya*), #1125. – But here the author limits himself to refuting the “realists”.

¹⁰⁴ Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/13r.1, cites *Ālambana-parīkṣā*: since the internal (*ādhyātmika*) matter (*rūpa*), like the external one, is an object (*ālambana*) of cognition, it is maintained that it occurs in cognition (*viññāna*) and generates cognition.

¹⁰⁵ AKB i. F 21.

¹⁰⁶ See #2468–#2481.

¹⁰⁷ Four conditions (*pratyayas*) are distinguished, which are named below. – Let us agree to translate *pratyaya* by “condition” in order to reserve the word “cause” for *hetu*.

engenders) a cognition (*viññāna*) similar to itself (*svākāra*, *svābhāsa* 似自) {1/20r.} is this condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of this cognition”.¹⁰⁸

- #0178 One cannot, with the Sāṃmitīyas, say that the condition qua object of a cognition alone is what engenders it (*janayati*) and nothing else, because in this hypothesis, the other conditions—i.e., condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*), condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*), condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*), e.g., the sense-faculty (*indriya*)—would also be called conditions qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*). [Correct definition, #2470.]

A.B.B.1.1.2.b.b. *Doctrine of the Sautrāntikas*

- #0179 [The Sautrāntikas believe that the “condition qua object” (*ālambana-pratyaya*) is the agglomerated atoms (= the agglomeration of the atoms).] When the five cognitions, i.e., the visual cognition (*cakṣur-viññāna*), etc., cognize color (了色), etc., they do not take (緣) the atoms as object but just the agglomeration (和合), since they take on the aspect of this agglomeration (*tad-ākāratvāt* 和合似彼相: we see a mass of blue, not the atoms of blue).

[But Dignāga has refuted this tenet.] When one breaks up (分析) the agglomeration, the cognition definitively no longer seizes ⟨or engenders⟩ the aspect of the agglomeration (似彼相識). Thus, the aspect of this agglomeration (和合相)—different from that of the atoms (異諸極微)—does not possess a reality of its own (實自體). [This is what the Sautrāntikas—for whom massive matter has only

¹⁰⁸ S. Lévi (1925), *Trentaine* [Sthiramati], F 16, line 18 (transl. based on Jacobi):

*katham etad gamyate, vinā bāhyenārthena viññānam evārthākāram utpadyata
iti | bāhyo hy arthaḥ, svābhāsa-viññāna-janakatvena, viññānasyālambana-pratyaya
iṣyate, na kāraṇatva-mātreṇa, samanantarādi-pratyayādi-viśeṣāprasaṅgāt |*

[Question:] – How is it to be understood that (the content of) *viññāna* arises in the form (*ākāra*) of an object (*artha*) without such an object being present external [to *viññāna*]?

[Answer:] – It is indeed the external (*bāhya*) object which, insofar as it causes the appearance of itself (*svābhāsa*) in *viññāna*, is the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of *viññāna* (i.e., on which it is directed) but not simply (*mātra*) as the cause as such (*kāraṇatva*), because otherwise it would not be necessary to distinguish the other conditions, such as the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*), etc. [... (Answer continues until F 17, line 7)].

“practical” existence—accept, see #0154.] But if the aspect of the agglomeration (和合相) is not a real thing (實), it cannot be said that the agglomeration is the “condition qua object” of the five cognitions (識緣): one could say “object”, if one wants, but not “condition” (*pratyaya*). The “condition”, which engenders, must be a reality: a non-existent thing, for example, a second moon (第二月), etc., cannot engender the five cognitions. <44>

A.B.B.1.1.2.b.c. *Doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins*

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The *Viṃśatikā* (*kārikā* 11) [*Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0075c15] distinguishes three theories of object (*ālambana*):

1. The object of cognition is the parts-possessing matter (*avayavi-rūpa*): Vaiśeṣika (勝論) theory (refuted in AKB iii, F 210–214, see also #0100, #0128) [*Kuiji, Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1843.0992b12].
2. The object of cognition is the atoms (*paramāṇu*), taken individually (*pratyekam*): Sarvāstivādin (薩婆多) theory [*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, 0992c09].
3. The object of cognition is the atoms (*paramāṇus*) when they are an agglomeration (*saṃhata*): Sautrāntika (經部) theory [*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, 0992c17].

But it would be proper to distinguish two Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多) theories, (1) the theory of the *Vibhāṣā* (毘婆沙), (2) the theory of Saṃghabhadra (正理師).

Kuiji says (cf. *Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1834.0993a06):

The early translation of the *Viṃśatikā* [舊唯識] [Paramārtha] uses only one single term to translate *saṃhata* because, [besides the Vaiśeṣikas,] it has in mind only the early Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. – But the school of Xuanzang translates *saṃhata* by two terms: (1) *hehe* 和合, (2) *heji* 和集: in that way, it distinguishes the Sautrāntikas (*hehe* 和合 or agglomeration system) and Neo-Sarvāstivādins (Saṃghabhadra, *heji* 和集 or combination system).

S. Yamaguchi has kindly compared the Chinese version of the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* (where *hehe* 和合 and *heji* 和集 are contrasted, as in the Chinese *Viṃśatikā* and in our text,) with the Tibetan version. The latter always has 'dus pa.

The Sanskrit texts use the expressions *saṃghāta-rūpa*, *cita-rūpa*, *saṃcita-rūpa*, *saṃhatāḥ paramāṇavaḥ* and *saṃcitāḥ paramāṇavaḥ* indiscriminately.

- a. “Our” text, explaining the doctrine of the early Sarvāstivādins, uses the term

hehe 和合 [“agglomeration”] (likewise Kuiji when commenting on the *Viṃśatikā*, who also has *he* 和 once); but AKB iii, F 213—[within the context of the] early Sarvāstivādins—has *samasta*, translated as *juji* 聚集.

b. As far as I know, Saṃghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra* (T.29.1562.0383c14) (transl. by Xuan-zang) does not have *heji* 和集 but *zhanzhuan hehe* 展轉和合 (but see #0181 [fn.]).

A.B.B.1.1.2.b.c.a. *Early Sarvāstivādins*

#0180 The early Sarvāstivādins think that the atoms seized individually—yet when they are agglomerated (*hehe* 和合)—are the “condition qua object” (所緣) (for the arising of each of the five) cognitions.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

For us—says the Buddhist refuting the Vaiśeṣika—the atoms, although suprasensory, become the object of sensory direct perception when they are joined together (*samasta*, *juji* 聚集): *paramāṇvatīndriyatve ’pi samastānām pratyakṣatvam* (AKB iii, F 213).

[Dignāga has refuted this tenet.] The characteristic or aspect of the atom (極微相) is not reflected in these cognitions. (The cognitions do not reproduce <45> the characteristic of the atom). The atoms do not possess the characteristic (相) which belongs solely to the agglomeration {1/20v.} since, in the state of non-agglomeration (不和合), they do not possess this characteristic. The atoms themselves (體) and their characteristics (相) remain the same whether there is agglomeration or not. In the state of agglomeration, just as in the state of non-agglomeration, the atoms (of color, etc.,) are not taken as objects by the five cognitions. – [Thus, the atoms, assuming they are real, are perhaps a “condition” of cognition; they are certainly not the object.]

A.B.B.1.1.2.b.c.b. *Neo-Sarvāstivādins—Tenet of the apeṣṣā (Saṃghabhadra)*¹⁰⁹

#0181 There is a theory that the atoms (極微) (of color, etc.,) seized individually (一一), i.e., when not “combined” (*heji* 和集), are not the object (*viṣaya* 境) of the five

¹⁰⁹ Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/22v.1. – Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0383c14) (translated in AKB ii, F 144, note) says: “The name *samghāta-aṇu* is given to these aggregated atoms (*zhanzhuan* 展轉: *anyonya*; *hehe* 和合: *samhata*)” (如是眾微。展轉和合。定不離者。說為微聚)。I do not find the theory or explanation of *apeṣṣā*, i.e., of *heji* 和集, in Saṃghabhadra, that is to say, in the places where one would look for it (i.e., places corresponding to the atomic explanations of AKB).

cognitions. But, in a state of combination (共和集位), they assist one another (*anyonyam apekṣante* ?, 展轉相資)¹¹⁰ and there occurs the arising of the massive characteristic or ⟨image⟩ or (*sthūla-lakṣaṇa* 麤相),¹¹¹ which is the object of the five cognitions (識境). This characteristic or ⟨image⟩ (相) is real (*dravya-sat*), thus, it is the “condition qua object” (*ālambana-pratyaya* 所緣) of cognition (*vijñāna*): [“condition”, since it is real; “qua object”, since cognition reproduces of it the ⟨characteristic or image⟩].¹¹²

This theory is not correct. We will establish five arguments against this theory:

- a. Whether combined (共和集) or non-combined (未集), the atoms have the same substance (體), the same characteristic (相).
- b. Thus, if the atoms of two clay containers (物), say, a pitcher (瓶), bowl (甌), etc., are the same (*sama* 等), then the cognition directed at the pitcher (緣彼相識) should be identical (無別) with that directed at the bowl. <46>
- c. In the state of combination (共和集位), {21r.} the ⟨individual (一一)⟩ atoms will each lose their characteristic (相) of smallness or “atomicity” (*aṇutva* 微), of “sphericity” (*pārimāṇdalya* 圓, *Siddhi* F 33).
- d. One cannot accept that the cognition that is directed at (or reproduces) (*ālamb*) the massive characteristic (*sthūla-lakṣaṇa*) (麤相識) would have a subtle characteristic (緣細相境) for its object (*viśaya*), since, in this hypothesis, ⟨the cognition of one kind of object (餘境識) could also be directed at the object of another kind [of cognition] (緣餘境), which should not be the case; e.g.,) the cognition of sound would just as easily cognize color.
- e. One cognition will take all things at the same time for its object, [since you accept that things of opposite characteristic are perceived at the same time].

¹¹⁰ *Trentaine* [Sthiramati], F 16, line 26 (transl. based on Jacobi):

anyas tu manyate | ekaika-paramāṇur anya-nirapekṣo 'īndriyo, bahavas tu paras-parāpekṣā indriya-grāhyāḥ |

But someone else thinks: “Each single atom (*paramāṇu*), when being without relationship to other [atoms], is not perceived by the sense-faculties (*atīndriya*), but many [atoms], when being in relationship (*apekṣā*) with one another, are seized by the sense-faculties.”

¹¹¹ The problem is examined in Kuiji's commentary on the *Viṃśatikā* (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1843.0993c).

For the massive characteristic (*sthūla-lakṣaṇa*) (or *sthaulya*) of the *aṇu-rūpa* (*samghāta-aṇu*), the molecule made up of seven atoms, see AKB ii, F 144.

- #0182 Such are the difficulties (失) that one comes up against, even when the existence of atoms is assumed to be established. (This is even more so when there are no real atoms external to *vijñāna*). And we have shown that atoms do not exist separate from *vijñāna*.

A.B.B.1.1.3. *Correct theory of the atoms*

- #0183 (From the above we definitively know that the images (相) developed from within *vijñāna* itself (自識所變), appearing similar to matter (*rūpa*) (似色), etc., serve as condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya* 所緣緣). The seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) of *vijñāna*, in turn, arises on the basis of these [images] (見託彼生) and carries along these images (帶彼相) [as its object].)

Thus, when *vijñāna* develops (*pariṇam* 變), its “image”-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) appears all at once (頓現), whether as the aspect or image of a large (大) thing or of a small (小) thing. *Vijñāna* does not develop fractionally (別) as a multitude of atoms (眾多極微) which, only when joined together, would constitute one thing (合成一物).

However, the Buddha (佛) speaks of atoms (極微). – [This is so] because he addresses people who believe in the reality (實體) of massive forms of matter (*rūpas*) (麤色). By dividing up (析) massive matter, he wants people to rid themselves of this belief. But he does not teach that forms of matter (*rūpas*) are, in reality, atoms. {1/21v.}

The Yogācāryas (瑜伽師),¹¹² (by means of conventional reasoning and understanding (以假想慧), step by step (漸次)) divide and subdivide (除析)—not with a real knife but with the mind¹¹³—(the image (相) of) massive matter to the point where it is not further divisible; to this extreme fraction, which is of completely fictitious existence, they conventionally give the name “atom” (極微). Although, [in contrast to the Sarvāstivādins who believe that the atom is indivisible because it has no parts,¹¹⁴] the Yogācāryas think that this atom is extended, i.e., that it <47> involves “spatial division” (*dig-bhāga-bheda* 有方分),¹¹⁵ nevertheless, it is

¹¹² Kuiji points out the variant “Yogācāra”, an epithet qualifying the masters who are the Yogācāryas. – He studies the five meanings of the word *yoga* in the expression “masters of *yoga*”: Many say that *yoga* = *dhyāna* (*Shuji* 2A/30v.5).

¹¹³ Compare the *Prajñā-sāstra*.

¹¹⁴ Saṃghabhadra: “It cannot be divided by another kind of matter (*rūpa*) or by the mind”.

¹¹⁵ *fangfen* 方分 corresponds to *dig-bhāga-bheda* (*Trentaine*). – Kuiji (T.43.1830.0272c21)

indivisible (不可析), for, if one would continue the dividing (析), the atom would appear “similar to space, to the void (*ākāśa*)” (似空現),¹¹⁶ and could no longer be called matter (*rūpa*). This is why it is said that “the atom is the limit of matter (色邊際)”.¹¹⁷

- #0184 From this we can conclude that resistant (*sapratigha* 有對) matter (*rūpa*) (cause or effect, atomic or massive) appears as a “development of *viññāna*” (識變現) and does not consist of atoms.

A.B.B.1.2. Non-resistant (*apratigha*) matter (*rūpa*)

- 2.1. Matter of informing by means of the body (*kāya-vijñapti-rūpa*); #0187
- 2.2. Matter of informing by means of speech (*vāg-vijñapti-rūpa*); #0203
- 2.3. Non-informing *rūpa* (*avijñapti-rūpa*); #0205
- 2.4. The three actions; #0207

- #0185 As for non-resistant (*apratigha* 無對) matter (*rūpa*), it may be said that—being *rūpa* like resistant (*sapratigha*) (matter (*rūpa*))—it is also not a real thing. Or [it may be said] that—being non-resistant (like mind and mental factors)—it definitively cannot be real matter.

We have observed, according to reason, that resistant matter—appearing with the characteristics of matter (現有色相) (i.e., materiality, we would say, shape, color, etc.)—cannot be regarded as a reality separate from *viññāna*. All the more

explains that *fangfen* 方分 means either *fen* of *fang* (“division of space, of *dis*”) or “*fen* that is *fang*” (方之分。方即分). Massive matter (*rūpa*) possesses *fangfen* 方分 in both senses; the atom possesses it only in the second sense. – We can thus attribute spatial division (*dig-bhāga-bheda*) to it although it is not divisible.

- ¹¹⁶ According to YBh, *juan* 3 at beginning. – That which is susceptible of being divided is not *paramāṇu*. The atom (*paramāṇu*) is subtle, thus, it is indivisible. It is not “like the mind”, thus, it is extended. – If the dissection were to be pursued, the mental image (*nimitta*) would be transformed, would appear like space, would no longer have the aspect of matter (*rūpa*).

- ¹¹⁷ This is not a formula of the Yogācāryas but a Sarvāstivādin definition, see AKB iii, *kārikā* 85, F 177:

paramāṇv-akṣarakṣaṇāḥ | rūpanāmādhvaparyantāḥ

(1) One atom (*parama-aṇu*) in the strict sense, (1) one syllable (*akṣara*) and (3) one moment or instant (*kṣaṇa*) are the limit or smallest unit of matter (*rūpa*), of the name (*nāman*) and of time (*adhvan*), respectively.

See Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun*, T.29.1562.0855b.

reason for that non-resistant *rūpa*—not appearing with these characteristics (現無色相)—can no more be spoken of as a real *dharma* of matter (*rūpa*) (真實色法) than are the mind and mental factors. {1/22r.}

A.B.B.1.2.1. *Matter of informing by means of the body (kāya-vijñapti-rūpa)*¹¹⁸

[For the Sarvāstivādins, non-resistant matter (*rūpa*) is:

1–2. matter of informing (*vijñapti-rūpa*): informing by means of the body (*kāya-vijñapti*) or by the action of the body; informing by means of speech (*vāg-vijñapti*) or by the action of <48> speech;

3. matter of non-informing (*avijñapti-rūpa*), bodily or vocal action that is not informing.¹¹⁹]

#0187 We must see whether or not these two kinds of informing (*vijñaptis* 表), i.e., informing by means of the body (身表) and informing by means of speech (語表), and the non-informative form (*avijñapti* 無表) really are matter (*rūpa*), (i.e., do really exist,) and we must explain the true meaning of these three actions.

⟨[As for their existence,] they do not really exist. What is the reason for this?⟩

#0196 If [“matter of informing by means of the body” (身表色)] refers to a real kind of matter (實有), what is the nature (性) of this kind of matter?

#0198 a. According to the Sarvāstivādins, this kind of matter (*rūpa*) is “shape” (*saṃsthāna* 形¹²⁰).

But, (1) shape is divisible (可分析) and (2) there are no atoms “length” (長等極微), etc.¹²¹ – Thus, the matter “shape” is not real (非實).

#0199 b. According to the Sāṃmitīyas,¹²² informing by means of the body (*kāya-vijñapti*) is “movement” (*gati* 動).

But [the matter “shape” is also not real since] the notion of movement does not withstand criticism: ⟨It ceases (滅) as soon as it arises and hence does not really move⟩; “conditioned” [factors] (*saṃskṛtas* 有為) cease (滅) without ⟨the need

¹¹⁸ This discussion of *rūpa* of informing (*vijñapti-rūpa*) is a summary of Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* (*Dacheng chengye lun*) (T.31.1609.0781–782, *Mdo*, 58, 8; 61, 2). – See my *Morale Bouddhique*, 1927, F 119.

¹¹⁹ AKB iv, F 3.

¹²⁰ AKB iv, F 4.

¹²¹ AKB iv, F 4, 9.

¹²² AKB: according to the Vātsīputrīyas.

for) a cause (不待因故), i.e., in the very place where they arise, and immediately or spontaneously: if ceasing (滅) were to need a cause, it would never take place, (i.e., cease).¹²³

c. According to the Dārṣṭāntikas, there is a certain *rūpa* which is neither color (*varṇa*) (顯) nor shape (*saṃsthāna* 形), and which is generated (所引生) by mind. This *rūpa* makes the hand (手) and the other limbs “move” (能動). It is called “action of informing by means of the body” or “bodily informative action” (*kāya-vijñapti-karman* 身表業).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

a. Kuiji, *Shuji* (2A/36v.6; T43.1830.0274a08):

Here the author refutes the Sauryodayikas (? *richulun* 日出論), i.e., the Sūtra-nikāya-mūla-ācāryas. In the first century after the Buddha's departure, in northern India at Takṣaśilā, there lived Kumārata 鳩摩邏多, that is, “Young-man Head” (Tongshou 童首), who composed 900 treatises (*śāstras*). At that time, in the five Indias, there were five Mahā-śāstra-ācāryas (五大論師)—just like the rising sun (*sūrya-udaya*)—who illuminated-guided the world, hence the name Sauryodayikas; because they were similar to the sun, they were also called Dārṣṭāntika-ācāryas (譬喻師); or, because these masters composed the *Drṣṭānta-mālā-śāstra* (喻鬘論), by gathering together extraordinary events (集諸奇事) (*adbhuta-vastus*, i.e., comparisons relating to the Buddha), they are called Dārṣṭāntikas (譬喻師). – [These scholars form the ancestry (種族) of the Sūtra-nikāya (經部) which considered them as authoritative (宗)] because what these scholars said became doctrine. Nevertheless, at that time, there was as yet no Sūtra-nikāya, the latter appearing in the fourth century [after the *nirvāṇa*].

See #0878. <49>

b. The Sautrāntika who refutes the Sarvāstivādin in AKB iv, F 12–13, very akin to the Theravādin (AKB iv, F 3, note), does not express himself exactly like the Dārṣṭāntika of Kuiji. – See, however, the hypothesis of “wind” initiating the action of the body following a volition (*cetanā*), following an effort (*prayatna*). AKB ix, F 294. – One kind of matter (*rūpa*) of the Sautrāntika is the matter (*rūpa*) brought forth by concentration, AKB iv, F 18.

c. *Karma-siddhi* (T31.1609.0781–782b).

The Richulun says: Conditioned [factors] (*saṃskṛtas*) do not go someplace else,

¹²³ AKB iv, F 4–8, *Ṣaḍdarśana*, p. 29, etc.

because their nature is to cease at that very moment. But, apart from that, there is a *dharma*. For its origin, it has a certain mind (*citta-viśeṣa*) that generates it by relying on the hand, the foot, etc. It is the cause that makes the hand or the foot (serially renewed) arise in another place: it is called movement (行動), also informing by means of the body (*kāya-vijñapti*).

In which sense-sphere (*āyatana*) is it included? – In the sense-sphere of visible form (*rūpa-āyatana*).

Then why not say that the eye sees it, just as it sees color? If it is not visible, it cannot inform another. Why call it informing (*vijñapti*)? ...

The theory of the Dārṣṭāntikas is also not reasonable. This kind of matter (*rūpa*) cannot be “movement” (動), the impossibility of which we have previously shown. {1/22v.}

[Question:] – Could it be the “cause of movement” (動因) (e.g., the cause of generating—in distinct places—the moments of the series that constitute the hand)?

[Answer:] – We know that this cause is the element wind (*vāyu-dhātu* 風界). But wind does not inform (*vijñāpayati* 表示), so it cannot receive the name *vijñapti* (informing) (表). Furthermore, “tangibles” (*spraṣṭavya* 觸),¹²⁴ among which wind is classified, are neither good nor bad (善惡)¹²⁵ in their nature (性) and, consequently, cannot be “action”. This also applies for color (*varṇa*) (顯), odor (香), taste (味), as for the tangible (觸).¹²⁶ – Consequently, “action of informing by means of the body” (身表業) is certainly not a real entity.

d. Correct theory.

#0201 With the mind for its cause (因)—to be precise, a mind “proceeding from effort” (*prāyogika-citta*¹²⁷), which here is the originating cause (*samutthāpaka-hetu*¹²⁸)—it happens that matter (*rūpa*), i.e., the hand (手), etc., which is a development of *vijñāna* (識所變) (in spite of anything the Sarvāstivādins say), arises and ceases (生滅) (contra Sāṃmitīyas) in a series (相續) that propagates itself <50>

¹²⁴ AKB i, F 18.

¹²⁵ AKB i, F 54.

¹²⁶ These definitions relate to our world, to the world of our Buddha (*kṣetra*). – But we know (see #0316) that conditions are different elsewhere. In the *Gandhasamūhaloka-dhātu* (I read *samūha* for *ji* 積), thought is expressed by odor, not by sound (*śabda*).

¹²⁷ AKB ii, F 320.

¹²⁸ AKB iv, F 36.

within space (轉趣餘方) as if it were moving. – Matter, i.e., the hand—as a spatial extending [of the hand] within its series—is “informing”, i.e., indicates the mind (表示心). Thus, figuratively (假), it can be given the name “informing by means of the body” (*kāya-vijñapti* 身表).

A.B.B.1.2.2. *Matter of informing by means of speech (vāg-vijñapti-rūpa)*¹²⁹

#0203 The action called “vocal informing” (語表) has also no real nature of sound (*śabda-svabhāva*). Indeed, (1) one moment (一刹那) of sound (聲) does not inform (*na vijñapayati* 無詮表¹³⁰);¹³¹ (2) a series of moments (多念相續) of sound is not a real thing; (3) we have previously already refuted the thesis of the existence of external resistant (*sapratigha* 有對) matter (*rūpa*).

#0204 In fact, with the mind for its cause, *vijñāna* develops (識變) (as something similar to) sound (似聲)—arising and disappearing as a series—which {1/23r.} is as if (似) [a series of sounds] would inform (表示). This series receives, figuratively, the name (假名) “informing by means of speech” (*vāg-vijñapti* 語表): there is nothing to be corrected in this interpretation, i.e., there is no conflict with reason.

A.B.B.1.2.3. *Non-informing matter (avijñapti-rūpa)*¹³²

#0205 If [matter of] “informing” (*vijñapti* 表) [or informing matter] is not real, how can “non-informing” (*avijñapti* 無表) [matter] be real?¹³³

Nevertheless, the name “non-informing” (*avijñapti*) is given figuratively (假) either to (1) a “volition” (*cetanā* 思) (within the context of concentration) to

¹²⁹ See #0302–#0316.

¹³⁰ AKB ii, F 241.

¹³¹ The Sarvāstivādins (AKB ii, F 241) accept that a moment (*kṣaṇa*) of sound is not an informer, except for the case of the Buddha (see, on this point, Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* [*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031]). – But, in regards to this, there should be other sentient beings like the Buddha. If sound is really an “informer”, the moment (*kṣaṇa*) of sound must inform.

¹³² AKB i, F 20; iv, F 3, 14–26. – *Morale bouddhique*, 1927, F 131.

¹³³ “Your non-informing matter (*avijñapti-rūpa*) is not real because it is included in matter (*rūpa*), like resistant (*sapratigha*) matter”. – “Your non-informing matter is not truly matter since it is non-resistant (*apratigha*), like mind”.

Kuīja laconically defines the manner in which Mahāsāṃghikas, Dharmaguptas and Sthāviras understand what the Sarvāstivādins call *avijñapti-rūpa*.

do good or bad (善惡) for a period of time (分限),¹³⁴ or to (2) a resolution (*praṇidhi* 願) (within the context of distraction, i.e., realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*]), to do good or bad for a period of time, and this also without being in conflict with reason.

[In the first case, it refers to non-informing (*avijñapti*) (matter) of meditation (*dhyāna*) or of the path (*mārga*).

In the second case, to non-informing (*avijñapti*) (matter) of the type of restraint called *pratimokṣa* (*pratimokṣa-saṃvara*) or of the type of non-restraint (*asaṃvara*).¹³⁵] <51>

In other words, [non-informing matter] refers either (1) to an actual volition that stops bad bodily or vocal actions (during concentration (*samādhi* 定)) (止身語惡現行思), or else (2) to the seeds (*bījas* 種) (#0411)—in the state of full increase (*utkarṣa-avasthā* 增長位)—of an important good or bad volition¹³⁶ that brings forth bodily and vocal actions (發勝身語善惡思). [These actions being matter (*rūpa*), the non-informing (*avijñapti*) will figuratively be called matter.]

Thus, the non-informing (*avijñapti*) [matter] has only existence as designation (*prajñapti-sat* 假有).¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Kuiji: We may also understand: “... the name *avijñapti* is given figuratively to the resolution (*praṇidhi*) proceeding from a volition (*cetanā*) ...”.

¹³⁵ AKB iv, F 43.

¹³⁶ According to the gloss: “of an important volition (*cetanā*) that is the generator of bodily and vocal actions, in contrast to a medium or weak volition. Indeed, according to the ancient masters, every volition of the distracted state does not generate non-informing (*avijñapti*) [matter]”. – The text gives: “of a good or bad volition that is the generator of important actions ...”.

¹³⁷ The [Vijñānavāda] School accepts non-informing (*avijñapti*) [matter] of the Sarvāstivādins as a “designation”, but modifies it, as one can see when comparing AKB and the “four-alternatives” table of Kuiji, *Shuji* (2A/46v.):

1. *avijñapti* (non-informing), not *vijñapti* (informing): restraint called *pratimokṣa* (*pratimokṣa-saṃvara*).
2. *vijñapti*, not *avijñapti*: actions of body and of speech, within the state of distraction.
3. *vijñapti* and *avijñapti*: volition (*cetanā*), within concentration, path. – YBh, *juan* 53, says that the mental volition (*manāḥ-cetanā*, i.e., volition that is not directed at body or at speech), since it informs (*vijñāpayati*) itself, is informing.
4. neither *vijñapti* nor *avijñapti*: volition of bodily and vocal action: [since this volition] teaches nothing to others, thus, it is not informing; [since this volition] does not

A.B.B.1.2.4. *The three actions*

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB iv, F 1; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, xvii, 3 (pp. 306–311), invaluable for *avijñapti* (non-informing).

#0207 Our adversary answers: “In the *sūtras*, the Bhagavat (世尊) says that there are three actions (業): (1) action of the body (身), (2) action of speech (語) and (3) action of the mind (*manas*). By denying actions of the body and of speech, you are contradicting the *sūtras*”.¹³⁸

#0208 [Reply:] – We do not deny these two actions: we only deny that they are matter (*rūpa* 色).

#0210 We are saying that:

1. by “action of the body” (身業), we mean the volition (*cetanā*) that moves (能動) the body;¹³⁹

2. by “action of speech” (語業), we mean the volition that brings forth (能發) speech.¹⁴⁰

[These two volitions make up, together, only one volition called “third volition”.]
<52>

3. By “action of the mind” (*manas-karman* 意業), we mean the two volitions, i.e., [a] that of “deliberation” (*upanidhyāna* 審) and [b] that of “judgment” (決),¹⁴¹ since they are associated (*saṃprayukta* 相應) with the mind (*manas* 意), {1/23v.} since they make the mind (*manas* 意) move (作動).

inform itself, thus, it is non-informing.

¹³⁸ *Karma-siddhi*, (*Dacheng chengye lun*, T.31.1609.0785c09).

¹³⁹ “Movement” of the body, (Ch.) *dong* 動, must be *bskyod* or *gyo*, *śarīra-ceṣṭā* or *kāya-viṣpanda*.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. the Sautrāntikas of AKB iv, F 12.

¹⁴¹ We have [i] *shen* 審 glossed as *shenlū* 審慮 for the name of the first volition (*cetanā*), [ii] *jue* 決 glossed as *jueding* 決定 for the name of the second volition.

In AKB i, F 81 (= AKB 2/14v.8): “That which is called *dṛṣṭi*, i.e., philosophical opinion, etc., is *saṃtīraṇa* (judgment), *jueduo* 決度, preceded by *upanidhyāna* (deliberation), *shenlū*”.

In AKB iv, F 13 (= AKB 13/6v.2), the Sautrāntika explains a theory that seems to be the source of our author’s theory: The non-informing (*avijñapti*) is a volition of a special nature which has, for its near cause, the intense volition that moves the body, and which has, for its distant cause, the intense volition of *shenjue* 審決.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

We can therefore speak of two volitions (*cetanās*), each being of two types:

1. The first—which is purely [volition], called above, “action of the mind” (*manas-karman*)—gives a certain form, a certain modality (*abhisamskaroti*) to the mind. It is *citta-abhisamkāra* (*Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 311). It has two phases: [i] “reflection” and [ii] “judgment”, two phases which, being clearly distinct, constitute two volitions, i.e., the first and the second:

First, there is the turning (*pravartana*) and modeling (*abhisamskaraṇa*) of the mind towards the good or bad object. (Kuiji)

2. The second is the volition that causes the movement of body and speech to originate (*kaya-vāk-samutthāna-cetanā*):

Then, there is the generating of body-speech. (Kuiji)

This second volition, although twofold due to its object, is single in its modality: this is called above the “third volition”.

#0211 The “third volition (*cetanā* 思)”, i.e., the volition that moves the body and instigates speech—being “modeled as good or bad” (*abhisamskṛta* 所造作)¹⁴²—is called “action” (*karman* 業).

It is also called ⟨“path” (道) or⟩ “path of action” (*karma-patha*):¹⁴³ (1) because it is trodden upon (所遊履), like a path, by the volitions of deliberation (審) and of judgment (決), (2) because it is the path (= support [*aśraya*]) ⟨giving rise to the fruit⟩ of pleasant or unpleasant retribution.¹⁴⁴

The result of this is that the first seven “paths of action” (業道) of the classical list (three of body: killing, etc., four of speech: <53> lying, etc.) are also volition in their nature, just like the last three [paths of action] (i.e., covetousness [*abhidhyā*], etc.).¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² *zaozuo* 造作 = *abhisamskaraṇa* (modeling), AKB 1/11v.8 (i, F 29); 4/3v.6 (ii, F 154), that which means *abhisamcetanā*, AKB 18/10r.8 (iv, F 232).

¹⁴³ See AKB iv, F 137, 168.

¹⁴⁴ The third volition (*cetanā*) goes on the path trodden upon by the first two, it is also their path, for they have it in view. The second goes on the path trodden upon by the first and is its path. The first and the third generate retribution (Kuiji). [This makes the translation “judgment” doubtful.]

¹⁴⁵ For the Sautrāntikas, volition (*cetanā*) is not an “action of *manas* (i.e., mind)”; action of *manas* is covetousness, etc. (AKB iv, F 169).

Or else—and this is the proper explanation for the name of “path of action” given to the bodily and vocal manifestations—bodily informing (*kāya-vijñapti*) and vocal informing (*vāg-vijñapti*) brought forth by volition (*cetanā*) (思發) are figuratively (假) called “action”.

They are called “path of action” (業道) since they are trodden upon (所履) by volition.

- #0212 From this we should conclude that any action really is not external matter (*rūpa* 外色). In the actions of the body and of speech, there is only internal *vijñāna* (內識), and this [*vijñāna*], when arising, develops as an appearance similar to matter (*rūpa*) (變似色生).

A.B.B.2. Formations dissociated (from mind) (*viprayukta-saṃskāras*)¹⁴⁶

- 2.1. Possession (*prāpti*) and non-possession (*aprāpti*); #0215
- 2.2. Similarity or group-homogeneity (*sabhāgatā*); #0250
- 2.3. Vital faculty or vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*); #0260
- 2.4. Attainments without mind and ideationlessness (*āsaṃjñika*); #0270
- 2.5. Conditioned characteristics (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas*); #0281
- 2.6. Names, phrases and syllables (*nāma-pada-vyañjana*); #0302
- 2.7. Proclivities (*anuśayas*), etc.; #0318

Editors: See also endnote 781 to AKB iv, F 169 (our English translation), where Lambert Schmithausen states: “The attribution of the *rejection* of the thesis ‘*cetanā* is mental action’ to the Sautrāntikas (Wayman: *Analysis of the Śrāvaka-bhūmi Manuscript*, p. 27, lines 19–23; *Les sectes bouddhiques*, p. 158, nr. 24) is based on a misunderstanding by L. de La Vallée Poussin, as a glimpse in the corresponding sections of the originals of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam* (AKBh 236.17 and 248.10) being published in the meantime, shows.”

- ¹⁴⁶ The dissociated ones (*viprayuktas*, i.e., the formations dissociated from mind [*citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*]) are not, like matter (*rūpa*), a development (*pariṇāma*) of mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*), but rather simple designations for certain aspects or states of matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caitta*). – Not only are they not “separate” from mind (*citta*) (like the unconditioned factors [*asaṃskṛtas*], see #0323 (fn.)), but we must say that they are not “different”, “distinct” from matter, mind and mental factors.

The “dissociated ones” (*viprayuktas*) are studied in AKB ii, F 178–244. In regards to them, the views of the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* are not markedly different from those of Vasubandhu, i.e., the “Sautrāntika” of Saṃghabhadra.

Editors: See also in Appendix Two, p. 1259, the list of hundred *dharmas* in Yogācāra.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The formations dissociated from mind (*citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*) are the *dharmas* which do not belong to the matter (*rūpa*) category, i.e., not being color, etc., which do not belong to the mind (*citta*) category, i.e., being neither mind nor associated with the mind. – The Theravādins, the Sautrāntikas and Harivarman are not acquainted with or do not recognize this category.

#0215 The “dissociated ones” (*viprayuktas* 不相應行), [i.e., the formations dissociated from mind,] are also not real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有). – <#0216> What are the reasons?

#0219 This is so (1) because possession (*prāpti* 得), non-possession (*aprāpti* 非得) and the other “dissociated ones” {1/24r.} are not—as this is the case for matter (*rūpa*), mind and mental factors—observed (*upalabhyante* 得) as proper “substances” (*sva rūpatas* 體相); <#0220> (2) because the activity (*kāritra* 作用) proper to them—and distinct from those of matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*)—is not observed (得).

#0221 From this we can conclude that they definitively are not realities <or real entities but> that they are certain states of matter, mind and mental factors that are figuratively designated (假立) by certain names in order to emphasize such or such a particularity. <54>

#0222 1. The “dissociated ones” (*viprayuktas*)—like matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas* 色心心所)—definitively do not have a real (實) substance (體) and a real activity (用) distinct (異) from the real nature and activity of matter, mind and mental factors, because they are included in the aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊). [They are included in the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāra-skandha*).]¹⁴⁷

#0223 2. The “dissociated ones” (*viprayuktas*)—like that which does not exist in the absolute sense¹⁴⁸—are definitively not real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有) if they are not included in mind (心), mental factors (心所), matter (色) and unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas* 無為).

Or else: The “dissociated ones”—like the other “imaginary entities” (i.e., exist-

¹⁴⁷ One cannot argue in the same terms against the true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*): the latter is not included in matter (*rūpa*), etc. But it is neither identical with matter, etc., nor is it separate from matter, etc. (See #0336.)

¹⁴⁸ *atyanta-abhāva* (畢竟無) (absolute non-existence): the hairs of the tortoise, one of the four kinds of non-existence (*abhāvas*) of YBh, *Vyutpatti*, 202, 3–6.

ence as designation [*prajñāpti-sat* 假法]¹⁴⁹—are not real entities in themselves (*dravya-sat-svabhāva* 實有體) because they are not included among the other realities (*dravya-dharmas*) that would be neither matter, nor mind,¹⁵⁰ etc.¹⁵¹

A.B.B.2.1. Possession (*prāpti*) and non-possession (*aprāpti*)¹⁵²

#0227 According to the Sarvāstivādins, one should accept—distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*)—two *dharmas* of real substance and of real activity (實體用):

1. “possession” (*prāpti* 得);
2. “non-possession” (*aprāpti* 非得).

#0228 They base themselves on the authority of *sūtra*:

Such {1/24v} a person (*pudgala* 補特伽羅) is endowed (*samanvāgata* 成就) with good or bad *dharmas*.

The saint (*ārya* 聖者) is endowed with ten *dharmas* pertaining to the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa-dharmas* 無學法).¹⁵³

Moreover, it is said:

The ordinary worldling (*prthagjana* 異生) is not endowed (成就) with the *dharmas* of the saint (*ārya-dharmas* 聖法).

Arhats (阿羅漢) are not endowed with defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱).

They say that it is by virtue of “possession” (*prāpti* 得) that one is “endowed” with (成) such and such *dharmas* and that it is by virtue of “non-possession” (*aprāpti* 非得) that one is “not endowed” (不成) with such and such *dharmas*.
<55>

1. Discussion.

¹⁴⁹ Like the pitcher (an example accepted by everyone), like anger (an example not accepted by everyone).

¹⁵⁰ Realities which do not exist.

¹⁵¹ Arguments drawn from the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* (*Āryadeśanāvīkhyāpana-sāstra* ?) (T.31.1602.0568a06).

¹⁵² Possession (*prāpti*) and non-possession (*aprāpti*) are explained in AKB ii, F 179–195, where Vasubandhu criticizes—from the Sautrāntika point of view—the Sarvāstivādin thesis.

¹⁵³ AKB ii, F 181; vi, F 295.

#0230 These *sūtras* are not conclusive. They do not teach the existence, (i.e., the real substance and real activity,) (實體用) of possession and of non-possession distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*).

#0234 a. The *sūtra* also says that the wheel-turning king (*cakravartin* 輪王) is “endowed” (成就) with seven jewels (寶),¹⁵⁴ but the Sarvāstivādin does not maintain that a person (*pudgala*) is “endowed” (in the sense of “endowed by virtue of possession”) with other persons (literally, *para-kāya* 他身 = *para-ātma-bhāva*; e.g., the jewel of the wife) or with non-sentient things (*asattva* 非情, e.g., the jewel of the wheel).

#0235 The Sarvāstivādin answers: – The wheel-turning king exercises mastery (*vaśīva* 自在力) in regard to the jewels (寶).¹⁵⁵ This is why the *sūtra* says he is “endowed” with jewels: a figurative way of speaking.

We reply: – Then why not accept that the *sūtra* passage: “endowed with good or bad *dharma*s (善惡法), ... endowed with the ten *dharma*s of the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*)”, should be interpreted in the same sense? Why maintain that these texts imply real “possession” (*prāpti*) (實得), i.e., a thing in itself?

#0236 The Sarvāstivādin answers: – The seven jewels (七寶) exist (at the present time (現在)). The *sūtra* uses the expression “endowed with” (成) figuratively (假) in order to say that the wheel-turning king (*cakravartin*) directs and “handles” the jewels. But this meaning is dismissed when the *sūtra* talks about the *dharma*s with which a person (*pudgala*) is “endowed”: past *dharma*s, future *dharma*s over which this person cannot exercise mastery. Thus, in the *sūtras* which we have quoted, [the expression “endowed with”] refers indeed to “possession”.

We answer: – From where does the Sarvāstivādin get the idea that a person can be endowed with (good, bad, etc.,) *dharma*s (that are separate from the present (離現在)), i.e., that are past or future? {1/25r.} Reason (理) prohibits the acceptance of the real existence of non-present (離現) *dharma*s.

[The Sarvāstivādin replies: – Lacking possession, a person will never be endowed with *dharma*s that he has not acquired or that he has lost, will never be endowed

¹⁵⁴ The argument drawn from the jewels is the same in AKB ii, F 181.

Editors: AKB iii, F 203 gives:

1. The wheel (*cakra*); 2. the elephant (*hasti*); 3. the horse (*aśva*); 4. the jewel (*maṇi*); 5. the queen (*strī*); 6. the chief steward (*grhapati*); 7. the counselor (*pariṇāyaka*).

¹⁵⁵ AKB ii, F 281.

with the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*).]¹⁵⁶

#0237 [We answer:] – The *dharmas* [that have been or will be] necessarily present, <56> i.e., that have been lost or have not yet been acquired, have seeds (*bījas*), i.e., good seeds (善種), etc.: [thus, we can say, figuratively, that the person is endowed with them].

#0239 b. [Question:] – Moreover, what major activity (勝用) does the Sarvāstivādin attribute to “possession” (*prāpti*) (in its relation to *dharmas*)?

#0242 [The Sarvāstivādin] says: – “Possession” is a “generator” (能起).¹⁵⁷

[Reply:] – In this hypothesis: (1) [“possession”] would generate unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas* 無為) that are not generated; (2) non-sentient things (*asattva* 非情) would not be generated since there is no “possession” of things; (3) the *dharmas* of which one has never had the “possession”, or of which one has lost “possession”, would never arise.

#0243 He answers: – “Possession” that is (the generating cause (因起) for) the *dharmas* of which one has never had the “possession” or of which one has lost the “possession”, is a “possession” “that arises with these *dharmas*” (*sahaja* 俱生¹⁵⁸).

[Reply:] – In this hypothesis, the two kinds of “origination” (二生)—i.e., origination (*jāti*) and origination-of-origination (*jāti-jāṭi*)¹⁵⁹—are useless (無用).

Moreover, if “possession” (得) is a generator (記), then—in the case of a person (*pudgala*) who is endowed with “possessions” of good, bad and non-defined *dharmas*—these various *dharmas*, (i.e., good, bad and non-defined,) would, of complete necessity, be actually present (*saṃmukhī-bhūta*) all at once (頓現前).

The Sarvāstivādin answers: – The actual presence of a *dharma* depends on various other causes (餘因), plus the “possession” that arises with this *dharma*.

[Reply:] – But then the hypothesis of “possession” is obviously superfluous.

#0244 He answers: – “Possession” is the cause that brings it about that one does not

¹⁵⁶ According to Kuiji. – It is simpler to translate: “For reason forbids one to accept the existence of real *dharmas* beyond the present, since the present *dharmas* necessarily have seeds (*bījas*), that are good, etc.” [This renders the hypothesis of “possession” (*prāpti*) useless.] – “Possession” of the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*), AKB ii, F 180, 187.

¹⁵⁷ *nengqi* 能起; cause of arising (*utpatti-hetu*) in AKB ii, F 182.

¹⁵⁸ AKB ii, F 182.

¹⁵⁹ AKB ii, F 222, 224.

lose (失) *dharmas*, for it is by virtue of “possession” that a person (*pudgala* 有情) remains “endowed” (成就) with these *dharmas* once they are possessed [i.e., even when these *dharmas* are not present and up to the moment when (the series of) “possession” comes to an end].¹⁶⁰

[Reply:] – Let us note that sentient beings are never without the *dharmas* with which it is possible to be “endowed” (成), i.e., without the actually present *dharmas* and without true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*).¹⁶¹

The *dharmas* without which sentient beings are able <57> to exist {1/25v.} are not really susceptible of being possessed (*prāp* 得): this refers to past and future *dharmas*, which do not exist.

Consequently, whether one considers the *dharmas* that “leave” or those that one does not “leave”, the “possession” (*prāpti*) is useless.

#0245 c. “Possession” (*prāpti*) is not a real entity (實無). The same applies obviously also to non-possession (*aprāpti*), (i.e., it is not [a real entity]).

2. Correct theory.

#0247 Thus, relative to the various modes or states (*avasthā* 分位) of the *dharmas* with which sentient beings can be endowed (*samanvāgata* 成), three kinds of possessing (*samanvāgama* 成就) are established (假立), when expressing oneself without any rigor:¹⁶²

- a. possessing in the state of seed (*bīja-samanvāgama* 種子成就);
- b. possessing by mastery (*vaśitva-samanvāgama* 自在成就);

¹⁶⁰ Saṃghabhadra’s answer, according to Kuiji; but the argument—in different terms—can also be found in AKB ii, F 183. – On the loss of possession (*prāpti*), giving up (*viḥāni*), abandoning (*prahāṇa*), discarding (*tyāga*), see AKB ii, F 193; iv, F 94, and elsewhere.

¹⁶¹ Literally: “The *dharmas* with which one can be endowed (which can be possessed [*prāpya*]) are the *dharmas* that do not leave (*tyaj*) sentient beings”.

There are two ways of defining “the *dharmas* that do not leave” (Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/57r.5):

1. The internal *dharmas*, pertaining to sentient beings (*sattvākhya*, AKB i, F 17), do not leave. The external *dharmas*, not pertaining to sentient beings (*asattvākhya*), leave.
2. None of that which is “development of *viññāna*” leaves: thus, external things, [i.e.,] things (= *asattva*) [and] “others”, do not leave. The *cakravartin* possesses the wheel, the queen, the horse, etc. But that which does not exist (*abhāva*; past, etc.) leaves.

The second explanation is better.

¹⁶² It is not correct that there is “possessing” (*samanvāgama*) of *dharmas* existing only as seeds. There is no “possessing” of other people or of things.

c. possessing by actualization (*samudācāra-samanvāgama* 現行成就).¹⁶³

#0248 The opposite of possession is figuratively called non-possession (*asamanvāgama* 不成就).

Although there are numerous varieties, nevertheless—with regard to the state in which the seeds (*bījas*) of *dharmas* of the <58> three realms (*dhātus* 界), which should be abandoned by the path of insight (見所斷種) (#2921), are not completely destroyed (害)—a non-possession (*aprāpti*) is figuratively established which is called “quality of ordinary worldling” (*prthagjanatva* 異生性, #3067)¹⁶⁴ because, at that time, there exists the “fact of not being endowed with the *dharmas* of the saint (*ārya*)”.

A.B.B.2.2. Similarity or group-homogeneity (*sabhāgatā*)¹⁶⁵

#0250 1. According to the Sarvāstivādins, we should accept a certain genre of *dharmas* that are real entities (實) and which is called “similarity [or group-homogeneity]” (*sabhāgatā* 同分)—the particular nature of which characterizes a respective group of living beings—which is separate from matter (色), mind (心), etc.).

¹⁶³ These distinctions are not specified in AKB ii, F 184–185, the doctrine of which is similar to that of our text.

We have: (1) “possessing potentially, or in the state of seed (*bīja*)”; (2) “possessing by mastery”; (3) “possessing by actualization”.

Our text summarizes YBh (T.30.1579.0587a10):

1. Possessed potentially (種子成就) are: (i) the defiled *dharmas* (*kliṣṭa-dharma*), as long as they have not been tamed by calm abiding (*śamatha*); (ii) the non-defined [innate] (*upapatti-lābhika avyākṛta*, AKB ii, F 320) *dharmas*, as long as they are not destroyed (*upahata*) by the path; (iii) the good innate *dharmas*, as long as they are not broken by false view (AKB iv, F 167, 171) (Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/58v–61r.).

2. Possessed by mastery (自在成就) are: (i) the good *dharmas* of preparatory effort (*prāyogika*, AKB ii, F 320, mundane and supramundane qualities [*guṇas*]); (ii) part of the non-defined *dharmas* (excluding the innate): everything potentially, if well understood (Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/61r.–62r.).

3. Possessed by actualization (現行成就) are: the present *dharmas*.

There are numerous problems in terms of detail.

¹⁶⁴ AKB ii, F 191.

¹⁶⁵ As for “similarity” (*sabhāgatā*), see AKB ii, F 195–198, where the criticism by the Sautrāntika is similar to that of our author.

For the difference between the similarity (*sabhāgatā*) and the universal (*sāmānya*) of the Vaiśeṣikas, see AKB ii, F 198. – For the “category”, see #0107, #0139.

[Question:] – How do you know that?

#0251 [Answer:] – For the *sūtras* say: “So-and-so obtains the similarity of humans (此人同分); so-and-so obtains the similarity of the gods (此天同分)” (= so-and-so is reborn among humans; so-and-so is reborn among gods), and so forth.¹⁶⁶ {1/26r.}

#0253 [Reply:] – This evidence is inconclusive (證不成), for these *sūtras* do not say that this refers to a ⟨real entity “similarity” (實同分)⟩ separate from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*).

#0255 2. The Sarvāstivādin formulates an argument based on speculation: Similarity ⟨really exists (實有) for⟩ it is the cause for generic or collective notions (knowledge) and expressions (language) (*sāmānya-buddhi-prajñapti* 同智言¹⁶⁷): we call individual beings, people, etc., by a collective name, i.e., “human”, “god”, “sense-element” (*dhātu*), etc.

[Reply:] – This argument is too far-fetched. The Sarvāstivādin would then have to accept ⟨a similarity related to grass (草)⟩, a similarity related to trees (木) (*vrkṣa-sabhāgatā*), e.g., a similarity related to the *trṇa*-tree (fan-palm) (*trṇa-sabhāgatā*), etc., because we say “tree” for all the trees, just as we say “human” for all humans. But he reserves “similarity” for living beings.¹⁶⁸

#0256 Moreover, since we have collective notions (knowledge) and expressions (language) (同智言) regarding similarities (*sabhāgatās* 同分) which are all ⟨generated from (起)⟩ similarities (同分), it would thus be necessary that the similarities, in their turn, would have a separate similarity (別同分). ⟨Since this is not so, why is it necessarily so in the former?⟩

[Or else, and this is our opinion, similar (*sabhāga*) sentient beings are not similar by means of the efficacy of a similarity.]

#0257 3. Some will say that similarity is the cause that brings it about that all <59> humans have the same occupations (事),¹⁶⁹ that all gods have the same predilections (*chanda* 欲); therefore it is a real entity (實).

[Reply:] – This is also not reasonable.

⟨The cause for the bringing about of⟩ this sameness regarding occupation and predilection is the habituation in previous lifetimes (宿習). ⟨What is the need

¹⁶⁶ AKB ii, F 198, note.

¹⁶⁷ AKB ii, F 196, § 5.

¹⁶⁸ AKB ii, F 197, § 3.

¹⁶⁹ *shiye* 事業 might be *karmānta*. – The equivalence *chanda* is certain, AKB 4/3v.7 [ii, F 154].

for conceiving a separate *dharma* that is a real entity called similarity?)

- #0258 4. Thus, by the term *sabhāgatā* (同分), scripture figuratively designates the mental and bodily *dharmas* that are common (相似) to sentient beings of different kinds of status (分位差別). [It does not have in mind certain realities distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*).]

A.B.B.2.3. Vital faculty or vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*)¹⁷⁰

- #0260 According to the Sarvāstivādins, there exists, distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*), {1/26v.} a certain real entity called vital faculty or vital principle (*jīvita-indriya* 命根).

[Question:] – How do you know that?

- #0261 [The Sarvāstivādin answers:] – Because the *sūtra* says so. Indeed, the *sūtra* says:

Three [entities] mutually support each other, namely, life (*āyus* 壽), heat (*ūṣman* 煖), and cognition (*viññāna* 識) ... (#0965).

The word life (*āyus* 壽) is a name for the vital principle (*jīvita-indriya* 命根).

- #0263 1. [Reply:] – This *sūtra* does not teach that “life” (*āyus* 壽) is a real entity in and of itself (體) distinct (異) (from matter, mind, etc.), and thus it is not conclusive.
- #0265 Moreover, we have already established before that matter (色) does not exist separate (離) from *viññāna*: thus, heat does not exist separate from *viññāna*; thus, (there is no distinct (別)) “life” (or vital principle (命根))—which is named next to heat—separate from *viññāna*.
- #0266 Moreover, if the vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*) were a real entity distinct from *viññāna* (異識實有), it would not really be a vital principle, like sensation (*vedanā* 受) and the other mental factors (which are distinct from cognition [*viññāna*] but are not a vital principle).
- #0267 2. a. [The Sarvāstivādins ask:] – But then why does the *sūtra* speak of three *dharmas* (三法), i.e., life (*āyus*), heat (*ūṣman*) and cognition (*viññāna*)?

[We reply:] – It (speaks of three *dharmas* to distinguish) the different modes of one single thing, i.e., of cognition.¹⁷¹ In the same way, scripture distinguishes four

¹⁷⁰ On the vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*), #0965 (#2487). – AKB ii, F 120, 123, 127, 215, 273; iv, F 154.

¹⁷¹ Material *dharmas* (*rūpa-dharmas*) which form part of the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) of the eighth cognition and which are perceived by the tactile [or body] sense-faculty

correct efforts (*samyak-prahāṇas* 正斷) which are but a single thing, namely, vigor (*vīrya*) (*Vyutpatti*, 40). <60>

b. [The Sarvāstivādins state:] – But then, when residing in the states without mind (*acittaka-avasthā* 無心位; #0270–#0279) where *viññāna* is absent, <one would be without life and heat,> but, indeed, there are life and heat.

[We reply:] – In the course of these states, *viññāna* does not leave the body, just as the *sūtra* says (#1035).

[The Sarvāstivādins ask:] – <But then why are they called states without mind (無心位)?>

[We reply:] – In the course of these states, the other cognitions (i.e., the evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-viññānas* 轉識], six or seven) are stopped (滅), {1/27r.} but not the eighth cognition or store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna* 阿賴耶) (#0395), the reasons for the existence of which we will demonstrate and discuss later in detail.

3. a. This eighth cognition serves <as a sufficient (足) substratum (體) for> the [three] realms (*dhātus*), [six] destinies (*gatis*), and [four] modes of birth (*yonis*) (界趣生) (see #0938), because it can occur everywhere (遍) (in the three realms [*dhātus*], i.e., spheres of existence, in contrast to the first five cognitions); it forms a continuous series (恆續) (in contrast to the first six cognitions); it is truly the “fruit of retribution” (*vipāka-phala* 異熟果, in contrast to the seven cognitions, #0928). – There is no necessity to separately invent a real vital faculty (*jīvita-indriya*) (#0965).

#0268 b. Indeed, what scripture figuratively designates (假立) by the name *jīvita-indriya* are the special efficacies (*sāmarthya-viśeṣa* or *śakti-viśeṣa* 功能差別) that are generated by action (由業所引) and that are supported by the seeds (*bījas*) that engender, in direct order (親生), the eighth cognition, [and these special] efficacies enable matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*) of a given existence to last for a given time.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The eighth cognition, as we know, is an unbroken stream. From existence to existence, it continues without interruption. It is nourished by causes generating effects of their own nature: we speak of blue or we think blue (actual *dharmas*); this speech, this thought—or, in a general term, this convention (*vyavahāra*)—brings forth the (*kāya-indriya*) are designated by the name “heat”. – The “seeds” (*bījas*) of the eighth cognition are given the name life (*āyus*); the active cognition is designated by the name *viññāna*.

seeds (*bījas*; potential *dharmas*) which will again bring forth new thoughts of blue. However, this stream of representations does not flow autonomously. To (1) the [condition] qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*), which is direct and immediate, is added (2) the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*), which is the regent, the sovereign—yet being indirect (i.e., condition [*pratyaya*] but not cause [*hetu*])—which is action (*karman*): the latter, of a specific ethical nature (good or bad), generates a fruit that is non-defined (neither good nor bad), namely, *duḥkha*, the eighth cognition. Action is the “cause of retribution” (*vipāka-hetu*); it brings forth the seeds (*bījas*) of retribution (*vipāka*).

By vital faculty or vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*), we mean seeds (*bījas*) of the first category, the ever-ready sources that feed the eighth cognition of a given existence. But if this eighth cognition occurs in such and such a destiny (human, etc.) and for a certain time and in such and such a state, it is a case of the seeds of the second category.

The eighth cognition is a reservoir of seeds of heavenly bliss, of hellish suffering, of seeds of all kinds (pure, impure): these are the seeds brought forth by action (*karma-bījas*) or seeds of retribution (*vipāka-bīja*) which rule and govern the stream of seeds of the first category, and which bring it about that, among <61> [the seeds of the first category], some become actualized (actual eighth cognition), while others remain in reserve in order to nourish existences to come (see *Siddhi* F 92–93).

Here are the notes of Kuiji, *Shuji* (2A/74v).

a. “The seeds (*bījas*) that engender in direct order the eighth cognition”.

“Seeds (*bījas*)”: this does not refer [here] to the actual (active) eighth cognition, which is not the vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*); it refers to the seeds of the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*) of the eighth cognition (not of its mental factors); of the eighth, i.e., in contrast to the seeds of the other cognitions.

“That engender in direct order”: this refers to the seeds of “name-speech” (#0386; #2597; #0617), which are the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*), the direct cause of the cognition (*viññāna*); these are not the seeds called seeds brought forth by action (*karma-bījas*), seeds proceeding from actions: the latter seeds engender the cognition, but as condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*); they are the cause of retribution (*vipāka-hetu*).

However, all the seeds of name-speech are not condition qua cause of the cognition; this is why the text says “that engender”.

- b. Certain efficacies—which enable the existence to endure and are generated by action, which are the cause of retribution—occur [supported] “by” the seeds just discussed and which are the direct cause. These efficacies would cease if these seeds were lacking.
- c. Due to these seeds, the actual eighth cognition takes the eye and the other *dharmas* for its object and support: thus, we can say that it supports (life and heat). But it is these seeds that support the actual eighth, i.e., without them, it could neither exist nor support the other *dharmas*. Thus, [the eighth] is not the root since it arises from seeds; thus, it is not [the eighth] that is the vital faculty or vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*).
- d. This is clearly seen from the definition: “Of the twenty-two faculties (*indriyas*) (#2484), the vital faculty is without relationships” (not *shu* 屬). The actual eighth is not the vital faculty; [the eighth] is not “not *shu*”, since it is the object of cogitation (*manas*).

See #0386, which takes up again the examination of the problem. It distinguishes (1) the trace qua equal outflow (*niṣyanda-vāsanā*) (which is the seeds of our text, the direct causes, i.e., the condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya*] of the eighth) and (2) the trace qua retribution (*vipāka-vāsanā*) (which is the “special efficacies” [*sāmarthyā-viśeṣa*] of our text: condition qua dominance [*adhipati-pratyaya*]).

See also #2597, where “(1) the trace (*vāsanā*) of name-speech” (= trace qua equal outflow [*niṣyanda-vāsanā*]) [very close to *vyavahāra-āyatana* of #2502] and (2) the trace of the cause of the (threefold) existence (*bhava-aṅga-vāsanā*), which is the trace qua retribution (*vipāka-vāsanā*), are distinguished. [The sole divergence and difficulty is that Kuiji says that the “special efficacies” are (supported) “by” (*zhang* 仗) the seeds (*bījas*) of “name-speech”.]

A.B.B.2.4. Attainments without mind and ideationlessness (*āsaṃjñika*)¹⁷²

#0270 The Sarvāstivādin thinks that (1–2) the two attainments (*samapātti*) without mind (*acittaka*) (二無心定), i.e., the attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*) and attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* <62> = attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation [*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti*]), as well as (3) ideation-

¹⁷² On the states of non-ideation and, in particular, the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), #1035; #2294. – YBh, 52, 56; *Vikhyāpana* (T.31.1602), 1; *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606), 2.

AKB ii, F 198–214; viii, F 193, 208, and elsewhere.

lessness (*asaṃjñikā* 無想, i.e., the state of non-ideation of the gods without ideation [*asaṃjñi-devas*, *asaṃjñi-sattvas*]) or the fruit (of retribution) of the attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-vipāka* 無想異熟), are, in their intrinsic nature, real entities (實自性) distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*).

[Question:] – How do you know that?

#0271 [The Sarvāstivādin answers:] – Indeed, if we do not have real *dharmas* here, we do not see what would prevent (能遮) mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) from becoming manifest (*citta-samudācāra-pratibandhana*¹⁷³).

a. Discussion.

#0273 [We reply:] – If, in order to explain the states of non-ideation, one maintains that there are separate real *dharmas* (別實法) distinct from matter, mind and mental factors, *dharmas* that prevent (能遮) mind (and that are called attainments without mind (*acittaka-samāpatti* 無心定)), {1/27v.} <#0275> then, in order to explain the state of the practitioner who has entered into the formless (*ārūpya*) meditative attainment, one would also have to accept that there are separate real *dharmas* that obstruct (能礙) matter (*rūpa*) and that are called formless meditative attainment (*ārūpya-samāpatti* 無色定). (Since this is not so, why is it necessarily so in the former?)

#0276 Moreover, why is a real *dharma* (實法) necessary to prevent (遮礙) mind (心)? “Things of secondary existence” (i.e., the conventional [*saṃvṛti* 假])—for example, (dams and) dikes (堤塘)—which do not exist in themselves, are also able to prevent.

b. Theory of the states of non-ideation.

#0278 1. When the practitioner cultivates the attainments—the first or the second—he begins (i.e., the period of preparation [*prayoga-avasthā* 加行]) by generating weariness (*vidūṣaṇā* 厭患) for mind, sensation and other mental factors (心心所) which are, indeed, coarse and unstable (麤動).¹⁷⁴ By virtue of this weariness, he generates an excellent “resolution for a certain period of time” (勝期願);¹⁷⁵ he

¹⁷³ AKB ii, F 213.

¹⁷⁴ Coarse (*audārika*), “easy to cognize”; unsteady, agitated and inconsistent (*dong* 動) = *cala*, *cañcala*, *capala*, *señjana*, because they are variables, intermittents.

¹⁷⁵ “I want to be without mind for a day, a week, an aeon (*kalpa*), more than an aeon (*kalpa-avaśeṣa*)”.

prevents the mind and mental factors in such a way that the mind and mental factors <63> become more and more subtle (*sūkṣma*) (漸細), more and more fine (*aṇu*) (漸微). All of this is preparatory (*prayoga*).

When the mind is utterly fine (微微),¹⁷⁶ [this mind] perfumes (*bhāvayati*) the eighth cognition (i.e., the “cognition that is retribution” [*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識], *ālaya*) bringing forth in this cognition (*vijñāna*) a very powerful (*adhimātra-tama*) seed (*bīja* 種) of the thought of weariness (極增上厭心), etc. [This seed is impure (*sāsrava*) for the attainment of non-ideation, is pure (*anāsrāva*) for the attainment of cessation.]¹⁷⁷ By virtue of this seed that weakens-tames (損伏) mind and mental factors, all coarse and unstable (羸動) mind and mental factors cease, for a certain time (暫), to enter into activity (暫不現行). This state (*avasthā*) is figuratively designated by the name “two attainments” (*samāpatti* 二定). Since the seed is good (*kuśala* 善), the attainment is also said to be good. {2/28r.}¹⁷⁸

- #0279 2. As for ideationlessness (*āsaṃjñika* 無想定), the fruit or “retribution” of the attainment of non-ideation, i.e., the quality of a god without ideation:

The clear minds that constitute the preparation for this attainment, (i.e., prior to the attainment of non-ideation,) have as their motive the fruit of this attainment, a fruit which the practitioner assumes to be *nirvāṇa*, but which is a heaven

[There is *qiyuan* 期願: *avadhi-praṇidhāna*, i.e., a vow for a time. However, at AKB 5/6r.1 [ii, F 206], *qixin* 期心, the vow which the *bodhisattva* undertakes, i.e., not to rise up before having obtained *bodhi*, is the Sanskrit *āśaya* = *abhiprāya*, and at #3074, the same *qixin* does not involve any idea of duration.]

Opinions differ on the duration of the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), see AKB viii, F 193, note; YBh, 37 at beginning; *Vibhaṣā* (T.27.1545.0698); Harivarman's *Tattva-siddhi* (T.32.1646.0369), etc. – It is examined whether, in the case of long duration, the practitioner does not “bless” his body (i.e., basis [*adhiṣṭhāna*], AKB vii, F 119).

¹⁷⁶ AKB viii, F 207.

¹⁷⁷ In the preparation for the attainment of non-ideation, the practitioner generates weariness of the six impure (*sāsrava*) cognitions (*vijñānas*), just as one generates weariness of a sickness. In the preparation for the attainment of cessation, the practitioner generates weariness of seven cognitions, whether pure or impure, for the pure cognition itself is a cause for fatigue.

¹⁷⁸ The attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), the purity of which proceeds from the view of the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-sūnyatā*) (—the seventh cognition [*vijñāna*] has not been suspended—) must be distinguished from the attainment of cessation, the purity of which proceeds from the view of the emptiness of *dharmas* (*dharma-sūnyatā*) (the seventh is suspended).

of the Br̥hatphala.¹⁷⁹ The seeds (*bījas* 種) brought forth through perfuming (所熏成) by the subtle mind then generate (招) a cognition that is retribution (i.e., *vipāka-vijñāna*, see #0740, #0928), namely, an eighth cognition of the Br̥hatphala. This cognition is such that it cannot serve as support for coarse and unstable (羸動) minds (i.e., more precisely, for the six evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñānas*] and their associates): the latter do not become active (不行).

To this state of non-manifestation of the evolving cognitions is figuratively attributed the name (假立) of ideationlessness (*asaṃjñika*) (無想). As it has for its basis the eighth cognition, which is truly retribution (*vipāka*), it is called “retribution” (異熟), although improperly, since it is really “arisen from retribution” (*vipākaja*, arisen from the eighth).¹⁸⁰ <64>

⟨Therefore we conclude that these three *dharmas* [i.e., the two attainments (*samāpattis*) and ideationlessness (*asaṃjñikā*)] are also not real entities.⟩

A.B.B.2.5. *Conditioned characteristics (saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas)*¹⁸¹

#0281 ⟨[Question:] – How do we know that, distinct from matter (*rūpa* 色), mind (*citta* 心), etc., there are conditioned characteristics that possess a real intrinsic nature (實自性)?

#0282 [The Sarvāstivāda answers:] – Because the *sūtra* says so⟩. The *sūtra* says:

There are three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtasya saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇāni*): everything that proceeds from causes (= the conditioned [*saṃskṛta*]) has three characteristics which themselves proceed from causes. These characteristics are (1) origination (*jāti*), (2) duration–deterioration (*sthiti-jarā*), (3) cessation (*nirodha*).

[Thus, this *sūtra* contrasts that which characterizes (*lakṣaṇa*) and that which is characterized (*lakṣya*). – The Sarvāstivādins use this *sūtra* to affirm the existence

¹⁷⁹ AKB ii, F 199; iv, F 203.

¹⁸⁰ The mechanism is complicated and there are two opinions. – One can believe (1) that the clear minds generate the “general reward”, i.e., the eighth cognition of the existence of the gods without ideation (which has a mind in the first moment [*sacittaka*]); (2) that the subtle-subtle mind generates the “particular reward”, i.e., the non-entering into activity of the mind-mental factors during the course of the existence in question.

¹⁸¹ See #0674. – AKB ii, F 222–238. Our text takes over several remarks of the Sautrāntika from AKB. However Saṃghabhadra refutes these remarks. – *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 546, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 193.

of the “characteristics of the conditioned” as real entities (*dravya-sat-svabhāva*) distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*).]

#0284 [We reply:] – But this *sūtra* does not say that, distinct from matter (*rūpa* 色), mind (*citta* 心), etc., there are [characteristics that are] real entities in their intrinsic nature (實自性). Thus, your argument is not conclusive.

[For us, the “characteristics” are neither identical with matter, mind and mental factors nor separate from it.]

a. Discussion.

#0286 1. Part: [Opponent:] – Does not the genitive (第六聲) [i.e., “conditioned characteristics of the conditioned”] indicate that there is a substantial distinction (異體) between the characteristics and the conditioned? [Just as “the clothing of Devadatta”, so the “characteristics of the conditioned”.¹⁸²]

[We reply: – This reasoning is not correct and does not prove that the characteristic “origination” of a *dharma* is distinct from the *dharma* that arises,] because the substance (體) “of” matter (*rūpa* 色) is certainly matter (色), and so on, ⟨i.e., the substance “of” mind is certainly mind⟩.

#0287 2. Part: [Opponent:] – The terms “the characteristic itself” (*lakṣaṇa* 能相體) and “the characterized” (*lakṣya* 所相) imply definitively difference: [smoke is the indication of fire, the thirty-two marks indicate the great man].¹⁸³

[We reply:] – But when we speak of ⟨the characteristics of⟩ solidity (*kāṭhinya* 堅相), etc., of earth (地),¹⁸⁴ etc., we use the genitive; we conceive a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) which specifies <65> the characterized (*lakṣya*): and nevertheless, the ⟨the characteristic of⟩ solidity is not distinct (異) from the earth. [Thus, the characteristic itself is not distinct from the characterized.]

#0288 3. Part: – [We further reply:] – If the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa* 相) of the conditioned (有為) is distinct (異) from the characterized itself (*lakṣya*) (所相體), then the characteristic itself (相體) of the unconditioned (無為) would be distinct from the characterized (*lakṣya* 所相).¹⁸⁵ {2/1v.}

#0289 4. Part: – Moreover, [we state,] if the characteristics (相) ⟨of origination (生),

¹⁸² AKB ii, F 236.

¹⁸³ AKB ii, F 230; Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/ 5r.–v.

¹⁸⁴ AKB ii, F 230.

¹⁸⁵ Non-arising (*anutpāda*) is one of the characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) of the unconditioned (*nirvāṇa*): it is evident that *nirvāṇa* is non-arising.

(duration,) etc.)—in themselves (*svabhāva* 體)—are simultaneous (俱有), then they would always (一切時) exert their activity (*kāritra*: *zuoyong* 作用) simultaneously (齊).

Subpart 4a: – [We state,] if the characteristics are contradictory (違), then the activities of origination, duration, etc., are contradictory.

The early Sarvāstivādins thus say: – The activities (用) are not simultaneous (不頓興), but the characteristics are simultaneous.

We reply: – The characteristics are, in themselves (體), also contradictory (體亦相違), like their activities. Thus, they are not simultaneous (俱有).

Subpart 4b: – (Moreover, [we state,] the activities of duration (*sthiti* 住), deterioration (*jarā* 異) and cessation (*nīrodha* 滅) are not simultaneous.)

[Saṃghabhadra says: – There is no difficulty in the various activities being simultaneous.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0409b–c).

Editors: But notice that Saṃghabhadra distinguishes between the activity (*zuoyong* 作用, *kāritra*) and the function or efficacy (*gongneng* 功能, *vṛtti*, *vyāpāra*, *sāmārthya*, etc.) of a *dharma*, whereas the Yogācāra (Xuanzang), here and in the following, does not. Dhammajoti (*Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma*, 2009: 129ff.) comments: “*Kāritra* is defined as a *dharma*’s capability of introducing the production of its own next moment. ... Hence *kāritra* uniquely defines presentness, and it is in terms of *kāritra* that the differentiation of the three times can be properly defined. ... Efficacy (*gongneng* 功能) refers to the function of serving as a direct condition.” – P. 126: “Thus, in darkness, the eye’s efficacy of seeing *rūpa* is impaired by darkness. But its *kāritra* of inducing a fruit is not impaired, so that even in darkness, the eye can induce the production of itself [in the next moment].”

Dhammajoti (p. 129) further comments: “In the *Nyāyānusāra*, ..., Xuan Zang also very consistently renders *kāritra* as *zuo yong* (作用) and as distinct from *gong neng* (功能) used for the terms denoting activities other than *kāritra*. – It is important to observe, however, that in other contexts, both in the AKB(C) and MVŚ, he is unfortunately not so consistent.”

Moreover, Dhammajoti comments (p. 308):

Saṃghabhadra explains [in his *Abhidharma-saṅgīti-paryāya-śāstra* 阿毘達磨異門足論 (T.29.1536.0810a–b)] that the simultaneous existence of the characteristics does not result in the fallacy pointed out by the Sautrāntika-Dārṣāntikas:

“The four characteristics exercise their activities at different stages (*avasthā*): At the time when a *dharma* is arising, the *jāti-lakṣaṇa* exercises its activity. When [this *dharma*] has reached the stage of having arisen, the three—*sthiti*, *jarā* and

We reply: – One cannot admit that the characteristic “duration” causes (the conditioned) to last at the same time that the characteristics “deterioration” and “cessation” causes it to age and cease.]

#0290 5. Part: [The Sarvāstivādin:] – The “substances” (體; *svalakṣaṇa*, *svarūpa*) of the characteristic (i.e., origination, etc.) and of the characterized (i.e., every conditioned *dharma*) exist at all times (俱本有).

[We reply:] – The activity (用) of the characteristics will then also exist at all times, for substance (*svalakṣaṇa*) and activity are not of a different nature (無別性).

[Answer:] – Their activity (用) depends on additional causes (i.e., the homogeneous cause [*sabhāga-hetu*], etc.) and conditions (待因緣) (i.e., the other three conditions [*pratyayas*]), and activity is thus intermittent.

[We reply:] – This means to admit that the causes and conditions do not exist at all times (非本有). Moreover, this also means to confess that the characteristics, i.e., origination, etc., are useless (無用), since the causes and conditions suffice.

#0291 6. Part: – [We state,] if the conditioned *dharma* (which is the characterized [*lakṣya* 所相])—although always existent (恆有)—is endowed with origination (生), etc. (i.e., with characteristics [*lakṣaṇas*]), then it would be fitting that the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta* 無為) *dharma* is also endowed with origination, etc. We do not see why the first should be endowed with characteristics but not the second.

#0292 7. Part: – [We state:]

a. Moreover, the past (*atīta-adhvan* 去) and the future (*anāgata-adhvan* 來) are not <66> present (*pratyutpanna*, *vartamāna* 現) and are not permanent (*nitya* 常, like the unconditioned): like a sky-flower (*gagana-utpala*, *kha-puṣpa* 空花), they are not real entities in themselves (*dravya-sat-svabhāva*). {2/2r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

For the controversy on the past and the future, see AKB v, F 50–65 (translated by Stcherbatski as appendix to *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 76): Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0621–626). – See also AKB ii, F 260–261, where it

vyaya—exercise their respective activities at the same time. Thus, the four characteristics exercise their activities at different times and there is no fallacy that one and the same *dharma* arises, stays, deteriorates and ceases at the same time.”

is explained that “in the future, there is no anteriority or posteriority”. – Time itself does not exist independently of things: the future is the future *dharmas* which are all future in the same way and without any differences.

b. “Origination” (生) is called existence (有). Since the future is non-existence, how can origination (which is existence) occur in the future (未來) which is non-existence? [For the Sarvāstivādin, origination engenders in the future state, before being originated itself.]

Moreover, since the present is existence, the past will be called non-existence. <“Cessation” (滅) is called non-existence (無).> The nature of cessation is that the *dharma* does not exist; thus, cessation cannot be present (非現在); thus, the characteristic “cessation” is in the past [and not in the present, as the Sarvāstivādin says].

The Sarvāstivādin replies: – We do not agree that the nature of cessation is non-existence, from which it would follow that cessation is of the past time.

[We reply:] – But if “cessation” (滅) is not non-existence (非無), “origination” (生) will not be existence (非有), for cessation and origination are contradictory (違).¹⁸⁷

Moreover, “cessation” contradicts “duration” (滅違住): how could these two be simultaneous (同時)?

“Duration” does not contradict “origination” (住不違生), for these two bring it about that a *dharma* exists: why would they not be simultaneous (異世)?

We conclude that all these theories are not reasonable (非理).

b. *Correct theory.*

#0295 By the power of causes and conditions (因緣力) (i.e., condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya*]), the “conditioned factors” (*saṃskṛta* 為法), which at first did not exist (*pūrvam abhūtvā* 本無), <67> now exist (*bhāva*) (今有); after having existed for a certain time (*bhūtvā*) (暫有), they return to non-existence (*abhāva*) (還無).¹⁸⁸ – Thus, in order to distinguish them from the “unconditioned factors” (*asaṃskṛta* 無為), one figuratively attributes four “characteristics” (*lakṣaṇa* 相) to them.

#0296 1. i. Not existing at first, the *dharma* now exists (*abhūtvā bhāvaḥ* 本無今有): this is the state of existence (*bhāva-āvasthā* 有位) called origination (*jāti* 生).

¹⁸⁷ Our author does not discuss Saṃgabhadra’s reply (T.29.1562.0409c).

¹⁸⁸ AKB ii, F 229.

- ii. The *dharma* remains for a time (暫停) in this state (of origination (生位)): this is what is called duration (*sthiti* 住).
- iii. The enduring *dharma* changes (別), (i.e., being different before and after (前後)): this is called transformation (*anyathā-bhāva*) or deterioration (*jarā* 異).
- iv. After having existed for a certain time (暫有), the *dharma* returns to non-existence (還無): this is a time of non-existence (無時) called cessation (*nirodha* 滅).

#0297 The first three states, i.e., origination, duration and deterioration, being existence (有), are present (現在). The last state, i.e., cessation, being non-existence (無), is past (過去). {2/2v.}

#0298 2. [Question:] – But how can cessation, if it is a “non-existent” (*abhāva-dharma*, *asad-dharma* 無法), be a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa* 相) of the conditioned, of a presently existent thing?

We answer: – Why is it wrong to indicate the future non-existence (*paścād-abhāva* 後無) of this thing to be a characteristic?

- i. The characteristic “origination” shows that the *dharma*—being presently existing—did not exist previously (先非有).
- ii. The characteristic “cessation” shows that the *dharma* will later no longer exist (後是無).
- iii. The characteristic “deterioration” shows that the *dharma* is not immutable (凝然).
- iv. The characteristic “duration” shows that the *dharma* is, for a certain time, endowed with activity (暫有用).

Thus, although the four characteristics, all together, name and indicate the conditioned *dharma* (有為法), nevertheless, they do so by emphasizing different aspects.

#0299 3. The four characteristics can thus be attributed to the “moment” (*kṣaṇa* 剎那)—as the Sarvāstivādin would have it—[however,] from the conventional point of view. But they can also—as the Sāṃmitīyas would have it—figuratively be attributed to a certain prolonged state (一期分位). [Or again, they can—as the Sautrāntikas would have it—be attributed to the moment and to the prolonged state.]

- i. The beginning [of a series (*pravāha*)] (初有) is called “origination” (生).

- ii. The subsequent non-existence (後無) [of a series] is called “cessation” (滅).
- iii. The homogeneous development of the series (相似相續), once arisen (生已), (*sabhāga-prabandha* ?) is called “duration” (住). <68>
- iv. Now, this series changes (or continuously evolves) (相續轉變), and this is called “deterioration” (異).¹⁸⁹

#0300 We conclude that the four characteristics are [not things in themselves but] figurative attributions (假立).

A.B.B.2.6. *Names, phrases and syllables (nāma-pada-vyañjana)*¹⁹⁰

#0302 According to the Sarvāstivādin, one should accept that there are real (實) “signifying” (*vyañjaka*? 詮表)¹⁹¹ entities—distinct from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*)—by virtue of which the person who speaks indicates what he wants to say. These entities are {2/3r.} names, phrases and syllables (*nāma-kāya*, *pada-kāya*, *vyañjana-kāya* 名句文身).

[Question:] – How do you know that?

#0303 [The Sarvāstivādin answers:] – This is so because scripture says so. A scripture says:

By becoming Buddha, he takes possession of extraordinary (*adbhuta* 希有) *nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāyas* (名句文身).¹⁹²

#0305 This scripture does not say that. The scripture (經), here, does not affirm the existence of real entities, such as names, etc. (實名等), distinct from matter, mind and mental factors. Thus, the argument is not demonstrative.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0413c):

¹⁸⁹ AKB ii, F 227, Sautrāntika doctrine.

The *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* assigns the characteristics to the moment (*kṣaṇa*), the other texts to the series.

¹⁹⁰ AKB ii, F 238–243. – See #0121 (*śabda* of the non-Buddhist scholars [*tīrthikas*]), #0203 (vocal action), and see #2597.

¹⁹¹ *vyañjaka* (?), *quanbiao* 詮表.

¹⁹² This is the text cited by Saṃghabhadra in his *Apidamo shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0413c20). He discusses at length the objections of Vasubandhu. [He cites particularly the Sanskrit replica of *Samyutta*, i, 39.]

It happens (1) that one perceives sound and that one does not perceive the syllables, and (2) conversely. Thus, the nature of sound and that of syllables are different.

1. A person hears “loudly” the speech of another person and, nevertheless, reflects and asks: “What did you say?” He heard the sound of the speech but did not understand the meaning because he did not understand the syllables generated by the sound. How can one doubt that the syllables differ from the sound?

2. Conversely, a person does not hear the sound and understands the meaning because he sees the movement of the lips and penetrates the syllables generated.

a. *Discussion.*

#0307 1. Names, ⟨phrases and syllables⟩ are not really signifiers (能詮) if they are—as you [i.e., the Sarvāstivādins] say—real entities distinct from sound (*śabda* 聲), just as color (色), etc., is not signifying. <69>

#0308 2. The Sarvāstivādin says that sound (聲) engenders (能生) names,¹⁹³ ⟨phrases and syllables⟩, but—as he freely admits—only a sound characterized by “modifications of tone” (*svara-ākuñcana* 音韻屈曲) (i.e., the sound of speech [*vāk-śabda* or *ghoṣa*], Kuiji)¹⁹⁴ engenders them.

We say: – These “modifications of tone” (the sound, “inflected”, “modulated” into *ka, kha, ga, gha* ...) are sufficient to signify (能詮). Why imagine names (*nāma*), phrases (*pada*) and syllables (*vyañjana*)?

#0309 3. But the Sarvāstivādin answers: – “The modifications (屈曲) of tone (音韻) that occur in sound (聲) are precisely my names, ⟨phrases and syllables⟩ i.e., real entities (實) distinct (異) from sound (*śabda-āyatana*) and engendered by sound”.

We will say: – According to this principle, the “modifications (屈曲) of shape (形) (*ākṛti-ākuñcana*: short, long; characters of writing) ⟨and of quantity” (量)⟩ that are seen in visible form (*rūpa*) ⟨should be separate real substances⟩ (實體) distinct (異) from “visible form” (*rūpa-āyatana* 色處).

#0310 4. The Sarvāstivādin abandons opinion 3 and specifies opinion 2. He says: “The

¹⁹³ Of the two doctrines of *śabda* (the name manifested [*vyaṅgya* 顯] or brought forth [*janya* 發] [from speech]), see #0121 and AKB, the author examines here only the second.

¹⁹⁴ *ququ* 屈曲 is without doubt *ākuñcana*. – *yinyun* 音韻 = *svara* (*Vyutpatti*); also *chandas*. – *ghoṣa* = *yusheng* 語聲.

modification of tone that occurs in sound is not signifying [—because (the modification of tone) is a modification occurring in the sound, and sound, in its nature, like modifications of color, is matter (*rūpa*) in its nature—], no more than the sound of the string (絃) or of the flute (管) is signifying. {2/3v.} [But it does engender the names, etc., which are signifiers.]”

We reply: – The sound with the modification of tone—like the sound (of the string or) of the flute—does not engender the names, etc. Moreover, it cannot be said that the sound—by itself—definitively is not a signifier. [Everyone knows that the sound made by trees teaches the *dharma*.]¹⁹⁵

5. The Sarvāstivādin replies: – “To accept that sound by itself signifies (能詮) is to accept that the sound of wind (風) or of the bell (鈴) signifies (有詮用). [Now, the only sound that signifies is ‘human’ sound or ‘animal’ sound.]”¹⁹⁶ <70>

[We reply:] – It is true that the sound of wind (or of a bell) does not (separately) bring forth real names, (phrases and syllables); we do not see why another sound would bring them forth. And if the sound of speech (語聲) alone brings forth names, etc., why not acknowledge that speech alone signifies without the help of names, etc. (唯語能詮)?

#0311 6. The Sarvāstivādin insists: – “For what reason do you definitively affirm that the sound of speech (語) signifies without the help of names, etc.?”

We reply: – “How do you know that these separate ‘signifying entities’ exist distinct from the sound of speech (語)? Gods (天) and men (人) generally know (the sound of) speech not to be distinct from signifying entities. To claim the signifiers to be distinct from speech, only a half-wit (*devānām-priya* 天愛) would believe that, but not others.”

b. *Correct doctrine.*

#0313 1. By considering the different modes or states (*avasthā-viśeṣa* 分位差別) which the vocal sound [or sound of speech] presents, names, phrases and syllables are conventionally distinguished (假建立):

#0314 i. the name signifies (i.e., makes known) the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*: the

¹⁹⁵ The Bhagavat does not speak, but he makes Ānanda, the trees and the walls speak. – See *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 366, note. – This is one of the aspects of the problem of “whether one speaks in the state of concentration” (Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* [Yibu: *zonglun lun*, T.49.2031]) and of the problem of the “supramundane *buddha*”, see CWSL 10/#2988.

¹⁹⁶ The *sattvākhyā* sound, belonging in itself to living beings, AKB i, F 17.

things) (名詮自性); {4r.}

ii. the phrase signifies modalities (*viśeṣa*, i.e., time, etc.) (句詮差別);

iii. the syllables (*vyāñjana* or *akṣara*), (i.e., words (字)), serve as support (*āśraya* 所依) for the two, i.e., names and phrases (文即是字).¹⁹⁷

#0315 2. Although these three have no separate substance (體) outside of sound (*śabda* 聲), nevertheless, sound is real (實), while names-phrases-syllables have only conventional existence (假). This is why names-phrases-syllables are classed within the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāra-skandha*) (within the formations dissociated from mind [*viprayuktas*]) and are not part of the sense-sphere of sound (*śabda-āyatana* 聲) or the “audible”.

3. In our tenet, there is no confusion between the unhindered knowledge of *dharmas* (*dharma-pratiṣamvid* 法無礙解) and the unhindered knowledge of eloquence (*pratibhāna-pratiṣamvid* 詞無礙解),¹⁹⁸ since the first has the real for its object, the second, the conventional.¹⁹⁹

Sound (聲), on the one hand, and names, phrases and syllables, on the other hand, are not included in the same aggregate (*skandha* 蘊), sense-sphere (*āyatana* 處) and sense-element (*dhātu* 界), (and are also distinct in each).

#0316 4. It is in our universe, that is, in the world of our Buddha (*buddha-kṣetra* 土) where we are living, that names, phrases and syllables (are figuratively attributed) (假立) by relying on sound (聲). But this is not the general rule. In other *buddha*-fields (佛土), the three, i.e., names, phrases and syllables, are figuratively established by also relying on (marvelous) light (光明妙), odor (香), taste (味) and tangible.²⁰⁰ <71>

A.B.B.2.7. *Proclivities (anuśayas), etc.*

#0318 According to certain schools (in particular, Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas), the proclivities (*anuśayas* 隨眠)²⁰¹ are (distinct from mind (*citta*) and) mental factors (*caitta*) and (are not included in the aggregate of the) formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應行).

¹⁹⁷ AKB ii, F 239.

¹⁹⁸ AKB vii, F 89.

¹⁹⁹ Reply to Saṃghabhadra's objection, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0414a3).

²⁰⁰ See #0199 (fn.), Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/26v. – Think of deaf-mutes, he says.

²⁰¹ AKB v, F 3–7.

- #0319 This opinion is not reasonable, as we can see from the names of the proclivities that are called attachment, etc., like the actual (現) defilements (i.e., attachment, etc. (*rāga-ādi* 貪等)), which are not (dissociated from mind (不相應)).
- #0320 Some scholars accept other formations dissociated from mind. {2/4v.} One should refute their theories in accordance with the principles presented above.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to Kuiji (T.43.1830.0289b06), the other dissociated (*viprayuktas*) formations are:

- a. The non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa* 不失) of the early Sāṃmitīyas, which is refuted by the *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* (T.31.1609.0783b20) that states: “By others, it is also called *zengzhang* 增長 (*paripuṣṭi* ?)”. – This is the non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*) described in *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, xvii, 14 (same comparison of “contract” or “IOU notes” [不失法如券]).
- b. The *hehe* 和合 of Saṃghabhadra, which is actually named at *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0396b15), but we do not find any explanation of it at the place where it should be (T.29.1562.0416). – Saṃghabhadra explains the two words *ca* and *iti* of the verse (*kārikā*) (AKB ii. verses 35–36a): *nāmeti ca*. He says: “*ca* indicates that *pada-kāya* (collection of names), *vyañjana-kāya* (collection of phrases) and *hehe* 和合 (*saṃketa*, *samavāya*, etc. ?) should be added to the list; *iti* indicates the dissociated ones (*viprayuktas*) accepted by others, like the possession of aggregates (*skandha-prāpti*), etc., distinct from “possession” (*prāpti*)”.
- c. The non-informing morality (*avijñapti-śīla* 無表戒) of Harivarman [for whom the non-informing (*avijñapti*) (see #0205) is neither matter (*rūpa*) nor mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*)]. – This non-informing morality is not found in the list of the dissociated (*viprayuktas*) formations of chapter 94 of the *Tattva-siddhi* which lists (and refutes): *prāpti* (possession), *aprāpti* (non-possession), the two *samāpattis* (attainments), *āsaṃjñika* (ideationlessness), *jīvita* (vitality), *jāti* (origination), *nirodha* (cessation), *sthiti* (duration), *sthiti-anyathātva* (duration-change), *jarā* (deterioration), *maraṇa* (death), *nāma* (names), *pada* (phrases), *vyañjana* (syllables), *prthag-janatva* (quality of ordinary worldling), etc. [The list set up by R. Kimura, *The Original and Developed Doctrine of Indian Buddhism in Charts*, Calcutta, 1920, p. 38, differs.]

To complete Kuiji's informations, we may mention:

- a. the schism of the *saṃgha* (*saṃgha-bheda*) of AKB ii, F 178 and iv, F 206;

- b. the “prediction” of AKB ii, F 304;
- c. the ten *dharmas*, that is, from [85.] *pravṛtti* (流轉, continuity) to [94.] *prabandha-uparama* (ending of connection, i.e., *anyathātva* [change]), in the list of one hundred *dharmas* (T.31.1614.0855c10). <72>

A.B.B.3. Unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*)²⁰²

- 3.1. General refutation; #0323
- 3.2. Refutation of space (*ākāśa*), cessation due to deliberation (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*), cessation not due to deliberation (*aprasaṃkhyā-nirodha*), etc.; #0326
- 3.3. Correct doctrine; #0332

#0323 The unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*), as being separate from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*),²⁰³ are certainly not real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有) as the Sarvāstivādins and others say. Such unconditioned factors are, in truth, not observed (*yuktita upalabhyante*).

A.B.B.3.1. General refutation

The *dharmas* that definitively exist (*bhāva-dharma* 有法) fall, in brief, into one of the following three categories:

1. *Dharmas* known through evidence (or direct perception) (*pratyakṣa-jñeya* 現所知), such as matter (色) which is known by the five cognitions (*viññānas*), such as the mind (心) and mental factors which are known by the “knowledge

²⁰² For the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*), see AKB ii, F 278; Saṃghabhadra, *juan* 17 (T.29.1562.0428c). — Vasumitra’s *Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031), see *Mahāsāṃghikas* and *Mahīśāsakas*.

In our text, i.e., #0072, #0454, #2552, #2719 (the three “natures”), #2760, #2778; #3254.

Editors: See also in Appendix Two, p. 1259, the list of hundred *dharmas* in *Yogācāra*.

²⁰³ The dissociated ones (*viprayuktas*) are matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caitta*), i.e., the dissociated ones are not different, distinct (*yi* 異, *bhinna*, *viśiṣṭa*) from matter, mind and mental factors. But the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*) are not matter, mind and mental factors; thus, it cannot be said that they are not different from them. We say that they do not have a real entity separate (*li* 離, *prthak*, *vyatireka*) from these *dharmas*, because, for the Great Vehicle, true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) (which is the only unconditioned factor) is—in relation to the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas*)—neither identical with (not *ji* 即), nor separate from (not *li* 離), nor different from (not *yi* 異), nor one with (not *yi* 一) them.

of another's mind" (*para-citta-jñāna*).

2. *Dharmas*, the experience of which is evident (*bhoga*, *upabhoga*, *paribhoga*, *sambhoga*, *anubhava* 現受用), such as the pitcher (瓶) or clothing (衣), etc., (which are not "known through evidence", being "fictitious" things, things of convention [*vyavahāra*] or of secondary or practical existence [*saṃvṛti*]).

Ordinary people usually know that these two kinds of *dharmas* exist without needing to resort to reasoning.

3. *Dharmas* (that are endowed with activity (*kāritra*, *kriyā*, *vyāpāra*) (有作用))—such as the sense-faculties of the eye (眼), ear (耳), etc., i.e., subtle and invisible matter that is not perceived by the senses²⁰⁴—the existence of which we know through reasoning and through their activity (用證).

Unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas* 無為), however, are not generally known by ordinary people as definitively existing, moreover, the unconditioned factors <73> are not endowed with an activity (無作用)—(such as that of the eye, ear, etc.)—to prove their existence. Again, if they were active, they would not be permanent (無常). Thus, unconditioned factors cannot be claimed to definitively exist—as real things—separate from the mind (不可執無為定有). {2/5r.}

Because the unconditioned factors are the object of knowledge (*jñeya-svabhāva* 所知性) (see #0334), or because their nature is revealed (所顯性)²⁰⁵ by matter, mind

²⁰⁴ AKB i, F 65; ix, F 231.

²⁰⁵ "Revealed", *suoxian* 所顯 or *suoxianshi* 所顯示. Both expressions occur in the *Treatise of a Hundred Dharmas* (*Dacheng baifa mingmen lun*, T.31.1614.0855b19). – The original is *udbhāṇita*, *sūcita*, *dyotita*, *vyāñjita*? – The AKB has *suoxian* = *prabhāṇita* in a very different usage, *kāma-prabhāṇito dhātuḥ*: the sphere nourished by desire. – In *Kāśyapa-parivarta*, Staël-Holstein, p. 209, there is: *ebhiś ca dharmair nirvāṇaṃ sūcyate | ete ca dharmāḥ sūnyāḥ*. – Kuiji explains:

1. matter (*rūpa*) reveals matter (as the sun makes objects visible);
2. matter reveals mind (*citta*) (bodily action indicates the mind);
3. mind reveals mind (the knowledge of another's mind cognizes this mind);
4. mind reveals matter (the mind takes matter for its object).

Our text uses, several times (#0337, etc.), the formula: "True suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) is revealed by emptiness (*śūnyatā*), the non-self (*nairātmya*), the knowledge of the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-śūnyatā*), the knowledge of the emptiness of *dharmas* (*dharmas-śūnyatā*)."

True suchness, which is the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*) nature of things, which is not separate from mind (*citta*) and from the developments of mind (*citta*), which is the *viññapti-mātratā*, is revealed when the "emptiness of the self (*ātman*) and of *dharmas*" (#0072)

and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*) [cognized as being empty] (see #0336)—like matter, mind and mental factors—it cannot be upheld that there would exist a real unconditioned factor (*asaṃskṛta*) (實無為性) separate from matter, mind and mental factors.

A.B.B.3.2. *Refutation of space (ākāśa), cessation due to deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), cessation not due to deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), etc.*

#0326 Is space (*ākāśa* 虛空),²⁰⁶ etc., unitary (一) or multiple (多)?

#0327 1. If [space] is unitary in itself and penetrates all sites (*sthāna*) (遍一切處), thus providing a place (*avakāśaṃ dadāti*) to the *dharmas*, color, etc., then it becomes multiple in accordance with the *dharmas* that are occupying it (隨能合法),²⁰⁷ for the site occupied by one thing (一所合處) is not <74> occupied by another thing: you would not want things to interpenetrate (互相遍)!

Are you going to say that space is not occupied by things (不與法合)? Then it does not provide them any place, no more so than the other unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*) do.

Also, explain whether or not there is space in things. If yes, there is interpenetrating (*saṃkara* 相雜); if no, space is not omnipresent (不遍).

2. If cessation due to deliberation (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* 擇滅) is unitary:²⁰⁸

is “realized”.

According to the *Treatise of a Hundred Dharmas*, it is necessary to rely on things (mind [*citta*], mental factors [*caitta*], matter [*rūpa*], formations dissociated from mind [*vi-prayukta*]) in order that the unconditioned factor (*asaṃskṛta*) (i.e., the *suoxian* 所顯 or *suoxianshi* 所顯示 category) be revealed. By discarding the defilement of these four kinds of things, one purifies the unconditioned factor (#3207), which is thus revealed: it is not revealed by images (*nimitta*), like the *dharmas* of the other categories (#2918).

²⁰⁶ For space (*ākāśa*), distinct from the elementary substance space (*ākāśa-dhātu*), see AKB i, F 8; ii, F 279; i, F 49. Criticism of the Mādhyamikas, AKB i, F 8, note. – Mahīśāsakas and Uttarāpathakas, *Kathā-vāṭthu*, vi, 6. – The arguments of our author are known to Saṃghabhadra (good illustration and defense of the unconditioned factors [*asaṃskṛtas*], T.29.1562.0429) for they come from the Sautrāntikas.

²⁰⁷ *Dharmas* are *nenghe* 能合, location is *suohe* 所合.

²⁰⁸ On the problem of the unity of the cessations (*nirodhas*) and how one takes possession of the cessations relative to such and such “fetters”, to such and such *dharma*, see AKB i, F 8; ii, F 284; *Vibhāṣā*, *juan* 31 at end; Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects*

then when the practitioner, by means of deliberation, abandons one of the nine categories or one of the five classes of fetters (*saṃyojana*), {2/5v.} he abandons the other categories, the other classes.

3. The same for the cessation not due to deliberation (*apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* 非擇滅), if it is unitary. When a *dharma* becomes “incapable of arising”²⁰⁹ through lack of the causes necessary for its arising—i.e., when cessation not due to deliberation relative to one *dharma* is obtained—then, at the same time, the cessation not due to deliberation of all *dharmas* would be obtained.

#0328 4. On the other hand, if the unconditioned factors are, in themselves, multiple, <then, they will be divided into classes and types (品類), and,> like color (色), etc., they will not be unconditioned factors. <Moreover, space would not be pervasive and provide place for all things>.

#0329 5. The unconditioned factors as conceived by other schools <—separate from mind and mental factors (離心心所) and as really existing (實有)—> are refuted in the same way (see #0340).²¹⁰

#0330 6. Finally, the Sarvāstivādins say that the unconditioned factors do not have any one of the six causes (*hetu*), any one of the five fruits (*phala*).²¹¹ Then, like the horn of a hare (兔角), they would not exist separate from the mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*).

A.B.B.3.3. Correct doctrine

#0332 The *sūtra*, it is true, does teach three unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*):

1. space (*ākāśa*);
2. cessation due to deliberation (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*);
3. cessation not due to deliberation (*apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*).

<They are, in short, of two kinds (略有二種).> Here is how it should be understood.

#0334 1. The three unconditioned factors exist as figurative designations (假施設有)

(*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031), Mahāsaṃghikas, thesis 34 (*Yibu zonglun lun lun*, T.49.2031.0015c21), Mahīśāsakas, thesis 19 (*idem*, T.49.2031.0017a07).

²⁰⁹ *Dharmas* destined not to arise (*anutpattika-dharman*), AKB i, F 10, 75; ii, F 266.

²¹⁰ Kuiji: “The other unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*) are not real things separate from mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*) because they are given as unconditioned factors, like the three”.

²¹¹ AKB ii, F 276.

that depend on <75> certain developments of *vijñāna* (識變). – One has heard (from the Buddha or the *bodhisattvas*) the names of space (*ākāśa* 虛空) and the other unconditioned factors. {2/6r.} Having heard these names, one has figurated (*vikalpa*) and conceived certain characteristics of space and the other unconditioned factors. Through the power of habit (習力), when the mind is directed towards these objects, the mind appears in the form of these same characteristics: a mental image (i.e., image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) of absence of “tangibility” or absence of extended matter, etc. (無為相現). This image (所現相) is conditioned (*samskṛta*), but it always appears similar to itself (前後相似), i.e., without any change before or after. Thus, one thinks that space is permanent (常) (and figuratively attributes (假說) it as being “permanent”), ...²¹²

#0336 2. The three unconditioned factors exist as figurative designations (假施設) that depend on the nature-of-things (*dharmatā* 法性), of which another name is *bhūta-tathatā* (“true suchness”).

#0337 True suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如)²¹³ is revealed (所顯) by emptiness (*śūnyatā* 空), by the non-self (*nairātmya* 無我): it is above the processes of the mind (心) and of the path of words (言路) which move within (the notions of) (1) existence (有), (2) non-existence (無), (3) both (俱) existence and non-existence, (4) neither (非) existence nor non-existence;²¹⁴ it is (1) not identical (—) with the *dharmas*, (2) nor different (異) from the *dharmas*, (3) nor both, (4) nor neither identical or different. As it is the “true principle” (*tattva* = *-tā* 真理)²¹⁵ of *dharmas*, it is called *dharmatā* (nature-of-things 法性).

[How can true suchness be designated by the names (1) *ākāśa* (space), (2) *pratisamkhyā-nirodha* (cessation due to deliberation), (3) *apratisamkhyā-nirodha* (cessation not due to deliberation), and also by the names (4) *āniñjya* (the immovable) and (5) *saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha* (cessation of ideation and sensation), which are the two unconditioned factors added by the (Vijñānavāda) School to the three traditional unconditioned factors?]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

²¹² *Vikhyāpana*, juan 18. – Kuiji, on the manner in which these kinds of figurating (*vikalpa*) of the unconditioned factors (*asamskṛtas*) emerge before the seventh stage.

²¹³ See #0072, #0222, #0244, #0323 (fn.), #0360, #0416, #0438, #0454; #3231, #3303.

²¹⁴ Kuiji explains: “It is separate (*li* 離) from existence It is above the path of words” But *li* is missing in the text.

²¹⁵ *zhenli* 真理. – *zhen* = *bhūta*, as in *bhūta-tathatā* (true suchness). – *li*, see *Siddhi* F 1 and 2. Equivalent of *zhenli* are *sattva*, *satya*, and also *tathā* in *tathāgata*. – See #2770, #2908.

Kuiji comments in the *Hundred Dharmas* (T.44.1836.0052a05):

There are six *dharmas* that are peaceful (*sānta*) (寂寞), empty (? *chongxu* 冲虛), immovable (湛然), permanent (常住) and not brought about (無所造作), and that are called unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta* 無為): namely, space (*ākāśa*), etc.

(1) The unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) “space” (*ākāśa*) is a name given to true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真諦) by comparison, for, like space, <76> it is separate from any hindrance (*āvaraṇa*). – True suchness receives the next four names, [i.e., cessation due to deliberation, etc.,] insofar as it is “revealed” (2) by the abandoning of the defilements (*kleśas*) (in this case, it is *nirvāṇa*), (3) by the non-generation of the conditioned through the lack of causes, (4) by the suppression of the joy-happiness (*prīti-sukha*) belonging to the third meditation (*dhyāna*), (4) by the absence of the ideations-sensations belonging to the perception-sphere of nothingness (*ākāśa-āyatana*).

The unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*) are non-arisen, unceasing, not past, not future, not here, not there, neither possessed nor non-possessed. – Their nature is very profound: it is only through things (*dravya*) that [their nature] is manifested ... (above, #0323).

- #0338 1. Insofar as true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) is free (離) from hindrances or obstacles (*āvaraṇa* 障礙, see #0154)—[being neither an obstacle nor having an obstacle: *nāvṛṇoti, nāvriyate*]²¹⁶—it can be called space (*ākāśa* 虛空).
2. Insofar as true suchness is “realized”, “penetrated” (證會)²¹⁶ by the practitioner when he has completely destroyed (滅) all impure *dharmas* (in other words, pollution [*saṃkleśa* (雜染)]) by the power of deliberation (*pratisaṃkhyā* 簡擇力 = pure path), it can be called cessation due to deliberation (*pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* 擇滅) [or *nirvāṇa*].
3. Insofar as true suchness—without the intervention of deliberation (擇力)—is pure in its nature (本性清淨) and, {2/6v.} moreover, revealed by the lack of causes and conditions (*pratyaya-vaikalya*) (緣闕所顯), it can be called cessation not due to deliberation (*apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* 非擇滅).
4. Insofar as true suchness is the cessation of unpleasant and pleasant sensation, it can be called the immovable (*āniñjya* 不動).²¹⁷

²¹⁶ *zhenghui* 證會. – *zheng* = *sākṣātkr.* – *hui* = *saṃsarga*; but, in Kuiji’s explanation of #2924, it is an equivalent of *da* 達; *pravedha* (penetration) = *tongda* 通達.

²¹⁷ *āniñjya* (“the immovable”) is the fourth unconditioned factor (*asaṃskṛta*) of the Mahī-

5. Insofar as true suchness is the not becoming active (*apracāra*, *asamudācāra* 不行) of ideations and sensations (*saṃjñā*, *vedita*), it can be called cessation of ideation and sensation (*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha* 想受滅).²¹⁸ <77>

#0339 These five, i.e., space, etc., are figurative designations (假立) with reference to true suchness (真如). But “true suchness” as well is merely a figurative designation (假施設名) (like food, oil, etc.).

#0340 1. In order to dismiss (遮撥) the idea that [true suchness] does not exist (*asattva* 無), it is said that it exists (有) (thus refuting emptiness badly understood²¹⁹ and false view [*mithyā-drṣṭi*]);

2. in order to dismiss (遮執) the idea that [true suchness] does exist (有) (Mahīśāsaka doctrine), it is said to be empty (*śūnya* 空);

3. in order that people do not think (along with the Ekavyavahārikas)^a that [true suchness] is “vacuous”, i.e., unreal” (虛), or “illusory” (“illusion”) (幻), it is said to be “real” (*shi* 實) [but it is neither real nor non-real]:

since [true suchness] is neither [a] non-true (*abhūta*, *wang* 妄), i.e., “non-existent” (like the imagined [*parikalpita*]), nor [b] upside-down (*vitatha*; *viparīta*, 倒), that is, “erroneous” (like the dependent [*paratantra*]), it is called *bhūta-tathatā* 真如 (true suchness).²²⁰

śāsakas (Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* [*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031]; Jiryō Masuda wrongly translates [the fourth unconditioned factor] as *acala* (“the immovable”), one of the rare mistakes of his fine work). – For the Mahīśāsakas, *āniñjya* (“the immovable”) is the abandoning of the obstacle to attainment (*samāpatti-āvaraṇa-prahāṇa*, cf. AKB vi, F 276).

The Sarvāstivādins (—and our author accepts their interpretation—) understand *āniñjya* (“the immovable”) to be the fourth meditation (*dhyāna*) where only neutral sensation [i.e., a sensation called “equanimity”] remains, AKB iv, F 197; vi, F 177; viii, F 161. – The schools of *Kathā-vatthu*, vi, 4, understand *āniñjya* to be the four formless meditations (*ārūpyas*), which are as many unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*) (cf. Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* [*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031], Mahāsāṃghika thesis, 34).

²¹⁸ In *Nirvāṇa* and *Morale Bouddhique* (F 110–111), we have studied the Pāli texts that establish close relationships between *nirvāṇa* and the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*). – Same point of view in *Kāśyapa-parivarta*.

²¹⁹ “Emptiness badly understood”, *Kāśyapa-parivarta*, Staël-Holstein, p. 95.

Mādhyamikas and Vijñānavādins mutually accuse one another of badly understanding emptiness; see the notes on Bhāvaviveka, see #0008; *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928.

²²⁰ *xu* 虛 here characterizes the imagined (*parikalpita*) (#2723); there is *xu* = *abhūta* (*Kāśyapa-*

- ^a One of the branches of the Mahāsāṃghikas. – “Like the Lokottaravādins, they are the contact point, i.e., the transition, between the Little Vehicle and the Great Vehicle. The Lokottaravādins say that the mundane (*laukika*) dharmas are false, that the supramundane (*lokottara*) dharmas are real. The Ekavyavahārikas say that all dharmas are merely names” (Kuiji, commentary on the *Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas*).

According to Bhavya (first list), they are so called because they say that one mind knows all the dharmas. – But Kuiji, commenting on Vasumitra, states (*Yibu zong-lun lun shu shuji*, X.53.0844.0575a025):

They say that all the dharmas, mundane (*laukika*) or supramundane (*lokottara*) (世出世法), are not real, are “conventional” (*sāmvṛta*) (但有假名), are names, *prajñaptis* (designations) (名即是説): names = *vyavahāra*, the way of speaking (and of thinking).

Vibhāṣā, *juan* 77 at beginning, cited in AKB v, F 54: “The three times are just speech, do not really exist”. – The Japanese commentators cite <78> the *Artha-pradīpa*, the *Pañcadeśanā-grantha* (Chinese works), Kuiji’s *Forest of Meanings* (*Dacheng fayuan yilin zhang*, T45.1861.0245) which illustrates this radical “nominalism”. We conclude that the Ekavyavahārikas accept the “emptiness of dharmas” (*dharma-sūnyatā*) of the Great Vehicle.

They differ from the Prajñaptivādins who do not affirm the purely nominal existence (*prajñapti-sattva*) of all the (1) mundane and (2) supramundane dharmas, who recognize some real dharmas in [these] two categories.

[(Question:)] – What is the difference between your doctrine and that of the Mahīśāsakas²²¹ who accept true suchness of the good, bad and non-defined fac-

parivarta, p. 153).

shiyōu 實有, *dravya-sat* (existent in reality), as opposed to *prajñapti-sat* (existent as a designation) (army: designation of soldiers) – *shi* 實 = *tattva* (reality), *satya* (truth).

zhen 真, true (*bhūta*); thus: non-true (*wang* 妄) which opposes it, or *abhūta*.

dao 倒, upside-down, erroneous (*viparīta*); is opposite to *tathā*, thus: what is upside-down (*vitatha*). The imagined (*parikalpita*) (#2723) is non-true (*wang* 妄) and merely “ideal” (*xu* 虛), like a second moon. The dependent (*paratantra*) is non-suchness (*dao* 倒), like an illusion, being generated by causes, being not what it appears to be: [the dependent ultimately] is the perfected (*pariniṣpanna*) (*bhūta-tathatā*), it does, however, appear like the imagined (*parikalpita*).

²²¹ The Mahāsāṃghikas have nine unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*):

a. three traditional ones, space (*ākāśa*), etc. (1–3);

tors (i.e., *kuśala-bhūta-tathatā*, *akuśala-bhūta-tathatā*, *avyākṛta-bhūta-tathatā*) as real entities (*dravya-sat*)?]

[Answer:] – We do not accept, as the Mahīśāsakas do, that there exists a real (*shi* 實) permanent *dharma* (常法) called true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如), separate from matter, mind and mental factors (*rūpa-citta-caittas*). [Our true suchness is neither identical with nor different from matter, mind and mental factors; it is neither real nor non-real.]

#0341 Thus, [these kinds of] unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas* 無為) are definitively not real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有).

A.B.B.4. *Object (grāhya) and subject (grāhaka)*²²²

1. Object and subject of knowledge.

#0343 The *dharma*s conceived by the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道) or the Little Vehicle (餘乘) as being separate (異) from the mind and mental factors do not have the nature of real entities <79> (*dravya-sat-svabhāva*)²²³ {2/7r.} because they

- b. four formless meditations (*ārūpyas*) (4–7);
- c. members of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) (8) and of the noble path (*ārya-mārga*) (9).

The Mahīśāsakas have nine unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*):

- a. three traditional ones (1–3);
- b. the immovable (*āniñjya*) (which, according to one interpretation, corresponds to the four formless meditations (*ārūpyas*), which definitively includes the concentrations that have neutral sensation [i.e., sensation called “equanimity”]) (4);
- c. nature (*dharmatā*, *bhūta-tathatā*) of good, bad, non-defined *dharma*s (5–7);
- d. nature of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) (8) and of the noble path (*ārya-mārga*) (9).

The nature of good *dharma*s is to generate a good fruit

The nature of dependent origination is that “ignorance (*avidyā*) being given, the (*karma*-) formations (*saṃskāras*) follow ...”. (Kuiji, *Commentarial Record on the Treatise on the Sects* [Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji, X.53.0844]).

See AKB iii, F 77–78.

²²² See #2900; see #0012, #0112.

Editors: LVP translates *grāhya* variously: objet, conçu, pris.

Likewise, he translates *grāhaka* variously: sujet, preneur, prenant, concevant.

We translate mainly as that which is seized or as object; that which seizes or subject.

²²³ The [Vijñānavāda] School’s real *dharma*s are the mind and mental factors (which are

are “seized” (*grāhya* 所取) as “objects”, like the mind and mental factors [that are seized by the “knowledge of another’s mind” (*para-citta-jñāna*²²⁴)].

- #0344 The consciousness (覺) (*dhī* or *buddhi*, i.e., the general name for “mind and mental factors”) which seizes (*grah* 能取) matter (*rūpas*), etc., also does not take them as objects (*ālamb* 緣) because it is “that which seizes” (*grāhaka*), i.e., “subject”, like consciousness that is directed at consciousness (緣此覺) [i.e., like the “knowledge of another’s mind” that is directed at another’s mind, and does not contact it, for it contacts only a “subjective” copy of this mind; see #0363].²²⁵

2. Knowledge.

- #0345 The mind and mental factors, because “dependently originated” (*paratantra-udbhava*, *pratītya-samutpanna* 依他起), are, like an illusion (*māyāvat* 幻事), not real entities in the absolute sense (*bhūta-dravya-sat*), (#2770).

3. *Vijñapti-mātra*.

[Someone may say that there is then no difference, from the point of view of reality, between the mind (*citta*) and its object (*viṣaya*). Why do you say that there is “nothing but *vijñāna*”, “*vijñāna* only” (*vijñāna-mātra* 唯識)?]²²⁶ <80>

- #0346 In order to refute the false theory that real entities—objects external to mind and mental factors—exist, we say that there is “nothing but *vijñāna*” (唯有識 *vijñapti-mātra*).

dependent [*paratantra*] by nature, #2770) and their development. For true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*), it is neither the same nor different from mind and mental factors: thus, it has nothing in common with the *dharmas* of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*) and of the Little Vehicle.

²²⁴ AKB vii, F 15.

²²⁵ “No *dharma* grasps any *dharma*” (*Dignāga*) (see #0361).

Tatparya-ṭīkā, Viz. S.S., p. 465: *na cittavyatirekiṇo viṣayāḥ | grāhyatvāt | vedanāvat*.

Sarva-darśana: p. 16: *grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittīnām prthagavabhāsaḥ | sa ekasmin candramasi dvitvābhāsa iva bhramaḥ ...*; p. 18: *yaḍ antarjñeyatattvaṃ tad bahirvad avabhāsate*.

²²⁶ Objects external to the mind have no more reality than the horns of a hare. Therefore we say that *vijñāna* alone exists (*vijñāna-mātra*). But we are expressing ourselves in this way from the practical [or conventional] point of view (*vyavahāratas*). We are not saying that *vijñāna* is a real entity (*dravya-sat*). Indeed, the mind that is directed at objects exists in the way that an illusion exists. – The “nothing but *vijñāna*”, conceived by the mind, is not a real entity because it is object (*grāhya*), like external things. The *vijñāna* that grasps “nothing but *vijñāna*” as being a real *dharma* constitutes the “seizing of *dharma*”, like the mind that conceives matter (*rūpa*), etc. (Kuiji).

#0347 But to believe this *viññāna*, i.e., *viññapti-mātra* (唯識), to be a real entity in the absolute sense (實有)—just like to believe in objects external to *viññāna*—this also would be “to believe in *dharmas*”, i.e., the belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha* 法執).

A.B.B.5. Various kinds of belief in dharmas (*dharma-grāha-vibhaṅga*)²²⁷

#0350 a. The “belief in *dharmas*” (*dharma-grāha* 法執)²²⁸ is, in short, of two kinds:

1. innate (*sahaja* 俱生);
2. figured (*vikalpita* 分別).

#0354 1. The first, (i.e., the innate belief in *dharmas*), proceeds solely from the power of an internal cause (內因力), that is, the false (*abhūta*, *vitatha* 虛妄) trace (*vāsanā* 熏習), i.e., the habit, from beginningless time, of believing in *dharmas* and the seeds that this habit has planted in the mind. It always (恆) accompanies the individual (與身俱); it arises or develops spontaneously (任運而轉), independently from any false teaching (*mithyā-deśanā* 邪教) or from any false figuring (邪分別). {2/7v.} This is why it is called innate (*sahaja*).

#0355 This may again [be subdivided into] two kinds:

- i. The first is constantly continuing (常相續)—never interrupted until the moment when the practitioner acquires pure knowledge (*anāsrava-jñāna*, #2918), ceasing definitively only with the obtainment of buddhahood—residing in the cogitation (*manas*; seventh cognition [*viññāna*]) which, being directed (緣) at the eighth cognition (distant object, archetype), generates (起) an image that appropriately belongs to (one’s own mind) (自心相)²²⁹ and conceives this image as a real *dharma* (#1411).

²²⁷ See #0062–#0075.

²²⁸ The belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*) is the same as the hindrance to what is to be known (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*), #3139. – Adherence to the *dharmas* (*dharma-abhiniveśa*), #3077. When there is belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) or belief in a person (*pudgala-grāha*), there is, by that very fact, belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*), but not reciprocally. Belief in a self is to conceive a *dharma* as one, as permanent, as acting, as experiencing. The two vehicles (that is, of the hearers [*śrāvakas*] and of the self-enlightened ones [*pratyekas*]) practice “emptiness of the person” (*pudgala-śūnyatā*); but they do not realize the emptiness of *dharmas* (*dharma-śūnyatā*) and are not freed from the belief in *dharmas*. – [See however *Madhyamakāvatāra*, i, 8.]

²²⁹ See #0067, #0364.

ii. The second is discontinuous (有間斷) and residing in the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 第六識). The latter is directed (緣) at the aggregates, sense-spheres and sense-elements (*skandha-āyatana-dhātus*)²³⁰—all at the same time or separately (或總或別)—which are <81> a development of the eighth cognition (識所變), and generates (起) an image that belongs to <one's own mind> (自心相), and conceives this image as a real *dharma* (執為實法).

#0356 These two kinds of belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*) are subtle (*sūkṣma* 細) and difficult to abandon (*heya* 難斷). It is only during the course of the ten stages²³¹ (in the path of cultivation [*bhāvanā-mārga*]) that the practitioner is able to tame them and abandon them (除滅) by the repeated practice of the “eminent contemplation” of “emptiness of *dharmas*” (*dharma-sūnyatā*) (勝法空觀) (see #0068).

#0358 2. The second, (i.e., the figured (*vikalpita*) belief in *dharmas* (分別法執),) proceeds also due to the power of external and present causes and conditions (*pratyaya*) (現在外緣力); <therefore, it is not innate>. In order for it to arise, false teaching (邪教) and false figuring (邪分別) are necessary.

Thus, it is called figured (*vikalpita* 分別).

#0359 It resides in the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識). {2/8r.}

There are two kinds:

i. Mental cognition is directed at the aggregates, sense-spheres and sense-elements (*skandha-āyatana-dhātus* 蘊處界) explained in a false teaching (i.e., in the teaching of the Little Vehicle); it generates an internal image, and conceptually figures and interprets (分別計度) this image to be a real *dharma*. This is the first type.

ii. Or else, it is directed at primal matter (*pradhānas*), categories (*padārthas*) (自性等相), etc., explained in a false teaching (*Sāṃkhya*, etc.), generates an image, and conceptually figures and interprets the image to be a real *dharma*.

#0360 These two types of belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*) are coarse (麤) and thus

²³⁰ In the description of the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) (see #0067), it is solely a question of the aggregates (*skandhas*) (which do not include the unconditioned factors [*asaṃskṛtas*]), because nobody considers the unconditioned factors as the self (*ātman*).

²³¹ From stage to stage, the *bodhisattva* abandons the varieties of the belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*) of the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) which prevent the obtainment of the stages (see #3058). As for the belief in *dharmas* of cogitation (*manas*), it is abandoned only by the obtainment of the quality of *buddha*.

easy to abandon. On entering the first stage, they are tamed and abandoned by contemplating (觀) true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如) as a function of the emptiness of *dharmas* (*dharma-sūnyatā*) of all *dharmas*.²³²

- #0361 b. By examining all these varieties of the belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha*), it is seen that the *dharmas* external to the considered mind (*svacitta-bāhya-dharma*, the archetypes) exist in certain cases and do not exist in other cases: [what cogitation (*manas*) is directed towards does always exist since it is the eighth cognition; primal matter (*pradhāna*) does not exist whereas the aggregates (*skandhas*) exist]. But the *dharmas* internal to the mind always exist.

More precisely, we may say that every belief in *dharmas* has, for its object (緣), pseudo-*dharmas* that are “manifestations” of one’s own mind <82> (*sva-citta-nirbhāsa* 自心所現) (but which are assumed to be really existing entities). Now, these pseudo-*dharmas* (似法相)²³³ proceed from conditions: {2/8v.} thus, they exist, but they exist in the same mode of existence as an illusion (幻有); [they are dependent (*paratantra*) (#2719): this is why we call them pseudo-*dharmas*]. “Real *dharmas*” (*dravya-dharmas* 實法), i.e., as objects of the belief in *dharmas* and being falsely interpreted (妄計度), definitively do not exist.

This is why the Bhagavat has said:

Know, O Maitreya (慈氏), that the object of cognitions (*viññānas*) is only an appearance (or manifestation) of cognition (*viññāna-nirbhāsa-mātra* 識所現) generated by (and dependent on) causes (or conditions) (*paratantra-svabhāva*), like an illusion, etc., (*māyā-ādivat*).²³⁴

²³² *sarva-dharma-dharma-sūnyatā-bhūta-tathatā*, true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) revealed by the emptiness of *dharmas* (*dharma-sūnyatā*), see, #0337.

²³³ *sifa* 似法 = *dharma-ābhāsa*, as in *hetv-ābhāsa*, *dr̥ṣṭānta-ābhāsa*.

²³⁴ *Samdhi-nirmocana* (T.16.0676.0698a28):

Maitreya says to the Buddha: “Bhagavat, are the images (*yingxiang* 影像) that one sees in concentration (*vipaśyanā-samādhi-gocara*) different from or not different from the mind?”

The Buddha says: “O son of good family, they are not different. Why is that so? This is because these images are only *viññāna*. O son of noble family, I say that the object (*ālambana*) of *viññāna* is only the ‘appearance’ of *viññāna* (*viññāna-nirbhāsa-mātra*).”

Maitreya says: “If the images that one sees in concentration are not different from the mind, how will this mind see this mind?”

A.C. *Conclusion*

#0363 1. Thus, the self (*ātman* 我) and the *dharma*s (法) that non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道) and the Little Vehicle (餘乘) conceive as existing separate from *viññāna* are thus not real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有). Consequently, the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) definitively do not need (用) external (外) *dharma*s, i.e., matter (*rūpa* 色), etc., as “condition qua object” (*ālambana-pratyaya* 所緣緣), for the activity that consists of taking an object (*pratīti* ?) (緣用) necessarily depends upon a reality (實有體).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The object of this activity (which is *viññapti*) is the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) (#0540) which the author considers here to be real, because it is “generated by causes and conditions” (*paratantra*) as opposed to the imagined (*parikalpita*) (a second moon) (#2723). <83>

An objection is raised which will be considered later, #2405, but which Kuiji examines here (*Shuji* 2B/51v/T.43.1830.0294a21):

Someone says: So be it; external matter (*rūpas*)—not being real (*dravyasat*)—are not the object of cognition (*viññāna*): the latter has the image (*nimitta*), which is a part (*bhāga*) of cognition and which appears to be external, for its object. But others exist, for example, the mind of another (*para-citta*) is real: is not this mind the object of cognition? The “knowledge of another’s mind” (*para-citta-jñāna* 他心智) of the *buddha* seizes (*grah*) the mind of another (能取他心). In fact, Vasubandhu (*Viṃśatikā*, *kārikā* 21, Lévi, F 10; *Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0077a21) says that “the knowledge of another’s mind of the non-*buddhas* does not cognize the mind of another as the *buddhas* cognize it, and, for this reason, is called inadequate, not conforming to the object (*ayathā-artha* 不如實)”. – Since it seizes an object (i.e., the mind of another) which is external to it, how can you say that the mind seizes only an object integrated to the mind (心取不離識境)?

But Dharmapāla (commentary on the *Viṃśatikā*) is saying (quote in Kuiji, *Shuji*, T.43.1830.0294b03):

The image (*nimitta*) that is developed by the “knowledge of another’s mind” of the *buddha* (佛他心智所變之相) is extremely similar to the archetype (to the

The Buddha replies: “O son of noble family, there is here no *dharma* that sees any *dharma*. But this mind, when it arises, there is the appearance of such an image.”

There follows the comparison of the mirror (see #2408).

other's mind) (是與本質心相極相似). This is why this knowledge, in the *buddha*, is superior to that of others. The author does not mean to say that it is different by nature in the *buddha* and in others, that, in the *buddha*, it seizes the mind of another directly. In the opposite hypothesis, there is *viññapti* and not *viññapti-mātra* (不爾便有識非唯).

This is an interpretation in agreement with that given by Vasubandhu himself, in the auto-commentary on the *Viṃśatikā* (二十唯識世親自釋).²³⁵

Our author will insist on this point that the *viññapti-mātra* thesis does not entail the negation (1) of the *viññāna* [i.e., mind] of another, (2) of multiple cognitions (*viññānas*) in each [mind], (3) of mental factors, (4) of the development (*pariṇāma*) of cognitions and mental factors.

- #0364 2. The mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas* 心心所法) of a certain group (*kalāpa* 聚) are not the immediate object (親所緣緣) of the *viññāna*, [i.e., the mind and mental factors,] of another group—like that which is not an object (= like sound that is not an object of visual cognition)—because they are included in another group.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This should be understood in two ways:

1. A given group = all *dharmas* of a certain individual (*pudgala*, *ātma-bhāva*, “body”). The knowledge of another's mind does not directly cognize another's mind, which is part of a foreign group. It cognizes an image that, more or less, reproduces this mind.
2. Each of the cognitions (*viññānas*) of each individual—along with its mental factors (*caittas*)—makes up a group: there is no direct intercognition between our *viññānas* [i.e., minds]. As we have seen (*Siddhi* F 18), cogitation (*manas*), i.e., the seventh cognition, which is directed at the eighth cognition, contacts it only through the image (*nimitta*) that it develops in imitation of the eighth.

“Group”, *ju* 聚, allows the choice between *rāśi* (AKB iii, F 137) and *kalāpa* which is here, certainly, the technical term: “A group (*kalāpa*) of mind and mental factors gives rise to a bodily action ...” (AKB iv, F 233). <84>

Likewise, the mental factors (*caittas*) of a given group {2/9r.} are also not the immediate object of the mind (*citta*) (親所緣) of that group because [these mental factors] are separate from that same mind (自體異), like the other *dharmas*

²³⁵ This is Kuiji's opinion.

(i.e., the eye sense-faculty, etc.) which are not seized (如餘非所取).²³⁶

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The problem of whether the mind cognizes itself, whether it cognizes its associates, etc. – In the *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0042c) (which Kuiji quotes here), it is asked “whether one knowledge cognizes all *dharmas*?”

AKB vii, F 45; *Kathā-vatthu*, v, 9, xvi, 4; Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T49.2031): Mahāsāṃghika thesis, 10a and 43a (see also notes by Masuda, pp. 20–21).

See, below, the theory of the parts (*bhāgas*), #0539.

- #0365 3. From this, we conclude that there is no external object (外境). It is only the internal *viññāna* (內識) that arises (similar to or) as if it were an external object (*bāhya-ārtha-ābhāsa* 似外境). Thus, a verse from a *sūtra* says:

External objects (外境) do not really exist (實皆無) in the way that fools (愚) conceptually figurate (分別) them;

The mind agitated by a trace (*vāsanā* 習氣) develops as what seems to be [external] objects.²³⁷

A.C.A. *Figurative attribution (upacāra) – Man and fire*²³⁸

#0367 a. *Objection by the Vaiśeṣikas* (勝論)

²³⁶ Two opinions in regard to the *buddha* (*ādarśa-jñāna-samprayukta-citta-caitta*), Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/53r.–v.

²³⁷ At first sight, *Laṅkāvatāra*, x, 154c–d and 155a–b by Nanjō Bunyū, p. 285 (variant in T.16.0671.0569a02–03) [transl. Suzuki].

*bāhyo na vidyate hy artho yathā bālair vikalpyate |
vāsanair lūṭhitam cittam arthābhāsaṃ pravartate ||*

There is no such external world as is discriminated by the ignorant.

When the Mind is agitated by habit-energy (or memory)

There arises what appears to be an external world.

According to Kuiji, *Ghanavyūha* 厚嚴經 (see #0532, T.43.1830.0294c08).

²³⁸ The same problem is discussed in *Sthiramati*, and in almost the same words in the *Trentaine*, ed. S. Lévi, F 17, 7–18, 2 [3b–4b]. – The argument is often used against the idealist, Śaṅkara, *Brahma-sūtras*, ii, 2, 28: *nābhāva upalabdheḥ*: “The non-existence [of eternal things] cannot be maintained; on account of our consciousness of them” (translated by Swami Sivananda); *Sarva-darśana*, p. 28: *bahirvad ity upamānokter ayukteḥ*: “If the external thing does not exist, the comparison ‘The mind appears as if it were external’, is not justified.”

If—separate from the internal *viññāna*—external things, i.e., a real self (*ātman*), real *dharmas*, do not exist, then we also do not see that the names *ātman* and *dharmas* could be figuratively attributed (*upacāryate*, see #0012) in order to designate the development of *viññāna*.

Three things are required in order that the figurative attribution (假) be possible: (1) a real thing (真事) to which a comparison will be made, (2) a thing <85> similar to the first (似事) and with which one will compare (the real thing), (3) a quality (or *dharma*) common (共法) to both things and which justifies the comparison.

Given (1) a real fire (真火), (2) a person similar to fire (似火人), (3) the qualities (法) of redness (*kapilatva* 赤) or fierceness (*tikṣṇatva* 猛) common to fire and to the man, then the figurative attribution (*upacāra* 假說) is justified, and we can say: “This man is a fire”. In the same way, a man can figuratively be called “a bull (牛)”, etc. {2/9v.}

But if the self (*ātman*) and *dharmas* do not exist (我法若無), what real thing will be the support (依) for the comparison (or figurative attribution) (假說)? [If this thing is lacking, how can its name be figuratively attributed?] If the comparison is lacking, how can one say “similar to” (似)? How can one say that the mind appears or develops similar to an external thing (*bāhya-artha-ābhāsa* 似外境轉)?

b. Refutation.

#0370 The objection is weak (or not reasonable), for we have demonstrated that the self (*ātman*) and *dharmas* do not exist separate from the mind.

However, let us examine the “figurative attribution” (*upacāra* 假說). [We will see that it does not involve, as you (i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas) believe, a real thing and common qualities.]

#0372 1. When one says: “This man is fire (火)”, etc., this is an attribution in terms of genus (*jāti-upacāra* 依類假說): comparing the man with the genus (*jāti* 類) fire.

2. Or else, when one says: “This man is a fire”. This is an attribution in terms of substance (*dravya-upacāra* 依實假說): comparing the man with an individual [entity], a substance (*dravya* 實), a thing.²³⁹

#0374 i. Attribution in terms of genus (*jāti-upacāra* 依類假說). – [The interpretation as] attribution in terms of genus is not reasonable since the qualities (*guṇa* 德)

²³⁹ Literally: The attribution (*upacāra*) of fire, etc., is not justified whether the category is considered or whether the individual is considered.

of red (赤), fierce (猛), etc., are not qualities of fire as genus. [(The qualities of fire as genus) are eleven in number.²⁴⁰ Red is a quality of color (*rūpa-guṇa*); fierceness of fire is the fire's power. Redness and fierceness are qualities that can occur in fire but are not qualities specific to fire.] If you compare and if you establish an attribution in the absence of common qualities (無共德), you could as well give the name of fire (火), figuratively, to water (水).

You might say: – Although the qualities of red and fierce are not specific to fire (as genus) (非類德), nevertheless, they always accompany fire (不相離), (and thus, the use of the attribution is permitted). <86>

[We reply:] – That may be so, but (this would also not be correct because) these qualities, (i.e., fierce, etc.,) are not necessarily linked to man as genus (人類), (i.e., these qualities and man as genus can be present but also separate from each other). {2/10r.} Thus, on the one hand, these qualities are not specific to fire, and, on the other hand, they do not have a definitive concomitance with man (as genus). And yet, by attribution, one says of the man that he is fire, etc.: thus, we know that this attribution is not an attribution based on the genus (不依類成).

- #0375 ii. Attribution in terms of substance (*dravya-upacāra* 依實假說). – ([The interpretation as] attribution in terms of substance is also not reasonable since the qualities of red, fierce, etc., are not common (非共有) to both).

You might say: – The qualities of red, fierce, etc., are common to this man and to the fire.

[We reply:] – So be it; but in view of the difference of the things themselves (體) that bear these qualities, it does not refer to the same qualities. [The fierceness is not the same in both cases ...] Therefore, lacking common qualities (無共), the man cannot be figuratively attributed by the name of fire. (Thus, it would be the same mistake as with the previous notion.)

You might say: – One can figuratively attribute him [by the name of fire] because the qualities (德) of red and fierce of the man resemble (相似) those of fire.

[We reply:] – No, this is also not reasonable, for when we say that the man is

²⁴⁰ See Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 104.

Editors: “They are (1) color, (2) touch, (3) number, (4) extension, (5) individuality, (6) conjunction, (7) disjunction, (8) priority, (9) posteriority, (10) viscosity, and (11) impression”.

a fire, we do not say that the qualities of the man resemble those of fire; we say that the man is like a fire.

Thus, the attribution (*upacāra*) does not rest on the thing ⟨or substance⟩ (*dravya* 實) just as it does not rest on the genus.

c. *True nature of figurative attribution* (*upacāra*).

#0377 ⟨Moreover, it is also not reasonable to⟩ think that the attribution must rest on three real given things (*bhūta-vastu* 真事), i.e., (1) that to which a comparison is made, (2) that with which one will compare and (3) the resemblance (see #0367).

#0378 1. The real given thing (真), in other words, the *sva-lakṣaṇa* (自相), ⟨i.e., the specific characteristic or⟩ the individual [known only by “direct perception” (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*),²⁴¹ i.e., by a type of cognition freed from words and from any <87> intellectual process (*jñāna-vikalpa*)], is not the object (*viśaya* 境) of “knowledge on the relative or conventional level (*saṃvṛta*) (假智)” and of expression (詮). {2/10v.} This knowledge and the expression do not contact (得) the specific characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa* 自相); they occur only in the domain of the general, of the common characteristics (*dharma-sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* 諸法共相).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Fire has heat as its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* = *sva-lakṣaṇa*) ... – The specific characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is known only by direct perception. An expression [i.e., designation or concept] does contact [the specific characteristic]. Mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), [arising] following the five cognitions (*viññānas*) (of the eye, etc.), generates a knowledge that is directed at the specific characteristic, and brings forth

²⁴¹ The *Siddhi* here touches on the problem of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) to which it will return in the contexts of the four parts (*bhāgas*) (#0539), the notion of exteriority (#2397) and the knowledges of the *buddha* (#3262). – It is far from me to attempt to unravel this problem in a footnote! But it is fitting to establish the two different values of the word *pratyakṣa*:

1. Sometimes it is a matter of direct cognition—free of any notion of type (*jāti*), etc.—that contacts the object directly, namely, an internal image (i.e., image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]): it is followed by a cognition that includes memory, etc., that brings forth and contacts an “object susceptible of being designated” (*abhidheya*). [For example: the visual cognition seizes blue immediately; it is mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) which conceives it as external, which names it “blue”.]

2. Sometimes it is a matter of a cognition from which the notion of subject and object is excluded; this is the knowledge without conceptual figurating (*avikalpaka*).

the expressions. But the specific characteristic is only the [distant] object; the expression indicates the general [or common] characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of the *dharma*s, not their specific characteristic ...

When we say matter (*rūpa*), we eliminate all of non-matter; all the *dharma*s of matter are included in “that which is expressible” (*abhidheya*) by the word matter (*rūpa*), and not just the *rūpa* of one thing ...

But the *dharma*s of the common characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-dharma*), like all *dharma*s, are the “development of *viññāna*”; they can be contacted; their nature (*svabhāva*) can be contacted ... These *dharma*s are therefore “object” (*ālambana*).

Each of the five aggregates (*skandhas*) has, for its specific characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), the aggregate which it is. [The specific characteristic of sensation (*vedanā*) is experience (*anubhāva*)]: the five aggregates have impermanence, emptiness, etc., for their common characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).

Each sense-sphere (*āyatana*) (i.e., the visible, the audible ...) has, for its specific characteristic, the sense-sphere which it is; the sense-spheres have the aggregate (*skandha*) to which they belong [—i.e., the visible, the audible ... are the aggregate matter (*rūpa*)—] for their common characteristics.

In each sense-sphere, there are many genera: blue has being blue for its specific characteristic; blue, yellow ... have their sense-sphere (*āyatana*), namely, the visible, for their common characteristic.

In each genus, there are many entities (*dravyas*), individuals: the individuals have their genus for their common characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*): all blue *dharma*s are “blue”; each [*dharma*] is its specific characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa*).

In each individual, in every blue *dharma*, there are many atoms: each is its specific characteristic ... The “expressible” nature of the *dharma*s is their common characteristic, their “inexpressible” nature is their specific characteristic.

If the expression (*abhidhāna*) were attached (*zhuo* 著) to the specific characteristic, when someone says “fire”, fire would burn their mouth, for fire has its specific characteristic in the burning of objects. The same for cognition: if the mind would contact the specific characteristic of fire, fire would burn the mind when someone thinks of fire. (Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/62v.).

[For the distinction between *āyatana-svalakṣaṇa* and *dravya-svalakṣaṇa*, Vasumitra, *Treatise on the sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031), thesis 28 of the Sarvāstivādins, AKB i, F 19, 60–61.] <88>

But, outside of this knowledge and of the expression, there does not exist any means (*upāya* 方便) of designating (*prajñap* 施設) the specific characteristic (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). Consequently, we say that the specific characteristic is the support of the relative or conventional knowledge and of the expression (假所依).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

[This] knowledge and the expression are “relative” or “conventional” (*sāmvṛta*), because they do not bear upon the “real given thing” (*svalakṣaṇa*) but upon a certain “nameable [thing]” (*abhidheya*) that resembles the real given thing: the latter is the distant—not the near—object (*ālambana*). When we contact the “intrinsic nature” (*svabhāva*) of blue, we do not have the idea of blue [as blue]: when we have the idea of blue, then what we contact is not the intrinsic nature, [and not more than that]. Nevertheless, relative or conventional knowledge has the real given thing for its object, and the expression expresses this given thing [in some manner]. We can thus say that the real given thing (*svalakṣaṇa*) is the support of intellection, which is “relative” or “conventional”.

2. However, in order to arise, relative or conventional knowledge and the expression (假智詮) [—at least in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*)—] must rely on sound (*śabda* 聲: in our case, on the informing action of speech [*vāg-vijñapti-karman*], human speech: one hears someone else say: “This is color”). (They do not occur if sound does not reach its sense-faculty (不及處).)

[But, if odor, taste and tangible are contacted by meeting with (their respective) sense-faculty, then sound does not contact the intrinsic nature of these various sense-spheres (*āyatana*s). Thus, the knowledge and the expression, which depend on sound, do not move in the domain of the real given thing.]

On the other hand, the expression (*abhidhāna* 能詮, i.e., the name [*nāma*]) and that which is expressible (*abhidheya* 所詮, i.e., the *dharma*) are not this real given thing, (i.e., the specific characteristic (自相)), which is the sound, [for the name is known, not by the ear, but by the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); for the sound, perceived by the ear, is not the thing designated by the name].

We can conclude that the figurative attribution (假說): “This man is a fire”, does not make use of (or does not rely on) realities (*bhūta-vastu* 真事), i.e., real given things, individuals (or specific characteristics) (*svalakṣaṇa*).

#0379 From this fact it follows that sound only occurs by making use of or relying on pseudo-entities (似事). By pseudo-entities, we mean characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) imputed (*adhyāropita* 增益) to the real given thing (*svalakṣaṇa*) and which are

not really existent entities (*dravya-sat* 非實有), which are not “things”. (Sound (聲) occurs by relying on the pseudo-characteristics of the imputation). – This having been stated, it follows that the figurative discourse, i.e., relative or conventional knowledge and expression, does not necessarily entail the employment of real given things (*bhūta*, *svalakṣaṇa* 真).

#0380

⟨Therefore these objections (of the Vaiśeṣikas) do not conform to proper principles or reason.⟩ <89>

The Bhagavat has used the terms *ātman* and *dharma*s figuratively: this usage does not permit one to conclude that the self (*ātman*) and *dharma*s have real existence. The Bhagavat wants to convert the people who believe in the self and in *dharma*s as being so many realities: therefore he uses the fallacious terms by which people wrongly designate the development of *viññāna* (識變) (i.e., seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*], image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*], the mind-subject, the mind-image). {2/11r.} This is what a verse of a *sūtra* says:

Addressing himself to fools (愚夫) and in order to refute the real self (*ātman*) and real *dharma*s in which they believe,

The Bhagavat figuratively employs (假說) the terms *ātman* and *dharma*s in regard to the development of *viññāna*, [i.e., to that which actually is transformed or developed from within *viññāna*,] (*viññāna-pariṇāma* 識所變) (*Ghanavyūha*). <90>

B. *DEVELOPMENT OF VIJÑĀNA (VIJÑĀNA-PARINĀMA)*

B.A. *Development is retribution (vipāka), cogitation (manas) and the six cognitions (vijñānas)*²⁴²

#0382 Although the characteristics of the development of *vijñāna* (識所變) are infinitely varied (無量種), nevertheless, the DEVELOPING *VIJÑĀNA* (能變識) is of THREE KINDS ONLY (唯三).²⁴³

Vasubandhu says in stanza 1d–2b (see #0012):

The developing *vijñāna* is of three kinds only: (1) *vijñāna* (識) that is retribution (異熟), (2) *vijñāna* that is called cogitating<-reckoning> (思量) and (3) *vijñāna* that is cognizing of objects (了別境識).

The Treatise:

The first kind (of *vijñāna*), that is, the eighth cognition, is called RETRIBUTION (*vipāka* 異熟) because, in its nature, it is retribution, in the largest number of cases. [It is not retribution among the *buddhas*, #0740.]

The second kind (of *vijñāna*), that is, the seventh cognition or *manas* (#1101), is called COGITATING<-RECKONING> (*mananā* 思量) because—uninterruptedly (恆) and in contrast to mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)—it <assessingly> cogitates<-reckons> (審思量) (#1478). [The eighth cognition and the first five are free of cogitating-reckoning.]

*La Vallée Poussin comments:*²⁴⁴

The reading *manyānā* (—the Nepalese MS. published by S. Lévi, however, has *mananā*—) is assured by several sources, for example, *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, *maññāna* (*māno maññānā maññitattam* ...); *Vyutpatti*, 245, 677; *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, p. 251; *Kāśyapa-parivarta*, ed. Staël-Holstein, 135 (p. 193); *Laṅkāvatāra*, ed. B. Nanjō, x, 102 (cf. p. 323, stanza 461 *mano manyati vai sadā*). The word is formed like *vi-paśyanā*, *anupaśyanā* (AKB vi, F 160), *pratihanyanā* (*Śikṣā-samuccaya*, 251, 14).

²⁴² *Kārikā* 2a–b.

²⁴³ See #0027. — We will see *Siddhi* F 93, #0418, #0524, #2335, #2572, and elsewhere, that “the developing *vijñāna*” is the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*) of *vijñāna*, that “the development of *vijñāna*” is the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) and the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*).

²⁴⁴ *Editors:* At *Siddhi* F 481, La Vallée Poussin corrects the following passage, commenting: “Note that I was wrong in correcting *mananā* to *manyānā* on *Siddhi* F 6 and 90”.

Mananā is translated [into Tibetan] by *rloms sems*, which is an equivalent of conceit (*māna*). – There are seven or nine kinds of conceit (*mānas*) (AKB v, F 26), which are various forms of pride; the most characteristic is the conceit of egotism (*asmi-māna*), which is poorly distinguished from “the notion of I”. – *Mananā* is a *cogitatio* involving an explicit “I am” (= Lat. *sum*).

The third kind of *viññāna* is called COGNIZING OF OBJECTS (了別境 or 了境) (#1512):²⁴⁵ this refers to the first six cognitions, i.e., the five cognitions <91> of the eye, etc., and the mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*). They are so called because they perceive coarse (麤) objects.

The word AND (及)²⁴⁶ shows that these six together are only one kind, i.e., the developing *viññāna*.

#0384 Each of these three (*viññānas*, i.e., awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]) are thus called developing *viññāna* (*pariṇāmi viññāna* 能變識).

The developing (能變) *viññāna* is of two kinds:

1. cause and development (*hetu-pariṇāma* 因能變);
2. fruit and development (*phala-pariṇāma* 果能變).

#0386 1. The first, i.e., development in terms of cause (*hetu-pariṇāma* 因能變), is the two causal traces (因習氣) of the eighth cognition, i.e., [a] (the trace) of equal outflow (等流) and [b] (the trace) of retribution (異熟) (*aṣṭama-viññānasya* {2/11v.} *niṣyanda-vipāka-hetu-dvaya-vāsanā* 二因習氣):

a. The trace qua equal outflow (*niṣyanda-vāsanā* 等流習氣) is generated and made to grow (生長) by good (善), bad (惡) and non-defined (無記) seeds (熏) of the first seven cognitions (*kuśala-akuśala-avyākṛta-viññāna-saptakād bījānāṃ jananaṃ vṛddhiś ca*).

b. The trace qua retribution (*vipāka-vāsanā* 異熟習氣) is generated and made to grow by impure good and bad seeds (有漏善惡熏) of the first six cognitions (*sāsrava-kuśala-akuśala-viññāna-ṣaṭkād bījānāṃ jananaṃ vṛddhiś ca*).

#0387 2. The second, i.e., development in terms of fruit (*phala-pariṇāma* 果能變), is—by the power of the aforementioned two kinds of traces (*vāsanās* 習氣)—the arising (生) of the eight cognitions (*viññānas*) and the manifesting (現) of their multiple characteristics (種種相).

²⁴⁵ “Perception” is a term as undetermined as *viññapti*. – See AKB i, F 30 where we have *viññāna* = *prativijñapti* = *viśayaṃ viśayaṃ praty upalabdhiḥ*.

²⁴⁶ Gloss: *ca* is *samuccayārtha* (heji 合集). – There is only one *ca* in the Chinese version.

#0389 With the trace qua equal outflow (*niṣyanda-vāsanā* 等流習氣) as condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣), the eight cognitions (*vijñānas*) arise in the diversity of their substance and of their characteristics (體相差別). This is what is called fruit of equal outflow (*niṣyanda-phala* 等流果), because the fruit is similar to the cause (果似因).

With the trace qua retribution (*vipāka-vāsanā* 異熟習氣) as condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya* 增上緣):

a. the eighth cognition is brought forth (感): the latter receives the name of *vipāka* (異熟, retribution) [i] because it corresponds (酬) to the ⟨power of⟩ projecting (*ākṣepaka*) action (引業力),²⁴⁷ [ii] because it constitutes a continuous series (恒相續) (see #0928);

b. the first six cognitions are brought forth: these correspond to the completing actions (*paripūraka* 滿業) arising from retribution (從異熟起) {2/12r.} and are thus called *vipākaja* (異熟生, “arisen from retribution”), and not *vipāka* (異熟, retribution), for they are interrupted (有間斷).

However, *vipākaja* and *vipāka* are both called *vipāka-phala* (異熟果, fruit of retribution) because they are ⟨fruits⟩ different from their causes (果異因).

#0390 The stanza (*kārikā*) designates here the cognition that is development in terms of fruit (*phala-pariṇāma-vijñāna* 能變果識)—i.e., the actual eighth cognition, “the place of attachment to the self” (*ātma-premā-āspada* 我愛執藏), which holds (持) the seeds (*bījas* 種) of <92> pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染)—by the name of *vipāka* (retribution). But the author does not want to say that only the eighth cognition is fruit of retribution (*vipāka-phala*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji, *Shuji* (2B/76; T.43.1830.0300a11), observes that here the word *pariṇāma* does not have the meaning that we attributed to it above (#0012). It no longer refers to the “unfolding” of the “root” or “head” *vijñāna*” (i.e., awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]) into “*vijñāna*-horns” (like the horns of an ox), i.e., into the seeing-*vijñāna*[-part] (*darśana-bhāga*) and the image-*vijñāna*[-part] (*nimitta-bhāga*). It [rather] refers to the evolution of the *bījas* (or *vāsanā*, i.e., “seeds”) into the actual cognition (*vijñāna*).

By development in terms of cause (*hetu-pariṇāma*), we understand the store-cog-

²⁴⁷ *Editors:* I.e., projecting *karma* which is responsible for determining the specific type of sentient existence into which one is reborn (human, etc.). In contrast to the completing or filling-up (*paripūraka*) *karma* that is responsible for the specific details and experiences within the specific type of sentient existence.

dition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) insofar as it is the “seeds (*bījas*) at the moment of being transformed into actual cognitions (*vijñānas*)”. [The process of the seeds engendering other seeds similar to themselves—until the moment when the inducing (*āvāhaka*) seeds, i.e., the “inductors”, are transformed into *janaka*, i.e., “generators of the actual cognition”—is called *bīja-pariṇāma* and will be explained at #2421.]

By the development in terms of fruit (*phala-pariṇāma*), we understand the eight actual cognitions, i.e., “in action”, the fruits of the seeds (*bījas*): the actual cognitions, roots (i.e., awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*], central element), which, by means of the “process” studied in #0524, #2335, #2571, will present itself as seeing-*vijñāna* and image-*vijñāna*.

Having explained this, we can now go into detail:

1. *hetu-pariṇāma*, the cognition (*vijñāna*) that is cause and development (*pariṇāma*);
2. *phala-pariṇāma*, the cognition that is fruit and development.

[What is considered here is the relationship of a first aspect of cognition (*vijñāna*) (i.e., *hetu-pariṇāma*) with a second aspect of cognition (i.e., *phala-pariṇāma*): but the first aspect, (in turn,) is the fruit of “its” causes, and the second aspect is the cause of “its” fruits.]

1. Only the eighth cognition is development in terms of cause (*hetu-pariṇāma*). It alone stores up the seeds (*bījas*) or potencies (*śaktis*). Insofar as it is seeds, it is called seed-cognition (*bīja-vijñāna*) or development in terms of cause (*hetu-pariṇāma*). [Our text designates the seeds (*bījas*) by the name of *vāsanā*, i.e., trace or “perfume”, because it wants to draw attention to the origin of the seeds. These arise from the cultivation (*bhāvanā*), from the “perfuming” (#0432) of the eighth cognition by the seven other actual cognitions. The actual cognitions “perfume-bring forth” the seeds: they place (*ādā*) new seeds or increase the pre-existing seeds.

There are two types of seeds (*bījas*):

- a. seeds qua outflow (*niṣyanda-bījas*);
- b. seeds qua retribution (*vipāka-bījas*).

a. The seven actual cognitions—whatever their ethical nature (good, bad, non-defined, pure or impure) may be—bring forth or increase the seeds qua outflow (*niṣyanda-bījas*) which are also called “seeds (*bījas*) qua name-speech” (#2600) (in close relation to the “conventional experience in accordance with speech” cause [*anuvyavahāra-hetu*], #2502; differing from traces in terms of name [*nāma-vāsanā*], #0522, #2789). – There is “blue” as being thought of or spoken of: from this fact a

seed is brought forth, an efficacy of the idea blue, which will be perpetuated by homogeneous generation in the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*); which, at the moment determined by the seeds qua retribution (*vipāka-bījas*) (see b.), will bring forth an image (*nimitta*) of blue in the *ālaya*, an image which will serve as archetype (see *Siddhi* F 18, #0171) for the image that will be the immediate object of visual cognition. Similarly for all thoughts-words. The actual mind that is pure, bad, etc., generates a seed which ends up as an actual mind that is pure, bad, etc. The seeds in question are thus called seeds qua outflow (*niṣyanda-bīja*) (#2547) because the fruit (actual mind) is of the same nature and same type as the cause (actual mind). (AKB ii, F 288, fruit of equal outflow [*niṣyanda-phala*]). <93>

b. With the exception of the seventh cognition or cogitation (*manas*), the actual cognitions bear a retribution (*vipāka*) when they are bad (*akuśala*), when, being good (*kuśala*), they are impure (*sāsrava*). – This excludes, consequently, the non-defined (*avyākṛta*) and the pure (*anāsrava*). – These [actual] cognitions bring forth seeds that are called “seeds brought forth by action” (*karma-bījas*), i.e., seeds generated by action, “seeds qua retribution” (*vipāka-bījas*), i.e., seeds that will engender retribution. – It is a question of a cause (i.e., *karman*) which, through the intermediary of the seeds (*bījas*), will bear a fruit the nature of which differs from its own: the cause—e.g., intention to kill, almsgiving with [going to] heaven in mind—is defined (*vyākṛta*); the fruit—e.g., infernal or celestial existence, being always, however, truth of suffering (*duḥkha-satya*)—is non-defined (*avyākṛta*) (#2547). Thus, this cause is the cause of retribution (*vipāka-hetu*) (AKB ii, F 271, 287).

2. The development in terms of fruit (*phala-pariṇāma*) is the actual cognition (*vijñāna*), more precisely, the central element of the eight cognitions, i.e., the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*), which is the fruit of the two kinds of seeds (*bījas*), in other words, the fruit of the seed-cognition (*bīja-vijñāna*). – [The development in terms of fruit] develops (*pariṇam*) into the “seeing”[-part] and “image”[-part].

a. Of this fruit, the seeds of the first category [i.e., seeds qua outflow (*niṣyanda-bījas*)] are the “condition qua cause” (*hetu-pratyaya*) (#2441). Innumerable and diverse, [these seeds] make the eight cognitions—the collection of the parts (*bhāgas*) of these eight with their mental factors (*caittas*) or “associates” (*saṃprayuktas*)—arise in the variety of their characteristic and their ethical nature. (See #0268.)

b. As for the seeds of the second category [i.e., the seeds qua retribution (*vipāka-bījas*)], they are the “condition qua dominance” (*adhipati-pratyaya*) (#2481). They bring into existence the retribution (*vipāka*), strictly speaking, that is to say, the eighth cognition, which the Chinese call “general reward”—one might say, the soul

of the future existence. Generated by the “action that projects existence” (*ākṣepaka-karman*, *Morale bouddhique*, F 175; AKB ii, F 273; iv, F 117, 198), the eighth is an uninterrupted flow (#0664), always non-defined, thus *vipāka* (retribution). – They also bring into existence the first six cognitions (= “specific reward”), which result from “completing actions” (*paripūraka-karman*). These six cognitions are, strictly speaking, not retribution (*vipāka*) since they are discontinuous. [Once interrupted, that which is retribution does not resume: for example, the vital principle.] They are “arisen from retribution” (*vipākaja*); for they arise from the eighth cognition that holds their seeds throughout the entire course of a given existence.

Sthiramati's doctrine differs (Lévi [1925], F 18):

1. Development in terms of cause (*hetu-pariṇāma*): the seeds (*bījas*) of the two categories (i.e., retribution [*vipāka*] and outflow [*niṣyanda*]) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) that have come to the state of maturity (*paripuṣṭi*).
2. Development in terms of fruit (*phala-pariṇāma*):
 - a. generation of the “active” store-cognition of a given destiny by the entering into activity (*vṛtti-lābha*) of the retribution (*vipāka*) seeds;
 - b. generation, “outside of the store-cognition” (ablative), of the cognitions called evolving (*pravṛtti*) (i.e., cogitation [*manas*] and the other six cognitions), by the entering into activity of the outflow (*niṣyanda*) seeds.
3. The evolving cognition (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), good and bad, deposits seeds of both categories in the *ālaya*.
4. The non-defined evolving cognition (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) and cogitation (*manas*) deposit outflow (*niṣyanda*) seeds. <94>



Bodhisattva Vasubandhu

C. *STORE-COGNITION (ĀLAYA-VIJÑĀNA)*

- C.A. Characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*); #0404
- C.B. Theory of the seeds (*bījas*); #0411
- C.C. Mode of operation (*ākāra*) and object (*ālambana*) (of the store-cognition); #0512
- C.D. Associated *dharma*s (*samprayuktas*) (of the store-cognition); #0581
- C.E. Ethical nature of the eighth and of its mental factors (*caittas*); #0637
- C.F. Uninterrupted strong current; #0664
- C.G. Cessation of the store-cognition. – Names of the eighth cognition; #0696
- C.H. Demonstrating the existence of the eighth cognition; #0754

#0395 〈Although we already have briefly explained〉 the names of the three kinds of 〈developing (能變)〉 *vijñāna*, nevertheless, we do not yet in detail know their characteristics. The author defines the first kind, the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka*), i.e., the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), [the eighth cognition in the (Vijñānavāda) School’s enumeration, because it is added, with cogitation (*manas*), to the six traditional cognitions]. 〈Now what are the characteristics of the first developing *vijñāna*? – The stanzas 2c–5a (Chin. 2c–4d) say:〉

tatrālayākhyā-vijñānaṃ vipākaḥ sarva-bījakam || 2cd
asaṃviditakopādi-sthāna-vijñaptikaṃ ca tat |
sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṃjñā-cetanānvitam || 3
upekṣā vedanā tatrānivṛtāvyaḥkṛtaṃ ca tat |
tathā sparśādayas { 12b } *tac ca vartate srotasaughavat* || 4
tasya vyāvṛttir arhattve | 5a

初阿賴耶識・異熟・一切種・|| 2cd
 不可知執受處了・常與觸、|
 作意受想思相應・唯捨受・|| 3
 是無覆無記・觸等亦如是・|
 恆轉如瀑流・阿羅漢位捨・|| 4

#0396

2c–d. First, the cognition that is known as store (*ālaya*; *ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識) is [also called] “retribution” (異熟) and “endowed with all seeds” (一切種).

3. [The store-cognition] has what is appropriated (*upādi* 執受) and the site (*sthāna* 處) [for its object; but this object, like the mode of operation or] cognizing (*ākāra* = *vijñapti* 了) [of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)], is unrecognized (*asaṃvidita* 不可知).

It is always (常) associated (相應) with contact (*sparsa* 觸), mental application (*manaskāra* 作意), sensation (*vid* 受), ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) and volition (*cetanā* 想).

4. In it, the sensation is only the neutral sensation (捨受). It is non-obscured-non-defined (無覆無記),
Contact, etc., are also like this (如是). It always evolves, like a strong current (瀑流).

- 5a. It is discarded in the state of *arhat* (阿羅漢). |

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The commentary [to part C] is divided naturally into seven sections to which an eighth is added, namely, the demonstration of the existence of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*): <95>

- A. Definition of the store-cognition: itself (specific characteristic [*svalakṣaṇa*]), as result, as cause: *ālaya*, *vipāka*, *sarva-bījaka*; #0404

- B. Theory of the seeds (*bījas*); #0411

(i) Definitions; (ii) origin of the seeds; (iii) six characteristics of the seeds. – Double causation. – Internal and external seeds; #0414

What is perfumed and that which perfumes; #0487

- C. Mode of operation (*ākāra*) and object (*ālambana*) of the store-cognition; #0512

Explanation of the stanza (*kārika*); #0518

General theory of the parts (*bhāgas*): (i) two parts; (ii) three parts; (iii) four parts; (iv) three parts, two parts, one part; #0530

- D. Associated *dharma*s (*saṃprayuktas*) or mental factors (*caittas*) of the store-cognition; #0581

Five mental factors (*caittas*); #0581

Sensation (*vedanā*) of the store-cognition; #0624

Other mental factors (*caittas*); #0629

- E. Ethical nature of the store-cognition and of its mental factors (*caittas*); #0637

F. Uninterrupted strong current; #0664

Correct doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*); #0664

G. Cessation of the store-cognition. – Names of the eighth cognition; #0696

E. Demonstrating the existence of the store-cognition; #0754

Sources of the Great Vehicle; #0763

Sources of the Little Vehicle; #0853

Arguments “from reason”: ten arguments; #0875

1. Mind (*citta*), the holder of seeds (*bījas*); #0875
2. Mind that is retribution (*vipāka-citta*); #0928
3. Five destinies (*gatis*) and four modes of birth (*yonis*); #0938
4. Theory of appropriating (*upādāna*); #0952
5. Life, heat and *vijñāna*; #0965
6. Mind at conception and at death; #0977
7. Cognition (*vijñāna*) and name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*); #0998
8. Theory of four kinds of nutriment; #1006
9. Attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*); #1035
10. Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) of the mind; #1077

The seven evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*) are contrasted with the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) (see #0447). – [We find in the *Samgraha-bhāṣya* (Paramārtha, T.31.1595.0167b08) the expression *shouyongshi* 受用識 which corresponds to the experiencing cognition (*saṃbhoga-vijñāna*) = evolving cognition; see #0447).

Sometimes there are six evolving cognitions, i.e., the six traditional cognitions: mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) and the five cognitions of the eye, etc. – Cogitation (*manas*), i.e., the seventh cognition, differs from the first six: it neither acts nor experiences [the fruit] (see #0078).

The seeds (*bījas*) of the seven evolving cognitions are in the store-cognition: the seven evolving cognitions bring forth, in the store-cognition, the seeds of the future seven evolving cognitions; the store-cognition supports and nourishes the seven evolving cognitions.

The seven evolving cognitions are always *pravṛtti*, i.e., “activity”, “action”, since, in the state of seeds, they are integrated into the store-cognition. <96>

C.A. Characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)A.A. *Ālaya*; #0404A.B. Retribution (*vipāka*); #0407A.C. Endowed with all seeds (*sarva-bījaka*); #0408C.A.A. *Ālaya*

#0404 The Treatise:

The FIRST (初) <developing> *vijñāna* (能變識), which is a store (*ālaya*) and which, in the Great Vehicle (大乘) and in the Little Vehicle (小乘) (#0754), receives the name STORE (*ālaya* 阿賴耶), is, indeed, store (*ālaya*) on three accounts:^a

1. [This cognition] is actively storing (*ālaya*) (能藏), i.e., a store-house, for it stores the seeds (*bījas*) that are passively *ālaya*, i.e., as being stored (#0817).
2. [This cognition] is passively what is being stored (*ālaya*) (所藏), [i.e., from the point of view of what is stored in it,] in the sense that it is “perfumed” by the *dharma*s of pollution (*saṃkleśa*).^b [These *dharma*s bring forth the seeds (*bījas*) in this cognition which make of it a store-house and store themselves in it. One can also explain: they are approached by it and it is “approached” by them.]
3. [This cognition] is the object <or store> for attachment (執藏). [Cogitation (*manas*) attaches itself to it (*ā-lī*), as to its self (*ātman*).^c]

^a Sthiramati, Lévi, F 18:

Ālaya means site (*stihāna*). The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is the site of the seeds (*bījas*) of the pollution (*saṃkleśa*) *dharma*s.

Or else, all *dharma*s cling to (*ālīyante*) [the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)], i.e., adhere (*upanibadhyante*) to it, being its fruit.

Or else, it clings to, i.e., adheres to all *dharma*s, being their cause.

Thus, it is called *ālaya* (see #0447).

- ^b Polluted (*sāṃkleśika*) *dharma*: “*zaran* 雜染, all the impure (*sāsrava*) *dharma*s or *dharma*s of *saṃsāra* (*pravṛtti*), not just the defiled (*kliṣṭa*; *ran* 染) *dharma*s. In Sanskrit, *saṃkleśa*; if the prefix *saṃ* is omitted, it would be only defiled” (Kuiji). – See #0447, #1077.

See #0861. – Compare the definition of Vasubandhu, AKB ix, F 292:

What is the cause of the idea of “I”? – It is a defiled mind which is perfumed

since eternity by this very idea of “I” and has as its object the series of minds within which it is generated.

In our text, *ālaya* is a name that is clearer and more sophisticated than “series of minds”.

In other words: [as for the first two,] the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and the *dharma*s of pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染) act as condition for one another (see #0447), [and as for the third,] sentient beings imagine (or conceive) (執) the store-cognition to be their own inner self (*ātman*) (自內我). <97>

#0405 By using the word STORE (*ālaya*), the stanza (*kārikā*) defines the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa* 自相), i.e., the intrinsic nature, (of the first developing *vijñāna*), i.e., of the eighth cognition. This cognition has the [particular] characteristics of being both a result (*kārya*) and a cause (*kāraṇa*): [its specific characteristic is to “bring together” (攝) these two characteristics and “being supported” (持) by them].

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji, *Shuji* (T43.1830.0301a24):

By specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), one should understand *svabhāva-lakṣaṇa* (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*), i.e., the essential characteristic.

1. The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) has the [particular] characteristic of being a result; it is thus called *vipāka* (“retribution”).
2. It has the [particular] characteristic of being a cause, it is thus called *sarva-bījaka* (“endowed with all seeds”).

Does it possess a specific characteristic beyond these two characteristics?

It has *shechi* 攝持 for its specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*), that is to say:

1. *She* 攝, *saṃgraha* (bring together) = *baohan* 包含, i.e., to envelop and bring together;
2. *Chi* 持 = *yichi* 依持, i.e., being supported (*saṃniśraya*).

On the one hand, the specific characteristic brings the [particular] characteristics of being a result and of being a cause back to a unity; on the other hand, being general or synthetic (?) (*zong* 總), it is supported by these particular characteristics. It is not that a general characteristic exists separate from the particular characters.

But if that is so, does the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) have only a nomi-

nal existence (*prajñapti-sat*)?

No. If one would set apart the two [particular] characteristics of being a result and a cause; if one would say that the bringing together of these two constitutes the specific characteristic, then the specific characteristic would not exist by itself. But the [particular] characteristics of being a result and a cause are not beyond the specific characteristic.

#0406 However, let us point out that (although the states (分位) of) the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa* 自相) of this cognition, i.e., the eighth cognition, are many—in accordance with the three states of spiritual progress (#0696–#0753)—[and although the name store (*ālaya*) is suitable for the eighth cognition only when it occurs in the first state,] nevertheless, the eighth cognition is denoted primarily (過重) and loosely (偏) by the name (store-cognition (藏識)): [precisely because this is the name it has in the first state, and because it is grasped as self (*ātman*) only in the first state].

C.A.B. *Retribution* (*vipāka*)

Considered as result, the eighth cognition is called RETRIBUTION (異熟 *vipāka*).^a

#0407 It is the “fruit of retribution” (*vipāka-phala* 異熟果) of good or bad actions which project (*ākṣip* 能引) an existence in a certain sphere of existence (*dhātu* 界), in a certain destiny (*gati* 趣), by means of a certain mode of birth (*yoni* 生) (#0938). Apart from it, there is no “vital principle” (*jīvita-indriya* 命根; #0260, #0965), {2/13r.} no similarity (*sabhāgatā* 眾同分; #0250) or any *dharma*—such <98> as the immortal *skandha* of the Mahīśāsakas (#0850)—which is continuous (*sarvadā*, thus, exempt from annihilation [*uccheda*], uninterrupted), in a series (thus, not immutable, exempt from eternalism [*śāśvata*]), and truly and *par excellence* the fruit of retribution (*vipāka-phala* 異熟果) (as opposed to the “arisen from retribution” [*vipākaja*] *dharmas*, see *Siddhi* F 93, #0267, #0389, #0928).

^a Sthiramati: *sarva-dhātu-gati-yoni-jātiṣu kuśala-akuśala-karma-vipākatvād vipākah*.

The three parts (*bhāgas*) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) are retribution (*vipāka*), with the exception of the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), which does not form a continuous series and is not a “true fruit of action”. – The three parts with their seeds (*bījas*), according to one opinion; but, according to the best doctrine, the three actual parts alone.

By the term *vipāka*, the author Vasubandhu indicates all the ways in which (the first developing *vijñāna* 能變識), i.e., the eighth cognition, is fruit (*phala*) (果相).

[There is a need to distinguish various states of the spiritual life: the *buddha*'s eighth cognition is not retribution (*vipāka*) (#0696). The eighth is also the fruit of equal outflow (*niṣyanda-phala*), etc. (#2747). But (1) since it is retribution among all sentient beings except the *buddha* and (2) since it is the only *dharma* that is truly retribution,] then 〈—although the characteristics of fruit (果) of this cognition are of many states (多位) and of many types (多種)—〉 it can 〈broadly, but not to all states (寬不共),〉 be designated loosely as “retribution” (異熟).

[The eighth cognition is four kinds of fruits (*phala*)—by excluding the fifth, i.e., the fruit of disconnection (*viśaṃyoga-phala*). The later moment is the fruit of equal outflow (*niṣyanda-phala*) of the earlier moment. The “mental factors” (*caittas*) are the fruit of human activity (*puruṣa-kāra-phala*) of the simultaneous cognition (*viññāna*), for the seeds (*bījas*), at the moment when they engender, are called *puruṣa-kāra* (human activity). See #2747,²⁴⁸ on the fruit of human activity. According to one opinion, the eighth cognition is not this last kind of fruit.]

C.A.C. *Endowed with all seeds (sarva-bījaka)*

#0408 Considered as cause, the eighth cognition is called ENDOWED WITH ALL SEEDS (*sarva-bījaka* 一切種). This cognition holds (*ādadāti* 能執持) the seeds (*bījas* 種子) of all *dharma*s and does not allow them to get lost (*praṇaś* 不失). Apart from this cognition, there is no *dharma* capable of holding (能遍執持) seeds of all *dharma*s.^a

The intention of the author is to indicate all the ways in which the first developing *viññāna* (能變識), i.e., the eighth cognition, is 〈the particular characteristic of the〉 cause. 〈Although the characteristics of cause (因) of this cognition are of many types (多種),〉^b nevertheless <99> this causality that consists of “holding (*dhar* 持) the seeds (*bījas* 種)” 〈is not shared (不共)〉, i.e., belongs to it alone. It can thus loosely be defined as endowed with all seeds (*sarva-bījaka*).

#0409 〈Although characteristics of the first developing *viññāna* itself are many, it can be said, in brief, that merely〉 these three ways (三相) of considering the eighth cognition, i.e., (1) itself, (2) as result, (3) as cause, exhaust the great variety of its aspects. {2/13v.}

^a Against the “Sautrāntikas-Dārṣṭāntikas, etc.” [see #0199, #0487; #0875; #1095]. As is said in YBh, 51:

²⁴⁸ Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/89r.

They think: – The seeds (*bījas*) of the mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta-dharmas*) and of the four fundamental material elements (*mahā-bhūta*) are located in the material sense-faculties (*rūpa-indriyas*); conversely, the seeds of the material sense-faculties are located in the mind and mental factors. Indeed, in the existences of the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu*) and the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*) How can an existence that involves a body be generated after the existence in the realm of immateriality, if the mind does not hold the seeds of the material sense-faculties? How can the mind begin again after the states of non-ideation, if the material sense-faculties do not hold the seeds of the mind?

We answer: – “The sense-faculties do not hold the seeds because they are not the eighth cognition, just like the external objects”.

The actual eighth holds the seeds of itself and of the other cognitions, and does not allow [the seeds] to be lost; it is thus called endowed with all seeds (*sarva-bījaka*). – It is a cause which one considers (1) to be actual, i.e., “active”, or (2) to be seed:

1. being actual, it is the supporting cause (*saṃnīśraya*; *yichi* 依持) of the seeds and of the other cognitions;
2. being seed, it is the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of [all the] *dharmas*. [See #0770.]

b. Considering the ten categories of cause (*hetu*) (#2499):

1. the actual eighth cognition is—in relation to actual *dharmas*—the considering cause (*apekṣā-hetu*), the assisting cause (*parigraha-hetu*), the co-operating cause (*sahakāri-hetu*), the non-impeding cause (*avirodha-hetu*);
2. the seeds of the eighth are, in addition, the inducing cause (*āvāhaka-hetu*), the bringing-forth cause (*abhinirvṛtti-hetu*), the projecting cause (*ākṣepaka-hetu*) and the determining cause (*pratiniyama-hetu*).

Considering the six categories of cause (*hetu*) (AKB ii, F 245):

1. the eighth, both actual and seed (*bīja*), is six causes in relation to *dharmas*.
2. a. the actual eighth (i.e., previous moment) is the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*) of the eighth (subsequent moment);
- b. the actual eighth is the co-existent cause (*sahabhū-hetu*) of its seeds;
- c. the actual eighth is the associated cause (*saṃprayuktaka-hetu*) of its mental factors (*caittas*);

- d. the actual eighth is the efficient cause (*karāṇa-hetu*) insofar as it holds its seeds.

Asvabhāva, *Samgraha-upanibandhana* (T.31.1598.0390b):

The eighth is the seed (*bīja*) of the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), thus, the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*); it is the support (*saṃniśraya*), thus, the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*).

As for the evolving cognitions, they are two kinds of condition (*pratyaya*) with respect to the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), i.e., at first, they nourish the seeds of the store-cognition; later, they cause the store-cognition to arise: they envelop and protect [or make grow] (攝殖; T.31.1598.0390c06) its seeds; that is to say, their trace (*vāsanā*) or perfuming is capable of drawing forth-envelop (引攝) the future store-cognition. <100>

C.B. *Theory of the seeds (bījas)*

B.A. Definitions; #0411

B.B. Origin of the seeds (*bījas*); #0424B.C. Six characteristics of the seeds (*bījas*). – Double causation. – Internal and external seeds; #0472

B.D. What is perfumed and that which perfumes; #0487

#0411 It is necessary to study in detail the definition of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識) as “endowed with all seeds” (*sarva-bījaka* 一切種), and to establish the characteristics of all seeds (*sarva-bījaka-lakṣaṇa-vibhaṅga*).

C.B.A. *Definitions*1. *What is this kind of dharma that is called seed (bīja 種子)?*

#0414 In the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), also called root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna* 本識), there occur ⟨special (差別)⟩ efficacies (*śakti* or *sāmarthya* 功能) which immediately engender (親生) their fruit, that is to say, an actual, i.e., active, *dharma*. [The author considers the seeds having come to maturity, not the seeds in their homogeneous generation, from their origin up to the state of maturity. See *Siddhi* F 92.]

2. *Reality of the seeds (bījas).*

#0415 In relation to the root-cognition (*vijñāna*) and in relation to their fruit, the seeds are neither identical nor different (#2426). Such is, in fact, the mode of relationship between the thing itself (*svabhāva* 體), i.e., cognition (*vijñāna*), and its activity (*kāritra* 用), i.e., seed; between the cause (*hetu* 因), i.e., seed, and the fruit (*phala* 果), i.e., actual *dharma*.

#0416 Although neither identical with the cognition and the fruit, nor different from the cognition and the fruit, nevertheless, the seeds are real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有). Indeed, that which has only nominal existence (*prajñapti-sat* 假法)—a line of ants, a cloth consisting of threads—cannot, like that which does not exist at all (*abhāva* 無), be “condition qua cause” (*hetu-pratyaya*).

This is not the doctrine of Sthiramati for whom the seeds—being neither identical (一) to all actual *dharma*s nor different (異) from these *dharma*s—are, like the pitcher (瓶), etc., of “nominal existence” and not real (是假非實).

But if this were so, then true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如), according to this

reasoning, would also be of nominal existence (假有), [for true suchness or the “nature-of-things” (*dharmatā*) is neither identical with the *dharmas* nor different from the *dharmas*].

[Sthiramati replies: – True suchness is of nominal existence <101> because it is not produced, just like a sky-flower.]

We would say: – In this hypothesis, there would be no real absolute truth (*paramārtha-paramārtha-satya* 真勝義諦). [In relation to what would the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*) be established? How could there be *nirvāṇa*? ... The aggregates (*skandhas*), sense-spheres (*āyatana*s) and sense-elements (*dhātus*) would, at the same time, be absolute truth (*paramārtha-satya*) and conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*); true suchness alone receives the name real absolute truth (*paramārtha-paramārtha-satya*) ...²⁴⁹] (see #0031, #2332, #2765, #2828).

#0417 However, if we say that the seeds, impure or pure (*sāsrava*, *anāsrava*), are real entities (*dravya-sat* 實有), {2/14r.} it is only from the conventional (*saṃvṛti* 世俗) point of view. The case for true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如) is not the same as for the seeds.

3. *The parts (bhāgas 分).*

#0418 Although the seeds rely (*āśri*) on the “substance” (體) of the eighth cognition as support [—on the “nature” of the cognition, that is to say, on the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*) which is “perfumable” and of which the seeds are the efficacies—], nevertheless, they are part of the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分) (of this cognition and not of the other [cognitions]) because, as Dharmapāla says, the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) always takes them for its object (#0518).²⁵⁰

4. *Ethical nature of the seeds (bījas 種).*

#0420 The impure (*sāsrava* 有漏) seeds—being integrated (與) into the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*), i.e., not distinct (別) from the cognition (*vijñāna*) itself, [being therefore of the same ethical nature]—are non-defined (*avyākṛta* 無記性). However, their causes (namely, the actual cognitions that perfume the “cognition that is retribution”) and their fruits (namely, the actual cognitions that arise from the seeds) are good, bad, etc. Thus, one says that the impure seeds are good, bad, etc.

#0421 The pure (*anāsrava* 無漏) seeds—not being incorporated (攝) in the nature of

²⁴⁹ Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/95.

²⁵⁰ Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/95v.–97r.

“cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*), not being of its ethical nature ⟨since their causes and fruits are contained in the good nature⟩, i.e., arisen from good causes, generating good fruits—are only called good.

If this is so, then a passage from YBh (決擇分)²⁵¹ presents a difficulty. It says that all the twenty-two faculties (*indriyas* 根) (of which the last three are pure, #2484) have seeds that are “retribution” (*vipāka-bīja* 異熟種子), that all [twenty-two faculties] are “arisen from retribution” (*vipākaja* 異熟生).

Let us note:

- a. Although the seeds of the last three faculties are called “retribution” (*vipāka* 異熟), nevertheless, they are not, for that, non-defined <102> because they are, in their nature, not retribution (*vipāka*). {2/14v.} YBh calls them ⟨seeds that are “retribution” (*vipāka-bījas* 異熟種)⟩ because they rely on the eighth cognition, which is retribution. We know that the [first five] cognitions (眼等識) that are of three kinds (good, etc.) rely on ⟨different natures and characteristics (異性相依)⟩, i.e., the eye, etc., which are always non-defined.
- b. The pure seeds are, in a certain sense, called “retribution” (異熟) because they change (*vi* 轉變) and ripen (*pāka* 成熟) by the power of perfuming (*bhāvanā* 熏習力). But YBh does not say that they are by nature retribution, that they are non-defined (無記性).

C.B.B. *Origin of the seeds (bījas)*

- B.1. Candrapāla; #0424
- B.2. Nanda and Śrīsenā; #0432
- B.3. Dharmapāla (including the discussion of “immaculate mind”); #0441

C.B.B.1. *Candrapāla*

#0424 According to the first masters, all seeds (*bījas* 種子), i.e., impure as well as pure, are primordial and natural (*prakṛti* 本性有); no seed arises from “perfuming” (*bhāvanā* 熏).

#0425 But the seeds increase ⟨and grow⟩ (增長, *vr̥dh*, *utkarṣ*, *puṣ*) by the power of perfuming (熏習力).

- a. This [view], in their opinion, results from several texts that are directed at the seeds in general:

²⁵¹ *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇi* 決擇分, YBh, 57.

#0427 1. *Akṣayamati-sūtra*:

All sentient beings, from beginningless time (*anādi-kālika*), have various kinds of *dhātus* (界)—like piles of seeds in a myrobalan fruit (*akṣa-rāśi-vat* 惡叉聚)—which exist by the very nature-of-things (*dharmatā* 法爾而有).

Here, the word *dhātu* (界) is another word for seed (*bīja* 種子).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

“The *Mahāyānālamkāra-śāstra* cites this *sūtra* by name; it is accepted in all three vehicles; the *Vibhāṣā* cites this text” (Kuiji). – On reading the *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0367c), we do not see that it gives the decisive formula, i.e., *anādi-kālika*:

In other *sūtras*, the Bhagavat has made the comparison with the piles of myrobalan seeds (*akṣa-rāśi*) ...: “*Bhikṣus*, all the kinds of *dhātus* that occur in sentient beings, they are included in the eighteen [sense-elements (*dhātus*)]”. Also in the *Bahu-dhātuka*, he has established sixty-two kinds of *dhātus*.

Sūtrālamkāra, iii, 2 (S. Lévi, p. 10) (transl. Thurman):

nānā-dhātukatvāt sattvānām aparimāṇo dhātu-prabhedo yathoktam akṣa-rāśi-sūtre

According to the *Heap of Faculties Scripture*, the classes of elements (*dhātu*) are infinite (*aparimāṇa*) because of the diversity of beings’ elements.

(According to the Chinese: *yathoktaṃ bahu-dhātuka-sūtre*). <103>

See S. Lévi’s note (translation, pp. 25–26). – The Tibetan translates *akṣa* by *ba ru ra* = *vibhūṭaka*, *akṣa*; thus, we have “myrobalan fruits which are used to play dice”.

2. Moreover the *Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra* says:

From beginningless time, *dhātu* is the support of all *dharma*s, etc.²⁵²

The word *dhātu* means here cause (*hetu* 因) (and “cause” means seed).

3. YBh also says: {15r.}

Although the seeds themselves, from beginningless time, exist naturally (or primordially) (*prakṛti* 性本有), nevertheless, they are [as if] brought

²⁵² *anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarva-dharma-samāśrayaḥ*.

See #0765, Sthiramati, *Trentaine*, S. Lévi, F 37 [21b], where the *dhātu* is the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*).

forth and imprinted anew (新所熏發) by pure and defiled (染淨) actions.

And again:

Sentient beings who are “determined to obtain *nirvāṇa*” (*parinirvāṇa-dharmaka* 般涅槃法者) are, from beginningless time, endowed with all the seeds; if they are “not determined to obtain *nirvāṇa*” (不般涅槃法者), they lack the seeds (種子) of the three kinds of *bodhi* (三種菩提).²⁵³

Thus, the texts confirming the same doctrine are many.

b. Regarding the pure seeds:

#0428 1. Moreover, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and other texts say that sentient beings are naturally ⟨or primordially⟩ (*prakṛti* 本有) diversified into five families (*gotras* 五種性別):²⁵⁴ thus, there are seeds “that definitively exist by the nature-of-things” (*dharmatā-bījas* 定有法爾種子), that do not arise from perfuming. <104>

2. Moreover, according to YBh (T.30.1579.0615a), hell beings (地獄) are endowed with three pure faculties (*indriyas*) (see #0421). This refers, obviously, to faculties in the seeds (*bījas* 種) state, not to actual (現) faculties.

3. Moreover, *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (T.30.1579.0478c):

The natural ⟨or primordially innate⟩ (*prakṛtiṣṭha* 本性住) family (*gotra*

²⁵³ Extracts from the second *juan*, beginning and end (T.30.1579.0284a29).

²⁵⁴ The five families of direct realization (*abhisamaya-gotras*) of *Laṅkā*, p. 63 of Nanjō. – YBh, 21; *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, 1; *Mahā-vyutpatti*, § 61, *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, Lévi, transl. p. 24 notes. – See #0467.

(1) The family of the hearers (*śrāvaka-gotra*), (2) the family of the self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddha-gotra*), (3) the family of the *tathāgatas* (*tathāgata-gotra*) = sentient beings who will certainly attain *bodhi* by means of the vehicle of the hearers (*śrāvakas*) or of the self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddhas*) or of the *tathāgatas*.

(4) Non-determined family (*aniyata-gotra*): sentient beings who will certainly attain *bodhi*, but without the vehicle being determined. By one of the two vehicles, they are able to branch off into the higher vehicle.

(5) Not belonging to a family (*agotraka*): sentient beings who will certainly not attain *bodhi*.

On the *gotra-bhū* (possessor of the supreme mundane factors [*laukika-agra-dharmas*]), AKB vi, F 167), Vasumitra, *Treatise on the sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031): thesis 28b of *Mahāsāṃghika* (34, in Kuiji's and in Masuda's calculation). – *Compendium*, p. 66, Rhys Davids and Stede, sub voc.

It is odd that the Pāli reads *gotra-bhū* (S. Lévi).

性) of the *bodhisattvas*, established by the nature-of-things (*dharmatā-prātilambhika* 法爾所得), passed on in an uninterrupted line (展轉傳來) from beginningless time (*anādi-kālika* 從無始). {2/15v.}²⁵⁵

Based on these authorities, it follows that the pure seeds (*bījas*), which are primordial and natural (本性), and exist by the nature-of-things, do not arise from perfuming.

#0429 c. In regard to the impure (有漏) seeds, they also are seeds “that exist by the nature-of-things” (*dharmatā-bījas*); although (increasing and growing (增長)) by perfuming, they are not brought forth by separate perfuming.

#0430 d. In this way, cause and fruit are established without confusion.

[The author has expounded the texts; now, he gives the “reason” (*yukti*):²⁵⁶

If certain seeds are new and brought forth by perfuming (as Dharmapāla believes), if all the seeds are new and brought forth by perfuming (as Nanda believes), the seeds are numerous. When, much later, the fruit arises, from which seed does it arise? The nature-of-things (*dharmatā*) requires that the new seeds be endowed with an equal efficacy. It cannot be accepted that two seeds generate the sprout at the same time In our tenet, there is no confusion The pure seeds, when they have not yet undergone growth, are called “natural family” (*prakṛtiṣṭha-gotra*); when they have undergone growth, they are called “family that results from perfuming” (*bhāvanā-māya-gotra*) (習所成: *abhyāsa-siddha-gotra*) (#2856). Similarly for the impure seeds.] <105>

C.B.B.2. *Nanda and Śrīseṇa*

#0432 According to the second masters, all seeds (*bījas* 種子) arise from perfuming

²⁵⁵ *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, “*Gotra-paṭala*”, summary by C. Bendall, *Muséon*, 1905. – The first pages are missing in the Cambridge MS. But there is certainly Tib. *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa* = *prakṛtiṣṭha* (natural); Tib. *chos nyid kyis thob pa* = *dharmatā-prātilambhika* (acquired by the nature-of-things). For Tib. *gcig nas gcig tu rgyud de ongs pa thog ma med pa'i dus can*, probably *paramparā āgata anādikālika*.

The text adds that this family (*gotra*) is a special sixfold sense-sphere (*ṣaḍ-āyatana-viśeṣa*) of the *bodhisattvas*, a certain superior kind of the six sense-spheres (*āyatana*s) belonging to the *bodhisattvas*. But Kuiji notes that it refers only to the sixth sense-sphere, i.e., the sense-sphere of the mental sense-faculty (*mana-āyatana*), in which the eighth cognition is included; this contains the pure seeds (*bījas*) that constitute the family (*gotra*) of the *bodhisattvas*.

²⁵⁶ Kuiji, *Shuji*, T.43.1830.0305a08.

(*bhāvanā* 熏).

#0433 [Someone may say: – Do the texts not state that they exist at all times?]

[Reply:] – Yes, but for the reason that that which perfumes (能熏) (i.e., actual *dharmas*) and that which is perfumed (所熏) (i.e., the store-cognition [*ālaya-vijñāna*]) do not have a beginning (俱無始有). Thus, the seeds are brought forth, from beginningless time, by perfuming (無始成就).

Bīja (種子 seed) is another name for *vāsanā* (習氣), i.e., “impregnation, perfume, trace”. The trace (*vāsanā* 習氣) is certainly due to perfuming (*bhāvanā* 熏習), just as the fragrance of sesame seeds (*tilagandha* 麻香氣) is due to the perfuming by flowers (花熏).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It seems that the translators poorly distinguish between *bhāvanā* (perfuming) and *vāsanā* (trace).

We have here clear-cut expressions: “*Bīja* is another name for *vāsanā* (*xīqī* 習氣); the trace (*vāsanā*) is certainly generated by perfuming (*bhāvanā*) (*xunxi* 熏習), just as the fragrance (*xiangqi* 香氣) of sesame seeds is generated by the perfuming (*bhāvanā* 熏) of the flowers”.

xunxi 熏習 or *xun* 熏 (#0487) = *bhāvanā*, the action of perfuming carried out by the flowers on the seeds, carried out by the actual *dharmas* on the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*).

xīqī 習氣, the impregnation, the perfume, the seeds (*bījas*).

But in AKB iv, F 249, the same comparison, *pুষ্পais tīla-vāsanāvat*: “as, because of the flowers, there is impregnation of the sesame seeds”, the Chinese has *vāsanā* = *xun* 熏.

But the three traces (*vāsanās*) are 熏習, #0435, and 習氣, #2586.

xīqī 習氣 = *vāsanā*, AKB vii, F 72, *Vyutpatti*; *Siddhi*, *kārikā* 19 (#2580). – #0493: generating the *xīqī* 習氣 is *xun[xi]* 熏習 = “generating the *vāsanā*, the perfume, is perfuming (*bhāvanā*)”.

Trimśikā, ed. S. Lévi, F 38 [23a] (transl. based on Jacobi):

tasmād avaśyam ālayavijñānaṃ tadanyavijñānasahabhūbhiḥ kleśopakleśair bhāvyaṭe svabījapuṣṭyādhānata ...

Therefore it is necessary to assume that the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is nourished (*bhāvyaṭe*) by the defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements

(*upakleśas*)—which are associated with other cognitions²⁵⁷—in that their own seeds (*sva-bīja*) are strengthened (*puṣṭi*).

F 37 [22a]:

saṃskāraparibhāvitā vā ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ

[If an *ālaya-vijñāna* were denied, one could ... assume] the six groups of cognition pervaded by the (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras*).

Elsewhere, *vāsanā* can be understood in the passive sense: perfume, impression, seed (*bīja*); and in the active sense: perfuming, imprinting, bringing forth or nourishing the seeds.

a. There is no lack of texts:

#0435 1. *Bahu-dhātuka-sūtra*:

The mind of sentient beings, being perfumed (所熏習) by defiled and pure *dharma*s, is an accumulation (*saṃcaya* 所積集) of numberless seeds (*aprāmaṇa-bīja*).

2. *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0135b05):

The internal seeds (內種) do not bear fruit unless they <106> are perfumed. {2/16r.}

The external seeds (外種) are sometimes perfumed, sometimes not (#0483).

3. Moreover, the threefold trace (*vāsanā* 三種熏習), (i.e., of speech (名言), etc.,) (#2597) includes all the seeds of impure *dharma*s. Since the threefold trace obviously exists due to perfuming (*vāsanā* 熏習), then all the seeds of impure *dharma*s (漏種) must come into being from perfuming (*bhāvanā* 熏生).

#0436 4. The pure *dharma*s (or seeds) (無漏種) also come into being from perfuming (熏習), for it is said in *Samgraha*:

When one hears the True Doctrine (正法) which is the “outflow” (等流) of the pure *dharma-dhātu* (法界), the *śruta-vāsanā* (聞熏習 = trace arising from hearing, see #0344) is generated.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Editors: Jacobi comments: Evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*).

²⁵⁸ T.31.1594.0136c03, not literal. – The *Samgraha* studies the origin of the supramundane (*lokottara*) mind. According to the *sūtra*, teaching from another (*parato ghoṣa*) and correct mental application (*yoniśo manaskāra*).

And again:

[The trace arising from hearing (*śruta-vāsanā*) is impure before the practitioner has entered into the stages; but this impure trace arising from hearing] is, in its nature (性), the seed (種子) of pure or supramundane (*lokottara*) 〈minds and〉 *dharmas* (出世心).²⁵⁹

[From these texts, (the second masters) conclude that, since the impure is the seed of the pure, they do not have to assume pure seeds due to the nature-of-things (*dharmatā-anāsrava-bījas*), i.e., pure seeds existing from the beginning by means of the nature-of-things.]

b. Refutation of Candrapāla's arguments.

#0438 Sentient beings, since beginningless time, belong to distinct families (*gotras* 種姓): but this fact does not result from the presence or absence of pure seeds (*bījas*), but rather from the presence or absence of the “hindrances” (*āvaraṇas* 障). – As YBh (T.30.1579.0589a) teaches:

Sentient beings who, in regard to 〈the realm of〉 true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如境), are 〈ultimately (畢竟)〉 prevented by the seeds of the two hindrances (二障種), i.e., the hindrance of defilements (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*) and the hindrance to what is to be known (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*), belong to the family of those who will not attain *nirvāṇa* (*aparīnirvāṇa-dharmaka-gotra* 不般涅槃法性) (#3139). {2/16v.}

Those who are 〈ultimately (畢竟) prevented〉 only by the seeds of the “hindrance to what is to be known” (所知障種) but not by the seeds of the “hindrance of defilements” (煩惱障)—according to whether the [praxis-oriented] faculties (*indriyas*, i.e., faith, etc.) are dull or sharp—belong either to the family of the hearer (*śrāvaka* 聲聞種性) or to the family of the self-enlightened one (*pratyeka-buddha* 獨覺種性).

Those who are 〈ultimately not prevented by〉 the seeds of both hindrances belong to the *tathāgata* family (如來種性). <107>

Thus, the original distinction of the families is established due to the hindrances and not due to the pure seeds.

#0439 The text relating to the hell beings (#0428) refers to pure seeds that will arise,

²⁵⁹ Ibid, *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0136c16), Vasubandhu, *Bhāṣya* (T.31.1596.0281c), Asvabhāva, *Samgraha-upanibandhana* (T.31.1598.0395a).

not to already existing seeds.

C.B.B.3. *Dharmapāla*

- 3.1. Refutation of Candrapāla; #0441
- 3.2. Refutation of Nanda and Śrīsenā; #0450
- 3.3. Refutation of the tenet of the immaculate (*viśuddha*) mind; #0452
- 3.4. Explanation of some difficulties; #0461

#0441 There are two kinds of seeds (*bījas*).

#0443 a. The first kind consists of “natural” or “primordial” (*prakṛti-siddha*, *prakṛti-bhava*, *maula* ?, 本有) seeds (*bījas*):

This refers to special efficacies (功能) which, since beginningless time (*anādikālika*), occur in the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) due to the nature-of-things (*dharmatā* 法爾而有) and which give rise to aggregates, sense-spheres and sense-elements (*skandhas-āyatanas-dhātus* 蘊處界).

It is in regard to these seeds that the Bhagavat (世尊) spoke the *sūtra* on the piles of myrobalan seeds (*akṣa-rāśi* 惡叉聚) (#0427):

⟨Sentient beings, since beginningless time, have various kinds of *dhātus*, like piles of myrobalan seeds, which exist by the nature-of-things.⟩ {2/17r.}

It is to these seeds that the arguments of Candrapāla refer (see #0424).

These seeds are called natural (or primordially innate) seeds (*prakṛtiṣṭha-bījas* 本性住種).

#0444 b. The second kind of seeds consists of seeds (*bījas*) that come to be (in time) (始起):

This means that they are the “perfume” (*vāsanā*), (i.e., come about through perfuming (熏習)) by actual (*samudācar* 現行) *dharma*s repeated again and again since beginningless time.

It is in regard to these seeds that the Bhagavat said:

The mind of sentient beings is perfumed by defiled (染) and pure (淨) *dharma*s. Thus, the mind is an immense (無量) accumulation (所積集) of seeds.

Various treatises (*śāstras*) also say:

The defiled and pure seeds (染淨種子) arise due to the perfuming by defiled and pure *dharmas*.

These seeds are called seeds arisen from perfuming (*bhāvanā-maya-bījas* 習所成種).

C.B.B.3.1. *Refutation of Candrapāla*

#0447 If the seeds (*bījas*) were exclusively “primordial” (本), the first seven cognitions (*vijñānas*) (i.e., the evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñāna* 轉識]) would not be a condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of the eighth cognition (阿賴耶). (See #0404, #0409.) {2/17v.}

Now, the *Samgraha*[-*upanibandhana*] (T.31.1598.0390b21) cites a verse of the *Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra*:

The *dharmas* (i.e., the seven cognitions) adhere (*ālīyante* 藏) to the cognition (識) (i.e., to the eighth cognition, the store-cognition). Likewise, the cognition adheres to the *dharmas*. They are, by nature, a fruit of one another and are also always, by nature, a cause (of one another).

The meaning (意) of this verse (*gāthā* 頌) is that the store-cognition (阿賴耶識) <108> and the seven evolving cognitions (轉識) <at all times (一切時)> generate one another <successively> (展轉相生), and are cause and fruit of one another (互為因果).²⁶⁰

²⁶⁰ *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0135b): *Mahāyānābhidharma-gāthā*. – Commentary of Vasubandhu (Paramārtha, T.31.1595.0167b), of Asvabhāva, *Samgraha-upanibandhana* (T.31.1598.0390b).

The first line is explained in one of Sthiramati's glosses on the meaning of the word *ālaya* (S. Lévi [1925], F 18 at bottom):

atha vā ālīyante upanibadhyante 'sminn [ālaye] sarva-dharmāḥ kārya-bhāvena

It is called *ālaya* because all the *dharmas* adhere to it in the quality of result.

Vasubandhu (Paramārtha): “This verse explains how the root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna*) and the experiencing cognitions (*sambhoga-vijñānas*) (受用識) [that is, evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*)] are cause and fruit of one another If the root-cognition is the cause of the *dharmas*, all the *dharmas* that are fruits must rest and adhere (*yizang* 依藏) in the root-cognition. If the *dharmas* are the cause of the root-cognition, the root (*mūla*) must rest and adhere in the *dharmas*. (See *Siddhi* F 95 at the top [T.31.1595.0167b08]).

The explanation of mutual causality by Asvabhāva, see *Siddhi* F 99.

The *Samgraha*²⁶¹ teaches the same doctrine:

The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識) and the pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染) *dharma*s (#1077) are a condition qua cause (因緣) of one another. Just as the flame (焰) is generated (continuously) (展轉生) from the candle (炷) (i.e., the *dharma*s arise from the seeds of the store-cognition); the candle is burning (continuously) (展轉燒) due to the flame (= seeds are brought forth and perfumed in the store-cognition by the *dharma*s). Moreover, just as bundles of reeds (束蘆) support one another (互相依住) (#0508).

Only in this reciprocal relationship of seeds and *dharma*s, true causality, i.e., the condition qua cause (因緣), occurs. The condition qua cause does not occur elsewhere. (See #2460.)

Thus, the seeds (*bījas*) arise from perfuming (熏). If the seeds did not arise from perfuming, how would the first seven cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*) (i.e., the evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñāna* 轉識] be the condition qua cause (因緣) for the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶)?

Someone will say in vain that the seven cognitions can be called condition qua cause because they make the primordial seeds increase (*puṣṭi* 長). – It would be in vain, for, (if it is not by perfuming (熏) that growth is triggered (令), which is called condition qua cause, then) {2/18r.} good and bad actions (善惡業) would be the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣) for the eighth cognition, which is the fruit of retribution (*vipāka*) (異熟果); [and yet, (these actions) are just the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*)]. (See #0268, #0390, #2481.)

#0448 Again, the noble teachings (*ārya-deśanā* 聖教, i.e., *sūtras* and *śāstras*) say that there are seeds that arise from perfuming, (and this contradicts Candrapāla's doctrine). Therefore Candrapāla's doctrine, (according to which there are only primordial seeds,) contradicts both reason (理) and teachings (教). <109>

C.B.B.3.2. *Refutation of Nanda and Śrīsenā*

#0450 (If seeds are generated only with a beginning), i.e., if there were no “primordial” pure seeds (*bījas*), then the first actual pure *dharma* (有為無漏), namely, the first moment of the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) (#2921), would not have a “condition qua cause” (因緣) and would not arise. It cannot be accepted that

²⁶¹ T.31.1594.0134c15, Asvabhāva, T.31.1598.0387c.

impure *dharmas* (有漏), i.e., “supreme mundane factors” (*laukika-agra-dharmas*) (#2900), should be the cause, i.e., the seed (種), of a pure (無漏) *dharma*.²⁶² In this hypothesis, ([i.e., when an effect could arise from its opposite, then]) a pure seed would be able to engender an impure *dharma*, or impure *dharmas* could arise [again] in the *buddha*, or a good (*kuśala*) seed could engender a bad (*akuśala*) *dharma*.

Thus, there are “primordial” seeds.

C.B.B.3.3. *Refutation of the tenet of the immaculate (viśuddha) mind*

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This is the tenet of the Vibhajyavādins according to our text. – Kuiji, *Shuji* (2B/113v; T.43.1830.0307a14):

The Vibhajyavādins are the Mahāsāṃghikas (大眾), Ekavyavahārikas (一説), Lokottaravādins (説出世), Kaukkuṭikas (雞胤). The author has in mind also the teachers of the Great Vehicle who believe that all seeds (*bījas*) are brought forth (新熏), or he has in mind the teachers [of the tenet] of [the substantially immaculate but] defiled mind (*xinhunshi* 心潤師; defiled = *hun* 潤).

“The master of the *Qixin lun* (大乘起信論) (*Śraddhā-utpāda*)” [i.e., Aśvaghoṣa] also believes in the immaculate mind (心性本淨). – Vasubandhu’s substantial treatise, *Foxing lun/Buddhagotra-śāstra* (?) (T.31.1610.0806c12), explains why the Bhagavat said that “all beings have *buddha* nature”. The belief in the self is not “innate” (*mūla*, *ādi* = *ben* 本); it is adventitious (*āgantuka* 客塵). There are nine [kinds of] “adventitious” [defilements] which come from outside and defile ...

On the immaculate mind:

We translate *viśuddha* = “immaculate”, reserving “pure” to represent *anāsrava*.

1. *Aṅguttara*, i, 10 (compare i, 255, 257; iii 16) (transl. Bhikkhu Bodhi):²⁶³

pabhassaram idaṃ cittaṃ taṃ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakiliṭṭhaṃ

Luminous, *bhikkhus*, is this mind, but it is defiled by adventitious defilements.

(In *Prajñā-pāramitā: prakṛti-prabhāsvara = prakṛti-śānta*. – *Bodhicaryāvatāra*–

²⁶² According to AKB vi, F 179, the receptivity to the knowledge of *dharmas* (*dharma-jñāna-kṣānti*) proceeds from the supreme mundane factors (*laukika-agra-dharmas*). – It does not have a homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*), being the first pure *dharma* that appears in the series since beginningless time.

²⁶³ La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925: 65.

pañjikā, ii, 1, ix, 28.)

2. Buddhaghoṣa, *Attha-sālinī*, p. 140, makes this *pabhassara* mind the *bhavaṅga* (see #0853), i.e., the *bhavaṅga-vijñāna* of the Sthaviras and Vibhajyavādins.
3. Andhakas of *Kathā-vatthu*, iii. 3.
4. *Śāriputra-abhidharma*, fourth part, chapter on *citta*, T.28.1548.0697b18:

The mind is immaculate in its nature: it is defiled by adventitious “dusts” (心性清淨。為客塵染). The ordinary worldling (*prthagjana*), being ignorant, can neither recognize-see truly nor cultivate (*bhāvanā*) the mind (不能如實知見。亦無修心). The saint (*ārya*), on the other hand, ... <110>

On the relationships of this Abhidharma with the *Dharmaguptas*, see J. Przyluski, *Conciles*.

5. *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0140b and foll.) against the immaculate mind of the Vibhajyavādins.
6. See AKB vi, F 299, *kārikā*, vi, 77a, where, in brief, the refutation of the immaculate mind of the Vibhajyavādins by Saṃghabhadra is translated (*Shun zhengli lun*, T.29.1562.0731).
7. Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031): thesis 35 of the *Mahāsāṃghikas* (thesis 42 in Kuiji, *Commentarial Record on the Treatise on the Sects* [*Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji*, X.53.0844], and Masuda's version).
8. *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (T.14.0476.0563b26) [translation by Xuanzang].

Upāli quotes the conversation he had with Vimalakīrti concerning two sinful monks:

... It is not necessary that this offense should afflict their mind. Why? Because this offense (the “nature” of this wrongdoing) is neither internal nor external nor between the two. As the Bhagavat has said: “Due to the pollution (*saṃkleśa*) of the mind, there is the pollution of sentient beings; due to the purification of the mind, there is the purification of sentient beings” (#1077). In the same way, the mind also is neither internal nor external nor between the two. Just as with the mind, so with the stain (*mala*) of the offense. Just as with the stain of the offense, so with all *dharma*s. What do you think, O Upāli? The mind is essentially immaculate. When it attains deliverance, is this mind previously defiled (*kliṣṭa*) or not?

I answered: – No.

Vimalakīrti replied: – The nature of the mind of all sentient beings is not defiled

earlier nor defiled later. Only, O Upāli, when there is *kalpa* (mind) then there is *vikalpa* (figuring), i.e. the *kleśa* (defilement); if there is no *kalpa* (mind), then there is no figuring (*vikalpa*), that is to say, [there is thus] the immaculate nature (性清淨). When there is erroneousness (*viparyāsa* 顛倒) ..., when there is belief in the self (*ātma-grāha* 取我). ... The nature of all *dharma*s arises, ceases, does not last: like an illusion, a magical being, lightning, a cloud ...

9. *Śrīmālā* (T11.0310.0677c23).

Tathāgata-garbha (如來藏) is the (1) *dharma-dhātu-garbha* (法界藏), (2) *dharma-kāya-garbha* (法身藏), (3) *lokottara-garbha* (出世間藏), (4) *prakṛti-prabhāsvara-garbha* (性清淨藏): it is primordially immaculate (*ādi-viśuddha* 本性淨). As I understand it, the *tathāgata-garbha*, although it is defiled by the adventitious defilements (*kleśas*) (客塵煩惱所染), nevertheless, it is inconceivable (不可思議), of the domain of the *buddhas* (*acintya tathāgata-gocara*) (如來境界) only. – Why is that? – The defilements do not touch the mind (煩惱不觸心), the mind does not touch the defilements (心不觸煩惱). ...

Compare *Laṅkāvatāra* (T16.0672.0599b): *tathāgatagarbhaḥ ... sūtrāntapāṭhe anuvartitaḥ | ... prakṛti-prabhāsvara (viśuddhyā ādi-viśuddha) eva varṇyate dvātriṃśal-lakṣaṇa-dharaḥ sarva-sattva-dehāntargato skandha-dhātva-āyatana-vāstu-veṣṭito rāga-dveṣa-moha-abhūta-parikalpa-mala-malino nityo dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāśvataś ca ...*

[This text is cited in *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 196, 13. Candrakīrti establishes (by means of the *Laṅkāvatāra* itself) that similar statements of the Bhagavat—accepted by the Vijñānavādins as “explicit”, of “obvious meaning” (*nītārtha*)—are in fact “implicit” (*neyārtha*).]

Laṅkāvatāra, p. 222, the Bhagavat explains how he taught the *tathāgata-garbha* (= store-cognition [*ālaya-vijñāna*]) to Śrīmālādevī. When it is said that it is necessary to “transmute” (*parāvart*) the *tathāgata-garbha*, it refers to the store-cognition (see #3207). <111>

#0452 [However, the Vibhajyavādins do not accept the pure “primordial” seeds (*bījas*) that are the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of pure actual *dharma*s. They think that these *dharma*s have a cause of another nature.]

According to the Vibhajyavādins (分別論者), although the nature of the mind is “essentially immaculate”²⁶⁴ (*prakṛti-viśuddha* ?) (心性本淨), nevertheless, being

²⁶⁴ The text has *ben* 本, root. – We may hesitate between primordially immaculate (*ādi-viśuddha*) (see *Laṅkā*, cited above, *Siddhi* F 110) and essentially immaculate (*prakṛti-*

soiled (所染污) by the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), i.e., the adventitious (*āgantuka*) “dusts” (客塵), the mind is called defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa* 雜染); when it is separated from the defilements, it turns to be pure (*anāsrava* 無漏) again. Thus, the pure *dharma*s do not arise without a cause (因). {2/18v.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji (T.43.1830.0307a17):

When it is separated from the defilements (*kleśas*)—its nature being immaculate—it is the cause of the “pure” (*anāsrava-hetu*). Just as milk changes into whey (如乳變為酪): in milk, there is the nature of whey (乳中有酪性); likewise, in wood, [there is] fire (木中火亦然).

- #0454 We ask what is the meaning of this expression: “nature of the mind” (心性)?
- #0456 a. Does it refer to ⟨the principle of⟩ emptiness (*śūnyatā* 空理), (i.e., to true suchness [*bhūta-tathatā*])? – The latter, (i.e., emptiness (空)), is not the cause of the mind (心因); being unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), being immutable (常), it definitively cannot be the seed (*bīja* 種子) of pure *dharma*s, for it itself (體) remains ⟨unchanged (無轉變)⟩, before and after (前後). (See #0337.)
- #0457 b. Does [the nature of the mind] refer to the mind itself? This explanation entails many difficulties:
1. To suppose that the mind—immutable (常) and one (一) as to substance (體)—evolves ⟨or changes⟩ (轉變) as to its characteristics (相): this would be similar to the Sāṃkhya theory (數論).
 2. If the nature of the mind, i.e., the mind itself, is immaculate, the bad (惡) or non-defined (無記) mind would be good (善).
 3. If you accept that, then it will be associated with faith (信) and with other virtues (等).
 4. If you do not accept this consequence, then the mind in question does not have the substance of a good mind (善心體); one could not say that its nature is good (善), and, even less, that its nature is pure (*anāsrava* 無漏).

viśuddha). – In the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, xi, 51 (T.31.1604.0615a), we find primordially calm from the beginning (*ādi-śānta*), *benlai* 本來 (as in the expression *anādi-kālika*), and naturally “nirvanized” (*prakṛti-parinirvṛta*), *zixing* 自性. – But (see #0460) we will encounter the expression *prakṛti-viśuddha* (essentially immaculate). – And we have seen that, in the natural family (*prakṛtiṣṭha-gotra*), *prakṛti* = *benxing* 本性. [*Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, 448, 1, 444, 9; *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, ii, 1; ix, 13, 28.]

5. As for the <112> good-impure (*kuśala-sāsrava* 有漏善) mind, it is—as everyone [should] know—polluted (*sāṃkleśika* 雜染): in the same way as the bad (惡) mind, etc., its nature (性) is not pure (無漏). Thus, it is not the cause (因) of a pure *dharma*, unless you are prepared to accept that the good, the bad, etc., engender one another. {2/19r.}

6. If you say that the nature of the impure mind is pure, you must also say that the nature of the pure mind is impure, (because it would be impossible to distinguish the condition qua cause (因緣)).

7. Moreover, if the mind of the ordinary worldling (*prthagjana* 異生) is pure, then pure *dharma*s would be active (*samudācar* 現行) in the state of the ordinary worldling, who then would merit the name of saint (*ārya* 聖者).

You might say: – Although the “nature” of the mind of the ordinary worldling is pure, nevertheless, since its “characteristics” (相) are defiled (染), it must not be called “pure” (無漏). (Thus, although the nature] does not have these faults (過), the seeds are also not pure.)

We will answer: – If the seeds (*bījas*) of this mind should not be called “pure”, then why does your treatise (論) assert that “there are ordinary worldlings endowed exclusively with pure seeds” (有異生·唯得成就無漏種子)? Nature and characteristic (性相) of the seeds (種子) and of the “active” (現行) *dharma*s are necessarily of the same order.

#0459 c. Then what is the meaning of the *sūtras* (*Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, *Śrīmālādevī-siṃha-nāda*) on the immaculate nature of the mind (心性淨)?

When the *sūtras* speak of mind, they are referring to the true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如) which (the principle of) emptiness (*sūnyatā*) of the mind (see #0337) manifests (心空理所顯), because true suchness is the true (*tāttvika* 真實) nature (性) of the mind. {2/19v.}

#0460 Or else, what the *sūtra* calls “essentially immaculate nature” (*prakṛti-viśuddha* 性本淨) is the mind as being dependent (*paratantra*), because the dependent nature of the mind itself (心體) is foreign to defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱).²⁶⁵

It is not the case that the impure (*sāsrava*) mind (有漏心) is in its nature (pure (*anāsrava* 無漏)). Hence, the nature of the impure mind is not called “essentially immaculate” (本淨) because it would be pure.

²⁶⁵ *Editors:* A more literal translation of the Chinese would be: “Or else, [the *sūtra*] states that the mind itself is non-defiled (非煩惱), and hence is called essentially immaculate nature (性本淨).”

La Vallée Poussin comments:

1. The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (of Sthiramati; Noel Péri, *Date*, p. 385; T.31.1606.0742c11) explaining the transmutation of the support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*) (see #3180) says that true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) is the *citta prakṛti-viśuddha* (*prakṛti*, *zixing* 自性), i.e., the “essentially immaculate mind”. It is covered up (*āvṛta*) by the generation of defilements (*kleśas*). When the defilements are abandoned, the immaculate nature of the mind is realized (*sākṣātkar*).
2. The dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) or dependent characteristic (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*) of the mind (#2719) – Our text has simply “the *ti* 體 of the mind”: the *ti* is the dependent nature, distinct from the *xing* 性 which is the perfected nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*) of the mind = true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*).
3. True suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*), being unconditioned, is not the cause of the mind, <113> is not a seed (*bīja*) capable of engendering a fruit. Thus, if the impure (*sāsrava*) mind is called “essentially immaculate”, this is not because it would be pure (*anāsrava*), but (1) because—being defiled (*kliṣṭa*) in its imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*)—it is not defiled as causal process (i.e., *paratantra*) exempt from the notion of subject and object, moreover, (2) because it is similar to an illusion. (#0340)

C.B.B.3.4. *Explanation of some difficulties*

- 4.1. Perfuming of internal seeds (*bījas*); #0461
- 4.2. Perfume or trace arising from hearing (*śruta-vāsanā*); #0464
- 4.3. Families (*gotras*) and seeds (*bījas*); #0467

#0461 We conclude that sentient beings (有情)—from beginningless time—have pure (*anāsrava*) seeds (*bījas*) that do not proceed from perfuming (不由熏習), with which they are endowed by the very nature-of-things (*dharmatā-samanvāgama* 法爾成就). In the course of time, when a sentient being arrives at the “state of excellence” (*viśeṣa-avasthā* 勝進位,²⁶⁶ i.e., after the factors conducive to liberation [*mokṣa-bhāgīyas*]), #2897), perfuming makes these seeds increase (and grow) (增長). The pure *dharma*s that arise (after the stages conducive to penetration [*nirvedha-bhāgīyas*])—namely, the path of insight, etc.—have these seeds as cause (因). When these pure *dharma*s (arise, they in turn perfume and) bring

²⁶⁶ In the broader sense, *viśeṣa* also means: pure or impure factors supported by concentration (*samādhi-saṃpñīśrita sāsrava-anāsrava-dharma*), AKB v, F 27.

forth new pure seeds.

The seeds of the impure *dharmas* can be understood in the same way: some are primordial, others proceed from perfuming.

C.B.B.3.4.1. *Perfuming of internal seeds (bījas)*

#0463 The *Samgraha* (cited above #0435) teaches that although all the internal seeds (*bījas* 內種) are definitively subject to perfuming, nevertheless, (it is not said that in a definitive manner that) all the seeds arise from perfuming. This text cannot be used as evidence to deny primordial seeds. {2/20r.}

But these (primordial seeds (本有種) too) can only bear their fruit, i.e., bring forth actual *dharmas*, if they have increased (and grown) (増盛) due to perfuming. This is why the *Samgraha* says that all internal seeds, whether primordial or new, are definitively subject to perfuming.

C.B.B.3.4.2. *Perfume or trace arising from hearing (śruta-vāsanā)*

#0464 [The *Samgraha* (see #0436) says that the “perfume” (熏習) arising from hearing (聞) the True Doctrine (when occurring in an ordinary worldling [*prthagjana*]) is a seed (*bīja*) of the supramundane (*lokottara*, supranatural = pure [*anāsrava*]) mind. We would thus have, here, a pure (*anāsrava*) seed that would proceed from an impure (*sāsrava*) perfuming.] <114>

But it should be noted that the “perfume” arising from “hearing” (*śruta-vāsanā* 聞熏習) is not exclusively impure. Indeed, when—after having sowed the factors conducive to liberation (*mokṣa-bhāgīyas*) (#2857)—the practitioner hears the True Doctrine (聞正法), the primordial pure seeds are, in fact, also perfumed (熏) in such a way that they progressively increase (and grow) (漸増盛) until they finally engender a mind of the supramundane order (出世心).²⁶⁷ Thus, these pure seeds can also be classed among the perfume arising from hearing (*śruta-vāsanā* 聞熏習).

#0465 There is perfume arising from hearing which is impure; as such, it is abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heyā* 修所斷), it is a creator of an excellent retribution (*vipāka* 勝異熟), it is an excellent condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya* 勝增上緣)—i.e., a necessary and effective condition, but not cause (i.e.,

²⁶⁷ Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/121r–v., on the action which the factors conducive to liberation (*mokṣa-bhāgīyas*) and the stages conducive to penetration (*nirvedha-bhāgīyas*) exert on the pure primordial seeds (*bījas*).

condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya*])—of the supramundane *dharma*s (出世法).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

“Hearing” brings forth the seeds (*bījas*) of which it is the actual cause: it perfumes and brings forth seeds of the “mundane” (*laukika*) order which are good (*kuśala*) without being pure (*anāsrava*); which should be abandoned (*heya*) and are abandoned by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*, #2980); which bear an excellent “mundane” fruit which is their retribution (*vipāka*).²⁶⁸ In regards to the *dharma*s of the supramundane order—beginning with the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*)—“hearing”, which is impure, cannot be their actual cause. It is “their condition qua dominance” (*adhipati-pratyaya*), for, without it, the pure primordial seeds, which are the cause of these *dharma*s, would not undergo the development necessary for their generation. “Hearing” perfumes the pure primordial seeds but does not bring them about.

There is perfume arising from hearing (*śruta-vāsanā*) which is pure; as such, it is “not to be abandoned” (*aheya* 非所斷攝), it is the actual cause, i.e., condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣) of the supramundane *dharma*s (出世法). – 〈This actual condition qua cause is a〉 subtle (微) cause, hidden (隱), difficult to know (難了). – This is why certain texts, e.g., the *Samgraha*, concern themselves only with the impure perfume arising from hearing, which is the coarse (麤) and manifest (顯) excellent (勝) condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya* 增上緣), and say, 〈in an expedient way (方便),〉 that it is the seed (*bīja*) of the supramundane mind. {2/20v.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Insofar as “hearing” exerts this nourishing action (the action of condition qua dominance [*adhipati-pratyaya*]) towards the pure primordial seeds (*bījas*), it generates a pure “perfume”. In other words, the seeds that it perfumes, without bringing them about, are pure and are the actual cause of the supramundane mind. This process of causality is difficult to understand. <115>

C.B.B.3.4.3. *Families (gotras) and seeds (bījas)*

#0467 According to the statement of YBh (T.30.1579, *juan* 52, see #0438), the distinct families (*gotras* 種姓) are established according to the hindrances (*āvaraṇas* 障).

²⁶⁸ *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0711c, on the *bhāvanā-heyas* (“to be abandoned by cultivation”) and the *aheyas* (“not to be abandoned”). – YBh (T.30.1579, *juan* 51) on retribution (*vipāka*).

But the author's thinking, i.e., Vasubandhu, is that the families have their *raison d'être* in the presence or absence of the pure seeds (*bījas*). That is to say:

1. If the pure seeds are completely absent in a person, that person belongs to the family "not determined to obtain *nirvāṇa*" (*aparinirvāṇa-dharmaka* 非涅槃法 or *agotraka*), because the seeds of both kinds of hindrances can never be destroyed in that person.
2. If a person possesses only the pure seeds pertaining to the two vehicles (二乘), this person belongs to the families of the hearer (*śrāvaka* 聲聞) or of the self-enlightened one (*pratyekabuddha* 獨覺), because the seeds of the hindrance to what is to be known (*jñeya-āvaraṇa* 所知障種) can never be destroyed in that person.
3. If a person also possesses the pure seeds of great *bodhi* (*mahā-bodhi*) or of the vehicle of the *tathāgatas* (or *buddha*) (佛), the seeds of the two kinds of hindrance (*āvaraṇa*) can be destroyed for good. This person belongs to the family of the *tathāgatas* (如來).

We see that whether or not the two hindrances can be abandoned (可斷) is due to the presence or absence of the pure seeds.

#0468 However, since the pure seeds, being subtle and hidden (微隱), (and difficult to know (難知)), {2/21r.} YBh establishes the distinction of the families (*gotras*) according to the hindrances (*āvaraṇas* 障).

[The doctrine is beyond doubt.] Aside from the pure seeds, what could be the cause which makes the hindrances to be either destructible (可害) or not destructible? Would one say that this difference in nature of the hindrances is due to the nature-of-things (*dharmatā*)? If you accept seeds of the hindrances to exist due to the nature-of-things (法爾), you must also accept the seeds of non-hindrance (*anāvaraṇa* 無漏法種), i.e., of liberation, to exist due to the nature-of-things.

If, (primordially (本),) the seeds of pure *dharmas* were completely absent (全無), then the noble path (*ārya-mārga* 聖道) could never arise. By means of what counteragent would one be able to destroy (能害) the seeds of the two hindrances in such a way that the distinction between the families (*gotras* 種姓) could be established according to the hindrances (依障)? Since the noble path could certainly not arise, it would also not be reasonable to say that it could, e.g., it would be absurd to attribute to hell beings the seeds of the future noble path (see #0439).

- #0469 In fact, the noble teachings (聖教) say in numerous places that <116> there are primordial (本有) seeds. <All contradict the position [of YBh]>. Thus, to maintain that all seeds arise <only with a beginning in time (始起)> is to contradict both reason and teachings.
- #0470 From this we know that there are two kinds of seeds of *dharmas*: <(1) those that are primordial (本有) and (2) those that are temporal, i.e., arise with a beginning in time (始起)>. {2/21v.}

C.B.C. *Six characteristics of the seeds (bījas). – Double causation. – Internal and external seeds.*

- C.1. Six characteristics of the seeds (*bījas*); #0472
 C.2. Double causation; #0481
 C.3. Internal and external seeds (*bījas*); #0483

C.B.C.1. *Six characteristics of the seeds (bījas)*²⁶⁹

#0472 Thus, seeds (*bījas* 種子) have, in short, six characteristics (六種):

#0474 1. The seeds are momentary (*kṣaṇika* 剎那滅):

Only that *dharma* which, <without interval (無間), necessarily> ceases as soon as it arises and which, consequently, can possess <superior power of> activity (*kāritra* 勝功力), can be a seed.

This definition excludes the permanent *dharmas* (常法). Being permanent and unchanging (*avikārin* 無轉變), they cannot be said to be capable of a generative operation (*janaka-kriyā* 能生用).²⁷⁰

#0475 2. The seeds exist simultaneously (*sahabhū*) with their fruit (果俱有):

Only that *dharma* which is simultaneous (俱) and actually connected with its fruit (果)—(namely, with the “actual” *dharma* or *dharma* “in action” [*samudācar*] which it must engender)—can be seed.

This definition excludes the *dharma* that is prior to the fruit (前後) (counter to the Sautrāntika-Sthavira) as well as the *dharma* that definitively has no relation to the fruit (e.g., Maheśvara) (定相離), [i.e., *dharmas*] that are not seed.

The seeds (種) and the actual *dharmas* (現) [i.e., their fruit] are of different

²⁶⁹ *Samgraha-bhāṣya*, Vasubandhu (T.31.1597.0329b).

²⁷⁰ This is explained very well in the Brahmanic sources, e.g., *Sarva-darśana*, translation of the Baudddha chapter, *Muséon*, 1902: 11–20.

type (異類), and thus can coexist (互) since they do not contradict each other (不相違): the “power” (*śakti*) that engenders (能生用) the actual *dharma* and the actual *dharma* itself coexist in a given individual (身).

On the contrary, [in terms of cause and fruit,] seeds of the same type (種子自類), <engendering one another (相生), certainly> cannot coexist (不俱有), for they would contradict each other (相違): seeds of the same kind generate one another in a series (前後). {2/22r.}

<Although a cause (因) may or may not exist simultaneously with its fruit (果)—> [(a) seed engenders the actual *dharma*: the cause is simultaneous with the fruit; (b) a seed engenders a seed that is similar to it: the cause is prior to the fruit] —nevertheless, we attribute “causal activity” (*hetu-kriyā* 因用) only to present things, not to future (un arisen) things and to past (already passed) things, which have no <117> “substance in and of themselves” (*svabhāva* = reality, 無自體). Thus, the name *bīja* (種子) is reserved for the seed as it engenders the actual *dharma* <or fruit> (生現果), not as it brings forth (引生) a *dharma* <or seed> similar to itself (自類).

Thus, it must be said that the seed exists simultaneously with its fruit.

#0476 3. The seeds form a continuous series (恆隨轉, *sadā-anuprabaddha* [?]):

Only those *dharma*s which, for a long period of time, continue as the same type in an uninterrupted series (一類相續) until the final state (究竟位), i.e., until the time when the noble path that counteracts (*pratipakṣa*) them appears, can be seeds.

This definition excludes [the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas for whom the six cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), i.e., the only cognitions they accept, are seeds]: but evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) are changeable (*vikārin* 轉易) and discontinuous (間斷), and thus are irrelevant, (i.e., are not associated with the seeds of *dharma*s).²⁷¹ [Matter (*rūpa*) too does not match the definition²⁷²].

This definition shows that seeds of the same type are engendered in succession (自類相生).

#0477 4. The seeds are determinate as to their ethical nature (*vinīyata* 性決定):

Only that *dharma* which possesses the capacity <or causal power (因力)> to engender an actual *dharma*, whether good, bad, non-defined, can be seed: this

²⁷¹ *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0135b).

²⁷² Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/7r. (T.43.1830.0310c12).

efficacy (功能) is determined (決定) [by the cause of the seed, namely, the good, bad, non-defined actual *dharma* that has perfumed or brought forth the seed].

This definition excludes (the doctrines of other Buddhist schools (餘部)), i.e., the Sarvāstivāda doctrine that a cause of a certain ethical nature (異性因) (good, etc.) can, (as condition qua cause (因緣)), i.e., as homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*), engender a fruit of another ethical nature (異性果).²⁷³ {2/22v.}

- #0478 5. The seeds depend on a complex of conditions (*pratyaya-sāmagrya-apekṣa* 待眾緣):

Only those *dharma*s which, in order to actualize their (extraordinary (殊勝)) efficacy (功能) to generate an actual *dharma*, depend on the coming together (合) of (their own respective complex of) conditions, can be seeds.

This definition excludes the cause called “nature” or “arising by itself” (*sva-bhāva*) (自然因) (#0119), accepted by certain non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道), a cause that (always and all at once) engenders its fruit (恆頓生果), without depending (on a complex of conditions or) on any condition. [It also excludes the causes <118> called Brahmā, etc.] Or else, it (excludes other schools (餘部)), i.e., condemns the advocates of past and of future existence, for whom the conditions are always present (緣恆非無).

This definition shows that—the required conditions not always being present—the seed (種) does not always (恆) and all at once (頓) engender its fruit.

- #0479 6. The seeds “induce” (*vin* 引) their specific fruit (*sva-phala-āvāhaka*) (引自果):

Only that *dharma* which respectively induces (and engenders) (*vinsheng* 引生) its own fruit, (such as matter (色), mind (心), etc., can be seed): [a seed of the mind (*citta*) brings forth mind, a seed of matter (*rūpa*) brings forth matter].

This definition excludes the non-Buddhist scholars’ (*tīrthikas* 外道) theory of the single cause (一因) engendering all fruits (一切果). Or else, it excludes (other schools (餘部)), i.e., the theory of the Sarvāstivādins, etc., for whom mind, matter, etc., are mutually “conditions qua cause” (*hetu-pratyaya*). [We accept that they are mutually “condition qua dominance” (*adhipati-pratyaya*).²⁷⁴]

²⁷³ Compare AKB ii, F 255ff. and *Vibhāṣā*, *juan* 18, which do not confirm what our author says.

²⁷⁴ See Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/11v. (T43.1830.0311c04); AKB ii, F 255–256; viii, F 142, and also Saṃghabhadra cited in note.

#0480 These six characteristics (or meanings (義)) belong only to the special “efficacies” (*śakti-viśeṣa* 功能差別) of the root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna* 本識) or store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*). {2/23r.} These efficacies alone (非餘) properly qualify seeds.

As for external seeds (外穀), such as (wheat seeds (麥),) rice seeds, etc., they are but a development (*pariṇāma* 所變) of *vijñāna* (識) due to the efficacies (or seeds) of *vijñāna*. They are called seeds (種) only by attribution (假立): they are not true seeds (實種子) (#0483).²⁷⁵

C.B.C.2. Double causation^a

#0481 The (power of the) seed (*bīja*), both external or internal,

1. insofar as it generates (*sheng* 生) the close fruit or the principal fruit (近正果) is called “generative cause” (*janaka-hetu* 生因);
2. insofar as it “projects” (*yin* 引) the distant fruit or supplementary fruit (*uccheṣa*) (遠殘果),^b (of such a kind that the fruit does not cease immediately), is called “projecting cause” (*ākṣepaka-hetu* 引因).^c

^a Some equivalences.²⁷⁶

1. Projecting cause (*ākṣepaka[-hetu]*), *qianyin* 牽引, #2504; AKB 16/15r.10 = iv, F 37; but there is also *yin* 引 = *ākṣip*, AKB iv, F 117, 198 and elsewhere.

²⁷⁵ Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/13r. (T43.1830.0311c28).

²⁷⁶ *Editors*: LVP comments below: “1. *ākṣepaka(hetu)*, *yinfā* 引發, *Siddhi*, viii, au début, Kośa, xvi, 15 a 10 = iv, trad. p. 37; ... 3. *āvāhaka(hetu)*, *qianyin* 牽引, *Siddhi*, viii, au début, ...”. Although in the AKB and in the references provided by LVP here, we find some support, but not unilateral, for rendering *ākṣepaka* as *yinfā* 引發, in his *Siddhi* references here, i.e., at #2504 and #2507, when Xuanzang discusses the ten causes, LVP renders the third cause, i.e., 牽引因, as *ākṣepa-hetu*, and the fifth cause, i.e., 引發因, as *āvāhaka-hetu*; likewise, throughout the CWSL and LVP’s translation and commentary, *ākṣepaka* is translated as *qianyin* 牽引 and *āvāhaka* as *yinfā* 引發. This is also supported by Wogihara (WG) and Hirakawa (HK):

<i>ākṣepaka-hetu</i>	牽引因 (WG.182a; HK.811a)
<i>āvāhaka-hetu</i>	引發因 (WG.213a; HK.435a)
<i>abhinirvṛtti-hetu</i>	生起因 (WG.103a; HK.837a)

Now, since his *Siddhi* references here, i.e., #2504 and #2507, are clear, LVP’s renderings might be an accidental error, we therefore adjust the renderings to the general usage in CWSL and in LVP’s translation: *ākṣepaka(-hetu)* = *qianyin* 牽引; *āvāhaka(-hetu)* = *yinfā* 引發.

2. Bringing-forth cause (*abhinirvṛtti[-hetu]*), *shengqi* 生起, #2505.

3. Inducing cause (*āvāhaka[-hetu]*), *yinfa* 引發, #2507. <119>

There are (#2614) the two kinds of causes mentioned here, the cause, which must be the projecting cause (*ākṣepaka-hetu*, *yin* 引), and the cause, which is the generative cause (*janaka-hetu*, *sheng* 生) or bringing-forth cause (*abhinirvṛtti-hetu*).

The expression *yinsheng* 引生 (#0475 and #0479) occurs at #1189, in order to characterize the action of condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*), which “opens-directs”. By translating “bringing forth” (*āvah*), one is not far from the meaning.

^b *can* 殘 = *uccheṣa*, AKB ii, F 121, where “a remainder of the fruit of retribution as life-force” is thus designated. – There is also *paribhukta*, *Vyutpatti*, 130, 35, the fruit that has already been enjoyed.

^c *Asaṅga’s Saṃgraha* (T.31.1594.0135b2).

Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0389c). – (1) The external seeds (*bījas*), in regard to the sprout (*āṅkura*), i.e., the near fruit, are the generative cause; in regard to the stem, branches, etc., i.e., the distant fruits, they are the projecting cause. (2) The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) (i.e., the internal seeds), in regard to name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*), is the generative cause; in regard to the sixfold sense-sphere (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*) and the other members of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), it is the projecting cause.

Kuiji, *Shuji* (T.43.1830.0312a12) cites a text by *Asvabhāva* which differs: “(1) The internal seeds, insofar as they engender the actual cognition (*vijñāna*), i.e., the near fruit, are the generative cause; in regard to name-and-matter, etc., they are the projecting cause. (2) The external seeds ...” as before.

Vasubandhu (T.31.1597.0330a20).

1. The internal seeds engender the “principal” (“direct”, *zheng* 正) fruit: they are the generative cause. They project the supplementary fruit: they are the projecting cause.

2. The present seeds engender the present body, the sixfold sense-sphere, etc.: they are the generative cause. They project what remains after death, the corpse [—on the corpse, see #0566; #0995, #2475—]: they are the projecting cause.

3. In the same way, the external seeds engender the plant in its entire development and project the rotten wood.

If the projecting causes were lacking, the body would disappear all of a sudden and all at once at death, just as this is the case for the body of illusory beings (AKB iii, F 30–31).

The bow and the arrow.

YBh, *juan* 10, ignorance (*avidyā*) projects, thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) generates (see #2614).

C.B.C.3. *Internal and external seeds (bījas)*

- #0483 The internal seeds (*bījas* 內種), which are primordial or brought forth by perfuming, must be perfumed in order (to be engendered and made to grow,) and to engender immediately the fruit (親能生果). They are, by nature, the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of the fruit.
- #0484 As for the external seeds (外種), sometimes they are perfumed, sometimes not.²⁷⁷ [They are actual *dharmas*, not “powers” (*śakti*) or seeds in the proper sense of the word.] They are not the condition qua cause <120> but the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*) of the fruit which they bring forth.
- #0485 The condition qua cause of this fruit is certainly the internal seed: the fruit of the seeds, just as the entire receptacle-world, is in reality the fruit (engendered from) internal seeds of the “non-personal” category (共相種), as we will explain below #0547–#0559.

C.B.D. *What is perfumed and that which perfumes*

- #0487 [In other terms, (1) that in which the seeds (*bījas*) can be brought forth or nourished, (2) that which brings forth or nourishes the seeds.]
- In dependence on what characteristics or meanings (義) can we speak of perfuming (熏習)?
- #0488 We speak of perfuming (*vāsanā* 熏習), i.e., bringing forth and nourishing (生長) seeds, when (four characteristics of) “what is perfumed” (所熏) and of “that which perfumes” (能熏; see #0432) are fulfilled.
- #0491 a. What is perfumed (所熏) must have four characteristics (or meanings (義)): {2/23v.}

²⁷⁷ Kuiji, *Shuji* (T43.1830.0312b18) quotes the *Samgraha* of Asvabhāva (T31.1598.0387–88): “Sesame (*atimuktata*, *tila*), etc., grows out of the manure; the manure does not perfume the sesame, it does not arise-cease with the sesame ... But when the flowers perfume the sesame seeds, they arise-cease with the sesame seeds ...” (see #0504).

#0493 1. What is perfumed endures (*āsthita-svabhāva* 堅住性):²⁷⁸

If a *dharma*, from beginning to end (始終), continues as a same type in a series (一類相續) and holds (能持) the “perfume” (*vāsanā* 習氣)—then it is perfumed (乃是所熏).

This definition excludes the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) and the mental factors (*caittas*) (Sautrāntika), sound (聲), (wind (風),) etc., which are not, by nature, this “permanence” (or “endurance”) (堅住) [i.e., no matter (*rūpa*) in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*), no evolving cognition during the attainment of non-ideation]—hence they are not perfumed (故非所熏).

#0494 2. What is perfumed is non-defined (*avyākṛta-svabhāva* 無記性):

If an even (平等) *dharma* is not incompatible (*aviruddha* 違逆: i.e., which does not contradict either good or bad) and receives the “perfume” (能容習氣)—then it is perfumed.

This definition excludes the power of what is good or of what is bad (善染勢力), i.e., what is too intense (強盛) to being imprinted (無所容納)—hence they are not perfumed.

Consequently, this definition excludes the eighth cognition of the *tathāgata* (如來) which is immaculate (淨) due to mirror-knowledge (*ādarśa-jñāna*) (see #3265), and which only carries along the formerly acquired seeds (*bījas*) (帶舊種) but does not undergo new perfuming (非新受熏), [does not receive new seeds].

#0495 3. What is perfumed is perfumable (*bhāvya-svabhāva* ?; 可熏性):

If a *dharma* is autonomous (*svatantra* 自在), not firm (堅密) like a stone (石) and (receives the traces (能受習氣)—then it is perfumed).²⁷⁹

This definition excludes the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) that depend on the mind (*citta*); {2/24r.} it excludes the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛta* 無為) (that

²⁷⁸ According to Vyutpatti, 98, 8.

²⁷⁹ Editors: Kuiji, Shuji (T.43.1830.0313a22), comments (translation: Alexander Mayer):

Compare, on the one hand, such a *dharma*, which is dominant, itself autonomous and without depending on another (若法為王而體自在。不依他起), with, on the other hand, [another *dharma*], which is not solid, itself insubstantial and easily receives perfuming (性非堅密。體是虛疏。易可受熏), unlike a stone, etc., [the latter *dharma*] is perfumable (非如石等是可熏習). If something is not solid, and is insubstantial, it can hold *bījas* (若不堅密。有虛疏故。可容種子). What is solid is otherwise (堅密不然).

are “firm or immutable” (堅密)—hence they are not perfumed). <121>

- #0496 4. What is perfumed is in close relationship (*samsrṣṭa* ? 共和合) with that which perfumes (能熏):

If a *dharma* is simultaneous with the perfuming (能熏), is sharing (the same time and) the same place (同時同處), and is neither identical (即) with the perfuming nor separate (離) from the perfuming—then it is perfumed (所熏).

This definition excludes (遮) another individual (他身), as well as the prior or later moment (刹那), (because there is no close relationship [with that which perfumes] (無和合義))—hence they are not perfumed (非所熏).

- #0497 Only the eighth cognition (*vijñāna*), i.e., when it is retribution (*vipāka*) (異熟識) (#0740), presents these four characteristics (四義) and (is thus perfumable (可是所熏)), but not the five mental factors (心所) of the eighth (#0581) and the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*).

- #0499 b. “That which perfumes” or “perfuming” (能熏) must have four characteristics (or meanings) (義):

- #0501 1. That which perfumes arises and ceases (*sa-utpāda-nirodha* 有生滅):

If a *dharma* is not permanent (*anitya* 非常), is provided with activity (作用) consisting in bringing forth and nourishing (生長) a seed (or trace) (*bīja* 習氣)—then it is perfuming (乃是能熏).

This definition excludes (遮) the unconditioned factors (無為) that are always identical (or immutable) (前後不變) and cannot (have the activity of) bringing forth and nourishing (生長用)—(hence they are not perfuming (故非能熏)).

- #0502 2. That which perfumes has eminent activity (*adhimātra-kriyā* 勝用):²⁸⁰ {24v.}

If a *dharma* arises and ceases (生滅), has great power (to increase and grow (力增盛)), and induces (能引) “perfume” (or traces) (*vāsanā* 習氣)—then it is perfuming (*bhāvanā* 能熏, see #0432).

This definition excludes (遮) the eighth cognition (i.e., the retribution-mind and its mental factors [異熟心心所]) and all other *dharma*s the power (勢力) of which is weak (羸劣) (i.e., the part of cognition which is image [i.e., *nimitta-bhāga*]; all the six cognitions when they are “arisen from retribution” [*vipākaja*] and

²⁸⁰ This eminent action differentiates the *dharma*s in question: (1) *rūpas* (matter) (that are image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]), which are not the action of “taking an object”, (2) minds that are generated spontaneously (*svarasena*), which take an object only in a weak way (Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/ 22r.–v. [T.43.1830.0313c25]).

are non-defined [*avyākṛta*])—hence they are not perfuming.

#0503 3. That which perfumes increases and decreases (增減):

If a *dharma* has eminent activity (勝用), is able to increase and decrease (可增可減), and plants (攝植)²⁸¹ the *vāsanā* (“perfume” 習氣)—then it is perfuming (能熏).²⁸²

This definition excludes (遮) the perfectly good *dharma*s (圓滿善法) of the “fruit of the *buddha*” for these *dharma*s do not increase and do not decrease—hence they are not perfuming. If these *dharma*s were perfuming (能熏), i.e., bringing forth or nourishing the seeds (*bījas*), then the four knowledges of the *buddha* (#3262) <122> would not be perfect (*paripūrṇa* 圓滿), it would be possible to <successively (前後) perfect the fruit of the *buddha*, which would then be of different grades, i.e., superior and inferior (勝劣)>.

#0504 4. That which perfumes is in close relationship (和合) with what is perfumed <and evolves (轉) along with it> (與所熏和合而轉):

Same explanation as above, #0496:

<If a *dharma* is simultaneous (與) with what is perfumed—sharing the same place and time (同時同處)—and is neither identical with what is perfumed nor separate (不即不離) from what is perfumed—then it is perfuming (能熏).>

This definition excludes another individual (他身), as well as the prior or later moment (刹那前後), because there is no close relationship (無和合義)—hence they are not perfuming (能熏).>

#0505 Only the seven evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識), with their mental factors (心所), have an eminent activity (勝勢用) and are capable of increase and decrease (增減). Having these four characteristics (義), they are “that which perfumes” or “perfuming” (能熏).

#0507 There is perfuming (*bhāvanā*; *xunxi* 熏習) when the cognition (*vijñāna*) that perfumes (= the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*] of one of the seven cognitions) (能熏) arises and ceases at the same time as the cognition that is perfumed (所熏) (= the awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*] of the eighth cognition). Indeed, at this moment, seeds (*bījas*) (= *vāsanā*) arise or grow (生長) in the perfumed cog-

²⁸¹ *shezhi* 攝植, envelop-plant.

²⁸² Cogitation (*manas*), up to the moment when it becomes pure (*anāsrava-avasthā*), grows and diminishes. The pure mind, in the period called causal (*hetv-avasthā*) in contrast with the fruitional period (*phala-avasthā*: fruit of *buddha*), increases and diminishes.

nitition (所熏中) in the manner in which the odor (熏) of the flower arises in the sesame seed (苳勝): flower and seed arise and cease at the same time (see #0483 [fn.]). Hence the name “perfuming” (熏習).

c. Seeds (*bījas*) and actual *dharma*s.

#0508 The perfuming cognition (能熏識) (i.e., the seeing-part of an evolving cognition), etc., arises from the seeds; arising, it is a cause which in turn perfumes seeds.

[Three *dharma*s are thus to be considered: (1) the seed that engenders, (2) the engendered “active” cognition, (3) the seed brought forth by the perfuming of the said cognition.] These three are, in order (展轉), cause and fruit (因果), and yet are simultaneous (俱時). – This is just as when the wick (炷) engenders the flame (焰) and when the flame engenders the incandescence (焦) of the wick; likewise, just as when the bundles of reeds (蘆束) mutually support one another. It is in accordance with reason to accept the simultaneity (俱時) of cause and fruit.²⁸³ <123>

#0509 1. [a] That which perfumes engenders the seed; [b] the seed generates the actual (現行) *dharma*: these two instances, in the nomenclature of the Little Vehicle, come down to the co-existent cause (*sahabhū-hetu* 俱有因) {2/25v.} generating the fruit of human activity (*puruṣa-kāra-phala* 土用果).²⁸⁴

2. The earlier (前) seed engenders the later (後) seed of the same kind: this is the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu* 同類因) inducing the fruit of equal outflow (*niṣyanda-phala* 等流果) (as the Great Vehicle—which does not accept that the actual *dharma* is a cause [*hetu*], i.e., as homogeneous cause, of an actual *dharma*—understands it).

These two are “causation” (*hetu-pratyayatā* 因緣性) (of a fruit (果)): apart from these two kinds of generation (—[a] the actual engendering the seed [*bīja*] and the seed engendering the actual; [b] the seed engendering the seed—), the other *dharma*s are not condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣). However, when [the

²⁸³ This problem has already been encountered above, #0447.

The comparison of the bundles of reeds (*naḍa-kalāpa*), *Samyutta*, ii, 114, in regard to *viññāna* and *nāma-rūpa*: *seyyathā dve naḍakalāpiyo aññam aññam nissāya tiṭṭheyum*; *Śālistamba-sūtra*, in my *Douze Causes*, F 28; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 561, n. 5.

On the simultaneous, i.e., the simultaneous factors that are simultaneous causes (*sahabhū-hetu*), AKB ii, F 252–255. – The Sarvāstivādin asserts the simultaneity of cause and result (the lamp and its light, the plant and its shadow, the three sticks that support one another); the Sautrāntika denies it.

²⁸⁴ AKB ii, F 248, 288.

dharmas other than these above] are given the name of condition qua cause—for example, the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* [of Sthiramati] discussing the members of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) (#2608)—[then the name] is given figuratively (假説). (On causality, see #0683–#0686).

- #0510 This is a summary exposition (略説) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) considered as “endowed with all seeds” (*sarva-bījaka* 一切種). <124>

C.C. *Mode of operation (ākāra) and object (ālambana) (of the store-cognition)*C.A. General theory of the parts (*bhāgas*); #0530C.B. General theory of the object (*ālambana*); #0547

#0512 (1) What is the mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相), (2) what is the object (*ālambana* 所緣) of this cognition (識), i.e., the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)? Vasubandhu answers (stanza 3ab, #0396):

*asaṃviditakopādi-sthāna-vijñaptikaṃ ca tat*²⁸⁵

#0514 “[The store-cognition] has WHAT IS APPROPRIATED (*upādi* 執受) and THE SITE (*sthāna* 處) for its object; but this object, like the mode of operation ⟨or COGNIZING⟩ (*ākāra* = *vijñapti* 了) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), REMAINS UNRECOGNIZED (*asaṃvidita* 不可知, #0578).”

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Ākāra means “aspect”: here the meaning is “mode [of operation]”, “manner of being”.²⁸⁶

By *vijñāna* 識, one should understand the substantial-part (*svābhāvika-bhāga*) of the *vijñāna*: what our author [i.e., Xuanzang-Dharmapāla] calls awareness-part (*sva-saṃvitti-bhāga*).

#0518 1. ⟨COGNIZE (了) means⟩ cognizing (*vijñapti* 了別) [or the “action of cognizing” (*vijñapti-kriyā*²⁸⁷)] which is the mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of the [*ālaya*]-*vijñāna*, for any *vijñāna* has cognizing as its mode of operation.

[*Vijñapti* is what is called the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分), “the part of the cognition that is seeing”.]

2. [The object (*ālambana* 所緣) of the store-cognition is twofold:

²⁸⁵ The stanza (*kārikā*) has *liao* 了, which stands for *liaobie* 了別 = *vijñapti*; it has *chu* 處, which stands for *chusuo* 處所 = *sthāna* (site).

See Sthiramati's commentary, Lévi, *Trentaine*, F 19.

²⁸⁶ *Editors*: Throughout his *Siddhi*, LVP translates *ākāra* mostly as “aspect”, but then also occasionally qualifies its meaning, as, for example, here and below at #0535. Based on this, we will mainly be using “mode of operation” for *ākāra*.

²⁸⁷ Our author attributes an action of cognizing” (*vijñapti-kriyā*) to *vijñāna*. But everyone knows that there is no thing here that thinks. Nevertheless, here there is a real entity (*dravya*) which exists because it cognizes, which has its essence in the action of cognizing. – Whatever one may be, one is Cartesian and Aristotelian despite oneself.

- a. site (*sthāna* 處);
- b. what is appropriated (*upādi* 執受).]

#0521 a. By SITE (處), i.e., a place (處所), we should understand the receptacle world (*bhājana-loka* 器世間),²⁸⁸ because it is the site that supports living beings (*saṃ-nīśraya* 所依).

- #0522 b. What is appropriated (執受) is twofold:
- i. seeds (*bījas* 種子);
 - ii. body endowed with faculties (*śendriyaka-kāya* 有根身).

[These two are called “what is appropriated” (*upādi*) because they are *upātta* (“made one’s own”, “appropriated”, #0561) by the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 識), <125> embraced (*parigraha* 攝, “incorporated”) into itself (自體), sharing its good or bad destiny (or its tranquillity and dangers) (*eka-yoga-kṣema* 安危).]

- i. By “seeds” (種子), we understand three kinds of traces (*vāsanā* 習氣):
 - a. traces in terms of image (*nimitta-vāsanā* 相);
 - b. traces in terms of name (*nāma-vāsanā* 名);
 - c. traces in terms of figurating (*vikalpa-vāsanā* 分別).²⁸⁹ {2/26r.}
- ii. Body endowed with faculties = the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 諸色根) and the bases of the sense-faculties (*adhiṣṭhāna*) (根依處).

#0523 <Both, i.e., what is appropriated (*upādi*) and the site (*sthāna*), are the [cognitive] object (所緣).>

C.C.A. General theory of the parts (*bhāgas*)²⁹⁰

A.1. Two parts (*bhāgas*); #0530

²⁸⁸ Compare the definition of the dependent (*paratantra*), *Sūtrālamkāra*, xi, 40 (*pada*, *artha*, *deha*); *Laṅkāvatāra*, 130, 9, *deha*, *bhoga*, *pratiṣṭhā*; *Madhyamakāvatāra*, 194.a

²⁸⁹ See #2235, #2794; compare the five *vastus* in the *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 224: [(1) name (*nāman*), (2) image (*nimitta*), (3) figurating (*vikalpa*), (4) correct knowledge (*saṃyag-jñāna*), (5) suchness (*tathatā*)].

²⁹⁰ See #0027. – As we shall see in the verse (*śloka*) cited on *Siddhi* F 129 under *b*, *aṃśa* is used as an equivalent for *bhāga* (part).

Our author, i.e., Xuanzang, has certainly read the *Buddhabhūmi-sāstra* (T.26.1530.0303b). – In regard to the parts (*bhāgas*) of pure knowledge and of knowledge without conceptual figurating (*avikalpaka*), see #2918, Kuiji, commentary on the *Vimśatikā*, 4/27r. (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1834.1007c).

- A.2. Three parts; #0535
- A.3. Four parts; #0539
- A.4. Three parts, two parts, one part; #0543

The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識)—in its “intrinsic substance” (*svabhāva* 自體, i.e., in its awareness-part [*svasaṃvitti-bhāga* 自證分], which is a real entity [*dravya*], #0536)—arises by the power of causes and conditions (因緣力). Arising, it has a twofold “objective” development (*pariṇāma* 變):

1. it develops (變), internally (= as internal “object”), as seeds (*bījas* 種) and as the body endowed with faculties (有根身),
2. it develops (變), externally (≠ as external “object”), as the receptacle world (器).

These diverse *dharmas*—developed from within itself [i.e., the store-cognition] (所變)—are its “image”-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分). In this image-part, the store-cognition finds its object (*ālambana* 自所緣), (based on which its mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) arises (起)).

#0526 [COGNIZING (*vijñapti* 了) in stanza 3a means that,] due to the object, (the store-cognition that is retribution (*vipāka*) (異熟識)) has an activity of cognizing (*vijñapti-kriyā* 了別用) with regard to its object (於自所緣). This activity of cognizing (了別用) is the “seeing”-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) of the store-cognition.

C.C.A.1. Two parts (*bhāgas*)

#0530 Each impure cognition (*vijñāna*), as soon as it arises (i.e., as soon as its intrinsic substance [*svabhāva* 自體] arises), appears (似...現) as two characteristics (*lakṣaṇa* 相):

1. as object of cognition (*ālambana* 所緣);
2. as subject of cognition (*sālambana* 能緣).²⁹¹ <126> {2/26v.}

²⁹¹ To the *suoyuan* 所緣 is opposed the *nengyuan* 能緣. – *Ālambana* is certain. I do not dare to create the word *ālambaka*, and I am certain as to rendering mind by the expression *sālambana* or *sālamba* = *sārammaṇa* = *sappaccaya*. See the Abhidharma texts, AKB ii, F 177; vii, F 39; also, *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, 84 (citing the Āgama); *Kathā-vatthu*, ix, 3–7; *Vibhaṅga*, 428; *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, 1185, 1508.

For *suoyuan*, *nengyuan*, AKB has *suoxing* 所行, *nengxing* 能行, translated into Tibetan by the equivalents of *grah*. – *grāhya* = *prameya* = *ālambana* = *artha*; *grāhaka* = *pramāṇa* = *sālambana* = *citta-caitta*.

In the same way, the “associates” of cognition (*samprayuktas* 相應法, or mental factors).

1. As for ⟨this characteristic of the⟩ object (所緣), it is the part (*bhāga*) of *viññāna* that is called image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分), the *viññāna* which is image.
2. As for ⟨this characteristic of the⟩ subject (能緣), it is the part of *viññāna* that is called seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分), the *viññāna* which is seeing.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

- a. *Majjhima*, i, 100. – Seeing one’s *mukha-nimitta*, i.e., the image of one’s face in the mirror.

Majjhima, iii, 225. – Cognition (*viññāna*) is distracted (*vikṣipta*), diffused (*visṛta*), when, having seen color by means of the eye, having heard sound by means of the ear ..., it pursues (*anusārin*) the image (*nimitta*) of the color, the sound

Majjhima, i, 119, the images (*nimittas*) are the good or bad “ideas” whereby one chases away the ones with the others.

For another meaning of *nimitta* [i.e., “marks”], see #0607.

- b. In the practices of concentration, the image (*nimitta*) is not, as Childers understands, the “sign” that the concentration has been obtained, but it is the image that the practitioner sees as soon as the concentration is obtained, “when the colored circle is seen equally well with the eyes open and shut”. – *Visuddhimagga*, p. 123.

- #0531 1. If the mind and mental factors (*citta* or *viññāna*, and *caittas*) did not have, in themselves, the characteristic (相) of “object” of cognition (所緣), they would not be directed (*ālamb* 能緣) at the object that is specific to them (自所緣境), or else, they would indistinctly be directed at all objects: with their specific object (自境) just as with the other objects (餘), and with the other objects just as with their specific object.

2. If the mind and mental factors did not have, in themselves, the characteristic (相) of “subject” of cognition (能緣), they would not be directed (能緣) at anything whatsoever, they would not take an object, they would not cognize, just as space (虛空), etc., does not cognize. Or else, we would end up [absurdly] saying that space, etc., also takes an object and cognizes.

#0532 Thus, the mind and mental factors certainly have two parts or aspects (相):

- a. image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分);
- b. seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分).

As the *Ghanavyūha* says (T.16.0681.0731c24):

Everything is merely cognition (有覺); the object of cognition (所覺義) <127> does not exist.

The subject-part (能覺分) and the object-part (所覺分) evolve (轉), however, by themselves. {2/27r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

With slight variations in T.16.0682.0757a14. — It is not too difficult to reconstruct one verse (*śloka*):

vedaka-mātrakaṃ sarvaṃ vedyam jātu na vidyate |
vedaka-vedya-bhāgau tu pravartete svayaṃ pṛthak ||

Or else: *bodhaka-mātrakam ...*

Kuiji, *Shuji* (3A/44r.4; T.43.1830.0318b03):

The first two quarter-verses (*pādas*) say that the mind, which is internal, exists; that the object, which is external, does not exist. The last two quarter-verses say that the mind is two parts (*bhāgas*): seeing (*darśana*) and image (*nimitta*). These are *svayambhū*, i.e., existing by themselves: because they are generated by the complex of their causes without depending on a thing that is external to the mind ...

C.C.A.2. *Three parts (bhāgas)*

#0535 1. If one would assume—with the early schools of Buddhism—that cognition (*vijñāna*) has, for its “condition qua object” (*ālambana-pratyaya*), a thing (*artha*) <or object (所緣境)> that is external to it <or apart from *vijñāna* (離識)>, this is established on the following definitions:

- i. the external thing (外境) is the object (*ālambana* 所緣) of cognition;
- ii. the internal image (which is our image-part [*nimitta-bhāga* 相分]) is the mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of cognition;
- iii. the seeing, i.e., that which sees (which is our seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga* 見分]) is the cognition itself, a real entity (*dravya* 事): for seeing is the intrinsic substance (自體相) of mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*).

In this tenet:

- a. the mind and mental factors, in other words, the cognition and its associates (*samprayukta*), have the same (同) “basis” (*āśraya* 所依): for they both have the

same moment of the faculty (*indriya*, i.e., sense-faculty of the eye, etc., mental sense-faculty) as their basis.

b. They have the same object (緣), for they both have the same moment of external blue as their object.

c. They have a similar (相似) mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相), for they all have the mode of operation of blue; but they are not the same mode of operation.

d. The associated *dharma*s—each is a real entity (*dravya*), a thing (事)—are undoubtedly “equal in number” (數等) (i.e., one cognition [*viññāna*], one sensation [*vedanā*], etc., at one time), but their characteristic (*lakṣaṇa* 相) is different (各異), in view of the fact that their modality (*xiang* 相 = *xiangzhuang* 相狀) is distinct (= in view of the fact that the operations of cognition [識] and of its associates, such as ideation, sensation [受想], etc., are distinct [各別]). <128>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to AKB ii, F 177, 267, Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0394c):

The mind and mental factors are called:

1. “having a basis” (*sāśraya*), because they depend on the sense-faculties (*indriyas*) (see #1120);
2. “having an object” (*sālambana*), because they seize their object (*viśaya-grahaṇa*);
3. “having a mode of operation” (*sākāra*) because they take on [*ākaraṇa*] a mode [of operation] [*prakāra*] according to the object;²⁹²
4. “associated” [*saṃprayukta*], i.e., “equivalent and united”, because they are “equivalent” (*sama*) and not non-united (*yukta*).

How are they equal?

By way of five equivalences (*samatā*): (1) basis (*aśraya*), (2) object (*ālambana*), (3) mode of operation (*ākāra*), (4) time (*kāla*), (5) [number of] of real entities (*dravya*). This last equivalence consists of the fact that, at a given moment, only one mind (*citta*) can arise; one mental factor (*caitta*) of each type (i.e., sensation [*vedanā*], etc.) is associated with this single mind: in the group of associates, there is one real entity or thing of each type.

²⁹² *Editors:* LVP translates here: “ayant un aspect (*sākāra*) parce qu'ils prennent forme d'après l'objet”. See footnote at AKB ii, F 177: “WOG.141.29–142.6: *sākārāḥ tasyaiv' ālambanasya prakāreṇa ākaraṇāt ...*”.

In his commentary on the *Viṃśatikā* (1/14v), Kuiji criticizes this definition; our text corrects this definition. – It is clear that the words *sama*, *samatā*, do not have the same meaning when it is a question (1) of basis (*āśraya*), of object (*ālambana*), of time (*kāla*), on the one hand, and (2) of mode of operation (*ākāra*) and of real entity (*dravya*), on the other hand. The first are identical; [as for the second,] the mode of operation is similar; the real entity is distinct.

On the associated ones (*samprayuktas*), #0581 and #0891 (Asvabhāva, *Samgraha-upanibandhana*, T.31.1598.0389c).

#0536 2. But when we recognize that things ⟨or objects⟩ (*artha*, *viṣaya*) (所緣境者) external to ⟨or separate from⟩ the mind do not exist, other definitions are necessary:

- a. the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分) is the object (*ālambana* 所緣) of cognition (*vijñāna*);
- b. the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) is the mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of cognition.

[On the one hand, the blue image; on the other hand, the action of cognizing (*vijñapti*) that sees the blue image.]

But these two parts (*bhāgas*) must have a basis (*āśraya* 所依):

- c. there exists what is called the “thing” (*dravya* 事) which is the basis and the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 自體) of the first two parts, and is called awareness-part (*svasaṃvitti-bhāga* 自證分), i.e., the part which is “awareness”.

If this part that cognizes the seeing-part were lacking, one would not remember (自憶) mind and mental factors, just as one certainly does not remember the images ⟨or objects⟩ (境) that one has never experienced (更).

[If one remembers that one has seen blue, then the cognition that one has seized blue has, in turn, been cognized. Thus, there is: (a) the blue image, i.e., the image-part, (b) the seeing of the blue, i.e., seeing-part, (c) cognition that one sees the blue, i.e., awareness-part.]

- i. Mind (心) and mental factors (心所) have the same ⟨faculties as⟩ basis (同所依根). {2/27v.}
- ii. They have a similar object (所緣), but not the same object: for cognition (*vijñāna*) <129> seizes the blue image as blue, sensation (*vedanā*) seizes it as pleasant, etc.

iii. They have a distinct mode of operation (行相): for the activity (*kriyā* 作用) of cognition is to cognize (*viññapti* 了別); the activity of sensation is to feel (領納), etc.

iv. The “things” (事) in question (i.e., cognition and its associates) are undoubtedly “equal in number” (數等) (one cognition, one sensation, etc.), nevertheless, their mode of operation (*xiang* 相 = *xingxiang* 行相 = *ākāra*) is different: for the “substances” (*ti* 體 = *tixiang* 體相) of cognition (識), of sensation (受), etc., are distinct.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

1. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the mind does not cognize itself. A moment of mind is cognized by the moment that follows. (See #0364.)

This problem is discussed in the *Jñāna-prasthāna* and in the *Vibhāṣā*, T.27.1545.0042c: “Does one knowledge (*jñāna*) cognize all *dharma*s?”; AKB vii, F 45 and note. (The *Vibhāṣā* mentions the opinion of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Dharmaguptakas, Mahīśāsakas, Westerners, Vātsīputriyas: for information on which see Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* [*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031]: Mahāsāṃghikas, thesis 10a, and Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/52,²⁹³ takes advantage). – *Kathā-vatthu*, v. 9, xvi, 4.

On “awareness”, *svasaṃvitti*, *svasaṃvedana*, see AKB iv, F 49; *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañcikā*, ix, 18, 24, *Madhyamakā-vṛtti*, p. 62, 63, etc. [The indications contained in these last two texts are summarized and explained by Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 250: knife, lamp, eye, memory.]

Above all, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, Tibetan version, pp. 166–170, transl. *Muséon*, 1910: 349. – Th. Stcherbatski, *Théorie de la connaissance*, 1926: 165–170.

2. The comparisons of the knife and of the finger-tip, *Ratnacūḍa-pariprcchā* (*Madhyamakā-vṛtti*, p. 62, Burnouf, *Introduction*, p. 561) [same doctrine of the invisible mind, etc., *Kāśyapa-parivarta*, Staël-Holstein, p. 144]. – Buddhaghosa explains: *agga* means *koṭi*, e.g., in the phrase: “He would touch his finger-tip with his finger-tip” (*Sumaṅgala-vilāsinī*, i, p. 235). – *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, pp. 255, 466; *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 228, and other treatises cited by Jacob, *Third Handful*, Bombay, 1911: 3; especially the verse (*śloka*) (*Prakaraṇa-pañcika*, p. 63; *Nyāya-kaṇikā*, p. 268) in which we are directly interested:

aṅgulyagraṃ yathātmānaṃ nātmanā spraṣṭum arhati |

²⁹³ As for the Buddha’s knowledge, see Vasumitra, *Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031): Mahāsāṃghikas, thesis 10 and Kuiji, *Shuji* 2B/ 53r.–v.

svāṃśena jñānam apy evaṃ nātmānaṃ jñātum arhati ||

Just as the finger-tip does not touch itself, so the knowledge (*jñāna*) does not cognize itself by a part of itself.

According to this, we ought to be speaking not of the *bhāgas* but of the *aṃśas* of *vijñāna*.

3. The *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra* (T.26.1530.0303a) cites the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*:

The mind and mental factors are called “evident” (*pratyakṣa*) because they <130> cognize themselves (lit.: because they realize [*sākṣātkar*] their “nature”). Otherwise, we would not remember the mind and mental factors, in the same way that we do not remember what we have not seen. ... Thus, the mind and mental factors illumine and cognize (*zhaozhi* 照知) themselves.

[Opponent:] – But things do not function like that in the world: the knife does not cut itself, the finger-tip does not touch the finger-tip.

[Reply:] – But do we not know that the lamp illumines itself [*Bodhicarya-avatāra-pañjikā*, ix, 18]?

[Opponent:] – How do you know that the lamp illumines itself? ...

[Reply:] – If it did not illumine itself, it would be enveloped in darkness (*tamasā āvṛtaḥ*).

[Opponent:] – But the lamp is not darkness. Why should it illumine itself?

[Reply:] – The pitcher and the garment are not darkness by nature; however, when they are not illumined by the lamp, they are enveloped in darkness and do not appear. They appear when the lamp illumines them. The lamp drives away the darkness and makes them appear: this is what is called “illumining”. The same for the lamp: it has as its nature to expel darkness, when it arises, and to make itself appear: this is what is called “illumining”.

The mind and mental factors, strong or weak, have this twofold action, (1) externally, to seize an object, (2) internally, to “realize” themselves (to be aware). Like the lamp that is able to illumine that which is “other”, it is also able to illumine itself. – It is not like the knife ...

Similarly *Nyāyabinduṭīkā-ṭippanī*, p. 32.

4. *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, Viz. S.S., p. 466.

[Opponent:] – Just as the finger-tip is not touched by the finger-tip, just so a “knowledge” (*jñāna*) is not seized (*grhyate*) by this very knowledge.

[Reply:] – We are not saying that the seizing (*grhīti*) of the object (*artha*) by the knowledge is itself seized. Indeed, this seizing is not an object of action (*nāsyāḥ karmabhāvaḥ*): in order for it to be object of action, it would be necessary that the seizing of the seizing would generate a fruit different from the seizing itself. This is not the case: when we say that the seizing is seized (that the knowledge is known), we mean that the seizing is, by itself, evident (*āvīrbhūta-svabhāva*). If it were not manifest, the objects too would not manifest: the manifestation of the objects depends on the manifest characteristic of knowledge (*yadi vaiṣā na prakāśeta nārthā api prakāśeran | tat-prakāśād-hīna-prakāśā hi te*).

In other words, it is said that there is *svasaṃvedana*, *svasaṃvitti*: not that a *dharma* is seizing itself, but because the mind is, by itself, luminous, manifest, aware: *bodhasya bodha-rūpatayotpattir eva svaprakāśakatvam*.

5. Dharmakīrti: *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārtha-dṛṣṭiḥ prasidhyati*. Thus: *svayaṃ-vedanaṃ tāvad aṅgikartavyaṃ anyathā jagad-āndhyaṃ prasajyeta* (*Sarva-darśana*, p. 15).

#0537 3. When the mind and mental factors (that arise one by one (一一生)) are examined in the light of reason (以理推徵), one sees that each of them has three parts (*bhāgas*):

a. One should distinguish:

i. “that which is to be known” (*prameya* 所量), i.e., the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*);

ii. the “means of knowledge” (能量) <131> or “action of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*), which is the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*);

iii. the “fruit of the means of knowledge” (量果), which is the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*) or “substantial”-part (*svābhāvika-bhāga*).²⁹⁴

b. The image-part and seeing-part (相見) must also have their support (所依) in a thing which is their “intrinsic substance” (*svabhāva* 體). [It cannot be accepted that the first two parts are “things” (*dravya*); for, if they were “things”, they would be external to the mind.]

This is what the verse of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* teaches:

The *nimitta* or internal image—appearing as if it were an external thing (似境相)—is the “object of the means of knowledge” (*prameya* 所量).

²⁹⁴ For that which is to be cognized (*prameya*), etc., see Kuiji, cited below, #0540 (fn.).

That which seizes this image (能取相) and the awareness (*svasaṃvitti* 自證)

Is, respectively, the “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa* 能量) and the “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala* 果).

The nature of these three is not differentiated.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

As G. Tucci has obligingly mentioned, the original of this verse (*kārikā*) has been preserved for us in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* by Jayanti Bhaṭṭa, Viz. S.S., i, p. 72; ii, p. 540:

yadābhāsaṃ prameyaṃ tat pramāṇa-phalate punaḥ |
grāhaka-kārasaṃvittiyos trayaṃ nātaḥ prthak kṛtam ||

That which is to be cognized (*prameya*) is the aspect in which the *vijñāna* appears. *Vijñāna*, insofar as it has the characteristic (or mode of operation) of “that which seizes” (*grāhaka-ākāra*) and the awareness (*saṃvitti*), i.e., the aware cognition, are the “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) and the “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*). These three [that is, *prameya*, *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala*] are not separate from *vijñāna*.

1. There is *zizhengfen* 自證分, literally *svasaṃvitti-bhāga*. Dignāga’s text, simply has *saṃvitti*. – Similarly in the verse: *avibhāgo hi buddhyātmā ... | grāhya-grāhaka-saṃvitti-bhedavān iva lakṣyate*. – The fourth part (*bhāga*), with which we will be concerned, *zheng zizheng fen* 證自證分 = *svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga* (awareness-knowing-part).

2. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, cited in the *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra* (T.26.1530.0303b11):

The mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta-dharmas*) have three parts (*bhāgas*): the first, *grāhya-bhāga* (所取分) (“that which is seized”); the second, *grāhaka-bhāga* (能取分), (“that which seizes”); the third, *svasaṃvitti-bhāga* (自證分) (“awareness”). These three parts (*bhāgas*) are neither one nor other (*tattva-anyatva*). The first is that which is to be cognized (*prameya* 所量); the second, “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa* 能量); the third, the “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) (*pramāṇa-phala* 量果).

The *Buddha-bhūmi* continues:

If one analyzes in a subtle way, we need four parts (*bhāgas*), that is, the three as above, and the fourth is the awareness-knowing[-part] (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti* 證自證分) ... (cited by our author, #0539). The first two are external ... (cited by our author, #0540). <132>

C.C.A.3. Four parts (*bhāgas*)

#0539 Finally, if the mind and mental factors are analyzed (*vibhaj* 分別) in a subtle way (細), we see that they have four parts (*bhāgas* 分), i.e., the three as explained above, and the fourth is the awareness-knowing-part (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga* 證自證分). {2/28r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The blue image, i.e., the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), is the object (*prameya*) of seeing, i.e., the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*), which is means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), “which sees the blue”. The fruit of this seeing is called awareness-[part] (*svasaṃvitti*), the “awareness that I see the blue”. The awareness-[part], which is the fruit of seeing, takes the seeing[-part] for its object; insofar as it takes an object, it must have a fruit which is called awareness-knowing[-part] (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti*), the “knowing that I am aware that I see the blue”, which cognizes the awareness[-part] as the awareness (*saṃvitti*) that cognizes the seeing[-part].

1. If a fourth part were lacking, by what would ⟨the third part⟩, i.e., awareness (*svasaṃvitti*) (自證分), in its turn, be known (*saṃ-vid* 證)? Awareness (*svasaṃvitti*), being a “part” (*bhāga*) of the mind (心分), must be known, [just like the seeing(-part) (*darśana*) is known by the awareness(-part)].

2. Moreover, if a fourth part were lacking, what would be the fruit (果) of the awareness-part (自證分)? But the awareness-part—being the “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa* 能量)—must have a fruit [of the means of knowledge] (*pramāṇa-phala*).

Someone might say: – The seeing-part (*darśana* 見分) is the fruit of the third part.

[Reply:] – That is impossible, [because if the seeing-part were its fruit, the seeing-part would always have to know the awareness-part (*svasaṃvitti*) by means of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), since (direct perception) would have to be its nature; but] the seeing-part (見分) is not always included in direct perception (非量攝). [Thus, the seeing-part (*darśana*) is not the fruit of the awareness-part. Thus, the latter has a fourth part for its fruit.] ⟨From this it follows that the seeing-part does not know (證) the third part, because that which knows itself (證自體) must be direct perception (現量).⟩

#0540 Various kinds of “parts” (*bhāga-vibhaṅga*):²⁹⁵

²⁹⁵ Everything up to #0543, with slight additions, is taken from the *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra*, T.26.1530.0303b (which undoubtedly depends to a great extent on Dignāga).

Of these four parts (四分), the first two are “external” (外), [in that the *vijñāna* as image, i.e., image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), appears as if being external (外), and the *vijñāna* as seeing, i.e., seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*), is concerned with this pseudo-external]. The last two parts are internal (内).

1. The first part, namely, the *vijñāna* as image, is only the object of cognition (*ālambana* 所緣 = object of the means of knowledge [*prameya*]); the other three are, in addition, also subject, i.e., having-an-object (*sālambana* = *pramāṇa*). <133>

2. The second part, namely, the *vijñāna* as seeing, has the first part for its object; it is sometimes “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa* 量), sometimes not “means of knowledge”; when it is means of knowledge, it is sometimes “means of knowledge” of direct perception (*pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* 現), sometimes “means of knowledge” of inference (*anumāna-pramāṇa* 比); [when it is “means of knowledge”, it has the third part (*bhāga*) as its “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*)].

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It is necessary to distinguish among the cognitions (*vijñānas*):

The second part (*bhāga*)—i.e., the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*)—of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and of the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) (i.e., eye, etc.) is—(1) [in terms of the store-cognition, directly cognizing its image (*nimitta*)], and, (2) in terms of the five cognitions, directly cognizing its image that proceeds from an archetype (i.e., the image [*nimitta*] of the store-cognition)—always and solely direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

The seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) of cogitation (*manas*) is never “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*).

The seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) is (1) direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*) (cognizing smoke, inferring fire from smoke); (2) sometimes, it is not “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) (cognizing a second moon that is not generated by visual cognition; cognizing the past or the future which do not exist, etc.).

Kuiji, commentary on the *Viṃśatikā* (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, 3/30r.; T43.1834.0999a24):

Before Asaṅga, two parts (*bhāgas*), i.e., image (*nimitta*) and seeing (*darśana*), the latter being direct perception (*pratyakṣa* 現量).

After Asaṅga, it is Dignāga who distinguishes three parts (*bhāgas*), i.e., image

(*nimitta*), seeing (*darśana*) and awareness (*svaśaṃvitti*) which are direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

Dharmapāla distinguishes four parts (*bhāgas*): the last two, i.e., awareness (*svaśaṃvitti*) and awareness-knowing (*svaśaṃvitti-śaṃvitti*), are direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

3. The third part (*bhāga*), namely, the awareness-part (*svaśaṃvitti-bhāga*), has the second, i.e., the seeing-part (*darśanabhāga*), and the fourth, i.e., awareness-knowing-part (*svaśaṃvitti-śaṃvitti-bhāga* 證自證分), for its object. [In both of these cases, it has the fourth as its fruit of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa-phala*).²⁹⁶] It is always direct perception (*pratyakṣa* 現量) since it realizes its very nature as *viññāna*. {2/28v.}

4. The fourth part, namely, the awareness-knowing-part, does not have the second—(because it would not serve any function (以無用故) since) it has already been taken as object by the third—for its object; it has only the third for its object and also for its “fruit of the means of knowledge”; it is always direct perception since it realizes its very nature.

The mind and mental factors are thus constituted by an amalgamation (合成) of four parts, which are object (*ālambana* 所緣) and subject (*sālamba* 能緣); which form a closed circuit without committing the error <134> of infinite regression (*anavasthā* 無窮過);²⁹⁷ which are not identical (非即), considering the diver-

²⁹⁶ The second, having the third as its fruit, is itself “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*).

The third, directed at the second, having the fourth as its fruit, is “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*), obviously; but, when it is directed at the fourth, what is its fruit? It is impossible that it is the fourth, because when it is directed at the second, the second is not its fruit ... *Cintyam etat* ... (Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/51–52).

²⁹⁷ Kuiji, *Viṃśatikā* (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, 3/29r.; T.43.1834.0998c25).

The measuring rod (foot, ten feet) is “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*); the cloth is “object of the means of knowledge” (*prameya*); knowing the measurements (number) is “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*).

Likewise, when the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) take *dharma*s for their object, we say they are four parts (*bhāgas*). – The seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) is “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*), the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) is “object of the means of knowledge” (*prameya*), the awareness[-part] (*svaśaṃvitti*) is “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*).

Likewise, when the awareness[-part] (*svaśaṃvitti*) takes the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) for its object, the seeing-part is “object of the means of knowledge” (*prameya*), the awareness[-part] is “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*), the awareness-knowing[-part]

sity of their action; which are not separate (非離), considering the unity of their substance (*svabhāva*); which, consequently, are four in number, without offending against the doctrine of *vijñapti-mātratā* (唯識理).

#0541 This is why a verse in *Ghanavyūha* states:

The mind of sentient beings is of two kinds, i.e., internal and external. Being internal (內) and external (外), all parts (*bhāgas*) Are entangled (纏)²⁹⁸ into “that which is seized” and “that which seizes” (所取能取). The seeing[-part] (*darśana*) is of various kinds.²⁹⁹

#0542 This verse means to say: The nature of the mind of sentient beings³⁰⁰ is constituted by the amalgamation (合成) of two [kinds of] parts (*bhāgas*). Whether internal or external, these parts are “entangled” (纏縛) into object and subject. The seeing[-part] (*darśana* 見) is varied: either means of knowledge (*pramāṇa* 量) or not means-of-knowledge (非量), either direct perception (*pratyakṣa* 現) {2/29r.} or inference (*anumāna* 比). (It has many different parts). Here, seeing (*darśana*) is to be understood as seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分).

C.C.A.4. *Three parts (bhāgas), two parts (bhāgas), one part (bhāga)*

#0543 The four parts (*bhāgas*) may be reduced to three parts (Dignāga, *Pramāṇa-*

(*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti*) is “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*).

When the awareness-knowing[-part] (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti*) takes the awareness[-part] (*svasaṃvitti*) for its object, the awareness[-part] is “object of the means of knowledge” (*prameya*), the *svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti* is “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*), and this same awareness[-part] (*svasaṃvitti*) is “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*), because there is the action of the cognition turning back on itself (返緣).

When, by means of the third [part], one is directed to the fourth, the fourth is “object of the means of knowledge” (*prameya*), the third is “means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa*) and the fourth part (*bhāga*) is “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*), for there is “means of knowledge” turning back on itself.

²⁹⁸ *chanrao* 纏繞 or *chanfu* 纏縛.

²⁹⁹ *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra*, T.26.1530.0303. – I can find only one approximate version in T.16.0681.0735a and T.16.0682.0761b06: “All internal and external things, whatever is seen, are only one’s own mind (內外一切物·所見唯自心). The mind of sentient beings is of two kinds: (1) that which seizes (*grāhaka*) and (2) that which is seized (*grāhya*) (有情心二性·能取及所取)”.

³⁰⁰ “Sentient beings” (眾生): this does not refer to the mind without conceptual figuring (*avikalpaka*) which is not “bound”.

samuccaya), because the fourth may be included in the third, (i.e., the awareness-part (自證分)): [their common nature is that of being “fruit of the means of knowledge” (*pramāṇa-phala*)]. <135>

Or they may be reduced to two (*Ghanavyūha*), because the last three are, in their nature, “taking an object” (*sāmba* 能緣) and, consequently, can be included in the “part that is seeing” (*darśana-bhāga*). By *darśana* (見) is meant “taking an object” (能緣).

Or they may be reduced to one, but not to the single part (*bhāga*) of Sthiramati (see *Siddhi* F 9) because, here, it is postulated that four parts make up only one part since their substance (體) is not different (別). As a verse in the *Laṅkā-avatāra* (入楞伽) states:³⁰¹

Because the mind (心) is attached (執著) to itself, the mind develops or evolves as what appears as external things (似外境).

That which is seen in this way (彼所見) does not exist. Therefore, there is only mind (唯心).

Thus, in many places, it is said that there is only one mind (唯一心). This expression “one mind” also includes the mental factors (*caittas*).³⁰² {2/29v.}

#0544 The mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of *viññāna* 識 is cognizing (*viññapti* 了別); the *viññapti* is the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) of *viññāna*.³⁰³

C.C.B. General theory of the object (*ālambana*)³⁰⁴

- B.1. The object that appears as if being external, i.e., the term “site” (*sthāna*) of the stanza (*kārikā*); #0547
- B.2. Internal object (i.e., what is appropriated [*upādi*]), which is twofold: seeds (*bījas*) and body endowed with sense-faculties (*śendriyaka-kāya*); #0561
- B.3. Various problems; #0568

³⁰¹ Chap. X, 101; Nanjio, p. 277:

svacittābhīniveśeṇa cittam vai sampravartate |
bahirdhā nāsti vai dṛśyam ato vai cittamātrakam ||

³⁰² Kuiji, *Shuji* (3A/55r.-v.).

³⁰³ Kuiji, *Shuji* (3A/55v.-58v.).

³⁰⁴ See section #2468.

C.C.B.1. *The object that appears as if being external, i.e., the term “site” (sthāna) of the stanza (kārikā)*³⁰⁵

#0547 <As for the term SITE (處) (in stanza 3a), what is meant is that) the eighth cognition or “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識), by the power of the “maturation” (*paripāka* 成熟力) of the common seeds (*bījas*) (*sādhāraṇa-bījas* 共相種), develops (*pariṇamati* 變) as the appearance (*-ābhāsa*) (似) of the receptacle world (*bhājana-loka* 器世間相),³⁰⁶ such as color (色), etc., that is to say, as the “fundamental material elements” (外大種) and as the “derivative material elements” (所造色).³⁰⁷

Although the *vijñāna* of each sentient being develops in this way in its own distinct way (各別), nevertheless, the result of this development (所變) is, <in terms of its characteristics (相),> “common”, i.e., it is similar (相似) for all: this is what makes the receptacle world, <i.e., the site (處所),> not being differentiated (無異). This is just as when many lamps (眾燈) are <136> assembled together (*dīpa-samūha* ?), the light (明) of each lamp is distinct, but the light of the collection of lamps is as if it were but one light. [The seeds of different sentient beings which contribute to the generation of the things that appear to all sentient beings are thus called “common seeds”: precisely, the common “common seeds”.]

#0549 Whose are the “cognitions that are retribution” (*vipāka-vijñānas*) that develop or evolve as these characteristics (相)?

#0551 1. According to the *Candragarbha-sūtra*, [the “cognitions that are retribution” are] the ones of all sentient beings. What are the reasons? For the *sūtra* says:

The world is generated all together by the dominant power (*adhipati-bala* 增上力) of the actions (業) of all sentient beings.³⁰⁸

#0553 2. *Dharmapāla refutes this opinion.* – If one would accept this opinion, one would have to think that then [i] the *vijñāna* of the *buddhas* (佛) and *bodhi-sattvas* (菩薩) would “truly” develop (實變) (—and not only by emanation

³⁰⁵ #0396, #0512.

³⁰⁶ Described in AKB iii, F 138.

³⁰⁷ The fundamental material elements (*mahā-bhūta*) and the derived material elements (*bhautika*), AKB i, F 21; ii, F 144, 314.

³⁰⁸ This is the doctrine of AKB iii, F 156, 184; iv, F 187 (*Morale Bouddhique*, F 168); but the author has in mind a Great Vehicle *sūtra* and the treatise (*śāstra*) called *Fo shuo lishi apitan lun* 佛說立世阿毘曇論, translated by Paramārtha (T.32.1644).

[*nirmāṇa*], see #0568, #0570, #3379—) as this “dirty land” (*kṣetra*) (雜穢土) here below; {2/30r.} and that then, conversely, [ii] the *viññāna* of the ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生) and lower sentient beings in general (i.e., the saints of the two vehicles and middling *bodhisattvas*) would “truly” develop as the pure excellent lands (淨妙土) either of this universe (the “spiritual mountain” [靈山] or *Gr̥dhra-kūṭa* [“Vulture Peak”], i.e., of the universe that we inhabit [*sahā-loka-dhātu*]) or of other regions (*Sukhāvatī* [“Land of Bliss”], etc.).

Moreover, can one believe that the saints (*āryas* 聖者) who, being weary with matter (*rūpa*) (厭離有色), are reborn in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界) would, although reborn at the top, continue to develop their “cognition that is retribution” as ⟨this impure land⟩, that is, the lower realms (*dhātus*)? What would be the use?

#0554 Therefore, the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-viññāna* 異熟識) which develops or evolves (變為) as this realm (*dhātu* 界) is the “cognition that is retribution” of sentient beings who presently inhabit this realm (*dhātu*) (現居) or who will be reborn there (當生). <#0555> It is true, the cited *sūtra* speaks of “all” (一切) sentient beings, but it is directed at only a small part (少分) of the sentient beings, for it envisages only the sentient beings whose actions are “common” (業同) and whose “cognition that is retribution” develops together (共變) and in unison.

#0557 But several objections or difficulties present themselves:

a. If this were so, then, when the receptacle world (器) is about to perish (壞),³⁰⁹ no sentient being <137> will be living there any longer, and no sentient being would be born there: then whose is the “cognition that is retribution” that develops (變為) as this ⟨realm (界)⟩, i.e., the receptacle world?

b. Moreover, the ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生) who are weary (厭離) with matter (色) and who are born in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界) have actually no material body (*rūpa-kāya* 色身): what would be the use for their “cognition that is retribution” to develop, in advance (預), as a lower realm (*dhātu*) (土) [under the pretext that they must some day fall from the realm of immateriality and be reborn below]? {2/30v.}

c. If one would presuppose, with the *Mahāsāṃghikas* and other schools,³¹⁰ that the gods of the *ārūpya* [i.e., realm of immateriality] possess a material body,

³⁰⁹ AKB, iii, F 182.

³¹⁰ AKB viii, F 135–141.

then there would be, between this material body (色身) and the other receptacle world (異地器) of land and water, the difference of subtle and coarse (羸細懸隔): the second could not serve as a support (*saṃniśraya* 依持 or a basis [*adhiṣṭhāna*]) for the first. Also, what advantage (益) would there be for the *vijñāna*, from on high, to develop as a receptacle below?

3. Correct explanation.

In fact, however, if a *vijñāna* develops as a receptacle (or land) (所變土), it is (basically (本)) because the receptacle must be a support (依持) or an enjoyment (*bhoga* 受用) for the material body (*sendriyaka-kāya* 色身) as which this cognition develops. Thus, the *vijñāna* develops as the receptacle in such a way that it supports and is of use (持用) to the body as which it develops (see #0563).

#0558 It follows from this that the *vijñāna* (識) of a sentient being born in another region (*dis* 他方, i.e., in another Trisāhasra universe³¹¹) can also develop (變為) as the stage (*bhūmi*) of this universe (此土) which corresponds to his own stage (自地).

Thus, a receptacle world (器世界)—whether at the time of its next disappearance (壞) and when it is no longer inhabited, or at the time of its appearance (成) and when it is not yet inhabited—is also not without actual existence (現有) [being the development of the *vijñāna* of sentient beings living elsewhere].

#0559 We have discussed above (#0547) the universe as the common enjoyment (*bhoga* 共受用) of sentient beings. But the different kinds of sentient beings—hungry ghosts (*pretas* 鬼), humans (人), gods (天) (*Viṃśatikā*, stanza 3; *Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0074c15)—do not see the same things: they have special “objects of enjoyment” (別受用). [The problem must be resolved according to the same principles.] <138>

C.C.B.2. *Internal object (i.e., what is appropriated [upādi]), which is twofold: seeds (bījas) and body endowed with sense-faculties (sendriyaka-kāya)*

#0561 1. Seeds (*bījas* 種子).

This refers to all the seeds of impure (*sāsrava*) *dharma*s (有漏法種), i.e., good, bad and non-defined, which are held (持) by the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識), {2/31r.} which are included (攝) in the very nature (性) of this cognition (*vijñāna*), and which are thus its object (*ālambana* 所緣).

³¹¹ “Great chiliocosm”, in Rémusat’s words, see AKB iii, F 170. – This is a *buddha* land (*buddha-kṣetra*), AKB iii, F 198; iv, F 229.

As for the seeds of pure (*anāsrava*) *dharmas* (無漏法種), although they rely closely (依附) on this *vijñāna*, nevertheless, not being included in its nature (性), they are thus not its object. (Although they are not its object, nevertheless,) it is not that they are “dissociated” (*viprayukta* 相離) from *vijñāna*: for, just as (the nature of) true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) (真如性), [these seeds] are not separate from *vijñāna*. Thus, in affirming their existence, we do not contradict the principle of *vijñapti-mātratā* (唯識).

#0563 2. Body endowed with sense-faculties (*śendriyaka-kāya* 有根身) (#0952).

To be considered here are [a] one’s own body and [b] the body of others.

a. By the power of maturation (*paripāka* 成熟力) of its particular or personal seeds (*bījas* 不共相種), my “cognition that is retribution” develops [i] as (what appears as (似)) the material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根) which, as we know, are subtle and invisible matter; [here the seeds are absolutely personal to me]; [ii] as (what appears as (似) the site (處)), i.e., the visible body, which supports the said sense-faculties (*indriya-āśraya-āyatana* 根依處); [here the seeds are undoubtedly personal; but the seeds of other sentient beings—sentient beings who indeed see my visible body—develop as my body at the same time as my own seeds: we thus have here personal “common seeds”].

That is to say, the material sense-faculties and the visible body that supports them are the internal (*ādhyātmika* 內) primary material elements (*mahā-bhūta* 大種) and secondary material elements (*upādāya-rūpa* 所造色).

b. By the power of maturation of its common seeds (*bījas* 共相種), my “cognition that is retribution” develops also as (what appears as (似) the site), i.e., the visible body (*indriya-āśraya-āyatana*), of other people (他身處). If this were not the case, I would have no vision, no “experience and enjoyment” (*bhoga*) of other people (受用他).

#0565 However, Sthiramati goes even further. He thinks that the “cognition that is retribution” of a certain individual also develops as (appearing as) (變似) the sense-faculties (*indriyas* 根) of others. This opinion is justified, he thinks, by a statement <139> in Aśaṅga’s *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (T.31.1599.0451b):

The *vijñāna* manifests (現) appearing as (似) the five bodily sense-faculties of oneself and of others. {2/31v.}

#0566 But Dharmapāla replies that the “cognition that is retribution” of one individual develops (能變) only as (what appears as (似) the site and) support of the

sense-faculties (*āśraya-āyatana* 依處) of others. This is so since I see another's ear; I experience it; but I do not need the ⟨sense-faculties (根)⟩, e.g., of hearing, of another, and the development of my *vijñāna* as the actual sense-faculties of another would be of no use to me. Besides, Asaṅga's text: ⟨“The *vijñāna* manifests appearing as the five bodily sense-faculties of oneself and of others”, can easily be understood as: “The *vijñāna* of each, ⟨i.e., of oneself and others (自他)⟩ develops as the sense-faculties of each”.

That the *vijñāna* of one individual develops as the visible body of another results from the fact that the corpse (尸骸) of a sentient being who is reborn in another stage (*bhūmi*) (生他地) or who has entered into *nirvāṇa* (般涅槃), continues to be visible (見相續). [This corpse is certainly not the development of the *vijñāna* of that individual.] (See *Siddhi* F 119.)

C.C.B.3. Various problems

- #0568 1. We have seen [i.e., #0557 (“Correct explanation”)] that *vijñāna* does not develop indifferently as the various realms (*dhātus* 界) and stages (*bhūmis* 地) (i.e., external receptacle world [外器] and internal body [內身]): rather, it is a question of the development that proceeds from the power of actions (業力).

But the cognition also develops by the power of concentration (*samādhi* 定), the power of a resolution (*pranidhi*), etc.: in this case, there is no fixed rule (決定) regarding the receptacle, the body, the realm and the stage, the personal body or the body of another. [For example, the cognition of the practitioner who possesses the divine eye³¹² develops as objects that are visible to that eye, even though of a stage (*bhūmi*) higher than that in which the practitioner is born.]

2. The bodies and receptacles (身器)—as which *vijñāna* develops—are, in most cases, a continuous series (恆相續); [but, nevertheless, some insects die at birth].

On the other hand, sounds (聲),³¹³ light (光), color and the smell of flowers usually last only a little time (暫時)—although sometimes also as a series—for they depend on (擊發起) the power of present conditions (現緣力).

- #0570 3. We have dealt briefly [#0563] with the various things ⟨and objects⟩ (境) as which <140> this eighth cognition develops: i.e., the impure seeds (*bījas*), the ten material sense-spheres (*rūpa-āyatanas*) (—of which five are both “internal” [*ādhyātmika*] and “external” [*bāhya*]; of which five, namely, the five sense-

³¹² *Vibhāṣā* [T.27.1545.0978c04].

³¹³ Sound (*śabda*) does not form a series (Abhidharma); see #0928; Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/80r.

faculties, are internal³¹⁴—) {2/32r.} and the real matter (*rūpa* 色) that is part of the sense-sphere of *dharma*s (*dharma-āyatana*) (namely, the matter [*rūpa*] seen during concentration).³¹⁵

#0572 It may be asked: – Why does this eighth cognition not develop as ⟨what appears as (似)⟩ mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*), as formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas*; see #0215), as unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*; see #0326), as non-existent things (*abhāva-dharma*s), and does not take these various categories for its object (*ālambana*)?

#0574 [Reply:] – There are two kinds of development of cognitions (*viññānas*).

In general (略), impure cognition (識變) is capable of two kinds of development:

- a. development by the power (勢力) of causes and conditions (因緣);³¹⁶
- b. development by the power of figurating (*vikalpa* 分別), a mental application (*manaskāra*).³¹⁷

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The first development proceeds from action (i.e., condition qua dominance [*adhipati-pratyaya*]), from the seeds (*bījas*) of name-speech (see *Siddhi* F 92). There is good reason to distinguish the development of the eighth cognition and the development of the first five cognitions (*viññānas*): but this development as the one or the others is generated spontaneously, without any intellectual operation (*vikalpa*) whatsoever. – For cogitation (*manas*) and mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*), the development presupposes figurating (*vikalpa*). (#0062, #0070)

(1) The *dharma*s that result from the first development necessarily have reality and activity (用); (2) the *dharma*s that result from the second are merely (但) objects of cognition (*viṣaya* 境).

But the eighth cognition, ⟨i.e., the cognition that is retribution (異熟識),⟩ is [merely] capable of the first development, ⟨i.e., by causes and conditions (隨

³¹⁴ AKB i, F 35, 73.

³¹⁵ The [Viññānavāda] School—as we have seen, #0205—does not accept the non-informing *rūpa* (*avijñapti-rūpa*) (being part of the sense-sphere of *dharma*s [*dharma-āyatana*]) of the Sarvāstivādins; but it does accept a certain *rūpa* brought forth by concentration, AKB iv, F 18. [The Yogācāra of which AKB speaks is indeed the *viññāna-vādin*, according to which the practitioner (or *yoga-ācāra*) sees]

³¹⁶ Kuiji, *Shuji* 3A/82r.

³¹⁷ Compare “mental application (proceeding from) resolution” (*adhimukti-manaskāra*), AKB ii, F 325; vi, F 150.

因緣)), not of the second. Thus, the *dharmas*, i.e., matter (*rūpas* 色), etc., which proceed (or develop) from the eighth cognition and which we have reviewed [#0563], must have and indeed do have real activity (實用).

a. It cannot be accepted that [the eighth cognition] develops as mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*), for then the mind and mental factors as which it would develop—being only the <141> image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分) of the eighth—would not take an object (能緣), and would thus be without real activity (無實用).

[Objection. – You say that minds and mental factors arise from the eighth cognition. Therefore it must be that the latter develops as mind and mental factors.]

Answer. – It is indeed from the eighth cognition that the real activity (實用) of the seven cognitions and their associates arises for they enjoy (*bhuj*) its image-part, i.e., the objects as which [the eighth cognition] develops. (See #0778.)

b. Nor does the eighth [cognition] develop as unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas* 無為) or as formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas*), which also do not have a real activity.

⟨Thus, the cognition that is retribution (異熟識) does not have mind (心), etc., as objects.⟩

[All of the above is understood in relation to the impure (*sāsrava*) eighth cognition.]

#0575 When the eighth cognition reaches the pure state (*anāsrava* 無漏位, *buddha*, #0741), it is associated with a preeminent understanding (*prajñā* 勝慧). {2/32v.} Although it is then without conceptual figurating (*avikalpaka* 無分別), without any intellectual operation³¹⁸ that would seize an image, nevertheless, it is clear (and pure) (*prasanna* 澄淨); it thus also manifests (現) all of these images (影) of unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*), of minds (*cittas*), etc., however deprived these *dharmas* are of real activity (實用). In the contrary hypothesis, the *buddhas* (佛) would not be omniscient (遍知). [He knows the non-existent (*abhāva*), since he knows the non-existent as non-existent ...³¹⁹]

But as long as it is in an impure (*sāsrava*) state (漏位), the eighth cognition, (i.e., this cognition that is retribution,) takes only (1) the receptacle world (器),

³¹⁸ 籌度. – *avikalpaka* (without conceptual figurating), #2918.

³¹⁹ The Vaibhāṣikas think that the non-existent (*abhāva*) cannot be the object of cognition and cite the *sūtra*: “It is impossible that I cognize, that I see that which does not exist in the world”, AKB v, F 64.

(2) the body (身) and (3) the impure seeds (*bījas* 種) for its object.

#0576 When it resides in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界) or the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu* 色界), (it takes these three for its object).

Residing in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界), it takes only the impure seeds for its object. The gods of this realm (*dhātu*), who are detached (厭離) from matter (*rūpa* 色), have nothing to do with the matter that is the fruit of action (*karma* 果); (they only have the matter that is the fruit (果) of concentration (*samādhi* 定)); but there is no conflict with reason (理無違) in terms of the eighth cognition taking the matter (*rūpa*) brought forth by concentration for its object.

#0578 (The term UNRECOGNIZED (*asaṃvidita* 不可知) [in stanza 3a] means that) this mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相, i.e., the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*], the cognizing (*viññapti*) or the action <142> of cognition) of the eighth cognition is extremely subtle (*aṇu-sūkṣma* 極微細), therefore difficult to recognize (了知).³²⁰ – Or else, the eighth cognition is called unrecognized (*asaṃvidita*) [i] because its internal object (i.e., the seeds and the faculties which the eighth seizes and holds) (內執受境) is also extremely subtle, [ii] because its external object (i.e., the receptacle world) (外器世間) is unfathomable in its “magnitude” (量難測). {2/33r.}

#0579 However, the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins ask: “If the mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of the eighth cognition (and the objects (所緣境) that it seizes) are unrecognized (*asaṃvidita*) (or difficult to know (難知)), how is it then that the eighth is a cognition (*viññāna* 識)?”

We answer the branch-Sautrāntikas [*Siddhi* F 222] who, like the Sthaviras, believe in a subtle mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*): “You yourself rightly accept that, during the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定), a certain cognition (識) does not leave the body (身), the mode of operation of which is unrecognized (*asaṃvidita*) (#0991; #1035). Thus, you should be able to accept that the eighth cognition is always this kind of cognition”.

³²⁰ *asaṃvidita* = *bu ke zhi* 不可知, which cannot be known. – “to observe” = *ke liao zhi* 可了知. – *liao* 了, *upalabh*.

We recall that the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) is cognized by the awareness-part (*sva-saṃvitti-bhāga*) which, by being directed at the seeing-part, generates the awareness-knowing-part (*svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga*). The meaning is then: “The eighth cognition generates, with difficulty, an awareness of the cognition of its object”.

But as for the Sarvāstivādins who deny the existence of cognition during the attainment of cessation, we say to them: “The cognition certainly remains during the aforesaid attainment (*samāpatti*) (滅定), since the practitioner—who is plunged into it—is classified among ‘sentient beings’ (*sattva* 有情), just as (he is classified among them) when he is, in your opinion, endowed with mind (*sacitta* 有心). The same is also true for the gods without ideation (*asaṃjñin* 無想), etc.”. (See #0270 and #1022.³²¹) <143>

³²¹ Sthiramati (Lévi, *Trentaine* F 19 [5b]), like our author, also puts forward the example of the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*). – He explains Vasubandhu’s text (stanza 3ab): *asaṃvidita-upādi, asaṃvidita-sthāna-vijñapti*: What is appropriated (*upādi*), i.e., one of the two objects of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), is unrecognized (*asaṃvidita*); the cognizing (*vijñapti*) of the site (*sthāna*), i.e., the second object, is likewise unrecognized. The term *asaṃvidita* (unrecognized) should be understood as *aparicchina*: non-determined, indistinct. What is appropriated (*upādi*) is not recognized (*saṃvidita*) by a cognition “this is in that, this is that”; it is not the object of a cognition that says *idam*: “this”. The cognizing of the site seizes this object (which is susceptible to a distinct cognition) in an indistinct way.

C.D. *Associated dharmas (saṃprayuktas) (of the store-cognition)*

D.A. Five mental factors (*caittas*) of the store-cognition; #0581

D.B. Sensation (*vedanā*) of the store-cognition; #0618

D.C. Other mental factors (*caittas*); #0629

C.D.A. *Five mental factors (caittas) of the store-cognition*

#0581 With how many “mental factors” (*caittas* 心所) is this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) associated (*saṃprayukta* 相應, #0535)?

#0582 Vasubandhu says in stanza 3cd:

sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṃjñā-cetanānvitam.

ASSOCIATED (相應) ALWAYS WITH (常與) CONTACT (*sparśa* 觸), MENTAL APPLICATION (*manaskāra* 作意), SENSATION (*vid* 受), IDEATION (*saṃjñā* 想) AND VOLITION (*cetanā* 想).

#0583 The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識)—since beginningless time and up until the moment of the realization of the “transmutation of the support” (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 轉) (#3180, the first path of adamant concentration [*vajrapamāsamādhi*])—is, in all its states (*avasthā* 位, #0728), ASSOCIATED (相應) ALWAYS WITH (恆與 = 常與) these five mental factors (*caittas*) that are, indeed, included in “universal mental factors” (*sarvaga* 遍行, #1641; #1052), namely, with contact (*sparśa*), mental application (*manaskāra*), sensation (*vedanā* = *vid*), ideation (*saṃjñā*) and volition (*cetanā*).³²²

C.D.A.1. *Contact (sparśa)*^a

#0587 1. CONTACT (*sparśa* 觸) means “the coming together of the three” (三和).

It is “analogous to”, <or a “cut out” of,> the transformation of the three (*vikāra-pariccheda* 分別變異) and has for its nature (性) to cause the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) to contact the object (觸境).^b

<Contact has for its activity (業) to be the support (依) for sensation (受), ideation (想), volition (思), etc.>

#0592 “Coming together of the three” (*trika-saṃnipāta* 三和). – The triad is the sense-faculty (*indriya* 根), the object (*viṣaya* 境) and the cognition (*vijñāna* 識). Their

³²² *Editors:* In LVP’s *Siddhi*, this paragraph is followed by an inserted paragraph: “As we have seen ...”, which in the original CWSL is rendered on *Siddhi* F 149 (= #0620). We have moved this paragraph back to its original place.

coming together occurs when these three conform to one another (相隨順): eye, blue and visual cognition Not: ear, odor and visual cognition.

These three pre-exist in the state of seeds (*bījas*). Contact, which itself also pre-exists in the state of seed, relies on these three to arise (依彼生). Arising, <144> it causes these three to come together (和合). Contact is thus called the “coming together of the three”.

“Transformation” (*vikāra* 變異). – Before the coming together, the three do not have the efficacy (*sāmarthya* 功能) adequate for the generation of mind and mental factors (生心所). But at the moment of the coming together (和合位), {3/1v.} [the three <conform to each other (有順)> and] acquire this efficacy. This transformation, this acquired activity, is called *vikāra* (變異).

“Cut out of the transformation” (*vikāra-pariccheda* 分別變異). – Contact resembles this transformation <and is thus called its “cut out” [or “being analogous” to it]>. [That is to say: it possesses—for the generation of mind and mental factors—a power similar to that which the three transformed things possess. Therefore it is called *vikāra-pariccheda*, for it is the “cut out” (分別) of the transformation, for it can be said that a son is the “cut out” of his father.^c]

#0593 [The three are all transformed at the moment of making contact.] However, it is <the inducing power (力引) of> the transformation (變異) of the sense-faculty (*indriya* 根) that has the preeminent role (勝) in the generation of contact. This is why the *Samuccaya-sāstra* (集論), etc., (which is followed by Sthiramati) merely defines contact as the cut out of the transformation of the sense-faculty (*indriya-vikāra-pariccheda* 分別根之變異).

#0594 Causing all mind and mental factors to come together in such a way that, non-dispersed, they come in contact with the object, this is the intrinsic nature of contact (*sparśa*).

^a On contact (*sparśa*), AKB iii, F 96, where the Pāli sources are cited; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, pp. 553–554: *Douze Causes*, F 20–22; *Études Asiatiques*, 1925, i, pp. 370–371.

Stcherbatski comes up against the difficult problem of contact (*sparśa*), “a real sensation (*sparśa*)”, “definitive sensation”, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, 1923: 16–17.

^b Sthiramati’s explanation is different (S. Lévi, *Trentaine* F 20 [6a] (transl. based on LVP and on Jacobi):

tatra sparśas, trika-saṃnipāta, indriya-vikāra-paricchedaḥ,

Contact (*sparsā*) is the discernment (or recognition) (*pariccheda*) of the modification (*vikāra*) of the sense-faculty (*indriya*)—a modification occurring when the coming together of the triad takes place (*trikaṣaṃnipāta*).

vedanā-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Contact has for its activity to be the support of sensation (*vedanā*).

indriya-viṣaya-vijñānāni trīṇy eva trikam | tasya, kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvena samavasthānam, trika-saṃnipātaḥ |

“Triad” (*trika*) refers to three (things), i.e., sense-faculty (*indriya*), object-field (*viṣaya*) and cognition (*vijñāna*). (When these three occur in a causal relationship with each other (*kāryakāraṇabhāvena*), i.e.,) when the sense-faculty and the object-field bring forth the cognition (*vijñāna*), then this is what is meant by the “coming together of the triad” (*trikāsaṃnipāta*).

tasmin sati, tat-sama-kālam evendriyasya sukhādi-vedanānukūlo yo vikāras tena sadṛśo viṣayasya sukhādi-vedanīyākāra-paricchedo yaḥ, sa sparśaḥ |

At this moment, (i.e., when the coming together of the triad takes place,) there occurs, (at the same time (*samakāla*),) a modification (*vikāra*) of the sense-faculty (*indriya*), which is favorable (*anukūla*) to a pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant or neutral sensation (*vedanā*). [The sense-faculty is affected in a certain way, when, with the object, it brings forth the cognition.] In conformity with this modification, similar to this modification (*sadṛśa*) [of the sense-faculty], there takes place a discernment (or recognition) (*pariccheda*) of the quality (*ākāra*), which the object-field (*viṣaya*) has, of being able to be experienced (*vedanīya*) in a pleasant (*sukha*), etc., way. This discernment is called contact (*sparsā*).

indriyaṃ punar yena viśeṣeṇa sukha-duḥkhādi-hetutvaṃ pratipadyate, sa tasya vikārah |

(The modification of the sense-faculty, however, is that quality of the sense-faculty whereby it becomes the cause (*hetu*) of pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*duḥkha*), etc., [sensation].)

sparsaḥ punar, indriya-vikāra-sādṛśyenendriyaṃ sprśatīndriyeṇa vā sprśyate iti, sparśa ucyate |

This discernment “contacts” (*sprśati*) the sense-faculty by the fact that it is in harmony (or has similarity) (*sādṛśya*) with the modification of the sense-faculty (*indriya-vikāra*); or else, one can say that the discernment “is contacted” (*sprśyate*) by the sense-faculty (since it is in harmony (or has similarity)

with the modification of the sense-faculty). Hence its name *sparsā* (contact).

ata eva, viṣaya-vikāra-paricchedātmako 'pīndriya-vikāra-pariccheda uktaḥ |

This is why—although it consists of the discernment of the modification of the object (*viṣaya-vikāra*)—it is defined as (= *ātmako*) “discernment of the modification of the sense-faculty” (*indriya-vikāra-pariccheda*).

*vedanā-saṃniśrayatvaṃ asya karma | evaṃ hy uktaṃ sūtre sukha-vedanīyaṃ
sparsaṃ pratītyotpadyate sukhaṃ veditam iti, vistaraḥ |*

⟨Its activity (*karma*) consists in the fact that it is the support (*saṃniśraya*) for sensation (*vedanā*). A *sūtra* indeed says: “In dependence (*pratītya*) on the—as pleasant sensation to be experienced (*sukhavedanīya*)—contact, there arises the pleasant sensation (*sukha*), etc., as that which is sensed (*vedita*).”⟩

- ° This meaning of *pariccheda*, [i.e., cut out,] is not known in our lexicons. – Our text has: “The contact (*sparsā*) being generated similar to that (i.e., to the transformation [*vikāra*]) is called *pariccheda*”. <145> The comparison “like a son who resembles his father is called *fenbie* 分別 (cut out) of his father” is from Kuji, *Shuji* 3B/4r.6.

- #0596 2. The activity (*karman* 業) of contact (*sparsā*) is to be the support (*saṃniśraya* 依) of the four other mental factors (*caittas*), i.e., mental application (*manaskāra*), sensation (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*) and volition (*cetanā*), for contact is similar to the efficacy (功能) that is adequate (順) for the generation of the mental factors, to the efficacy belonging to the three when they have come together.

- #0597 Indeed, the *Sūtra of the Arising and of Ceasing* (起盡經)³²³ says that the aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊) of sensation (*vedanā* 受), ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) and formations (*saṃskāras* 行) have contact for their condition (*pratyaya* 緣). This is why the *sūtra* says [a] that cognition (*vijñāna* 識) arises from the coming together (和合) of two causes (因): the sense-faculty and object (*indriya-viṣaya-dvika*), for example, the eye and color, etc.; [b] that contact (觸) arises from the coming together of three [causes] (*indriya-viṣaya-vijñāna-trika*): sense-faculty, object and cognition, e.g., eye, blue, visual cognition; [c] that the other mental factors (受等) arise from the coming together of four [causes] (*indriya-viṣaya-vijñāna-sparsā-catuṣka*): the same three plus, e.g., the contact of the eye.

- #0598 3. If contact is the support of all the mental factors, why does YBh (T.30.1579.0291c,

³²³ The *Qijin jing*, so called because it explains birth and cessation.

0601c) merely say that contact is the support (所依) of three mental factors, i.e., sensation, ideation and volition? {3/2r.}

Because volition (思) is preeminent (主勝) in the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāra-skandha* 行蘊) inasmuch as it “instigates” (*abhisamṣkar*) action.³²⁴ Naming *cetanā* (volition) is, thus, naming the other mental factors of the aggregate of formations (*saṃskāra-skandha*).

4. The *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605) teaches that contact (*sparsā*) is the support of sensation (*vedanā* 受依) because contact is the near (近) and predominant (勝) principle in the generation of sensation. That is to say, the marks (*nimitta* 相) of agreeable (*manojñā* 可意), etc., which are seized by contact (觸), are very close (極相鄰近) to the marks of advantageous (順益), etc., (*āhlādaka*, *paritāpaka* ...),³²⁵ which are seized by sensation (受). Contact <146> thus is more important than any other mental factor for the inducing of sensation (cf. #1064).

#0599 5. Someone may ask if contact (*sparsā*) is merely a designation (假) of the simple fact of the coming together of the three, as the Sautrāntikas would have it (see #1065), or if contact is something separate.

Contact is, (in its nature (自性),) a separate real (實) thing (and not a figurative designation (假)), for it (is, in its nature, a mental factor that) constitutes one of the six hexads of *dharmas*, for it is (included as a form of) nutriment (食, see #1006), for it is a “condition” (*pratyaṃyā* 緣, i.e., a member of dependent origination [*pratītya-samutpāda*]), just as sensation (*vedanā*) and the other mental factors (*caittas*) (which are, by nature, not the same as the coming together of the three (三和)).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB iii, F 96, where the *Ṣaṭ-ṣaṭka-dharma-paryāya* is cited (*Majjhima*, iii, 180). – *Samghabhadra*, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0385b).

C.D.A.2. Mental application (*manaskāra*)

#0601 1. MENTAL APPLICATION (*manaskāra* 作意) has for its nature (性) to “bend” (*ābhoga*, *ābhujana* 能警) the mind (*citta*).

³²⁴ Definition of the Abhidharma, formations (*saṃskāras*) = the six groups of volition (*cetanā-kāyas*) (AKB i F 28), repeated in the *Samuccaya*.

³²⁵ The equivalences *shunyi* 順益 = *āhlādaka* (“refreshing, reviving”) and *sunhai* 損害 = *paritāpaka* result from the comparison of the *Siddhi* and of the *Triṃśikā*, S. Lévi, F 20. – But the version *anukūla* (favorable), *pratikūla* (unfavorable), is not excluded.

[Mental application] has for its activity (業) to direct (*āvarj* 引) the mind to the object (*ālambana* 所緣).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

“Directing” = *yin* 引 = *āvarj*, *adhyāhar*, *niṣkarṣ*.

#0602 It is called *manaskāra* (mental application) because (first in the stage of seed [*bīja*], then “in action”) it arouses (警覺) the seeds of the mind (心種) that ought to be generated (起) (when the other conditions being given) and directs this mind—once arisen—in such a way that it goes to the object (趣境). {3/2v.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It appears as if *ābhoga* should be understood as “bend”—despite the comments in *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, i. 16—in the expression *anābhoga* (*Muséon*, 1914).

However, *ābhoga* = *jing* = *jingjiao* 警覺 = warn-awaken = “arouse”.

Although it also exerts the same activity ⟨of inducing and directing (引起)⟩ in regard to the mental factors (*caittas* 心所), nevertheless, the text does not speak of the mental factors ⟨but merely of inducing the mind⟩ because the mind (心) is the ruler (主).

#0603 2. [a] According to Saṃghabhadra,³²⁶ mental application (*manaskāra*) causes the mind to turn towards (迴趣) another object; or, [b] according to the *Samuccaya-sāstra* (and also according to Saṃghabhadra), it holds the mind (*cittadhāraṇa* 持心) fixed (住) on one object.

These explanations are not reasonable and are to be rejected because, <147> by accepting the first [= a], mental application would not be universal (*sarvaga* 遍行), and, according to the second [= b], mental application (*manaskāra* 作意) ⟨would not be different (不異) from⟩ concentration (*samādhi* 定).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 154: *manaskāra* [mental application] = *cetasa ābhogaḥ* [is the bending or orienting or alerting of the mind] = *ālabane cetasa āvarjanam avadhāraṇam* [that which makes mind lean toward its cognitive object and that restricts mind to the cognitive object]. – *manaskāra* = *manasaḥ kāraḥ* [is explained as an act by the mind] or *manaḥ karoty āvarjayati* [the mind acts in making (itself) lean toward] (see #0210).

Abhisamayālaṃkāra-āloka:

³²⁶ *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0389c25).

cetasa ābhoga ālambane cittadhāraṇātmakaḥ

The bending of the mind; the mind being held fixed on its cognitive object.

Compare Sthiramati, *Trentaine* F 20 [6a], which differs in detail (transl. based on Jacobi):

manaskāraś cetasa ābhogaḥ | ābhujanam ābhogaḥ | ālambane yena cittam abhimukhī-kriyate |

Mental application is (in a manner of speaking) the bending (*ābhoga*) of the mind, whereby this mind is turned towards (*abhimukhīkriyate*) its cognitive object (*ālambana*).

⟨The word *ābhoga* comes from the verb *ābhuj* (to bend).⟩

sa punar ālambane citta-dhāraṇa-karmakaḥ |

Mental application has for its activity to bring it about that the mind is held fixed (*dhāraṇa*) on its cognitive object.

citta-dhāraṇam punas tatraivālambane punaḥ punaś cittasyāvarjanam | etac ca karma, citta-santater ālambana-niyamena viśiṣṭam manaskāram adhikṛtyoktam, na tu yaḥ prati-citta-kṣaṇam | tasya hi pratikṣaṇam eva vyāpāro, na kṣaṇāntare |

To hold the mind fixed (on its cognitive object) consists in the fact that the mind is directed again and again on its cognitive object. This activity applies to that kind of mental application which—by means of the mind being fixed on an object—is characterized as a chain (*santati*), but this activity does not apply to that mental application which occurs in every moment (*kṣaṇa*) of the mind; for the latter functions (*vyāpāra*) only in one moment and does not function in a later moment.

On the role of *manaskāra* = *samanvāhāra* [holding] (*samanvāharaṇakṛtya*) in cognition, *Majjhima* i, 190; *Kathā-vatthu*, xxvii, 8; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, pp. 554, 567; see #1657.

Various types of *manaskāras*, AKB ii, F 135.

C.D.A.3. *Sensation (vedanā)*

- #0605 1. SENSATION (*vedanā* 受) has for its nature “to experience (*anubhava* 領納) the favorable (順), pernicious (違), neither favorable nor pernicious characteristics (俱非) of the object”.

Sensation has for its activity to generate “thirst” (愛), for it generates the desire

(欲) for reunion (*saṃyoga* 合), for separation (*viyoga* 離), for neither of them.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 20 (6b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

vedanā anubhava-svabhāvā |

Sensation is experience (*anubhava*) in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*).

sā punar viṣayasyāhlādaka-paritāpaka-tad-ubhayākāra-vivikta-svarūpa-sākṣāt-karaṇa-bhedāt tridhā bhavati, sukhā, duḥkhā, aduḥkhāsukhā ca |

Depending on whether the object-field (*viṣaya*) is realized (*sākṣātkaraṇa*) as being delightful (*āhlādaka*), painful (*paritāpaka*) or in a nature (*svarūpa*) different from both (*ubhaya*) of these modes (*ākāra*), sensation is threefold, i.e., pleasant, unpleasant or neither pleasant or unpleasant.

evam tv anye manyante | śubhāśubhānām karmaṇām phala-vipākam pratyanubhavanti anenety, anubhavaḥ | tatra śubhānām karmaṇām sukho 'nubhavaḥ phala-vipākah | aśubhānām duḥkhaḥ | ubhayeṣāṃ aduḥkhāsukhaḥ |

Others, however, have a different opinion:

“Experience” (*anubhava*) is that by which one experiences, according to the case (*pratyanubhavanti*), the ripening or retribution (*vipāka*) of the fruit (*phala*) of good (*śubha*) or bad (*aśubha*) actions (*karma*).

The ripening or retribution of the fruit of good action is pleasant experience; that of bad [action] is unpleasant experience, that of both (simultaneously), however, is neither pleasant nor unpleasant.

tatra cālaya-vijñānam eva śubhāśubha-karma-vipākah |

Now, however, the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) itself is the karmic ripening or retribution (*karma-vipāka*) of good or bad action.

tat-saṃprayuktaivopekṣā paramārthataḥ śubhāśubhānām karmaṇām phala-vipākah | sukha-duḥkhaḥ tu, kuśalākuśala-karma-vipākajativāda, vipākopa-cārah |

The indifference (*upekṣa*) that is associated with the store-cognition is, in truth (*paramārthatas*), the ripening or retribution of the fruit of good and bad actions; pleasant and unpleasant (experiences), however—because they arise “from” the ripening or retribution (*vipākaja*) of good or bad actions—are called, in a figurative way of speaking (*upacāra*), (karmic) ripening or retribution (*vipāka*).

tatra sukho 'nubhavo, yasminn utpanne, 'viyogecchā, niruddhe ca, punaḥ saṃyogecchā jāyate | duḥkho 'nubhavo, yasminn utpanne, viyogecchā, niruddhe ca,

punar asaṃyogecchā | aduḥkhāsukho, yasminn utpanne niruddhe cobhayaṃ na jāyate |

“Pleasant experience” is (the state) from which one does not wish to be separated (*aviyogecchā*) once it has occurred; is (the state) with which one wishes to be united again if it has disappeared.

“Unpleasant experience” is the state from which one wishes to be separated (*viyogecchā*) once it has occurred; is the state with which one does not wish to be united again if it has disappeared.

“Neither pleasant or unpleasant experience” is (the state) where, when it occurs or disappears, both [above mentioned consequences] do not occur.

#0607 2. According to Saṃghabhadra,³²⁷ sensation (*vedanā*) is of two kinds:

- a. sensation qua object (*viṣaya-vedanā* 境界受), that is, experiencing the object (領所緣);³²⁸
- b. sensation qua intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vedanā* 自性受), that is, “experiencing the simultaneous contact (*sparsā*) (領俱觸), (i.e., the contact conducive to pleasurable experience [*sukha-vedanīya-sparsā*], etc.)”.

Only the second, i.e., sensation qua intrinsic nature, constitutes sensation proper, is the specific characteristic of sensation (*vedanā-svalakṣaṇa* 受自相), <148> for the first, i.e., sensation qua object, (is shared (共) by the [specific] characteristic of other [mental factors]), i.e., is not distinguished from the mental fac-

³²⁷ Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0384a):

What is called sensation (*vedanā*) is the experience (*anubhava*)—favorable (to the body), pernicious, neither favorable nor pernicious experience—of the agreeable, disagreeable or neither agreeable nor disagreeable contact (*sparsā*).

Saṃghabhadra, *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0338c26):

Sensation is of two kinds, (1) *zhiqu* 執取受 *vedanā*, (2) *svabhāva-vedanā* (*zixing* 自性受). The first is the experience (*anubhava*) of the thing that is its object (*svālabhāna-viṣaya*, *zi suoyuan jing* 自所緣境); the second is the experience of contact (*sparsā*) that accompanies it: this is why the Bhagavat spoke of contact conducive to pleasurable experience (*sukha-vedanīya-sparsā*), etc. (see AKB iii, F 100).

(There follows an interesting analysis of several *sūtras*.)

zhiqu 執取 represents *anubandha* (“to bind”) in AKB vi, F 139; the meaning here is clearly “to perceive”, “to seize”.

³²⁸ *jingjie* 境界 which is object-field (*viṣaya*) (see AKB iv, F 18), object-domain (*gocara*) (*Vyutpatti*, 65).

tors (*caittas*) in general, which all are “experiencing the marks (*nimitta*) of the object”.

#0610 This opinion is not reasonable:

- i. Sensation (*vedanā*) certainly is not directed (*ālamb* 緣) at the concomitant (*sahaja* 俱生) contact (*sparśa*). {3/3r.}
- #0611 ii. One cannot say, due to the very reason that [sensation] arises “similar to contact” (似觸), that it would be called “experiencing contact” (領觸), for, on this account, every fruit resembling its cause (i.e., the fruit of equal outflow [*niṣyanda-phala*]) (似因之果) would be sensation in its nature.
- #0612 iii. Moreover, if sensation experiences its cause, i.e., contact, it should be called *hetu-vedanā* (因受): “sensation of its cause” or “experience of its cause”, and not “experience qua intrinsic nature (自性)” (*svabhāva-vedanā*).
- #0613 iv. It is also not reasonable for you to say: “Just as the king (王) consumes his kingdom (國邑), sensation experiences the nature of sensation (*vedanā-svabhāva* 受體) arisen from contact (觸所生), and thus it is called sensation qua intrinsic nature ([*vedanā*-]*svabhāva-vedanā* 自性受)”, without abandoning your doctrine of the “non-awareness (non-*vedanā*) of itself” (不自證); [Saṃghabhadra does not accept self-awareness (*svasaṃvedanā*) or awareness (*svasaṃvitti*): mind and mental factors cannot take themselves for their object.]
- #0614 v. If, finally, you call it experience qua intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vedanā*) because it never abandons its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), then all *dharma*s would be called experience qua intrinsic nature.
- #0615 ⟨Thus, this explanation of Saṃghabhadra only seduces infants (誘嬰兒).⟩
- #0616 In fact, “sensation qua object” (*viśaya-vedanā*) is not ⟨shared (非共) by the [specific] characteristic of⟩ the other mental factors (*caittas*), because—although the other mental factors “experience” the object—⟨it is definitively what is called sensation qua object⟩ which, alone, experiences the object in its favorable (順), pernicious (違), etc., characteristics (相); (this is not shared by the others).

C.D.A.4. Ideation (*saṃjñā*)

#0617 IDEATION (*saṃjñā* 想) has for its nature to seize the “marks” of the object³²⁹

³²⁹ Sthiramati, *Trentaine* F 21 [6b] (transl. based on Jacobi):

(*viṣaya-nimitta-udgrahaṇa* 於境取像). {3/3v.}

[Ideation] has for its activity <149> (—when it is mental [*mānasī*]—) to devise and provide (施設) the various names-and-words³³⁰ (*nānā-abhidhāna-prajñapti-karmikā* 種種名言為業). When the distinct marks of the object (境分齊相) have been established (*vyavasthita* 安立)—“This is blue, this is not-blue”—only then can the various expressions (種種名言) corresponding to these marks be generated (隨起) (common characteristics, see #0375).

C.D.A.5. Volition (*cetanā*)

#0618 VOLITION (*cetanā* 思) has for its nature to “condition or instigate” (*abhisamskāra* 造作; AKB ii, F 154) the mind (*citta* and *caittas*).

saṃjñā viṣaya-nimittodgrahaṇam |

Ideation is the seizing (*udgrahaṇa*) of the mark (*nimitta*) of the object-field (*viṣaya*).
viṣaya ālambanam | *nimittam tad-viśeṣo, nīla-pītādy-ālambana-vyavasthā-kāraṇam*
 | *tasyodgrahaṇam nirūpaṇam nīlam etan na pītam iti* |

“Object-field” (*viṣaya*) means the cognitive object (*ālambana*).

“Mark” (*nimitta*) means a particularity (*viśeṣa*) of [the object-field] which brings it about that the cognitive object is exactly established as “black”, “yellow”, etc.

“Seizing (*udgrahaṇa*) of [the object-field]” is the recognition (or examination) “this is blue, not yellow”.

AKB i, F 29; ii, F 154, 177, *saṃjñā* = *saṃjñāna* [conceiving] = *viṣaya-nimitta-grahaṇa* [seizing or apprehension of the marks of the object-field] = *viṣaya-viśeṣa-rūpa-grāha*. – *nimittam vastuno vasthāviśeṣo nīlatvādi tasyodgrahaṇam paricchedaḥ*.

Atthasālinī, p. 110 [transl. Pe Maung Tin]:

nīlādibhedam ārammaṇam sañjānāti ti saññā. sā sañjānanalakkhaṇā paccabhiññā-narasā ...

The noting of an object as blue-green, etc., is perception. It has the characteristic of noting and the function of recognizing what has been previously noted.

The expression *nimittam* (*anuvyañjanam*) *gaṇhāti* (*Mahā-vastu*, iii, p. 52; *Majjhima*, i, 119 ...) is explained in the *Saundarananda*, xiii, 44 (see also Rhys Davids-Stede). Childers translates it very well as “to fall in love”. – The monk should not know whether he is dealing with a man or a woman. – The two marks (*nimittas*), i.e., male and female, are part of the list of ten marks (*nimittas*), namely, the five sense-spheres (*āyatana*s): visible form, ... tangible; male and female; arising, duration-change, passing away (AKB viii, F 185). – Above, #0530, the six sense-spheres (*āyatana*s), i.e., the mark of visible form (*rūpa-nimitta*), ...

³³⁰ *abhidhāna* (expression), for lack of a better term, for *mingyan* 名言. See #2600.

Volition has for its activity to maneuver (*niyojana* 役)³³¹ the mind towards the good, etc. Volition seizes the object in its relationships with the good, etc.; seizing this characteristic (相) of the object, it carries out action: it maneuvers (驅役) the mind in such a way that the latter generates the good, the bad, the non-defined.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 21 (7a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

*cetanā cittābhisamṣkāro, manasaś ceṣṭā | yasyām satyām, ālambanaṃ prati cetasaḥ
praspanḍa iva bhavaty, ayaś-kānta-vaśād ayaḥ-praspanḍavat |*

Volition (*cetanā*) is the conditioning or instigating (*abhisamṣkāra*) of the mind (*citta*), an activity (*ceṣṭā*) of the **manas*³³² so that during its occurrence the mind moves (*praspanḍa*), so to speak, towards its cognitive object (*ālambana*), just as iron (*ayaś*) moves due to the influence of a magnet (*ayaskānta*).

#0619 <These five mental factors are included in the universal (遍行) *dharma*s and are therefore definitively associated with the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識). The characteristic of their universality will be explained later at length [#1649].>

#0620 As we have seen (#0536), although these five mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., differ from the store-cognition, i.e., the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*), in regard to (1) the mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) (i.e., the seeing part [*darśana-bhāga*] or cognizing [*viññapti*]), nevertheless, i.e., <similar in terms of time (時), basis (依), object (所緣), thing (事), etc., that is, they are> (2) simultaneous with the store-cognition, (3) having the same basis as the store-cognition; (4–5) their object (*ālambana* = image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) and the thing (*dravya*) that they are (i.e., the awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]) resemble the object and the “thing” of the store-cognition. Thus, they are said to be ASSOCIATED (*saṃprayukta* 相應), i.e., being “equivalent and united”, with the store-cognition.

³³¹ *quyi* 驅役, i.e., “to stimulate, excite”, is the translation of *niyojayati*, AKB 30/7v.10, where I have translated “to direct and use”. The man directs the horse at work, memory is directed to and used for the object to be remembered.

³³² *Editors*: Jacobi translates “innere Sinn” and Lévi “le Mental”, i.e., their translation for the seventh cognition, but the context seems to suggest that *manas* here is not used in the technical sense limited to the seventh cognition, but rather to mind in general. The meaning of *manas* varies according to context, and sometimes, although not often, the context is not clear enough to determine what kind of *manas* is meant in a specific passage. We therefore mark all such occurrences of *manas* with an *.

C.D.B. *Sensation (vedanā) of the store-cognition*

[Vasubandhu says in stanza 4a (Chin. 3d):]

upekṣā vedanā tatra.

IN (the store-cognition), THE SENSATION IS ONLY THE NEUTRAL SENSATION.

a. [There is incompatibility between the store-cognition and the other two sensations:]

- #0624 1. The mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) (= *darśana-bhāga*) of this cognition (*viññāna*) is extremely non-acute (極不明了) [and, therefore, in harmony with this sensation, whereas the other sensations require a clear seeing].
2. This cognition does not discern (*pariccheda*) the <150> favorable or unfavorable (遑順, *anukūla*, *pratikūla*) marks (*nimitta*) of the object. {3/4r.}
3. It is subtle (微細); [and the other sensations are of a gross order].
4. It is of a single type (一類 *eka-jatīya*, *avikārin*); [and the other sensations involve change].
5. It evolves in an uninterrupted series (相續); [and the other sensations involve discontinuity].

Therefore, the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*) occurs ONLY (唯) associated with NEUTRAL SENSATION (捨受).

- #0625 b. Moreover, the sensation associated with this store-cognition is only retribution (*vipāka* 異熟), because it comes exclusively from the action that has previously projected the existence (*ākṣepaka-karman* 引業), without depending on present conditions (*pratyaya* 現緣). It “proceeds spontaneously” by the power (勢力) of good or bad actions (善惡業) (*-bala-svarasa-vāhinī*). Thus it can generate only the neutral sensation (捨受). – The other two sensations (of pain and pleasure (苦樂)) are not true “retribution” (非真異熟) but “arisen from retribution” (*vipāka-ja* 異熟生),³³³ for they depend on present conditions, i.e., favorable or unfavorable objects. (Thus they are not associated with this cognition.)

- #0626 c. Moreover, if sentient beings always seize their store-cognition as their inner “I” (*svam abhyantaram ātmānam* 自內我), it is because the store-cognition is perpetual (常) and homogeneous (無轉變). If it were associated with the two

³³³ On *vipākaja* (“arisen from retribution”), AKB i, F 68; ii, F 265, 271, 290, 320. – See #0407, #0502.

sensations (of pain and pleasure (苦樂)), it would be heterogeneous (轉變): it could not be seized as an “I” (我). (Therefore, it is only associated with the neutral sensation.)

- #0627 d. If the store-cognition is associated [only] with neutral sensation, how can this cognition also be the retribution of bad (*akuśala* 惡) actions? {3/4v.}

You accept that good (善) actions generate (招) neutral sensation;³³⁴ it should also be the same for bad actions. In fact, just as the non-defined (*avyākṛta* 無記) is not opposed to good and to bad: good action and bad action generate (招) non-defined *dharma*s; in the same way, neutral sensation is not opposed to (the classes of) pain (苦) and of pleasure (樂) [which are—in an existence that is “general reward”, i.e., the fruit of the action that projects existence—that which is called “specific reward”, i.e., the fruits of complementary actions].

C.D.C. Other mental factors (*caittas*)

- #0629 a. Why is this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) not associated with the five mental factors (*caittas*) with special (objects) (*vinīyata* 別境, see #1668, #0745)? <#0631> (Because (these mental factors and this cognition) are opposed to each other.) <151>

#0633 Indeed:

1. Predilection (*chanda* 欲) is the desire-aspiring (希望) for a “considered” thing (*abhiprete vastuny abhilāṣaḥ* 欲希望所樂事).

The store-cognition proceeds (*pravartate*) spontaneously (任運) by the power of action and is foreign to desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望).

2. Resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解) is the ascertainment (印持) regarding a determined thing (*niścite vastuny avadhāraṇam* 印持決定事).

The store-cognition is dull (瞢) and obscure (昧), free of ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印持).

3. Memory (*smṛti* 念) is the remembering (唯明) of a familiar thing (*saṃstute vastuny abhismaraṇam* 明記曾習事).

The store-cognition is obscure (昧) and weak (劣), free of recollecting (*anusmaraṇa* 明記).

4. Concentration (*samādhi* 定) is the ability to keep the mind fixed on a single

³³⁴ AKB iv, F 109.

object (*cittasya ekasminn artha āsañjanam* 令心專注一境).

The store-cognition proceeds spontaneously (任運) and takes a new object from moment to moment (剎那別緣).

5. Understanding (*prajñā* 慧) is the discernment of things such as qualities, etc. (*vastu-guṇa-ādi-pravicaya* 簡擇德等事). {3/5r.}

The store-cognition is subtle and obscure (微昧), incapable of discernment (*pravicaya*).

⟨Thus, this cognition is not associated with (the five mental factors with) special objects.⟩

- #0634 b. Being only retribution ⟨in its nature⟩, this store-cognition is also not associated with the good (善) mental factors (#1766) nor with the defiled (染污) ones (#1906), etc.
- #0635 c. As for the four undetermined (*aniyatas* 不定) (or non-defined [*avyākṛta*]) (無記性) *dharmas*, namely, regret (*kaukrīya* 惡作), etc. (#2156),³³⁵ they are discontinuous (間斷), they are definitively not retribution. <152>

³³⁵ AKB ii, F 165.

C.E. *Ethical nature of the eighth and of its mental factors (caittas)*

E.A. Ethical nature of the eighth; #0637

E.B. The characteristics of mental factors; #0646

C.E.A. *Ethical nature of the eighth*

[Vasubandhu says in stanza 4b:]

anivṛta-avyākṛtaṃ ca tat.

IT (i.e., the store-cognition) IS NON-OBSCURED-NON-DEFINED (是無覆無記).

#0637 *Dharmas* are, from the “ethical” point of view (#1766), of three kinds: good (善), bad (不善), non-defined (*avyākṛta* 無記); more precisely, of four kinds, for the non-defined is obscured (*nivṛta-avyākṛta* 有覆無記) or non-obscured (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 無覆無記). [The latter is of four kinds, among which is the retribution (*vipāka*) type.³³⁶] (In which kind is the store-cognition (阿賴耶識) included?)

#0639 This store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is exclusively non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta*) because it is retribution (異熟) (in its nature (性)).³³⁷

#0641 1. If “retribution” (異熟), i.e., the store-cognition, were good (*kuśala* 善), then saṃsāric existence (*pravṛtti* 流轉: origin [*samudaya*], suffering [*duḥkha*]) would be impossible.

If it were defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染污, i.e., bad [*akuśala*] or obscured-non-defined [*nivṛta-avyākṛta*]), then disappearance of saṃsāric existence (*nivṛtti* 還滅, i.e., cessation [*nirodha*] and path [*mārga*]) would be impossible.

2. (Moreover, because this cognition is the support (依) of good (善) and defiled (染) *dharmas*, if it were itself good or defiled, [this cognition and *dharmas*] would be contradictory and) it would be unable to support good or defiled *dharmas*. {3/5v.}

3. (Moreover, because this cognition is by nature perfumed (所熏), then, if it were) good (善) or defiled (染), like that which has an extremely good or bad odor (極香臭), it would not receive perfuming (受熏) (see #0487). <#0642> However, it is due to the perfuming (熏) of the store-cognition and due to the seeds (*bījas*) brought forth by this perfuming that the cause and the fruit (因果) of defiled (染) and pure (淨) *dharmas* occur.

³³⁶ AKB ii, F 35.

³³⁷ AKB ii, F 320.

#0643 Thus, the store-cognition is only non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 無覆無記).

#0644 Obscured (*nivṛta* 覆), “veiled, obstructive”: – a defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染) *dharma* is called in this way because it makes an obstacle (*ni-var* 障) to the noble path (*ārya-mārga* 聖道), and also because it veils (or obscures 蔽) the mind (心) (i.e., the perfected [*pariṇiṣpanna*] nature of the mind, #2719) and prevents the purification (淨) of the mind (i.e., of the dependent [*paratantra*] mind). – This store-cognition is not defiled (非染), thus, it is called NON-OBSCURED (*anivṛta* 無覆).

Defined (*vyākṛta* 記): – the good (善) or bad (惡) <153> *dharma* is called in this way [a] because it bears an agreeable (愛) or disagreeable (非愛) fruit (果),³³⁸ [b] because (it is, in and of itself (自體),) much more discernible (殊勝) than that of the non-defined *dharma*: thus, it can be “defined” (可記別). – This store-cognition is neither good nor bad, thus, it is called NON-DEFINED (*avyākṛta* 無記).

C.E.B. The characteristics of mental factors (*caittas*)

#0646 Vasubandhu says in stanza 4c (Chin. 4b):

tathā sparśādayaḥ (觸等亦如是)

CONTACT (*sparsa*), ETC., ARE ALSO LIKE THIS.

What is the meaning of this brief definition? {3/6r.}

1. We can take it to mean that the word “like this” (如) refers to what was just said: the mental factors (*caittas*) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) are, (in their ethical nature, only) non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 無覆無記), just like the store-cognition (如阿賴耶識) itself, for the mental factors, (that is, contact (觸), mental application (作意), sensation (受), ideation (想) and volition (思), are also like this (爾), that is,) associated (*saṃprayukta*) *dharma*s must always be of the same ethical nature (同性), [i.e., good, bad or non-defined, just as the mind (*citta*) which is the ruler].

#0647 2. Or else, “like this” (如) refers to five characteristics of the store-cognition. Just like the store-cognition (如阿賴耶), its five mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., also:

1. are retribution (異熟);
2. have an unrecognized (不可知) mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) and object

³³⁸ AKB iv, F 35.

(*ālambana* 所緣);

3. have three kinds of things for their object (緣三種境);
4. are associated with five *dharmas* (五法相應);
5. are non-obsured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 無覆無記).

⟨Thus, the verse says that “contact, etc., are also like this” (亦如是).⟩

#0649 3. But, according to Nanda, the scope of the word “like this” (如) is not limited (無簡別) [to five characteristics]. Thus, just like the store-cognition (阿賴耶), the mental factors, ⟨contact, etc.,⟩ have, ⟨besides retribution (異熟), etc., also⟩ a sixth common characteristic, that of “being endowed with all the seeds” (*sarva-bījaka* 一切種). ⟨In a detailed explanation this would also include “non-obsured-non-defined”. The text says, in a non-limited way (無簡別), “are also like this” (亦如是).⟩

#0651 This is not reasonable. Dharmapāla argues against this opinion. <#0652> What are the reasons?

#0653 1. It cannot be said that the mental factors (*caittas*) hold (持) the seeds (*bījas* 種子) as does the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), [i] for the mental factors, contact, etc., rely on cognition (*vijñāna*), which is the ruler, and are not autonomous (*svatantra* 自在), [ii] for the mental factors, such as the bad *dharmas* (i.e., attachment [*rāga* 貪], etc.) or the good *dharmas* (i.e., faith [*śraddhā* 信], etc.) cannot receive perfuming (不能受熏). {3/6v.}

#0654 2. Moreover, if the mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., would also receive perfuming, then a sentient being would not be “one”, for his singleness results from the singleness of the cognition that holds the seeds. One (一) sentient being would be sixfold in itself (六種體): [store-cognition, contact (*spṛśa*), sensation (*vedanā*), etc.].

#0655 And if that were so, then from what reservoir of seeds, among the six, would the actual *dharma* that is the fruit of the seed arise? ⟨Reason does not allow it to be said that the fruit⟩ arises from six (多) seeds at once, for it is unheard of that a single sprout (*aṅkura* 芽) arises from six seeds.

#0656 ⟨Would you claim that the fruit⟩ arises only from a single one of the six seeds? Then it would follow that the other five seeds would be without activity (無用).

You could also not say that the six seeds engender ⟨their fruit⟩ successively (次第), <154> for they were ⟨perfumed (熏習)⟩ at the same time (同時), are of equal power (同勢力), etc.

#0657 Moreover, nor could you maintain that six fruits arise all at once (頓生), for you cannot see that, 〈in a single sentient being,〉 six visual cognitions (眼識), etc., are generated simultaneously (俱時) 〈in the space of one instant (一刹那頃)〉.

#0658 Nanda replies: – I never said that the mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., receive perfuming and that they hold (持) the seeds.

〈Dharmapāla says: – If that is not so, then how can contact, etc., like the eighth cognition, be called “endowed with all seeds” (*sarva-bījaka*)?〉 {3/7r.}

#0659 Nanda replies: – What I am saying is that 〈the five mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., have (the characteristic of taking) semblance-seeds (似種相) [as objects] and are accordingly called “endowed with all seeds” (一切種). Indeed: (1) the mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., have the same object (*ālambana* 所緣), etc., as the cognition (*viññāna*); (2) they definitively have an 〈immediate condition qua〉 object (親所緣緣), thus, in an existence of the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色), contact, etc., take the seeds (*bījas*) for their object, since the body and the receptacle world are absent. – [Thus the mental factors “are directed at” the seeds; in other words, they have the seeds—or more precisely, the “semblance-seeds”—as image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*). *Viññāna* develops as seeds (which are a part of its object), i.e., as seeds that are capable of engendering a fruit; they are thus really seed (*bīja*). The mental factors, which have the same object as the cognition, must also develop as seeds, but as semblance-seeds.]

This 〈characteristic of taking〉 semblance-seeds (似種相) [as objects] is not the “condition qua cause” (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣) that engenders actual cognitions (*viññānas* 現識), etc. – In the same way, while the *viññāna* develops as sense-faculties (*indriya*) that serve as support for the visual cognitions, etc., the mental factors, 〈i.e., contact, etc., in the realm of immateriality (上),〉 develop, in a parallel way, as semblance-sense-faculties, i.e., the eye, etc. (似眼根), which do not serve as support for these cognitions. Comparison: just as a “resemblance of fire” (似火) does not burn (燒用).

Dharmapāla does not accept this explanation: – This is not reasonable. Indeed, Vasubandhu attributes to the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*) (識) being endowed with all seeds (*sarva-bījaka*), as a third characteristic (#0408), and having for its object what is appropriated (*upādi* 執受) (of which the seeds form a part) and the site (*sthāna* 處), as a fourth characteristic (#0514). <#0660> Nanda cannot—without accusing Vasubandhu of an offense of pointless repetition (*punar-ukta* 重言失) 〈in his root-verse (本頌)〉—maintain that the mental factors, i.e., contact

(觸), etc., can be called *sarva-bījaka* (“endowed with all seeds” 一切種) because they have the semblance-seeds (i.e., that which falls into the fourth characteristic) for their object (所緣似種). Thus the expression *sarva-bījaka* must have a different meaning than “having seeds (*bījas*) as object”, and can definitively only mean “receiving the perfuming and holding the seeds” (受熏能持種). {3/7v.}

#0661 And moreover, the argument of Nanda—that the scope of the formulation “are also like this” (亦如是) is not limited (無簡別) [to five characteristics]—leads too far (and definitively is not conclusive). It cannot be said <155> that the five mental factors, i.e., contact, etc., like cognition (*vijñāna*), are also cognizing (*vijñapti* 了別) (i.e., that which properly belongs to cognition) and that contact, etc., are also associated with the five mental factors, i.e., contact, etc. [Contact would be associated with contact itself, just as cognition is associated with contact.]

#0662 Therefore, the expression “are also like this” (*tathā* 亦如是) must be understood as meaning “with all due qualifications” (*yathāyogam* 隨所應說), and does not mean “alike from every viewpoint” (非謂一切). <156>

C.F. *Uninterrupted strong current*FA. Correct doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*); #0664

FB. Refutation of incorrect doctrines; #0677

C.F.A. *Correct doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda)*³³⁹#0664 Is the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識) permanent (*śāśvata* 常) or is it discontinuous (*ucchinna* 斷)?

#0667 It is neither permanent nor discontinuous, (because it always evolves (恆轉)). [Vasubandhu says in stanza 4cd:]

*tac ca vartate srotasaughavat:*It evolves as a continuous current, like the flow of a river.³⁴⁰

According to the Chinese version:

IT ALWAYS EVOLVES (恆轉), LIKE A STRONG CURRENT (*oghavat* 如瀑流).

1. ALWAYS (恆) means that this cognition, since beginningless time, constitutes one homogeneous series (一類相續) (= always non-defined) that is constant (or permanent) (常) and without intervals (or without interruption (無間斷)); for it is the root (本) of the three realms (*dhātus* 界), of the five destinies (*gatis* 趣), of the four modes of birth (*yonis* 生; #0938) which are its “designations” (*prajñāpti* 施設), for (its nature is to be) a series (*saṃtāna*) consistent (堅) enough to hold (持) the seeds (*bījas* 種) and to safeguard them, (i.e., without losing them).³⁴¹

2. IT EVOLVES (轉) means that this cognition, since beginningless time, arises and ceases (生滅) in each moment (念念), it changes (*vikāra* 變異) from its former state to a subsequent state. The cause (因) ceases and the fruit (果) arises (#0382),³⁴² {3/8r.}: thus, it is not single (一), like the self (*ātman*), and it is not permanent (常), like primal matter (*pradhāna*). Therefore it is capable of being perfumed by actual cognitions (*vijñānas*) (i.e., the evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñāna* 轉識]) and capable of being the cause of new (seeds for 成種) actual cognitions.

³³⁹ See #2607.³⁴⁰ See #0824.³⁴¹ On *saṃtāna* (series), see *Samyutta*, iii, 143; *Dīgha*, iii, 105; *Journal Asiatique*, 1902, ii, 283; Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 167, 169, 174; La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925: F 38, 116.³⁴² Editors: LVP translates: “Il est cause et fruit, naissance et destruction”.

[If it were permanent, like space, it could not be perfumed; if it could not be perfumed, the distinction between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* would disappear.]

#0669 The word ALWAYS (恆) rejects (遮) the notion of annihilation (or of discontinuity, *uccheda* 斷).

The words IT EVOLVES (*varṭate* 轉) reject (表非)—the notion of [eternality or] permanence (*śāśvata* 恆).³⁴³ <157>

Vasubandhu gives an example:

#0671 LIKE A STRONG CURRENT (如瀑流): it is the very nature-of-things (*dharmatā* 法爾) of “causation” (*hetu-phala-bhāva* 因果) that it is foreign both to permanence and to discontinuity.

Like the water of a strong current (瀑流水), without being permanent or without being discontinuous, flows for a long time “as a series” (相續) with whatever it carries along (floating or sinking in it (有所漂溺)), so also this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), i.e., since beginningless time, it arises and ceases, forms a series, is not permanent and not discontinuous, [carries the defilements (*kleśas*) and the actions,] carries with it the sentient beings who are floating up or sinking down (漂溺) [: good destinies, bad destinies,] and brings it about that sentient beings do not escape existence (*niḥsaraṇa* 出離).

#0672 Moreover, like (a strong current), struck (擊) by wind (風), etc., gives rise to waves (波浪) without its current being interrupted, so also this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), i.e., due to many causes and conditions, gives rise to actual cognitions (*vijñānas*), i.e., the visual cognition, etc., without its constant flux being interrupted.

#0673 Moreover, like (a strong current) carries leaves (草) on its surface, fish (魚) in its depths, etc., and follows the course of the current (隨流) (without losing any of them (不捨)), {3/8v.} so also this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), i.e., it flows constantly (恆相隨轉) with the seeds (or traces) (*bījas* 習氣) that are internal (內) [and which are of the same nature as the store-cognition = seed-cognition (*bīja-vijñāna*), *Siddhi* F 92,] and with the mental factors (i.e., contact, etc., #0581) that are external (外).

#0674 This comparison (法喻) shows that this store-cognition is a beginningless pro-

³⁴³ The definition of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) in *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, i, 1, should be recalled: *anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvatam* For our author: *sotpādam sanirodham anucchedam*

Sassatadiṭṭhi, etc., *Samyutta*, iii, 98.

cess or “causation”, (i.e., cause and effect,) without permanence (非常), without discontinuity (非斷). That is, since beginningless time, the nature of this cognition (*viññāna*) is such that, at each moment, there is the arising of the fruit and the ceasing of the cause; because of the arising of the fruit, there is no discontinuity (斷); because of the ceasing of the cause, there is no permanence (常). Non-discontinuity, non-permanence: such is the “principle” (*li* 理) of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda-naya* 緣起理).

This is why Vasubandhu said that this store-cognition “always evolves like a current” (恆轉如流).

C.F.B. *Refutation of incorrect doctrines*

- B.1. Doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins and of the Sāṃmitīyas; #0677
- B.2. Doctrine of the Sthaviras; #0689
- B.3. Doctrine of the Sautrāntikas; #0693

C.F.B.1. *Doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins and of the Sāṃmitīyas*

[These schools do not accept our theory. They formulate objections to which we will reply.] <158>

#0677 **Objection.** – According to the Great Vehicle, the past (過去) and the future (未來) are not real things (實有). Thus, in the tenet of the Great Vehicle, there is no fault of eternalism (*śāśvata* 常). But (how can you avoid) the fault of annihilation (*uccheda* 斷)? Thus, this dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda* 緣起) does not conform to the scriptural definition (or the correct principle) (正理) of *pratītya-samutpāda*.

#0678 **Answer.** – You accept the real existence (實有) of the past (過去) and of the future (未來). Thus, you avoid the fault of annihilation (斷). (But how can you avoid the fault of eternalism (常)?) Thus, your dependent origination is not better than mine, (i.e., it also does not conform to the correct principle of dependent origination,) for it is stained by the fault of eternalism (常). {3/9r.}

#0679 **Objection.** – By putting me at fault (斥他過), you do not establish your own thesis (義).

#0680 **Answer.** – It is difficult to establish the correct principle (正) without first refuting the false (邪) ... [But there is no annihilation (*uccheda*) in my dependent origination:] at the moment (*asyām avasthāyām*, at the instant of the process) when the prior cause (前因) ceases (*nirodha* 滅), then the subsequent fruit (後

果) arises (生): just as one side of the balance-beam (秤) rises at the same time as the other side descends (*tulā-daṇḍa-unnāma-avanāma-vat* 如秤兩頭低昂時等). In that way, causes-and-fruits (因果) form a series (相續), just like a current (流). To avoid annihilation (斷), it is not necessary to assert the figurative existence (假) of the past and of the future (去來).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Compare *Śālistamba-sūtra* (in my *Douze Causes*, F 75) (transl. Ross Reat):

na ca pūrvaniruddhād bījād anikuro niṣpadāyate nāpy aniruddhād bījāt | api tu bījaṃ ca nirudhyate tasminn eva ca samaye 'nikuraś cotpadāyate | tulādaṇḍonnā-māvanāmavāt | ato nocchedataḥ (pratītyasamutpādo draṣṭavyaḥ).

How is it (to be seen) as “not annihilation”? Not from the previous cessation of the seed does the sprout issue forth, nor indeed without the cessation of the seed. But still the seed ceases, and at just that time the sprout arises, like the beam of a scale rocking to and fro. Therefore annihilation is not (the case).

The AKB (*Vyākhyā*) reads: *tulādaṇḍanāmonnāmavāt*.

Used by the commentator of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 73, 142. – The comparison of the balance-beam, Candrakīrti, *Madhyamaka-avatāra*, 97, 1 (translation *Muséon*, 1910: 262). – [For Candrakīrti, the arising of *dharma*s from their cause is similar to the arising of an illusion, just as Nāgārjuna teaches it, *Nirupamastava*, 15: *niruddhād vāniruddhād vā bījād anikurasambhavaḥ | māyotpādavad utpādaḥ sarva eva tvaṇotyate.*]

#0681 **Objection.** – When the cause (因) is in the present state (*vartamāna-bhāva-avāsthāyām* 現有位), the subsequent fruit (後果) has not yet arisen (生), then one may ask of what can the cause indeed be the cause? – When, in turn, the fruit is in the present state (現有時), the prior cause (前因) has already ceased (*niruddha* 滅), then one may ask of what can the fruit be the fruit? <159> – Since cause and fruit are lacking, how can you avoid the faults of annihilation (*uccheda* 斷) and of eternalism (*śāśvata* 常)?

#0682 **Answer.** – [There is the same weakness in your doctrine.] If the subsequent fruit (後果) already exists (in the future state) at the time when the cause (actually) exists, and since [the fruit] exists in advance and by itself (*prakṛtiṣṭha* 本有), then how does this fruit depend on the prior cause (前因)? Since the notion of cause would disappear, how can you hope to establish the notion of fruit? In the absence of cause, in the absence of fruit, how can you avoid the faults of annihilation (斷) and of eternalism (常)?

#0683 Objection. – You know very well that I establish the notions of cause and fruit (因果義) {3/9v.} “by relying on” the activity (*kāritra* 作用) of *dharma*s.³⁴⁴ Thus, my objection (詰難) does not rebound against my own tenet (宗). [The future fruit has no activity because it is not present. The cause attracts it into the present.]

#0684 Answer. – If the same thing (體) exists in advance (本有), then its activity (用) must also, since the causes-and-conditions (因緣) on which this activity depends are also given in advance (本有).

#0685 Thus, in your tenet, cause and fruit (因果) are definitively lacking. It is thus advisable to accept the “correct principle” (正理) of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) as it is taught in the Great Vehicle (大乘).

This correct principle (正理) is ⟨profound (深) and excellent (妙)⟩; it is beyond speech (離言) (as is the specific characteristic [*svalakṣaṇa*] of all the *dharma*s). These names, i.e., cause (*hetu* 因), fruit (*phala* 果), etc., are all figurative designations (假施設).

Considering the present actual *dharma* (現在法) (which alone exists) as having the power (*kāritra* 用) of attracting (or engendering) (引) the subsequent (後) *dharma* (which is its fruit), we posit figuratively (假立) a future *dharma* [while there exists only a power of the generation of this fruit], and, relative to this future fruit (當果), we say that the present actual *dharma* is the cause (現因).

Considering the present actual *dharma* as corresponding (酬)³⁴⁵ to a prior *dharma* (前相), we posit figuratively (假立) a past cause [while there exists only the correspondence of the present *dharma* with the past *dharma*], and, relative to this past cause (曾因), we say that the present actual *dharma* is the fruit (現果). <160>

We say “posit figuratively” (假) because it is the present actual cognition (*vi-jñāna* 現識) itself “that appears similar to the future, similar to the past”, “similar to the fruit, similar to the cause” (似彼相現). [That is to say: that which is called cause, that which we consider to be the prior cause, is the present cognition as dependent; that which we consider to be the fruit is the same cognition as that which generates.]

#0686 Thus, this doctrine ⟨or principle 理趣⟩ of cause and of fruit (因果) obviously stays far away from the “extreme views” (*anta* 邊) of annihilation (*uccheda*) and of eternalism (*śāśvata*), and conforms (契會) to the “Middle Way” (*madhyamā*

³⁴⁴ AKB v, F 55.

³⁴⁵ *chou* 酬, #0933, AKB 14/9v.10 [iv, F 62], 30/9r.4 [ix, F 280].

pratipad 中道). Every wise person (智者) {3/10r.} should (follow [this principle]), practice (修) it and study (學) it.

C.F.B.2. *Doctrine of the Sthaviras*

#0689 (There is another opinion which says that although) the past and the future (去來) do not exist, nevertheless, causes and fruits (因果) form a continuous series (恒相續). [What actually is the nature of *dharma*s?]

#0690 As rapid (極迅速) as the present *dharma*—at least mental *dharma*s, i.e., mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*)—may be, there is, nevertheless, a prior period and a subsequent period, arising and ceasing, i.e., two periods (*pūrva*, *apara*, *utpāda-nirodha-kāla* 初後生滅二時).

When it arises, it corresponds (酬) to its cause; when it ceases, it attracts (引) its fruit: although this *dharma* has two periods (時) (arising and ceasing), nevertheless, it is itself single (一).

The prior cause (前因) ceases (*nirudhyate*); the subsequent fruit (後果) arises (*utpadyate*): although these two *dharma*s, i.e., cause and effect, are distinct in their substance and their characteristic (體相), nevertheless, they are simultaneous, both present in one another.

#0691 Thus, cause and effect (因果) are not “figurative designations” (假施設). And yet there is no [fault of] “annihilation” (*uccheda* 斷), as in the theory of the Great Vehicle; there is no [fault of] “eternalism” (*śāśvata*), as in the theory of the Sarvāstivādins. Moreover, the previously discussed difficulties (難) that trouble the other tenets are resolved; what wise person (智者) would reject my [correct] interpretation (捨此) in order to trust other false ones (信餘)?

Refutation:

#0692 This is nothing but empty talk (虛言) (and is without real meaning):

1. How is it possible that one moment (*kṣaṇa* 一念), one “instant”, can be two time periods (二時)? [A *dharma* cannot be in two time periods.]
2. Arising (生) and ceasing (滅), which are contradictory (相違), <161> cannot be actually present (現在) at the same time. [The two *dharma*s, i.e., arising and ceasing, cannot be of the same time period.]
3. If ceasing (滅) is present (現在), {3/10v.} then arising (生) will be future (未來) (just as the Sarvāstivādins say, #0685).
4. What is called “arising” (生) is existence (*bhāva* 有), (since it is actually

present (現在)); what is called “ceasing” (滅) is non-existence (*abhāva* 無): ceasing will thus be past (過去) (as the Great Vehicle says).

[The Sthaviras reply: – But who says that ceasing is non-existence? This is not the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins for whom ceasing is present.]

If ceasing is not non-existence (無), then arising is not existence (有): since arising is present (現), is existence (有), ceasing will be past, will be actually non-existence (現無).

5. [The Sthaviras attribute arising and ceasing to a single *dharma*:] Moreover, these two are contradictory (相違), (how can their substance (體) be one (一)?) Like pain and pleasure (苦樂), etc., they cannot, together, constitute one thing (事).

6. (If arising and ceasing (生滅) are one (一), then they cannot have two time periods (時).) If arising and ceasing are different (異), you cannot say that they refer to the same *dharma* (or have the same substance as support (同依一體)); [if they are merged, why attribute to a *dharma* two time periods?]

We conclude: – That the period of arising (生時) and the period of ceasing (滅時) are both actually present and simultaneous (俱現在), that arising and ceasing refer to the same *dharma*, this is certainly not a very satisfactory (or reasonable) conception.

C.F.B.3. *Doctrine of the Sautrāntikas*

#0693 (The Sautrāntika scholars (經部師), etc.,) do also not succeed in establishing (the principle of) the causal continuity (因果相續理) because they do not accept the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識) that holds the seeds (*bījas* 種). <#0694> Thus we must accept (the correct principle (正理) of) the causal series (因果相續), i.e., the dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda* 緣起), conforming to the sound doctrine of the Great Vehicle (信大乘). {3/11r.} (See #0509.) <162>

C.G. *Cessation of the store-cognition (ālaya-vijñāna). – Names of the eighth cognition*

G.A. Cessation of the store-cognition; #0696

G.B. Names and varieties of the eighth cognition; #0729

C.G.A. *Cessation of the store-cognition*

#0696 Since beginningless time (無始), this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) always evolves like an uninterrupted river (恒轉如流). At what moment, in what state is it definitively (究竟) discarded (*vyāvṛtta* 捨)?

#0698 Vasubandhu answers in stanza 5a:

tasya vyāvṛttir arhātve

“The store-cognition IS DISCARDED (捨) (in the final path (方究竟)), IN THE STATE OF ARHAT (阿羅漢位).”

[What does *arhat* mean?]

#0700 The *āryas* (聖者), that is, the saints of the three vehicles, abandon (斷) the hindrance (*āvaraṇa*) of defilements (*kleśas*) (煩惱障) and are called *arhats* (阿羅漢) from the time (i.e., the adamant concentration [*vajra-upama-samādhi*]) when they completely exhaust (究竟盡) it (#3143).³⁴⁶ [The expression “completely exhaust” means: (1) radically destroying, killing, (2) taming, putting out of action. The saints of the two vehicles make it impossible for the defilement to rearise but—not abandoning the hindrance that prevents the seeing of *jñeya* (= the “to-be-known”)—they do not terminate the defilement.³⁴⁷] This is so, for at that time, the incapacity (*dauṣṭhulya* 羸重³⁴⁸) engendered by the defilements (煩惱) is completely and forever removed (永遠離), and it is said that the store-cognition (識) is DISCARDED (捨).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See the note by Wogihara, Asaṅga's *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 29, which cites numerous sources and which prefers the reading *dauṣṭulya*; but in *Mahāvvyutpatti*, 119, 20, it is *dauṣṭhulya*.

³⁴⁶ Sthiramati defines the *arhat*, in the words of the AKB (vi, F 227ff.), as obtainment of the two knowledges (*jñāna*), [i.e., knowledge of exhaustion (*kṣaya-jñāna*) and knowledge of non-arising (*anutpāda-jñāna*)].

³⁴⁷ See *Siddhi* F 18 under ^c.

³⁴⁸ AKB v, F 2; *Trentaine*, F 27.

#0704 [One may, nevertheless, be less certain about the meaning of the definitions that are given in the treatises (*sāstras*). There are three opinions.]

1. According to the first masters, the word *arhat* (阿羅漢) designates only the saints of the three vehicles (三乘) who have obtained the state of the fruit of the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學果位): [a] all of them have killed the enemies that are the defilements (*kleśas*) (*ari-han* 害煩惱賊); [b] they are all worthy of receiving (應受) excellent veneration (妙供養) by the world (世間) (*arh*); [c] they are all liberated from (or will never return to experience) (永不復受) existence that is delimited (or “in segments”) (*paricchinnā* 分段生, #2694). {3/11v.} <163>

#0705 How do we know that this is the case?

#0706 These teachers cite YBh (決擇分):³⁴⁹

The *arhats* (阿羅漢), self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddhas* 獨覺) and *tathāgatas* (如來) are no longer endowed (*samanvāgata* 成就) with the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶).

[But they cite this text incompletely! In the same place, YBh says that the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is also absent in “non-retrogressing *bodhisattvas*” (*avaivartika*³⁵⁰).]

These teachers answer by citing the *Samuccaya-sāstra* (集論) (more precisely the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* of Sthiramati, T.31.1606.0763c) which says [that the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) retain some part of the hindrance consisting of defilements (*kleśa*-

³⁴⁹ YBh (T.30.1579.0684–0685).

Is that which is endowed with the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) endowed with evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*)? Four cases:

1. *ālaya*, not evolving cognition: the five states without ideation: dreamless sleep (*acittaka-nidrā*), unconscious stupor (*acittaka-mūrchā*), attainment without ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*), attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), gods without ideation (*asaṃjñi-devas*): all mind has disappeared, except for the *ālaya*;
2. evolving cognition, not *ālaya*: the *arhats* or self-liberated ones (*pratyekabuddhas*), non-retrogressing *bodhisattvas* (*avaivartika-bodhisattvas*), *tathāgatas*, in the state with ideation;
3. both: the other sentient beings in the state with ideation;
4. neither the one nor the other, i.e., the *arhats* or the self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddhas*), non-retrogressing *bodhisattvas* (*avaivartika-bodhisattvas*), *tathāgatas*, entered in attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), placed (or “arrived”) at *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣa*).

³⁵⁰ AKB iv, F 220

āvaraṇa) up until the end of their *bodhisattva* career]:

- #0707 At the time when the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) attain *bodhi* (菩提), they abandon at once (頓斷) the hindrances (*āvaraṇas* 障) of the defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) and to what is to be known (*jñeya* 所知); they become *arhats* (阿羅漢) and *tathāgatas* (如來).

This text proves that the *bodhisattvas*—not having <completely abandoned and exhausted (未永斷盡) the seeds of defilements (煩惱種子)—>(are not *arhats* and) must have the store-cognition (阿賴耶識). – First point.

Second point. – YBh (決擇分) (T.30.1579.0582a), when it says that the “non-retrogressing *bodhisattvas*” (不退菩薩) do also not have the store-cognition, does not contradict the *Samuccaya-sāstra*.

- #0709 Indeed, it refers to the *bodhisattvas* who are at the same time *arhats*, or, rather, to the *arhats* who have become *bodhisattvas*: the practitioners who—possessing the state of the fruit of non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學, i.e., *arhat*) <by the two vehicles (二乘)>, either by the vehicle of the hearers (*śrāvaka-yāna*) or by the vehicle of the self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddha-yāna*)—“turn their mind” (迴心) and undertake (向) the path of great *bodhi* (大菩提). They become *bodhisattvas* since they go towards (趣) *bodhi*; being *arhats*, they certainly do not retrogress (退) by generating <the hindrance (障) of> defilements (*kleśas* 惱障); thus, they are called “non-retrogressing *bodhisattvas*” (不退菩薩). {3/12r.} [They change their name of hearer (*śrāvaka*), self-enlightened one (*pratyekabuddha*), non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*), <164> into that of the non-retrogressing *bodhisattva*. Being *arhats*,] they are not endowed with the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識).

- #0710 <That is, being included here among *arhats*, these passages in the treatises do not oppose our interpretation.>

- #0712 2. According to Dharmapāla (i.e., second masters), the *bodhisattvas* are called “non-retrogressing” (*avaivartikas*) from the eighth stage (i.e., “immovable” [*acalā* 不動地]) onward. [In this stage, they no longer have the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and they are included among the *arhats* of whom Vasubandhu’s stanza spoke (in stanza 5a): “The store-cognition is abandoned in the state of *arhat*”.]

Indeed:

- a. in [these *bodhisattvas*], any defilement (*kleśa*) completely (永) ceases to become active, to manifest as “action” (*samudācar*) (不行);
- b. [these *bodhisattvas*] effortlessly flow (任運轉) within the rapid current (駛

流) of *dharma* [= they spontaneously go into the ocean of the markless (*ānimitta*): *daśa-bhūmaka*];

c. they are able to practice all the virtues (*caryā*) (起諸行), and all the virtues in each [of the virtues],³⁵¹

d. from moment (刹那) to moment—without interruption—their pure *dharma*s increase (轉增進) [i.e., they do not retrogress from what has been acquired³⁵²]: therefore, the *bodhisattvas* of the last three stages are called non-retrogressing (*avaivartika*) *bodhisattas* (不退菩薩).

#0713 Thus, although these *bodhisattvas* have not yet completely abandoned (and exhausted) (斷盡) the seeds (*bījas* 種子) of the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) that are in the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) (#0740), nevertheless, their series of the “actual” mind being all pure, the defilements of the seventh cognition—i.e., afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi* 我見), (afflicted self-love (我愛), etc., of the figured (*vikalpita* 分別) class) (see #1265)—do not become attached again (*na ālīyante* 不復執藏) to this “cognition that is retribution” as their inner “self” (自內我). {3/12v.} Thus, the “cognition that is retribution” of these *bodhisattvas* can no longer be called *ālaya* (阿賴耶). Thus (it is said that these *bodhisattvas* no longer have the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and, thus, it is also said that) these *bodhisattvas* are, in our text, included among the *arhats* (阿羅漢).

#0716 3. According to Nanda (i.e., third master), the *bodhisattva* is non-retrogressing (*avaivartika*) from the first stage (初地) onwards.

Indeed:

a. he has already “realized” (*sākṣāt-kar* 證) the “principle” (*li* 理, i.e., true suchness [*bhūta-tathatā*], #0337) which the two kinds of emptiness (*sūnyatās*) reveal (二空所顯理) [since he has practiced the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*), see #2915];

b. he has already obtained (得) the two kinds of superior (*viśeṣa*) knowledge (殊勝智) [i.e., either the knowledge without conceptual figurating (*avikalpaka*)

³⁵¹ Before the stages (*bhūmi*), the *bodhisattva*—practicing one practice of perfection (*pāramitā*) (#3018)—practices this practice; in the first seven stages, he practices all the practices by practicing one practice, but he takes the practices one at a time, i.e., “giving” in the first stage, “morality” in the second, etc. . . . [However, with more skill in the seventh stage]; in the last three stages, all at once.

³⁵² AKB vi, F 267.

and the subsequently acquired (*prṣṭha-labdha*) knowledge, see #2918; or else, the knowledge of equality (*samatā-jñāna*) and the <165> knowledge of discernment (*pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna*), see #3266];

c. he has already abandoned (斷) the two heavy hindrances (*āvaraṇas* 重障) called figured (*vikalpita* 分別; #0070, #0358);³⁵³

d. he practices—by practicing one practice (一行)—all practices (諸行).

Although, in view of benefiting (利益) others, he generates defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), nevertheless, these defilements are not faults (過失) (i.e., he has no defilement-faults [*kleśa-doṣa* 煩惱過失]), (and thus, he is also called non-retrogressing *bodhisattva*).

#0718 Thus, although (this *bodhisattva*) has not abandoned or exhausted (斷盡) the defilements (*kleśas*) called “innate” (*sahaja* 俱生), nevertheless, the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見), (the afflicted self-love (我愛),) etc. (#0273), of the figured (*vikalpita* 分別) class do not become attached again to the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*) as their inner “self”. Thus, the “cognition that is retribution” of this *bodhisattva* can also no longer be called *ālaya* (阿賴耶). {3/13r.} Thus, (it is said that this *bodhisattva* no longer has the store-cognition and, thus, it is also said that) this *bodhisattva* can be designated by the name *arhat* (阿羅漢).

#0719 Moreover, we read in the *Samuccaya-śāstra* (集論):³⁵⁴

Although the *bodhisattvas* of the ten stages (十地菩薩) have not yet completely abandoned all defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), nevertheless, even so, these defilements—like poisons subdued by mantras and medicinal herbs (咒藥所伏諸毒)—do not generate any defilement-faults (*kleśa-doṣa*), [being subdued by pure knowledge (*anāsrava-jñāna*)]. In all the stages, the *bodhisattvas* are thus similar to *arhats* (阿羅漢) who have already abandoned the defilements.

Thus, all the *bodhisattvas* possessing a stage can also be called *arhats* (阿羅漢).

#0720 4. This is not reasonable. [The first and the second masters do not accept this thesis.]

In the first seven stages, the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), (the afflicted

³⁵³ Heavy, i.e. intense (*tīkṣṇa*). – The belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*) is the hindrance to what is to be known (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*) (#3146).

³⁵⁴ *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0763–64, continuation of the text cited #0707.

self-love (我愛), etc., of the innate category (俱生) (associated with cogitation [*manas*]) continues to become attached (*ā-li* 執藏) to this “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*) as their inner “self” (自內我): thus, the “cognition that is retribution” is still called *ālaya* (阿賴耶).

#0721 Nanda replies: – “In view of the cessation of the afflicted view of a self (我見), <the afflicted self-love (我愛), etc.,> known to be figured (*vikalpita* 分別) (which are associated with mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*]), <since they are no longer attached to the store-cognition (不復執藏),> one can say that <the “cognition that is retribution”> is no longer called *ālaya*”. {3/13v.}

#0722 [Objection:] – Then in that case, <the “cognition that is retribution”> would no longer be called *ālaya* (阿賴耶) among the trainees (*śaikṣas* 學, i.e., stream-enterers [*srota-āpanna* 預流], etc.), a thesis in contradiction with various treatises (*śāstras*).

#0723 Nanda answers: – “No, for the defilements (*kleśas*) which the *bodhisattvas* of the stages generate do not—due to proper knowledge (正知)—bring forth any defilement-fault (*kleśa-doṣa*), and stream-enterers (*srota-āpannas* 預流), etc., cannot obtain (得) <such a thing (事)>, so how can the stream-enterers, etc., <be compared to these *bodhisattvas*>”.

#0725 [Reply:] – [(These kinds of defilements) can be obtained by the stream-enterers (*srota-āpannas*).] Although the defilements which their first six cognitions generate do not—(due to pure or correct knowledge (正知))—bring forth any defilement-fault (*kleśa-doṣa*) (過失), nevertheless, their seventh cognition (*manas*) is an impure (*sāsrava*) state of mind (漏心位), <manifests spontaneously (任運現行) and> continues <166> to attach (執藏) itself to the “cognition that is retribution” as a “self”. <So how are these *bodhisattvas* not the same as the stream-enterers (預流), etc.?)> Thus, Nanda’s opinion is not reasonable. [From the eighth stage onward, the *bodhisattvas* are a pure series (*anāsrava-saṃtāna*); the defilements no longer become active (*samudācar*); the seeds (*bījas*) of the defilements remain, but the actual defilements have disappeared. Thus, we can say that the defilements are discarded. Prior to the eighth stage, the defilements are actually generated: see YBh 78 and *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, 48, 25.]

#0726 5. [Let us conclude by siding with the first and second teachers.]

The *arhats* (阿羅漢) have abandoned (斷) the incapacity (= coarse and heavy) of the defilements (*kleśa-dauṣṭhulya* 煩惱麤重) (see #0696) of the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*), {3/14r.} which [incapacity] has been completely

exhausted (究竟盡) at the adamantine concentration (*vajra-upama-samādhi*) (definition of the first masters). [These *arhats*] no longer become attached (執藏) to the “cognition that is retribution” (or store-cognition) (阿賴耶識) as an inner “self” (自內我) (definition which includes the *bodhisattvas* of the eighth stage, as the second masters would have it). As a consequence, it must be said that [the *arhat*’s] “cognition that is retribution” can no longer be called *ālaya* (阿賴耶), and that they have discarded (捨) the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*).

But it is not the case that the *arhats* discard (捨) every kind of eighth cognition as such by abandoning the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), and that—at the time of the adamantine concentration (*vajra-upama-samādhi*)—it would be due to the lack of any cognition holding the seeds (*bījas*) (持種) that the *arhats* would enter into *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu* 無餘涅槃).

C.G.B. *Names and varieties of the eighth cognition*

- #0729 In fact, although every sentient being (*sattva*) is endowed with the eighth cognition, nevertheless, this eighth cognition receives different names in accordance with various viewpoints:
- #0733 1. It may be called *citta* (心), “mind”, from the root *ci*, i.e., to accumulate, because it is “accumulated (所積集) by seeds (*bījas* 種子) which various *dharma*s (法), i.e., the seven cognitions, imprint on it (熏習)” (see #0878).
- #0734 2. It may be called *ādāna-vijñāna* (阿陀那), “retaining (*ādadāti*) cognition”, because it retains (執持) the seeds (種子) and the material sense-faculties (色根) and prevents them from perishing (壞) (#0408, #0776, #0824, #0952).
- #0735 3. It may be called *jñeya-āśraya* (所知依), “support to what is to be known”, because the eighth cognition supports (依止) the *dharma*s, i.e., objects of knowledge (*jñeya* 所知), defiled (染) or pure (淨).³⁵⁵ {3/14v.} <167>
- #0736 4. It may be called *bīja-vijñāna* (種子識), “seed-cognition”, because it universally conveys-holds (任持) all the mundane and supra-mundane seeds (*Siddhi* F 92, #0408, #2441).
- #0737 All these names, and still others—(root-cognition [*mūla-vijñāna*], cause of the threefold existence [*bhavāṅga-vijñāna*], aggregate that endures until the end of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāra-koṭi-niṣṭha-skandha*), see #0853–#0859)—are suitable for all the states of the eighth cognition.

³⁵⁵ As explained by Asvabhāva, *Samgraha-upanibandhana*, T.31.1598.0286c.

#0739 Also:

1. It may be called *ālaya* (阿賴耶), “store”, because it embraces or envelops-stores (攝藏) all the pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染) *dharma*s (#1077) and in this way prevents them from disappearing; because the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-drṣṭi* 我見), (the afflicted self-love (我愛),) etc., become attached (執藏) to [*ālaya*] as their inner “self” (自內我).

The name *ālaya* is suitable only for the eighth cognition of ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生) and of trainees (*śaikṣas* 有學)—but not for the *arhats*, i.e., in the state of the non-trainee (無學位), and for the “non-retrogressing” *bodhisattvas* (不退菩薩)—(who do become attached to) the pollution *dharma*s (雜染法).

#0740 2. It may be called *vipāka-vijñāna* (異熟識), “cognition that is retribution”, because it is the fruit of retribution (異熟果) of good and bad actions (善不善業) that project (引) *saṃsāra* (生死).

This name is suitable only for the eighth cognition of ordinary worldlings (異生), of saints of the two vehicles (二乘) and of all the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩), but not for the stage of the *tathāgatas* (如來地) where there remains nothing but good *dharma*s, for, among all these sentient beings, there are non-defined *dharma*s which are of retribution. {3/15r.}

#0741 3. It may be called *vimala-vijñāna* (無垢識), “stainless cognition”, because it is the support (所依止) of the very immaculate (*ati-viśuddha* 最極清淨) and pure (*anāsrava* 無漏) *dharma*s. [Some make a ninth cognition (*vijñāna*) of this cognition (*vijñāna*).]

This name is suitable only for the eighth cognition of the stage of the *tathāgata* (如來地), for the eighth of other sentient beings, (that is, *bodhisattvas* (菩薩), saints of the two vehicles (二乘) and ordinary worldlings (異生),) conveys seeds (*bījas* 種) of the impure (*sāsrava* 漏) class, is susceptible to receive perfuming (受熏) [—and the *buddhas* are not susceptible to perfuming which would imply progress, which would contradict the idea of perfection—] and has not yet become a very (good and) pure (善淨) (eighth) cognition.

As the *Tathāgataguṇālaṃkāra-sūtra* says:

The stainless (無垢) cognition (*vijñāna*) of the *tathāgatas* is of immaculate (*viśuddha* 淨) and pure (*anāsrava* 無漏) nature (= *dhātu* [界] = *svabhāva*), liberated from all the hindrances (*āvaraṇa* 障), associated with the (perfect) mirror knowledge (*mahā-ādarśa-jñāna* 圓鏡智). (#3262)

#0742 In stanza 5a, Vasubandhu deals with the cessation of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) alone, because its faults (*doṣa* 過失) are heavy (= *saṃkleśa-ālaya-doṣa-gurutva*) (重), because it is the first of the two impure (*sāsrava*) states which the saint discards (捨). <168>

The “cognition that is retribution” itself (*vipāka-vijñāna*) (異熟識體), which is also impure, is discarded (捨) by the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) at the time when they attain *bodhi* (菩提), is discarded by the hearers (*śrāvakas* 聲聞) and the self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddhas* 獨覺) at the time when they enter {3/15v} into *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder (無餘依涅槃) and, consequently, cease to experience the fruit of actions.

There is no time when the stainless cognition itself (*vijñāna*) (無垢識體) could be discarded, for there is no time when benefitting (*artha-caryā*; literally *hita-sukha*) (利) sentient beings (and bringing them joy (樂)) would come to an end.

As for the other names, i.e., mind (*citta* 心), retaining (*ādāna*), etc., they are suitable, as we have seen, for all the states of cognition (*vijñāna*) (and should be used depending on the meaning). [The period when they are abandoned cannot be determined for they are discarded when the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) or the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*) is discarded.]

#0745 Thus, the eighth cognition (第八識), (generally speaking, exists in two states (位):) the one in the impure (*sāsrava*) state should be distinguished from the one in the pure (*anāsrava*) state.

I. In the impure state (有漏位), [i.e., when it is called *ālaya* (store) or *vipāka* (retribution), the eighth is as we have defined it, i.e.,] it is non-defined (*avyākṛta* 無記性), <#0746> associated only with five mental factors (*caittas*) (i.e., contact [*sparśa* 觸], etc.), <#0747> having what is appropriated (*upādi* 執受) and (the site (*sthāna* 處)) for their object (境) (see #0561).

#0749 II. In the pure state (無漏位), it is exclusively good (*kuśala* 善性). <#0750> It is associated with twenty-one mental factors (心所):

1. five universal (*sarvatraga* 遍行) [mental factors] which always (恆) accompany every [type of] mind (心) (#0581, #1649);
2. five [mental factors with] “special” (objects) (*pratiniyāta-viṣaya* 別境) (#0633):
 - a. predilection (*chanda* 欲), because it constantly (常) is the desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 樂) to realize-cognize (證智) the “considered” (*abhipreta*, 所觀) thing (境);

- b. resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解), because it always (恆) is the affirmation (*ava-dhāraṇa* 印持) with regard to the considered thing (所觀境);
 - c. memory (*smṛti* 念), because it always (恆) is the clear recollection (明記) of the thing (境) experienced in the past (曾受); {3/16r.}
 - d. concentration (*samādhi* 定), because the *bhagavat* (世尊) never has a non-concentrated mind (不定心);
 - e. understanding (*prajñā* 慧), because it constantly discerns (*pravīcaya* 決擇) all *dharma*s;
3. eleven good (*kuśala* 善) *dharma*s (#1766), because it constantly (常) is associated with very pure faith (極淨信), etc.

[The pure eighth cognition] is associated with twenty-one mental factors only, for not being defiled (染污) and not being distracted (散動), it is not associated with bad and non-defined *dharma*s (i.e., defilements [*kleśa*], etc., regret [*kaukrīya*], etc.). <#0751> This cognition is also always accompanied only by neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨受), for it always moves in a spontaneous manner (任運) and (evolves) in perfect equality (平等轉). <#0752> It has all *dharma*s for its object, for the mirror knowledge (鏡智) (#3265) is universally directed at all the *dharma*s. <169>

C.H. *Demonstrating the existence of the eighth cognition*

#0754 How do we know that separate from the cognitions, i.e., the visual cognition, etc., accepted by the Little Vehicle, there is an eighth cognition ⟨with a distinct substance of its own⟩? <#0756> From ⟨the definitive authority (定量) of⟩ the noble teachings (聖教) (i.e., texts of both vehicles) and from reasoning (正理).

H.A. Sources of the Great Vehicle; #0763

H.B. Sources of the Little Vehicle; #0853

H.C. Arguments from reason; ten arguments; #0878

C.H.A. *Sources of the Great Vehicle*

#0763 I. In the *Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra* (大乘阿毘達磨契經), it says: <#0765> {3/16v.}

*anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ |
tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo 'pi ca* ||³⁵⁶

⟨From beginningless time, there is an element (*dhātu* 界). It is the support (依) for all *dharma*s, etc.

From that there occur all destinies (*gatis* 趣) and [also] the obtaining in terms of realizing (證得) of *nirvāṇa* (涅槃).⟩

First explanation.

#0768 This eighth cognition is subtle (微細) in its nature and hence reveals itself only through its activity (作用), through its effects.

#0770 The first two quarter-verses (*pādas*) reveal (顯) the eighth cognition (第八識) ⟨in its activity (用)⟩ as cause (*hetu* 因): “It is the element (*dhātu*) that has no beginning”; and ⟨in its activity⟩ as condition (*pratyaya* 緣): “It is the support for all *dharma*s” (#0408).

The last two quarter-verses reveal (顯) [the eighth cognition] ⟨in its activity

³⁵⁶ Cited above #0427 and Sthiramati, *Trentaine*, S. Lévi, F 37, where *saṃsāra-pravṛtti* (process (or continuity) of *saṃsāric* existence) = “rebirth among the different classes of sentient beings (or the moment of conception in other existences)” (*nikāya-sabhāga-antareṣu pratisaṃdhi-bandhaḥ*), and *nivṛtti* (abolition of *saṃsāric* existence) = element of *nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇa-dhātu*) with-remainder or without-remainder.

nivṛtti = *huanmie* 還滅.

pravṛtti = *liuzhuan* 流轉.

adhigama = *zhengde* 證得.

(用)) as supporter-carrier (依持) (1) of the process (*pravṛtti* 流轉) of existence [i.e., *saṃsāra*] and (2) of the abolition (*nivṛtti* 還滅) of existence [i.e., *nirvāṇa*]: “This cognition being given, there occur all destinies and also the obtainment and realization of *nirvāṇa*”.

#0774 1. *Dhātu* (界), “element”, means cause (*hetu* 因):

This refers to the eighth cognition considered as seed (*bīja*), i.e., the seed-cognition (*bīja-vijñāna* 種子識), which, from beginningless time, is a continuous series (展轉相續) of potencies (*śakti*) that immediately engender (親生) all the *dharma*s (see *Siddhi* F 92, #0408, #0736). (Thus it is called a “cause” (因).)

#0776 2. *Samāśraya* (依), “support”, means condition (*pratyaya* 緣):

[This refers to the eighth cognition considered as actual (“active”). This is the retaining cognition (*ādāna-vijñāna* 阿陀那) (see #0734), i.e., the cognition that [“retains” or] “seizes and holds” (執持), which, <170> since beginningless time, is the support (*niśraya* 依止) of all *dharma*s, etc. (Thus it is called a “condition” (緣).)

#0778 Indeed, the eighth cognition (i.e., the awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]) seizes and holds (執持) seeds (*bījas* 種子), is the support (*āśraya* 所依) of the actual *dharma*s (現行法), (that is, it develops as them (變為彼) and is their support (為彼依)). {3/17r.}

#0780 On the one hand, (‘‘develops as them’’ (變為彼) means that) [the eighth cognition] develops as the receptacle world (器) and as the body endowed with sense-faculties (有根身): it is the support of both.

#0783 On the other hand, (‘‘is their support’’ (為彼依) means that) [the eighth cognition] is the support (依止) of the other evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識):

#0785 a. it “seizes and receives” (執受) the five material sense-faculties (色根), allowing the first five cognitions (*vijñānas* 識), i.e., the visual cognition, etc., to rely on these sense-faculties (and to evolve (轉));

#0786 b. it is, moreover, the support (依止) of *manas* (末那) [i.e., the seventh cognition,] which, in its turn, allows mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 第六意識) to rely on [this *manas*] (and to evolve).

#0787 We know that *manas* (末那) and mental cognition (意識), being evolving cognitions (轉識), must, like the first five cognitions, i.e., the visual cognition, etc., rely on sense-faculties that are simultaneous with them (俱有), and [we know]

that the eighth, being a cognition (in its nature (性)), must also have a simultaneous support (俱有依), which is the seventh, i.e., *manas* (#1120).

#0789 Such is the activity (用) of this eighth cognition as cause (*hetu* 因) and as condition (*pratyaya* 緣).

#0792 3. *Tasmin sati* (由此有), i.e., “from that”, that is to say, *tasmin vijñāne sati*, means “from that cognition (*vijñāna*)”.

4. *Gatiḥ sarvā* (有諸趣), i.e., “there occur all destinies (*gati* 趣)”, that is to say, “there occur the good and the bad destinies”. {3/17v.}

#0794 That is, it is due (有) to this eighth cognition (第八識) that all *dharma*s (i.e., the seeds [*bīja*s]) favorable (順) to the *saṃsāric* process (*pravṛtti* 流轉)—that is, the generators of the process of the actual *dharma*s that are *saṃsāra* or “existence”—are seized and held (*ādatta* 執持) in such a way that the sentient beings (有情) continue to proceed (*pravart* 流轉) in *saṃsāric* existence (生死). [The actual *dharma*s constitute the *saṃsāric* process (*pravṛtti*); the defiled seeds that generate the actual *dharma*s are called “favorable to the *saṃsāric* process” (*pravṛtṭy-anukūla* or *pravṛtṭi-bhāgīya*).]

#0796 The text speaks only of destiny (*gati* 趣) (#1120).³⁵⁷ Although defilement (*kleśa* 惑), action (*karma* 業) and mode of birth (*yonī* 生) are also the *saṃsāric* process (*pravṛtti* 流轉), nevertheless, the text designates *pravṛtti* by the single word *gati* (destiny), because destiny is the principal part (勝) of the fruit (果) (i.e., the fruit of suffering [*duḥkha-phala*], the truth of suffering [*duḥkha-satya*]).

#0797 Or else, the word destinies (*gati* 趣) includes both “the place where one is going” (所趣), i.e., destiny (*gati*), and “that which causes one to go” (能趣), namely, defilement, action and mode of birth. The “retinue” (*pariṣkāra* 資具) of the destinies—i.e., on the one hand, <171> the receptacle world, on the other hand, defilement-action—can thus also be designated by the word destiny (*gati* 趣).

#0798 In fact, defilement (惑), action (業) and mode of birth (生) rely on this eighth cognition: the latter is the support (依持) of the *saṃsāric* process (流轉) (i.e., *pravṛtti*) (defilement, action, suffering or destiny).

#0800 5. *Nirvāṇa-adhigamo 'pi ca* (及涅槃證得), i.e., “and obtaining in terms of realizing (證得) of *nirvāṇa*”:

It is due to the existence of the eighth cognition that the obtaining in terms of realizing (證得) (*sākṣātkāra-pratilambha* = *adhigama*) of *nirvāṇa* (涅槃) can occur.

³⁵⁷ AKB iii. F 12.

- #0802 Indeed, it is this eighth cognition that seizes-holds (*adadāti* 執持) the said *dharma*s of abolition (*nivṛtti* 還滅), that is to say, the pure (*anāsrava*) seeds (*bījas*) that cause the actual noble path to arise in such a way that the practitioner (修行者) realizes and obtains *nirvāṇa*.
- #0804 The text speaks only {3/18r.} of the obtaining in terms of realizing (證得) of *nirvāṇa*, i.e., the path (道) to *nirvāṇa*. Indeed, being unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), *nirvāṇa* does not exist due to this eighth cognition, {i.e., does not exist} by relying on this cognition. [The cognition does not seize-hold *nirvāṇa*; it seizes-holds the seeds of *nirvāṇa* which are conditioned (#0427).]
- #0805 Or else, one can say that this text only speaks of *nirvāṇa* as that which is to be realized (所證) because the practitioner (修行者) truly aspires to *nirvāṇa*.
- #0806 Or else, the expression *nirvāṇa-adhigama* must mean: “*nirvāṇa* and *nirvāṇa-adhigama*”, i.e., *nirvāṇa* (涅槃) and the path (樂) to *nirvāṇa*, for both are of the abolition (*nivṛtti* 還滅) category.

The word *nirvāṇa* (涅槃) designates the abolition (*nivṛtti*) or cessation (*nirodha* 滅) which should be realized (所證).

The following word *adhigama* (證得) designates the noble path (道) which causes the obtaining (能得) of the abolition.

By the noble path that abandons (*prahā*) (能斷道), one abandons the defilements (*kleśa*) that should be abandoned (斷所斷惑); at the time when the defilements are (completely exhausted (究竟盡)), *nirvāṇa* is realized (and obtained).

- #0807 That which abandons (i.e., the noble path) that which should be abandoned (i.e., the defilements), {that which leads to realization (i.e., the noble path)} of that which should be realized (i.e., *nirvāṇa*), all of that depends on this eighth cognition which thus {is active (用)} as the support (依持) of abolition (*nivṛtti*).

Second explanation.

- #0809 The first quarter-verse (*pāda*) {of the above verse from the *Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra*} explains the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 自性) of this eighth cognition (i.e., the seed-cognition [*bīja-vijñāna*]), the constant (恆) procession of cause and effect (i.e., dependent origination [*pratītya-samutpāda*]) that does not have a beginning (無始).

The last three quarter-verses say—first, in general (總) (i.e., the second quarter-verse), and, then, in detail (別) (i.e., the third and fourth quarter-verses)—that this (actual) cognition is the support (所依止) <172> {of both *dharma*s (法)}, i.e.,

(1) the pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染) *dharma*s and (2) the purification (*vyavadāna* 清淨) *dharma*s (#1077). {3/18v.}

#0810 1. The first, i.e., the polluted *dharma*s (*sāṃkleśika-dharma*s 雜染法), refer to the truth of suffering (*duḥkha-satya* 苦諦) and the truth of the origin (*samudaya-satya* 集諦) (苦集諦):³⁵⁸ that is, on the one hand, “the place where one is going” (所趣), on the other hand, “that which causes one to go” (能趣); on the one hand, birth (生) (or existence) (i.e., the fruit of suffering [*duḥkha-phala*]), on the other hand, defilement and action (業惑).

2. The second, i.e., the purified *dharma*s (*vaiyavadānika-dharma*s 清淨法), refer to the truth of cessation (*nirodha-satya* 滅諦) and the truth of the path (*mārga-satya* 道諦): that is, on the one hand, that which is to be realized (所證), *nirvāṇa* (涅槃); that is, on the other hand, that which causes one to realize (能證), i.e., the noble path (道).

#0811 Both exist only by relying on this eighth cognition, for it is impossible (or unreasonable) that they rely on the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), etc.

Third explanation.

#0813 The first quarter-verse (*pāda*) explains the substance (體) of this eighth cognition, a beginningless (無始) series (相續).

The other three quarter-verses say that it is the support (所依止) of the three kinds of “nature” (*svabhāva* or *lakṣaṇa* 自性), <#0814> in the order: dependent (*paratantra* 依他起) nature, imagined (*parikalpita* 遍計所執) nature, perfect (*pariniṣpanna* 圓成實) nature, respectively (see #2723).

#0815 The ideas (義) expressed in this verse (頌) can refer only to the eighth cognition. {3/19r.}

#0817 II. The *Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra* says:

The cognition (*vijñāna*) which, being endowed with all the seeds (*bījas* 種子), “envelops (and stores)” (攝藏)³⁵⁹ all *dharma*s,

Is called store (*ālaya* 阿賴耶). I have revealed (開示) it to the best (individuals) (勝者).

³⁵⁸ AKB vi, F 124 and 136.

³⁵⁹ At #1367, we will see that “the defilements (*kleśas*) are *shecang* (enveloped) by calm abiding (*śamatha*)”, i.e., most probably rendered in Sanskrit as *parigṛhīta*.

But the assisting cause (*parigraha-hetu*), #2499, is *zhishou* 執受.

#0819 The eighth, the root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna* 本識) is endowed with all seeds (種子). Thus, it “envelops (and stores)” (攝藏) all *dharmas* of pollution (*saṃ-kleśa* 雜染) (#1077).

#0820 This is why it is given the name “store” (*ālaya* 阿賴耶). – It does not resemble the primal matter (*pradhāna* 勝性) of the Sāṃkhyas which is transformed (轉) into the “great one” (*mahat* 大), etc., for the seeds themselves (種子體) are not the same as the fruit itself (果體) (i.e., the same thing as the actual root-cognition); for the actual *dharmas* that rely on the “root” (*mūla*), and the “root” that supports them, arise and cease at the same time (俱生滅) (see #0415).

One also gives the name “*ālaya*” (阿賴耶) to this cognition because <173> *dharmas* of pollution (雜染法) envelop (and store) it as it envelops (and stores) them (攝藏) (see #0447); but also because sentient beings become attached to it (執藏) as their “self” (我).

“The best (individuals) (勝者)”. – This refers:

#0821 a. either to the (group of) *bodhisattvas* (菩薩眾) who—having entered the “path of insight” (見道)—have obtained the direct realization of reality (*tattva-abhisamaya* 真現觀) (#2927): since they realize-understand (證解) [without negation or error] the nature of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識), it is appropriate that the Bhagavat (世尊) correctly reveals (開示) it to them; {3/19v.}

b. or to all *bodhisattvas* (菩薩), even those who do not yet possess the stages, those who have not yet entered into the path of insight (見道前): the latter, although they do not realize-understand (證解) (the store-cognition), nevertheless, they believe-understand (信解 = *adhimuc*) and will seek to acquire the “transmutation (*parāvṛtti*) (of the support)” (轉依) of the eighth cognition (see #3180); (for this reason, the Buddha was also referring to them).

#0822 The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識)—all the cognitions except for the store-cognition—do not correspond to the definition given by this verse.

#0824 III. *Samdhi-nirmocana* (解深密經) also says:

The retaining cognition (*ādāna-vijñāna* 阿陀那識)—very profound and very subtle (甚深細), like a strong current (瀑流)—proceeds with all the seeds (*bījas* 種子).

Fearing (恐) that they might conceptually figurate (分別) (and seize (執)) it to be a self (*ātman*), I have not revealed (開演) it to the foolish (凡愚).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Samdhi-nirmocana (*Jie shenmi jing*, T16.0676.0692c22) (same readings, but the order of the quarter-verses [*pādas*] is 1, 3, 2, 4); cited in YBh (T.30.1579.0579a15, 0718c02) and in Sthiramati, *Triṃśikā*, Lévi, F 34, with a third quarter-verse in poor shape which may be restored after the Tibetan version (communication with S. Yamaguchi):

ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo
ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo |
bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi(to)
mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ ||

The correction *mā haiva* (for MS. *mohaiva*) is justified by *Mahā-vastu*, iii, 167, 7: *mā haiva rājño ... bhaveya*.

The Chinese, however, translates *bāla* (the foolish) as *fanyu* 凡愚, which, according to the commentary, indicates two categories, (1) the ordinary worldlings (*pṛthag-janas*) and (2) the fools (*mūḍhas*) [i.e., people of the first two vehicles].

#0826 The eighth cognition seizes-holds (*ādadāti* 執持) the seeds (*bījas* 種子) (#0875) of *dharma*s; it seizes-receives (*upādadāti* 執受) (the basis of) the material sense-faculties (色根依處) (#0954); it also seizes-grasps (*samādadāti* ? 執取) rebirth (#0977) and the series (結生相續). Thus, it is called retaining (*ādāna* 阿陀那).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

“Seize-hold” = *zhichi* 執持 = *ādā*.

“Seize-receive” = *zhishou* 執受 = *upādā*.

“Seize-grasp” = *zhiqu* 執取, which I assume represents *samādā*, <174> since the word must contain the root *dā*. – But AKB vi, F 139, *zhiqu* translates Tib. *rjes su ’brel* = *anubandh*: “In order to bind (*anubandh*) a new existence (*punar-bhava*), there is no *dharma* comparable to afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha*)”.

“Rebirth”, correctly “that which binds the rebirth”, *jiesheng* 結生, “binding birth”, glossed by Kuiji as “the defilements (*kleśas*) that moisten birth”, is a translation for the words *pratisaṃdadhāti*, *pratisaṃdhi*, *pratisaṃdhibandha* (see AKB 9/4v.10 [iii, F 51]; 27/11r.10 [vii, F 102]).

“Series”, *xiangxu* 相續 = *saṃtāna*, glossed by Kuiji as “the fruit consisting of suffering (*duḥkha-phala*)”.

[The retaining cognition (*ādāna-vijñāna*)] is called very profound (甚深), for the sentient beings not belonging to a family (*agotrakas* 無性) (see #0428, #0467) {3/20r.} are incapable of examining (its depth) (窮底).

It is called very subtle (甚細), for the saints of the family (*gotra* 性) who “proceed towards peace” (趣寂種), (i.e., the determined [*niyata*] hearers [*śrāvakas*] and determined self-enlightened ones [*pratyekabuddhas*],) are incapable of understanding it (*pratividh*) (通達).

[The retaining cognition] is the real (*tāttvika* 真實) seed (*bīja* 種子) of all the *dharma*s, [and, as an actual cognition (*viññāna*), it carries-holds all seeds; it is therefore called “endowed with all seeds” (*sarva-bīja*), #0408.]

Stirred (*īrita*, *abhyāhata*, *kṣubhita* 擊) by conditions (*pratyaya* 緣), it engenders (生), like waves (波浪), temporary cognitions (i.e., the evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-viññāna* 轉識]); but itself, it is always continuous (無間斷), like a (strong current) (瀑流).

#0828 The ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 凡) are those not belonging to a family (*agotrakas* 無性).

The fools (*mūḍhas* 愚) are (those who “proceed towards peace” (趣寂)), i.e., those of the first two vehicles [i.e., the hearers (*śrāvakas*) and self-enlightened ones (*pratyekas*)].

The Bhagavat (世尊) does not teach (or reveal (開演)) “the doctrine of the eighth cognition, the generator of *dharma*s” to them; he fears that they would misunderstand the meaning of this doctrine, would generate a “belief in a self” (*ātma-grāha*) of the conceptually figured (*vikalpita*) type (分別執) (see #0062) and would, consequently, when they are ordinary worldlings, fall into bad destinies (惡趣), and, when they are saints (*āryas*), create an obstacle (障生) to the noble path (聖道).³⁶⁰ <175>

#0829 (Only the eighth cognition has such characteristics [as mentioned in the above verse].)

#0831 IV. *Laṅkāvatāra* (入楞伽經) also says:

#0832 Just as when various waves (波浪) arise on the ocean (海) stirred (遇) by the wind (風) which is their condition (*pratyaya* 緣), while the forces

³⁶⁰ On this subject, Kuiji, *Shuji* (4A/20) mentions the controversy between Xuanzang and the Sāṃmitiya teacher Prajñāgupta, a pupil of Sthiramati, of the country of Lolo in southern India (Valabhi, Watters, ii, 246), author of a treatise in 700 verses against the Great Vehicle, who does not distinguish the two kinds of belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*). – We will come across Prajñāgupta again (Péri, *Date*, p. 52) in Kuiji, *Shuji* 7B/69.

(作用) (that give rise to the waves), active-ready (現前), evolve (轉) uninterruptedly. {3/20v.}

So also this ocean (海) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識). Hit (擊) by the wind (風) of objects (境), etc., it constantly gives rise (起) to these waves which are the (temporary) cognitions (*vijñānas*), while the forces (作用) (that bring forth the cognitions), active-ready (現前), evolve (轉).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

1. Our text is related to the *Laṅkāvatāra*, ii, 99–100; x, 56–57 (T16.0671.0566c03):

taraṅgā hy udadher yadvat pavanapratyayoditāḥ |
nṛtyamānāḥ pravartante vyucchedaś ca na vidyate ||
ālayaughas tathā nityaṃ viśayapavaneritaḥ |
citrais taraṅgavijñānair nṛtyamānaḥ pravartate ||

Kuiji (T43.1830.0351b21) cites very precisely the translation by Bodhiruci (T16.0671), and notes that [the translations] do not agree, [meaning that the translation by Bodhiruci is less correct]; then he says that the Chinese transcript for *Laṅkā* is not correct.

2. The conditions of the waves are: [a] condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*), the ocean, [b] condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*), the wind. – By analogy with the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), we speak about the forces—contained in the ocean—giving rise to waves.

The store-cognition is the reservoir of the forces (or seeds [*bījas*]) that are the “condition qua cause” of the temporary cognitions (*vijñānas*). The latter depend, in addition, on objects (i.e., the condition qua object [*ālambana-pratyaya*]), etc., (whereby “etc.” = condition qua dominance [*adhipati-pratyaya*], condition qua immediate antecedent [*samanantara-pratyaya*]).

This is, roughly, the meaning of the verse. But the third quarter-verse (*pāda*) of the first verse [in *Siddhi*]¹—identical with the fourth quarter-verse of the second verse—presents a difficulty: *xianqian zuoyong zhuan* 現前作用轉. – Gloss: “The efficacies (*gongneng* 功能 = *sāmarthya*, *śakti*) which engender the seven cognitions are called *xianqian zuoyong* 現前作用. – *xianqian* (*abhimukha*), which I translate as “prêtes” [*Editors*: and which we translate here into English as “active-ready”].

#0833 The cognitions (*vijñānas*) that are not the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) (i.e., the visual cognition [*cakṣur-vijñāna*], etc.) are not—like the great ocean (大海)—a constant series that (evolves and) gives rise to waves (浪) which are the cognitions. Thus we know that there is a separate eighth cognition.

#0834 The texts of the Great Vehicle (大乘經) that could be cited on this subject are innumerable (無量). (They all state that there is such an eighth cognition (第八識).)

[But the question is raised as to whether the *sūtras* of the Great Vehicle are authoritative.] <176>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Among the documents relative to the controversy on the authenticity of the Great Vehicle, *Explanation of the Noble Teachings* (*Vikhyāpana*), T.31.1602.0581b; *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix, 42 foll.; the *Siddhānta* of Mañjuśaḥāśavajra (i, 128a1) [which is analyzed by Wassiljew, pp. 262–263 (S. 289–290)], who cites the verse of the *Sūtra-ālaṃkāra* (see #0851). Compare AKB ix, F 252; *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, F 23.

#0836 The *sūtras* of the Great Vehicle (大乘經) are authoritative, for:

1. they conform to the “non-self” (*nairātmya* 無我) and contradict the “self”, the person (*pudgala*) (數取趣);
2. they turn away from process (*pravṛtti* 流轉) (i.e., *saṃsāra*) and turn towards abolition [of *saṃsāra*] (*nivṛtti* 還滅) (i.e., *nirvāṇa*);
3. they praise the Buddha (佛), the Dharma (法) and the Saṃgha (僧); they depreciate the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道);
4. they teach (*vijñap* 表) the *dharma*s, i.e., the aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊), etc., and refute (遮) the primal matter (*pradhāna* 勝性), etc.;
5. the followers of the Great Vehicle think that they are included among the *sūtras* since they show the truth (理) without erroneousness (顛倒). Consequently, like the *Ekottara-āgama* (增壹) and the other texts of the Little Vehicle, the *sūtras* of the Great Vehicle form part of the authoritative scriptures (*āgama*) (至教量). {3/21r.}

#0839 Besides, Āryamaitreya (聖慈氏)—in the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*—demonstrates by means of seven kinds of arguments (七種因) that the Great Vehicle *sūtras* are really (真是) the “word of the Buddha” (*buddha-vacana* 佛說):

(1) *ādāv avyākaraṇāt* (2) *sama-pravṛtter* (3) *agocarāt* (4) *siddheḥ* |

(5) *bhāva-abhāve bhāvāt* (6) *pratipakṣatvād* (7) *rutānyatvāt* ||³⁶¹

- #0841 1. *ādāv avyākaraṇāt* (先不記故): “Because [the supposed calamity of the Great Vehicle] was not predicted at the beginning”.

If the *sūtras* of the Great Vehicle were spoken—after the *nirvāṇa* (滅度) of the Bhagavat (or Buddha) (佛)—by a certain person with the view of destroying (壞) the True Doctrine (正法), why did the Bhagavat (世尊) not predict (當起) this calamity (怖事) as he predicted (記別) other future calamities before (先預)?

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See the note by S. Lévi, in his translation of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 6. – The future perils (*anāgata-bhayas*) (*Aṅguttara*, iii, 100) which were pointed out by Oldenberg, *Buddhistische Studien*, p. 635, and which I believe are addressed by Aśoka, are of another type. – The predictions with which we are dealing here are of the Kṛkin-dream type (AKB viii, F 220), the Bimbisāra-dream type (*I-tsing*, Takakusu, p. 13), <177> *Rāṣṭrapāla-paripṛcchā* (Finot, p. ix), *Candragarbha-praśna* (*Tibetische Lebensbeschreibung*, p. 88; *Kanjur*, Mdo, 32, fol. 216), etc.

There are two poignant lines in *Mahā-vastu*, ii, p. 370: “He who will uphold the declining True Doctrine, even if it were for only one day ...”.

Kuiji has a lengthy note (*Shuji* 4A/27r.; T.43.1830.0352b29) which would be worthwhile translating:

In the *Saddharmavipralopa-sūtra* (? T12.0396, see AKB viii, F 220), the Bhagavat predicts that, in the land of Campā 瞻波羅國, a *bhikṣu* will destroy the True Doctrine. He also predicts the division into eighteen schools. – But why did he not predict the attacks of the non-Buddhists, the attacks of the Little Vehicle against the Great Vehicle? Why did he not predict the Great Vehicle? – Did he not predict the calamity which is the Great Vehicle when he speaks of the vermin that eats away at the lion?

- #0842 2. *sama-pravṛtteḥ* (本俱行故): “Because [the Great Vehicle] coexists (俱行)

³⁶¹ *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, i, 7, ed. S. Lévi, p. 3. – The version cited in the *Siddhi* differs from the version of Prabhākaramitra, T.31.1604, as Kuiji has noted. T.31.1604 omits the word *ādau*, translates *bhāvābhāve bhāvāt* as *ti fei ti* 體非體, whereas the *Siddhi* has *you wu you* 有無有.

The fifth argument may be divided into two: *bhāve bhāvāt* and *abhāve 'bhāvāt*. Thus there are eight arguments.

Xianyang shengjiao lun (T.31.1602) and *Xianyang shengjiao lun song* (T.31.1603) has ten arguments, for the most part the same as here.

from the beginning with the Little Vehicle (小乘)”.

From the beginning (本來), the teaching (教) of the Great Vehicle (大乘) and that of the Little Vehicle (小乘) have existed together (俱行). Why should the Great Vehicle alone not be the word of the Buddha (佛說)?

- #0843 3. *agocarāt* (非餘境故): “Because [the teaching of the Great Vehicle] is not accessible to (or is not of the domain of) others, i.e., the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*) or followers of the Little Vehicle”.

The teaching of the Great Vehicle is vast (廣大) and very profound (甚深); it is not of the domain of speculation (思量境界)³⁶² of the non-Buddhist scholars (外道), etc., who cannot attain it; it is not promulgated in their *sūtras-sāstras* (經論); and when it is promulgated (at least partially, as we will see), the disciples of the Little Vehicle do not recognize it (or have no “trusting understanding”) (*adhimuc* 信受) in it. Thus, it is wrong that the *sūtras* of the Great Vehicle is not the word of the Buddha (佛說). {3/21v.}

- #0844 4. *siddheḥ* (應極成故): “Because you admit [that the Great Vehicle as the word of *buddhas*] is well-established”.

When you say that the Great Vehicle has been spoken by other *buddhas* (餘佛) (Kāśyapa, etc.), but is not the word of the present Buddha (Śākyamuni) (今佛語), you accept our thesis (理) that the teaching of the Great Vehicle (大乘教) is the word of the Buddha (佛所說) and is well-established (極成).

- #0846 5. *bhāva-abhāve bhāvāt* (有無有故): “Because of the consequences of the existence or non-existence of the Great Vehicle”.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to our commentary and that of Asaṅga, which is very close, *bhāvābhāve bhāvāt* means *bhāve bhāvāt* and *abhāve 'bhāvāt*: “If there is a Great Vehicle, our texts are this Great Vehicle; if there is no Great Vehicle, there is no vehicle of the hearers (*śrāvakas*) or of the self-enlightened ones (*pratyekas*) either” (same doctrine at the beginning of *Madhyamakāvatāra*). It should be *bhāvābhāve bhāvābhāvāt*; but one could read *bhāvāt* preceded or not by *avagraha*.

If there is a Great Vehicle, one must trustingly accept (應信) that “this” teaching (教) <178> of the Great Vehicle (= our Great Vehicle) is the word of the Buddha (佛所說) since—outside of [the teaching of] this Great Vehicle of our Buddha—one cannot find another Great Vehicle.

³⁶² Speculation = *siliang* 思量.

#0847 If there is no Great Vehicle [= if the teaching of our Buddha does not include the Great Vehicle], then neither will there be the teaching (教) of the vehicle of the hearers (*śrāvakas*) (聲聞乘), for—without the Great Vehicle—nobody would become a *buddha* (成佛). Thus, who would appear into the world (出於世) to teach the vehicle of the hearers? It is absurd, ⟨or contradictory to reason,⟩ to maintain that only the vehicle of the hearers is the word of the Buddha (佛所說) ⟨and not the teaching of the Great Vehicle⟩.

#0848 6. *pratipakṣatvāt* (能對治故): “Because it is counteractive”.

By relying on *sūtras* of the Great Vehicle, the diligent practitioner (皆能引得) {3/22r.} ⟨generates and⟩ obtains (引得) the knowledge without conceptual figuring (*avikalpaka-jñāna* 無分別智) (#2918) which directly counteracts (正對治) all the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱). Thus, ⟨one should trustingly accept (應信) that⟩ the Great Vehicle is the word of the Buddha (佛所說).³⁶³

#0849 7. *rutānyatvāt* (義異文故): “Because the meaning differs from the letter” (義異文).

⟨The purport (意趣) of⟩ the doctrines (所說) of the Great Vehicle is very profound (甚深). One must not assume a meaning (義) on the basis of a literalist understanding (隨文) and then ⟨slander (誹) and⟩ deny (謗) its authenticity (非佛語) by taking advantage of this slavish interpretation. <#0850> Thus, the Great Vehicle is truly (真) the word of the Buddha (佛說).

#0851 ⟨Thus, this verse of the *Sūtrālamkāra* (莊嚴論) says:⟩

⟨[The Great Vehicle is truly the word of the Buddha] (1) because it was not predicted at the beginning (先不記), (2) because it coexists (俱行) [with the Little Vehicle], (3) because it is not of the domain practiced by others (非餘所行境), (4) because it is well-established (極成), (5) because of the existence or non-existence (有無有) [of the Great Vehicle], (6) because it counteracts (對治), (7) because the meaning differs from the letter (異文故).⟩

³⁶³ This is quite close to the argument in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (ix, 45): there is no true quality of a *bhikṣu* (*bhikṣutā*) without awareness of emptiness.

According to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, the saint of the Little Vehicle does not acquire *nirvāṇa* because he ignores the “emptiness of *dharma*s” and he does not destroy the hindrance of defilements (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*). The doctrine of our authors differs, as we will see in the tenth *juan*.

C.H.B. Sources of the Little Vehicle

#0853 The *sūtras* of other schools (餘部)³⁶⁴ also say, albeit in veiled language (密意說), that there is a store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識) which has a distinct intrinsic nature (自性).

#0855 1. In the canonical scriptures (*āgamas* 阿笈摩) of the Mahāsāṃghika-nikāya (大眾部), [the store-cognition] is designated—in veiled language—under the name of “root-cognition” (*mūla-vijñāna* 根本識). <179> Indeed, the cognitions (*vijñānas*) of the eye, etc., {3/22v.} have it for their support (依), just as the root of a tree (樹根) is the origin (本) of the ⟨stem (莖),⟩ leaves, etc. – The cognitions of the eye, etc., cannot function in this way, i.e., as a root.³⁶⁵

#0856 2. In the *sūtras* of the Sthaviras (上坐部) and in the treatises of the Vibhajya-vādins (分別論者),³⁶⁶ [the store-cognition] is designated, ⟨in veiled language,⟩ by the name *bhavāṅga-vijñāna* (有分識) [compare *Siddhi* F 196, the subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)].

Bhava (有) means the threefold mode of existence (三有) (in the three realms [*dhātus*]).

Aṅga (分) means cause (*hetu*).

The *ālaya* alone, being constant (恆), being universal (遍) (= existing in the three realms [*dhātus*], different from the cognition of the eye, etc.) can be “the cause of the threefold existence” (三有因).

³⁶⁴ Cf. Vasubandhu's *Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya* (T.31.1597.0326), *Mahāyānasamgraha-upanibandha* by Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0385-0386), which is cited by Kuiji.

Two important lines of the *Karmasiddhi-prakarāṇa* (T.31.1609.0785a): “In the *sūtras* of the Tāmraparṇīya-nikāya, this cognition (*vijñāna*) is called *bhavāṅga-vijñāna*; in the *sūtras* of the Mahāsāṃghika-nikāya, [this cognition is called] root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna*); the Mahīśāsakas call it the aggregate of enduring until the end of *saṃsāra* (*saṃsāra-koṭi-niṣṭha-skandha*)”.

³⁶⁵ “root” = *mūla* = *genben* 根本; “principle” = *ben* 本; “support” = *yizhi* 依止.

³⁶⁶ The text gives, word for word: Sthaviranikāyasūtra-vibhajyaśāstrin. – Kuiji says that the *Siddhi* cites in total four schools. But here we should distinguish two schools. The *Upanibandha* (T.31.1598.0386b) explains first the Sthavira opinions: “The Sthaviras designate this cognition (*vijñāna*) by the word *bhava-aṅga* because the *ālaya* is the cause (*aṅga* = *hetu*) of existence ...”, and adds: “The Vibhajyavādinikāya says the same”. – See #1048.

Kuiji: In the past, they were called Vibhajyavādi-nikāya; now Prajñāptivādi-nikāya (see AKB ii, F 219; v, F 24).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

As we have seen, #0853 (note), the *Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa* attributes the doctrine of *bhava-aṅga* to the Tāmraparṇīyas. – Actually, the text has: *chitongkebu* 赤銅鑠部; but the character 鑠 can be corrected as *ye* 葉, leaf, with the same phonetics. The reading “Tāmraparṇīyas” is recommended by two passages in the *Kośa-vyākhyā*, ix, p. 252: “This *sūtra* is accepted by the Tāmraparṇīya school ...”, and especially i, p. 32: “The Tāmraparṇīyas accept a *hr̥daya-vastu* (heart)”, which is the *hadaya-vatthu* of the scholars of Taprobane. (See *Siddhi* F 221.)

There are numerous sources on the *bhavaṅga* in the Pāli literature, Buddhaghosa, *Attha-sālinī*, p. 140, *Visuddhimagga*, *Nettipakaraṇa*, p. 91. – Mrs. Rhys Davids dealt with it several times, *Compendium*, p. 9; translation of *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, pp. 2, 32, 134; *Quest Review*, 1917, Oct. p. 16, *Buddhist Philosophy*, 1924: 226, 234, 272. Mention should also be made of S.Z. Aung, *Compendium*, p. 267, Keith, *Buddhist Philosophy*, pp. 186, 194. – I have noted (*Nirvāṇa*, 1925, F 65) that Buddhaghosa recognizes in the *bhavaṅga* “the immaculate mind” of the *Āṅguttara*, i, 10 (see #0452).

The annotators of Kuiji and of the *Samgraha-upanibandha*, cited in brief by Saeki Kyokuga, have commented on the root-Sthaviras (subtle mind = *bhava-aṅga*, simultaneous with the coarse mind, *Siddhi* F 196) and the branch-Sthaviras (the two minds being non-simultaneous), on the nine types of mind of the Sthaviras, i.e., (1) *bhavāṅga*, at the moment of arising: the mind goes spontaneously to the object without <180> being capable of figurating (*vikalpa*); (2) *abhinirhāra*; (3) *dr̥ṣṭi* [Elements of comparison with the Pāli sources.]

- #0857 3. The Mahīśāsakas (化地部) call this [cognition] the “*skandha* that endures until the end of *saṃsāra*” (*saṃsāra-koṭi-niṣṭha-skandha* 窮生死蘊), [in fact, the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) endures until the adamant concentration (*vajra-upama*), #0700]. – Apart from the store-cognition (第八識), there is no *skandha-dharma* (蘊法) that endures, in this way, ⟨i.e., until the end of *saṃsāra* (窮生死際),⟩ without discontinuity (無間斷時). Matter (*rūpa* 色) is interrupted (間斷) in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya*) (無色界); ⟨other minds,⟩ every mind, etc., which are not a store-cognition, have ceased (滅) among the gods without ideation (無想天) and also elsewhere; the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應行) have no distinct existence by themselves (別自體) separate from matter (*rūpa*) and from mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) (色心等): all these points have already been established. Thus, the *skandha* of which the Mahīśāsakas speak, ⟨i.e., the *skandha* that endures until the end of *saṃsāra* (窮生死蘊),⟩ can only be the store-cognition. {3/23r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Qiong shengsi yun 窮生死蘊 (*jāti-maraṇa-* [birth-death] *skandha* [aggregate]).

The first three words for the expression *qiong shengsi bian* 窮生死邊 (or *ji* 際) = *samsāra-koṭi-niṣṭha* (enduring until the end of *samsāra*) of AKB 6/12v.1 (ii, F 272, note); for in *Vyutpatti* there is: *qiong weilai ji* 窮未來際 = *aparānta-koṭi-niṣṭha* (enduring until the end of time).

This [Vijñānavāda] school accepts three kinds of *skandhas*: (1) the momentary aggregates (*kṣaṇa-skandhas*), the *dharma*s that cease from moment to moment; (2) *eka-janma-avadhi-skandhas*, i.e., the *dharma*s that endure for the duration of one existence, such as the sense-faculties (*indriyas*), etc.; (3) the aggregate that endures until the end of *samsāra* (*samsāra-koṭi-niṣṭha-skandha*), which is being considered here (*Samgraha-upanibandhana* by Asvabhāva).

Compare Vasumitra, *Treatise on the sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031.0017b04): thesis number 3 of the Sautrāntikas; in the chapter on the Mahīśāsakas, it is not a question of a constant *skandha*; however, see their thesis number 30b.

#0859 4. The Sarvāstivādins (一切有部), in their *Ekottara-āgama* (增壹經), also have a text that designates—in veiled language—the eighth cognition under the name of *ālaya* (阿賴耶). This text says that sentient beings (1) have [afflicted] love (愛) for the *ālaya*, (2) take pleasure (樂) in the *ālaya*, (3) are delighted (欣) with the *ālaya*, and (4) are satisfied (喜) with the *ālaya*.

#0861 These four expressions show that the *ālaya* (阿賴耶識)—considered in a general manner (總), considered (in a specific manner (別)), i.e., as past-present-future (三世)—is the object of attachment (*rāga* 貪) [of the seventh cognition].

La Vallée Poussin comments:

In the *Aṅguttara*, ii, 131, there is: *ālayārāmā bhikkhave pajā ālayaratā ālayasa[m]-muditā*; same text *Ekottara*, Tōkyō, xii, i, 70a, see S. Lévi, transl. of *Sūtrālamkāra*, p. 17.

Before the triad *ārāma-rata-saṃmudita*, our text puts a fourth expression, literally, *ālaya-thirst* (*ai* 愛): the word *ai* = *sneha* (afflicted love), AKB ix, F 272; #1277.

According to *Samgraha-upanibandha* (Asvabhāva, T.31.1598) *ai* (愛) relates to the *ālaya* in <181> general, the other three terms relate, in order, to the three time periods of the *ālaya*. – *Samgraha-bhāṣya* (Vasubandhu) differs.

Sentient beings seize the *ālaya* to be their true inner self (*sva adhyātmika ātman*) (真自內我), and for as long as the *ālaya* is not abandoned (斷) by the adaman-

tine concentration (*vajra-upama-samādhi*), so long do they always generate—without interruption—attachment (*āsaṅga*, *abhiniveśa* ? 愛著) in regard to it. Thus, the *ālaya* (阿賴耶識) is the real (真) object (*āyatana*) (or site) (處) of attachment (愛著).

- #0863 a. It is not to the other five “aggregates of attachment” (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊) (—with the exception of the *ālaya* which forms part of the impure [*sāsrava*] aggregate of cognition [*vijñāna-skandha*]—) that sentient beings are attached as their self. <#0865> That is to say, sentient beings born in locations (處) where sensation is exclusively painful (一向苦受),³⁶⁷ do not have attachment (不生愛著) for these other five “aggregates of attachment”; they always hate (厭逆) them without respite; they think: “When will I discard (當捨) this life (*jīvita* 命), {3/23v.} this similarity or group-homogeneity (*nikāya-sabhāgatā* 眾同分; *saṃskāra-skandha*, see #0250), this suffering body-mind (苦身心), so that I, freely (*svatantra* ? 自在), will feel happiness (快樂)?”
- #0866 b. The five objects of sense enjoyment (*kāma-guṇa* 五欲) are also not the real object (or site) of attachment (真愛著處), for the practitioners “detached from desire” (*kāma-vītarāga* 離欲者), i.e., ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*) or saints (*āryas*), although without attachment (貪著) in regard to these (five excellent) objects (of sense-enjoyment), continue to have love (愛) for their self (我) (i.e., self-love [*ātma-sneha*]).³⁶⁸
- #0867 c. The agreeable sensation (*sukhā vedanā* 樂受) (is also not the real object or site of attachment), for the practitioners who are detached from the (defiled (染)) third meditation (*dhyāna* 靜慮), (although being weary (厭) with) this (agreeable) sensation, nevertheless continue to have love for their self.
- #0868 d. The afflicted view of self (*[sat-]kāya-dr̥ṣṭi* 身見) (is also not the real object or site of attachment), for the practitioners who have trust (信) in the non-self (*nairātmya* 無我) and are not yet non-trainees (*aśaikṣas* 無學 = *arhats*), although they do not generate attachment (貪著) to the afflicted view of self (*kāya-dr̥ṣṭi* 身見), nevertheless still continue to have love (愛) for their inner self (內我). <182>

³⁶⁷ In the bad destinies (i.e., hells, animals, hungry ghosts [*pretas*]), there is no agreeable sensation that is “[the fruit of] retribution” (*vipāka-phala*); but agreeable sensation, i.e., the fruit of equal outflow (*niṣyanda-phala*), is not impossible there (Vasubandhu).

³⁶⁸ The saints (*āryas*) who are detached from *kāma* (desire) (third fruit = non-returners [*anāgāmins*]) are detached from the five objects of sense enjoyment (*kāma-guṇas*): nevertheless, they are afraid of thunderstorms; thus ...

La Vallée Poussin comments:

That is to say: these saints have abandoned the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*) (since they have acquired the path of insight [*darśana-mārga*]); they have no longer any attachment to the self as the afflicted view of self conceives it; they have no longer any figured (*vikalpita*) belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), figured (*vikalpita*) afflicted view of a self (*ātma-drṣṭi*). But in them there remains the innate (*sahaja*) belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), an “idea” of self (*ātman*) belonging to the seventh cognition (see #0067). They love this “inner self”, *neiwo* 內我.

- #0869 5. The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識, i.e., the cognition of the eye, etc.) (are also not the real object or site of attachment), for the practitioners, not yet being non-trainees (*āśaikṣas* 無學) and who seek (求) the “cessation of the mind” (滅心),³⁶⁹ although they are weary (厭) with the evolving cognitions, etc., {3/24r.} nevertheless continue to have love (愛) for their self (愛我).
- #0870 6. The material body (*rūpa-kāya* 色身) (is also not the real object or site of attachment) for the practitioners (who are detached from defiled (染) matter), although they are weary with matter (*rūpa*) (or the material body), nevertheless continue to have love for their self.
- #0871 7. As for the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayukta-saṃskāras* 不相應行; see #0215), they have no distinct existence by themselves (別自體) separate from matter (*rūpa*) and from mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) (色心等), thus, they are also not the real object or site of attachment (真愛著處).
- #0872 We may conclude: – When ordinary worldlings (*pṛthagjanas* 異生) and the trainees (*śaikṣas* 有學) generate love (for their self, although they either) love or do not love the other “aggregates of attachment” (*upādāna-skandhas*) (餘蘊), in all cases, they definitively generate love (愛) for their self (in regard to this cognition (識)). This love for their self refers, in reality, to the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*). (Only this cognition is the real object or site of attachment (真愛著處).)
- #0873 Thus, when the *Ekottara-āgama* says (#0859) that “sentient beings have love for the *ālaya* (愛阿賴耶)”, it definitively designates, by the word *ālaya*, (this, and only this,) store-cognition (阿賴耶識).

³⁶⁹ I.e., attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*), attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation (*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti*), see #0270.

C.H.C. *Arguments from reason; ten arguments*³⁷⁰

- C.1. Mind (*citta*), the holder of the seeds (*bījas*): Refutation of the opinions of the Sautrāntikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, etc.; #0875
- C.2. Mind that is retribution (*vipāka-citta*); #0928
- C.3. Five destinies (*gatis*) and four modes of birth (*yonis*); #0938
- C.4. Theory of appropriating (*upādāna*); #0952
- C.5. Life, heat and *vijñāna*; #0965
- C.6. Mind at conception and at death; #0977
- C.7. Cognition (*vijñāna*) and name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*); #0998
- C.8. Theory of four kinds of nutriment; #1006
- C.9. Attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*); #1035
- C.10. Pollution (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) of the mind; #1077

C.H.C.1. *Mind (citta), the holder of the seeds (bījas): Refutation of the opinions of the Sautrāntikas, Mahāsāṃghikas, etc.*

#0875 <After adducing the noble teachings, we will now show the proper reasons [for this understanding of the *ālaya*].>

#0878 The *sūtra* says:

[The eighth cognition] is called *citta* (心) because it is *cita* (集起) (i.e., has accumulated and generates [所集起]) the seeds (種子) of polluted (*sāṃkleśika* 雜染) and pure (*vyavadānika* 清淨, see #1077) *dharmas*. {3/24v.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 177 (Xuanzang, T.29.1558.0021c20) has: *cinotīti cittam*: “*citta* because it accumulates-generates, *jiqi* 集起”. That is to say “because it accumulates the good and the bad” (*Vyākhyā*), “because it accumulates-generates the mental factors (*caittas*) and the actions” (Puguang).

Here [in our section of the *Siddhi*], we have the same expression *jiqi*, but in the passive voice (所集起). <183>

But later, we find two meanings of *citta*:

- a. inasmuch as it holds the seeds (*bījas*), it accumulates-generates them, i.e., *cinoti*, in the active voice: *cinotīti cittam*;
- b. it is accumulated-generated by defiled and pure seeds: *citam iti cittam*.

³⁷⁰ See summary, #0396.

To which is added a third meaning:

- c. *ci* being translated as *jiji* 積集, “accumulated-piled up”: this is the *citta* because it is perfumable.

In his commentary on Vasubandhu’s small *Treatise on the Hundred Dharmas* (T.44.1836.0047a11), Kuiji explains the *citta-dharmas* in the following way:

1. In the sense of *jīqi* 集起, to accumulate-generate: the eighth cognition which stores up the seeds, which generates the actual cognitions.
2. In the sense of *jiji* 積集, to accumulate-pile up: the first seven cognitions, which are capable of perfuming the eighth, because they accumulate the seeds (in the eighth).
3. In the sense of *jīqi*, to accumulate-generate: the first seven cognitions, because, being actual, they accumulate the perfuming and generate the seeds.
4. In the sense of *jiji*, to accumulate-pile up: the eighth which stores up.

[We see that the eighth cognition is *jīqi* and *jiji*, i.e., in the active voice and in the passive voice.]

5–8. The *citta* is also that which takes an object, etc.

If this eighth cognition is lacking, there is no mind (*citta*) that could hold the seeds (*bījas*) (持種心).

[The various scholars of the school of the Sūtras [= Sautrāntikas], the schools of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sthaviras and Sarvāstivādins, have only unacceptable theories.]

1. *Sautrāntikas*. – *Root thesis* (#1044).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The refutation by the Sautrāntikas consists of three parts:

- a. Sautrāntikas, root thesis: the aggregates (*skandhas*) are perfumable and hold the seeds (*bījas*);
- b. Sautrāntikas, “masters who differ” or “branch-thesis”: cognition in itself (*viññāna-jāti*) is perfumable;
- c. Dārṣṭāntikas: the prior moment perfumes the subsequent moment;

whether one considers the cognition (*viññāna*) (Dārṣṭāntika thesis), whether one considers cognition in itself (*viññāna-jāti*) (viewpoint foreign to the Dārṣṭāntikas), the perfuming of the subsequent by the prior is impossible.

See—at the end of the chapter on the *ālaya*, *Siddhi* F 221—the summary of the notes of Kuiji on the various kinds of Sautrāntikas.

[Reply: – Whatever these scholars think about this, the seeds (*bījas*) are not held by the five aggregates (*skandhas*).

a. The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*) are not the *citta* of which the *sūtra* speaks.]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It refers here to the actual first six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), the six cognitions of the early school: mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) and the visual, auditory, etc., cognitions. Cogitation (*manas*) is also an evolving cognition, but it is not the topic here. <184>

#0885 The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) are interrupted (間斷) in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定) and in the other four states of non-ideation:³⁷¹ [thus, they cannot, constantly, hold the seeds]. They arise from sense-faculties (根) and their objects (境), and by means of various mental applications (*manaskāra* 作意); they are, sometimes, of different type (類), i.e., good (善), etc.:³⁷² [thus they cannot perfume one another]. (They easily (易) arise and dissipate (易脱起),) like a flash of lightning (電光), etc., and they do not endure (*sthira* 堅住): thus, they are not perfumable (可熏習).

[Thus, they are not the *citta* of which the *sūtra* speaks, for they do not receive seeds (they are not *cita* in the sense of accumulated-piled up);] they do not hold the seeds (持種) (one cannot attribute the action of *cinoti*, accumulate-generate, to them); they are not the mind that is accumulated-generated (所集起) by defiled (染) and pure (淨) seeds.

#0886 On the contrary, this store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is of a single type (一類),

³⁷¹ Kuiji *Shuji* 4A/43v. (#2264). – Sleep, faint (*mūrchā*), attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*), gods without ideation. – The minds at birth and at death come under the category of *mūrchā* (#0980).

³⁷² The original, by restoring it word for word = *indriya-artha-manaskāra-kuśala-ādi-vijātīya-vikāra-utpatteḥ*.

Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0389c), commenting on the verse of *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0135a) has some useful remarks: – The Sautrāntikas do not accept that the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*) could be simultaneous; thus these cognitions (*vijñānas*) are not “associated” (*samprayukta*); therefore they do not perfume one another. According to the Mahāsāṃghikas, they can be simultaneous; but the Mahāsāṃghikas do not believe in perfuming (#1219).

always uninterrupted (無間斷), like the sesame seed (荳蔕) (that takes on the smell of flowers) or the garment (that takes up the dye), enduring (堅住): thus, being perfumable (可熏), it corresponds (契當) to the *citta* (心) of which the *sūtra* speaks.

#0888 If one denies the existence of a mind (*citta* 心) that holds the seeds (持種), this is not only to be in conflict with scripture (經) but also to be in conflict with correct reason (正理).

#0889 On the one hand, “actually generated” (所起) *dharmas*, i.e., defiled (染) or pure (淨), {3/25r.} will not—in the absence of the perfumed (所熏) mind (*citta*)—⟨perfume⟩, i.e., bring forth seeds, will not increase pre-existing seeds (熏成種): thus, [the actually generated *dharmas*] ⟨would be irrelevant and⟩ would lose any efficacy (功).

On the other hand, if actually generated *dharmas*, ⟨i.e., defiled or pure,⟩ would not have seeds ⟨as cause⟩, how would they arise? Are you claiming, with the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道), that they arise spontaneously and by themselves (*svayambhū* 自然生)?

#0890 b. Matter (*rūpa* 色) and the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應) are not perfumable, do not hold seeds (*bījas*): <185>

They are not “mind” in their nature (心性): like sound (聲), light (光), etc., they cannot be perfumed (所熏) by the actual internal *dharmas* (內法), defiled (染) or pure (淨). How could they hold the seeds (持種)?

In addition, they have no real intrinsic nature (實自性) separate from mind. ⟨How could they be seized as a support (依止) of internal seeds (內種)?⟩

#0891 c. The mental factors (*caittas*).

The mental factors (心所) associated with the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識), ⟨just as the cognitions (識),⟩ are interrupted (*ucchidyante* 間斷), ⟨easily⟩ arise as such and such and dissipate (*vikalpa-utpatti*) (易脫起), are not autonomous (*svatantra* 自在), are not mind in their nature (*citta-svabhāva* 心性), being mental factors. Therefore they do not hold the seeds (持種); they also cannot receive perfuming (受熏).

#0892 Thus, we must recognize the existence of a mind (*citta* 心)—distinct from the evolving cognitions—that holds the seeds (*bījas*) (持種).

#0894 2. *Sautrāntikas*. – *Divergent masters* (*yishi* 異師 – cf. #1048).

According to certain *Sautrāntikas*, {3/25v.} the six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-*

vijñānas) (六識), since beginningless time, succeed one another, arising and ceasing, relying on sense-faculties (根), objects (境), etc. Although the moments of the evolving cognitions, in their “individual reality” (*dravya* 事), change (轉變)—[while all these moments are, equally, *vijñapti*, i.e., cognizing]—nevertheless, in itself (*jāti* 類), i.e., “cognition in itself” (*vijñāna-jāti*), it does not change (無別) and remains. “Cognition in itself” (*jāti*) is perfumed (所熏習); it holds (能持) the seeds (*bījas*). – Thus, it is not necessary to conceive (執) of an eighth cognition in order to explain the causal succession (因果) of pure (淨) and defiled (染) *dharma*s.³⁷³

#0896 [Reply:] – This theory, ⟨or that kind of talk (言),⟩ does not make sense (無義).
<#0897> [If the Sautrāntikas ask:] Why is that the case? [It is due to four reasons.]

#0899 a. If your “cognition in itself” (*vijñāna-jāti*) is a real thing (*dravya* 實), you are adopting the opinion of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道; that is, the Vaiśeṣikas) who consider the universals-individuators (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) (#0110) to be a real thing. If its existence is purely fictitious (假), then in itself (*jāti* 類), it cannot hold the real seeds ⟨of internal *dharma*s⟩ (內法實種) since it is fictitious, since it is deprived of the special properties (勝用) required to hold the seeds (see #0496).

#0900 b. ⟨Moreover, what is the nature (性) of⟩ your “cognition in itself” (*vijñāna-jāti* 識類)?

Is it good or bad? – ⟨If it were good (善) or bad (惡), then⟩ it would not be able to receive perfuming (受熏) since it would not be non-defined, ⟨i.e., it would be defined (記)⟩, like the cessation due to deliberation (*pratisamkhyā-nirodha* 擇滅). <186>

Is it non-defined? – ⟨If it were non-defined (無記),⟩ then, when the mind (心) is good or bad, there would be no non-defined mind: your “cognition in itself”—defined as non-defined and firm—would be interrupted (斷). Indeed, if an individual thing (*dravya* 事, the individual) is good or bad, then the thing in itself (*jāti* 類) cannot be non-defined, for the “particular thing in itself” (別類)—[in contrast to the “general thing in itself” (*mahā-sattā*)]—must be of the same (同) nature (性) as the particular individual things (別事). {3/26r.}

#0901 c. Moreover, your “cognition in itself” (*vijñāna-jāti*), even if it were non-defined and perfumable, would definitively disappear during the states of non-ideation (無心位): since it is discontinuous (間斷) ⟨in nature (性)⟩, it is not ⟨enduring

³⁷³ See Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0389c09).

(堅住)). Thus, although it could receive the perfuming (受熏), it would not be able to retain the seeds (*bījas*) (執持種).

- #0902 d. Finally, the mind (心) of the *arhat* (阿羅漢) and that of the ordinary worldling (*prthagjana* 異生) would have the same “cognition in itself” (*viññāna-jāti* 識類). These minds would have mutual perfuming (熏) by the defiled (染) and pure (無漏) *dharma*s: do you accept this absurd (失) thesis?

Again, the various sense-faculties (根), i.e., the eye, etc.—being in themselves the same (*jāti* 類) (namely, the “sense-faculty in itself”)—would perfume one another (應互相熏); the various other *dharma*s, i.e., faith, etc., (together with the visual cognition, etc. (與眼等識),) being in themselves the same (namely, the “*dharma* in itself”) would perfume one another. – You reject this thesis: <#0903> therefore you should not maintain that your “cognition in itself” receives the perfuming.

#0904 3. *Dārṣāntikas*.

Whether one considers the individual [cognitions] (*dravya* 事) or [cognition] itself (*jāti* 類), (the *Dārṣāntikas* think that any) two successive moments (前後二念) of the (group of) six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-viññānas* 六識身) cannot be simultaneous (*sahabhū* 俱有).

[We reply:] – But in the case of two moments (念) being separated from each other, these evolving cognitions cannot perfume one another (互相熏), since that which perfumes (能熏) and what is perfumed (所熏) must be simultaneous (俱時). {3/26v.}

#0905 4. *Mahāsāṃghikas*.

[These scholars do not take the “cognition in itself” (*viññāna-jāti*) into account.] They think that the six evolving cognitions can be simultaneous (俱時轉). But, (for reasons given above,) they do not accept the notion of perfuming.

[We reply:] – Thus, not being perfumed (所熏), the evolving cognitions do also not hold (能持) the seeds (*bījas*). <187>

#0907 5. *Sthaviras*.³⁷⁴

[They do not accept the existence of seeds, i.e., as entities in themselves.] The prior moment (前), whether of matter (*rūpa* 色) or of mind (*citta* 心), is, according to its own type (自類) (and without interruption (無間)), the seed of the sub-

³⁷⁴ Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0396b) attributes this opinion to the Sautrāntika; see note *Siddhi* F 221.

sequent moment (後種), whether of matter or of mind. In this way, the chain of cause and effect (因果義) is established. – Thus, the arguments in favor of the eighth cognition are not conclusive (證不成).

#0909 [We reply:] – This doctrine is not reasonable.

a. There is no perfuming (熏習), that is to say, the prior moment, ⟨according to its own type (自類),⟩ does not perfume, i.e., does not bring forth any seed; how could ⟨the prior moment (前)⟩ be conceived as the seed of the subsequent moment (後種) with which it is not simultaneous?

#0910 b. Moreover, once interrupted (間斷), matter (*rūpa*) or mind (*citta*) would not re-arise (更生). [The series of matter is interrupted when one is reborn in the higher realm (*dhātu*)]

#0911 c. The non-trainees (*aśaikṣas* 無學) of the two vehicles (二乘) would not have a final aggregate (*skandha* 後蘊): the series of their aggregates would not be able to be extinguished in *nirvāṇa* since matter (*rūpa* 色) and mind (*citta* 心) of the dying (死位) non-trainee would be the seeds of future matter and future minds (後種).

#0912 d. If the Sthavira, replying to the second objection (= b), says that matter (色) and mind (心) ⟨successively (展轉) arise as⟩ seeds (種生) of one another (i.e., hence the re-appearance of matter after an existence in the higher realm [*dhātu*]), we will say that neither matter (色) nor the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) are perfumed (所熏習), {3/27r.} as we have seen above.

#0914 6. *Sarvāstivādins*.

They say that *dharmas* of all three times (三世) exist (有) (AKB v, F 50). The cause makes the fruit arise which, in turn, is a cause (因果感赴). All of that works well. So why take the trouble of conceiving a cognition (*vijñāna*) as holder of the seeds (*bījas*) (能持種識)? – It is true that the *sūtra*³⁷⁵ says that the mind (*citta* 心) is a seed (種子), that it generates defiled (染) and pure (淨) *dharmas*: but the *sūtra* expresses itself in this way due to the powerful energy (勢用強) of mind (*citta*). <188>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The *sūtra* says that the mind (*citta*) is seed (*bīja*) because its energy is greater than that of matter (*rūpa*); but it does not mean to speak of a *citta*-holder of seeds.

³⁷⁵ The *Ranjing jiqi xin jing* 染淨集起心經; would this literally be *kliṣṭa-suddha-caya-utpāda-citta-sūtra*?

The Sautrāntikas, who believe that matter (*rūpa*) holds the seeds, explain: the *sūtra* designates the mind (*citta*) alone as seed (*bīja*) because the mind is more important than matter.

For the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviras: the mind (*citta*) is capable of generating matter (*rūpa*); this is why the *sūtra* speaks only of the mind.

#0916 [We reply:] – This theory is not reasonable for past (過去) and future (未來) *dharma*s are neither permanent (*nitya* 常 = not being “unconditioned”) nor present (現). Like sky-flowers (空花), etc., they are not realities (實有). <#0917> Moreover, they have no activity (作用);³⁷⁶ therefore they cannot be conceived as being a cause (or condition) themselves (因緣性).

Thus—lacking an eighth cognition that holds the seeds (種) of actual *dharma*s, defiled (染) and pure (淨)—causation (一切因果) is not explained.

#0919 7. *Bhāvaviveka*.

A certain teacher takes the Great Vehicle (大乘) teaching on emptiness (空理)—conceived as negation of characteristics (*lakṣaṇas*) (遣相)—as absolute (究竟) (and not as intentional³⁷⁷); [for example the text: all *dharma*s are without a nature

³⁷⁶ Contrast AKB ii, F 293–294.

³⁷⁷ Literally: who takes the *mahāyāna-lakṣaṇa-pratiṣedha-śūnyatā-naya* as absolute (究竟). This is the tenet of *Bhāvaviveka* (see #0008; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, 36, etc., Noel Péri, *Date*, p. 44, Watters, ii, 222, *I-tsing*, Takakusu, p. lviii, 181; author of *Karatala-ratna*, T.30.1578). This is the *wuxiang* 無相 (*alakṣaṇa* ?) tenet, the tenet of the *Three Treatises* (*Bukkyō Daijiten*, 1699) which is opposed to the tenet of the three characteristics or natures (*lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas*) (#2719).

Kuiji Shuji 4B/57v. – *Bhāvaviveka-alakṣaṇa-mahāyāna*. From the point of view of the conventional truth (*samvṛti-satya*), he accepts the dependent nature (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*) and the perfected nature (*pariṇiṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*); on the level of the truth of reality (*tattva-satya*) (= absolute truth [*paramārtha-satya*]), both are empty. [Hence the name characteristiclessness (*alakṣaṇa*): negation, in real truth, of the dependent (*paratantra*) and of the perfected (*pariṇiṣpanna*).] – Now the purpose of the word “emptiness” is to discard the imagined (*parikalpiṭa*). – *Bhāvaviveka* claims that the texts [where emptiness is affirmed] are a direct explanation [= of obvious meaning], and relying on the faulty reasonings of the *Karatala-ratna* (T.30.1578) [i.e., “the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas*) are empty in reality”, etc.], he denies the existence of this cognition (*viññāna*) and of all *dharma*s: “Everything is without a nature (*niḥsvabhāva*)”. – What are these faulty reasonings?

In my tenet, the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas*) and unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛtas*) are, in their nature, neither empty nor non-empty ...

(*niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarve dharmāḥ*]. <189> Relying on faulty reasonings (*anumāna-ābhāsa* 似比量), [Bhāvaviveka] denies (撥) the existence (1) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and (2) of all the *dharmas*.

- #0921 [We reply:] – (1) This tenet is in radical contradiction {3/27v.} with the *sūtra* cited above (#0914). <#0922> (2) <To conceive as unreal or> to deny the real existence (*sattva*) of the knowledge (智) of suffering, of the abandonment (斷) of the origin of suffering, of the realization (證) of the cessation, of the practice (修) of the path; of the defiled (染) (i.e., suffering and origin of suffering) and of the pure (淨) (i.e., cessation and path); of the cause (因) (i.e., origin and path) and of the fruit (果) (i.e., suffering and cessation): this is a major “false view” (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見).³⁷⁸

[But, this master replies: I do not deny—on a mundane truth level—the existence of all these *dharmas*; I deny only their true reality.]

- #0923 [We answer:] – The non-buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas* 外道) who uphold a false view, they themselves too—while denying (毀謗) the cause and fruit of defiled and pure *dharmas* (染淨因果)—also do not teach an absolute negation (全無); they maintain only that there are no realities there (非實), and this is what is called false view. – <#0924> If all of the *dharmas* would not be real (實有), why would the *bodhisattva* (菩薩), in order to discard (捨) *saṃsāra* (生死), diligently endeavor to accumulate (勤修集) the provisions of *bodhi* (*bodhi-saṃbhāra* 菩提資糧)? What reasonable (or wise) person (智者), in order to repulse imagined adversaries (幻敵) (i.e., the defilements [*kleśas*]), would recruit (求) “sons of a stone (or barren) woman (*śilā-aputraka* 石女兒)” (= good *dharmas*) and use them as an army (軍旅)?

- #0925 Let us then think (or trust) (應信) that there is a mind (*citta* 心), i.e., a holder of seeds (能持種), on which the defiled (染) and pure (淨) *dharmas*, causes (因) and fruits (果), rely. <#0926> This mind is this eighth cognition (第八識).

C.H.C.2. *Mind that is retribution (vipāka-citta)*³⁷⁹

- #0928 Moreover, according to a *sūtra*, there is a *vipāka-citta* (異熟心), i.e., “a mind that is retribution”, brought forth (*abhinirvṛtta* 感) by good or bad action (善惡

³⁷⁸ AKB v, F 18.

³⁷⁹ See #0407, #0740.

Vipāka-viññāṇa, *Visuddhimagga*, p. 551; compare *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, § 431; *Vibhaṅga*, p. 187.

業). If this eighth cognition is absent, then such *vipāka-citta* is absent. {3/28r.}

- #0931 1. This is so because the six cognitions (eye ... mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*]) are interrupted (有間斷), they are not always the fruit of action (業果): then, being like the flash of lightning (電光), etc., they are not the “mind that is retribution”.

We know, indeed, that the *dharma*s that <190> are retribution (*vipāka*) no longer continue once they are abandoned (斷已更續), for example, the vital faculty (*jīvita-indriya* 命根),³⁸⁰ etc.

- #0932 The six cognitions, such as the visual cognition, when they are brought forth (所感) by action (業), like a sound (*śabda* 聲), etc.,³⁸¹ do not form a constant series (恆續); thus they are “arisen from retribution” (*vipāka-ja* 異熟生) and are not real retribution (*vipāka* 真異熟).³⁸²

- #0933 2. We definitively have to accept the existence of a real “mind that is retribution” (*vipāka-citta* 異熟心) which corresponds (酬) to the action that projects this existence (*ākṣepaka-karman* 酬牽引業,³⁸³ *Siddhi* F 196 and #0389) [—and not to the completing or filling up actions (*paripūraka-karman*)—] which can occur everywhere (遍), i.e., in the three realms (*dhātus*), and which exists uninterruptedly (無斷), which develops (*pariṇam* 變) as the receptacle world (器) and as body-endowed-with-faculties (身), which is the “support” (依) of the living being (*sattva*) (#0547, #0563).

Indeed: (1) there is no receptacle world (器) and no body (身) separate from mind (離心); (2) the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應法) (and especially the vital faculty [*jīvita-indriya*]) are not real things in themselves (實體); (3) the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) do not always exist (恆有). {3/28v.} – If this mind (心), i.e., the eighth cognition, were non-existent, what will develop as receptacle world and as body? – Finally, [wherever mind exists, there is a “living being” (*sattva*); there is no living being where there is no mind; if you do not accept the eighth cognition,] what *dharma*—during the five states of non-ideation—will be the support (依) for the continuous abiding (恆立) of the living being (有情)?

³⁸⁰ AKB ii, F 120, 273.

³⁸¹ “Like sound (as we hear it)”. – The Great Vehicle thinks that *śabda* is *vipākaja*: see AKB i, F 69; *Vibhāṣā*, 18, 1. – See #0566.

³⁸² See #0382, #0948, #0950, 0983, #1042.

³⁸³ AKB iv, F 198.

- #0934 3. Moreover, in the concentrated state (定) as in the non-concentrated state—whether the concentration involves intellectual operation (思慮) (i.e., when mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*] becomes attached to a thing or to a truth) or does not involve such an operation (i.e., attainment of cessation [*nirodha-samāpatti*], etc.)—there are always numerous bodily sensations (*kāyikī vedanā* 身受). (If this [mind that is retribution] did not exist, then) the practitioner (身) would later, when emerging from a concentration, not experience well-being (怡適) or physical fatigue (勞損). – Thus, if a real “mind that is retribution” (*vipāka-citta*) would (not always exist, that is, would) not continue through all the states of concentration, (how could these bodily sensations (身受) exist in these states (位)).
- #0935 4. Consider the living beings (*sattva*) who are not <191> *buddhas* (佛).³⁸⁴ – [You accept that, at certain times, their six cognitions are a fruit of action, are non-defined (*avyākṛta*) and retribution (*vipāka*).³⁸⁵] – At the time when these sentient beings generate cognitions of another type (i.e., good minds (善心), bad minds)—as at the time when they must actually generate cognitions of this type—they also have a real “mind that is retribution” because, without being *buddhas*, they are living beings, [which assumes the continuous presence of the “mind that is retribution”].
- #0936 Thus there exists always a real “mind that is retribution”, and it is this mind which is this eighth cognition. {3/29r.}

C.H.C.3. *Five destinies (gatis) and four modes of birth (yonis)*

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See #0267, #0792.

See AKB iii, F 12f. – The destinies (*gatis*) are aggregates (*skandhas*):

1. “pertaining to sentient beings” (*sattvākhyā*: with the exception of the aggregates that constitute the receptacle world: which is part of the realms [*dhātus*]);
2. non-obscured-non-defined (with the exception of the good or obscured aggregates which are “pertaining to sentient beings”, but are not part of a destiny);

³⁸⁴ That is to say, the *bodhisattvas*, the saints of the two vehicles, the ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*). – The *buddhas* are separate since there is nothing in them that is retribution (*vipāka*) and, consequently, non-defined (#0740, #0949, #1032).

³⁸⁵ AKB ii, F 125, 290, 320; *Vibhaṅga*, 187.

3. with the exception of the aggregates that constitute the intermediate existence (*antarā-bhava*).

The four “modes of birth” (*yonis*), AKB iii, F 26. – The five destinies are included in the four modes of birth (AKB iii, F 12): the latter are thus the existences of the five destinies classified according to the mode of generation; they include, moreover, the intermediate beings who are not part of the destinies.

#0938 Moreover, the *sūtra* teaches that sentient beings (*sattva*) circulate (*saṃsarati*, *saṃcarati* 流轉) through the five destinies (*gatis* 五趣) and the four modes of birth (*yonī* 四生); [that they successively take on the destinies of a human, etc.; that they arise among sentient beings born from the womb, etc.].

If this eighth cognition did not exist, we cannot see what the destiny and the mode of birth would consist of.

- #0940 1. Destiny (*gati* 趣) or mode of birth (*yonī* 生) must be:
- a real thing (實有) (and not a fictitious *dharma* like the “vital principle”, #0260);
 - constant (恆) (= uninterrupted);
 - universal (遍) (able to occur in the three realms [*dhātus*]);
 - unmixed (*asaṃkīrṇa* 無雜).

⟨*Dharmas* such as these can be established as truly real destinies and modes of birth.⟩

#0942 “Unmixed”: if the *dharmas* that are not “of retribution” (*vipāka* 異熟), <192> for example, the “good *dharmas* proceeding from effort” (*prāyogika-kuśala*),³⁸⁶ were part of the destiny (*gati-paryāpanna*) or mode of birth (*yonī*), then the destiny (趣) or mode of birth (生) would be mixed (雜亂): for an individual (i.e., a sentient being of the realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*]), when a good mind of the concentration (*dhyaṇa*) domain (i.e., the realm of fine-materiality [*rūpa-dhātu*]) is generated, would, at the same time, belong to the human destiny and to the divine destiny.³⁸⁷

#0943 Matter (*rūpa* 色) as retribution (異熟) (distinct from [the effect] of accumulation [*aupacayika*]³⁸⁸) and the five cognitions caused by action (業所感) do not form part (遍) of the destiny or the mode of birth, for matter and the five cog-

³⁸⁶ AKB ii, F 320.

³⁸⁷ AKB iii, F 12.

³⁸⁸ AKB i, F 69.

nitions are completely absent (全無) in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界).

#0944 In all the existences, there are the “good (善) innate (生得) *dharmas*”³⁸⁹ and mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) caused by action (業所感): although these *dharmas* have three of the [four] required characteristics [for being a destiny or a mode of birth], (i.e., being universal (遍), being a destiny and mode of birth (趣生) [= being a real thing (實有)], being unmixed (無雜), nevertheless, they do not always exist), i.e., they lack the characteristic of constancy (恆).

#0945 The formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應行), which are not real things (實自體), are obviously out of the question (in regards to properly constituting a real [basis] for the destinies (*gatis* 趣) and the modes of birth (*yonis* 生)). {3/29v.}

#0947 2. Only the “mind that is retribution” (*vipāka-citta* 異熟心) and its mental factors (*caittas* 心所) possess the four characteristics, (i.e., real, constant, universal and unmixed,) and constitute the (proper real) destiny and mode of birth.

#0948 [It is said (by some) that the “minds of retribution” distinct from the “mind that is retribution”—namely, the “specific reward”—constitute the destiny (*gati*).] But if this “mind that is retribution” is lacking, then, when a sentient being born in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界) generates a good (善) mind, etc., (i.e., that which suppresses the specific mind of retribution), the destiny and the mode of birth (*gati-yoni* 趣生) would be absent in him, [for this sentient being is only of a good mind and the destiny and the mode of birth (*gati-yoni*) is non-defined by definition].³⁹⁰ – If one wants the destiny and the mode of birth to include everything that is impure (*sāsrava* 漏, including therein the good-impure), one would say that the destiny and the mode of birth is absent in the sentient being of the realm of immateriality (無色界) who generates a pure mind (無漏心). This is contrary to reason. – One wants to avoid the objection taken from the absence of the four characteristics, (i.e., the former error (前過),) and one falls into another fault (失). (Hence only the *dharma* of retribution (異熟) is the proper real [basis for] the destiny and the mode of birth.)

#0949 The *tathāgata* (如來) (or *buddha*) has no *dharma* (法) that is retribution (異熟), that is non-defined (無記); thus, he is not included in the destiny and the mode

³⁸⁹ I.e., acquired at birth (*upapatti-lābhika*) as opposed to “proceeding from effort” (*prāyogika*).

³⁹⁰ AKB iii, F 12.

of birth (*gati-yoni*) (趣生). He has no impure (漏) *dharma*, thus, he is also not included in the realms (*dhātus* 界) (see #1032 and #3309): the Bhagavat (世尊) has already discarded (捨) the truth of suffering (*duḥkha-satya* 苦諦) and the truth of the origin (*samudaya-satya* 集諦) (that is to say, he is not involved with suffering [*duḥkha*] and the origin of suffering [*duḥkha-samudaya*]) for all the seeds of proliferation (*prapañca-bījas* 戲論種) have (already and forever) been abandoned (斷) for him. {3/30r.} <193>

#0950 <The proper real [basis for] the> destiny and mode of birth can be constituted only by the “mind that is retribution” (*vipāka-citta* 異熟心) and its mental factors (*caittas* 心所), [i.e., a mind that is truly retribution (*vipāka*) and not “arisen from retribution” (*vipāka-ja*)]: such a mind (and its mental factors) do not really exist separate from the eighth cognition. Thus, we know that the distinct existence of this eighth cognition is certain.

C.H.C.4. Theory of appropriating (*upādāna*)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to AKB i, F 63, the appropriated (*upātta*) is the matter (*rūpa*) which the mind and mental factors take (*upagrhāta*) and “appropriate” (*svīkṛta*) as basis or physical seat (*adhiṣṭhāna*). ... The matter (*rūpa*) which the Abhidharma calls appropriated (*upātta*) is, in ordinary speech, called “sensitive”, “alive” (*sacetana*, *sajīva*). – See also AKB i, F 17; ix, F 233.

In *Divya*, passim: *upātteṣv eva skandhadhātāvāyataneṣu karmāṇi ... vipacyante*.

The appropriated (*upātta*) body is what is grasped (*upādāna*); appropriating presupposes an appropriator (*upādātār*), *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 576.

#0952 Moreover, according to the *sūtra*, the “body endowed with material sense-faculties” (*rūpīndriya-kāya*³⁹¹ 色根身) is “appropriated” (*upātta* 有執受).³⁹² If this eighth cognition did not exist, what would be the appropriator (*upādātār* 能執受) of this body, i.e., “that which appropriates the body”? (See #0993.)

#0954 If, (only in the present world,) the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根)—with that which serves them as basis (依處) (in all nine material sense-spheres [*āyatanas*] with the exception of sound)—are appropriated (有執受), it is definitively due to a mind that appropriates them (能執受心). To the exclusion of the

³⁹¹ The *rūpīndriya-kāya* of our text = *sendriyaka-kāya* of #0563.

³⁹² Our text does not have *upātta*, but *sa-upādātṛka* (?), *you zhishou* 有執受, i.e., *you neng zhishou xin* 有能執受心: with a mind that is appropriating.

six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識, i.e., visual cognition, ... mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*]), <#0956> this mind can only be the “mind that is retribution” (*vipāka-citta* 異熟心). The latter, indeed, is projected by former action (先業所引); it is not good or defiled (善染), etc. (i.e., pertaining to deportment [*airyāpathika*], etc.³⁹³); it is of a single type (一類), i.e., it is only non-defined; it can occur everywhere (遍), i.e., in the three realms (*dhātus*); it exists in a continuous series (相續); <and it appropriates (執受) a body endowed with material sense-faculties (有色根身)>.

<The evolving cognitions (轉識), such as visual cognition, etc., do not have this meaning (義).>

- #0957 1. This *sūtra* means that the evolving cognitions (轉識), such as visual cognition, {3/30v.} etc.—not being homogeneous (i.e., <of a single type [一類]> = being good, etc.), not occurring everywhere (遍), i.e., in the three realms, not constituting a continuous series (相續)—do not appropriate for themselves <an internal body endowed with material sense-faculties (自內有色根身)>. This is not to say that the “mind that is retribution” (異熟心) alone <appropriates (能執受)>, since that would mean to say that the material body (*rūpa-kāya* 色身) of the *buddha* (佛) (whose body is good-pure [*kuśala-anāsrava*]) is not <194> “appropriated” (執受) by the *buddha*’s mind, since, in the *buddha*, there is no *dharma* that is retribution (*vipāka*). – Here it is only a question of the impure (有漏) material body (色身): only the “mind that is retribution” appropriates this body.
- #0960 2. The evolving cognitions (轉識), let us say, are dismissed. They are generated (起) by present conditions (*pratyaya* 現緣), like sound (聲), wind (風), etc. – When they are good (善), defiled (染), etc., they are not brought forth (引) by action (業), like the cessation not due to deliberation (*apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha* 非擇滅). When they are “arisen from retribution” (*vipākaja* 異熟生), they are not truly retribution (*vipāka* 異熟), they cannot occur everywhere (遍), i.e., in the three realms (*dhātus*) <as support> (依), they do not constitute a continuous series (相續), like lightning (電光), etc., they do not appropriate (能執受) the impure material body (漏色身).
- #0961 3. When we speak of mind (*citta* 心) or cognition (*vijñāna* 識) that appropriates, this also includes the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) which are necessarily associated (相應). – In the same way, the expression “*vijñāna* only” (*vijñāna-mātra* 唯識) does not exclude the existence of the mental factors. {3/31r.}

- #0962 4. The material sense-faculties (色根) and the factors dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應行) do not have an object (*sālambana* 所緣, see #0530), (like space (虛空), etc.). How could it be assumed that they appropriate (能執受) a body endowed with sense-faculties (色根身)?
- #0963 Thus, a mind (*citta*) that appropriates (*upādātar* 能執受) exists separately: this mind (心) is this eighth cognition (第八識).

C.H.C.5. *Life, heat and vijñāna*

- #0965 Moreover, according to the *sūtra*, three *dharma*s, i.e., life (壽), heat (煖) and *vijñāna* (識), endure in a series (相續) by mutually supporting (依持) one another (see #0260). We say that the eighth cognition is the only *vijñāna* (lasting long enough) to serve as support (持) for life and heat.
- #0967 1. The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) are discontinuous (有間) and (evolving) (有轉), like sound (聲), wind (風), etc.; they are incapable of the constant operation (*kriyā* 用) of supporting (持). Thus, they are not the *vijñāna* of which the *sūtra* is speaking, (i.e., which supports life and heat).
- #0968 [Among the *vijñānas*, it is] the eighth cognition alone, as “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*), which is not discontinuous (無間), not (evolving) (無轉), like life (壽), heat (煖). {3/31v.} Thus one can attribute this constant operation (用) (of supporting (持)) to it, and thus it is the *vijñāna* which supports life and heat.
- #0970 2. The *sūtra* teaches that these three *dharma*s mutually support (依持) one another, and you accept that life (壽) and heat (煖) are homogeneous (or of a single type) (一類) and a continuous series (相續). Is it reasonable to think (that cognition alone is not so), i.e., that the *vijñāna* in question is the evolving cognition, is neither homogeneous nor continuous? <195>
- #0971 Objection. – Although the *sūtra* does say that these three *dharma*s (法) support one another mutually, nevertheless, it also says that—unlike life and *vijñāna*—it is only “heat” (煖) that does not occur everywhere in the three realms (*tri-dhātuga*) (不遍三界). So why not think that—unlike life and heat—*vijñāna* (識) (alone evolves discontinuously (間轉)), i.e., is neither homogeneous nor continuous.
- #0973 Reply. – The fact that heat does not occur in the three realms (*dhātus*) does not invalidate (過難) our former argument (前理). Wherever the three *dharma*s occur together (namely, in the two lower realms), these three *dharma*s evolve

continuously (無間轉) and, consequently, can always support one another (相持): indeed, this constant operation of supporting one another would be impossible if not all three are continuous. – Thus, the term *vijñāna* (識), in the list of three *dharma*s, does not refer (詮) to the evolving cognitions (轉識): 〈bringing up (舉緩)〉 the absence of heat in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*), 〈i.e., that it is not everywhere (不遍),〉 does not change (壞) anything in this case, 〈i.e., in our former argument (前理), thus, what was formerly (前) said is well established (極成) in terms of its reasoning (理)〉. {3/32r.}

#0974 3. Moreover, 〈among these three *dharma*s, two types〉, i.e., life (壽) and heat (煖), are certainly only impure (*sāsrava*) *dharma*s; thus we know that the *vijñāna* that supports them, 〈like life and heat,〉 is definitively not pure (*anāsrava*). – If you do not accept the existence of the eighth cognition, then tell us what *vijñāna* (識) will support (持) the life (壽) of a sentient being born (生) in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界) who generates a pure evolving cognition 〈or mind〉 (無漏心).

#0975 From this we know that there exists a “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) that is homogeneous, 〈i.e., a single type (一類)〉 (= always non-defined), continuous (恆), occurring everywhere, i.e., in the three realms, supporting life and heat (持壽煖): that *vijñāna* is this eighth cognition (第八識).

C.H.C.6. *Mind at conception and at death*

#0977 Moreover, the *sūtra* says that, at conception and at death (受生命終), sentient beings (情類) 〈must be born with〉 a distracted mind (*vikṣipta-citta* 散心), are not without mind (*acittaka* 無心), do not have a concentrated (定) mind (*samāhita-citta* = attainment of cessation [*nirodha-samāpatti*]). The mind at conception (生) and at death (死) can only be this eighth cognition.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Neither Kuiji, *Shuji* (4A/81), nor the Abhidharma sources that teach the same doctrine (AKB, iii, F 132) give any details on this *sūtra*. – *Kathā-vatthu*, xv, 9, against the Rājagirikas, argues that one does not die in a state of the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*). (See the story of the death of Maudgalyāyana.)

“Conception” = *upapatti-bhava*, *pratisaṃdhi*. – Mind at conception or <196> mind which re-incarnates and “links up” with the new existence = *pratisaṃdhi-citta*, *prāṭisaṃdhika-citta*. (*Visuddhimagga*, 548, 659, *pratisaṃdhi-citta*; the reference by Stede to *patisaṃbhidā*, i, 52, is not justified). – “Mind at death” = *maraṇa-citta*,

marāṇa-antika-citta, *cyuti-citta*. – These two minds are mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) (AKB iii, F 131).

1. In S.Z. Aung's learned note on *bhavaṅga*, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 267, we will see that the Buddhaghosian scholasticism with its *vīthi-cittas* (= evolving cognition [*pravṛtti-vijñāna*]), with its flow of *bhavaṅga-cittas*, beginning with the mind of *pratisaṃdhi* (rebirth) and ending with the mind of *cuti* (death) (these three kinds of mind coming from generative action (*janaka-karman* = projecting action [*ākṣepaka-karman*] and having an object and mental factors), is very close to the theory of our authors. – The only notable difference is that the flow of the *bhavaṅga-cittas* is interrupted by the *vīthi-cittas*, whereas the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) is not interrupted by the evolving cognitions. – But, for Kuiji's Sthaviras, the subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) (which corresponds to Buddhaghosa's *bhavaṅga-citta*) can either coexist with the coarser mental cognition or else does not coexist with it (which is Buddhaghosa's doctrine). (See #0856, #0991.)

2. We may recall that, after having spoken his last words: *vayadhammā saṃkhārā* ..., the Buddha entered into the first meditation (*dhyāna*), went up to the fourth formless meditation (*ārūpya*); from there, into the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) (and Ānanda thought that he was dead); then he came back to the first meditation, went up to the fourth, in which he entered into *nirvāṇa*. – According to YBh, 80, the non-trainees (*aśaikṣas*) pass directly from attainment of cessation into *nirvāṇa* without remainder (*anupadhiśeṣa*).

#0980 1. In these two moments, (i.e., at conception and at death (生死)) (#2314), the mind (心) and the body (身) are “stupefied”, “dull” (惛昧, *styāna*, *manda*), like in a dreamless sleep (*asvāpnikā nidrā* 睡無夢) and in extreme stupor, i.e., fainting (*ati-mūrchā* ? 極悶絕, on account of Māra, of herbs, etc.). The sharp (*paṭu* 明了) evolving cognition (*pravṛtti-vijñāna* 轉識) {3/32v} (i.e., mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*], #1159) certainly cannot manifest (現起).³⁹⁴

#0981 Moreover, at these two moments, neither a conscious mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相 = action of cognizing [*vijñapti-kriyā*]) nor a recognized or discerned (*saṃvidita*) object (所緣) can be attributed (知) to the six kinds of evolving cognition (轉識) (see #0575): that is to say, that these cognitions are then certainly not active (*samudācar* 現行), just as they do not work in the state without mind (*acittaka* 無心位).

#0982 If the mind at conception-death is, as you maintain, an evolving cognition (轉

³⁹⁴ Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0392b).

識), it should—like in any other state (i.e., state of distraction)—be perceived (*saṃvidita* 知) in its mode of operation (行相) of cognizing and in its object (所緣). <197>

#0983 The case of the eighth cognition, (i.e., the real cognition that is retribution (異熟識),) is quite different. Extremely subtle (*sūkṣma* 微細), it cannot be recognized (*saṃvidita* 可了) either in its mode of operation (行相) or in its object (所緣). Being the fruit of the action (業果) “that projects the existence in question” (*ākṣepaka* 引), it is truly retribution (*vipāka*): for a determined time (一期) (i.e., for the duration of the existence), it constitutes a constant (恆) and homogeneous (無轉變) series (相續). (Being a distracted mind (散有心),) it is designated by the name “mind at conception”, “mind at death” (生死心). It is through this fact that the sentient being, at these two moments, is not “without mind”.

2. [Certain masters of the Great Vehicle have other theories regarding the mind at conception. But in regard to death, people agree that the evolving cognitions are absent because the body and the mind are stupefied.]

#0985 Nanda says: – “At conception and at death, the five cognitions (*vijñānas* 識) (i.e., visual, etc.) are definitively absent. As for mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識), it seizes its object (境) either (1) due to (因) the five cognitions (五識), or (2) due to another’s teaching (他教), or (3) due to the power of concentration (*samādhi* 定): but, at conception (生位), these three causes (因) cannot be present; {3/33r.} thus, (at conception,) mental cognition is also not present.”

#0986 Dharmapāla says: – “If this were the case, then mental cognition would always be absent in sentient beings born in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色界), for (1) the five cognitions (五識) and (2) another’s teaching (他教) are certainly absent in this realm, (3) for the concentrated mind (*samādhi-citta* 定心) is certainly aroused (引) from within the distracted (*vikṣipta* 散) mental cognition (意識), and there is no reason why the distracted mental cognition (or mind (散心) that arouses concentration (定)) should appear in this realm.”

#0987 Nanda replies: – “The concentrated mind (定) manifests (*saṃmukhī-bhavati* 能現在前) later (後)—i.e., in the course of the existence in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*)—automatically (率爾), by the force of habit (串習力).”

#0988 Dharmapāla answers: – “Why does it not manifest (現起) from the first moment (初生時) of the existence in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*)? Moreover, why does mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) also not manifest from the first moment of the existence in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界) (and

in the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu* 色界)), since it is habitual (串習)?”

#0989 Nanda will undoubtedly reply that mental cognition does not manifest at this first moment due to the stupefaction (昏昧) of the body and of the mind: this is the very reason (因) that Dharmapāla has given. <#0990> What is the use of looking for other reasons? <198>

#0991 3. According to the Sthaviras (餘部), at the time of conception (生), death (死), etc., there exists a certain (別) (homogeneous (一類), extremely) subtle mental cognition (意識) {3/33v.} the mode of operation (行相) of cognizing and the object (所緣) of which are unrecognized (*asaṃvidita* 不可了).³⁹⁵

We reply that this subtle cognition (*viññāna*) can only be our eighth cognition (第八識), for no well-established (極成) mental cognition presents this characteristic of non-perceptibility. (See #1048.³⁹⁶)

#0993 4. Moreover, at the approach of death (將死), coldness (冷觸) (i.e., the “tangible” called coldness³⁹⁷) occurs gradually (漸) in the body, either starting at the feet or starting at the head (下上身分), according to the nature of (good or bad) actions (善惡業) that must be retributed in the coming existence.³⁹⁸ – This fact (that the coldness occurs gradually) is inexplicable if the eighth cognition, which appropriates the body, is absent.³⁹⁹

As for the six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-viññānas* 轉識), they do not appropriate (執受) the body (身); [thus the coldness cannot be explained by the fact that they would abandon their grasp (*upādāna*) or their appropriation (*svīkaraṇa*)].

#0994 The first five cognitions (*viññānas*) (i.e., visual, auditory cognition, etc.) have their own respective individual support (依) (i.e., eye, etc.). [Thus they do not appropriate the body as a whole, #1167, and if they appropriate their sense-faculty, coldness will occur in this faculty when they are not active.] If you say that the fifth cognition (i.e., tactile cognition [*kāya-viññāna*]) appropriates the whole of the body, we will answer <199> that this cognition does not move (不行:

³⁹⁵ Two opinions among the Sthavira-nikāya masters: (1) root-opinion, the two mental cognitions (*mano-viññānas*), i.e., the gross and the subtle, coexist; (2) branch-opinion, they occur at different moments. (See #0856, #0977.)

³⁹⁶ Kuiji, *Shuji* (4A/87–89).

³⁹⁷ AKB i, F 18.

³⁹⁸ AKB ii, F 133, iii, F 134–135.

³⁹⁹ *Editors*: LVP, in his translation, mentions that he had placed lines 3/33v.3–6 after 33v.6–34r.2. We have reestablished the original order of the entire section.

without commentarial gloss). [Moreover, when death is gradual (*krama-mṛtyu*⁴⁰⁰), the five cognitions disappear without the heat disappearing.]

There remains the sixth cognition or mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*).⁴⁰¹ It does not always occur in the body [i.e., it is often interrupted, and we do not see that its absence produces coldness]. Its object (境) is not fixed (定) [whereas the eighth cognition—at the end of life as at other times—always has the same object]. When the sixth cognition occurs (in the body 寄身) (that is to say: always, except during the five states without mind), it attains, always in a series (恆相續), a certain object by means of a certain faculty [i.e., unlike the eighth cognition, see #1167].

⟨It should not be maintained that the gradual arising (漸生) of coldness (冷觸) [in the body at death] is due to this [sixth consciousness].⟩

#0995 Projected by the power of earlier actions (先業力), only ⟨the mind that is retribution (異熟心)⟩ constitutes a continuous (恆) and universal (遍) series (相續): it appropriates (執受) all the parts of the body (身分). Coldness (冷觸) occurs there where it discards (捨) its grasp (執受), {3/34r.} for the three *dharma*s, i.e., life (壽), heat (煖) and *vijñāna* (識), are not dissociated (不相離).

#0996 The part where the coldness (冷觸) occurs is no longer “pertaining to sentient beings” (*sattva*, *sattvākhyā*⁴⁰² 情). Although that part is, as we have seen (#0566), also a development (*pariṇāma* 變) of the eighth cognition, nevertheless, the eighth cognition no longer appropriates (執受) [that part].⁴⁰³

Hence we definitively know that this eighth cognition exists.

C.H.C.7. Cognition (*vijñāna*) and name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*)

#0998 Moreover, according to a *sūtra*, cognition (識) exists due to name-and-matter (名色) (*nāma-rūpa-pratyayaṃ vijñānam*) and *vice versa*, ⟨name-and-matter exists due to cognition⟩. These two *dharma*s are the support of one another (相依), like (two) bundles of reeds (蘆束), and function (*pravartante* 轉) simultaneously. To what cognition (*vijñāna*) does [the *sūtra*] refer here if not to this eighth cognition? (In the absence of this [eighth] cognition, the other cognitions would not,

⁴⁰⁰ AKB iii, F 134.

⁴⁰¹ Kuiji, *Shuji* (4A/90r.).

⁴⁰² AKB i, F 17.

⁴⁰³ In fact, this is the distant fruit or the supplementary fruit of development (*pariṇāma-uccheṣa-phala*), see #0481.

in and of themselves (自體), exist either.)

#1000 The same *sūtra* explains name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*):

By name (*nāman* 名), one should understand the four non-material (非色) aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊), (namely, *viññāna* and three mental factors: sensation [*vedanā*], ideation [*saṃjñā*] and volition [*cetanā*]); by matter (*rūpa* 色), one should understand the *kalala* (羯邏藍) (i.e., first embryonic state), etc.

This pair name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*) (which is the five aggregates) and cognition (*viññāna* 識) persist (*tiṣṭhanti* 住) by being the support of one another (相依), like two bundles of reeds (蘆束), condition (*pratyaya* 緣) one another, exist (or evolve) (轉) simultaneously (俱時), do not separate off (捨離) from one another. {3/34v.}

#1001 (The evolving cognitions, such as visual cognition, etc., are included in the category *nāman* (名), so without this [eighth] cognition, what should actually be meant by cognition (*viññāna* 識)?)

#1002 Someone may say: – By “name” (*nāman* 名), one should understand (the aggregate of cognition (識蘊)), i.e., the first five cognitions, and by “cognition” (*viññāna* 識), i.e., the cognition that supports this *nāman* (and the *rūpa*), one should understand the mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*), i.e., the sixth cognition.

Reply: – This would mean forgetting that the five cognitions do not exist during the—here considered—embryonic period (*kalala-ādi* 羯邏藍) [and, consequently, cannot be designated by *nāman* in the expression *nāma-rūpa*].

#1003 Moreover, the six evolving cognitions (轉識) are not continuous (or evolving discontinuously) (間轉); they would not always (恆) have <200> the quality (or power) (力) of appropriating (*upādā* 執持) name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa* 名色). It could not be said that they are the constant condition (*pratyaya* 緣) of name-and-matter.

#1004 Thus, by “cognition” (*viññāna* 識), the *sūtra* means the eighth cognition. {4/1r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See #2614 and my *Douze Causes*, F 12–18; Oltramare, *Formule bouddhique des douze causes*, Genève, 1909; *Théosophie bouddhique*, p. 189 foll.; *Madhamaka-vṛtti*, p. 561; *Visuddhi*, pp. 558–562.

Etymology of *nāman*, AKB iii, F 94; *Attha-sālinī*, p. 392. – *Kalala*, AKB iii, F 58; *Vibhāṣā*, T.27.1545.0417. – Puguang, 9, 41, on the opinion of the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas.

According to the Sarvāstivādins, the member “cognition” (*vijñāna*) = the six cognitions, (i.e., mental cognition [*manovijñāna*], visual cognition, etc.) of the intermediate existence. The member “name-and-matter” (*nāma-rūpa*), which is the embryonic existence up to the formation of the sense-faculties, results from this member: (1) *rūpa* is the substance of the embryo, (2) *nāman* is mental cognition alone, since the cognitions of the eye, etc., do not yet exist (AKB iii, F 85).

Kuiji attributes a different theory to the Sarvāstivādins. (1) By considering the first moment, one should, by *vijñāna*, understand mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); by *nāman*, one should understand the three mental factors (*caittas*) (i.e., ideation [*saṃjñā*], sensation [*vedanā*], volition [*cetanā*]) that accompany mental cognition. (2) By considering the second moment, at which name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*) exists, by *nāman*, one should understand mental cognition and its mental factors.

For the Sthaviras, *vijñāna* = subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); *nāman* = coarse mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*).

C.H.C.8. *Theory of four kinds of nutriment*⁴⁰⁴

#1006 Moreover, according to a *sūtra*:

All sentient beings continue to remain (住) through nutriment (食) (*sarve sattvā āhāra-sthitikāḥ*).

Without this eighth cognition, the nutriment consisting of cognition (*vijñāna-āhāra* 識食體) would be lacking.

#1008 The *sūtra* says that there are four kinds of nutriment (食):

#1012 1. *kavaḍḍikāra-āhāra* (段食): “nutriment-by-mouthfuls” (⟨i.e., material food⟩), which has transformation–deterioration (變壞) for its characteristic (相).⁴⁰⁵

This refers to three *dharma*s, i.e., odors-tastes-tangibles (香味觸), ⟨i.e., bondages of⟩ the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界繫), which function as nutriment when they are transformed and deteriorate (變壞). Color (or sense-sphere of visible

⁴⁰⁴ AKB iii, F 119–128. – Rhys Davids-Stede.

⁴⁰⁵ *bianhuai* 變壞, which translates *rūpaṇa* according to the etymology of *rūpa*, *Vyutpatti*, 245, 1153; AKB i, F 45; *Attha-sālinī*, p. 52.

form [*rūpa-āyatana* 色處]) is not a nutriment of this kind, (i.e., a nutriment-by-mouthfuls (段食),) since color has no function (用) at the time of transformation-deterioration (變壞時).⁴⁰⁶

- #1013 2. *sparsā-āhāra* (觸食): “nutriment consisting of contact”, which has <201> “contact” with the object (觸境) for its characteristic (相) (see #0587).

This refers to impure (*sāsrava* 漏) contact (*sparsā* 觸). At the very moment when “contact” seizes the object (取境), it “nourishes” (攝受) satisfaction (喜),⁴⁰⁷ etc., and functions as nutriment since it comforts the body.

Although this contact is associated with the eight cognitions (*viññānas*), {4/1v.} nevertheless, it is outstandingly excelling in its meaning of nourishing (食義偏勝) when it is associated with the first six cognitions. The contact with coarse and manifest objects (麤顯境)—nourishing satisfaction (喜), pleasure (樂) and “comforting neutral sensation” (順益捨)—is nutriment *par excellence* (資養勝).

- #1014 3. *manah-samcetanā-āhāra* (意思食): “nutriment consisting of mental operations (i.e., intentionality)”, which has “desire-aspiring” (希望; *abhiḷāṣa*, *āśamsā*) for its characteristic (相).⁴⁰⁸

This refers to impure “volition” (*cetanā* 思)—accompanied by predilection (欲) (*chanda-sahavartini*)—which desires (希) the agreeable (*manojña* 可愛) object (境) and functions as nutriment.

Although this volition is associated with the eight cognitions (see #0618), nevertheless, it is outstandingly excelling in its meaning of nourishing (食義偏勝) when it is associated with mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), for mental cognition is the principal agent of (or excelling in) (勝) “desire for” (希望) (an object (境)).

- #1015 4. *viññāna-āhāra* (識食): “nutriment consisting of cognition”, which has sustaining (執持, seizing and holding, *ādā*) for its characteristic (相).

This refers to impure cognition (漏識); the latter—fortified (*upacita* 增長) by (the power (勢力) of) the first three nutriments (段觸思)—(functions as nutriment), nourishes (資養, YBh, 66–67) the fundamental material elements of the sense-faculties.

⁴⁰⁶ AKB iii, F 121.

⁴⁰⁷ “Nourish”, *sheshou* 攝受, *udgrah*, *parigrah*, *samgrah*, *adhiṣṭhā*; glossed as *ziyang* 資養, *shengzhang* 生長.

⁴⁰⁸ “Aspiration”, *xike* 希可, *xiwang* 希望.

Although this “nutriment consisting of cognition” includes the eight cognitions themselves (自體), nevertheless, it is the eighth cognition that is outstandingly excelling in its meaning of nourishing (食義偏勝). Homogeneous (一類 = of a single type, i.e., always non-defined), existing as a constant series (相續), it is the sustainer *par excellence* (執持勝). {4/2r.}

- #1016 [Asaṅga’s] *Samuccaya-śāstra* (集論) (T.31.1605.0672b) can thus say that these four nutriments (食) are included in the three aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊, that is to say, matter [*rūpa*], formations [*saṃskāras*], cognition [*vijñāna*]), five sense-spheres (*āyatana*s 處, i.e., odor [*gandha*], taste [*rasa*], tangible [*spraṣṭavya*], mental sense-faculty [*manas*], factors [*dharmas*]), eleven sense-elements (*dhātus* 界, i.e., seven minds [*cittas*] plus odor [*gandha*], taste [*rasa*], tangible [*spraṣṭavya*], factors [*dharmas*]). <202>

Discussion.

- #1017 These four nutriments receive the name *āhāra* because they preserve (or increase) (持, *āhar* or *ādhar* ?) body (身) and life (命) of sentient beings and prevent them from perishing, from being interrupted (壞斷).
- #1018 “Nutriment-by-mouthfuls” (段食) plays a role only in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界). Although the next two [nutriments, i.e., “nutriment consisting of contact” (觸食) and “nutriment consisting of mental operations or intentionality” (意思食)] play a role everywhere in the three realms (*dhātus* 界), nevertheless, these three depend on the fourth nutriment, [i.e., “nutriment consisting of cognition” (識食)], i.e., they exist or do not exist according to whether the fourth is present or absent.
- #1021 The (six) evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), i.e., the visual cognition, etc., discontinuous (有間) and (evolving) (有轉), do not—everywhere (遍) or always (恆)—sustain body (身) and life (命).
- #1022 They are interrupted (間斷) in the two attainments “without mind” (*acittaka* 無心定), during sleep (*nidrā* 睡眠) and during a faint (*murchā* 悶絕), among gods without ideation (無想天). And, in the states “with mind” (*sacittaka-avasthā* 有心位), they vary (*vikar* 轉易) according to the sense-faculty (or support) (所依), the object (緣), the nature (性) (good, etc.), the realm (*dhātu* 界), the stage (*bhūmi* 地), etc., (and, thus, they are not everywhere and not always present to sustain body (身) and life (命)).
- #1023 If you deny the eighth cognition, {4/2v.} then tell us which nutriment (食) the *sūtra* is talking about when it says that “all sentient beings continue to remain

through nutriment”.

1. Sarvāstivādins.

#1025 [Against the Sarvāstivādins, we say that] in these states without mind (*acittaka-avasthā* 無心位), the past (過去) or future (未來) cognition (*viññāna* 識), etc., cannot be a nutriment (食). Indeed, it is neither present (現) nor constant (常); like a sky-flower (空花), etc., it has neither substance (體) nor activity (用). Even if it had substance and activity, not being present and being like space (虛空), etc., it would not be a nutriment by nature (食性).

It also cannot be said that the “mind of entry into attainment” (入定心), etc., is a nutriment (食) of the practitioner (in a state without mind (無心位)), i.e., in the attainment of non-ideation, for, (when being without mind,) this mind has disappeared, for we have well established that the past (過去) is not a nutriment.

#1026 Moreover, it cannot be said that formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應行), (i.e., the vital faculty [*jīvita-indriya*], similarity or group-homogeneity [*nikāya-sabhāgatā*]) are the nutriment (食) of the practitioner who is in this attainment [of non-ideation] (無想定), {4/3r.} for the “dissociated *dharmas*” (不相應法) do not really exist in themselves (實有) and, besides, they are not included among the four nutriments, (such as nutriment-by-mouthfuls (段食), etc.).

2. Sthaviras.

(According to Vasubandhu, in *Samgraha-bhāṣya*, the Sautrāntikas).

#1027 We cannot accept, as these scholars do, that mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*) (第六識)—in the <203> subtle state—remains in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定), etc. (#1044), and functions as nutriment there. (Their theory is not reasonable and will be refuted at length later.)

3. Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivādins.

#1029 Moreover, when a sentient being born in one of the two higher realms (*dhātus* 界) generates a pure (*anāsrava* 無漏) mind (心), what is its nutriment (食)? – It is the distinctive feature of the pure cognition (識), etc., to break-deteriorate (破壞, *kṣapayati*) existence (*bhava* 有).⁴⁰⁹ This mind cannot sustain (as nutriment (食)) the body (身) and life (命) of this sentient being.

4. Sautrāntikas.

Do the Sautrāntikas accept that the pure mind (無漏識) holds the impure (漏)

⁴⁰⁹ AKB iii, F 122.

seeds (*bījas* 種) which would be nutriment (食)? – This is also unacceptable, for the pure cognition (無漏識), etc., such as *nirvāṇa* (涅槃), does not hold (執持) impure seeds.

5. Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivādins.

- #1030 It cannot be said that, in the higher realms (*dhātus* 界), the body (*kāya* 身) and life (*āyus* 命) of sentient beings are nutriment (食) for each other because they sustain each other (相持): for the body and life are not included among the four nutriment. {4/3v.}

Moreover, the body is absent in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu* 無色) and your vital principle (*jīvita-indriya*) (命) finds nothing there which could sustain it: the similarity or group-homogeneity (*nikāya-sabhāgatā* 眾同分), etc., are not real substances (實體).⁴¹⁰

Conclusion.

- #1031 From this we certainly know that separate from the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識), there is a “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) which is homogeneous (一類 = of a single type, i.e., always non-defined), continuous (恆), occurring everywhere (遍), i.e., in the three realms, sustaining body and life (執持身命), and which prevents them from perishing and interruption (壞斷). This is the root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna*) of which the Bhagavat (世尊) speaks when he says that “all sentient beings continue to remain through nutriment”.
- #1032 “All sentient beings”: – The word “sentient being” (*sattva* 有情) applies only to the “aggregates of attachment” (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊, i.e., “impure” [*sāsrava*] aggregates [*skandhas*]⁴¹¹); but there is nothing impure (漏) in the *buddha* (佛). Thus, the *buddha* is not included among “sentient beings”. – When a treatise (*śāstra*)⁴¹² says that [the *buddha*] is a sentient being and that he continues to remain through nutriment (依食住), this should be understood as referring to a mere show of appearance (示現) of a sentient being and a mere show of appearance of [remaining through] nutriment. <204>
- #1033 The “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) is excelling in its nature of nourishing (勝食性). That cognition is this eighth cognition. {4/4r.}

⁴¹⁰ Compare AKB iii, F 5.

⁴¹¹ AKB i, F 6, 13.

⁴¹² Asaṅga, *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

“Show of appearance”, 示現, *nidarśana*, *saṃdarśana*.

The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0717a27) distinguishes six kinds of aggregates, sense-elements and sense spheres (*skandha-dhātva-āyatanas*) (蘊界處有六種差別):

1. external (外門): as a usual rule, the sentient beings of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*);
2. internal (內門): all stages of concentration (一切定地);
3. of long duration (長時): ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*);
4. of limited duration (分限): in general, the trainee (*śaikṣas*) and non-trainee (*aśaikṣas*);
5. of short duration (暫時): the non-trainee (*aśaikṣas*) at the last moment;
6. as a show of appearance (顯示): the *tathāgatas* and the perfect (*niṣṭhāgata*) *bodhisattvas-mahāsattvas*. – T.31.1606.0716c18, the nutriment of the *tathāgatas* and these *bodhisattvas* is merely “a show of appearance”.

In the *Samgraha*, it refers only to the *tathāgatas*. – “It is only as a show of appearance that the Buddha Bhagavats take nutriments-by-mouthfuls ... in order to conform with the world. ... In reality, the *buddhas* are not sentient beings (*sattvas*), are not non-sentient beings.”

See, #0949. The problem of the *buddha* and the elements (*dhātus*) is taken up again at #3311.

C.H.C.9. Attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*)

#1035 Moreover, according to a *sūtra*:

In the person who resides (*viharati*) in the attainment of cessation (i.e., the attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation [*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti*]) (住滅定者), the conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*) of body, speech and mind (身語心行) have all ceased (*nirodha* 滅);⁴¹³ his life (*āyus* 壽) has not ceased, he also does not lose heat (*uṣman* 煖), his sense-faculties (根) do not deteriorate (*praluj* 變壞), his *vijñāna* (識) does not leave (離 = *hā*) the body (身).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

[See #0270–#0279 and #2294. – Our author relies on the *Samgraha*. – Compare the

⁴¹³ Editors: LVP has: “les Saṃskāras ... ne laissent pas d’être détruits (*nirodha*)”.

account of Buddha's death, #0977.]

With this *sūtra* which perhaps may be found in *Madhyama*, one should compare the *Vedalla-sutta*, *Majjhima*, i, 296. – In contrast to death where vitality is exhausted (*āyu parikkhīno*), heat has been dissipated (*usmā vūpasantā*) and the faculties are fully broken up (*indriyāni viparibhinnāni*), in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) vitality is not exhausted (*āyu aparikkhīno*), heat has not dissipated (*usmā avūpasantā*), the faculties become exceptionally clear (*indriyāni vipassannāni*). The phrase “the cognition (*vijñāna*) does not leave the body” is missing: but the author undoubtedly believes that cognition, indeed, does not leave the body because he goes on to say: “When life, heat and cognition leave the body, the latter is lying around ...” (prose turned into verse in the Sarvāstivādin canon, see AKB ii, F 215).

The attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) is examined, *Majjhima*, i, 301, where the order in which the [bodily, verbal and mental] conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*) disappear and re-arise is fixed (see my *Douze Causes*, F 10).

The problem of emerging from the attainment of cessation, see *Majjhima*, i, 301: “because the mind is ‘perfumed’ (*bhāvita*) for this effect”; i, 296: “due to the conditioning forces of life (*āyuh-saṃskāras*)”. (On these conditioning forces [*saṃskāras*], which are not defined in the *sūtra*, see AKB ii, F 120, 122).

AKB ii, F 211–213 (comp. viii, F 207, note): opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas (the past exists, thus the mind of entry into attainment (*samāpatti-citta*) is the cause of <205> the mind of emerging (*vyutthāna-citta*): although the mind is absent, it is an attainment (*samāpatti*); sic Ghosaka; see *Vibhāṣā*, 152, 16; 2, 15; opinion of the Sautrāntikas-Ancient Masters (the *rūpa* [matter] is the *bīja* [seed] of the mind); opinion of Vasumitra (*Yibu zonglun lun*, T.49.2031) (a subtle mind remains during the attainment).

The only cognition (*vijñāna* 識) that does not leave the body (不離身) during the course of, <or in the person who resides in,> the attainment of cessation (住滅定者) is this eighth cognition.

#1039 The other cognitions, i.e., visual cognition, etc., are actually coarse (麤) and inconsistent <or fickle> (動)⁴¹⁴ in their mode of operation of cognizing (*ākāra* 行相). <In regard to objects (所緣境)>, the person in whom they arise (起) becomes necessarily worn out (勞) and agitated (慮): then he becomes weary (厭患) with

⁴¹⁴ “Coarse” (*audārika*), because their *xiangmao* 相貌, i.e., their aspect, their mode [of operation] (*prakāra*) (*Vyutpatti*), is easy to cognize. – “Inconsistent <or fickle>”, *dong* 動 (*cala*, *cañcala*, *capala*), because changing and interrupted. – See #1021.

them and seeks to stop (求止息) them for a while.⁴¹⁵ Little by little (漸次), he tames them and expels them (伏除) until the time when they are completely exhausted (盡) [for one day, for one week, and, according to the Great Vehicle, for an aeon (*kalpa*) or longer]. It is said of the practitioner who has obtained this cessation (*nirodha*) that he resides in the attainment of cessation (住滅定). – Thus, the other cognitions, i.e., the seven evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), cease (滅) during the attainment (定).

If the *sūtra* does not have in mind an actual cognition (*vijñāna* 識) that is subtle (微細), homogeneous (一類 = of a single type, i.e., always non-defined, not modifiable, not agitated), constant (恆), universal (遍; able to occur everywhere in the three realms [*dhātus*]), and that can seize-hold (*ādā* 執持) life (壽), the sense-faculties, etc., then of what *vijñāna* is it speaking when it says: “His *vijñāna* does not leave the body” (識不離身)? {4/4v.}

- 9.1. Theory of the Sarvāstivādins; #1041
- 9.2. Sautrāntikas. – Root-theory (= Dārṣṭāntikas); #1044
- 9.3. Sautrāntikas. – Branch opinion; #1048
- 9.4. Sautrāntikas. – Mind (*citta*) without mental factors (*caittas*); #1064

C.H.C.9.1. *Theory of the Sarvāstivādins*⁴¹⁶

#1041 According to these scholars, if the *sūtra* says that *vijñāna* does not leave the body (不離身), it is because *vijñāna* appears again (還起) after the attainment, just as it can be said that intermittent fever (隔日瘧) does not leave the body during the lulls.

#1042 Then they cannot say that the conditioning forces (*saṃskāras* 行) of the mind (心) (i.e., sensation [*vedanā*], ideation [*saṃjñā* 想], #1057) have ceased (滅) in the attainment, for the mind, i.e., *citta* or *vijñāna* (識), arises and ceases (起滅) with its conditioning forces, i.e., ideation (想), etc. – Either <206> the formations do not leave the body, or *vijñāna* leaves the body.

Life (壽), heat (煖) and the sense-faculties (根) would also be in the same situation as the *vijñāna* (識): they will leave the body in order to return to it. (That would be a great error (大過)). Thus, you must accept that *vijñāna*, like life, heat (煖), etc., does not leave the body.

⁴¹⁵ How one enters into the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), AKB viii, F 207.

⁴¹⁶ See AKB ii, F 211.

Moreover, if *vijñāna* completely leaves (全無) the body, the latter—like pebbles of stone (瓦礫)—is no longer “pertaining to sentient beings” (*sattvākhyā* 有情數, #0995); then how can it be said that a certain person (*pudgala*) resides in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) (住滅定)?

Moreover, if (the cognition that is retribution (異熟識)) leaves (無) the body, what is it that takes and holds (*ādā* 執持) the sense-faculties (根), life (壽) and heat (煖)? If they are not taken and held, these *dharmas* will (perish and) cease (壞滅). The person entered into the attainment of cessation—like a corpse (死屍)—would no longer have life, heat and sense-faculties.

If *vijñāna* (識) leaves the body, how would it be taken up again (*pratisamdhā* 還生)? [Where will the “mind of emerging” come from?] {4/5r.} To what does the *sūtra*’s statement: “*vijñāna* does not leave the body” (不離身), refer?

In fact, when the cognition that is truly retribution (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) has discarded (捨) this body here, the cognition (識) no longer arises again (重生), “except in order to take up a new body (餘身), a new existence”.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The Kandō edition of Saeki Kyokuga has *li tuo yushen* 離託餘身 [in Taishō documented as varia]: “except by relying on another body”; a reading adopted by the Japanese edition which adds the word “time”, that is to say, in the Japanese order *li yushen tuo shi* 離餘身託時. – Kuiji reads: *li tuo yusheng* 離託餘生. – But the Tōkyō and Taishō editions adopt a variant that gives *shi* 識 = *vijñāna* instead of *tuo* 託.

Asaṅga, *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0137a05): “For the ‘cognition that is retribution’ (*vipāka-vijñāna*), once abandoned, separate (*li* 離) from the moment of rebirth (i.e., *pratisamdhī-bandha*), does not arise again”.

Vasubandhu, *Samgraha-bhāṣya* (T.31.1597.0334c12): “If it is claimed that, on emerging from the attainment, the *vijñāna* re-arises, and that, consequently, it can be said that *vijñāna* does not leave the body: this is not correct. There will not be a *vijñāna* of emerging from the attainment; for the *vijñāna* that is the fruit of retribution (*vipāka*), once abandoned, does not arise again, separate from the moment of rebirth (*pratisamdhī-bandha*)”, thus *tuo yusheng* 託餘生.

Asvabhāva, *Samgraha-upanibandhana* (T.31.1598.0395c): “This text is easy to understood; there is no need to explain it”.

Kuiji (*Shuji* 4B/16v): “The mind that is retribution (*vipāka*), once abandoned, is not

taken up again (*pratisaṃdhāna*, AKB iv, F 175) because it is retribution, just as matter (*rūpa*) is retribution. It is true that the six cognitions, called *vipāka*, re-arise: but we do not accept that they are retribution: [they are “arisen from retribution” (*vipākaja*), arisen from the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)]. <207>

C.H.C.9.2. *Sautrāntikas*. – Root-theory (= *Dārṣāntikas*)

[As for the *Sautrāntikas* who do not talk about a subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) and who think that matter (*rūpa*) can hold the seeds (*bījas*) of mind, we reply:]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

No mind during the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*). – But matter (*rūpa*) (i.e., the body) is the seed (*bīja*) of the mind subsequent to the attainment (*samāpatti*). – Vasubandhu, AKB ii, F 212, sums up the tenet of the ancient masters: “Two *dharma*s are seeds of one another (*anyonya-bījaka*), namely, the mind (*citta*) and the body endowed with sense-faculties (*śendriyaka-kāya*)”. – The mind is the seed of the body that is taken up again after an existence in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*); the body is the seed of the mind that is taken up again after the attainment without mind. – See #0878.

#1044 Moreover, if, during the attainment, a *vijñāna* that holds (持) the seeds (*bījas* 種) does not exist, how could the *vijñāna* of emerging from the attainment (i.e., *vyutthāna-citta*), which has no seed, later arise?

We have already well established (極成) that, [on the one hand,] the past (過去), the future (未來), the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應) are not real things (實有體); that, on the other hand, matter (*rūpa* 色)—which remains during the attainment—(does not exist separate from mind (離識) and) neither receives perfuming (受熏) nor holds seeds (持種). Besides, from all evidence, the *vijñāna* persists during the states without mind (*acittaka* 無心位), (i.e., the attainment of cessation (滅定), etc., just as it does during states with mind (有心位), like the concentration in which cognition truly exists,) since these states consist of sense-faculties, life and heat (根壽煖), since these states are the states of a living being (*sattvākhyā* 有情攝).

#1045 <From this reasoning we conclude that for the person who resides in the attainment of cessation (住滅定者) there certainly is> a *vijñāna* that does not really leave the body.

C.H.C.9.3. *Sautrāntikas*. – Branch opinion⁴¹⁷

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji, *Shuji* (4B/18r.) – “Now the author refutes the diverging opinion of the Sūtra-nikāya [= Sautrāntika] branch-system (經部末宗轉計) (see *Siddhi* F 211). – The Sthavirācāryas also think that, in the course of the attainment, there is a subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); we have refuted them above, #0579, #1027”.

Vasumitra, in the *Paripṛcchā-sāstra* (he has written other books, the *Pañcavastuka*, etc.), says that the attainment involves a non-manifest (*aparispṛṣṭa*) mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), *Siddhi* F 204–205. – Puguang, 26: “According to this treatise, Vasumitra agrees with the thesis of these Dārṣṭāntika-Vibhajyavādins [of whom the *Vibhāṣā* speaks]”.

Vibhāṣā (T.27.1545.0774a): “The Dārṣṭāntikas Vibhajyavādyācāryas say that, in the attainment, a subtle mind (*citta*) is not destroyed. Indeed, ...”. (See #0856.) <208>

#1048 These scholars think that mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) or the sixth cognition remains during the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*): {4/5v.} for this reason, the *sūtra* says that *vijñāna* does not leave the body (不離身).

This is also not reasonable.

A. Four comments.

1. This attainment (*samāpatti* 定) is also called “attainment without mind” (*acittaka*) (無心定).

#1049 The Sautrāntika answers: – Yes, but <it is called “without mind” (無心)> because the first five cognitions (五識) are absent in it.

We reply: – On this account, every attainment (一切定) should be called “without mind” (無心) <because the attainments are all without the group of five cognitions (五識身)>.

2. Mental cognition (意識) is included in the six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*), thus, it is absent in this attainment of cessation (滅定), just like the <group of the> first five evolving cognitions (五識身).

3. The Sautrāntika might say: – “During this attainment [of cessation], mental cognition (識) is unrecognizable (*asaṃvidita* 不可知) in its mode of operation (行相) and its object (所緣)” (see #0578).

We would answer: – “Then—no more than life (壽), heat (煖), etc.—we would

⁴¹⁷ See *Siddhi* F 222.

have no mental cognition or sixth cognition (第六識) there” (see #0991).

4. The Sautrāntika might say: – “During this attainment, mental cognition (識) remains recognizable (可知) in its mode of operation and in its object”.

We would answer: – “Your attainment of cessation (*nirodha*) is not an attainment of cessation any more than the other states (餘位) where the mode of operation (行相) of the mind (or cognition) (識) and its object (所緣) are recognizable (可了知); <#1050> for if the practitioner enters into this attainment of cessation (入此定), it is precisely (本) in order to leave (止息) these conscious states.”

#1052 B. [Do the mental factors (*caittas*) exist or do they not exist during this attainment [of cessation]? For the Sautrāntika, the mental factors exist there, with the exception of sensation (*vedanā*) and ideation (*saṃjñā*).]

1. Moreover, if mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) or the sixth cognition does exist (during this attainment), one would think that its “associates” (or mental factors) (*saṃprayukta* = *caittas* 心所法) either exist there (or do not exist there). {4/6r.} <#1055> If the mental factors (心所) do exist there, why does the *sūtra* (經) (#1035) say that the conditioning forces (*saṃskāras* 行) of the mind (心) (i.e., including sensation [*vedanā*] and ideation [*saṃjñā*]) have all ceased (皆滅) (in this attainment (定))? Moreover, why would this attainment be called attainment of the cessation (or destruction) of ideation and sensation (*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti* 滅受想定)?

#1056 2. Answer by the Sautrāntikas. – In the preparatory state (*prayoga* 加行) to this attainment [of cessation] (定), the practitioner experiences weariness (*nirveda* 厭) only of ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) and sensation (*vedanā* 受):⁴¹⁸ this is why, among the mental factors (*caittas*), only ideation and sensation are destroyed [or have ceased]. – Again, only two *dharma*s, i.e., ideation and sensation, (among the mental factors (心所),) receive <209> the name of conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*) of the mind (心行), because (even during the lower attainments, i.e., the meditations [*dhyānas*] and formless meditations [*ārūpyas*]) they are sharp (*paṭu*) and “condition” (or assist-aid) (*pariṣkāra*) the mind (資助心強). (Thus, why should there be a contradiction if we speak of the cessation of the conditioning forces of the mind (心行滅)?)

#1057 3. Reply. – In the preparatory stage to the “attainment called non-ideation” (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti* 無想定), (only ideation ceases for) the practitioner experi-

⁴¹⁸ See AKB ii, F 211.

ences weariness (厭) only of ideation (*saṃjñā* 想); you, however, (you do not accept this and) think that sensation (*vedanā*) is also absent in this attainment.

Another point. If you say that, among the mental factors, only ideation and sensation are sharp and “condition” (or assist-aid) the mind (資助心強), we would say that, (when these two have ceased (滅), that) the mind which must rely on them will also have ceased.

#1058 4. The Sautrāntika defends himself. – Inhalation and exhalation (*ānāpāna* 入出息), which are conditioning forces (*saṃskāras* 行) of the body (身), disappear (or cease) (滅) in the fourth meditation (*dhyāna*) without the body having to disappear for that (猶在). {4/6v.} In the same way, the mind does not necessarily need to perish when its conditioning forces (*saṃskāras* 行), i.e., ideation and sensation, disappear (or cease) (滅).

5. Theory of the conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*).

#1059 This answer is useless, for the Sautrāntika accepts that speech (語) is impossible when the conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*) of speech (語行), i.e., initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺), are absent (or cease) (滅).

In fact, as for the conditioning forces (行), they are either [a] universal (*sarvaga* 遍) or [b] non-universal (非遍) *dharma*s (法).

a. The first, (i.e., the universal conditioning forces (遍行),) are those which are always present when the *dharma* that they “condition” is present; when they cease (滅), this *dharma* is impossible, (i.e., it definitively also ceases). [It is in this way that speech is impossible when its conditioning forces, which are universal, cease.]

b. The second, (i.e., the non-universal conditioning forces (非遍行),) are those the presence of which are not indispensable; (when they cease, the *dharma* may still exist). [It is in this way that the body does not disappear when its conditioning forces cease.]

[For example,] inhalation and exhalation (*ānāpāna* 入出息) are non-universal conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*) (非遍行), for, when the breath (息) ceases (滅), the body (身) still exists (猶在).

As for initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺) in speech (語), they are included in the universal conditioning forces (遍行), for, when these cease, speech (語) definitively is absent).

Now as for sensation (*vedanā* 受), ideation (*saṃjñā* 想), etc., they should also be

included in the category of universal conditioning forces (*saṃskāras* 遍行), for, according to the Sautrāntikas, they are, along with volition (*cetanā* 思), etc., part of the class of the generally permeating factors (*mahā-bhūmikas* 大地法 = mental factors necessarily associated with every mind⁴¹⁹). Thus, when sensation and ideation are stopped (or cease (滅)) in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), the mind (心) definitively also ceases. How could it subsist without their support, (i.e., when they cease)? <210>

6. Another point. – [The Sautrāntika is not justified to affirm the absence of sensation and ideation, and the presence of the other mental factors (*caittas*).]

He accepts that volition (思), etc., are also generally permeating factors (*mahā-bhūmika* 大地法). Thus, when ideation and sensation cease, (volition would also have to cease). {4/7r.} How could volition persist?

Faith (*śraddhā*) (which is a mode [*avasthā*] of volition) and all the mental factors—which are not universal (conditioning forces (遍行)) and which cannot persist if the universal [conditioning forces] are absent—would also be absent (during this attainment (此位)).

Thus, it is wrong that the other mental factors (心所) remain with the exception of ideation and sensation.

If the Sautrāntika insists on the presence of the other mental factors, (i.e., volition (思), etc., during this attainment,) then he should accept the presence of ideation and sensation which, according to him, are generally permeating factors (大地法).

Moreover, he accepts the presence of volition (*cetanā* 思), etc., (in this attainment (定)): thus, he should also accept the presence of contact (*sparśa* 觸), for all the other mental factors (心所) arise due to (the power of) contact (see #0596). But if contact is present, sensation will also be present, in accordance with the *sūtra*: “sensation exists due to contact” (*sparśa-pratyayā vedanā* 觸緣受). And if sensation is present, ideation will also arise, for these two are never dissociated (*viśaṃsr̥ṣṭa* 相離).⁴²⁰

#1060 7. Objection by the Sautrāntika. – From the principle “sensation exists due to contact” (*sparśa-pratyayā vedanā* 觸緣受), it does not follow that all contact generates sensation, for, despite the principle: “Thirst exists due to sensation” (*vedanā-pratyayā tṛṣṇā* 受緣愛), we know that not all sensation generates thirst

⁴¹⁹ AKB iii, F 104, opinion of the Sautrāntika Śrīlābha, cf. AKB ii, F 150 note, ix, F 262.

⁴²⁰ AKB, iii, F 106.

(愛). [Thus contact and volition can be present without sensation being present.]
 〈Consequently, your reasoning is not valid.〉 {4/7v.}

- #1061 8. Reply. – The two cases are not alike, 〈for distinctions need to be made〉, i.e., the Buddha (佛) himself specified (簡) the meaning of the formula “thirst exists due to sensation” (*vedanā-pratyayā tṛṣṇā*). He said: “Sensation (受) which generates thirst (愛) is the sensation that arises from a contact (*sparśa* 觸) accompanied by ignorance (*avidyā* 無明)” = Sensation, 〈as condition (緣),〉 generates thirst only when it proceeds from contact accompanied by ignorance.⁴²¹ – Nowhere did the Buddha specify that sensation was generated only by a certain contact. – Thus, contact being given, sensation necessarily follows. Besides, 〈the principle (理) that〉 sensation (受) and ideation (想) go together 〈is definitive (決定)〉.

In other words, accepting that the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) includes volition (思) and the other mental factors, the Sautrāntika should accept that it also includes sensation (受) and ideation (想). If you admit this, then this is to contradict, in terms, the <211> *sūtra* that teaches: “The conditioning forces (*saṃskāras*) of the mind cease therein (心行滅)”; this is also to attribute to this attainment a nature contradictory to its name “attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation” (滅受想定).

[Thus, the mental factors are absent in this attainment.]

C.H.C.9.4. *Sautrāntikas – Mind (citta) without mental factors (caittas)*

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji, *Shuji* (4B/26v.) – The author refutes the opinion according to which the mental factors (*caittas*) are absent. The AKB (ii, F 212) says: “The Bhadanta Vasumitra, in the *Paripṛcchā-śāstra*, says: [There is a subtle mind (*citta*) in the attainment (*samāpatti*)]”; this is a divergent Sautrāntika master. – That “two *dharma*s (i.e., matter [*rūpa*] and mind [*citta*]) are seeds (*bījas*) of one another, that there is no mind in the attainment, that mind re-arises with matter as seed” (AKB *ibid*; see #1044)—this is the root thesis of the Sautrāntikas: there is no mind in the attainment. – Next, they develop a divergent (轉) thesis: “There is mind in the attainment”; and again: “There are mental factors”. – Then, furthermore, they develop another divergent thesis: “There are no mental factors”. This is the “divergent branch-thesis, namely: “There is mind, there are no mental factors”.

⁴²¹ *Sūtra* cited in AKB, ii, F 213; iii, F 71; comp. iii, F 100.

Our author relies on the sources cited in AKB ii, F 212–213.

#1064 1. [We state:] – If the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) are absent, the cognition (*viññāna* 識) or mind (*citta*) is also absent:

a. We do not see any other mind (心) (i.e., beyond the alleged *citta* that the Sautrāntika says is present in the attainment of cessation [*nirodha-samāpatti*]) that is not accompanied by mental factors (心所).

b. It is the rule that the *dharma* does not exist (or ceases (滅)) when its (universal (遍)) conditioning forces (*saṃskāras* 行) are absent (or cease).

c. The Sautrāntika cannot say that sensation (*vedanā*), ideation (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*) are generally permeating factors (*mahā-bhūmikas* 大地法) if he accepts the existence of a certain mind (*citta*) not accompanied by sensation, etc. {4/8r.}

d. The cognition that the Sautrāntika says is present in the attainment of cessation would be without “associates” (*saṃprayukta*); it would also be without support (*āśraya* 所依 = sense-faculty [*indriya*]), without object (所緣), without activity of cognizing (*ākāra*): in a word, just as matter (*rūpa* 色), etc., it will also not be mind (*citta*).

[Finally, the Sautrāntika would have it that mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*), unaccompanied by mental factors, subsists in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*).] Moreover, against him we refer to the *sūtra* which says:

Due to the mental sense-faculty (*manas* 意) and *dharma*s (as condition (緣)), mental cognition (意識) arises; the meeting of the three (三和合) is contact (*sparsa* 觸); at the same time <212> as contact, there arise sensation, ideation and volition (受想思).⁴²²

If mental cognition (意識) is present in the attainment of cessation, then contact (觸), due to “the meeting of the three” (三和合) (see #0587), will also necessarily be present. And sensation, ideation and volition definitively arise with contact: how can it be accepted that attainment of cessation includes mental cognition unaccompanied by mental factors (心所)?

⁴²² *mano dharmān ca pratītya utpadyate manoviññānam | trikasaṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ | sparśa-sahajā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā ca.* – *Sūtra* cited by Ghōṣaka (AKB ii, F 212) (*Samyukta-āgama*, 11, 8; see *Samyutta*, ii, 72 and the sources cited in AKB iii, F 97). – Kuiji, “the *Sūtra* of ten questions” (with the reading: *sparsāpratītyayā vedanāsaṃjñāsaṃskāra-skandhāḥ*).

2. Reply by the Sautrāntika.

#1065 At other times, the “meeting of the three” (三和) has the power (力) of constituting (成) or engendering contact (*sparsa* 觸),⁴²³ and, through contact, generates sensation (*vedanā*), etc. But in order to enter into the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), the practitioner has experienced weariness (厭患) of the mental factors (*caittas* 心所), from which it follows that, during the attainment of cessation, the meeting of the three (三事) is incapable of constituting or of generating contact. Consequently, there is also absence of the mental factors, i.e., sensation (受), etc. {4/8v.}

#1066 3. We reply: – If attainment of cessation is without mental factors, it should be called “attainment of cessation of the mental factors” (*caitta-nirodha-samāpatti* 滅心所定), not “attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation (滅受想)” (*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti*).

#1067 Reply by the Sautrāntika. – During the preparatory stage, (when weariness (厭) occurs,) the practitioner experiences weariness regarding ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) and sensation (*vedanā* 受) only. The latter two cease when the attainment (*samāpatti*) is obtained and, at the same time, all mental factors (心所) cease also. But the attainment (定) takes its name from the method by which it is generated, (i.e., the prior weariness).

#1068 [We reply:] – This reasoning proves [or would imply] that the mind (心) should also cease in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), like all other mental factors (*caittas* 心所), i.e., at the same time as sensation and ideation in regard to which weariness (厭) has been experienced. – If it would not cease, <213> how could the attainment of cessation receive the name “attainment without mind (*acittaka*) (無心定)”?

#1070 4. Moreover, what would be the ethical nature of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) which is supposed to exist in the state of attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*)? [(a) Would it be defiled (*kliṣṭa*) or non-defined (*avyākṛta*)? (b) Would it be good (*kuśala*)?]

#1072 a. This mental cognition could not be defiled (染) or non-defined (無記): [i] there is nothing that is defiled or non-defined in a good attainment (*samāpatti*) (善

⁴²³ Kuiji, *Shuji* (4B/19): Two opinions among the Sautrāntikas: (1) the meeting of the three (*trika-saṃnipāta*) is contact (*sparsa*) itself: it is said that it constitutes (*cheng* 成) contact [this is the Sautrāntika thesis of AKB iii, F 96]; (2) [the meeting of the three] differs from contact and engenders contact [this is the Vaibhāṣika thesis; see #0599].

定);⁴²⁴ [ii] every other defiled or non-defined⁴²⁵ mind that we know of is necessarily accompanied by mental factors (*caittas* 心所); [iii] the preparation (i.e., weariness) cannot generate the defiled or the non-defined. – [But then, is weariness equally weary with the good as with the bad?] – Weariness (厭) regarding the good cannot generate the defiled or the non-defined, for [this weariness is due to the pursuit of “calm” (*śanta*):] by seeking calm (求寂靜), one cannot, via a reverse effect, generate ⟨distraction⟩ (*vikṣepa* 散) [i.e., the defiled or the non-defined]. {4/9r.}

#1073 b. [This mental cognition] could not be good:

i. It could not be good through “association” (*samprayogatas*⁴²⁶) (相應善)—on account of the good *dharma*s (the root of good [*kuśala-mūlas* 善根], i.e., non-greed [*alobha* 無貪], etc.) with which it would be associated—since you deny that it is accompanied by mental factors (*caittas*).

ii–iii. It could not be good in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatā*) (自性善) or be absolutely good (*paramārthatas*) (勝義善), ⟨because that would contradict your own doctrines (宗),⟩ for it is neither the root of good (*kuśala-mūla*), etc., nor *nirvāṇa* (涅槃).

iv. Will you say that [this mental cognition] would be good through its originating cause (*samutthānatas*⁴²⁷) (等起善), being *samutthita* (induced-realized 引發) through “a good root of effort” (*prāyogika*, *yātnika*⁴²⁸) (加行善根)? – This is also not reasonable since this would contradict your own tenet (宗): just as the other good minds, the mind of the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) could not be good through its originating cause (等起). Indeed, immediately after a good mind (善心無間), three kinds of mind (三性心), i.e., good, bad and non-defined minds,⁴²⁹ may emerge [which would then have to be entirely good through their originating cause]. Thus, how could a mind be good because it is preceded by a good mind?

Hence, a mind is good due to ⟨the power of⟩ association (*samprayogatas* 相應力), [because it is associated with the eleven good mental factors (see #1766)].

⁴²⁴ See AKB viii, F 145.

⁴²⁵ Editors: LVP has “définie”.

⁴²⁶ AKB iv, F 33.

⁴²⁷ As in AKB iv, F 34.

⁴²⁸ AKB ii, F 320.

⁴²⁹ AKB ii, F 67ff.

Thus, just as the other good minds, mental cognition of the attainment of cessation would be good because it would have to be associated (相應) with the “roots of good” (善根) (non-greed [*alobha*], etc.). How can you say <214> that this cognition (or mind (心)) is solitary (獨) and without mental factors (心所)? Consequently, if the mental factors (心所) are absent in the attainment of cessation, the [mental] cognition (心) is also absent there.

- #1074 We conclude. {4/9v.} The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), i.e., the visual cognition, etc., leave the body (離身) during the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定位). When the *sūtra* says: “*Vijñāna* does not leave the body (不離身)”, it is speaking of the eighth cognition (第八識). When the practitioner enters (入) into the attainment of cessation, this is not in order to stop (止息) the very calm (*śanta*, *śiva* 極寂靜) retaining cognition (*ādāna-vijñāna* 執持識).
- #1075 In regard to the attainment of non-ideation (無想) (*āsaṃjñi-samāpatti*) and the gods without ideation, the reasoning and conclusion are the same.

C.H.C.10. *Pollution (saṃkleśa) and purification (vyavadāna) of the mind*

#1077 Moreover, the *sūtra* says:

Through the pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染) of the mind (心), the sentient being (有情) is polluted (雜染); through the purification (*vyavadāna* 清淨) of the mind, the sentient being is purified (清淨).

The only mind that corresponds to this definition is the eighth cognition. (If this cognition (識) would not exist, then there could not be impurity (染) or purity (淨) of the mind (心).)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This formula is in *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (T.14.0476.0563b). The commentators say that this *sūtra* is not an authority for the Little Vehicle, but the formula is in the *āgama* (*Kṣudrakāgama*, AKB ix, F 249). In fact, it is cited by Saṃghabhadra (*Shun zheng-li lun* T.29.1562.0731b) when discussing the sovereignty (*indriyatva*) of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*). – Vasubandhu, on the same subject (AKB ii, F 105), cites the verse (*gāthā*):

cittena nīyate lokaś cittena parikṛṣyate |
ekadharmasya cittasya sarve dharmā vaśānugāḥ ||

which is a translation of *Samyutta*, i, 39:

*cittena niyati loko cittena parikissati |
cittassa ekadhammassa sabbeva vasam anvagu ||*

[Translation Bhikkhu Bodhi:]

The world is led around by mind;
By mind it's dragged here and there.
Mind is the one thing that has
All under its control.

There is a parallel text, *Āṅguttara*, ii, 177: *cittena kho bhikkhu loko niyyati cittena parikissati cittassa uppannassa vasam gacchati*, which is cited in *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, p. 151, *cittēnāyaṃ loko nīyate cittena parikṛṣyate cittasyotpannasyotpannasya* (??) *vaśe vartate*. A verse (*gāthā*) was made from this text and is cited by Saṃghabhadra: “The world is led by the mind, it is also tormented or dragged around (*lao* 勞) by the mind; when the mind has arisen, all [of that = the world] falls under its power.”

The commentator of Śāntideva (i.e., *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, ix, 28) presents the opinion of the Yogācāras on pollution (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) of the mind.

The mind (*citta*) veiled by the defilement of desire, etc., is said to be polluted (*saṃkliṣṭa*). These defilements, i.e., desire, etc., exist by relying on the mind; they are adventitious, for they are generated by the power of believing in non-existent things (*abhūta-samāropa*). *Saṃsāra* is the succession of existences generated <215> by these defilements. The mind, in itself (= in the true sense [*paramārthatas*]), is clear in its nature (*prakṛti-prabhāsvara*, see #0460), non-adventitious (*anāgantuka*), empty of the seeds (*vāsanā*) of clinging to the belief in the object, subject, etc., a belief that arises from false imaginations (*abhūta-parikalpa*); in its nature it is free of duality (*advaya-svabhāva*), it is free of adventitious defilements; it receives the names *āśraya-parāvṛtti* (transmutation of the support) and *vyavadāna* (purification).

Thus (*tad evam*) without a mind truly existing as a thing (*vastusad-bhūtam*), there can be no pollution (*saṃkleśa*) or purification (*vyavadāna*) there, for *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are mind (*citta*) in their nature, for it is said: “It is the mind that is polluted, it is the mind that is purified”.

#1079 The *dharma*s of pollution (*saṃkleśa* 染) and of purification (*vyavadāna* 淨) have the eighth cognition (心) as their root (本) or foundation. This is so because, if they arise (生), it is with the mind (心) for their cause (因); if they remain (住), it is by relying on the mind; the mind is perfumed (熏) by them; {4/10r.} the

mind holds their seeds (*bījas* 種).

10.1. Pollution (*saṃkleśa*); #1082

10.2. Purification (*vyavadāna*); #1089

C.H.C.10.1. Pollution (*saṃkleśa*)

#1082 The *dharma*s of pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染法) are, in short (略), of three kinds, (that is, they are distinguished in kind as):

1. defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) [of the three realms (*dhātus*) and of two categories, i.e., to be abandoned by insight (*darśana-heya*), to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*), #2915, #2980];
2. action (*karman* 業), [i.e., the bad (*akuśala*) and the good-impure (*kuśala-sāsrava*)];
3. fruit (*phala* 果), [i.e., “general reward”, fruit of the action that projects the existence, “specific reward”, fruit of the actions that complete the said existence].

#1084 1. Lacking an eighth cognition that holds the seeds (*bījas* 種) of defilement (*kleśa* 煩惱), the arising of the defilements becomes impossible, (i.e., there would be no causes for it) [a] when one changes (*saṃcāra* 往還) the realm (*dhātu* 界) or stage (*bhūmi* 地), [b] when a non-defiled (*akliṣṭa* 無染) mind (心) has just been generated.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

By pollution (*saṃkleśa*) is meant defilement (*kleśa*), action (*karman*) and fruit (*phala*), in other words, the truth of the origin (*samudaya-satya*) and the truth of suffering (*duḥkha-satya*), in other words, *saṃsāra*. – Every *dharma* favorable to *saṃsāra* is “polluted” (*sāṃkleśika*).

This can be explained:

1. It is due to the mind [i.e., due to the seed-cognition (*bīja-vijñāna*), namely, the eighth cognition as seeds (*bījas*)] that the actual impure *dharma*s arise.
2. It is by relying on the [actual] mind that the seeds of the actual impure *dharma*s remain. <216>
3. The mind, as impure seeds, receives the perfuming of the actual pure *dharma*s.
4. The actual impure mind holds the seeds of the actual pure *dharma*s.

Or else:

1. All the actual conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas*), pure or impure, arise due to the eighth cognition insofar as the latter is seeds.
2. The same conditioned factors remain by relying on the actual eighth.
3. Because the actual eighth receives the perfuming of these actual pure and impure conditioned factors (proof of 2.).
4. Because the eighth holds the seeds of the actual conditioned factors (proof of 1.).

Indeed, the other *dharma*s that are not the eighth cognition (i.e., matter [*rūpa*], etc.) are incapable of holding the seeds (*bījas* 種); past (過去) (and future (未來)) *dharma*s do not really exist and cannot be a cause.

To accept that the defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) arise without seeds, i.e., without a cause (因), is to deny the fruits (果) of the trainee (*śaikṣa* 學) and of the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學) of the three vehicles (三乘); for the defilement would be able to re-arise without a cause among the trainees and the non-trainees, and even though these saints have already abandoned (已斷) it.

- #1086 2. Lacking an eighth cognition that holds (持) the seeds of action and of its fruit (業果種), the subsequent arising of action (業) and of its fruit (果) will also take place without a cause (無因), either after changing (往還) the realm (*dhātu* 界) or the stage (地), or after a *dharma* of contradictory nature (異類) (namely, a pure [*anāsrava*] mind that engenders neither action nor fruit) is generated.

⟨We have already previously rejected other seeds (種) and other causes (因)⟩. [We know, indeed, that matter (*rūpa*) and the other *dharma*s do not hold the seeds; we know that past *dharma*s are not a cause.] {4/10v.}

But if the action and the fruit arise without a cause (無因), why would the action and the fruit of the three realms (三界) not be generated for the saint who has already entered into (the realm (界) of) *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder (無餘依涅槃)? And the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) would also be generated without a cause (無因).

- #1087 3. Moreover, [the process of pollution (*saṃkleśa*)—i.e., of *saṃsāra* (*pravṛtti*), of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) or of (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāra*)—is possible only if] “cognition exists due to (*karma*-)formations” (*saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* 行緣識). This causality is impossible if there is no eighth cognition. <217>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati (S. Lévi, *Trentaine* F 37; transl. based on LVP and Jacobi):

tatrālaya-vijñānād anyat saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānaṃ na yujyate | saṃskāra-pratyaya-vijñānābhāve, pravṛtter apy abhāvah |

The only cognition (*vijñāna*) of which it can be said that it occurs “due to (*karma*)-formations” (*saṃskāra-pratyaya*) is the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*). *saṃskāra-pratyaya-vijñānābhāve, pravṛtter apy abhāvah |*

In the absence of the cognitions due to (*karma*)-formations, there is also no continuation of *saṃsāra*.

saṃsārasya ālaya-vijñānānabhyupagame, pratisaṃdhi-vijñānaṃ vā saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ parikalpyeta, saṃskāra-paribhāvitā vā ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāyāḥ |

If you do not accept (*abhyupagama*) the *saṃsāric* store-cognition, then “cognition due to (*karma*)-formations” could be either (1) the *vijñāna* at conception (*pratisaṃdhivijñāna*) or (2) the six cognitions (*ṣaḍvijñānakāya*) perfumed by (*karma*)-formations (*saṃskāraparibhāvitā*).

tatra ye saṃskārāḥ prātisaṃdhika-vijñāna-pratyayatveneṣyante, teṣāṃ cira-niruddhatvān, niruddhasya cāsattvāt, asataś ca pratyayatvābhāvān, na saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ pratisaṃdhi-vijñānaṃ yujyate |

[The first hypothesis is unacceptable for] the (*karma*)-formations that are the reason for conception, which are considered to be the cause or condition (*pratyaya*) of *vijñāna*, have long ceased, and what has ceased does not exist: and something non-existing cannot be a cause; thus, a *vijñāna* at conception caused by (*karma*)-formations is not possible.

pratisaṃdhau ca nāma-rūpaṃ apy asti, na kevalaṃ vijñānaṃ | tatra vijñānaṃ eva saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ, na nāma-rūpaṃ iti, kā tatra yuktiḥ | tasmāt saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ nāma-rūpaṃ iti, vaktavyaṃ, na tu vijñānaṃ iti |

[The first hypothesis is also unacceptable for,] at conception (*pratisaṃdhi*), there is not only *vijñāna* but also name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*). What proof could there be that only *vijñāna* is due to (*karma*)-formations and not name-and-matter? Thus one would have to say: “Due to (*karma*)-formations, there is name-and-matter”, but not *vijñāna*.

katamad anyad vijñāna-pratyayaṃ nāma-rūpaṃ |

What other [name-and-form] could account for: “name-and-matter which is due to *vijñāna*”?

yad uttara-kālam iti cet, tasya prātisaṃdhika-nāma-rūpāt ka ātmātīśayo, yatas

*tad eva vijñāna-pratyayaṃ na pūrvam, pūrvañ ca saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ nottaram
iti |*

Would it be a later name-and-matter? But what advantage in its nature would [the later name-and-matter] have in comparison to the name-and-matter related to conception, so that [the later name-and-matter] should be due to *vijñāna*, but not the earlier (name-and-matter), and that the earlier (name-and-matter) should be due to (*karma*-)formations, but not the later (name-and-matter)?

*ataś ca saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ nāma-rūpam evāstu, kiṃ pratisaṃdhi-vijñāne-
nāṅgāntareṇa parikalpitenā |*

Therefore, it should be said that name-and-matter is due to (*karma*-)formations; what purpose would there be for a made up intermediary member “*vijñāna* at conception”.

tasmān na pratisaṃdhi-vijñānaṃ saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ yujyate |

Thus the *sūtra* should not make *vijñāna* a member of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) if this *vijñāna* were the *vijñāna* at conception (*prati-saṃdhi-vijñāna*).

In fact, we have already previously rejected the thesis that the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識) receive perfuming (受熏).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This is counter to the Sautrāntikas who accept the seeds (*bījas*) but deny the eighth cognition.

In our [Vijñānavāda] tenet, the eighth cognition is perfumed and holds the action-seeds (*karma-bījas*, i.e., seeds brought forth by action or by [*karma*-]formations [*saṃskāras*]); these seeds are soaked in thirst and grasping (*upādāna*), and constitute the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya*) of the future eighth cognition. The latter has the seeds of name-speech as condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) (see *Siddhi* F 92). The future eighth cognition is thus due to (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāra-pratyaya*).

The evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*) are discontinuous, are not non-defined, cannot hold the seeds.

The “defiled *vijñāna* at conception” (*kliṣṭaṃ prātisaṃdhika-vijñānam* 結生染識) is not brought forth (感) by (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras* 行).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This is counter to the Sautrāntikas and to the Sarvāstivādins who think that “the mind at conception” (*pratisaṃdhi-citta*) is defiled (*kliṣṭa*), see AKB iii, F 117–118. Being defiled, this mind is not brought forth (*utpād, nirvart*) by (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras*), because that which is brought forth by (*karma*-)formations is always non-defined (*avyākṛta*). Thus the cognition (*vijñāna*) of the formula *saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam* is not [their] mind at conception (*pratisaṃdhi-citta*).

[If the cognition (*vijñāna*) brought forth by (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras*) is the cognition included in name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa* 名色),] the *sūtra* should say: “Name-and-matter exists due to (*karma*-)formations” (*saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ nāma-rūpaṃ* 名色行為緣). <218>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Challenged by the preceding argument, the Sarvāstivādin replies: “There is—in name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*)—a *vijñāna* which is retribution (*vipāka*), therefore non-defined, and which is brought forth by (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras*), for the latter exist although they are past”. The author replies: “If *vijñāna* brought forth by the (*karma*-)formations ...”.

The Sautrāntika is forced to the same explanation. He does not believe in the actual existence of [past] (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras*) but, he says “we accept the seeds (*bījas*), like you [i.e., the Yogācārin]”. Thus, he must explain: the present (*karma*-)formations bring forth seeds that will bring fourth the non-defined *vijñāna* which must arise in the state of name-and-matter (*nāma-rūpa*).

A *dharma* that is distant and separated in time (時分懸隔) cannot be “condition” (*pratyaya* 緣) [contrary to the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas].

And just as you cannot say: “*Vijñāna* exists due to (*karma*-)formations (*saṃskāras*)”, so you also cannot say: “Existence (*bhava*) exists due to grasping” (*upādāna-pratyayo bhavaḥ*).

C.H.C.10.2. Purification (*vyavadāna*)

#1089 The *dharma*s of purification (*vyavadāna* 清淨) are also of three kinds:

1. “mundane” (*laukika* 世道) path, i.e., the six practices;⁴³⁰
2. “supramundane” (*lokottara* 出世道) path;

⁴³⁰ See AKB vi, F 239 (which seems to follow the *Vijñāna-kāya*, *juan 7* at the beginning); see #2667.

3. “fruit of abandoning” (斷果), [i.e., the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) *dharma* obtained due to the abandoning of the defilements (*kleśas*) by means of these paths].

#1092 1. Lacking the eighth cognition that holds the seeds (*bījas* 種) of the two paths, ⟨i.e., the mundane (世) and the supramundane (出世) pure paths (清淨道)⟩—as soon as the actual [two pure paths] are interrupted by a mind of a different nature (異類心) (i.e., the mind of another realm [*dhātu*], defiled mind)—the subsequent generation (後起) of these two pure paths (淨法) would be impossible, ⟨i.e., would be without a cause (無因), {4/11r.} for we have already previously rejected other causes⟩. [Indeed, apart from their own seeds, these paths cannot have the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), i.e., visual (*rūpa*), etc., as their causes.]

Would you say that ⟨the two pure paths (二淨道)⟩ re-arise without a cause (無因而生)? – Then you should accept that ⟨the two pure paths⟩ can arise even after having already entered into ⟨the realm of⟩ *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder (無餘依涅槃界) and that the support (所依) [i.e., the body, of those who are on these two pure paths], could also re-arise ⟨without a cause⟩ in this *nirvāṇa*.

#1093 2. Moreover, we cannot see how the “first supramundane path” (出世道初) (i.e., the first moment of the path of insight [*darśana-mārga*], #2924)⁴³¹ <219> could arise if an eighth cognition—which, at all times, holds the “original” seeds (i.e., the seeds of the nature-of-things [*dharmatā-bījas* 法爾種], see #0427) of the supramundane path—would not exist. – Indeed, the impure (漏) *dharmas* (—i.e., the supreme mundane factors [*laukika-agra-dharmas*], #2897, of which our opponents believe that they engender the first supramundane or pure path—) are of a different nature (類別) and cannot be the cause (因) of this path.

To think that the first supramundane path arises without a cause is to renounce one’s claim to be a Buddhist (釋種).

If the first supramundane path does not arise, the following ones will also not arise. Consequently, the paths (道) and the fruits (果) of the three vehicles (三乘) would be absent.

#1095 3. Lacking a *vijñāna* that holds the seeds of the defilement (*kleśa* 煩惱), the

⁴³¹ The author is criticizing the Sautrāntika, the opinion of Kumāra, etc., of the first century (namely, that matter [*rūpa*] and mind [*citta*] mutually sustain one another), not that of the fourth century Sautrāntika who claims a subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*).

fruit of “abandoning the defilements” (*kleśa-prahāṇa-phala*, *prahāṇa-phala* 斷果)—namely, the transmutation of the support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 轉依) (#3180)—is also impossible.

Can one assume that the eighth cognition does not exist and that the path of abandoning (i.e., unhindered path [*ānantarya-mārga* 無間道]) is generated?

At the time when this path (道) would be generated, actual (現行) defilements would not exist since the mind is pure; but the pure mind and the defiled mind (i.e., defilements) (染淨二心) do not go together. {4/11v.} The seeds (種子) of the defilement would not exist since the minds (心) associated with the path (道) cannot hold such seeds (持彼種). There is, (in terms of their intrinsic nature (自性),) a contradiction (相違) between these seeds and these minds, as there is between these seeds and *nirvāṇa*. – [Thus, the Sautrāntikas explain nothing with their seeds being held by actual minds.]

As for the Sarvāstivādins, their asserted past (去) and future (來) defilements (*kleśas*) do not really exist; their asserted possessions (*prāptis* 得) do equally not really exist. – That other *dharma*s, i.e., matter (*rūpa*), etc., could hold the seeds (*bījas* 種) is also not possible.

Thus, lacking the eighth cognition, that which should be abandoned (所斷) by the path of abandoning is absent.

The path that abandons (能斷) would also be absent.

Thus, we do not see relative to what (依誰) (since that which should be abandoned is absent) or due to what (由誰) (since that which abandons is absent) the “fruit of abandoning” (*prahāṇa-phala* 斷果) could be established.


#1096 Objection. – The fruit of abandoning (斷果) consists of the fact that, due to the power of the path (道力), defilements (*kleśa* 惑) will no longer re-arise.

Answer. – This explanation is insufficient. In fact, if <220> the eighth cognition is absent, the practitioner will be a non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學 = *arhat*) from the arising of the first path (初道) onwards. Indeed, lacking seeds, [i.e., their cause,] every defilement (惱皆) from then on would already be without a cause (無因) and would absolutely be incapable of arising (*anutpattika-dharma*). [Indeed, the mind of the first path is all there is of an “active” mind in the practitioner; this mind cannot give rise to defilements. There is no seed of the defilement if the eighth cognition, the reservoir of the seeds, is absent.]

#1097 But as soon as one accepts the eighth cognition, everything is properly estab-

lished. Only this cognition holds the seeds of pollution (*saṃkleśa*) (染) and of purification (*vyavadāna*) (淨).

- #1098 The arguments of reason (理趣) that demonstrate the existence of the eighth cognition are innumerable (無邊). We have given only a summary exposition (of the essential points) (綱要) of them for fear of being too lengthy.
- #1099 (That this cognition exists distinctly is shown clearly (顯然) in both the noble teachings (教) and through reason (理). All wise people (智人) should accept it in good faith.) {4/12r.} <221>



Kuiji on the Sautrāntikas.

[La Vallée Poussin inserts here various notes on the Sautrāntikas:]

It should be helpful to collect Kuiji's notes on the Sautrāntikas here. Kuiji treats this subject [i.e., the Sautrāntikas] in:

1. his commentary on Vasumitra's *Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji*, X.53.0844.0577b23, 0590c2);
2. his commentary on our *Siddhi* (*Shuji* 2A/36) (translated above, #0199):
 - Shuji* 4A/53v. (commenting on #0904);
 - Shuji* 4B/18 (commenting on #1045);
 - Shuji* 4B/43 (commenting on #1087);
 - Shuji* 5A/14r. (commenting on #1222).

[As for his second commentary:]

Kuiji, *Shuji* 4A/53v. = T.43.1830.0358a09 (commenting on #0904):

The author refutes the Sautrāntikas and, at the same time, the Dārṣṭāntika-ācāryas. The Dārṣṭāntika-ācāryas are “different masters” (yi 異) of the Sautrāntikas: he refers to the Sūrya-udaya-śāstrins (= Sauryodayikas ?, see #0199) who are given the name of Sautrāntikas. The latter are of three kinds:

- a. Mūla, i.e., Kumārata (鳩摩羅多);
- b. Śrīlāta (室利邏多), who composed the Sautrāntika-*Vibhāṣā*, whom [Saṃgha-bhadra] in his *Nyāyānusāra* calls “the Sthavira”;
- c. the one called merely Sautrāntika.⁴³²

As the Mūlācārya [Kumārata] composed the *Jieman lun* (結鬘論⁴³³: *Mālyagrantha-śāstra* ?), the *Guangshuo piyu* 廣說譬喻 (*Avadāna* ... ?) “Detailed account of the comparisons”, (title of a treatise [*śāstra*] according to Péri, p. 22, note), he was called Dārṣṭāntikācārya, taking his name from what he said.

Kuiji, *Shuji* (4B/43) (commenting on #1087):

The author establishes the existence of the seeds of the nature-of-things (*dharmatā-bījas*) (see #0427): “The objection bears against Kumārata, etc., of the first century, who maintains that matter (*rūpa*) and mind (*citta*) support one another mutually; not against

⁴³² The issue is whether it should not be understood as: “The Sthavira of whom Saṃgha-bhadra (in his *Shun zhengli lun* [T.29.1562; **Nyāyānusāra*]) speaks is the third; he is called merely Sautrāntika”.

⁴³³ Variant: *Yuman lun* 喻鬘論, *Siddhi* F 222, top.

the Sautrāntikas of the fourth century who recognize a subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)”.

Kuiji, *Shuji* (5A/14r.) (commenting on #1222):

The Sautrāntika-ācāryas (*jingbu shi* 經部師) of the *Sthavira-nikāya* (*shangzuobu* 上座部) do not accept the eighth cognition and make matter (*rūpa*) to be the cause (i.e., the condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya*]) of mind (*citta*). A commentary says: The Sautrāntikas first (*xian* 先) maintain that, when the *arhat* enters into the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*), the matter (*rūpa*) of the fleshly heart (*hrdaya-māṃsa-rūpa*) contains (*parigrah*) the seed (*bīja*) of the mind-of-emerging from the attainment (*samāpatti*). This demonstrates that the *dharma*s of matter are the cause of mind. [We have seen the close relationship of the Sthaviras and of the Sautrāntikas at #0907, #1027 and #1048 .] – On the heart, #0856.

[As for Kuiji's first commentary:]

Also cf. Kuiji, *Commentarial Record on the Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji*, X.83.0844). – The commentary (X.83.0844.0577b23) on *Siddhi* (*Shuji* 4A/53v.) says that the Sautrāntikas are of three kinds:

- a. Mūla (*genben* 根本), i.e., Kumārata;
 - b. Śrīlāta;
 - c. the one vaguely called [the] Sautrāntika (*weifan*).
- a. On the first, see the commentary on the *Siddhi* (*Shuji* 2A/36v.) (see #0199): his name is translated as “Young-man Head” (Tongshou 童首); <222> Sautrāntika-mūla-ācārya, he appeared in the first century after Buddha's *parinirvāṇa*, composed the *Yuman lun* 喻鬘論, collected the *adbhuta-vastus* (?), is called Dārṣṭāntika-ācārya. At this time, there was not yet any Sautrāntika. Later, his words were developed (?). Likewise *Si-yu-ki*, xii, 10 (Beal, ii, 302, Watters, ii, 286) and Puguang, ii, 5.
- b. The next one—i.e., Śrīlāta, of the fourth century—composed the *Sautrāntika-Vibhāṣā* (Puguang, ix, 28): Śrīlāta, translated as “Excellent Acquisition”. Saṃghabhadra, xxi, 10 (*Shun zhengli lun* T.29.1562.0458c) calls him “the Sthavira”.
- c. The third one is easy to know (*yizhi* 易知).⁴³⁴

[This last one might be Vasubandhu. – In many passages, Saṃghabhadra refutes *jingzhu* 經主, the “Sūtra master”, who is certainly Vasubandhu, a not very faithful interpreter, in his view, of the Sarvāstivādin doctrine and suspect of Sautrāntika tendencies. He

⁴³⁴ As in the first note on *Siddhi* F 221, it can be understood: “The last, whom Saṃghabhadra calls the Sthavira, is easy to know.”

refutes “the Sthavira” almost as frequently. Formerly, I thought that (Saṃghabhadra) must mean “the Sthavira school” (*Nirvāṇa*, 1925, F 136, 23, 145) and I have attributed doctrines to this school of which it is probably innocent. This “Sthavira” is Śrīlābha. Kuiji refers to Saṃghabhadra, beginning of chapter iii (T.29.1562.0458c): “Consequently, the doctrine of *jingzhu* 經主 (Vasubandhu) is not good. Here the Sthavira says: In the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*), the mind (*citta* = *vijñāna*) and the mental factors (*caittas*, i.e., sensation, etc.) mutually support one another ...”. We have, on p. 352, col. 2: “The uneducated Sthavira maintains that the tangible ...”.]

Kuiji, *Commentarial Record on the Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji* X.53.0844.0590c) (explaining the Sautrāntika chapter). – The Sautrāntikas are of three types, just as we have explained (X.53.0844.0577b), by citing the commentary on the *Siddhi*. What the treatise (*śāstra*) explains here is the doctrine of the fourth century master [i.e., Śrīlāta, Saṃghabhadra’s Sthavira, the Bhadanta-mahā-sthavira of Tāranātha ?]. – Kumārata thinks that matter (*rūpa*) and mind (*citta*) bear one another’s seeds (*bījas*; traces [*vāsanā*]), as is explained in AKB v, F 7 (ii, F 212, line 8): “The ancient masters (*pūrva-ācārya*) think that two *dharma*s are one another’s seeds (*anyonya-bījaka*): these two *dharma*s are the mind and the body endowed with sense-faculties (*śendriyaka-kāya*)”. But, in the fourth century, the Sautrāntikas established the “subtle mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)”. As the fourth century Sautrāntikas diverged from the Dārṣṭāntikas, they are called the branch-Sautrāntikas. The commentary on the *Siddhi*, *Shuji* 3A/90 (commenting on #0579) says: “This refutes the Sthaviras and the branch-Sautrāntikas who established a subtle mental cognition”.

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Tāranātha, p. 47, transl. p. 59:

At this time (of the separation of the eighteen sects), there lived, in Kaśmir, the *brahman* Śūdra who venerated the Vaibhāṣika Bhadanta Dharmatrāta and the Sautrāntika-ādi (Tib. *mdo sde pa'i thog ma*, i.e., the founder of the Sautrāntikas) the Kaśmirian Mahā-bhadanta Sthavira ... The texts (*āgama*) of the Sautrāntikas were the (Tib.) *lung dpe'i 'phreng ba*, the (Tib.) *sde snod 'dzin pa'i dpe khyud*, etc.

Wassiljew, *Buddhismus*, p. 48 (S. 52): “Als erster Sautrāntika erscheint der Grosse Sthavira, <223> ein Eigenname ... ‘Der Kranz der Beispiele’ und ‘Sammlung von Beispielen des Korbbaltenden’ ... sind uns ganz unbekannt” [“As the first Sautrāntika appears the Great Sthavira, a proper name ... ‘The garland of examples’ and ‘Collection of examples of the upholders of the baskets (*piṭakas*)’ ... are completely unknown to us”].

Schiefner, p. 59: “In the Tangyur [Cordier, p. 432], there is a *Drṣṭānta-mālyā*”. – [It must be seen if the *Āgama-drṣṭānta-mālā* of Tāranātha corresponds to this treatise in the Tangyur (Cordier corrects *Drṣṭānta-mālā*): this would be an extract of the *Drṣṭānta-mālā* containing comparisons relating to the Buddha: the *adbhuta-vastus* of Kuiji.]

* * *

Noël Péri, *Date*, 1911: 21:

1. There is a Kumārata, translated as “Young-man Son” (Tongzi 童子)—master of Harivarman, the author of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* (T.32.1646, rather than *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*)—a Sarvāstivādin master who teaches the doctrines of the *Vibhāṣā*.

2. Another Kumārata is Kumāralabdha, translated as “Young-man Acquisition” (Tongshou 童授)—also Kumāralābha, Kumāralāta—passes as the founder of the Sautrāntika school, was Śrīlābha’s teacher, one of the four sons of the *Xiyu ji* 西域記 (Stanislas Julien, ii, p. 214), along with Āśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Deva. “This suggests a more remote date than that of Kumārata, and which would come closer to the date that Vasumitra (*Treatise on the Sects* [*Samayabhedoparacanacakra*], T.49.2033) assigned for the appearance of the Sautrāntika school, 400 years after the *nirvāṇa*. However, the mention of Deva presents a difficulty.”

p. 22: “The *Richu lun* 日出論 [*Sūrya-udaya-śāstra*], which is generally attributed to the second [Kumārata], is, nevertheless, sometimes mentioned under the name of the first; but the latter is considered to be the author of the *Xianliao lun* 顯了論 [*xianliao = uttāna*; in *Vyutpatti, prabhāṇita*, AKB i, F 43], the *Jieman lun* 結鬘論, *Yuman lun* 喻鬘論, *Guang shuo piyu lun* 廣說譬喻論, etc., which are nowhere attributed to the second. [Summarizing, I am led to believe in the distinction of these two figures, of which the second would have to be the author of the *Richu lun* 日出論. All of these works are, by the way, unknown].”

* * *

If Kuiji is to be believed, several centuries separate the Kumārata “Young-man Head” (Tongshou 童首) [see *Siddhi* F 48, 221] and the Kumārata “Young-man Acquisition” (Tongshou 童授) [*Siddhi* F 223].

* * *

Śrīlābha—Lüders corrects it to Śrīlāta, because “si-li-lo-to kann nur Śrīlāta sein” [“si-li-lo-to can only be Śrīlāta”] [室利邏多]; but *Lotus* (358, 530) and *Introduction* (567, 623): “Che li lo to must be none other than the *ārya* Ārīlābha”—is frequently named in *Kośa-vyākhyā*, i, p. 55; iii, pp. 71, 80, 91, 98 (= Sautrāntika), 102, etc.

lābha = *lāta* = taken, received (*lā ādāna*), and the written forms *t* and *bh* are very similar; the two names are interchangeable in spelling and meaning.

* * *

We have several verses of Bhadanta Kumāralābha, AKB vi, F 128:

duḥkhasya ca hetutvād duḥkhaiś cānalpakaiḥ samuditatvāt |
duḥkhe ca sati tadiṣṭer duḥkham iti sukham vyavasyanti ||

And AKB ix, F 265–266:

drṣṭidaṃṣṭrāvabhedaṃ cāpekṣya bhraṃśaṃ ca karmaṇām |
deśayanti buddhā dharmam vyāghrīpotāpahāravat ||

and, *ibid.*, some fragments of a verse (*śloka*). <224>

* * *

On the Chinese phonemes that we are accustomed to transcribe as Kumārata, see Heinrich Lüders, *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, 1926: 20. – *Ibid.*, on the respective information of Xuanzang, see also Stanislas Julien, i, 154, ii, 213; Beal, i, 138, ii, 302; and on the patriarchs.

It is clear that Young-Man Acquisition = Kumāralābha, Kumāralāta, Kumāra[lā]ta; but we cannot explain “Young-Man Head” (Tongshou 童首).

Despite the observations of Lüders, p. 20, note, it is strange that a Sautrāntika pays homage to the Sarvāstivādins and to the masters Pārśva, etc.

One questions whether the title *Sūtrālaṃkāra* [for *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*] and the author Aśvagoṣa should be dismissed. <225>



Bodhisattva Asaṅga

D. *MANAS*

- D.A. Name of the seventh cognition; #1101
- D.B. Support (*āśraya*) of cogitation (*manas*); #1111
- D.C. Object (*ālambana*) of cogitation; #1233
- D.D. Intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 性) and mode of operation (*ākāra* 相) of cogitation; #1262
- D.E. Associated factors (*saṃprayuktas*) of cogitation; #1265
- D.F. Cessation of cogitation; #1381
- D.G. Demonstration of the existence of cogitation; #1431

#1101 We have thus already explained the first developing (能變) *viññāna* and its characteristics (相). What is the SECOND DEVELOPING *VIÑÑĀNA* (and its characteristic)? Vasubandhu replies to this question. The stanzas 5b–8a (Chin. 5–7) say:

tad-āśritya pravartate | 5b
tad-ālambaṃ manonāma viññānaṃ mananātmakam || 5cd
kleśaiś caturbhiḥ sahitaṃ nivṛtāvyākṛtaiḥ sadā |
ātma-drṣṭy-ātma-mohātma-māna-ātma-sneha-saṃjñitaiḥ || 6
yatrajas tanmayair anyaiḥ sparśādyaiś cārhatō na tat |
na nirodha-samāpattau mārge lokottare na ca || 7
dviitīyaḥ pariṇāmo 'yaṃ | 8a

次第二能變・是識名末那・|
 依彼轉・緣彼・思量為性相・|| 5
 四煩惱常俱・我癡我見・|
 并我慢我愛・及餘觸等俱・|| 6
 有覆無記攝・隨所生所繫・|
 阿羅漢滅定・出世道無有・|| 7

#1103

5b–d. Next (次), as for this (*ayaṃ*) second developing (*pariṇāmo* 能變) *viññāna*, this cognition (*viññāna* 識) is given the name *manas* (末那). It evolves (*pravartate* 轉) with that (*tad* 彼), i.e., the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*), for its support (*āśritya* 依) and for its object (*ālambaṃ* 緣), having for (its nature (性) and its mode of operation (相) (*ātmakam*)) “cogitating-⟨reckoning⟩” (*mananā* 思量),

6. [*Manas*] is always (*sadā* 常) accompanied (*sahitaṃ* 俱) by four defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), namely, delusion regarding the self (*ātma-moha* 我癡), afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見), together with (并) conceit regarding the self (*ātma-māna* 我慢), afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha* 我愛), and it is accompanied (俱) by “other” (*anyaiḥ* 餘) [mental factors (*caittas*), i.e.,] contact (*sparsa* 觸), etc.
7. [These mental factors] are included (攝) in the obscured-non-defined (*nivṛtāvyākṛtaiḥ* 覆無記); they are bound (所繫) to [the place or stage (*bhūmi*)] (*tanmayair*) where [the individual is] born (*yatrajas* 隨所生); [defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas*)] does not exist (*na tat* 無) in the *arhat* (阿羅漢), in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定) and in the supramundane path (*mārga lokottare* 出世道). <226>

D.A. *Name of the seventh cognition*

#1107 The Treatise:

NEXT (次), i.e., after the discussion of the ⟨first developing cognition (能變識)⟩, i.e., “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識), it is appropriate to explain ⟨the characteristics (相) of⟩ the “⟨DEVELOPING (能變)⟩ cognition (*vijñāna*) of cogitating⟨-reckoning⟩ (*mananā* 思量)” (see #0382). {4/12v.} In the noble teachings (聖教), THIS COGNITION (是識) IS GIVEN THE special NAME (名) *MANAS* (末那) because it is distinguished from the other cognitions and surpasses (勝) them in terms of its constant (恆) ⟨assessingly⟩ cogitating⟨-reckoning⟩ (審思量) (#1262).

⟨How does this name differ from that of the sixth cognition (*vijñāna*) (第六識), i.e., mental cognition (意識)?⟩

#1108 [This *manas*] could, of course, be called *mano-vijñāna*, by taking the term [*mano-vijñāna*] to be a *karmadhāraya* or descriptive compound (持業釋), i.e., “cognition that is cogitation (*manas* 意)”; just as the eighth cognition is called *ālaya-vijñāna* (藏識), i.e., “cognition that is *ālaya*”.

[But this name *mano-vijñāna* also suits the sixth cognition, i.e., “mental cognition”, which the noble teachings actually call *mano-vijñāna*.] Here we take the term [i.e., *mano-vijñāna*] to be a *tatpuruṣa* or determinative compound (依主釋), of the same type as the word *caṅśur-vijñāna* (眼識), i.e., “cognition of the eye”, etc. In the case of the sixth cognition, *vijñāna* (cognition) is different from *manas* (cogitation) (識異意), [and it is called *mano-vijñāna*, i.e., “cognition of the mental sense-faculty, i.e., cogitation (*manas*)” or “cognition based on cogitation (*manas*)” or “mental cognition”].

Fearing (恐) that there could be confusion (濫) between the seventh and the sixth cognition, the noble teachings (聖教) call the seventh cognition simply by the name of cogitation (*manas* 意).

Moreover, there are other reasons for indicating it by the name of cogitation (*manas* 意):

1. in order to distinguish (簡) it [a] from *citta* (心) (i.e., from the eighth cognition) and [b] from the six cognitions (識) (i.e., mental cognition, visual cognition, etc.), for it is:

- a. inferior (劣) to *citta* in regard to the power of accumulation (積集) (*cinoti*, accumulate; *ci*, accumulated; where *citta* = store-cognition [*ālaya-vijñāna*], see #0878),

- b. inferior to the six cognitions in regard to the power of discerning or cognizing (*vijñapti* 了別);
- 2. in order to show (欲顯) that cogitation provides the immediate support (*āśraya* 近所依) for mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識), (it is simply given the name cogitation (意)). <227>

D.B. *Support (āśraya) of cogitation (manas)*

- #1111 Vasubandhu's stanza (*kārika* 5b) states *tad-āśritya* ⟨*pravartate*⟩ (依彼轉): ⟨IT EVOLVES⟩ WITH THAT [i.e., the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)] FOR ITS SUPPORT, <#1113> indicating the support (*āśraya* 所依) for cogitation (*manas*).

⟨THAT (彼) means the same as before (in stanza 2ab, #0382), namely,⟩ the “first developing *vijñāna*” (初能變識), thus, this support is the eighth cognition,

The noble teachings actually say that this seventh cognition, that is, cogitation (*manas*), has the store-cognition (藏識) for its SUPPORT (依). {4/13r.}

- #1115 According to Nanda, it should be understood that cogitation (*manas* 意) has the seeds (*bījas* 種) of the eighth cognition for its support (所依)—i.e., its own seeds which occur in the eighth—not the actual “active” eighth cognition (現識), for cogitation is not discontinuous (無間斷): it cannot be said that it arises (生) by requiring an actual [eighth] cognition (現識) for its simultaneous (*sahabhū*) support (俱有依).

- #1116 According to Dharmapāla, cogitation (*manas* 意) has both the actual eighth cognition (現識) and the seeds (種) of the eighth cognition (識種) for its support (所依). Although cogitation is not discontinuous (無間斷), nevertheless, it is susceptible to change ⟨or transformation or evolution⟩ (*vikāra* 有轉易, at entry into the path of insight, etc.; this refers to the non-*buddhas*) and consequently is given the name of evolving cognition (*pravṛtti-vijñāna* 轉識) (see #1160). Thus it should be said that it arises (生) by requiring an actual eighth cognition (現識) for its simultaneous support (俱有依).

- #1117 EVOLVES (*pravartate* 轉), in stanza (*kārika* 5b), means ⟨i.e., continuously evolving or developing or flowing⟩ (*anupravartate* 流轉), indicating in this way that this cognition (此識), i.e., cogitation (*manas*), constantly (恆) relies (依) on the eighth cognition (識) and takes it for its object (取所緣).

D.B.A. *General theory of the support (āśraya)*⁴³⁵

- #1120 All the minds (*cittas* 心) and mental factors (*caittas* 心所) have “supports” (*āśrayas* 所依). There are, in general, three kinds of support. {4/13v.}

- #1121 1. The support that constitutes the “condition qua cause” (*hetu-pratyaya-āśraya* 因緣依) (#1125).

⁴³⁵ See #2259, #2437.

That is, this condition is the seeds (*bīja*) themselves (自種子).⁴³⁶ <228> All conditioned *dharma*s (*saṃskṛta* 有為法) depend (託) on this kind of support, since they certainly do not arise (生) without the seeds that are their “causal condition” or “condition qua cause” (自因緣).

2. The support that constitutes the “condition qua dominance” (*adhipati-pratyaya-āśraya* 增上緣依) (#1134).

That is, this condition refers to the six internal sense-spheres (*ādhyātmika ṣaḍ-āyatana* 內六處).⁴³⁷ – All the minds and mental factors (心心所) depend on this kind of support which is called “simultaneous support” (*sahabhū āśraya*) or “simultaneous faculty” (*sahabhū indriya* 俱有根) since they certainly cannot evolve (*pravart* 轉) without it.

3. The support that constitutes the “condition qua immediate antecedent” (*samanantara-pratyaya-āśraya* 等無間緣依) (#1187).

That is, this condition refers to the “*manas* that has already ceased” (*pūrvaniruddha* 前滅意)—the word *manas* here includes all eight cognitions (*vijñānas*). <All the minds and mental factors (心心所)> depend on <this kind of support which is also called> the condition of succession (*krānta-pratyaya*) or faculty of succession (*krānta-indriya* 開導根),⁴³⁸ since they certainly would not arise (起)

⁴³⁶ The expression *bīja-āśraya* (“seed-support”) refers only to seed engendering a seed (succession of momentary seeds that are engendered similar to one another).

The expression *hetu-āśraya* (“cause-support”) means seed engendering a seed and seed engendering an actual *dharma* (see #0509, #1128).

⁴³⁷ The “six internal sources of cognition” (AKB i, F 37): (1) eye (*cakṣus*), (2) ear (*śrotra*), (3) nose (*ghrāṇa*), (4) tongue (*jihvā*), (5) body (*kāya*) and (6) mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya*) or sense-sphere of the mental sense-faculty (*mana-āyatana*).

For the Little Vehicle, the sense-sphere of the mental sense-faculty (*mana-āyatana*) is not simultaneous with the cognition (*vijñāna*), is not “simultaneous support” (*sahabhū-āśraya*) and is included in the third category, *samanantara* (immediate antecedent) (AKB i, F 31).

The seventh and the eighth cognitions (*vijñānas*) are included in the *mana-āyatana*.

⁴³⁸ Instead of *samanantara*, which is explained as *sama* + *anantara* (AKB ii, F 306 and below, #1187), one can say *kaidao* 開導 [glossed *kaipi yindao* 開闢引導], the condition (*pratyaya*) that “opens-guides”. – The original Sanskrit of this word is given to us by Kuiji’s transcription, *jielanduo* 羯爛多 = *krānta*, which is translated correctly as *cidi* 次第 = *krama*.

The distinction should be noted that the mental factors (*caittas*) are condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*) but not “opening and guiding support”

without it.

#1122 Only minds and mental factors have this threefold support (具三所依); they are thus called “having a support” (*sāśraya* 有所依),⁴³⁹ in contrast to the other (餘) *dharma*s. <229>

- A.1. Support that constitutes the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya-āśraya*); #1125
- A.2. Simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya*) or the support that constitutes the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya-āśraya*); #1134
- A.3. Support that constitutes the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya-āśraya*) and the opening and guiding support (*krānta-āśraya*); #1187

D.B.A.1. *Support that constitutes the condition qua cause (hetu-pratyaya-āśraya)*⁴⁴⁰

#1125 The first support, i.e., the support that constitutes the condition qua cause, (is the seeds as support (種子依) and should be explained like this):

According to Nanda and Jinaputra, the seed (*bīja* 種) must have already ceased (滅) so that the actual fruit (現果) can arise (生).

[The cause and the fruit are not simultaneous: Sautrāntika thesis.]

Indeed:

1. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*⁴⁴¹ distinguishes—among the twenty-four types of “already arisen” (*jāta*, *utpanna* ?)—that which is called the “[state] without an already arisen seed” (無種已生). [This refers to the last aggregates (*skandhas*) of the *arhat*: at this time, the seed has entered into the past, and the past is non-existent; the present seed ceases before the future fruit arises. The *arhat* has only aggregates which have no seed—i.e., he is “without seed”—and which have arisen.]

2. The seed (*bīja* 種) is not simultaneous (不俱有) with the sprout (*aṅkura* 芽), etc. {4/14r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It is necessary to distinguish the “eye” (*cakṣus*) and the “eye-sense-element” (*cakṣur-*

(*krānta-āśraya*, #1209); whereas the mind (*citta*), being the ruler, is “support” (*āśraya*) and, consequently, is at once condition qua immediate antecedent and “opening and guiding support”.

⁴³⁹ See AKB ii, F 177.

⁴⁴⁰ See #2441.

⁴⁴¹ *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0707c).

dhātu) (YBh, 56, 9; *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0703c). [There are four alternatives:]

1. *cakṣus*, not *cakṣur-dhātu*: the last [eye-]skandha of the *arhat*;
2. *cakṣur-dhātu*, not *cakṣus*: among the sentient beings of the material realms (*dhātus*) as long as the eye has not arisen; or when, having arisen, it has ceased; among the ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*) of the immaterial realm (*dhātu*);
3. both *cakṣus* and *cakṣur-dhātu*: except in cases 1, 2 and 4;
4. neither *cakṣus* nor *cakṣur-dhātu*: the *arhat* who has lost the eye, who has not had the eye, who is born in the immaterial realm, who has entered into *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder.

#1127 But Dharmapāla thinks that these [two] arguments are not demonstrative (證):

1. The intention of the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* is to say that, at the *arhat*'s last moment, the *arhat*'s seeds (*bījas*) are incapable of engendering new seeds of their types: the *arhat* is thus “without seeds”, but he has this support (彼依), i.e., existing last seeds (後種) which bring forth (引生) an actual fruit that is simultaneous with them, and which are “already arisen”.

2. [The point] that the seed (種) engenders the sprout (芽), etc., this is causality in the mundane sense, not in absolute truth (*paramārtha* 勝義; #0481). Besides, it has not been well demonstrated that the sprout arises after the seed ceases (種滅芽生); I do not accept this thesis. And it is well established that the flame (焰) and the wick (炷) are simultaneous (同時) and reciprocal (互) causes (因) (see #0508). <230>

#1128 Truthfully, in the causation of seeds generating seeds (within their own type (自類)), the cause (因) and fruit (果) are not simultaneous (不俱); but seeds and the actual *dharma* (種現) engender one another (相生) and are definitively simultaneous (俱有). This is why YBh (T.30.1579.0302b) defines the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣):

Impermanent *dharma*s (無常法, i.e., the seeds and actual *dharma*s) are (1) causes (因) of *dharma*s of another nature (他性) and are also (2) causes of a later moment (後念) of [*dharma*s of] their own nature (自性).

“Of their own nature” (自性), i.e., in terms of their own kind (自類), the previous (前) seed (種子) is the cause of the later (後) seed.

“Of another nature” (他性), i.e., the seed (種) and the actual (現行) *dharma* are causes of one another (互) (see #0432).

Likewise, the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* says:⁴⁴²

The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) and the (actual) defiled (染) *dharma*s {4/14v.} are mutually condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣)—just as bundles of reeds (束蘆) [supporting each other]—and exist simultaneously (俱時而有).

Moreover, the same treatise says:⁴⁴³

The seed (*bīja* 種子) and its fruit (*phala* 果) are necessarily simultaneous (俱).

We conclude that the *bīja-āśraya* (種子依)—that is to say, “seed-support of actual *dharma*s”—definitively does not involve succession (*apūrva-acarima* 非前後).

#1129 Given, there may be certain texts (referred to by the Sautrāntikas) which teach that there is succession between the seed and its fruit (種果前後), but these texts are concessional, (or are provisional (隨轉理門)).

#1130 The eight cognitions (*vijñānas*) (八識) and their mental factors (*caittas* 心所)—pure or impure—thus have definitively their particular seeds (種子) for their support (所依).

D.B.A.2. *Simultaneous support (sahabhū-āśraya) or the support that constitutes the condition qua dominance (adhipati-pratyaya-āśraya)*⁴⁴⁴

#1134 Next, the “simultaneous support” (俱有依) of the first five cognitions, and of the sixth, seventh and eighth cognitions, will be studied [with reference to] four masters:

- 2.1. Opinion of Nanda; #1135
- 2.2. Opinion of Sthiramati; #1140
- 2.3. Opinion of Śuddhacandra; #1165
- 2.4. Opinion of Dharmapāla; #1171

D.B.A.2.1. *Opinion of Nanda*

A. As for the first five cognitions (i.e., visual cognition [*cakṣur-vijñāna*], etc.),

⁴⁴² Asvabhāva, *Saṃgraha-upanibandhana* (T.31.1598.0388a).

⁴⁴³ Asvabhāva, *Saṃgraha-upanibandhana* (T.31.1598.0389c).

⁴⁴⁴ See #2481; above, #0171; Kuiji, *Shuji* 2A/13r.

they have, as their sole simultaneous support (依), the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識), because the latter necessarily exists when the five cognitions are present (*samudācāra* 現起, *saṃbhūti*, etc.).

That which is called sense-faculty (*indriya* 根),⁴⁴⁵ i.e., the eye, etc., <231> does not constitute distinct (別) simultaneous supports (俱有依) of the five cognitions, i.e., by the eye (眼), etc., because the five sense-faculties are just (即) seeds (*bījas* 種子).

#1135 The *Viṃśatikā-kārikā* (stanza 9, *Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0075b16) says: {4/15r.}

yataḥ svabījād vijñaptir yad-ābhāsā pravartate |
dvividhā-āyatanatvena te tasyā munir abravīt ||

Its own seed (*bīja*) from which the cognition (*vijñāna*⟨/vijñapti⟩) arises and the thing of which the cognition seizes the aspect,⁴⁴⁶ the Muni has designated this pair as the twofold sense-spheres (*āyatana*) of cognition.

[The visual cognition (*caḥsur-vijñāna*) arises from a seed which is the eye, i.e., its internal sense-sphere (*āyatana*), the sense-sphere of the eye (*caḥsur-āyatana*); it seizes the aspect of color, (and this color is) its external sense-sphere, the sense-sphere of visible form (*rūpa-āyatana*).]

According to Xuanzang's translation:

Cognition (識) arises (生) from its own seeds (自種) (i.e., the seeds of the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*] and of the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) and develops ⟨or evolves⟩ (轉) appearing as if it were an external object (似境相) (i.e., the five external objects). In order to establish the distinction of the internal sense-spheres (*āyatanas*, i.e., seeds of the seeing[-part] [*darśana-bījas*] = faculty [*indriya*]) (內處) and the external sense-spheres (*āyatanas*, i.e., actual image [*nimitta*] = five “external” objects) (外處), the Buddha (佛) said that these (two) are ten (十).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The visual cognition (*vijñapti* or *vijñāna*) appears as visible form (*rūpa*: color, shape). It arises from a seed (*bīja*) that is specific to it when the latter has come to a certain stage in its development. This seed and the thing in the aspect of

⁴⁴⁵ AKB ii, F 103.

⁴⁴⁶ *Editors:* LVP renders *yad-ābhāsā pravartate* more freely “... et la chose dont le Vijñāna prend l'aspect, ...”.

which the cognition appears (i.e., color ...) are designated by the Bhagavat as being, respectively, the sense-sphere of the eye (*cakṣur-āyatana*) and the sense-sphere of visible form (*rūpa-āyatana*) of the visual cognition, in other words, as being an eye, i.e., the source of visual cognition, as being a color, i.e., the source of visual cognition. The same for the four other cognitions, i.e., auditory, etc. (Vasubandhu's auto-commentary to *Viṃśatikā*, stanza 9: S. Lévi, F 5–6 [3b]).

The purpose of this verse (*kārikā*) [from the *Viṃśatikā*] is to show that—having in mind the establishment of the twelve sense-spheres (*āyatana*s 十二處) [and the refutation of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*) who believe in a self (*ātman*)]—the Buddha (or Bhagavat) (世尊) designates the seeds (*bījas* 種) of the five cognitions (識) by the name of sense-faculties (*indriyas* 根), i.e., the eye, etc., and the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga* 相分] (of the five cognitions) by the name of objects (*viṣaya* 境), i.e., color [visible form], etc. – The sense-faculties (根), i.e., the eye, etc., are thus just (即) the seeds of the five cognitions.

Likewise, Dignāga in the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* (T.31.1624.0888c29) says:⁴⁴⁷

The name five *indriyas* (根) is given to the efficacies of matter (*rūpa-sāmarthya* 色功能, *bījas*) <232> that reside in the cognition (*viññāna* 識) (i.e., in the eighth cognition). These efficacies and the matter-object (*viṣaya-rūpa* 境色) have, from beginningless time (無始), been mutual (互) causes (因).

[In other words, they are causes and effects of the actual cognizings of matter (*rūpa-viññaptis*), i.e., of the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) and of the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*).]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The efficacies of matter (*rūpa*), having reached the stage of maturity (*paripāka*), bring forth—in the actual cognition (*viññāna*)—the five matter-objects (*viṣaya-rūpas*). The latter, in their turn, generate—in the eighth cognition—the five *indriya*-efficacies which are efficacies of matter (*rūpa*). According to one's point of view, these two kinds of matter are either identical with or not identical ... with the eighth cognition.

What should be understood by the matter-objects (*viṣaya-rūpas*) which are generated by the efficacies of matter (*rūpa*), and which, in their turn, regenerate these efficacies? *Viṣaya-rūpa* = matter which is the object of cognition. Dignāga considers the image

⁴⁴⁷ *Viṃśatikā*, 2/16r.

of matter (*rūpa-nimitta*) into which the *viññāna* develops; this image is immediately the cause of a *viññāna* as seeing (i.e., the seeing of matter [*rūpa-darśana*], the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]).

The meaning of [Dīgnāga's] verse (*kārikā*) is as follows: In the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-viññāna* 異熟識), there occur efficacies (or seeds [*bījas* 種子]) which engender the “cognizing of matter” (*rūpa-viññapti* 色識) by the eye, etc., [i.e., which engender an actual cognition (*viññāna*) that develops as color, sound, etc.,] (and which are called “efficacies of matter”) (色功能). This cognition is thus called “cognition of matter” (*rūpa-viññāna* 色識); [it is called “by the eye” when it develops as color, “by the ear” when it develops as sound ...].

The efficacies in question, or seeds (*bījas*), are given the name of “five sense-faculties” (*indriyas* 根). There is no eye, ear, etc., separate from these seeds.

These seeds (種) (i.e., the seeds of the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga-bījas*]) and the cognition of matter (*rūpa-viññāna* 色識) (i.e., the actual seeing-part) constantly function (常) as causes (因) for each other (互): {4/15v.} for the actual seeing-part—itsself a fruit of seeds—perfumes the eighth cognition and is the cause of seeds, (for the perfuming (能熏) and the seeds (種) alternate (遞) as causes (因)).

#1136 B. The seventh and the eighth cognition do not have this distinct simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya*),⁴⁴⁸ for, due to their own great power (自力勝), they develop in a continuous series (恒相續轉).

#1137 C. The sixth, i.e., mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), occurs (*utpadyate*) necessarily due to (要託) *manas* (末那) [i.e., the seventh cognition (#1108)] which serves as its distinct simultaneous support (別有此依). <233>

D.B.A.2.2. *Opinion of Sthiramati*

#1140 The above opinion is unacceptable, (since it conflicts with both reason (理) and teachings (教)).

A. Concerning the first five cognitions (*viññānas*).

1. If the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根) are none other than (即) the seeds (*bījas*) of the five cognitions (五識), there will be confusion (雜亂) with the seeds (種) of the eighteen sense-elements (*dhātus*) (十八界).

#1145 Now, in many places (處處) (e.g., YBh, T.30.1579.0846c), the noble teachings (聖教)

⁴⁴⁸ Editors: I.e., the mental cognition, see #1134.

say that the eighteen sense-elements each have their own distinct seeds (別有種).

#1146 2. Moreover, the seeds (種) of the five cognitions (五識) are diverse: some generate the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分), others generate the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分). Which are the seeds that you say are the material sense-faculties (根), i.e., the eye (眼), etc.?

a. Are they seeds of the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga-bījas* 見分種)? No, for in this hypothesis, the sense-faculties would be included in the aggregate of cognition (*vijñāna-skandha* 識蘊).

b. Are they seeds of the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga-bījas* 相分種)? No, for in this hypothesis, the sense-faculties would be included in the external (sense-spheres) (*bāhya-āyatana* 外處).

But (either case contradicts (違)) the noble teachings (YBh, T.30.1579.0596b, 0602a) {4/16r.} according to which the five sense-faculties (五根), i.e., the eye, etc., are the aggregate of matter (*rūpa-skandha* 色蘊), are included in the internal (sense-spheres) (*ādhyātmika-āyatana* 內處).

#1147 3. Moreover, if the five sense-faculties (五根) were (identical with (即)) the seeds (種) (of the [corresponding] five cognitions (五識)), then the five sense-faculties would be the “condition qua cause” (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣) (of the five cognitions). Then we should not say that they are the “condition qua dominance” (*adhipati-pratyaya* 增上緣) (YBh, 54, 5; *Samuccaya-śāstra*, 5).

#1148 4. Moreover, if the nose (鼻) and tongue (舌) sense-faculties (根) were (identical with (即)) the seeds (種) of the two cognitions (識), i.e., of odor and of taste, then the nose and tongue would only exist in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界); or else, the two cognitions, i.e., of odor and taste, would exist throughout (通) the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu* 色界). – Two hypotheses contradicted by the noble teachings.⁴⁴⁹

The same difficulty would arise if the sense-faculties (根) of eye, ear and body (眼耳身) were (identical with (即)) the seeds of the three cognitions, i.e., visual, auditory and tactile, for these three cognitions exist in two stages (or realms) (界) (i.e., the realm of desire and the first meditation [*dhyāna*]), whereas these three sense-faculties exist in five stages (地) (i.e., realm of desire and the four meditations).⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁹ Compare AKB i, verses 46f. (F 98f.; see also F 55ff.).

⁴⁵⁰ AKB viii, F 162–164.

- #1149 5. Moreover, the seeds of the five cognitions can be throughout (通) good (善) or bad (惡). Thus, the five material sense-faculties (五色根) would not—as the teachings say (*Samuccaya-sāstra*, 4, 20)—be exclusively (唯) non-defined (無記).
- #1150 6. Moreover, the seeds of the five cognitions are not “appropriated” (*upātta* 執受); <234> the five sense-faculties (五根),⁴⁵¹ if they were these seeds, would also not be “appropriated”.⁴⁵² {4/16v.}
- #1151 7. Moreover, if the five material sense-faculties are the seeds of the five cognitions, then we would have to think that *manas* (末那) (i.e., the sense-faculty of mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*]) would be (identical with (即)) the seeds of mental cognition (意識種), for this *manas* is to mental cognition what the five sense-faculties (五根) are to the five cognitions.
- #1152 8. Moreover, YBh (T.30.1579.0279a; also *juan* 83) attributes three “supports” (*āśraya* 依) to visual cognition (*vijñāna*), etc. – (If the five material sense-faculties were only (即) the seeds of the five cognitions, e.g.,) if the eye were (identical with) the seed (*bīja*) of the visual cognition, then the [five cognitions] would have only two supports (依) (see #1134).
- #1153 9. Moreover, the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0695c) says that the five sense-faculties, i.e., the eye, etc., are both actual *dharmas* (現) and seeds (種). (To conceive them only as seeds is in contradiction with all the noble teachings (聖教).)
- #1155 However, the above objections (過難) of Sthiramati⁴⁵³ can be avoided by adhering to the thesis: (Within the cognition that is retribution (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識),) “the five material sense-faculties (五色根) are seeds (*bījas*)”—not the seeds that are cause, i.e., condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣), that immediately engender (*jan* 生) the seeds of the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) (五識種)—but the seeds brought forth by action (*karma-bījas* 業種)⁴⁵⁴ that are the “condition qua dominance” (*adhipati-pratyaya*) (增上), that bring forth (*abhinirvart* 感) the five cognitions (五識). – This theory excellently agrees (妙符) with the two stanzas (頌)

⁴⁵¹ AKB i, verse 34d (F 62f.).

⁴⁵² Kuiji (*Shuji*, T.43.1830.0382a29) cites YBh (T.30.1579.0609c20): “The five [sense-faculties (*indriyas*)] and one part of the ‘dusts’ (i.e., internal sense-sphere [*ādhyātmika āyatana*]) are appropriated (*upātta*); the rest is not appropriated”. – For *upātta*, see #0952; AKB i, F 63; iv, F 28; *Vyākhyā*, i, p. 27.

⁴⁵³ Dharmapāla, explaining the *Viṃśatikā*, Kuiji, *Shuji* 4B/74.

⁴⁵⁴ Seeds brought forth by action (*karma-bījas*), see *Siddhi* F 92. – Also actual action (*karman*).

(*Viṃśatikā* and *Ālambana-parīkṣā*, #1135) and is in harmony (善順) with YBh (#1152). Moreover, it is safe from the preceding criticisms. {4/17r.}

#1156 According to Sthiramati, this reply (is empty words (虛言) that) have no real meaning (實義), and this for ten reasons:

1. the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根) would not be non-defined (無記);

2–4. moreover, they would not be exclusively “appropriated” (*upātta* 執受), not be exclusively included in the aggregate of matter (*rūpa-skandha* 色蘊), and not be exclusively internal sense-spheres (*ādhyātmika-āyatana* 內處);

5. the nose (鼻) and the tongue (舌) would belong only to the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界); the three sense-faculties, i.e., the eye, ear and body, would not belong to the first five stages (五地);

6. the action (*karman* 業) that brings forth (感) mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) would be the *manas* (末那) (because—according to the analogy of the five sense-faculties—just as the five sense-faculties are seeds brought forth by action [*karma-bījas*], so *manas*, i.e., the support of mental cognition, would be action [*karman*]); <235>

7. the five sense-faculties, i.e., the eye, etc., would not be both actual *dharma*s (現) and seeds (*bījas* 種);

8. moreover, they would not be “material sense-faculties” (*rūpīndriya* 色根), i.e., the eye, etc.;

9. moreover, if the five cognitions (識) were brought forth by action (*karman*) (業所感), they would be exclusively non-defined (一向無記): but we know that they are also good, etc.;⁴⁵⁵

10. the five cognitions—when being good (善), etc.—are not brought forth by action (非業感); thus, they could not have the five sense-faculties, i.e., the eye, etc., as simultaneous support (俱有依).

⟨Thus, this statement (所言) [that the sense-faculties are seeds (*bījas*) brought forth by action (#1155)] is not a good defense (善救).⟩

#1157 Sthiramati continues: – Moreover, the noble teachings [i.e., *Samdhi-nirmocana*, T16.0676.0692b] repeatedly say {4/17v.} that “the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*

⁴⁵⁵ If one replies: “Although the eye is seed brought forth by action (*karma-bīja*), i.e., the action (*karman*) not yet being ripe, the cognition (*vijñāna*) (which the eye brings forth) is not exclusively non-defined”, we say: “The cognitions, when being good, etc., ...”.

阿賴耶識) develops (*pariṇamati* 變) as what appears (似) as material sense-faculties (色根), as “material” (*rūpa*) support of the sense-faculties (*indriya-āśraya-āyatana* 根依處) and as receptacle world” (*bhājana-loka* 器世間) (#0547). How can you deny (撥) the existence of the material sense-faculties (色根)? To affirm (許) that the cognition (*viññāna*) of the eye, etc., develops as what appears (似) as color, etc., but to deny that the eye, etc., is a development of the store-cognition (藏識所變), is to be profoundly (深) mistaken (迷謬) about the *ālaya* and the seeds (*bījas*), and to contradict the teachings (教) and reason (理).

#1158 Without a doubt, the stanzas of the *Viṃśatikā* and of the *Samdhi-nirmocana* say that the seeds (*bījas* 種子) or “efficacies” (*sāmarthya*, *śakti* 功能) are given the name of five sense-faculties (*indriyas* 五根), but they express themselves in this way in order to dismiss the doctrine (Sautrāntika, etc.) that holds that there are real (實) material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根) separate from mind (*viññāna-vyatirekin* 離識). These stanzas do not teach that the material sense-faculties (色根) are ⟨identical with (即)⟩ the seeds of cognition (*viññāna-bījas* 識種), are ⟨identical with (即)⟩ the seeds brought forth by action (*karma-bījas* 業種); they refer figuratively (假名) by the name of seed (*bīja* 種子) and “efficacies of matter (*rūpa*) (色功能)” to that which, in fact, consists of the developments of *ālaya* (識所變) appearing as eye faculty, as ear faculty, ...: because these developments have the function (用) of bringing forth and generating (發生) the five cognitions (*viññānas*).

#1159 B. Concerning mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*).

[Sthiramati continues:] – The clear (*paṭu* 明了) mental cognition (意識)—when being directed (緣) at the five objects (境)—must have the five cognitions as simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya* 俱有依), {4/18r.} for it must be simultaneous (俱) with these five cognitions [: lacking which, it would not be clear]. If mental cognition does not have the five cognitions, i.e., visual, etc., as support (依), it will not be the support of the five cognitions, for the five [cognitions] and mental cognition have equal power (勢力), etc., in mutually supporting each other. (See #1179.) <236>

#1160 C. Concerning the seventh cognition.

[Sthiramati continues:] – Moreover, although the seventh cognition is never interrupted, nevertheless, since it is transformed (轉易) by the path of insight (見道), etc. (see #1417), it should have, like the first six cognitions, a simultaneous support (俱有依). In the contrary hypothesis, like the eighth cognition, it

would not be included in the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識). But the noble teachings (YBh, T.30.1579.0651b, etc.) say that the evolving cognitions are seven in number (#1116, #1181). – Let us conclude that the seventh cognition has a simultaneous support, namely, the actual (現行) store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 第八識), not the seeds (*bījas*) of the eighth.

According to YBh (T.30.1579.0580b15), (*Samgraha* T.31.1598.0390c02):

Manas (末那) exists (you 有) because the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) exists (有); mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) exists (*zhuan* 轉) with *manas* (末那) for its support (依).⁴⁵⁶

This treatise means to say: “*Manas* (末那) exists by taking the actual store-cognition (現行藏識) for its support (依止), {4/18v.} not due to the seeds (*bījas* 種) of the store-cognition”. If it were otherwise, the *sūtra* would say: “mental cognition (意識) exists (有) because the store-cognition (藏識) exists (得轉)”. [The store-cognition contains the seeds of *manas* and of mental cognition: if *manas* derives from its seeds contained in the store-cognition without relying on the actual store-cognition, one would need to accept, in the same way, that mental cognition derives from its seeds and does not rely on *manas*.]

#1161 Thus, Nanda, the first teacher, contradicts both the teachings (教) and reason (理).
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⁴⁵⁶ Literally: “*Manas* comes to be (you 有, *bhavati* ?) ...; mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) functions (*zhuan* 轉 *pravartate*) ...”. But, as we see in Kuiji, there is no difference in terms of meaning between the two expressions.

The text continues: “Just as the five cognitions (*vijñāna-kāyas*) exist by taking the five sense-faculties (*indriyas*) for their support (*āśraya*) and do not exist when the five sense-faculties are missing” (page 677 of the Japanese edition).

If the first masters say: “The meaning of this text is that the seeds (*bījas*) [of the sixth which are in the eighth] are the support, and not that an actual cognition (*vijñāna*) is the support”, the text should say: “The sixth exists due to the existence of the *ālaya*”. Why is the sixth said to exist due to an intermediate member, i.e., not in an immediate way, to the eighth? Why is the order eighth-seventh-sixth established? If the first masters say: “When the seeds of the sixth generate the actual sixth cognition, they generate it only in conformity with the seeds of the seventh; the latter are thus its support, therefore the text teaches a mediate procession”, that is not correct. According to the analogy with the five sense-faculties and the five cognitions, the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) should have a special sense-faculty (*indriya*).

The Abhidharma says: “The visual cognition (*caṅśur-vijñāna*) relies on the eye, depends on the eye; the eye is called *vijñāna-āyatana* (sense-sphere of cognition)”.

#1162 Thus, in brief, [Sthiramati] states:

1. the first five evolving cognitions (*viññānas*) (轉識) each always have two simultaneous supports (*sahabhū-āśraya* 俱有依), namely, the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根) and, at the same time, the mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識);
2. the sixth evolving cognition (*pravṛtti-viññāna* 轉識), i.e., mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*), has certainly always one simultaneous support, namely, the seventh cognition (第七識) or cogitation (*manas*); when [the sixth] is simultaneous with the five cognitions (*pañca-viññāna* 五識), (it also has the five cognitions (五識) as a simultaneous support (俱有依));⁴⁵⁷
3. the seventh evolving cognition, i.e., cogitation, has certainly only one simultaneous support, namely, the eighth cognition (第八識);
4. only the eighth cognition (—in the states of cause [*hetu-avasthā*, i.e., states of non-mastery, #1755, #3285]: i.e., non-*buddhas*—) is never subject to modifications (恆無轉變) and upholds itself (自能立): thus, it has no simultaneous support (俱有依). {4/19r.}

D.B.A.2.3. *Opinion of Śuddhacandra*

#1165 According to Śuddhacandra, this explanation is not entirely reasonable (盡理).

1. Like the other cognitions (*viññānas*), the eighth cognition is a cognition (by nature), thus it must, like the others, have a simultaneous support (俱有依). The seventh and the eighth cognitions always coexist (*saha pravartante* 恆俱轉). What is wrong in thinking that they are the support (依) of one another?
- #1166 2. The seed-cognition (*bīja-viññāna*) and the actual cognition (*viññāna*). — If one accepts that the actual cognition (現起識) has the seeds (種) for its support (依), one should also accept that the seeds (of cognition (識種)) have the actual cognition (現識) for their support (依). The cognition that perfumes (能熏) (i.e., the first seven actual cognitions) is the support of the arising (*utpāda* 生) of new seeds, of the growth (*upacaya* 長) of old seeds. The “cognition that is retribution (異熟)” (*vipāka-viññāna*) (i.e., the eighth cognition) is the support by which both [i.e., the old and new seeds] endure (*sthiti* 住). Without these supports, the seeds (of cognition (識種)) could neither arise, nor grow, nor endure (不生長住).

⁴⁵⁷ Editors: LVP has: “quand il est simultan  aux cinq Viññānas, il a en outre pour support l’organe mat riel” (...), it has, in addition, the material sense-faculty for its support).

- #1167 3. The eighth cognition and the sense-faculties (*indriyas*). – When it arises in the material realms (色界) (i.e., realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*] and realm of fine-materiality [*rūpa-dhātu* 色界]), the “cognition that is retribution” (異熟識) “takes” (*ādadāti* 執持, #0952) the body (身) and exists (*pravartate* 轉) by taking the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya* 色根) for its support (依). As the *Laṅkā-avatāra* [T.16.0671.0566c] says:

The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 阿賴耶識)—struck by the wind of actions (業風所飄)—universally (遍) relies on the sense-faculties (根), continues in a constant series (恆相).

And YBh (T.30.1579.0579b) also says:

The six cognitions, i.e., visual, etc., having each a specific support (各別依), {4/19v} do not appropriate (*upādā* 執受) the body and the material sense-faculties <238> (*rūpīndriya-kāya* 有色根身).

If the store-cognition, i.e., “cognition that is retribution” (異熟識), would not universally rely on the material sense-faculties, it would, like the six cognitions, not appropriate (執受) them, or else, the argument (所立因) of YBh (“having a specific individual support”) shows the fault (失) of inconclusiveness (不定) (see #0957, #0993).

- #1168 Let us conclude that the eighth cognition (藏識), considered as an actual cognition, necessarily has one simultaneous support (一依), namely, the seventh cognition. When it arises in a material realm (*dhātu* 有色界), it has also a second support in the material sense-faculties (色根), i.e., eye, etc. As for the seeds (*bījas* 種子) (of cognition (識)), they definitively have the actual eighth or the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) for their support. At the time when they are impregnated (熏習位) in the latter, they also have the cognition that impregnates or perfumes (能熏) for their support.

- #1169 The rest is as previously explained by Sthiramati.

D.B.A.2.4. *Opinion of Dharmapāla*

- #1171 According to Dharmapāla, this explanation (—all the above points—) is not reasonable because it does not take into account (未了) the distinction (別) between:

1. that which is supported (*sāśraya* 依);

2. that which is a support (*āśraya*, 所依).

- #1175 1. “That which is supported” or “that which relies on a support (*āśri*)” (依) refers to all *dharma*s that arise (生) and cease (滅):

All *dharma*s, indeed, arise (生) (e.g., the new seeds [*bījas*]) and endure (住) (e.g., the primordial seeds [*mūla-bījas*]) due to causes (*hetu* 因) [which are what is relied on (所仗)] (e.g., the actual cognition [*viññāna*]) and due to conditions (*pratyaya* 緣) [which are what is depended on (所託)].⁴⁵⁸

Of these causes and conditions by relying (仗) on which and dependent (託) on which the *dharma*s exist, {4/20r.} it is also said that they have a support (依).

Just as the king (王) and his ministers (臣) support one another (互相依), etc.

- #1176 2. “That which is a support” (*āśrita*, *āśraya* 所依) refers (乃是) to *dharma*s that:
- a. (are determinative) (決定);
 - b. “have an object” (*sālabhāna* 有境)⁴⁵⁹ (in contrast to the fundamental material elements [*mahā-bhūtas*], to the “dusts” [i.e., color, etc.], to the seeds [*bījas*]);
 - c. are a ruler (為主) (in contrast to the mental factors);
 - d. cause the mind (*citta* 心) and mental factors (*caittas* 心所) to seize their own object (取自所緣) (in contrast to the entire aggregate of sensation [*vedanā-skandha*] and the entire aggregate of ideation [*saṃjñā-skandha*] and one part of the aggregate of formations [*saṃskāra-skandha*]).

The *dharma*s that correspond to this <239> definition are the six “internal sense-spheres of cognition” (*ādhyātmika āyatana* 內六處), [namely, the five material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya*) and the mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya*, *mana-āyatana*)].⁴⁶⁰

Other *dharma*s [are not a support because they] do not have an object (有境), (are not determinative (定),) are not the ruler (主).

On the other hand, [the internal sense-spheres of cognition are a support and] are like a king (王), not like a minister (臣), etc.

This is why the noble teachings (YBh, T.30.1579.0602a, etc.) reserve the name of

⁴⁵⁸ Condition = all the conditions with the exception of the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*), e.g., the root-cognition (*mūla-viññāna*).

⁴⁵⁹ AKB i, F 62.

⁴⁶⁰ AKB i, F 37, 63, n., 95, ii, F 110 ...

◁“having a support” (有所依)⁴⁶¹ only for mind (心) and mental factors (心所), and do not give it to *dharma*s such as visible form (*rūpa* 色), etc., because the latter do not have an object (所緣).

This is why [the texts] only say that mind (*citta*) is the support (所依) of mental factors (*caittas*), not that the mental factors are the support of mind, because the mental factors are not a ruler (主).⁴⁶²

#1177 Undoubtedly, there is, in several texts, confusion between “that which is a support” (*āśraya* 所依) and “that which is supported” (*sāśraya* 依). They say about “that which is supported” that it is “that which is a support”; and about “that which is a support” that it is “that which is supported”. These are inaccurate figurative expressions⁴⁶³ [which we will justify by saying that, if the sense of “that which is a support” is narrow, the sense of “that which is supported” is broad (see #1176)]. {4/20v.}

#1179 The following results from the preceding:

1. As for the five cognitions (*viññānas* 五識). – They certainly have four kinds of simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya* 俱有所依):⁴⁶⁴

- a. the five material sense-faculties (色根);
- b. the sixth cognition;
- c. the seventh cognition;
- d. the eighth cognition.

The five cognitions are necessarily absent if one of the four kinds of support is absent.

⁴⁶¹ Editors: LVP translates here: “C’est pourquoi les textes ... réservent le nom de support aux Citta-caittas ...”, but Chinese has “having a support” (有所依).

⁴⁶² 1. The five sense-faculties are support (*āśraya*) and having an object (*saviṣaya*);
2. the mind is support (*āśraya*), having an object (*saviṣaya*), having a support (*sāśraya*), having an object (*sālabhāna*);
3. the mental factors are having an object (*saviṣaya*), having a support (*sāśraya*), having an object (*sālabhāna*).

As for the difference between *viṣaya* (object-field) and *ālabhāna* (cognitive object), see AKB i, F 52, 62.

⁴⁶³ Inaccurate (*suiyi* 隨宜) expressions: i.e., *sui qingyi* 隨情宜 and *sui wenyi* 隨文宜 are distinguished.

⁴⁶⁴ The five sense-faculties: *Mahāśāstra* = *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (YBh) and *Samuccaya-śāstra*; the sixth: *Samdhi-nirmocana*; the seventh: *Asvabhāva*.

The four kinds of support each show particular characteristics:⁴⁶⁵

- a. The sense-faculties are the “having-the-same-object support” (*sama-viṣaya-āśraya* 同境所依) of the five cognitions, for they have with them the same present object.
- b. Mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) is the “figurating support” (*vikalpa-āśraya*) (分別所依) of the five cognitions, [for mental cognition has the object of the five <240> cognitions, which are without figurating (*avikalpaka*), for its figured object. Mental cognition is with figurating (*savikalpaka*) and is, nevertheless, the support of the cognitions that are without conceptual figurating (意是分別為無分別依). As YBh (T.30.1579.0601b16) says:

The mind (*citta*) with figurating and the mind without figurating are directed at the same present object ... (有分別心、無分別心。當言。同緣現在境。)]

- c. Cogitation (*manas*) is the “pollution-and-purification support” (*saṃkleśa-vyavadāna-āśraya* 染淨所依) of the five cognitions, because their defilement or their purity depend on it.
- d. The eighth cognition serves as the “root support” (*mūla-āśraya* 根本所依) of the five cognitions.

#1180 Some noble teachings, such as the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0695c), only say that the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) have the five sense-faculties for their support:

- i. because the five sense-faculties (根) are the special (不共) support (依) of the five cognitions,
- ii. moreover, because the five sense-faculties necessarily have the same object (同境) as the five cognitions,
- iii. because they are close to (近) the five cognitions,
- iv. because they are aligned (相順)⁴⁶⁶ with the five cognitions. [According to AKB i, F 95, the five cognitions have the sense-faculty for their unique simultaneous support.]

⁴⁶⁵ Editors: The following is heavily glossed on the basis of *Shuji* (T.43.1830.0386b14).

⁴⁶⁶ This is a way of translating the phrase *xiangshun* 相順 = *parasparam anūkulatā*. I am inclined to understand this according to AKB i, F 95f.: “The support of cognition (*vijñāna*) is the sense-faculty, since the cognition is modified according to the modality of the sense-faculty”. But Kuiji *Shuji* (4A/94r.) has another explanation.

- #1181 2. As for the sixth cognition, i.e., the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 第六意識). – It only has two kinds of simultaneous supports (俱有所依), namely, the seventh and the eighth cognition: the mental cognition is necessarily absent if one of these two kinds of support is absent. Although, when it takes the five (simultaneously occurring) cognitions for its support, it is sharper (*paṭu* 明了) (when conceiving the object (取境)), nevertheless, the five are not determinative for its existence, and are thus not counted as its supports (所依), [even though they could be called: “support of the clarity of mental cognition”].

Some noble teachings (*Samuccaya-sāstra*) only say that mental cognition relies on the seventh cognition, [and do not mention the eighth]:

- because the seventh is the “pollution-and-purification support” (*saṃkleśa-vyavadāna-āśraya* 染淨依) of the sixth;
- because [the seventh] is included, like the sixth, among the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識);
- because [the seventh] is the close support (近) of the sixth;
- because [the seventh] is aligned (相順) with the sixth. [Like (the sixth), (the seventh) is endowed with judgment (*nīṭraṇa*); it infects the sixth by defiled beliefs (*kliṣṭa-grāhas*), etc.]

- #1182 3. As for the seventh, i.e., cogitation (*manas*) (第七意識). {4/21r.} – It has only one kind of simultaneous support (俱有所依), <241> namely, the eighth cognition, i.e., the common support. There definitively is no cogitation if the eighth cognition (藏識) is absent. As a verse of the *Lankāvatāra* says:

ālayaṃ hi samāśritya mano vai saṃpravartate |
cittaṃ manaś ca saṃśritya vijñānaṃ saṃpravartate ||

Manas (末那) is active (轉) by relying on the *ālaya* (阿賴耶);

Cognition (*vijñāna* 識) (i.e., the other evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñānas*]) is active by relying on the *citta* (心) (i.e., on the *ālaya*) and on cogitation (*manas* 意).

- #1183 4. As for the eighth cognition (阿賴耶識). – It has also only one kind of simultaneous support (俱有所依), that is, the seventh cognition; there (definitively is no eighth cognition) without this support, (i.e., if this cognition is absent). Indeed, YBh (T.30.1579.0651b) says:

The *ālaya* (藏識) is always (恒) simultaneously active (*saṃpravartate*)

(俱時轉) with *manas* (末那).

Moreover, [Asaṅga, *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0136a),] says:

The store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) always relies (恒依) on the defiled (染污).

⟨This refers to the *manas* (末那),⟩ [i.e., by “the defiled”, one should understand *manas*].

This treatise (*śāstra*), it is true, also teaches that *manas* (末那) is absent in three states (三位) (i.e.: [a] in the *arhat*, [b] during the attainment of cessation [*nirodha-samāpatti*], [c] in the course of the supramundane path [*lokottara-mārga*], see #1385): we should understand that, in these three cases, only the defiled (or obscured) (*nivṛta* 有覆) *manas* is absent, [and not that the seventh cognition is absent].

Likewise, it is said that the store-cognition (阿賴耶) is absent in four states (四位) ([a] hearer [*śrāvaka*], [b] self-enlightened one (*pratyekabuddha*), [c] non-retrogressing *bodhisattva*, [d] *tathāgata*): {4/21v.} but the eighth cognition is not absent. (See #0726.) This is so also here [i.e., in the case of *manas*].

Although when the eighth cognition arises in a material realm (色界) (i.e., the realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*] or the realm of fine-materiality [*rūpa-dhātu*]), it also has the five material sense-faculties for its support (依), nevertheless, this type of support is not determinative for the eighth cognition, ⟨i.e., they do not definitively exist and therefore are not considered to be its support (所依)⟩.

As for the seeds (*bījas* 種) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) (in other words, as for the seed-cognition [*bīja-vijñāna* 識種], see #0736), they do not presently take their own object (現取自境), [they do not bring it about that the mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*) take an object]. Thus, they do not fit into the definition of “that which is a support” (所依, #1176); they belong in the category of “that which is supported” (有依).

- #1184 5. As for the associated (*samprayukta* 相應) *dharmas*. – Every associated *dharma* or mental factor (*caitta* 心所) has the cognition (*vijñāna* 識) with which it is associated—plus (加) the support or the supports associated with this cognition (自相應之心)—for its support (所依).

- #1185 These definitions excellently conform with the teachings and reason. <242>

D.B.A.3. Support that constitutes the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya-āśraya*) and the opening and guiding support (*krānta-āśraya*)⁴⁶⁷

- 3.1. Opinion of Nanda; #1187
- 3.2. Opinion of Sthiramati; #1193
- 3.3. Opinion of Dharmapāla; #1215

D.B.A.3.1. Opinion of Nanda

- #1187 1. 〈With regard to the “opening and guiding support” (開導依), [Nanda] is of the opinion (義) that〉 the five cognitions (*viññānas*) do not form a series (相續) of successive moments, either each in their own kind or amongst one another, <#1188> since they must be led (i.e., induced-engendered 引生) by mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 第六識). The latter is thus the only “support that opens the path for them and guides them” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依).⁴⁶⁸ [These cognitions are moments (*kṣaṇa*) and are followed by moments of mental cognition; a moment of visual cognition does not follow a moment of visual cognition or of auditory cognition, but it follows a moment of mental cognition, which brings back a moment of visual cognition ...]
- #1189 2. The sixth cognition, or mental cognition, forms 〈a series by itself (自相續)〉, i.e., a series of moments of mental cognition; in addition, it can also be led (引生) by the five cognitions; thus, it has the first six cognitions as its “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya*). {4/22r.}
- #1190 3. The seventh and eighth cognitions [also] form a series by themselves, but they are not led by the other cognitions; thus, they have 〈only their own kind〉, i.e., the seventh and the eighth, respectively, as their “opening and guiding support”.

⁴⁶⁷ The condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*) is studied at #2446, Kuiji, *Shuji* (7B/53v.).

The word *sama* is susceptible to various interpretations. It can be understood as “of the same kind”, visual cognition and visual cognition It can be understood as quantitative similarity: “In the present group, one mind (*citta*), one sensation (*vedanā*) ..., the same also later”.

anantara = “immediate”, see #1215–#1229.

⁴⁶⁸ See #1120. – A moment gives place to the following moment, opening the path for it; in addition, it brings it about or attracts it, it guides it.

The moment preceding *nirvāṇa* opens the path to a following moment, but does not attract this moment.

D.B.A.3.2. *Opinion of Sthiramati*

#1193 〈According to Sthiramati, the previous opinion is not completely reasonable.〉

#1196 A. Concerning the first five cognitions (*vijñānas*) (前五識).

Nanda's opinion is correct as far as the first five [cognitions] are concerned: (1) in the state of non-mastery [of the path] (未自在位), [(2) in the case of the sudden encounter with the object,] (3) in the case of the encounter with a mediocre (or non-eminent) object (遇非勝境).

[But there is a need to examine:

1. the state of mastery (#1198);
2. the five (cognitions) of equal outflow (*niṣyanda*, 等流) <243> that are distinguished from the five “automatic” (*sāhasa* ?, 率爾, or 卒爾⁴⁶⁹) (cognitions) (#1200);
3. the powerful objects (#1204).]

#1198 1. In the state of mastery (自在位)—this concerns *buddhas* (佛) and *bodhi-sattvas* of the last three stages who possess mastery with regard to objects (於境自在)—the activity (用) of the sense-faculties (*indriya* 根) is interchangeable (互); it is spontaneous (*svarasena* 任運, i.e., without conceptual figuring [*vikalpa*]), “decisive” (決定):⁴⁷⁰ free of figuring inquiring (*paryeṣaṇā* 尋求). Could it be said that these five cognitions (*vijñānas*) do not form a series under these conditions?

#1200 2. [In contrast to the five cognitions aroused by the encounter with the object,] the five cognitions of equal outflow (等流五識) are led (引生) by the power (勢力) of mental application (*manaskāra* 作意) of “decisiveness” (決定), of a defiled (染) or pure (淨) mental application, [i.e., mental applications that are mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)]: these five cognitions [along with mental cognition] apply themselves (*samavadhā* 專注) to the object (所緣). [Just as when one contemplates an image of the Buddha: mental cognition and visual cognition have the image for their object.] Neither mental cognition nor visual cognition stop (for an instant (頃)).⁴⁷¹ Why not accept that this is a series (相續) of numerous (多) moments of visual cognition?⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁹ AKB 18/15r.1 [iv, F 242].

⁴⁷⁰ See #0210. There are many equivalents: *vyavasāya*, *nirṇaya*, *niścaya*, *niyama*.

⁴⁷¹ There are: *wei neng she qing* 未能捨頃 glossed as *wei xiu du lai* 未休觀來.

⁴⁷² Kuiji, *Shuji* (5A/4v.).

#1201 Thus, YBh (T.30.1579.0280a24) establishes the details of this process:

[An “automatic” mind which is visual cognition; a mind of “inquiring” (*paryeṣanā* ?) which is mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) (see #1206); a non-defined mind of “decisiveness” (ascertainment ?) which is mental cognition;] after the mind of decisiveness, there occurs a defiled (染) or pure (淨) mind which is mental cognition (決定心): {4/22v.} subsequent to this mind, there occurs a good (善) or bad (不善) visual cognition of equal outflow (*niṣyanda* 等流, i.e., of the same ethical nature) enters into activity (轉).

But not by the power of its own figurating (*vikalpa*) (自分別力) since it is led by mental cognition (意). As long as this mental cognition (意) does not turn (趣) towards another object (境), the two cognitions (識), i.e., mental (意) and visual (眼), form a good (善) or defiled (染) series (相續而轉) during a prolonged period of time (經爾所時).

⟨Just as with visual cognition,⟩ the same for the auditory cognition, etc., ⟨up to the tactile cognition (身識)⟩. <244>

#1202 This text is thus clearly meant to show that visual cognition (眼識) and mental cognition (意識) both form a series (俱相續轉) during a prolonged period of time (經爾所時). Since mental cognition is not absent at the time when visual cognition is active, it cannot be said that the two cognitions (*vijñānas*) together form a series by generating each other alternately (互相續生).

#1204 3. The continuous presence (相續現前) of a powerful object (增盛境) (*udbhūta-vṛtti-viṣaya-saṃtāna-saṃmukhī-bhāva*) crushes and ravishes (逼奪) body (身) and mind (心) which become incapable of slipping away for even a moment (暫捨). At such a time, the five cognitions (i.e., *vijñāna-kāyas* 五識身) then necessarily form a series. {4/23r.} This is what happens in the hot hells (熱地獄) (by means of the powerful activity [*udbhūta-vṛttitva*] of fire) and among the *Kṛdā-pradūṣikas* (戲忘天), ⟨i.e., the gods who are spoiled by amusements⟩.⁴⁷³

#1205 YBh (T.30.1579.0584c01) (see #1229) says:

If those six cognitions “there” are the condition qua immediate ante-

⁴⁷³ According to YBh, 54, the four higher gods of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*); according to *Vibhāṣā*, 199, 15, the Thirty-three or the gods of the terraces of Meru (*Meru-pariṣaṇḍas*) (see AKB ii, F 219; iii, F 159). – The Pāli form is *Khiddāpadosika*, *Dīgha*, i, 19.

cedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣) of these six cognitions “here”, they are given the name of mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya* 意根).

#1206 Nanda thinks that the five cognitions are “intercepted”, i.e., that nothing but mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) appears between all the moments of the five cognitions, (i.e., before and after (前後)): if that were so, the treatise (*śāstra* 論) should define the mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya*) by saying: “If this single cognition ‘there’ (i.e., mental cognition) is the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣) of those six cognitions ‘here’, it is given the name mental sense-faculty”, or else: “If these six cognitions ‘there’ are the condition qua immediate antecedent of this single cognition ‘here’ (i.e., mental cognition), they are given the name mental sense-faculty”. (Since this is not so, we know that) the wording that YBh adopts shows that the five cognitions form a series (相續), [that one moment of visual cognition is the condition qua immediate antecedent to a moment of visual cognition].

B. Concerning mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識).

#1208 1. When the five cognitions arise, a moment of mental cognition is necessarily present. This moment induces (弓) the subsequent moment (後念) of mental cognition and causes it to arise. It is not the five cognitions that are the “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依) of this second moment. <245>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

YBh, 3: “The five cognitions (*vijñānas*) come into activity (*pravartante*) after (*anu*) the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)”.

Pramāṇa-samuccaya: “Mental cognition exists at the same time as the five cognitions; this mental cognition induces the second mental cognition (of inquiring [*paryeṣaṇā*])”.

#1209 2. In the states (位) without mind (*acittaka-avasthā* 無心, i.e., sleep [睡眠], faint [悶絕], etc.), mental cognition (意識) {4/23v.} is interrupted (斷). When it re-arises later, it has the eighth cognition (藏識) and the seventh cognition (末那), which form an ever-continuous series (恒相續), for its “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依).

Nanda thinks that—after the states free of mind—mental cognition has the past moment of its nature (*sabhāga* 自類 [homogeneous] = the mental cognition previous to the state free of mind) for its “opening and guiding support” (開導). Why does Nanda not hold the same theory for the five cognitions that re-arise

after having been interrupted? If this theory is not true for the five cognitions, it is not true for mental cognition.

C. Concerning the seventh and the eighth cognitions (*viññānas*).

#1210 1. When the *manas* (末那) arises, for the first time, associated with the knowledge of equality (*samatā-jñāna* 平等性智, #3266), this is certainly due to the sixth or mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*). It has thus mental cognition for its “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依) (#1417).

#1211 2. Likewise, it is with the sixth and seventh cognitions as “opening and guiding support” that the pure (*vimala*) eighth cognition (第八淨識) arises, (for the first time,) associated with the mirror knowledge (圓鏡智) (#0741, #3265).

Moreover, the *Samgraha* (third *juan*) teaches that the “mind that is retribution” (*vipāka-citta* 異熟心), [in the case of ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*), etc.,] is supported (依) by the defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas* 染污意), (i.e., by the seventh cognition according to Vasubandhu, by the sixth cognition according to Asvabhāva); or that [—in the case of *bodhisattvas* within certain conditions—] it is supported by a good mind (善心) associated with compassion and with a resolution (*karuṇā-praṇidhi* 悲願). – Thus, in certain cases, the eighth cognition has also the sixth and the seventh cognitions for its “opening and guiding support” (開導依). {4/24r.}

#1212 In conclusion. – What was said by the first masters is not completely reasonable (未究理):

#1213 1. The five cognitions (*viññānas*) (五識) have any one among the first six cognitions for their “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依): [in fact, either they form a series of the same kind or they are led by a cognition of another kind];

2. the sixth or mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*) (第六意識) <246> has the preceding mental cognition (前自類) or—after the states without mind—the seventh and eighth cognitions for its “opening and guiding support”;

3. the seventh (第七) (or *manas* (末那)) has the preceding seventh (前自類) or the sixth (cognition for its “opening and guiding support”);

4. the eighth (or the retaining cognition (*ādāna-viññāna* 阿陀那識)) has the preceding eighth (前自類) and the sixth and seventh (第六七) (for its “opening and guiding support”).

⟨All of this does not contradict reason, as has been argued before.⟩

D.B.A.3.3. *Opinion of Dharmapāla*

#1215 〈According to Dharmapāla, what was said by〉 Sthiramati is also not reasonable.

#1217 Which *dharma*s, indeed, can be the “support that opens-guides” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依)?

1. *Dharma*s which “have an object” (*sālabhāna* 有緣法: thus, neither matter (*rūpa*), nor the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas*) nor the unconditioned factors [*asaṃskṛtas*]);
2. those which are rulers (主) (thus excluding the mental factors);
3. those which fit the definition of the “condition qua the [similar (*sama* = *sabhāga*) and] immediate antecedent” (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣) (thus excluding dissimilar *dharma*s).

The *dharma*s that show these characteristics—namely, the previous moments of mind-as-ruler—are, with regard to the minds (心) and mental factors (心所) that follow them, called “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依) because they open [the path] for them, attract-guide them [in such a way that they arise] (開導引導). {4/24v.} This refers only to minds, not to mental factors, to matter, etc.

#1219 If that (i.e., the previous moment of mind-as-ruler) does not arise simultaneously (俱起) with this (i.e., the subsequent moment of mind or of mental factors), it can be said that the former, with regard to the latter, has the power of opening-guiding (開導力).

In one and the same individual (一身), the eight cognitions can arise simultaneously (俱起). But how could a different kind (*visabhāga* 異類) of cognition be the “opening and guiding support” (開導依) of a different cognition? If one maintains that it can be the “opening and guiding support” (依), the obvious conclusion is that different cognitions must not arise simultaneously, (and thus minds (心) do not arise together (並生),) which is a doctrine of another school (異部), i.e., the Little Vehicle (Sarvāstivādin).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji (*Shuji*, 5A/12v7): The Sarvāstivādins say that—mind (*citta*) forming an obstacle to mind—the six cognitions cannot arise at the same time. Thus, they are led to say that a cognition of a certain kind is the immediate antecedent of a cognition of another kind. – Nevertheless, some Ābhidhārmikas, who are called Sāṃtāna-sabhāgikas, say: “A *dharma* is only the condition qua immediate antecedent (*sam-*

anantara-pratyaya) of a similar (*sabhāga*) *dharma*: mind (*citta*) and mind, sensation (*vedanā*) and sensation”.

Cf. AKB ii, F 302. – Notice that the source of AKB, i.e., *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0050c), <247> has it that these scholars define the “near condition qua immediate antecedent” in this way.

#1221 Moreover, in one and the same individual, different cognitions (*viññānas* 識) arise simultaneously (俱起), in great or small number (多少), without being definitive (定) in this regard. If one maintains that they are the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣) amongst each other, matter (*rūpa*), etc., will also be the condition qua immediate antecedent of matter. (That would contradict the noble teachings) (*Bodhisattva-bhūmi*) that say that only mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas* 心心所) are the condition qua immediate antecedent.

#1222 It is true that the *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0137a) says that matter (*rūpa* 色) also is the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣). But this statement is meant “as a concession” (縱奪言): the *Samgraha*, lowering itself to the Little Vehicle (小乘),^a concedes (假縱) that the previous matter (*rūpa* 色) is the condition qua immediate antecedent of the subsequent mind (*citta* 心) {4/25r.} in order to remove (奪) the even more erroneous thesis that it is its condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣).

If not, [i.e., if the statement of] the *Samgraha* is taken literally, the prefix *sam* (等, in *samanantara*, which signifies *sama*, i.e., equal and similar) would have no *raison d'être* (or would be useless) (無用).

If the first master says that this prefix *sam* (等) does not preclude (遮) quantitative (多少) equality but affirms (表) only qualitative (*sabhāga*) (同類) equality, he is contradicting (違) his own thesis (汝執) that the different, (i.e., different kinds of cognition (異類識),) is the condition qua immediate antecedent of the different, [i.e., different kinds of cognition].⁴⁷⁴

^a A type of Sautrāntika (see *Siddhi* F 221).

Kuiji (*Shuji* 5A/14r.–v.), which should be translated in full:

Lowering itself to the Little Vehicle: the *sthaviranikāye sūtranikāyācāryāḥ*

⁴⁷⁴ AKB ii, F 300 (according to the second masters of the *Vibhāṣā*, 11, 4): The prefix *sam* is intended in the sense of equality. Consequently, mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) alone are the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*), for, in regard to the *dharma*s of matter (*rūpa*), there is no equality between cause and fruit ...

(= *sautrāntika-ācāryāḥ*). – Not accepting the eighth cognition, they make matter (*rūpa*) the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of mind (*citta*).

A commentary:

The Sautrāntikas first (*xian* 先 = *pūrvam*) maintained that—when the *arhat* enters into the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*)—the fleshly matter (*rūpa*) which is in the breast (*hṛdaye māṃsa-rūpa*) “includes” (*parigrah*) the seed (*bīja*) of the subsequent mind that appears suddenly when emerging from the attainment (*samāpatti*). From that, we thus know that the *dharma*s of matter are the condition qua cause. – Now, the Great Vehicle, in order to remove this doctrine that matter is the condition qua cause, says, in the way of a concession, that it is the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*).

Samgraha, commented on by Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0396b).

#1223 In conclusion: each of the eight cognitions (*viññānas*) is the “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依) <248> of *dharma*s of its own type only; this thesis closely conforms (深契) with the teachings (教) and with reason (理), for *dharma*s of the same type do necessarily not arise at the same time (俱起).

It is the same for the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) as for the cognitions (*viññānas*).

Five difficulties:

#1225 1. Although one mind (*citta* 心) and some mental factors (*caittas* 心所) of different kinds (異類) (sensation [*vedanā*], ideation [*saṃjñā*], etc.) arise together (並生): [nevertheless, the mind-as-ruler is the “condition qua immediate antecedent” (*samanantara-pratyaya*) of the mind and mental factors, and conversely].

[How is that?]

The mind and the mental factors, although of different types, are in fact associated with each other (*saṃprayukta* 互相應); they are combined into a kind of unity (和合似一 = closely related as if being one); they definitively arise and cease at the same time (俱生滅); they necessarily are of the same nature (in terms of activity) (事業) (good, bad, non-defined); when the mind (一) “opens and guides” (開導), the mental factors (餘) also open and guide. [Such are not the relationships of different minds (*cittas*) or cognitions (*viññānas*).] {4/25v.} Thus, the fact that mental factors of different kinds are the condition qua immediate antecedent (等無間緣) among themselves does not prove that the same holds for minds or cognitions (識).

- #1226 2. However, mental factors (心所) are not the “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依), because they are not rulers (主) with regard to the *dharma*s that are made to arise (所引生). [Indeed, only that which is a ruler is a support (*āśraya*).]
- #1227 3. [Why not accept that the various mental factors, i.e., sensation (*vedanā*), etc., are the support with regard to *dharma*s of their own kind? Why make cognition (*viññāna*) the support of the mental factors?] – If each of the mind and mental factors is the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣) of its own kind only (i.e., mind [*citta*] of mind, sensation (*vedanā*) of sensation, etc.), at the time of the ⟨first⟩ “transmutation” (*parāvṛtti* 轉依, #3180) of the seventh and eighth cognitions, this kind of condition (*pratyaya* 緣) will be absent (闕) for faith (信) and for the other good mental factors. Now, this contradicts the noble teachings which say that mind and mental factors arise from four conditions (四緣).
- #1228 4. Although mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識) is interrupted (斷) in the states (位) without mind (無心) (*acittaka-avasthā*), ⟨sleep (睡眠), faint (悶絕), etc.⟩ nevertheless, when it resumes, it has the preceding moment of its own kind, i.e., the last preceding moment of mental cognition, for its “opening and guiding support” (*krānta-āśraya* 開導依). – Likewise for the five cognitions (識) ⟨when they are interrupted (間斷)⟩: what is called “immediate and similar antecedent” (無間) (*samanantara-pratyaya*) is not the immediately preceding moment and is not of another kind <249> (*citta-nirantara*); it is the last moment of the same kind: the moment that is not separated by a moment of the same kind.⁴⁷⁵
- [But at what time does this preceding moment fulfill the role of support? In fact, the past does not exist.] – At the time when this moment was present (今) and was about to cease (滅), it is from then on the ⟨opening and guiding (開導)⟩ support of the future *dharma*. Why go to so much trouble (煩) to establish that different types (異類) can be the “opening and guiding support” (開導依)? {4/26r.}
- #1229 5. It is true that the noble teachings say that the first six cognitions induce (引起) one another, or that the seventh and eighth cognitions arise by relying on the sixth and the seventh. But this refers to a “special” (*viśiṣṭa* 殊勝) condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya* 增上緣), not to a true condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間), hence there is no contradiction.

⁴⁷⁵ Compare AKB ii, F 306.

YBh⁴⁷⁶ [explaining the four conditions (*pratyayas*)] says:

If these cognitions (*vijñānas*) necessarily arise immediately after this cognition, i.e., without interval (無間), then this cognition is said to be their condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間緣).

Moreover⁴⁷⁷ (see #1205):

These six cognitions, i.e., the condition qua immediate antecedent of those [later] six cognitions, are given this name of mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya* 意根).

These texts do not present any difficulty, for, if the expression is general (總), the intention (意) is to distinguish (別). There is also no contradiction. [One should (mentally) add: “the condition qua immediate antecedent where each (cognition) follows its own kind”.]

#1230 Consequently, it is in close conformity with the teachings (教) and with reason (理) to accept that the cognition of the same kind is the only support of the respective cognition.

#1231 Having concluded this digression (傍論) (*prāsaṅgika śāstra*), let us return to the discussion of our main treatise (正論). {4/26v.}

<Although this developing cognition (能變識), i.e.,> cogitation (*manas*), has three supports (所依) [i.e., (1) support of the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya-āśraya*), (2) support of the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya-āśraya*) or simultaneous support (*sahabhū-āśraya*), (3) support of the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya-āśraya*) or opening and guiding support (*krānta-āśraya*), #1120], nevertheless, the stanza (*kārikā* 5b) says: *tad-āśritya pravartate* (依彼轉), that is, “[*Manas*] EVOLVES (轉) WITH THAT (彼), i.e., the store-cognition, FOR ITS SUPPORT (依)”, for it addresses (顯) only the first two kinds of support (*āśraya*), [i] because it wants to teach (顯) that the support of this cognition, i.e., cogitation, is the same as its object (*ālambana*) (依緣同); moreover, [ii] because the first two kinds of support are more important (勝用); or [iii] because the third one, i.e., the “opening and guiding support” (開導依), is easy to understand. <250>

⁴⁷⁶ T.30.1579.0292a03, 0775c.

⁴⁷⁷ T.30.1579.0584c01.

D.C. *Object (ālambana) of cogitation (manas)*

#1233 <Thus, having already discussed the support (*āśraya* 所依) of this cognition (識),> what is the object (所緣) of cogitation (*manas*)?

#1236 Vasubandhu answers [in stanza 5c] *tad-ālambam* (緣彼): “*Manas* takes THAT FOR ITS OBJECT”.

#1238 THAT (彼), i.e., the same cognition (*viññāna* 識) that is its support (*āśraya* 所依), for the noble texts [YBh, T.30.1579.0580c] say that the seventh cognition has the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna* 藏識) for its OBJECT (緣).⁴⁷⁸

A. The “non-transmuted” (*aparāvr̥tta*) cogitation (*manas*)⁴⁷⁹ (#1400):

1. Opinion of Nanda.

#1241 Cogitation (*manas* 意) has, for its object, the *svabhāva* (體), i.e., the “very nature” of the store-cognition—[not the “image”-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), not the seeds (*bījas*) of the store-cognition]—and the *dharma*s associated with the store-cognition (i.e., its mental factors). (See #0530.)

#1242 Indeed, according to YBh [T.30.1579.0651b], *manas* (末那) is always associated (相應) with the conceiving (執) of the “self” (*ātma-grāha* 我執) and the conceiving of the “mine” (*ātmīya-grāha* 我所執). <#1243> (That is, cogitation has, for its object, this substance (體) and its associated *dharma*s): it conceives (執) the store-cognition as “self” (*ātman* 我); it conceives the *dharma*s associated with the store-cognition as “mine” (*ātmīya* 我所).

#1244 Thus, these *dharma*s are not separate from the store-cognition (識), being the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) of the store-cognition. Thus, this explanation does not contradict (違) the texts <or teachings> that define the object of *manas* as the store-cognition alone. Likewise, in the phrase *viññapti-mātra* (唯識), [the term *viññapti* means the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors, i.e., the cognition (*viññāna*) and its associates]. {4/27r.} (See #1403.)

2. Opinion of Citrabhānu.

#1246 The opinion of Nanda is unacceptable for no text says that *manas* has the mental factors, i.e., contact (*sparśa* 觸), etc., for its object (緣).

#1247 Thus, cogitation (*manas* 意) has only the “seeing”-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) and the “image”-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*)

⁴⁷⁸ Above, #0404; YBh, 63; *Samuccaya*, 2; see #1451.

⁴⁷⁹ When it is impure (*sāsrava*), the trainees (*śaikṣas*) of both vehicles, the *bodhisattvas* before the first stage.

for its object (緣) and, in this order, conceives these two parts (*bhāgas*) as “self” (我) and as “mine” (我所). However, these two parts (相見) have their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 體) in the store-cognition itself <251> (i.e., in the awareness-part [*svaśamvitti-bhāga*] of the store-cognition). Thus Citrabhānu’s explanation does not contradict the texts (and teachings (聖)) that define the object of cogitation as the store-cognition alone.

3. Opinion of Sthiramati.

#1249 The opinion of Citrabhānu is also not reasonable:

Indeed, [if the cogitation is directed at the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), it would be directed at the objects (*viśaya*) of the five material sense-faculties, but] the objects (境) of the five material sense-faculties (色根) are not included in the aggregate of cognition (*vijñāna-skandha* 識蘊). [Now the texts specify that cogitation is directed at the store-cognition, thus on the aggregate of cognition.]

Like the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) [of which it is said that they cognize “external” things], cogitation would also be directed at external things (緣外). [But the texts say that its activity is internal.]

Like mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識), cogitation would have an object shared (共境) with the five cognitions. [But the noble teachings assign to it a particular object.]

Let us add that cogitation (*manas*) of sentient beings born in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*) would not be conceiving the “mine” (*ātmīya-grāha*), for only persons who feel weary of matter (*rūpa*) (厭色), and whose store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) thus does not develop as matter (變色), are born in this realm.

#1250 Sthiramati concludes that this cogitation (*manas* 意) is directed (緣) only at the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) itself and at its seeds (*bījas* 種子), that it conceives the store-cognition as self (*ātman* 我) and the seeds as mine (*ātmīya* 我所). {4/27v.}

#1251 The seeds (種) are not real entities (*bhūta-sad-dravya* 實有物) but only efficacies (*sāmarthya*, *śakti* 功能) of that actual cognition (*vijñāna*). Thus, this explanation does not contradict the texts (or noble teachings (聖教)) that assign to cogitation the store-cognition as sole object.

4. Opinion of Dharmapāla.

#1253 Sthiramati’s interpretation must be rejected as unreasonable. – On the one hand,

the seeds (*bījas* 種子) of matter (*rūpa*) (i.e., color, etc.) are not the aggregate of cognition (*viññāna-skandha* 識蘊); YBh (T.30.1579.0588c) says that seeds are real things (*bhūta-sat* 實有) for, supposing that they are things of secondary existence (*sāmvṛta* 假), like non-existent things (無), they would not be causes (i.e., the condition qua cause [*hetu-pratyaya* 因緣]).

Besides, this cognition (識), i.e., cogitation (*manas*)—always accompanied by the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi* 薩迦耶見)⁴⁸⁰—arises <252> spontaneously (任運) in a constant (恆) and homogeneous (*eka-jātīya* 一類) series (相續): is it possible that it conceives (執) the “self” (*ātman*) and the “mine” (*ātmīya*) separately? It cannot be that, within one single mind (一心), there would be (the separate conceiving (別執)—functioning simultaneously (俱轉)—of) two objects (二境), i.e., eternality and annihilation (*śāśvata-uccheda* 斷常), etc., and two kinds of conceiving (*grāha* 執). And it should also not be said that cogitation—functioning (轉) in the same way (*eka-rasena* 一味) from beginningless time (轉)—can have two kinds of conceiving successively (前後).

#1254 Dharmapāla concludes that cogitation (*manas* 意) has only the “seeing”-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna* 藏識) for its object (緣), not the other parts (*bhāgas*) of this cognition (*viññāna*), {4/28r.} for this part, from beginningless time, forms a constant and homogeneous series (一類相續), and appears as permanent and single (似常一), for it is the constant support (所依) of all the *dharma*s (i.e., in contrast to the mental factors: thus, it is fitting to be conceived as self [*ātman*]). It is only this “part” that cogitation conceives as its internal self (*ātman*) (自內我), in contrast to matter (*rūpa*).

#1255 However, the texts say that cogitation conceives the “mine” (我所) (*ātmīya-grāha*): this creates a difficulty. Let us say that the texts express themselves in this way out of a habit of style (*bhāṣya-ākṣepa* 乘語勢).⁴⁸¹

Or else, cogitation conceives the store-cognition to be the self of itself (我之我), and one uses the two expressions, i.e., “self” (*ātman*) and “mine” (*ātmīya*), as referring to the seeing-part alone.

#1256 This explanation conforms well to the teachings (教) and to reason (*yukti* 理), for several texts attribute only the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見) (i.e., not the afflicted view regarding that which pertains to a self [*ātmīya-dṛṣṭi*])

⁴⁸⁰ I.e., the innate (*sahaja*) “afflicted view of self” that has nothing to do with the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*) with twenty branches, which is figured (*vikalpita*), #0062.

⁴⁸¹ AKB iv, F 242.

to cogitation (*manas*), for the conceiving of the “self” (*ātma-grāha* 我執) and the conceiving of the “mine” (*ātmīya-grāha* 我所執) cannot arise simultaneously (俱起).

B. The “transmuted” cogitation (*manas*):

#1258 When it has not yet been “transmuted” (*aparāvṛtta* 未轉依), cogitation (*manas*) has only the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) for its object (緣). When the transmutation of the support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 轉依已) has already been obtained (#3278, first stage), then the (pure) cogitation (*manas*) has also—besides the eighth cognition⁴⁸²—true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā* 真如) and the other *dharma*s for its object. In fact, the knowledge of equality (*samatā-jñāna* 平等性智; #1405, #3292) obtains, i.e., realizes (證得), the ten forms of equality (*samatā* 平等),⁴⁸³ for, penetrating the variety (差別) of dispositions, (i.e., resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解),) <253> of sentient beings (有情) (i.e., the *bodhisattva*s of the ten stages), the knowledge of equality manifests (示現) the variety of images (*bimba* 影像) of the Buddha (佛) (i.e., the body of enjoyment for others [*para-saṃbhoga-kāya*]). {4/28v.}

#1259 The stanza (*kārikā*) considers only the “non-transmuted” (未轉依) cogitation, [i.e., the *manas* before entry into the stages]. This is why it says nothing more than that the *manas* has that store-cognition (藏識) for its object (緣).

[As for the difference between the non-transmuted cogitation and the transmuted *manas*, it is justified:] the erroneous (迷; *bhrānta*, *sāsrava*) is narrow (局), the awakened (悟; *anāsrava*) is wide (通); (the object (境) of) non-self (*nairātmya* 無我) is universal (遍); (the object of) *ātman* is non-universal (不遍) (see #1873).

#1260 C. How can this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*), take its own support (自所依), i.e., the eighth cognition, for its object (緣)?

In the same way that the later mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) can take its (prior *manas* (前意)), that is, the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*), for its object (緣), namely, the cognition (*vijñāna*) which has just passed away (i.e., the sense-element of the mental sense-faculty [*mano-dhātu*] or mental sense-faculty [*mana-indriya*]). Since that is well established in both vehicles, then [the question how cogitation takes its own support for its object] does also not present a difficulty. <254>

⁴⁸² When the saints of the two vehicles “transmute” the *manas*, then the *manas* has the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna*)—and no longer the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*)—for its object (above, #0276, #1417).

⁴⁸³ *Buddha-bhūmi*, 5.

D.D. *Intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and mode of operation (ākāra) of cogitation (manas)*

#1262 [Vasubandhu's] stanza (*kārikā* 5d) says that *manas* is *mananā-ātmaka* (思量為性相): HAVING FOR ITS NATURE AND ITS MODE OF OPERATION “COGITATING<-RECKONING>” (see #0382).

This expression HAVING FOR ITS NATURE AND ITS MODE OF OPERATION (-*ātmaka* 性相) shows that this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*), is cogitating<-reckoning> (思量 *manyānā*) as far as its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*, 自性) is concerned and as far as its mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) is concerned.

#1263 Indeed, it is in cogitating<-reckoning> (思量) that cogitation has its intrinsic nature (namely, its awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]), it is by (用) cogitating<-reckoning> that cogitation has its mode of operation, i.e., its seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*], see #0518).

The special name of *manas*—which is also called *citta* and *viññāna*—is justified from the point of view of intrinsic nature and of mode of operation, for it is called *manas* (末那) because it is deliberation (*upanidhyāna*; 審慮) and cogitating<-reckoning> (*mananā*; 思量), with regard to its object [i.e., the *ālaya*].

When it, [i.e., the seventh cognition,] is not yet transmuted (*aparāvṛtta* 未轉依), it operates (i.e., constantly and assessingly cogitates-reckons (恆審思量),) only on (the characteristics (相) of) the conceived seeming self (*ātman*) (所執我). {4/29r.}

After the transmutation (*parāvṛtti*) (轉依), it operates, (that is, assessingly cogitates-reckons (審思量),) also on (the characteristics (相) of) the non-self (*nair-ātmya* 無我相). <255>

D.E. *Associated factors (saṃprayuktas) of cogitation (manas)*

- E.A. The four defilements (*kleśas*); #1265
- E.B. Other mental factors (*caittas*); #1290
- E.C. Sensation (*vedanā*) of cogitation (*manas*); #1351
- E.D. Ethical nature of cogitation; #1362
- E.E. Stage (*bhūmi*) of cogitation; #1371

D.E.A. *The four defilements (kleśas)*

- #1265 With how many mental factors (*caittas* 心所) is this cogitation (*manas* 意) associated (相應)? – To this question, Vasubandhu replies, [in stanza 6ab; Chin. 6a]: <#1271>

kleśaiś caturbhiḥ sahitam ... sadā

[*Manas*] IS ALWAYS ACCOMPANIED BY FOUR types (種) OF DEFILEMENTS (*kleśas*) (四煩惱常俱).

- #1272 The word ACCOMPANIED (*sahita* 俱) is synonymous with “associated” (*saṃprayukta* 相應).

- #1273 A. From beginningless time up to the transmutation (轉依), this cogitation (*manas* 意)—associated (相應) with the FOUR (四) “root (本) DEFILEMENTS (煩惱)” (*mūla-kleśa*)—spontaneously (任運) and always (恆) takes the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) for its object (緣). <#1275>

What are its four [defilements]?

Vasubandhu specifies [in stanza 6cd; Chin. 6bc: 謂我癡我見并我慢我愛]: <#1277>

ātma-dṛṣṭi-ātma-moha-ātma-māna-ātma-sneha-saṃjñitaiḥ

[*Manas*] is accompanied by defilements (*kleśas*) CALLED DELUSION REGARDING THE SELF (*ātma-moha*), AFFLICTED VIEW OF A SELF (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), TOGETHER WITH CONCEIT REGARDING THE SELF (*ātma-māna*), AFFLICTED SELF-LOVE (*ātma-sneha*).

- #1278 1. DELUSION REGARDING THE SELF (*ātma-moha* 我癡): this is ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) which causes delusion (*mohayati* 愚) regarding the (characteristic of) self (*ātman*) (我相); which makes one unable to see (or be mistaken about) (*vipratipatti* 迷) the (principle (理) of) non-self (see #1443); (hence it is called *ātma-moha*).

2. AFFLICTED VIEW OF A SELF (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見): this is belief in a self (*ātma-*

grāha 我執) (#0012) (part of the afflicted view of self [*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*]), i.e., the conceiving of a self (*ātman*), by which one erroneously considers (妄計) *dharmas*, which are not a self (非我法), to be a self (我); (hence it is called *ātma-drṣṭi*). {4/29v.}

3. CONCEIT REGARDING THE SELF (*ātma-māna* 我慢): this is arrogance (*garva* ? 倨傲) which—relying (恃) on the supposed self (*ātman* 我) that is conceived (執)—makes (令) the mind exalted (*unnati* 高舉); (hence it is called *ātma-māna*).

4. AFFLICTED SELF-LOVE (*ātma-sneha* 我愛): this is affection (or attachment) for the self (*ātma-preman* 我貪) which generates a deep (深) clinging (*abhiṣvaṅga* 耽著) for the self (*ātman* 我) that is conceived (執); (hence it is called *ātma-sneha*).

The word TOGETHER WITH [i.e., 并, in the Chinese wording of the root stanza] is used in order to show that conceit (*māna* 慢) and afflictive love (*sneha* 愛) accompany (俱) the afflicted view (*drṣṭi* 見), that afflicted love accompanies conceit (慢): an association (相應) which the Sarvāstivādins (餘部執) do not accept.

#1279 These four are called DEFILEMENT (*kleśa* = 煩惱):

1. because they ALWAYS (常) torment (擾) and make turbid (濁) the “internal mind” (內心) (i.e., store-cognition) in such a way that the “external cognitions (*vijñānas*)” (i.e., evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñāna*]) (外轉識) are always “polluted” (*saṃkliṣṭa* 雜染 = *sāsrava*, i.e., good, bad, non-defined); [this is <256> the explanation of *fan* 煩];
2. because, [due to point 1,] they bring it about that sentient beings (有情) transmigrate (生死輪迴) and are unable to escape (出離).

#1282 B. The root defilements (*mūla-kleśas*) are ten in number (十種). Why is cogitation (*manas*) associated only with four?

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to the Abhidharma (AKB v, F 2), there are six root defilements (see #1907):

1. attachment (*rāga*);
2. hostility (*pratigha*);
3. conceit (*māna*);
4. ignorance (*avidyā*);
5. afflicted view (*drṣṭi*);
6. doubt (*vimati*).

There are five afflicted views (*dr̥ṣṭis*):

1. afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*);
2. afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-dr̥ṣṭi*);
3. false-view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*);
4. esteeming of bad views (*dr̥ṣṭi-parāmarśa*);
5. overesteeming of morality and vows (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*).

By replacing the afflicted view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) of the list of six with this series of five, we have ten defilements (*kleśas*) or proclivities (*anuśayas*).

The afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) is twofold:

1. belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*);
2. belief in mine (*ātmīya-grāha*).

- #1284 1. The presence of the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi* 我見) causes the other views to not arise, since two understandings (*prajñās* 慧)—[every view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) is understanding (*prajñā*), i.e., the discernment of *dharma*s (see #0629)]—cannot be associated with one mind (一心).

On the other hand, the view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) of this cognition (識), i.e., cogitation (*manas*) must be {4/30r.} the afflicted view of a self (我見):

a. for the two esteemings (*parāmarśas* 二取) and the false view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi* 邪見) are exclusively “with figurating (*vikalpa*)” <or figured (*vikalpika*)> (分別生) (#0062, #0350) and are exclusively to be abandoned by insight (*darśana-heya* 見所斷),⁴⁸⁴ while the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) of cogitation are exclusively “innate” (*sahaja* 俱生) and are to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷);

b. for the afflicted view regarding that which pertains to a self (*ātmīya-dr̥ṣṭi* 我所見) and the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-dr̥ṣṭi* 邊見) arise by relying on the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi* 我見): but the view (*dr̥ṣṭi* 見) associated with cogitation does not rely on an afflicted view of a self; it always internally seizes (執) the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) for its object and conceives the notion of a self (*ātman* 我) in regard to it.

Thus, this view must be the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi* 我見).

- #1285 2. Doubt (*vimati* 疑) cannot occur, due to the afflicted view’s characteristic of certainty <and decisiveness> (見審決).

⁴⁸⁴ Compare AKB v, F 10.

3. Hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) has no place, due to the presence of afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha* 愛著我).

(Thus, there are only four defilements (煩惱) associated with this cognition.)

#1287 4. [Question:] – How can the three, i.e., afflicted view (*dr̥ṣṭi* 見), conceit (*māna* 慢) and afflicted love (*sneha* 愛), be simultaneous (俱起)?

[Answer:] – Their *ākāras* (行相), i.e., modes [of operation], are not contradictory. Their being simultaneous presents no difficulty.

#1288 [Question:] – But does YBh (T.30.1579.0621c19) not say that attachment (*rāga* 貪) brings the mind (心) down (下), whereas conceit (*māna* 慢) lifts it up (舉)?

[Answer:] – Without a doubt, but YBh, in that passage, deals with the figured defilement (*vikalpita-kleśa* 分別), with an external object (外境), with despising others (所陵), with the coarse (麤), whereas here, it is a question of the innate defilement (*sahaja-kleśa* 俱生), of an internal object (內境), of exalting the self (所持), of the subtle (細). Therefore YBh presents no difficulty. {4/30v.} <257>

D.E.B. Other mental factors (*caittas*) of cogitation (*manas*)

#1290 Is this cogitation (*manas* 意) not associated with mental factors (*caittas* 心所) other than only the four defilements (*kleśas*)? – <#1292> [Vasubandhu's] stanza (*kārikā* 7a2–b1; Chin. 6d)), answering this question, says:

anyaiḥ sparśa-ādyaiś ca

AND [ca] it is ACCOMPANIED BY “OTHER” [mental factors,] CONTACT, ETC. (及餘觸等俱).

[The meaning of OTHER (*anyaiś* 餘) is not clear.]

#1296 I. According to one opinion, this cogitation (*manas* 意) is only associated with nine mental factors (心所): the four defilements (*kleśas*) mentioned above and the other five *dharma*s, i.e., the universals (*sarva-tragas*), namely, contact (*sparśa* 觸), mental application (*manaskāra* 作意), sensation (*vedanā* 受), ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) and volition (*cetanā* 思) (#0581), for cogitation (*manas* 意) is definitively associated (相應) with universals (遍行).

Above, the stanza (*kārikā* 3cd) said (#0396) that the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), i.e., cognition that is retribution (異熟識), is accompanied by universals, that is, contact (觸), etc. In order to indicate that the universals of cogitation are not of the non-obscured[-non-defined] (*anivṛta* 無覆) class, like those of the

store-cognition, the stanza 7ab (Chin. 6d) says that they are different from the latter, and therefore uses the word OTHER (*anyaiś* 餘).

- #1297 As for AND (*ca* 及), it is *samuccaya-artha*, (i.e., has the meaning of adding up) (義集): “The former four defilements (*kleśas*) (combined (合) with) the later five universals are always associated with *manas* (末那).

[Cogitation (*manas*) is only associated with these nine; it is not associated [a] with the five special factors (*vinīyatas*), [b] with the eleven good factors (*kuśalas*), [c] with the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*), [d] with the four undetermined factors (*anīyatas*).]

- #1299 A. 〈Why does this cogitation (*manas* 意) not have other mental factors (*caittas* 心所)?〉

The mental factors with special objects (*vinīyatas*) (see #0633, #1668).

- #1301 1. Predilection (*chanda* 欲; #1672) is desire-aspiring (希望; *abhilāṣa*, *prārthanā*) for a thing (*vastu* 事) that will not be immediately obtained (未遂合). – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation, arises spontaneously (任運): it takes a thing (*artha* 境) which will be immediately obtained (遂合) for its object (緣) {4/31r.} and which is thus not something to be desired-aspired for (無所希望). – 〈Thus, cogitation has no predilection.〉

2. Resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解; #1691) is the “ascertainment” (*avadhāraṇa* 印持) of a thing (境) not yet determined (*aniścita* 曾未定).⁴⁸⁵ – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation, at all times (無始), constantly takes a determined (定) thing (事) for its object (緣) (i.e., a thing that it takes only to be a self [*ātman*] and not to be another thing). This thing is thus not “to be ascertained” (所印持). – 〈Thus, cogitation has no resolve.〉

3. Memory (*smṛti* 念; #1699) is solely the recollection (記憶) of a thing (事) experienced (*saṃstuta*) in the past (曾所習). <258> – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation, constantly takes an actually “experienced” (*vedita*) (現所受) thing (境)—which is not a thing that is remembered—for its object (緣). – 〈Thus, cogitation has no memory.〉

4. Concentration (*samādhi* 定; #1707) is solely the binding of the mind (繫心)

⁴⁸⁵ #0745, #0633, #1668, like Sthiramati (Lévi, *Trentaine* F 25 [10b]): *adhimokṣo niścite vastuni tathāivādvadhāraṇam* | [“Resolve (*adhimokṣa*) consists in the fact that when one has determined a specific thing (*niścite vastuni*), that one likewise ascertains (*avadhāraṇa*) it.”]. – Here we have *aniścite*, the reading of the *Siddhi* and of Kuiji, *Shuji* (5A/41r.–v.).

focusedly (專注) on a single thing (一境). – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation, arises spontaneously (任運), takes its object (緣) from moment to moment (剎那別) and is not focused on a single thing (專一). – (Thus, cogitation has no concentration.)

5. Understanding (*prajñā* 慧; #1723) (is of the same nature as the afflicted view of self). Thus, it is not named separately, [under its name, as being associated with cogitation, for the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi* 我見), which has already been named, is understanding. See #1284, #1317.]

#1302 B. The good (*kuśala* 善) *dharma*s (#1766), being pure (淨), do not accompany this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*).

#1303 C. As for the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) (#2045), they arise necessarily in dependence on the different (差別) successive (前後) states (*pūrvā-apara-avasthā-viśeṣa*) of the root defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱): (since, outside of the root defilements, they have no separate “nature”, they do not arise at the same time as the latter). – This cognition, i.e., cogitation, is always associated with four defilements {4/31v.} that remain, before and after (前後), in the same (一類) unchanged (無別) state. (Thus, this cognition is not accompanied with subsidiary defilements.)

D. The undetermined factors (*anīyatas* 不定) (see #2156):

#1304 Regret (*kaukr̥tya* 惡作) is remorse (*vipratīṣāra* 追悔) regarding a former action (業). – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*)—spontaneously (任運) and constantly (恆)—takes a present (thing) (現境) for its object (緣), (and has no remorse (悔) regarding former actions). – Thus, cogitation has no regret (惛沈).

Drowsiness (*middha* 睡眠), due to the heaviness (重) and darkness (昧) (*laya, styāna* ? 重昧) of the body (身) and of the mind (心), occurs sometimes for a while (due to the power (力) of many) external (外) conditions (緣) (i.e., sickness, cold, wind). – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation—from beginningless time homogeneous (一類)—seizes the internal (內) and does not depend on many external conditions. – (Thus, drowsiness does not occur [in cogitation].)

Initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺) are both turned outwardly (外門); being, respectively, superficial (淺) and deep (深), inquiring (*paryeṣaka* 推) and examining (*pratyaवेक्षaka* 度), coarse (麤) and subtle (細), they bring forth speech (發言) (see #1059). – But this cognition, i.e., cogitation, is only turned inwardly (內門); being uniform (一類), it seizes the self (*ātman* 我). – (Thus, cogitation is not accompanied with these two.)

- #1306 II. According to another opinion, (the above explanation of the meaning of OTHER (*anyaiś* 餘) is not reasonable), i.e., [the meaning is not that cogitation (*manas*) is accompanied by the four obscured-(non-defined) (有覆) defilements (*kleśas*) and that the five (universals) (i.e., contact, etc.) are of another type (*anya*, i.e., other than the five of the store-cognition)]: for the words [in stanza 6b (Chin. 7a)]: “INCLUDED IN THE OBSCURED-[NON-DEFINED] CATEGORY” (有覆攝; *nivṛta*-[*avyākṛtaiḥ*]; #1103), {4/32r.} refer both to the five [universals] and the four defilements. <259>

Moreover, if the stanza (*kārikā*) does not expressly say (闕) that cogitation (*manas* 意) is accompanied (俱) by subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱), it is because the defilements (煩惱) are necessarily accompanied by subsidiary defilements.

Thus, in stanza 7a (Chin. 6d), the word OTHER (*anyaiḥ* 餘) indicates the subsidiary defilements. [It should be translated:

Manas is accompanied by four defilements, by others (i.e., the subsidiary defilements), and by the five (universals), i.e., contact (*sparśa*), etc.

Among the scholars who accept this opinion, there are four masters:⁴⁸⁶]

- #1310 A. [First masters:] – Five subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) are universally (遍) associated with every defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染) mind (心).

- #1311 As the *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0676b23; T.31.1606.0723a29) says:

Languor (*styāna* 惛沈), restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), non-faith (*āśraddhya*

⁴⁸⁶ First master. – Five subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) in every defiled mind: *styāna*, *auddhatya*, *āśraddhya*, *kausīdya*, *pramāda*.

Second master. – Six: *āśraddhya*, *kausīdya*, *pramāda*, *muṣita-smṛtitā*, *vikṣepa*, *asaṃprajanya*.

Third master. – Ten: *pramāda*, *auddhatya*, *styāna*, *āśraddhya*, *kausīdya*, *mithyā-chanda*, *mithyā-adhimokṣa*, *mithyā-smṛti*, *vikṣepa*, *asaṃprajanya*.

Fourth master. – Eight: *styāna*, *auddhatya*, *āśraddhya*, *kausīdya*, *pramāda*, *muṣita-smṛtitā*, *vikṣepa*, *asaṃprajanya*.

AKB ii, verse 26 (F 161): *mohaḥ pramādaḥ kausīdyaṃ āśraddhyaṃ styānam uddhavaḥ | kliṣṭe sadaiva*.

Mūla Abhidharma: *āśraddhya*, *kausīdya*, *muṣita-smṛtitā*, *vikṣepa*, *avidyā*, *asaṃprajanya*, *ayoniśo-manaskāra*, *mithyā-adhimokṣa*, *auddhatya*, *pramāda*.

For the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*), see the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0724) and see #2045.

不信), slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠) and heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸) are always associated with any defiled (染污) minds whatever they are.

- #1312 Indeed, independent of inaptitude (*akarmaṇyatā* 無堪任性), etc., it is impossible that there be “the quality of being defiled” (*kliṣṭatā* 汚性) in the mind. [Inaptitude is a type of which languor (*styāna*) is a specimen, #2084.] When the defilement (*kleśa* 煩惱) occurs, the mind (心) is said to be defiled (染污); thus these five [subsidiary defilements] necessarily occur in the state of the defiled mind (染心位), for when the defilement (煩惱) occurs, it is certainly due to inaptitude (= languor), to agitation (*uddhava* 囂) (= restlessness [*auddhatya*]) (#2078), to non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信), to slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠) and to heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸).⁴⁸⁷ <260>

[Restlessness (*auddhatya*), in truth, is defined as a part of attachment (*rāga*); we then ask: How can it exist at the same time as hatred (*dveṣa*)? How can it occur in every defiled mind?]

- #1314 Although restlessness (掉舉) {4/32v.} occurs universally in every defiled mind (染心), nevertheless, it is merely specified as “part of attachment” (貪分) because it increases (增) in the state of attachment (*rāga* 貪位).

Likewise, although drowsiness (*middha* 眠) and regret (*kaukr̥tya* 悔) can universally be associated with minds of all three natures, i.e., good, bad and non-defined, nevertheless, they are merely specified as part of delusion (*moha* 癡分) because they increase in the state of delusion (癡位).

- #1315 We also know that other texts say that the universal (遍) subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) (= which occur in every defiled mind [染心]) are either six or ten in number, nevertheless, this is not this way here. These texts (use “universal” (遍)) from a different point of view (*artha-viśeṣam upādāya* ? 依別義), (and do not really mean “occurring universally in all defiled minds” (遍一切染心)).

⁴⁸⁷ *Uddhava* is a “metrical” synonym of restlessness (*auddhatya*) in AKB and *Trīṃśikā*. – Here the original is *xiaodong* 囂動.

[*Xiaodong* 囂動 = *raonao* 擾惱 (comp. *upāyāsa* ?). – *xiao* 囂 = *xuanxiaojū* 誼囂舉. – *dong* 動 = *chandongdiao* 慘動掉. There is certainly *xiaodong* 囂動 in the defiled mind, thus there is restlessness (*auddhatya*), *diaoju* 掉舉.]

Objection: There is inaptitude (*akarmaṇyatā*) with good minds. Would one say that there is languor (*styāna*) in good minds? – Answer: It is because cogitation (*manas*) has [languor] that good minds have inaptitude. Likewise, a good mind is impure (*sāsrava*) without this mind having languor.

1. In the list of twenty subsidiary defilements (隨煩惱), one identifies six universals (i.e., non-faith [*āśraddhya*], slackness [*kausīdya*], heedlessness [*pramāda*], impaired memory [*muṣita-smṛtitā*], distraction (*vikṣepa*), lack of proper discernment [*asamprajanya*]) by selecting:

- that which occurs as both coarse and subtle (麤細), [thus eliminating “anger (*krodha*) and the other nine” which are coarse only];
- that which is both non-defined and bad (無記不善), [thus eliminating non-modesty (*ahrī*) and shamelessness (*atrapā*), which are coarse and subtle, but bad only];
- that which forms an obstacle (障) both to concentration (*samādhi* 定) and to understanding (*prajñā* 慧), [thus eliminating languor (*styāna*), which does not form an obstacle to concentration, and restlessness (*auddhatya*), which does not form an obstacle to understanding].

2. In the list of twenty-two subsidiary defilements (隨煩惱), one identifies ten universals (by adding languor [*styāna*], restlessness [*auddhatya*], false predilection [*mithyā-chanda*], false resolve [*mithyā-adhimokṣa*]), because one selects [i] that which (can occur as two natures), i.e., coarse and subtle (麤細), [ii] that which can be non-defined.

Thus, the texts in question do not contradict each other or our doctrine.

#1317 Let us conclude that this cogitation (*manas* 意) is accompanied {4/33r.} with fifteen mental factors (*caittas* 心所): namely, the previous nine *dharma*s on which there is agreement (contact [*sparśa*], etc., delusion regarding the self [*ātma-moha*], etc.) plus five subsidiary defilements (隨煩惱), plus—among the five special factors (*vinīyatas* 別境)—understanding (*prajñā* 慧). Although the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見) is included in this special factor “understanding”, nevertheless, in the list of fifty-one mental factors (心所), the two are distinguished (i.e., understanding [*prajñā*] is a type, afflicted view of a self is a sub-type [of it]).

#1318 <Question: – Why is this cogitation (*manas* 意) devoid of other mental factors (心所)?>

[Answer:] – Cogitation is not associated:

- with ten mental factors, i.e., “anger (*krodha* 忿) and the other nine”, which are coarse (麤) and agitated (動) (in their mode of operation (行相)), whereas this cognition, i.e., cogitation, is a subtle “deliberating” (審細) (and is thus not

accompanied [with anger, etc.]; <261>

2. with non-modesty (*ahrī* 無慚) and shamelessness (*atrapā* 無愧), which are exclusively bad (不善), whereas this cogitation is non-defined (無記) (and is thus not associated [with them]);

3. with distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂), by which the mind (心) is dispersed outwardly (*bāhya-artha-visara* ? 馳流外境), whereas this cogitation arises seizing—constantly (恆) and inwardly (內)—a single object, (and is not dispersed outwardly; thus is not associated [with distraction]);

4. with “lack of proper discernment” (*asamprajanya* 不正知), which generates the external (外) movements of body (身), of speech (語) and of mind (意), and which contradicts-breaks (違越) the rule (*vidhi* 軌則) (while being distinct from “irregular action” [*vidhi-prabhraṣṭa*]⁴⁸⁸, {4/33v.} whereas cogitation (*manas*) seizes only an internal (內) object, (and thus is not accompanied [by lack of proper discernment]).

Other mental factors (心所) are also absent, as mentioned above (#1297).

#1321 B. [Second masters:] – Six subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) (are universally (遍) associated with) every defiled mind (染心), <#1322> as the *Yogaśāstra* (YBh, T.30.1579.0604a) teaches:

Non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信), slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠), heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸), impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā* 忘念), distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂) and lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya* 惡慧) (are associated with every defiled mind).

#1323 In the absence of the last three, (i.e., impaired memory, distraction and lack of proper discernment,) the mind (心) cannot generate (起) defilement (*kleśa* 煩惱) for, in order for the defilement (煩惱) (i.e., attachment [*rāga* 貪], etc.) to arise, there must arise (發起) impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā* 忘念) and false discernment (*mithyā-pravicaya* 邪簡擇) about the things that have been personally previously experienced or known by hearsay (*pūrva-anubhūta-viśaya* 曾受境界) and about the category (*prakāra* 種類) of these things (*pūrva-anubhūta-viśaya-prakāra*). [The defilement that is directed at the things of another realm (*dhātu*) is directed only at the ideas that have been formed based on the name; likewise, false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) which is aimed at cessation (*nirodha*).]

There necessarily also arises distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂) (regarding an object

(境)),⁴⁸⁹ for when defilement (煩惱) arises, mind necessarily chases after the object and lets itself go (*visarati*) (流蕩).⁴⁹⁰

#1325 As for languor (*styāna* 惛沈) and restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), their modes of operation (*ākāra* 行相) are contradictory; {4/34r.} both cannot occur universally in every defiled mind (染心).

The treatise (*Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T31.1606.0723a29; #1311) says that five *dharmas* are “universals”, i.e., languor, restlessness, etc., (i.e., occur universally in all defiled minds (染心)). But it sets up this list because—among the defiled *dharmas*—it selects:

1. that which occurs both as coarse and as subtle (麤細) (eliminating anger [*krodha*], etc.);
2. that which contradicts only the good (善) *dharmas* (i.e., non-faith [*āśraddhya*] contradicts faith [*śraddhā*]; regret [*kausīdya*] contradicts vigor [*vīrya*]; languor [*styāna*] contradicts ease [*praśrabdhi*]; restlessness [*auddhatya*] contradicts equanimity [*upekṣā*]; heedlessness [*pramāda*] contradicts heedfulness [*apramāda*]: <262> whereas other subsidiary defilements also contradict the five special factors [*vinīyatas*]);
3. that which is exclusively (純) subsidiary defilements (隨煩惱) (in contrast to the root defilements [*mūla-kleśas*] and the undetermined factors [*anīyatas*]);
4. that which is of two natures, i.e., non-defined and bad (二性) (i.e., in contrast to non-modesty [*ahrī*] and shamelessness [*atrapā*], which are exclusively bad).

#1326 As for the doctrine of the ten universal (十遍) subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*), it is explained as above (#1315).

#1328 Cogitation (*manas* 意) is thus accompanied (俱) with nineteen mental factors (*caittas* 心所): (1–5) contact (*sparśa*), etc.; (6–9) delusion regarding the self (*ātma-moha*), etc.; (10–15) six subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱), which have just been explained, and also, (16–18); memory (*smṛti* 念), concentration (*samādhi* 定) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧), and (19) languor (*styāna* 惛沈).

The special mention of memory (*smṛti* 念) is explained as understanding (慧) is explained above (#1317).

Concentration (*samādhi* 定) is also included for cogitation is focused on a single

⁴⁸⁹ Editors: LVP has “lack of proper discernment” (*asamprajanya*) instead of distraction (*vikṣepa*).

⁴⁹⁰ *liudang* 流蕩, i.e., *chiliu* 馳流, plus *zongdang* 縱蕩.

object, namely, it seizes the self (*ātman* 我) (as its object), and never discards (捨) it.

Languor (*styāna* 惛沈) should be added because this cognition, i.e., cogitation, is weighted down by ignorance [*avidyā* 無明], falsely turns to the internal, does not turn toward the external, (hence making the mind torpid).

#1329 Restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉) is absent because it contradicts languor (*styāna*).

The absence of other mental factors (心所) is as explained by the second masters (#1316). {4/34v.}

#1332 C. [Third masters:] According to a third opinion, ten subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) (are universally associated with every defiled mind (染心)).

#1333 According to YBh (T.30.1579.0622b27):

Heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸), restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), languor (*styāna* 惛沈), non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信), slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠), false predilection (*mithyā-chanda* 邪欲), false resolve (*mithyā-adhimokṣa* 邪勝解), false memory (*mithyā-smṛti* 邪念), distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂), lack of proper discernment (*asaṃprajanya* 不正知): these ten arise with every defiled (染污) mind, penetrate all places in the three realms (*dhātus*).

#1334 When false predilection (*mithyā-chanda* 邪欲) and false resolve (*mithyā-adhimokṣa* 邪勝解) are absent, the mind (心) cannot generate a defilement (*kleśa* 煩惱), for attachment (*rāga* 貪) and other defilements are generated only if there is desire for union or for separation (樂合離) with regard to the experienced object (所受境), only if there is ascertainment (*avadhārana* 印持) of the characteristics (相) of the object (事).

#1336 Do not contest that resolve (*adhimokṣa*) is universal, for the person who has doubt (*vimati*, *vicikitsā* 疑) about the philosophical truth (理) does not necessarily experience uncertainty (or hesitation) (猶豫) regarding things like visible form (*rūpa* 色), etc.; thus, resolve (勝解) can also be associated with doubt (疑). One may also have doubt (or hesitation) (猶豫) regarding things, without this kind of doubt (疑) being the defilement (煩惱) with this name (for example: Is this thing painful or not?), {4/35r.} as when one wonders (or doubts) (疑) whether one sees a man (人) or a post (机).

#1337 Elsewhere (餘處), (these two universals), i.e., false predilection (*mithyā-chanda* 邪欲) and false resolve (*mithyā-adhimokṣa* 勝解), are not <263> classified as universals because they are not manifest (in a coarse way) (麤顯) when the

mind (心) has a disagreeable thing for its object (緣非愛事), when the mind is associated with doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑相應). (When one doubts the truth, one does not have ascertainment [*avadhāraṇa*] in regard to it). Nevertheless, they occur in every defiled mind.

#1338 Concerning other *dharma*s that are associated or not associated with cogitation (*manas*), as above.

#1340 This cogitation (*manas* 意) is thus accompanied by twenty-four mental factors (*caittas* 心所): the nine previously mentioned *dharma*s, that is, contact (*sparsā*) and the other four, as well as delusion regarding the self (*ātma-moha*) and the other three; ten subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱); five special factors (*vinīyatas* 別境).

⟨They can be explained according to previous reasoning.⟩

#1341 ⟨As for other mental factors (心所) that are missing in the list, their absence can be understood as previously explained.⟩

D. [Fourth masters:] According to Dharmapāla.

#1343 ⟨All the above three opinions are not entirely reasonable.⟩

In fact:

- #1346 1. The person who doubts (疑) whether another world (他世) exists or not has neither predilection (*chanda* 欲) nor resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解) in regard to it.
2. If, when the defilements arise (*kleśa-utpāda-avasthā* 煩惱起位), there is no languor (*styāna* 惛沈), then there definitively is no inaptitude (*akarmaṇyatā* 無堪任性).

If there is no restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), {4/35v.} then there is no agitation (*uddhava* 囂動): just as when the mind is good (善), etc., this is not a defiled (染污) state.

3. If there is no distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂) ⟨in a defiled mind (染心)⟩, then there is no chasing after the object and letting oneself go (*visarāṇa* 流蕩): this is not a defiled state.

4. If there is no impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtītā* 失念) and no lack of proper discernment (*asaṃprajanya* 不正知), then the defilements (煩惱) are unable to manifest (*samṃukhī-bhāva* 現前).

#1347 Thus, every defiled mind (染污心) is certainly associated with ⟨and arises with⟩ eight subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱), i.e., (1) languor (*styāna* 惛沈),

(2) restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), (3) non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信), (4) slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠), (5) heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸), (6) impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā* 忘念), (7) distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂), (8) lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya* 不正知).

[As for the claims of the second masters.] – If impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā*) and lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya*) were memory (*smṛti* 念, i.e., false memory [*mithyā-smṛti*]) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧, i.e., bad understanding [*ku-prajñā*]) in their nature, then they would not universally occur in every defiled mind (染心), for every defiled mind is not directed at a previously experienced (*vedita*) (曾受) object (緣) (e.g., the false view [*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*] that denies *nirvāṇa*) and does not include discernment (*pravicaya*) (有簡擇).

But if impaired memory and lack of proper discernment are ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) (in their intrinsic nature (自性)) (as YBh understands: they are the ignorance-part [*avidyā-bhāga*]), then they entirely penetrate (or universally occur in) the defiled mind, as we have explained it. {4/36r.}

#1348 This cogitation (*manas* 意) is thus accompanied with eighteen mental factors (*caittas* 心所): (1–9) the first nine *dharma*s, i.e., contact (*sparśa*), etc., and delusion regarding the self (*ātma-moha*), etc.; (10–17) eight subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) plus (18) one understanding (*prajñā*) with a special object (別境), i.e., afflicted view of a self [*ātma-dṛṣṭi*].

⟨The other mental factors that are absent [in this list] and the three passages from⟩ the treatises that indicate other figures (*Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0724 [first masters: five subsidiary defilements], YBh (T.30.1579.0604a) [second masters: six subsidiary defilements] and YBh T.30.1579.0622b27 [third masters: ten subsidiary defilements]) are explained as we have seen.

#1349 Thus, this explanation does not contradict the teachings (教) and reason (理). <264> {5/1r.}

D.E.C. Sensation (*vedanā*) of cogitation (*manas*)

#1351 With which sensations (*vedanās* 受) is defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas* 染污意) associated (相應)?

#1353 First opinion [YBh, T.30.1579.0331a]. – It is associated with the sensation of satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜受) alone, because it is always directed, internally (內), at the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), conceives of it as a self (*ātman* 我), engenders satisfaction (喜) and love (愛).

#1355 Second opinion. – This is not so, for in this hypothesis, ⟨the sensation of⟩ satisfaction (喜受) would exist in all spheres up to the perception-sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation (*naiva-saṃjñā-na-asamjñā-āyatana*, i.e., the summit of cyclic existence [*bhavāgra* 有頂]), which would be in contradiction with the noble teachings (YBh and AKB).

#1356 Let us say that this cogitation (*manas* 意) is associated (相應) with four sensations (*vedanās* 受):

1. Concerning the existences ⟨or births⟩ (生) in the bad destinies (*durgati* 惡趣), cogitation (*manas*)—being directed (緣) at the eighth cognition—is, in fact, directed at the fruit (果) generated by bad actions (不善業): thus, it is associated with ⟨the sensation of⟩ dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂受). [Bad actions are of the “conducive to dissatisfactory experience” (*daurmanasya-vedanīya*) class.]

2. As for the destinies ⟨or births⟩ (生) of humans (人), of the gods of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) (欲天), of the gods of the first two meditations (*dhyānas* 靜慮), cogitation is associated with satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜受), for the eighth cognition—at which it is directed—is the fruit of good actions (善業果) “of the stages that involve satisfaction” (*saumanasya-bhūmika* 有喜地).

3. As for the destinies ⟨or births⟩ of the gods of the third meditation (*dhyāna* 第三靜慮),⁴⁹¹ cogitation is associated with the sensation of pleasure (*sukha-vedanā* 樂受), for the eighth cognition—⟨at which it is directed⟩—is the fruit of good actions “of the stage that involves pleasure” (有樂地). {5/1v.}

4. As for above (i.e., [the destiny or birth of the gods of] the fourth meditation (第四靜慮) up to the summit of cyclic existence [*bhavāgra* 有頂]), cogitation is associated with neutral sensation [i.e., sensation called “equanimity”] (*upekṣā-vedanā* 捨受), for the eighth cognition—⟨at which it is directed⟩—is the fruit of good actions “of the stage that involves only neutral sensation” (捨地).

#1358 Third opinion. – ⟨The preceding theory is also not reasonable, for⟩ cogitation, since beginningless time, proceeds spontaneously (任運), homogeneously (一類) (i.e., of one type, non-defined [*avyākṛta*]), directed inwardly (內), conceiving a self (*ātman*) (執我), always unmodified (恆無轉易): thus, it is not associated with sensations (*vedanās* 受) that involve change ⟨and variation⟩ (*vikāra* 變異). <265>

#1359 Moreover, let us add that, where *manas* (末那) differs from the store-cognition (藏識), [Vasubandhu’s] stanzas 5b–8a (*kārikā*) express it explicitly (別): [they

⁴⁹¹ AKB ii, F 114.

specify its support, its object, etc.]. If cogitation, in contrast to the *ālaya*, were susceptible to four sensations (*vedanās* 受), the stanzas would also say so. Since this is not so, as far as sensation is concerned, cogitation is definitively like the *ālaya*. Thus, it is associated with the neutral sensation (捨受) alone.

#1360 As long as [defiled cogitation] is not transmuted (*parāvṛtta*, see #1400) (未轉依位), cogitation (*manas*) is associated with the aforementioned mental factors (*caittas* 心所) alone. Once it is transmuted (已轉依位), only twenty-one mental factors arise together:

1–5. the five universal ones (遍行) (#1649);

6–10. the five “special” ones (別境) (#1668); {5/2r.}

11–21. the eleven good ones (善) (#1766).

And, like the store-cognition, ⟨once the transmutation has taken place (已轉依位),⟩ cogitation is associated with neutral sensation [i.e., sensation called “equanimity”] (捨受) alone because it always proceeds (轉) spontaneously (任運), because it is always associated with the “knowledge of equality” (*śamatā-jñāna* 平等) ⟨or because it always, with regard to objects, proceeds with the “knowledge of equality”⟩.

D.E.D. *Ethical nature of cogitation (manas)*

#1362 In what ethical nature are the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) of cogitation (*manas* 末那) included?

#1365 They ARE exclusively (非餘) INCLUDED IN THE OBSCURED-NON-DEFINED (*nivṛta-avyākṛta* 有覆無記攝).⁴⁹²

#1366 1. The four defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), etc., associated with this cogitation (*manas* 意)—being defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染) *dharmas*—are obstacles (障礙) to the noble path (*ārya-mārga*) (聖道); they “obscure”, i.e., hinder and taint, ⟨or hide and cover⟩ (隱蔽), the mind (自心) (namely, cogitation that is their ruler); thus, they are [included in what is] called OBSCURED (*nivṛta* 有覆).

2. On the other hand, they are neither good (善) nor bad (不善): thus, they are [included in what is] called NON-DEFINED (*avyākṛta* 無記).

#1367 Just as the defilements (煩惱), etc., in the two higher realms (*dhātus* 界)⁴⁹³—being enveloped (*parigṛhīta* ? 攝藏) by the power of calm abiding (*śamatha* 定力)

⁴⁹² AKB ii, F 315.

⁴⁹³ AKB v, F 40, 74, 93, 218.

—are included in the non-defined (無記), so likewise, (the defiled *dharmas*), i.e., the defilements associated with cogitation (*manas*), their support (所依) being subtle (*sūkṣma* 細), their process (*pravartana* 轉) being spontaneous (*svarasena* 任運), are also included in the non-defined (無記).

- #1368 But once transmuted (已轉依), the [pure] cogitation (*manas*) is exclusively good (*kuśāla*) (in its nature (性)). {5/2v.} <266>

D.E.E. *Stage (bhūmi) of cogitation (manas)*

- #1371 To what stage (*bhūmi* 地) do the mental factors (*caittas* 心所) of cogitation (*manas* 末那) belong?

- #1373 [Vasubandhu's] stanza (*kārikā* 7a or Chin. 7b) answers, *yatrajas tan-mayaiḥ*: [these mental factors] ARE BOUND TO (所繫) that stage or place (*bhūmi* 地) WHERE that individual is BORN (所生).⁴⁹⁴

- #1375 When the eighth cognition arises in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界), the mental factors (心所) (e.g., afflicted view of a self [*ātma-dṛṣṭi*]) associated with the actual (現行) *manas* (末那) are of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*, *kāma-maya*, *kāma-āpta*) and so on up to the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra* 有頂), for they are “spontaneous” (任運) and always seize (執) the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) of their stage (*bhūmi*) (自地藏識) for their object (緣) by considering it to be their inner self (*ātman*) (內我); they never seize the *dharmas* of another stage (*bhūmi* 地) (i.e., such and such a seed [*bīja*] contained in the *ālaya*) for their object.⁴⁹⁵

- #1377 [The store-cognition contains the seeds of every stage;] but if, as retribution (*vipāka* 異熟) of actions, an actually manifest (現在前) store-cognition (藏識) is generated in a certain stage (起彼地), it is said to be “born in a certain stage”

⁴⁹⁴ Translated by *suosheng sui xi* 所生隨繫. – *xi* can be understood (1) as *shu* 屬, in which case the seventh cognition performs the activity of depending in regard to the eighth on which it depends; or else, (2) as *fu* 縛, in which case the four defilements (*kleśas*) bind (*fu*) the seventh cognition.

In other words, the Chinese version can be read as either *yatrajas tanmayam*: cogitation (*manas*) is of the stage (*bhūmi*) in which the individual is born: it depends on the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) which constitutes this individual; or else, *yatrajas tanmayaiḥ*: cogitation is bound by the defilements of the stage in which the individual is born.

⁴⁹⁵ For example, the belief in the innate self (*sahaja-ātma-grāha*) among the mental factors (*caittas*) in question.

(生彼地).

The (defiled (染污)) cogitation (*manas* 末那) takes the store-cognition (as its object (緣)) and seizes (執) it as its self (*ātman* 我), namely, it is attached (繫屬)⁴⁹⁶ to that, i.e., the store-cognition, and it is thus said to be “bound to that [place]” (*tan-maya* 彼所繫), i.e., bound to the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna-maya*).

#1378 Or else, cogitation is bound (所繫縛) by the defilements (煩惱), etc., of that stage (彼地) where the store-cognition arises; it is thus said to be “bound to them” (*tan-maya* 彼所繫), (i.e., *tad-bhūmi-kleśa-maya*).

#1379 But once [the support is] transmuted (轉依), the cogitation (*manas*) is dissociated from the stages (*bhūmis*) and (is not bound anymore (非所繫)). <267>

⁴⁹⁶ “Attached”, *xishu* 繫屬, *pratibaddha*, AKB 7/3r.10 [vii, F 305].

maya, *xi* 繫, translates *āpta*, *pratisaṃyukta*.

“Bound”, *xifu* 繫縛, *saṃyojana*, AKB 22/6v.10 [vi, F 131].

D.F. *Cessation of cogitation (manas)*FA. Abandoning of cogitation (*manas*); #1381

FB. Non-defiled cogitation; #1398

FC. Three different characteristics (*viśeṣas*) of cogitation; #1411D.F.A. *Abandoning of cogitation (manas)*

#1381 This defiled {5/3r.} cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas*) (染污意), since beginningless time (無始), continues in a continuous series (相續). In what state is it temporarily (暫) or forever (永) abandoned (斷)?

#1385 [Vasubandhu's] stanza (*kārikā* 7bd or Chin. 7cd) answers this question (cf. #1103):

arhato na tat | na nirodha-samāpattau mārge lokottare na ca ||

[Defiled cogitation] DOES NOT EXIST IN THE *ARHAT*, IN THE ATTAINMENT OF CESSATION (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定) AND IN THE SUPRAMUNDANE PATH (阿羅漢滅定出世道無有).

#1387 By *ARHAT* (阿羅漢), one should, in general, understand the non-trainees (*aśaikṣas*) (i.e., abiders in the state of the fruit of the non-trainee [*aśaikṣa-phala-stha* 無學果位]) of the three vehicles (三乘). In this state of *arhat*, defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭaṃ manas* 染意)—the seeds (*bījas*) as well as the actual (種及現行)—is forever (永) abandoned (斷滅). It is therefore said that IT DOES NOT EXIST (*na*) (無有).

As for the state of the trainees (*śaikṣas* 學位)—in the state of ATTAINMENT OF CESSATION (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定) and when they practice the ⟨SUPRAMUNDANE⟩ PATH (出世道)—defiled cogitation is temporarily (暫) “tamed” (伏滅) (incapable of being actualized). It is thus said that IT DOES NOT EXIST (無有).

#1390 1. Defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas*) (染污意), since beginningless time (無始時), is subtle (微細), uniform (一類), a spontaneous (任運) process: the six mundane practices (i.e., the impure path [*sāsrava-mārga* 有漏道]) cannot tame (伏滅) it.⁴⁹⁷ But the noble path of the three vehicles (三乘聖道)—being pure mind (*anāsrava-citta*)—does tame it, for the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*, see #0040) is contradicted by the true understanding of non-self (*nairātmya*) (真無我解) [which is the “knowledge without conceptual figurating” (*avikalpaka-jñāna*), #2918]; for cogitation (*manas* 意) is also impossible when the “pure subse-

⁴⁹⁷ YBh, 63 and 88. – This is the mundane (*laukika*) path of AKB vi, F 239 (vii, F 29, 46–47), according to the *Vijñāna-kāya*, Tokyo, xxiii, 9, 29b18 [T.26.1539.0563c23].

quently acquired knowledge” (*prṣṭha-labdha-anāsrava-jñāna* 後得無漏) is actually manifest (現在前), which {5/3v.} is the outflow (*niṣyanda* 等流) of the actual “cognition” {of no-self}. <268> – These two knowledges, {i.e., the true understanding of non-self (真無我解) and the subsequently acquired knowledge (*prṣṭha-labdha* 後所得),} are pure (無漏), and both receive the name of SUPRAMUNDANE PATH (*lokottara-mārga* 出世道).

#1391 2. Attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定; #0279, #1035) is the equal outflow (等流) of the noble path (聖道); it is perfectly calm (極寂靜) [and, actually, similar to *nirvāṇa*]. Defiled cogitation is incompatible with it.

#1392 Nevertheless, the seeds (*bījas* 種子) of this cogitation (*manas*) have not yet been forever abandoned (未永斷). When the practitioner leaves the attainment {of cessation} (<*nirodha*->*samāpatti* 滅盡定) or the noble path (聖道), cogitation becomes active (現行) again, and this for as long as the seeds have not ceased (滅).

3. As for the *arhat*.

#1394 The defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) associated with this defiled cogitation (染意) are of the innate (*sahaja* 俱生, #0062) category; therefore, they are not abandoned (所斷) (i.e., in terms of their seeds) by the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) (見) [since they arise spontaneously]; they are defiled (染污), therefore, they are not “not to be abandoned” (*aheya* 非所斷).

#1395 All the seeds (種子) of these defilements, being very subtle (極微細), will be abandoned (斷) at the same time as the seeds of the most tenuous (下下) defilements (煩惱) of the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra* 有頂) are abandoned, i.e., at one time and in one stroke (一時頓), for they are all of equal power (*āvedha, prabhāva, ākṣepa*) (勢力等). This is what happens when the adamant concentration (*vajra-upama-samādhi* 金剛喻定) is actually manifest (現在前). {5/4r.} All these seeds (種) being abandoned in one stroke (頓), the practitioner becomes an *arhat* (阿羅漢), and defiled cogitation disappears forever {in the state of the non-trainee (無學位)}. (See #0068.)

#1396 The non-trainees (*āśaikṣas* 無學) or *arhats* of the two vehicles (二乘) who turn (迴趣) towards the Great Vehicle (大乘) are, in reality, *bodhisattvas* (菩薩), i.e., from the moment of their branching off (i.e., first thought of *bodhi*) (初發心) until the state immediately prior to buddhahood (成佛). But the stanza (*kārikā* 7b, Chin. 7c) designates them also by the name of *ARHAT* (阿羅漢), since [the *bodhi-sattvas*] are, like the others, {i.e., the *arhats*, etc.} free of the belief in a self

(*ātma-grāha*) 〈and are thus not spoken of separately〉.⁴⁹⁸

D.F.B. *Non-defiled cogitation (manas)*

#1398 a. According to Sthiramati, *manas* (末那) or the seventh cognition is always “defiled”; [i.e.,] there is no *manas* when the hindrance of defilements (*kleśa-āvaraṇa* 煩惱障) (i.e., in the “belief in a self” [*ātma-grāha*] category) is absent, for the noble teachings (聖教) say:

1. *manas* is absent in the three states (三位), which we will study (Asaṅga, *Samuccaya-śāstra* 大乘阿毘達磨集論, T.31.1605.0666a = #1411);

2. moreover, *manas* is said to be always associated with four defilements (*kleśas* 四惑) <269> (Asaṅga, *Vikhyāpana* 顯揚聖教論, T.31.1602.480c);

3. moreover, *manas* is said to be the support for the pollution of cognition (*viññāna-saṃkleśa-āśraya* 識雜染依) (Asaṅga, *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* 攝大乘論本, T.31.1594.0133c).

b. [But Dharmapāla says that *manas*, ceasing to be defiled, continues to exist in its nature (i.e., as seventh cognition).]

#1400 Sthiramati’s thesis is in contradiction with the teachings (教) and with reason (理).

1. A *sūtra* [YBh, T.30.1579.0651c] says that there is a supramundane (*lokottara* 出世) *manas* (末那).

#1401 2. Mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), when it is non-defiled (無染), as when it is defiled, definitively has a support (*āśraya* 依) that has “arisen with it” (*sahabhū* 俱生) and that is special (不共) (see #1180).

#1402 3. YBh (T.30.1579.0580c)⁴⁹⁹ teaches {5/4v.} that the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna* 藏識) definitively always functions (*pravartate* 轉) simultaneously with one cognition (*viññāna*), which will be *manas* (末那); that it functions simultaneously with two cognitions (二俱轉), i.e., mental cognition and *manas*, when mental cognition (意識) occurs; 〈that it functions simultaneously〉 with three cognitions when one of the five cognitions occurs; and so on: 〈that it functions simultaneously〉 with all seven cognitions when the five cognitions occur at once (頓).

If, as Sthiramati understands, the *manas* or seventh cognition disappears (無)

⁴⁹⁸ The text has: “since the meaning of *ying* 應 is equal [to *arhat*]”. – *ying* can be translated here as *arhattva*.

⁴⁹⁹ And *Vikhyāpana* (T.31.1602.0566).

during the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定), ⟨then, at that time, the store-cognition (藏識) would not be accompanied by any cognition and then⟩ YBh would wrongly say that the store-cognition definitively always functions simultaneously with one cognition.

If the seventh cognition disappears during the noble path (聖道) (which involves mental cognition), ⟨then, at that time, the store-cognition must be accompanied with one cognition and then⟩ YBh would wrongly say—when mental cognition occurs—that the store-cognition definitively functions simultaneously with two cognitions.

#1403 4. The *Āryadeśanāvīkhyāpana-śāstra* (Xianyang, T.31.1602.0480c24) says:

Manas (末那), [arisen from the seeds (*bījas*) of the store-cognition, takes this cognition (*vijñāna*) for its object {5/5r.} and] is always associated with four defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), i.e., [(1) delusion regarding the self (*ātma-moha*), (2) afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha*), (3) belief in a self and in mine (*ātma-ātmīya-grāha*), (4) conceit regarding the self (*ātma-māna*)].

But it adds:

Or else, [*manas*] is associated with their opposites (翻); whether in the aspect (行) of elevation (*utkṣepa* 恃舉) or in the aspect of equality (*samatā* 平等), [it always functions with this cognition (i.e., the store-cognition)].

We conclude from this text that this cogitation (*manas*) can be defiled (染) or non-defiled (不染).

#1404 5. YBh (T.30.1579.0651c), says that “defiled cogitation” (*manas* 染意) is absent in the state of *arhat* (阿羅漢位). – Do not draw the conclusion that the seventh cognition is absent in this state, for the treatise (*śāstra*) also says that one discards (捨) the store-cognition (*ālaya* 賴耶) in the state of *arhat*. Now you yourself think that the eighth cognition remains in the *arhats*. ⟨If the latter is the case (爾), why would it be not the case with the former?⟩ (See #0726, #1183.)

#1405 6. Moreover, various treatises, i.e., *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (T.31.1604.0607a01) and [Asvabhāva’s] *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* [commentary] (T.31.1598.0438a18), say:

The knowledge of equality (*samatā-jñāna* 平等智) is acquired by the transmutation (*parāvṛtti* 轉) of the seventh cognition (#0417, #3180, #3271).

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This knowledge, like the other knowledges (智), must rely (*āśri* 所依) on a pure cognition (*viññāna* 淨識) with which it is associated. [Without support (*āśraya*), (without a mind-as-ruler,) there is no mental factor (*caitta*) that relies on it.] Thus, lacking this pure seventh cognition, the knowledge of equality (*samatā-jñāna*) will be absent (because, in the absence of a support (所依), there cannot be that which has a support (能依)). Indeed, one cannot think that this knowledge relies on the first six evolving cognitions (⟨*pravṛtti*-⟩*viññānas* 轉識), for it is constant (in *buddhas* (佛)), like the mirror knowledge (*ādarśa-jñāna* 鏡智).⁵⁰⁰ {5/5v.}

#1406 7. Moreover, if the seventh cognition is absent in the state of non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學), the eighth cognition will, in this state, have no simultaneous support (俱有依). Now, being a cognition, it must have this support (依), like the other cognitions (above, #1182).

#1407 8. Moreover, by the fact of the seventh cognition with which the belief in a self (*ātma-graha*) is associated, it is accepted that the belief in a self (我執) constantly occurs (恆行) in the person who has not yet realized the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-sūnyatā*) (or non-self of the person [*pudgala-nairātmya* 補特伽羅無我]) (see #1415). But the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha* 法我執) also constantly occurs in the person who has not yet realized the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-sūnyatā*) (or non-self of *dharma*s [*dharma-nairātmya* 法無我]).

On what cognition (識) will this belief in *dharma*s rely, if the seventh cognition disappears (i.e., along with the belief in a self, with the hindrance of defilements [*kleśa-āvaraṇa*])? – On the eighth cognition? Impossible, for the eighth is without [the mental factor] “understanding” (*prajñā-caitta* 無慧, see #0633).

Let us conclude that (we must trust (信) that), among the saints (聖) of the two vehicles (二乘)—in the generation of the noble path [道], in the attainment (of cessation) (滅定), in the state of *arhat* (or non-trainee) (無學)—this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*), remains constantly active (恆行), endowed with the belief in *dharma*s, for the saints in question have not realized the emptiness of *dharma*s (法無我).

#1408 9. Moreover, various treatises, i.e., the YBh (T.30.1579.0580b) and the *Samgrāha* (T.31.1594.0133c17), establish the necessity for the existence of a seventh cognition as support (依) for the sixth, because the sixth must have a support in the same way as the first five. {5/6r.} If—at the time when the noble path (聖道) occurs or

⁵⁰⁰ *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra* [T.26.1530.0304a21].

in the state of non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學)—the seventh cognition is absent as support of the sixth, then the reasoning (宗因) of YBh would be doubly mistaken. — Or else, would the first five cognitions also have no support (依)? These five always have a support, and, likewise, the sixth.

- #1409 Thus, it is certain that in the three aforementioned states, a non-defiled cogitation (*manas*; 無染污意) remains always present. The texts, which say that cogitation (*manas*) is absent there, consider only defiled cogitation (*manas* 染意). Likewise, we have seen that the store-cognition (阿賴耶) is absent in four states (位) (i.e., the non-trainees of the three vehicles and <271> the non-retrogressing [*avaivartika*] *bodhisattvas*, #0700), but the eighth cognition is not absent there. <The same is the case here.>

D.F.C. *Three different characteristics (viśeṣas) of the cogitation (manas)*⁵⁰¹

- #1411 This seventh cognition or cogitation (*manas* 意) presents, in brief, three different characteristics: either <#1412>

1. it is associated with the view (見) of the substantial existence (我) of a person (*pudgala* 補特伽羅), or
2. it is associated with the view of the substantial existence of *dharma*s (法), or
3. it is associated with the knowledge of equality (*samatā-jñāna* 平等性智).

- #1415 As for the first characteristic, [a] such is the *manas* {5/6v.} of all ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生) continuously (相續); [b] such is the *manas*—when their state of mind (心位) is impure (*sāsrava* 有漏) [i.e., when they are not practicing the noble path]—of the trainees (*śaikṣas* 有學) of the two vehicles (二乘) and of one category of *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) (with the exception of the *arhats* who became *bodhisattvas* by branching off) before the eighth stage (*bhūmi* 地).

This *manas* takes the store-cognition (阿賴耶識) for its object (緣) and generates the view (見) <of the substantial existence (我)> of a person (*pudgala-dr̥ṣṭi* 補特伽羅): [it considers the store-cognition to be a self (*ātman*), a person (*pudgala*)].

- #1416 As for the second characteristic, [a] such is the *manas* of all ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*), hearers (*śrāvakas* 聲聞) and self-enlightened ones (*pratyekabuddhas* 獨覺) (i.e., non-trainees [*aśaikṣas*] and trainees [*śaikṣas*]) at all times, [b] such is the *manas* of all the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) when the knowledge of the

⁵⁰¹ See #0062, #0350.

emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-sūnyatā-jñāna* 法空智) or the fruits (果) of this knowledge (i.e., the “subsequently acquired [*prṣṭha-labdha*] knowledge” and the attainment [*samāpatti*]) is not present.

This *manas* takes the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) for its object (緣) (see #0740) and generates the view ⟨of the substantial existence⟩ (我) of *dharma*s (*dharma-dṛṣṭi* 法我見): [it considers the “cognition that is retribution” to be a *dharma*].

- #1417 As for the third and last characteristic, [a] such is the *manas* of all the *tathāgatas* (如來) at all times, [b] such is the *manas* of the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) when they are practicing the path of insight (*darśana* 見道),⁵⁰² and when—during the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā* 修道)—they are practicing the knowledge of the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-sūnyatā-jñāna* 法空智) or its fruits.

This *manas* takes the pure (*vimala* 無垢, #0741) cognition (*vijñāna*) (in the case of the *buddha*), the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) (in the case of *bodhisattvas*), and also the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas*) and true suchness (*bhūta-tathatā*) for its object (緣). It generates the knowledge of equality (*śamatā-jñāna* 平等性智).

- #1420 When there occurs the view ⟨of the substantial existence (我)⟩ of a person (*pudgala-dṛṣṭi*), then there must also be present the view ⟨of the substantial existence (我)⟩ of *dharma*s (*dharma-dṛṣṭi* 法我見), for {5/7r.} belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執) must be supported by the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha* 法執): just as in order to apprehend a post (杙), etc., for a man (人), etc., first it is necessary to be mistaken (迷) about the post, etc., ⟨in the dark (夜)⟩.

- #1421 Although the two views (*dṛṣṭis* 見) ⟨of self (我) and of *dharma*s (法)⟩ have different functions (用), nevertheless, they do not contradict <272> each other, and together they depend on a single “understanding” (*prajñā*). Likewise, although visual cognition (*cakṣur-vijñāna* 眼識), etc., is itself (體) single (一), nevertheless, it has different functions (多用), i.e., cognizing of blue (*nīla-vijñapti* 了別青), etc., for there is no contradiction. ⟨It is the same here [with the two views]⟩.

- #1424 1. The [following] trainees (*śaikṣas*) have only the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha* 法執) (associated with the seventh cognition) because they have already “tamed” (伏) the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執):

- a. trainees (有學) of the two vehicles (二乘) (i.e., determined family [*niyata-*

⁵⁰² I.e., the path of one mind, according to Kuiji; but also the path of three minds according to another commentator, #2915.

gotra]], when they practice the [noble] path (聖道) (*mārga*: i.e., path of insight [*darśana-mārga*] and path of cultivation [*bhāvanā-mārga*]), when they are in the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定): [at other times, they also have the belief in a self];

b. *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) of “sudden realization” (頓悟),⁵⁰³ [with the exception of the path of insight, in the course of which the belief in *dharma*s is absent in them],⁵⁰⁴ when, in the path of cultivation (修道), they practice the knowledge of the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-śūnyatā-jñāna* 生空智) or enjoy the fruits (果) of this knowledge (*jñāna*) (i.e., the subsequently acquired knowledge [*prṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*] and the attainment of cessation [*nirodha-samāpatti*]); yet, when they practice the knowledge of the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna*), the belief in *dharma*s is absent in them];

c. *bodhisattvas* (有學) of “gradual realization” (漸悟), in the two paths, when they practice the knowledge of the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-śūnyatā-jñāna* 生空智) or enjoy its fruit (果).

⁵⁰³ The two categories of *bodhisattvas*: [a] “sudden realization”, i.e., *bodhisattvas* who will attain the fruit of the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*) by the vehicle of the *bodhisattvas* (becoming *buddhas* by the obtainment of this fruit) and those who are still trainees (*śaikṣas*); [b] “progressive realization”, i.e., the saints who have attained the fruit before becoming *bodhisattvas*.

⁵⁰⁴ Here the author is considering the “path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) of one mind” (#2927). – When the *bodhisattva* practices the “path of insight of three minds”, the first mind is not free of the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*).

Three cases are envisaged:

1. Saints of the first two vehicles who never rid themselves of the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*). The belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*) (and only the belief in a self) is absent in them when they have minds included in the path.
2. *Bodhisattvas* who have not practiced the [path of] insight (*darśana*) in the two vehicles, who, being still ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*), have entered into the career of the *bodhisattva*: they become trainees (*śaikṣas*)—when practicing a path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) involving the absence of the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*)—by means of the cognition of the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-śūnyatā-jñāna*); in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*), they practice sometimes [i] the emptiness of the person (*pudgala-śūnyatā*) (in which case the belief in a person is absent in them, but not the belief in *dharma*s), [ii] sometimes the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-śūnyatā*) (in which case the two beliefs [*grāhas*] are absent in them).
3. *Bodhisattvas* who have become *bodhisattvas* after having obtained the quality of the trainee in the two vehicles: similar to the two preceding ones, except in regard to the path of insight.

- #1425 2. Non-trainees (*aśaikṣas* 無學) of the two vehicles (二乘) (determined family [*niyata-gotra*]) and <273> the *bodhisattvas*⁵⁰⁵ (of gradual realization), when the knowledge of the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-sūnyatā-jñāna* 法空智) or its fruit (果) are not present (不現前), have only the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha* 法執) because they have already “abandoned” (斷) the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 法執). {5/7v.}

[As for the *bodhisattvas*, the time when they practice the path of insight (*darśana-mārga*) and, during the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*), the times when the knowledge of the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-sūnyatā-jñāna*) or its fruits are present must be excluded: the belief in *dharma*s is absent then.]

- #1427 However, in the eighth stage (*bhūmi* 地) and above, the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執) forever ceases to become active (永不行) among all *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) whatever their category, (1) whether it is already forever abandoned (永斷) (i.e., in the non-trainees: *bodhisattvas* of gradual realization, that is to say, non-trainees of the two vehicles who have become *bodhisattvas*), or (2) whether it has been forever tamed (永伏) (i.e., in the trainees: [a] *bodhisattvas* of gradual realization, that is to say, trainees of the two vehicles who have become *bodhisattvas*, [b] *bodhisattvas* of sudden realization who are necessarily trainees). – But, except in the time when they are practicing the knowledge of the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-sūnyatā-jñāna* 法空智) or enjoying the fruits (果) of this knowledge (*jñāna*), they generate the belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha* 法執). There is here no contradiction.

- #1428 As the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (T16.0676.0707c18) says:

In the eighth stage and above, all of the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) are no longer active (現行): there remains only the hindrance to what is to be known (*jñeya-āvaraṇa* 所知障) (#3139) as the support (*āśraya* 所依) [i.e., there remains only a belief in *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*) belonging to the *manas*: there remains only the belief in *dharma*s (= hindrance to what is to be known) of the seventh cognition which here is the support].

This hindrance to what is to be known (所知障) is actual (現), i.e., not a seed (*bīja* 種) (i.e., this hindrance is not the seed of the belief in a self [*ātma-grāha*] of the sixth cognition). (Otherwise, the defilements (煩惱) would exist also.)

- #1429 3. As far as the two vehicles (二乘) are concerned, the cogitation (*manas* 意)

⁵⁰⁵ Editors: LVP translates “... et les Bodhisattvas des deux catégories ...”.

with which the belief in *dharmas* (*dharma-grāha* 法執) is accompanied is said to be “non-defiled” (*akliṣṭa* 不染). But as far as the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) are concerned, cogitation is also said to be “defiled” (染) because it forms an obstacle (障) to the knowledge (*jñāna* 智) that belongs to them. Cogitation is thus also called obscured-non-defined (*nivṛta-avyākṛta* 有覆無記), {5/8r.} whereas, in what concerns the two vehicles, etc., it is called non-obscured (*anivṛta* 無覆) because it does not form an obstacle to the knowledge that belongs to the two vehicles.

4. Cogitation (*manas*) is non-defined (*avyākṛta*) and, among the four kinds of the non-defined, it belongs to the category “arisen from retribution” (*vipākaja* 異熟生). Indeed, it so called because it constantly arises from the eighth cognition which is the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識); it is not “fruit of retribution” (*vipāka-phala* 異熟果). [If it is called *vipākaja*, it is not that it arises from good-bad actions of retribution (*kuśala-akuśala vipāka-karman*):] <274> The term *vipākaja*, indeed, is comprehensive (通) and includes all that is non-defined without falling into the other three classes of the non-defined: just as any condition (*pratyaya* 緣) that is not (included in the other [conditions], i.e., the conditions qua) cause (*hetu*), qua object (*ālambana*) and qua the immediate antecedent (*samanantara*), is called condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya* 增上緣).⁵⁰⁶ <275>

⁵⁰⁶ AKB ii, F 288, 292.

D.G. *Demonstration of the existence of cogitation (manas)*

- #1431 [Question:] – How do we know that this cogitation (*manas*), i.e., the seventh cognition, is a cognition itself existing separate from the first six cognitions, i.e., visual cognition, etc.?
- #1433 [Answer:] – From the 〈definitive authority (定量)〉 of the noble teachings (聖教) and of proper reasoning (*yukti*).

- G.A. Arguments drawn from the noble teachings; #1437
 G.B. Solitary ignorance (*āveṇikī avidyā*); #1445
 G.C. Two conditions (*pratyayas*) of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); #1469
 G.D. The name *manas*; #1476
 G.E. Two attainments (*samāpattis*); #1480
 G.F. Gods without ideation; #1484
 G.G. Ordinary worldling (*prthagjana*) and the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), and absence of the belief in a self; #1492

D.G.A. *Arguments drawn from the noble teachings*

- #1437 1. In many places in the *sūtras*, the Bhagavat (薄伽梵) teaches that *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* (心意識) have three different kinds of meaning:
- citta* (心) due to accumulating and generating [*cita* 集起];
 - manas* (意) due to “cogitating/-reckoning” [*mananā* 思量];
 - vijñāna* (識) due to cognizing [*vijñapti* 了別].

〈These are the three different meanings.〉

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See AKB ii, F 176, where the etymologies which we have here are shown.

Kuiji: For the Little Vehicle, *citta* is the future mind; *manas*, the past mind; *vijñāna* the present mind. Moreover, no difference in nature: it is the same mind that takes the three names.

- #1439 Thus, although these three meanings extend to all eight cognitions (*vijñānas*), nevertheless, by taking into account the essential (勝) 〈and manifest (顯)〉 characteristic of each of them: {5/8v.}

- the eighth is called *citta* (心) because the eighth (i.e., as actual [cognition]) accumulates (集, *cinoti*) the seeds (*bījas* 種) 〈of *dharma*s (法)〉 and [because the eighth] (i.e., as seed, that is, as seed-cognition [*bīja-vijñāna*]) is generating (起)

dharmas (#0878);

b. the seventh is called *manas* (意) because, taking the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), etc., for its object (緣), it does not stop or is constantly (恆) (and assessingly (審)) “cogitating(-reckoning)” (*man* 思量) the object as a self (*ātman* 我), etc.;

c. the remaining first six are called *vijñāna* (識) because their function is to cognize (*vijñap* 了別) their six specific objects (境) in a coarse (麤), changing (動) and discontinuous (間斷) way.

#1440 As the verse in *Laṅkāvatāra* (入楞伽) says:⁵⁰⁷

cittam ālaya-vijñānaṃ mano yaṃ manyanātmakam |
grhṇāti viṣayān yena vijñānaṃ hi tad ucyate ||

⟨*Citta* means store-cognition (藏識); *manas* means that which is of the nature of cogitating-reckoning (思量性);

Vijñāna means that which seizes or cognizes (了) the [characteristics (相) of] objects (境).⟩

Moreover, the Great Vehicle (大乘) *sūtras* specify in many places that there is a seventh cognition. Thus, this cognition exists separately; for we have already extensively demonstrated that the Great Vehicle *sūtras* are authoritative (*āgama-prāmāṇya* 至教量, see #0836). ⟨We do not need to repeat that again.⟩ <276>

#1442 2. Elsewhere, a *muktaka-sūtra* (解脱經),⁵⁰⁸ accepted by the Little Vehicle, also specifies this seventh cognition. {5/9r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Muktaka-sūtra, *Vyākhyā* ad AKB iii, F 13, *Vibhāṣā*, 172, 3. – *muktaka* is here, in Chinese, translated by “liberation” (解脱). – When one translates [*muktaka* as] *ling-uo* 零落 “fraction-fallen”, it refers to an apocrypha or to a corrupt text.

The [following] verse is found there:

The defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染污) cogitation (*manas* 意) always (恆時) arises (生) and ceases (滅) with the defilements (*kleśas* 惑);

If it is freed (解脱) from the defilements, it will have neither past (曾)

⁵⁰⁷ *Laṅkāvatāra* x, stanza 102, p. 278, T16.0672.0626c22; T16.0671.0567c14.

⁵⁰⁸ I.e., a *sūtra* that is not part of the canonical scriptures [*āgamas*], as, for example, the *Devatā-sūtra* (T15.592).

nor future (當) [defilements].

- #1443 The *sūtra* itself gives the commentary on this verse. – There is a defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas*) (染污意) which, since beginningless time, always arises and ceases together with the four defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱), namely, (1) afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi* 我見), (2) afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha* 我愛), (3) conceit regarding the self (*ātma-māna* 我慢), (4) delusion regarding the self (*ātma-moha* 我癡). When these defilements have already been abandoned (斷) by the arising of the counteragent path (*pratipakṣa-mārga* 對治道) (i.e., the unhindered path [*ānantarya-mārga* 無間道]), then this cogitation (*manas* 意)—from this moment on (i.e., at the path of liberation [*vimukti-mārga* 解脫道]), the state of non-trainee [*aśaikṣa*)]—attains liberation (解脫). At that time, the defilements associated with cogitation (*manas* 意) will not only no longer exist in the present, but past (過) or future (未) defilements will also not exist, for past (過去) and future (未來) *dharma*s have no reality ⟨or intrinsic nature⟩ (無自性).⁵⁰⁹

⟨Being weary of (厭) and fearing (恐) endless presentations (廣文),⟩ we will not bother to indicate the analogous texts ⟨or teachings (教)⟩ of all the schools (部). {5/9v.}

D.G.B. *Solitary ignorance (āveṇikī avidyā)*⁵¹⁰

- #1445 ⟨Having already quoted the noble teachings (聖教), we will show the correct reason (正理).⟩

#1448 The *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra* teaches:

The ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) called *āveṇikī* (solitary, 不共)—subtle (微細) and always active (恆行)—obscures reality (覆蔽真實), [hinders it from being cognized].

Such ignorance would be absent if this seventh cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*),

⁵⁰⁹ All schools admit this *sūtra*, but they explain it differently:

For the Sthaviras, it refers to the defiled sixth cognition (*viññāna*); the defilements (*kleśas*) are simultaneous; there is one subtle mind which is the sixth because the latter is always present as mind arisen from sensation, etc. (*vedanāja-citta-ādi*).

For the Mahāsāṃghikas, the word “always” should not be taken literally, as when one says that someone never eats.

For the Sarvāstivādins, the four defilements are not simultaneous but successive.

⁵¹⁰ The author is following the commentaries of the *Samgraha*, Asvabhāva, etc. – See #2668.

would not exist.

- #1451 a. Explanation of the *sūtra*. — Ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生) (in contrast to <277> the saints [*āryas*] for whom the pure path [*anāsrava-mārga*] is present)—(of all moral types), i.e., whether their mind is good, bad or non-defined—always generate the ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) called *āveṇikī* (不共 solitary), which causes error (*moha*) as to (reality), i.e., “non-self” (*nairātmya*) (迷理), which obscures (覆) reality or true suchness (*bhūta-tathāta* 真實) and which forms an obstacle (障) to the noble eye of “understanding” (*ārya-prajñā-cakṣus* 聖慧眼).

As the verse says (*Samgraha*, T.31.1594.0134a01):

Although the mind (= knowledge) of reality (*tattva-artha-citta* = *anāsrava-bhūta-jñāna* ? 真義心) is about to manifest (當生), there always is obstructively (障礙) present—accompanying any kind of mind (俱行一切分)—what is spoken of as solitary (*āveṇikī* 不共) ignorance (*avidyā* 無明).

That is why the *sūtra* says:

Ordinary worldlings (異生) always live (處) as in a long night (長夜)—i.e., blinded (所盲) by ignorance (*avidyā*), their minds (心) stupefied and intoxicated (惛醉纏)—and are never awakened (醒覺).

- #1452 To assume that, in the state of the ordinary worldling (*prthagjana* 異生), the generation of this ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) could even temporarily (暫) cease (不起) {5/10r.} is to contradict the *sūtra*. It is contradictory to assume that ignorance—which involves error regarding reality, i.e., non-self (*nairātmya*) (迷理) [and which is the essence of the state of the ordinary worldling]—could both be active and not be active (有行不行) in the ordinary worldling according to whether his mind is good or bad. And it is not reasonable that this ignorance has the six cognitions as its seat (or support) (依), for it would follow that, on the one hand, it would be discontinuous (間斷) (contradicting the *sūtra* and the verse) [since these six cognitions are not constant] and, on the other hand, that the six cognitions would always be defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染, accompanied by defilement), which is not true.

As soon as the existence (有) of *manas* (末那) [—always accompanied by solitary ignorance (*āveṇikī avidyā*) as long as the practitioner does not abandon the state of the ordinary worldling—] is accepted, these difficulties disappear.

b. Explanation of the term *āveṇikī* (不共).⁵¹¹

#1454 Defiled cogitation (*manas* 染意), as we have seen (#1273), is always associated with four defilements (*kleśas* 惑) (i.e., [1] afflicted view of a self [*ātma-dṛṣṭi*], [2] delusion regarding the self [*ātma-moha*], [3] conceit regarding the self [*ātma-māna*], [4] afflicted self-love [*ātma-sneha*]). How can the ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) associated with cogitation [—and which is obviously the delusion regarding the self of this list—] be said to be “solitary” (不共 *āveṇikī*)? <278>

#1456 1. According to one opinion, the afflicted view (*dṛṣṭi*) [of a self] (我見), conceit (*māna*) [regarding the self] (我慢) and afflicted self-love (*sneha*) (我愛) that accompany ignorance (*avidyā*) are not actual defilements or root defilements (*mūla-kleśas* 根本煩惱), [but are secondary defilements, i.e., subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*)]. Thus, ⟨why would there be a problem for⟩ ignorance to be called solitary (不共 *āveṇikī*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

What are the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) referred to here? – Two opinions:

a. It does not refer to the twenty subsidiary defilements (see #1315, twenty and twenty-two subsidiary defilements), but to the subsidiary defilements as explained by the *Kṣudraka-vastu* (cited in AKB v, F 88), to the *avasthā-viśeṣas* (special modalities) of the root defilements (*mūla-kleśas*).

b. By afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), one should understand incorrect knowledge (*asamyag-jñāna*); by conceit regarding the self (*ātma-māna*), [one should understand] pride (*mada*); by afflicted self-love (*ātma-sneha*), [one should understand] restlessness (*auddhatya*).

#1458 2. But according to Candrapāla, this opinion contradicts both reason (理) and the teachings (教). Indeed, these three are not among the “purely” (*kevala* ? 純) subsidiary defilements (= *upakleśas* [隨煩惱] which are subsidiary defilements only⁵¹²) (which are twenty in number); these three are included among the six or ten defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) (i.e., six or ten, according to whether one does not or does divide afflicted view [*dṛṣṭi*], see #0282); scripture says expressly and many times that the defiled (染污) *manas* (末那) is always associated with four defilements, [i.e., but not that it is associated with subsidiary defilements]. {5/10v.}

⁵¹¹ See AKB vii, F 66 for the unique or unshared factors (*āveṇika-dharmas*) of the Bhagavat and various notes on the word *āveṇika*. The *āveṇikī avidyā* of the *Vibhāṣā*, AKB ii, F 167, v, F 31, 34.

⁵¹² AKB v, F 88.

#1459 However, among the four defilements, ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) is the ruler (主) (being cause-support). Although it is accompanied by three defilements, it is called solitary (*āveṇikī* 不共), for delusion (*moha*) (or ignorance [*avidyā*]), since beginningless time (無始際), always stupefies and deceives the mind (內昏迷) without (the dominance of delusion (癡增上)) ever having been “properly examined” (省察).

#1460 Someone will say: But afflicted view (見), conceit and afflicted love (*drṣṭi-māna-sneha*) are called “associated” (*saṃprayukta* 相應) [with ignorance] [when the latter is the ruler (主): very good]. But, when they themselves are the ruler, should they not be called solitary (不共 *āveṇika*)?

[Reply:] – Without a doubt, just like ignorance (無明). [If you assume that they are the ruler,] it is not wrong to also call them solitary (*āveṇika*). [But nowhere is a *drṣṭi* (view) spoken of as being solitary (*āveṇikī*).]

#1462 3. According to a third opinion, this ignorance (or delusion) (*avidyā* = *moha* 癡) is called *āveṇikī* (不共) because this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*)—alone among the cognitions (*viññānas*)—possesses it; just as the unique factors (*āveṇika-dharmas*) of the *buddha* (不共佛法) [are called in this way because they belong solely to the *buddha*].

#1463 Someone will say: – If that is so and if the esteeming of bad views (*drṣṭi-parāmarśa*) or some other kind of defilement (*kleśa*) belongs exclusively to a certain cognition (*viññāna*) (i.e., mental cognition [*mano-viññāna*]) and is absent in this cognition, i.e., the seventh, should [this defilement] then be called solitary (*āveṇika* 不共)? <279>

[Reply:] – No. If one says of a *dharma* that it is solitary (*āveṇika* 不共), this is (not due to its absence but) only due to its solitary characteristic (or state (立)) and also due to its excellence (殊勝). That is, the ignorance (*avidyā* 不共) associated with the seventh, i.e., cogitation (*manas*)—since beginningless time (無始), {5/11r.} always active (恆行)—obstructs (障) the knowledge of reality (*bhūta-artha-jñāna* 真義智); such an eminent function (勝用) is absent in the ignorance of the other cognitions (*viññānas* 識). Of the ignorance which belongs exclusively to this cognition, i.e., the seventh cognition, we say that it is solitary (*āveṇikī* 不共).

[Question:] – But then will the other three defilements of the seventh also be called solitary (*āveṇika* 不共)?

[Answer:] – No, for only [this ignorance (*avidyā* 無明)] is the ruler (主), (and

it alone merits this name). Or else, if one wants the three other defilements to also merit the name “solitary” [by contrast with the same three defilements of the other cognitions], then it is ignorance (*avidyā*) alone that is called solitary (*āveṇikī*) in contrast with the delusion (*moha* 癡) of the sixth cognition [and this in order to refute the doctrines of the Little Vehicle which confuse the solitary ignorance (*āveṇikī avidyā*) of the seventh cognition with this delusion].

#1465 In fact, the solitary ignorance (*āveṇikī avidyā* 不共無明) is of two kinds:

- a. *nitya-cāriṇī* (恆行), (i.e., the solitary ignorance that is) constant, which belongs to cogitation (*manas*) alone (and not to the other cognitions);
- b. *kevala-cāriṇī* (獨行), (i.e., the solitary ignorance which is) isolated, [that is to say, not associated with the root defilements (*mūla-kleśas*) but associated only with ten subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*), i.e., anger (*krodha*), etc.,] which is absent in cogitation, [for the ignorance of the cogitation is always accompanied by the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), etc.].

#1466 This is why YBh (T.30.1579.0622a11) says that there are two kinds of ignorance (無明 *avidyā*):

- a. if ignorance is accompanied by the root defilements (*mūla-kleśas*)—attachment (*rāga* 貪), etc., (of the sixth cognition)—it is called associated (相應) ignorance (*saṃprayukta-avidyā*);
- b. if ignorance is not accompanied by attachment, etc., (*rāga-ādi*), it is called isolated (*kevala-cāriṇī* 獨行) (ignorance).

The “isolated” (*kevala-cāriṇī* 獨行) ignorance (*avidyā*):

1. When [this ignorance] is the ruler (主) (—strictly “isolated”, not associated with anger [*krodha*], etc.: it refers to the ignorance that involves an error about the truth, which arises from figurating [*vikalpa*], see #0062)—[this ignorance] is only abandoned by insight into the truths (*darśana-heya* 見所斷). {5/11v.} It is this kind [of ignorance] that is referred to in the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*:

The noble (*ārya* 聖) trainees (*śaikṣa* 學) (i.e., saints who have practiced the path of insight [*darśana-mārga*]) have already forever abandoned the solitary ignorance (*āveṇikī avidyā* 不共無明) (i.e., the *kevala-cāriṇī* king) (and therefore do not bring forth new *karma* (新業)).⁵¹³

2. When [this ignorance] is not the ruler (主) (—being associated with anger

⁵¹³ Compare AKB v, F 12.

[*krodha*], etc., which is the ruler—), [this ignorance] is also of the category that is abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷), for anger (*忿*), etc., is abandoned by insight and by cultivation (見修所斷). <280>

- #1467 The two vehicles [i.e., the Little Vehicle and the Great Vehicle,] accept the 〈solitary (*āveṇikī* 不共)〉 ignorance (*avidyā*) that is isolated (獨行). Only the Great Vehicle accepts the 〈solitary (*āveṇikī* 不共)〉 ignorance that is constant (恆行).

D.G.C. *Two conditions (pratyayas) of mental cognition (mano-vijñāna)*⁵¹⁴

- #1469 Moreover, the *sūtra* says:

With the eye (眼) and colors (色) as condition (緣), the visual cognition arises ...; with *manas* (意) and the *dharma*s as condition, the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) arises.

What is this *manas* (意), i.e., the condition (*pratyaya*) of mental cognition, if not this seventh cognition?

- #1471 1. Indeed, the five cognitions necessarily have a sense-faculty (*indriya*), i.e., the eye, etc., for their condition (*pratyaya*), that is, 〈a support (所依), a sense-faculty, [a] which is “condition qua dominance” (增上) (*adhipati-pratyaya*) (and not “condition qua cause” [*hetu-pratyaya*], as is the seed [*bīja*], #1474), [b] which is specific (不共) to each cognition (i.e., the eye for visual cognition [*cakṣur-vijñāna*] ...; in contrast to the root-cognition [*mūla-vijñāna*] that is a general support), [c] which is simultaneous (俱有) with the cognition (and not immediately preceding).

〈Reason (理) commands that〉 mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識)—being included in the first six cognitions—must have a support (*āśraya* 所依) of this type. [This mental cognition] will not have such a support if this seventh cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*),⁵¹⁵ is absent. [Therefore the Sarvāstivādins are wrong in defining the *manas* of the *sūtra* as: “Of these six cognitions, the cognition which has just passed away is the mental sense-faculty (*manas*)”.⁵¹⁶] {5/12r.}

- #1472 2. [The Sthaviras say that there is a (type of) matter (*rūpa*) in the breast, i.e., a *rūpa-dravya*, which is analogous to the eye, etc., which serves as sense-faculty

⁵¹⁴ *Editors:* LVP inserts here the section “The name of the *manas*”, which occurs later in the original Chinese text, starting #1476. We have restored here the original sequence.

⁵¹⁵ The author follows the interpretation of Asvabhāva (*Samgraha*); Vasubandhu differs.

⁵¹⁶ AKB i, F 31–32.

(*indriya*) to mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*).⁵¹⁷ It cannot be said that mental cognition <282> has material (*rūpa* 色) *dharmas* for its support (*āśraya* 所依), for *manas* (意) is not material (*rūpa* 色)⁵¹⁸ [i.e., mental sense-faculty (*manas*) or sense-element of the mental sense-faculty (*mano-dhātu*) is one of the seven mind-sense-elements (*citta-dhātus*)⁵¹⁹]; for mental cognition (意識), [if it were to have matter (*rūpa*) for its support], would be without two kinds of figurating (*vikalpas* 分別), i.e., recollecting (*anusmaraṇa* 隨念) and examining (*nirūpaṇā*⁵²⁰ 計度), [just like the first five cognitions].⁵²¹

#1473 3. [The Sautrāntikas think, it is true, that the five cognitions do not have a simultaneous (*sahabhū*) support (俱有所依). It is a previous moment of the sense-faculty (*indriya*) that engenders the subsequent cognition. It is the same for mental cognition.] – In fact, the five cognitions have a simultaneous support (所依), for, like the sprout (芽) and its shadow (影), they exist (or function) (*pravartante*) simultaneously (俱時而轉) with the five sense-faculties (根); moreover, they must take the same object (*viṣaya* 境) as the five sense-faculties and must be simultaneous (俱時) with them, like mind (*citta* 心) and the mental factors (*caittas* 心所).

#1474 We conclude. – The well-established mental cognition (極成意識), being one of the six well-established cognitions (極成六識), must—quite like any other of these six, i.e., visual cognition, etc.—have a specific (不共) support (distinct from

⁵¹⁷ For the *hṛdaya-vastu* (i.e., the matter that is the fleshly heart [*hṛdaya-māṃsa-rūpa*], above, #1856 and *Siddhi* F 221) of the Tāmraparṇīyas, AKB i, F 32 and ix, F 452. – Also C. Rhys-Davids, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, iii, 2, p. 353.

⁵¹⁸ *Editors*: LVP renders: “... car le Rūpa n’est pas Manas [... for matter is not the mental sense-faculty].

⁵¹⁹ AKB i, F 31.

⁵²⁰ AKB i, F 60.

⁵²¹ Kuiji has various notes on the three kinds of figurating (*vikalpas*).

See AKB i, F 60. – According to *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0219b08), there are three kinds of figurating (*vikalpas*):

1. figurating in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vikalpa* 自性分別);
2. figurating consisting of examining (*nirūpaṇā-vikalpa* 推度分別);
3. figurating consisting of recollecting (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa* 隨念分別).

The first (which is initial inquiry and investigation [*vitarka-vicāra*]) belongs also to the first five cognitions. – The Great Vehicle differs ...

Kuiji, commentary on the *Viṃśatikā* (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, 3/30r.–32v; T.43.1834.0999a following).

the eighth cognition), a support [a] which is a sense-sphere (*āyatana* 處) bearing its name (*mana-āyatana*, and not a material sense-sphere [*rūpa-āyatana*] as the Sthaviras would have it), [b] which is not included in the “condition qua immediate antecedent” (*samanantara-pratyaya* 等無間, like the mental sense-faculty [*manas*] that has already ceased [*pūrva-niruddha*] of the Sarvāstivādins), [c] which is a “condition qua dominance” (增上所依) (*adhipati-pratyaya*, and not the “condition qua cause” [*hetu-pratyaya*], like the seed [*bīja*]).⁵²² – [This support (*āśraya*) is our seventh cognition.] <283>

D.G.D. *The name manas*⁵²³

#1476 Moreover, the *sūtra* says: cogitating(-reckoning) (思量) is called *manas* (*manyata iti manas*,⁵²⁴ *cogitat ergo vocatur manas*) [attributing to *manas* a present activity]. What is this *manas* that cogitates(-reckoning), if not the seventh cognition? (If this cognition would not exist, then neither would that [cogitating-calculating].) {5/12v.}

1. [The Sarvāstivādins say that the past mental sense-faculty (*manas*) is called “cogitating(-reckoning)” (*manyamāna*).]

#1477 We say: – At the time when mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) exists, i.e., at the present moment (現在前時), the immediately antecedent mental sense-faculty (等無間意) (*manas*) has already ceased (滅) and no longer exists, for, (in the light of reason (理),) past (過去) and future (未來) [*dharmas*] do not exist (非有).

2. [The Sautrāntikas accept that the past does not exist.]

⁵²² Cogitation (*manas*) immediately engenders mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); it is the near and main support (*āśraya*). With regard to the eighth cognition, cogitation (*manas*) is the support of pollution and of purification (*saṃkleśa-vyavadāna-āśraya*) and does not immediately engender; with regard to the five cognitions, cogitation (*manas*) is the support of pollution and of purification (*saṃkleśa-vyavadāna-āśraya*) but not the support-that-engenders. The simultaneous mental factors (*caittas*) are also the support of mental cognition: but they are not solely support, since they rely on mental cognition.

Kuiji, *Shuji* (5B/27r.).

⁵²³ *Editors*: Here is the section which in LVP’s *Siddhi* occurs at *Siddhi* F 280–281.

⁵²⁴ There is the phrase *manuta iti manah* (AKB ii, F 177). – But *Laṅkāvatāra*, x, 400, *manasā manyate punaḥ*; 461: *mano manyati vai sadā*

The mental sense-faculty (*manas*) of the Sarvāstivādins is defined in AKB i, *kārika* 17, F 31: “Of these six cognitions, the cognition which has just past away is the mental sense-faculty (*manas*)”.

We say: – [If the mental sense-faculty (*manas*) is past for you, then] the activity of cogitating(-reckoning) (思量用) is definitively missing (for if the mental sense-faculty does not exist, an activity of cogitating(-reckoning) [*mananā-kriyā*] cannot be attributed to it).

The name *manas* (意) is thus not justified.

3. [The Sautrāntikas say: – The past mental sense-faculty (*manas*) does not exist, but] an activity is figuratively attributed (*upacāra* 假說) to it.

[We say]: – That is also not reasonable, for if this activity, (i.e., cogitating-reckoning (思量),) does not truly exist, what could be (the basis (依) for being able to) figuratively say that something is performing it?

4. [The Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins say: – The past mental sense-faculty (*manas*), when it was present, has performed this activity; therefore, although past, it can be called *manas*.]

We say: – (The previously existing (曾有) [mental sense-faculty],) when it was present, (was cogitating-reckoning (思量)), and at that time, this alleged *manas* was called *viññāna* (識) (i.e., mental cognition [*mano-viññāna*], visual cognition [*cakṣur-viññāna*], etc.). How can you maintain that—once past and without activity—it should be called *manas* (意)?

#1478 Thus, there is a seventh cognition, i.e., *manas* (末那), distinct from the six, which constantly (and assessingly) “cogitates(-reckons)” (*manyate* 恒審思量)⁵²⁵ and which, not figuratively but properly, is called *manas* (意). [Nevertheless, imitating <281> the example of a true and actual *manas*,] one can figuratively (假) give the name *manas* (意) to (this already ceased support (已滅依)), i.e., the

⁵²⁵ Editors: Kuiji (T.43.1830.0238c25) glosses cogitating-reckoning (思量), which renders *mananā* or *manyānā*: “cogitating means pondering (思謂思慮), reckoning means reckoning with (量謂量度), because it cogitates and reckons (思量), reckoning with the *ālaya* in terms of Self” (思量第八度為我故).

As for being constant (恒) and assessing (審) (Kuiji, T.43.1830.0298b07):

- the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*), although constant, is not assessingly cogitating (第八雖恒。非審思故);
- the mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*), although assessingly cogitating, is not constant (意識雖審思而非是恒);
- the first five cognitions are neither constant nor assessingly cogitating (五識彼非恒起。非審思故);
- the seventh cognition alone is both constantly and assessingly cogitating-reckoning (第七識恒審思量).

past mind [without saying which one it is among the six cognitions].

[*Manas* (意) has two meanings:

- a. that which “cogitates⟨-reckons⟩” (*manyate* 思量);
- b. that which supports (*āśraya* 依止).

Our cogitation (*manas*), ⟨i.e., the seventh cognition,⟩ is *manas* on both of these accounts; but every mind that has just ceased (過去) ⟨although being non-existent (現無) in itself (體), is only that which supports (依止) or⟩ opens the path to the subsequent cognition; the subsequent cognition relies (依止) on it in order to arise ⟨and exist⟩ (與現). As support, it resembles then the cogitating-reckoning cogitation (*manas*) (思量之意). Thus, (the mind that has just ceased) can ⟨solely⟩ be called *manas* (意) ⟨and is not called cognition (識)⟩. [This justifies the texts which the Sarvāstivādins cite.⁵²⁶]

D.G.E. *Two attainments (samāpattis)*

#1480 Moreover, the *sūtra* distinguishes two kinds of attainment, i.e., attainment of non-ideation (*āsaṃjñi-samāpatti* 無想定) and attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定). If “defiled cogitation” (*kliṣṭa-manas* 染意), which is not interrupted in the attainment of non-ideation and which is interrupted in the attainment of cessation, would not exist, we do not see how these two attainments would be distinguished. {5/13r.}

#1481 Indeed, they both involve the cessation (*nirodha* 滅) of the six cognitions (識) and their mental factors (*caittas* 心所); they themselves (體) are not different in terms of making the ⟨same number (數),⟩ i.e., twenty-two kinds, of mental factors cease. (Little Vehicle: twenty-one).⁵²⁷ ⟨If defiled cogitation (*manas* 染意) were absent,⟩ then how could we distinguish between the two ⟨attainments (定) in which one has cogitation and the other does not have cogitation⟩?

The Sarvāstivādins will say that [the two attainments] differ (1) in the preparatory practice (*prayoga* 加行), (2) in the sphere (*dhātu* 界) and stage (*bhūmi* 地) in which they are practiced, (3) with regard to ⟨the support (依)⟩, i.e., the persons

⁵²⁶ *Editors: Shuji* 5B/31r.4: 如何似現意名意也。意有二義。一思量義。二依止義。第七通有二名。過去但唯依止。體雖現無。與現依止。思量之意相似。故但名意。不名為識。

⁵²⁷ The Great Vehicle, in fact, counts eleven good permeating factors (*kuśala-mahā-bhūmikas*); the *Samuccaya-śāstra* eliminates the root of good “non-delusion” (*amoha-kuśala-mūla*). (See “Seventy-five and one hundred *dharma*s”, *Muséon*, 1905: 178).

who practice them, [(4) the mode of acquisition (*prāpti*), (5) the name, (6) the fact of being or not being accessible to non-Buddhists, (7) the fruit].⁵²⁸ But this explanation is also worthless, for it fails to indicate the cause (因) of these differences (差別) which lies in the presence or the absence of cogitation. (If cogitation does not exist, the cause of these differences will also not exist.)

#1482 The separate existence of this cogitation (*manas* 意) is thus beyond any doubt (定).

D.G.F. *Gods without ideation (asaṃjñi-sattvas)*

#1484 Moreover, the *sūtra* (經) teaches that, for the sentient beings without ideation (*asaṃjñi-sattvas* 無想有情, or *asaṃjñins*),⁵²⁹ the mind (心) and mental factors (心所) are interrupted (滅) during the duration of one lifetime (一期生). Thus these gods, i.e., the sentient beings without ideation, would not be “defiled” (*kliṣṭa* 染) if this cognition, i.e., cogitation (*manas*), did not exist.

#1486 Indeed, during this long period of time (長時), the six cognitions (i.e., the evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識]) are absent: the *ātma-grāha* (我執), i.e., the conceiving of a self or the belief in a self (我執), would thus be absent if it were not for the fact of cogitation (*manas* 意). – We do not see that there is any other place (處) where sentient beings bound by all the bondages (*sakala-bandhana* 具縛) would be freed from the belief in a self for an entire existence (一期生), {5/13v.} [that is, the sentient beings without ideation (*asaṃjñins*) must have a belief in a self because they <284> are ordinary worldlings (*prthag-janas*), like the other ordinary worldlings]. If they were freed from the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), the saints (*āryas* 聖賢) would not have to consider this type of existence with (scolding and) weariness (訶厭), no more than *nirvāṇa* (涅槃).

#1487 1. The Sarvāstivādins say that the gods without ideation have an awareness and conceiving of a self (*ātman*) at the beginning and the end of their life.⁵³⁰ (Thus, there is no error (失)). Therefore the [above] objection does not hold.

We say that it does hold, since this kind of conceiving is absent in the interval (中間) and during a very long time (長時). (Thus, there is an error (過).)

2. The Sarvāstivādins say that the past (去) and future (來) *dharma*s exist, that

⁵²⁸ AKB ii, F 200.

⁵²⁹ AKB ii, F 199.

⁵³⁰ AKB ii, F 199.

the gods without ideation are thus defiled by the past and future defilements (*kleśas*) of which they have “possession” (*prāpti*, above #0227). (Thus, there is no error.)

We say that the past and future *dharma*s are not present (現), are not permanent (常) (like the unconditioned [*asaṃskṛta*]). (Thus, there is an error). One cannot have “possession” (得) of them since that which (is to be possessed (所得)) does not exist.

#1488 3. [The Mahāsāṃghikas explain the defilement by the presence of certain formations dissociated from mind (*viprayukta-saṃskāras*), i.e., the proclivities (*anuśayas*), see #0318.] We have already demonstrated that the formations dissociated from mind (不相應) do not exist.

#1489 4. [The Sautrāntikas say: “Among the gods without ideation, there is no actual belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*), but the seeds (*bījas*) of the belief in a self remain in the state of non-ideation, thus, this state involves a belief in a self”.] We have already established (#0878) that no *dharma*, except the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識), can receive (perfuming (受熏) or) seeds (*bījas*; *vāsanā* 熏習). [Thus, if you do not recognize the existence of the store-cognition, you cannot accept the existence of the seeds of the “belief in a self”.]

#1490 We conclude that the state of the gods without ideation (無想天) is defiled (染污) by the fact of *manas* (末那) which, without interruption (恆), generates the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執). It is for this reason that the saints (*āryas* 賢聖) only (scold and) are weary of (訶厭) this state.

D.G.G. *Ordinary worldling (prthagjana) and the belief in a self (ātma-grāha), and absence of the belief in a self (ātma-grāha)*

#1492 Moreover, the *sūtra* teaches that ordinary worldlings (*prthagjana* 異生), when their mind (心) is good (善), bad (染) or non-defined (無記), {5/14r.} always carry along (帶) a belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執). This assumes the existence of cogitation (*manas*), (i.e., if this cognition did not exist, neither would that [belief in a self]).

#1495 a. Although ordinary worldlings can have minds (心) of these three kinds of nature (性) <285> (good, etc.) and can outwardly (外) (*ad extra*)—by the fact of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*)—generate actions (業) of a corresponding nature, nevertheless, by the fact of cogitation, they continuously (恆) internally (內) generate a belief in a self (執我). And this belief in a self brings it about

that good actions—e.g., giving, etc. (*dāna-ādi* 施等), generated in the six cognitions—are not freed of the image[-part] (*nimitta* 相) [of oneself].⁵³¹

#1496 This is what YBh (T.30.1579.0580c10)⁵³² explains:

The defiled (染污) *manas* (末那) is the support (*niśraya*, *saṃniveśa* 依止) of the cognitions (*viññānas* 識) (of the sixth, of the first six). As long as it has not been destroyed (滅), there is bondage to the cognizing of the image[-part] (*nimitta-vijñapti-bandhana* 相了別縛): the cognizing (*viññapti*), or seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) of the mind, remains bound—without obtaining liberation—to the *nimitta* (相), i.e., to the object or representation (*nimitta*, *viśaya-nimitta*, image-part). When defiled *manas* (末那) is already destroyed, there is liberation (解脫) (from the bondage to the image-part (相縛)).

#1498 Of what does this state of “bondage (to the image-part (相縛))” of the mind consist?

In the inability to recognize (了達) the true nature of the characteristics (or image) (相) of the object (境) which, in fact, has the same mode of existence as an illusion (幻事) or a mirage, etc. (see the definition of the dependent [*para-tantra*], #2719). The mind as cognizing (*viññapti*) (the mode of operation [*ākāra*] of the mind, see #0526), in other words, as seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分), is bound (所拘) by the mind as representation, image (*nimitta*), image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分): bound, it does not obtain independence or mastery (*svātantrya*, *vaśitā* 自在). (This is called bondage to the image part (相縛).)

#1499 It is in this sense that a verse states: {5/14v.}

In this way, defiled (染污) cogitation (*manas* 意) is the support (所依) of cognition (*viññāna* 識); as long as this cogitation is not destroyed (滅), the bond (縛) of cognition can never be undone (脫).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This verse (*gāthā*) is cited by Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0384–0385) with insignificant variation, as Kuiji observes (*Shuji* 5B/38v.). He adds: “It is not known from where it is taken. Some say that the *Mahāyānābhidharma-sūtra*, 51, has the same meaning with a slight difference in wording”.

⁵³¹ Asvabhāva: “He who gives, thinks that he gives the gift”. That is the image (*nimitta*).

⁵³² And *Vikhyāpanā*, 17.

- #1501 b. Moreover, if one refuses to accept the constant existence of a belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執) belonging to cogitation (*manas*), one ought to consider <286> the good (*kuśala* 善) or non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 無覆無記) mind (心) as non-impure (*anāsrava*)⁵³³.

In fact:

1. the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) that poison the six cognitions of a certain series (自相續) (= of a certain person) cannot co-exist with a good (善), etc., mind of that very series; this good mind cannot be directed at (緣) or bound (縛) by past (去) or future (來) defilements which (according to reason) do not exist.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

On the occasion of this problem, the *Abhidharma-kośa* sets forth the Sarvāstivādin doctrine of the existence of the past and of the future *dharma*s, AKB v, F 48.

2. The good mind cannot be said to be impure (漏) because it is the object of the defilements of another (他惑); a mind would also be very pure (無漏) by the fact of another's liberation (他解).⁵³⁴
- #1502 3. <Moreover, it cannot be said that this good (善) mind, etc., is impure (漏)> by the fact of the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas* 不相應), i.e., by the fact of distinct proclivities (*anuśayas* 隨眠)⁵³⁵ which would form a constant series (相續), for it has already been well established (#0318) that such proclivities do not really (實) exist. {5/15r.}
- #1504 4. <It also cannot be said that the good (善) mind, etc., is impure (漏)> because it arises from impure seeds (*bījas* 種). [Like us, the Sautrāntikas deny that the good mind is impure by the fact of past defilements, by the fact of another's mind, by the fact of proclivities (*anuśayas*) being considered as formations dissociated from mind. But they think that the good mind is impure because it is engendered by impure seeds.]

There are no reasons (因) why the seeds of the good mind—[seeds that have been planted by a good action]—become impure at a moment when no defilements occur.

- #1505 [Would anybody say that impure seeds occur together with seeds of the good mind and that, consequently, the good mind is impure?] There are impure seeds

⁵³³ AKB i, F 6.

⁵³⁴ Compare AKB i, F 7, 58–59; v, F 38.

⁵³⁵ AKB v, F 4.

(漏種) in the mental series of the saints who are not yet *arhats*: will you say that the pure (無漏) minds (noble path) of these saints are also impure?

#1506 Although the mind (or action) of giving and other good minds (or actions) (施等業) are “induced” (*ākṣip, upanī* 引) by a defilement (煩惱), nevertheless, the defilement does not occur simultaneously with these minds (or actions). The impure (漏) here is not a direct cause (正因). The word “impure” (*sāsrava* 有漏) should be understood as “with *āsrava* (fluxes)”, (i.e., being simultaneous with impurity). <287>

5. Moreover, the non-defined action (無記業) is not induced by defilement (煩惱). How can it become impure?

#1507 c. A *dharma* is impure (漏) by the defilement (*kleśa*) of an individual himself (自身) (not by another’s defilement), by the defilement (煩惱) as being active (*samudācar*) (not by the defilement as seed [*bīja*]); by the defilement that is arising (生) and ceasing (滅) at the same time as [the *dharma*], and that, consequently, is in mutual causality (增益) with it (not by the past or future defilement). – {5/15v.} By the actual impure *dharma*, a seed (種) of an impure (漏) *dharma* is brought forth (“perfumed” [熏]). Later, the good *dharma*, when it arises, will be impure.⁵³⁶

Since this is how it is with ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生), this is how it is also with trainees (*śaikṣas* 學): [their mind, even though good, is impure since their cogitation (*manas*) or seventh cognition is defiled by the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha*)].

The non-trainees (*aśaikṣas* 無學) have impure (漏) *dharma*s, although unaccompanied by *āsravas* (fluxes) (漏): these are *dharma*s that proceed from former (先) impure seeds (漏種) and, for this reason, are impure (漏). (In terms of

⁵³⁶ *Dharmas* (good, etc.) are impure by the fact of cogitation (*manas*)—mutual cause of nourishment with each other—which arises and ceases with the active defilements (*kleśas*) of an individual himself.

The seventh cognition is the support for the pollution (*saṃkleśa-āśraya*) of the six cognitions (#1179); it nourishes (*prapuṣṇāti* ?) the six. But how do the six nourish the seventh? – “To nourish” is meant in two ways, to increase (*zengzhang* 增長, #1006) and not to damage. The sixth cognition performs actions, brings forth (*abhinirvart*) the eighth which is the support and object of the seventh, which will take place in a series. Thus it may be said that it nourishes the seventh. On the other hand, at the moment one performs impure actions, one is not increasing the seventh but one is not damaging it, therefore, one is nourishing it.

reason,} there is no contradiction, as is the case for the Little Vehicle.

#1508 Conclusion. – *Dharmas* that are good (善), etc., may be impure (漏) because there is a *manas* (末那) that does not stop generating the belief in a self (*ātma-grāha* 我執). If cogitation (*manas* 意) were absent, the good *dharmas* would definitively not be impure. Therefore, a seventh cognition exists.

#1509 There are numerous arguments (for the existence of this cognition). We have set forth six kinds according to the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (攝大乘). People of intelligence (智者) should trust (and study them).

In truth, <288> the *sūtras* (經) say that there are six cognitions: but that is an inexact manner of speaking (or a concession) (隨轉理門), or else, the texts in question speak of six by taking into account the six special (*asādhāraṇa*) faculties (*indriyas*) (that act as support (所依)). {5/16r.} In fact, there are eight kinds of cognition.

[The explanation of *manas* is finished.] <289>



Master Xuanzang

E. *SIX COGNITIONS (VIJÑĀNAS)*⁵³⁷

- E.A. Names of the six cognitions (*vijñānas*); #1520
- E.B. Nature (*svabhāva*) and mode of operation (*ākāra*); #1531
- E.C. Ethical nature of the six cognitions; #1536
- E.D. Formations associated with mind (*samprayuktas*); #1562
- E.E. Conditions for the generation of the first five and the sixth cognitions; #2256

#1512 We have <thus> explained the second “developing *vijñāna*” (*pariṇāma-vijñāna* 能變識). What is the definition, <i.e., characteristics (相),> of the third <developing *vijñāna*>?

The author replies to this question with the last three quarter-verses (*pādās*) of the eighth stanza (*kārikā*). [Vasubandhu’s] stanza 8b–d (Chin. 8) says:

trītiyaḥ ṣaḍ-vidhasya yā | 8b
viśayasopalabdhīḥ sā kuśalākuśalādvayā || 8cd

次第三能變・差別有六種・|
 了境為性相・善不善俱非・|| 8

#1515

8b–d. The third “developing (*pariṇāma*) [*vijñāna*]” (能變) is the cognizing of the sixfold object; good, bad, neither.

Or, according to Xuanzang:

8. <Next,> the third <developing *vijñāna*, which is distinguished (差別) into> six kinds; <its nature and mode of operation 性相> consists in the cognizing (了) of the object (境),⁵³⁸ good (善), bad (不善), neither (俱非).

#1518 The Treatise:

After <discussing> the developing *vijñāna* <that cogitates (思量),> called cogitation (*manas*), it is necessary to explain <the characteristics (相) of> this kind of “<DEVELOPING> *vijñāna*” (<*pariṇāma*->*vijñāna* 能變識) that consists of “apperception of the object” (了境).

⁵³⁷ *Kārikās* 8b–16.

⁵³⁸ “It has perception (*upalabdhī*) as *xing* 性 and *xiang* 相 ...”; the expression *xingxiang* translates the word *-ātmaka*. See below, *Siddhi* F 291–292.

E.A. *Names of the six cognitions (viññānas)*⁵³⁹

#1520 This kind (of *viññāna* is generally DISTINGUISHED (差別) INTO) SIX KINDS (有六種) since the *viññāna* in question is differentiated according to:

- a. the six sense-faculties (*indriya* 根);
- b. the six objects (*viṣaya* 境).

#1523 a. It is given the name of *caḥsur-viññāna* ... *mano-viññāna*, that is, “cognition of the eye [i.e., visual cognition] (眼識) ... cognition of the mental sense-faculty (*manas*) [i.e., mental cognition (意識)]”.

The name (of each of these cognitions) is established according to the sense-faculty, for the sense-faculty here has five kinds of significance:⁵⁴⁰

1. cognition has the sense-faculty for its support (*āśraya*: yī 依);
2. cognition is brought forth (*vidhā*: fa 發) by the condition of the sense-faculty;
3. the seed (*bīja*) of the cognition depends on (or is of the same order as) (*shu* 屬) the sense-faculty;
4. cognition aids (*zhu* 助) the sense-faculty;
5. cognition is similar (*ru* 如) to the sense-faculty.

(See #2330.)

Although the six cognitions (*viññāna-kāya* 識身) all (evolve (轉) by) relying (依) on cogitation (*manas* 意),⁵⁴¹ nevertheless, only the sixth *mano-viññāna* <290> receives the name *mano-viññāna* (意識, “cognition of the mental sense-faculty, i.e., cogitation (*manas*)” or “cognition based on cogitation (*manas*)” or “mental cognition”), {5/16v.} for it is called after its special support (不共依), i.e., the seventh [cognition] or cogitation (*manas* 意); in the same way, the five cognitions—although relying on *manas* (意)—are called after their special support, i.e., the eye,⁵⁴² etc. The characteristics are thus distinct and the expression *mano-*

⁵³⁹ See AKB i, F 96.

⁵⁴⁰ Kuiji in *Shuji* (T43.1830.0416a07).

⁵⁴¹ As for their condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*), see #1187.

⁵⁴² In fact, the five and the eighth rely on cogitation (*manas*), so why say that cogitation is the special support of the sixth? – The seed (*bīja*) of the sixth conforms to the seed of cogitation; when the seed of cogitation manifests, the sixth arises; just as the seed of the visual cognition (*caḥsur-viññāna*) relies on the seed of the faculty of the eye (*caḥsur-indriya*). On the contrary, the five and the eighth do not rely on the seed of cogitation.

viññāna does not lend itself to confusion (無相濫過).

Or else, we can say that *mano-viññāna* (mental cognition) is so named because it relies on *manas* (意; cogitation) alone, whereas the five rely, furthermore, on the material sense-faculties (*rūpīndriya*), i.e., the eye, etc.⁵⁴³

The six cognitions are, therefore, named in a specific way due to their support, and because of the relation of the ones with the others: cognition of the eye ... cognition based on cogitation (*manas*).

The same cannot be said for the seventh and eighth (心意非例) [which are given a name that corresponds to their nature: cogitation (*manas*) due to the activity of cogitation (*mananā*); mind (*citta*) due to “accumulation” (see #1108, #0878). This is why the eighth—although relying on cogitation (*manas*)—is not called *mano-viññāna*; this is why the seventh—although relying on *citta*—is not called *citta-viññāna*.]

- #1524 b. Or else, the six cognitions are named after their object (隨境): *rūpa-viññāna* ..., *dharmā-viññāna*, “cognition of visible form, ... of *dharmas*”. This is a designation that corresponds to the meaning of the word *viññāna* (cognition) because what is understood by cognition is the cognizing (*upalabdhi*) relative to each of the six objects:⁵⁴⁴

1–5. The five, i.e., cognition of visible form, ..., cognition of the tangible, each cognize, respectively, only visible forms (*rūpas*), ..., tangibles (*spraṣṭavyas*).

6. The sixth, i.e., the cognition of *dharmas* (*dharmā-viññāna*), cognizes all the *dharmas* (visible forms, etc.); or else, it cognizes that which, specifically, is *dharmas*, namely, the sense-sphere of *dharmas* (*dharmā-āyatana*).⁵⁴⁵ This is why it is given the name of *dharmā-viññāna*.

Editors: See also footnote to #1474.

- ⁵⁴³ *Editors:* Kuiji comments (T1830.0416b28):

謂眼等五，亦依眼等五有色根。此第六識，若等無間，若俱有依，唯依意根。「依唯意」故，得「意識」名。五通意、色，二所依故。

“The five cognitions also depend on the physical faculties (note Han Jingqing: 不只依等無間. does not only depend on *samanantara*). The sixth, if *samanantara*, or if *saḥabhū-āśraya*, only depends of *mano-indriya*. Thus ‘depending on *manas* 意 only’, therefore called *mano-viññāna*. The five, on the other hand, all depend on the *manas* and on *rūpa* as *āśraya*.”

- ⁵⁴⁴ Compare AKB i, F 30, *viññānaṃ prativijñaptiḥ* = *viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ praty upalabdhīḥ*.

- ⁵⁴⁵ AKB i, F 46.

The names attributed to the six cognitions thus suit them uniquely, without there being any “overlapping”. <291>

#1526 The designation of the six cognitions due to their object is valid when the state in which there is no “mastery of the five material sense-faculties” (五色根未自在) is considered. When there is mastery (i.e., some say, from the first stage onwards; others say, in the state of buddhahood⁵⁴⁶), the activity of the sense-faculties is interchangeable (諸根互用): the cognition brought forth (發識) by any one of the sense-faculties whatsoever can attain all the objects (緣一切境). {5/17r.} From that time on, in order to avoid confusion (無相濫失), the cognitions should be designated according to the sense-faculty alone.

#1527 The *Sūtrālaṃkāra*⁵⁴⁷ (T.31.1604.0605a) says that each of the *tathāgata*’s ⟨five sense-⟩ faculties is active (轉) with respect to the five objects (五境).

If this text expresses itself in this way: “with regard to the five objects”, it is because it is concerned only with coarse and manifest objects (麤顯), i.e., objects of the same kind (同類境) [as the considered material sense-faculties].

#1528 But the *Buddhabhūmi-sūtra* (T.16.680.722b09) (#3266),⁵⁴⁸ when dealing with the knowledge of accomplishing action (*krtya-anuṣṭhāna-jñāna* 成所作智) (obtained by the “transmutation” of the five sense-faculties), says that this knowledge (*jñāna*) cognizes (決擇) the eighty-four thousand different mental states (*citta-carita* 心行⁵⁴⁹) of sentient beings, generates three kinds ⟨of action⟩ of the [body of] emanation (*nirmāṇa*) (三業化), puts forward four kinds of answers (四記; i.e., direct answer [*ekāṃśa-vyākaraṇa*], etc.⁵⁵⁰). If the activity of this knowledge were not universal (遍緣), it would be incapable of doing that.

#1529 Thus, the support (*āśraya* 所依) and object (*ālambana* 所緣) of the six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-viññānas* 轉識), coarse and manifest (麤顯), are well established (極成). This is why the stanza (*kārikā*) does not specify them. We have

⁵⁴⁶ Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/50v.

⁵⁴⁷ *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* ix, 41: *pañcendriyaparāvṛttau vibhutvaṃ labhyate param | sarva-arhāvṛttau sarveṣāṃ ...*

When the five sense-faculties are “transmuted” (#3180), all function with extreme mastery relative to the five objects ... [S. Lévi: absolute mastery of all, regarding the functioning of all their senses ..., absolute mastery of all the five sense-faculties, regarding the activity of all the five senses ...]

⁵⁴⁸ Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/53r.

⁵⁴⁹ Compare AKB i, F 47.

⁵⁵⁰ AKB v, F 44.

had the opportunity to speak of their support (所依) (#1111); we will, below (#1531, #1571), have the opportunity to speak of their object (所緣境).

E.B. *Nature (svabhāva) and mode of operation (ākāra) of the six cognitions*

#1531 <Next, (Vasubandhu) says that THE NATURE AND MODE OF OPERATION (性相) of the third “developing *vijñāna*” (*pariṇāma-vijñāna*) CONSISTS IN THE COGNIZING OF THE OBJECT (*viśaya-upalabdhyātmaka* 了境為性相). <292> By expressing himself in this way, the author indicates the “(intrinsic) nature” (*svabhāva* 自性) and the “mode of operation” (*ākāra* 行相) of the six cognitions (*vijñānas*), for the sixfold cognition has cognizing of the object (了境) for its “nature”, {5/17v.} and it is by way of (*yong* 用) this very cognizing that it has its “mode of operation” (行相). [In other words, the activity (*yong* 用) of cognition, i.e., the cognizing, is its mode of operation.] (See #1262.) At the same time, this justifies the (distinct (別)) name of *vijñāna* (cognition) given to [each of] these six (as opposed to the seventh and the eighth): they are called *vijñāna* (cognition) because they “cognize” (*liaobie* 了別; *paricchid*, *vijñā*) the object (境).

#1533 As the *sūtra* says:

What is visual cognition (*cakṣur-vijñāna*)? – It is that which, by relying on the eye-faculty, cognizes (了別) visible form (*rūpa* 色)

What is mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識)? – It is that which, by relying on the mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya* 意根), cognizes *dharma*s (了別諸法).

#1534 This *sūtra* indicates only the special support (*āśraya* 不共所依) before the transmutation of the support 未轉依位, it indicates only that which is cognized (所了) by the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分). For the explanation of the other supports and of the other objects of cognizing (i.e., the awareness-part [*svasaṃvitti-bhāga*] is directed towards the seeing-part, etc.), see above, #0536.

E.C. *Ethical nature of the six cognitions (vijñānas)*

#1536 〈What is the ethical nature (性) of these six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識)?〉

#1537 The stanza (*kārikā*) says that cognizing (*upalabdhi*) which constitutes the six cognitions is:

1. GOOD (*kuśala* 善);
2. BAD (*akuśala* 不善);
3. NEITHER (*advayā* 俱非).

#1540 1. What is called NEITHER (*advayā* 俱非, *anubhayā*) is the cognizing which is neither good nor bad, which is non-defined (*avyākṛtā* 無記).

2. What is called GOOD (*kuśala* 善) ([whether being] pure [*anāsrava*] or impure [*sāsrava*]) is that which is “beneficial” (*anugraha*, *śhunyi* 順益) in this world (此世) and in the other [world] (他世) (= for this life and afterwards). {5/18r.} The fruit of the “good”, namely, human or divine pleasure (人天樂果), is beneficial (順益) for the present life but not for the future life. [(This fruit) is non-defined; it causes (or can cause) decline-disaster, *shuaisun* 衰損, in the future life.] The fruit of the “good” is, thus, not qualified as “good”.

3. What is called BAD (*akuśala* 不善) is that which is “disadvantageous” (*weisun* 違損) in this world and in the other [world]. <293> The fruit of the “bad”, namely, the suffering of the bad destinies (*durgati*, *apāya*) (惡趣苦果), is disadvantageous for the present life, but not for the future life; it is, thus, not qualified as “bad”.

4. What is called “non-defined” (*avyākṛta* 無記) is that which cannot be defined (記別) as good (善), bad (不善), beneficial (益), disadvantageous (損).

#1541 The six 〈evolving〉 cognitions (*vijñānas* 轉識), [a] when they are associated with the eleven good mental factors (*caittas*) (i.e., faith [*śraddhā* 信], etc.), they are included in the “good”; [b] when they are associated with the ten mental factors—of which non-modesty (*āhrīkya* 無慚; see #2068) is the first—they are included in the “bad”; [c] when they are dissociated from both, they are included in the “non-defined”.⁵⁵¹

#1544 [At a given moment, can the six cognitions (*vijñānas* 六識) be of three natures (i.e., good, bad, non-defined 三性)?]

⁵⁵¹ Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/59.

a. According to one opinion, that would be impossible: {5/18v.}

(1) for there would be a contradiction (互相違) in the case when the six cognitions are together directed at an external object, since they would be endowed with three natures;⁵⁵² for when the six cognitions being directed, at the same time, at the external, the three natures would be in contradiction;

#1545 (2) for the five [cognitions] are led (導引, see #1187) by mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識), arise (simultaneously) with it and have the same object (俱生同境) as it, and would, consequently, be good or defiled in accordance with mental cognition: to accept that the five can, simultaneously, be of different natures (三性俱行) would be to accept that mental cognition (意識) is of three natures at the same time (通三性), which would contradict (proper reasoning) (違正理). Thus, at one given moment, the six cognitions cannot be of three natures.

#1546 It is true that—according to YBh (瑜伽 T.30.1579.580c) and *Vikhyāpana* (T.31.1602.0480c, 0566c)—“the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) of a single time period (一時) occurs with the three natures (i.e., good, etc.) being associated (相應) with the evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識)”, but these texts must <294> be understood as (referring to) many moments (多念) of the store-cognition. Just as when YBh (T.30.1579.0291b, 0609a) says: “One mind has not only one arising and ceasing (一心非一生滅)”. [This refers to many homogeneous moments constituting—what could be called—one mind.] (Thus there is no conflict here).

#1548 b. According to another opinion, (the six) cognitions of the three natures [i.e., good, etc.] can co-exist (三性容俱), <#1549> for the five cognitions, (such as that of visual cognition)—whether “automatic” (率爾) or “in a series” (等流) (see #1187), and of different natures (#2325)—can, at the same time, arise as numerous or less numerous.

#1550 Although the five cognitions definitively arise together with mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), nevertheless, it does not follow that then they would (neces-

⁵⁵² The text has: 同外門轉 (functioning together with regard to the external) 互相違 (mutual contradiction) = “the simultaneous external activity involves a contradiction”.

Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/59v.8: 此六轉識 (these six evolving cognitions [*pravṛtti-vijñānas*] 同緣外境 (being together directed at the external object) 諸三性等 (the three natures) 互相違故 (mutual contradiction).

These masters think that as soon as the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) have arisen (that is to say: as soon as one of the five cognitions has arisen), a mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) arises. (See #1187.) Thus, the five cognitions do not arise together. Thus, the three natures of the five cognitions are not simultaneous.

sarily) have to be of the same nature, i.e., good, etc., as the mental cognition. {5/19r.} The above objection, i.e., “that mental cognition would be, at the same time, of several natures”, is directed against the doctrine that affirms the identity in nature for simultaneous cognitions, (and is irrelevant here (唐捐)).

#1552 This is why YBh (T.30.1579.0605c) expresses itself as follows:

Due to sound as cause, the practitioner emerges from the concentration: thus, there arises another cognition (*viññāna*), i.e., auditory, which is simultaneous with mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*) (意識俱轉) associated with the concentration (與定相應). It is not this mental cognition (alone) which, by itself, grasps the sound (能取此聲). If an auditory cognition would not occur in the course of the concentration, the practitioner would not emerge from the concentration (出定) due to the sound. It is not at the moment when the sound is perceived (取聲時) that the practitioner emerges from the concentration, but if, after the sound has been perceived (領受), curiosity or desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望, see #0633, #1301) occurs, then the practitioner emerges from the concentration.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Vibhāṣā (T.27.1545.0929b29). – “I remember, said Mahāmaudgalyāyana [in the Vinaya], that, while being in the attainment of nothingness (*ākīṃcanya*), I heard the elephants trumpeting at the [river] bank of the Mandakīnī”.

Was Maudgalyāyana in an attainment when he heard it, or had he emerged from an attainment? – The *Vibhāṣā* answers: “He was not in an attainment; the hearing disappears in the first meditation (*dhyāna*) ..., all the more so above it ...”. [This story is discussed in the Vinaya where the Bhagavat explains the true mind of Maudgalyāyana.]

For the Great Vehicle, he heard before emerging from the attainment. If not so, why would he emerge from the attainment? – But can the mind of nothingness (*ākīṃcanya*) take the sound—being of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*)—for its object? ...

This example is discussed in Kuiji’s commentary on Vasumitra’s *Treatise on the Sects*, chapter Mahāsāṃghikas, discussion of the problem “whether one can speak in the state of attainment”. <295>

#1553 The auditory cognition (*śrotra-viññāna* 耳識) which, in the course of concentration (在定), “automatically” (率爾) hears the sound (聞聲), cannot be good, for—

as long as the “transmutation ⟨of the support⟩” (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 未轉依) has not taken place—any “automatic” (率爾) ⟨dropping into⟩ mind (墮心, #1743) is necessarily non-defined (無記, #1193).

#1554 This argument demonstrates that mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) associated with the five cognitions is not necessarily {5/19v.} of the same nature (good, etc.) as the five. [In the course of the concentration, mental cognition is good; auditory cognition is non-defined. One can conclude that, in the state of non-concentration (*vikṣipta-avasthā*), the same disharmony can occur.]

#1556 The texts merely say that mental cognition, being simultaneous with the five [cognitions] (五俱), is directed (緣) at the same object as the five. They do not say that it is of the same nature as the five.

#1557 Although the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (雜集論, T.31.1606.0726a) affirms that the five cognitions are absent in the state of concentration (等引位), nevertheless, this statement is directed at the majority of cases (多分). [The cognitions (*vijñānas*) are five: only auditory cognition occurs in the course of the concentration. The people who enter into concentration are numerous: only the *arhats* of the “unshakeable” class⁵⁵³ can generate auditory cognition in the course of the concentration.]

[But, one will say, the five are led by mental cognition; mental cognition draws them. If the five are of three natures (i.e., good, etc.), mental cognition which draws them should then also be, at the same time, of three natures.]

#1558 [In the state of distraction, the five—whether they exist in a moment, as Nanda would have it, or whether they form a series, as Dharmapāla (#1187, #1215) would have it—can be of three natures (i.e., good, etc.).] If mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意), occurring simultaneously with the three natures (三性俱轉), pays special attention (偏注) to the object of one of the five cognitions, it would be of the same nature as this cognition. If it does not pay special attention (無偏注)—[that is to say, if, overall, it is directed at all the objects or sense-spheres (*āyatana*s), i.e., visible forms (*rūpa*s), etc.]—it will be non-defined.⁵⁵⁴ [The non-defined nature is neither in contradiction with the good nor with the bad: non-defined mental cognition can be associated with the good or bad cognition of the eye.] <296>

Thus, the six ⟨evolving⟩ cognitions can, at the same time, present ⟨all of these⟩ three natures (三性容俱).

⁵⁵³ AKB vi, F 259.

⁵⁵⁴ Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/68r. – See #1638.

- #1559 They are exclusively good after the “transmutation” when, in this way, “mastery” is obtained (得自在位), for the *rūpa* and the mind (*citta*) of the *buddha* (佛色心) are included in the truth of the path (*mārga-satya* 道諦), are integrated into the <noble> path; for the *buddha* has <forever> eliminated (永滅除) any seed of proliferation (*prapañca-bīja* 戲論種).

E.D. *Formations associated with mind (samprayuktas)*⁵⁵⁵

#1562 With which ⟨or how⟩ many mental factors (*caittas* 心所) are the six cognitions (*vijñānas*) associated (相應)?

#1563 [Vasubandhu's] stanza 9 says:

sarvatragair viniyataiḥ kuśalaiś caitasair asau |
samprayuktā tathā kleśair upakleśais tri-vedanā || 9

此心所遍行・別境善煩惱・|
隨煩惱不定・皆三受相應・|| 9

9. The cognizing constituting the six cognitions (*vijñānas*) is associated with the universal *caittas* (or mental factors), the special ones, the good ones, with the defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*), and is capable of three sensations (*vedanās*).

According to Xuanzang:

9. These [six cognitions] are associated with (相應) the mental factors (*caittas* 心所), i.e., the universal ones (遍行), the special ones (別境), the good ones (善), with the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱), with the undetermined ones (*anīyata* 不定), ⟨all⟩ with three sensations (*vedanās* 受). {5/20r.}

#1566 The Treatise:

Considering all possibilities, THESE (此) six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*) ARE, ⟨in general,⟩ ASSOCIATED WITH (相應) THE MENTAL FACTORS (心所) of the six categories (六位), i.e., the universal mental factors, etc.

D.A. Mental factors (*caittas*) in general; #1569

D.B. Three sensations (*vedanās*); #1584

D.C. Universal and special mental factors; #1641

D.D. Good mental factors; #1766

D.E. Defilements (*kleśas*); #1906

D.F. Subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*); #2045

D.G. Undetermined mental factors (*nīyatas*); #2156

D.H. Relationship of the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caittas*); #2243

E.D.A. *Mental factors (caittas) in general*

#1569 <The MENTAL FACTORS (*caitta* 心所)> are called thus because they <always> arise (起) by relying on *citta* (mind), are associated (相應) with the mind (心), are connected with <or belong to> (繫屬, *pratibaddha*) the mind. This is just as when we give the name *ātmīya* (“mine”) (我所) to that which depends on <or belongs to> (屬) the *ātman* (“me”).

#1571 Mind (*citta* 心) seizes (*grah* 取) only the “general” characteristic (*zongxiang* 總相) of the object (*ālambana* 所緣).

Mental factors (*caittas* 心所) also seize (取) the “particular” characteristic (*bie-xiang* 別相) of the object.

The mental factors collaborate (助成) with the mind (心事) and <accomplish its purpose, and> thus receive the name of mental factors; this is just as when the master (painter) (畫師) draws the outline (作模) and the pupils (資) fill in the colors (填彩). <297>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It really seems that *zongxiang* 總相 should be universal characteristic (*samastalakṣaṇa*), see AKB iii, F 108; vi, F 162; but *xiang* 相 = *nimitta*, see #1662.

On the mind (*citta* = *viññāna*) and the mental factors (*caittas*), see AKB ii, F 177; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, pp. 65, 74 (Sticherbatski, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 148). – *Nyāyabindu* (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 14: *cittam arthamātragrāhi caittā viśeṣāvasthāgrāhiṇaḥ sukhādayaḥ*. [The mental factors are defined as *sukha-ādayaḥ* in Ānandagiri, *Brahma-sūtra*, ii, 2, 21.]

Cognition (*viññāna*) seizes the general object; each mental factor (*caitta*) seizes what the cognition seizes, plus the particular characteristic of which the perception is unique to [the mental factor].

#1572 This is why YBh (T.30.1579.0291b) says:

Cognition (*viññāna*) cognizes (*viñānāti* 了別) the general characteristic (總相) of the thing (*vastu* 事).

Mental application (*manaskāra* 作意) cognizes (了)⁵⁵⁶ this characteristic and the characteristics not yet cognized (所未了相) by cognition (*viññāna*) (or *citta*-king), i.e., the particular characteristics (別相) that can be seized (*grah* 所取) only by mental factors (*caittas*).

⁵⁵⁶ Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/73 has *liao* 了 and *liaobie* 了別 indiscriminately. – See #1531.

Contact (*sparśa* 觸) cognizes (能了) the agreeable (*manojña* 可意), etc., characteristics of the object.

Sensation (*vedanā* 受) <cognizes 能了> the comforting (*āhlādaka*; *pari-grāhaka*, *anugrāhaka* ?, 攝受), etc., characteristics. {5/20v.}

Ideation (*saṃjñā*) <cognizes 能了> the characteristics that are the cause of speech (*yanshuo yin* 言說因, see #0617).

Volition (*cetanā* 思) <cognizes 能了> the characteristics that are the cause of what is correct (*samyag-hetu* 正因), the cause of what is false (*mithyā-hetu*), the cause for what is neither correct nor false (*ubhaya-viruddha*) [which are causes of action (*karma-hetu*)].⁵⁵⁷

This is why mental application, contact, etc., are given the name of mental-factors-*dharma*s (*caitta-dharma*s 心所法).

[See #0581–0627, #1641–1665.] This shows that the mental factors are also directed (緣) at general characteristics (總相).

Elsewhere (*Madhyānta-vibhāga*), it is said:

Predilection (*chanda* 欲) also cognizes (亦能了) the characteristic of the “considered” (*abhipreta*) thing (可樂事).

Resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解) <also cognizes> the characteristic of the determined (*niścita*) thing (決定事).

Memory (*smṛti* 念) <also cognizes> the characteristic of the experienced thing (串習事).

Concentration (*samādhi* 定) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧) <also cognize> the characteristics that are qualities, faults (得失), etc.

[See #0633, #0745, #1672.]

#1573 Due to these ten *dharma*s (i.e., five universal mental factors and five special mental factors), there are—relative to the object—eleven good mental factors, thirty-two defiled mental factors and four undetermined mental factors generated.

#1574 All these mental factors *dharma*s (*caitta-dharma*s) seize <both> (兼取) the particular (*viśeṣa*) characteristics (別相) of the object (*ālambana* 所緣) [as well as the general characteristics]. <298>

⁵⁵⁷ We should understand: “the characteristics that are causes of good actions ...”.

E.D.A.1. *Six categories of mental factors (caittas)*

#1576 Although all mental factors (*caittas* 心所) are—in terms of name and in terms of meaning (名義)—equally mental factors, nevertheless, they are differentiated into six kinds of categories (*ṣaḍ avasthā-prakāra-viśeṣāḥ* 六位種類差別).

#1577 That is to say:

1. five UNIVERSAL (遍行) [mental factors];
2. five SPECIAL [mental factors] ⟨in terms of having specific objects⟩ (別境);
3. eleven GOOD (善) [mental factors];
4. six DEFILEMENTS (*kleśas* 煩惱); {5/21r.}
5. twenty SUBSIDIARY DEFILEMENTS (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱);
6. four UNDETERMINED (不定) [mental factors].

#1578 ⟨Thus altogether (合) there are fifty-one (五十一) mental factors in six categories (位)⟩.

#1579 1. [Universal (*sarvatraga*) mental factors,] for they definitively occur with every mind (*citta* 一切心).

2. [Special (*pratiniyata-viṣaya*) mental factors,], for they arise when being ⟨specifically⟩ directed (緣別) at specific objects (別境).⁵⁵⁸

3. [Good (*kuśala*) mental factors,] for they arise only with a good mind (善心).⁵⁵⁹

4. [Defilements (*kleśas*),] for they, by their nature, are included in the root defilements (*mūla-kleśas* 根本煩惱).

5. [Subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*),] for they, by their nature, are ⟨only⟩ modes of defilements (*kleśa-avasthā*) or an outflow of the defilements (*kleśa-niṣyanda* 等流性).

6. [Undetermined (*aniyata* 不定) mental factors,] for they can occur with a mind

⁵⁵⁸ According to AKB ii, F 153, the universal and the special [mental factors] are, indiscriminately, generally permeating (*mahā-bhūmika*), i.e., universal, [mental factors]. – [I repeat that—in my edition of AKB, despite my long note at ii, F 154—it should read *adhimokṣa* (resolve) and not *adhimukti* (resolution).]

⁵⁵⁹ Ten good [mental factors], according to AKB ii. 25. – Our school adds the third root of good (*kuśala-mūla*), namely, non-delusion (*amoha*).

According to the Sautrāntikas, faith (*śraddhā*) and vigor (*vīrya*) can be good, bad, non-defined. This is also the theory of Harivarman. This is why our author says: “for they arise only with a good mind (*citta*)”.

that is good (善), defiled (染), etc.⁵⁶⁰

#1580 YBh (T.30.1579.0291a) reduces the six categories to five because the defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) are equally “defiled” (*kliṣṭa* 染) *dharma*s. Further, it explains the difference of its five categories according to four “alls” (*sarva* 一切):

- a. occurring in all natures [i.e., good, etc.] of mind (一切性);
- b. occurring in all stages (*bhūmis*) (一切地);
- c. occurring at all times (一切時);
- d. occurring all together (一切俱).

⟨Among these five [categories]:⟩

1. The universal (遍行) [mental factors] have [all] four “alls” (*sarva* 一切):
 - [a. they are associated with a good, bad, non-defined mind;
 - b. they exist in all stages (i.e., stage with investigation [*bhūmi savicārā*], etc.; the nine stages [*bhūmis*]: realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*], etc.);
 - c. they exist at all times (when there is mind; since beginningless times; <299> directed at every object);
 - d. when one is present, the others are present].
2. The special (別境) [mental factors] have only the first two [“alls”].
3. The good (善) [mental factors] {5/21v.} have only one [“alls”], (i.e., they occur in all stages).
4. The defiled (染) [mental factors] have none ⟨of the four⟩ [“alls”].⁵⁶¹
5. The undetermined (不定) [mental factors] have only one [“alls”] (that is, the first): they occur ⟨in all natures (一切性)⟩, i.e., with good minds, etc.

#1581 ⟨This is how the five kinds of categories [of mental factors] are differentiated⟩.

E.D.B. *Three sensations (vedanās)*

B.1. Five sensations (*vedanās*); #1597

B.2. Simultaneity of the sensations; #1637

⁵⁶⁰ According to one explanation: “good, defiled, non-defined”. According to another explanation, the word “etc.” designates the two preceding categories.

⁵⁶¹ This definition is referring to the majority of cases (*bāhulika*): it accounts only for the generality of the cases, for ignorance (*avidyā*) occurs in all realms (*dhātus*).

#1584 1. 〈These〉 six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas* 轉識)—being “with figuring (*vikalpa*)” (“interrupted” 易脫) and not determined (不定, i.e., the aspects of pleasure, displeasure, neutral sensation all occur there)—can 〈ALL (皆)〉 BE ASSOCIATED (相應) WITH THREE SENSATIONS (*vedanās* 三受) because [these *vijñānas*] experience (*anubhava* 領):

- a. the favorable (順) characteristic of the object;
 - b. the pernicious (違) characteristic of the object;
 - c. the neither favorable nor pernicious (非二) characteristic of the object.
- a. The experience (*anubhava* 領) of the favorable characteristic of the object (*anukūla-viṣaya-lakṣaṇa* 順境相), i.e., delighting and comforting (適悅) body and mind, is called *sukhā vedanā* (樂受), i.e., beneficial, agreeable sensation.
- b. The experience of the unfavorable characteristic of the object (違境相), i.e., pernicious (逼迫) to body and mind, is called *duḥkhā vedanā* (苦受), i.e., unbeneficial, disagreeable sensation.
- c. The experience of the neutral characteristic 〈of the object〉 (中容境相), i.e., not generating either discomfort or comfort (非逼非悅), is called *aduḥkha-asukhā vedanā*, i.e., neither unbeneficial nor beneficial sensation or neither disagreeable nor agreeable sensation (不苦樂受).

#1587 2. Each of these three sensations (*vedanās*) is of two kinds:

- a. associated with the five cognitions (*pañca-vijñāna-kāya-saṃprayuktā* 五識相應), it is said to be “bodily” (*kāyikī* 身受) because it relies [not only on the mind but also] on that part of the body which is its specific support;
- b. associated with mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) (意識相應), it is said to be “mental” (*caitasikī* 心受) {5/22r.} because it relies only on the mind. <300>

3. Moreover, all three can be [a] “impure” (*sāsrava* 有漏) or [b] “pure” (*anāsrava* 無漏), for sensation of displeasure (*duḥkha*) (苦受) can also arise due to pure *dharma*s.⁵⁶²

#1588 4. 〈Or else,〉 each of the three 〈can be divided into three〉:

⁵⁶² Kuiji, *Shuji* 5B/80r.–v.

Two opinions. According to the first: “The faculty of displeasure (*duḥkha-indriya*) and the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya-indriya*) can bring forth the pure; that which is brought forth by the pure can be pure; sensation (*vedanā*) is broad, faculty (*indriya*) is narrow. This is why the *sāstra* says that the sensation of displeasure (*duḥkhā vedanā*) can be pure.”

[a] to be abandoned by insight (*darśana-heya* 見所斷), [b] to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷), [c] not to be abandoned (*aheya* 非所斷);
 〈moreover:〉

[a] pertaining to the trainee (*śaikṣa* 學), [b] pertaining to the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學), [c] pertaining to neither the trainee nor the non-trainee (*naiva-śaikṣa-na-aśaikṣa*).

#1590 5. Or else, [the three sensations] can be 〈divided into four kinds〉: [a] good (善), [b] bad (不善), [c] obscured-non-defined (有覆無記), [d] non-obscured-non-defined (無覆無記).

#1592 According to one opinion, 〈each of〉 the three sensations can show these four natures. [The most difficult point is to establish that the faculty of displeasure (*duḥkha-indriya*) (= sensation of displeasure [*duḥkhā vedanā*]⁵⁶³) can be obscured-non-defined.]

[i] Spontaneous (任運) (= natural or innate, *sahaja* 俱起, #0062) attachment (*rāga* 貪) and spontaneous delusion (*moha* 癡) when associated with the five cognitions (*vijñānas*), [excluding hatred (*dveṣa*) which is always bad,] and [ii] spontaneous defilement (*kleśa*) (任運煩惱) (associated with mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna*]) in the destinies of exclusive suffering (純苦趣): all that, since not bringing forth action (發業), is non-defined; <#1593> all that can be associated with the faculty of displeasure (*duḥkha-indriya* 苦根) [not with the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya-indriya*) which is never non-defined].

#1594 YBh (T.30.1579.0627c) says:

All the defilements (*kleśas*)—when they are spontaneous (任運) (= abandoned by the path of cultivation [*bhāvanā-mārga-heya*])—occur associated with three 〈actual〉 sensations (*vedanās* 三受, i.e., displeasure [*duḥkha*], pleasure [*sukha*], neutral sensation [*upekṣā*]). {5/22v.}

Defilements (i.e., attachment-hatred-delusion [*rāga-dveṣa-moha*]) that extend throughout all the cognitions (*vijñānas*) (通一切識身) (whereby the five cognitions [*vijñāna-kāyas*] are included) can be associated with all the faculties (*indriyas*) (i.e., displeasure, pleasure, neutral sensation).

Those [defilements] that do not extend throughout all the cognitions (i.e., afflicted view of self [*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*], afflicted view of holding to an extreme [*antaḥgrāha-dṛṣṭi*], defilements belonging to the mind [*manas*]) can

⁵⁶³ AKB ii, F 105.

be associated with the faculties of the domain of mind (*mano-bhūmika* 意地: dissatisfaction [*daurmanasya*], satisfaction [*saumanasya*], which are part of displeasure and pleasure).

The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0709b14) says:

Spontaneous defilements (*kleśas*) (任運煩惱) of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātuvāpta* 欲界繫), which generate bad conduct <301> (*duṣcarita* 惡行), are also bad (*akuśala* 不善). The others are obscured-non-defined (有覆無記).

#1595 Thus, ⟨each of⟩ the three sensations can be of four natures.

E.D.B.1. *Five sensations (vedanās)*

#1597 Or else, sensations (*vedanās*) ⟨can be divided into⟩ five kinds:

1. displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦);
2. pleasure (*sukha* 樂);
3. dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂);
4. satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜);
5. neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨).

#1598 1–4. Indeed, the sensations of displeasure (苦) and of pleasure (樂), i.e., agreeable and disagreeable, are ⟨each⟩ of two kinds, ⟨for discomfort and delight differ:⟩

- a. according to whether they affect the body or affect the mind (遍悅身心);
- b. according to whether they are accompanied with figurating (*savikalpaka* 有分別 = satisfaction; *avikalpaka* 無分別 [without conceptual figurating] = pleasure) or are not accompanied by it;
- c. according to whether they are heavy (= displeasure) or are light (= dissatisfaction) (尤重輕微).

[“Agreeable” sensation is thus the faculty of pleasure (*sukha-indriya*) or the faculty of satisfaction (*saumanasya-indriya*). “Disagreeable” sensation (*duḥkha*) is thus the faculty of displeasure (*duḥkha-indriya*) or the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya-indriya*).]⁵⁶⁴

5. As for the “neither disagreeable nor agreeable” sensation, it is of a single type ⟨or not further distinguished⟩ (不分二):

⁵⁶⁴ See AKB v, F 40.

- a. for there is no difference in the action which it performs (i.e., “being not discomforting, not delighting”) (非逼非悅); {5/23r.}
- b. for this sensation is always without conceptual figurating (*vikalpanā*) (無分別);
- c. for it always evolves evenly (*sama-pravṛtti* 平等轉: not heavy, not light).

#1601 1. The sensation that comforts (適悅受)—associated with the five cognitions (*viññānas*)—is always given the name of pleasure (*sukha* 樂).

#1602 Associated with mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識)—in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界) and in the preliminary concentrations (*sāmantaka* 近分) of the first two meditations (*dhyānas*) (二靜慮)—it is called satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜) because it delights only the mind (悅心) (precisely: mental cognition and one part of the sense-sphere of the body [*kāya-āyatana*]).

Associated with mental cognition—in the actual first two meditations (i.e., root meditation [*mūla-dhyāna*], excluding the preliminary concentration) (二靜慮根本)—it is called pleasure (*sukha* 樂) and satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜) because it delights the body and the mind (悅身心).

Associated with mental cognition—in the third meditation (*dhyāna* 第三靜慮) (i.e., the preliminary concentration [*sāmantaka* 近分] and the root meditation [*mūla-dhyāna* 靜慮根本])—it is called pleasure (*sukha* 樂) because it is calm <302> (*śānta*, *kṣema* 安靜), heavy (尤重), without conceptual figurating (*vikalpa*) (無分別).⁵⁶⁵

#1604 2. The sensation that discomforts (逼迫受)—associated with five cognitions (*viññānas*)—is always called displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦).

#1607 Associated with mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), according to one opinion, it is only dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) because it discomforts the mind (逼迫心), because the noble teachings say that the painful (*saṃtāpa* 感受) of the domain of mind (*mano-bhūmika* 意地) is called *daurmanasya-indriya* (faculty of dissatisfaction, 憂根). {5/23v.}

#1608 YBh (T.30.1579.0665a) says:

Among hell beings, as soon as the retribution (*vipāka* 異熟) (i.e., the eighth cognition, which is only “retribution”, see #0407) has begun, a series of displeasure (*duḥkha*) (苦憂相續) (of the first five cognitions)

⁵⁶⁵ For all of this, see AKB ii, F 113–116.

and of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) (of mental cognition)—generated by this retribution (*vipākaja*)—begins.

Moreover, YBh (T.30.1579.0302c) says:

Hell beings are endowed with initial inquiry and investigation accompanied with dissatisfaction (*vitarka-vicāra-daurmanasya* 尋伺憂俱); likewise, also, one part of the hungry ghosts (*pretas* 鬼趣) and of the animals (傍生).

#1609 We thus know that the heavy painful sensation (*saṃtāpa* 尤重感受) of the domain of mind (*manas*) (意地) is given the name of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂); all the more so, the light one (輕).

#1611 According to another opinion (Dharmapāla), ⟨[painful sensation] falls into two categories⟩.

Among gods and among men, painful sensation of the domain of mind is always called dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) because it is not heavy (尤重).

Among animals and among hungry ghosts (*pretas*) (傍生鬼界), it is called displeasure (*duḥkha* 憂) and dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 苦) because—according to whether these places consist of exclusive suffering (純受) (similar to the hells) [YBh, 57] or of mixed ⟨sensation⟩ (雜受)—the aforesaid sensation is heavy or light (輕重).

In the hells (奈落迦), it is called displeasure (*duḥkha*) because, in this place consisting of exclusive suffering (純受), it is heavy (尤重) and without conceptual figurating (*vikalpa*) (無分別).

#1612 Indeed, YBh (T.30.1579.0627c) says:

Three sensations (*vedanās*) (i.e., displeasure [*duḥkha*], pleasure [*sukha*] and neutral sensation [*upekṣā*]) can be active (現行) with ⟨all⟩ spontaneously (任運) ⟨generated⟩ defilements (*kleśas*). {5/24r.}

The details as above, #1594.

Moreover, YBh (T.30.1579.0622a) says:

The natural (*sahaja* 俱生) afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi* 薩迦耶見) is only non-defined (無記), as is also the natural afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-drṣṭi* 邊執見). Disagreeable sensation (*duḥkha*) that accompanies these two afflicted views (*drṣṭis*) cannot be included

in ⟨the faculty of⟩ dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya-indriya* 憂根) for ⟨YBh (論) says that⟩ the latter is never non-defined. <303>

Moreover, YBh (T.30.1579.0616b) says:

Hell beings are certainly not endowed (成就) with the other three active (現行) faculties (*indriyas* 根); the same is the case for the hungry ghosts and animals with exclusive suffering (純苦).

- #1614 What are these other three faculties (*indriyas*)? Pleasure (樂), satisfaction (喜), dissatisfaction (憂), for these sentient beings are endowed with active neutral sensation (現行捨).
- #1615 Objection. – [These sentient beings] are ⟨definitively⟩ not endowed with adventitious (*āgantuka* 客) neutral sensation (捨) i.e., with the neutral sensation associated with the six cognitions (*viññānas*) (as opposed to that of #0624, #1356). [Thus it is neutral sensation which is the third missing faculty, and not dissatisfaction.]
- #1617 [We reply:] – ⟨How do you know that the passage in question is speaking only of adventitious sensations (客受)?⟩ It cannot be a question of this kind of neutral sensation, for, in view of the fact that the six adventitious cognitions are ⟨sometimes⟩ absent in them, one could then as well say that the sentient beings in question are not endowed with the mental sense-faculty “cogitation” (*mana-indriya*) (意根). – It cannot be accepted {5/24v.} that—while attributing the mental sense-faculty (*mana-indriya*) to the sentient beings in question—the treatise (論, i.e., YBh) means, by *manas*, all [eight] cognitions, and that, in speaking of the sensations (*vedanās*), it has in mind only the adventitious sensation (客受) (i.e., that of the six cognitions).
- #1619 Moreover, [we state,] if the treatise (i.e., YBh) would have adventitious sensation (*vedanā*) (客受) in mind [when stating that hell beings are certainly not endowed with the other three active faculties], how can it say that hell beings necessarily have eight faculties (*indriyas*) (implying: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, *manas*, neutral sensation [*upekṣā*], life [*āyus*])?
- #1621 If the reply is that the eighth [faculty (*indriya*)] is dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) (but not displeasure [*duḥkha*]) because the five cognitions (*viññānas*) do not form a continuous series (相續), we will ask if there then would be dissatisfaction (憂根) at death, at birth (死生), in the moments of fainting (*mūrchā* 悶絕)?
- #1622 We will ask the same question if someone says that the eighth [faculty (*indriya*)]

is displeasure (*duḥkha*) because bodily cognition (*kāya-vijñāna*) forms a series.

#1623 If it is maintained that the eighth [faculty (*indriya*)] is one of the sexual organs (*vyāñjana* 形), the answer is “no”, for these sentient beings do not necessarily possess this kind of faculty. Generated (招) by bad actions, they can be sexless (無形). Due to these bad actions, they must suffer (受苦) by way of the five sense-faculties: this is why they are endowed with the faculty of seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, but there is no need for them to possess a sexual organ, for the latter is not a cause of painful sensation. In the great Avīci hell (無間大地獄) (i.e., in contrast to the small hells), {5/25r.} there is no striving (希求) for sexual intercourse (婬欲事). <304>

#1624 Thus this eighth faculty (*indriya*), which hell beings necessarily possess, is definitively the faculty of neutral sensation (*upekṣa-indriya* 捨根), because the seventh and the eighth cognitions (*vijñānas*) are associated with neutral sensation (see #1356 and #0624).

#1625 Just as in the stage of extreme pleasure (極樂地)—namely, in the third meditation (*dhyāna*)—the sensation which delights (悅) the mind (*manas* 意) is called pleasure (*sukha* 樂), there is no ⟨faculty of⟩ satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜根) there.

Just as in the places (*āyatana*) of extreme suffering (極苦處), the sensation which afflicts (迫) the mind (*manas* 意) is called suffering (*duḥkha*), there is no ⟨faculty of⟩ dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂根) there.

#1626 Consequently, in the text above (#1612), the three missing faculties are pleasure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction (憂喜樂).

#1628 It is true that some texts (Vasubandhu, *Samgraha*, T31.1597.0327b) say that hell beings experience an “outflow pleasure” (*niṣyanda-sukha* 等流樂). This statement is either a “concession” (隨轉理說; spoken in conformity with the Sarvāstivādin theory), or else, (if it is in conformity with the Great Vehicle,) it is directed at places with mixed sensation (雜受處) (i.e., animals and hungry ghosts). There cannot be “retribution-pleasure” (*vipāka-sukha* 異熟樂) in the hells, which are said to be of exclusive suffering (純苦).

#1629 It is also true that in ⟨the noble teachings⟩, i.e., *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T31.1606.0726a), painful sensation (*saṃtāpa*) of the domain of mind (*manas*) (意地感受) is given the name ⟨faculty of⟩ dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya-indriya* 憂根). This designation is directed at the majority of cases (*bāhulika eṣo nirdeśaḥ*: it is precise regarding the whole of humans and gods, regarding one part of the hungry ghosts and animals); or else, it is a concession (隨轉, in conformity with the Sarvāsti-

vādin theory) (and does not really conflict [with our position]).

#1631 Likewise, the assertions of YBh (T.30.1579.0665a) cited above (#1608), {5/25v.} namely:

Among hell beings, as soon as the retribution (*vipāka* 異熟) (i.e., the eighth cognition, which is only “retribution”, see #0407) has begun, a series of displeasure (*duḥkha*) (苦憂相續) (of the first five cognitions) and of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) (of mental cognition)—generated by this retribution (*vipākaja*)—begins.

Moreover, YBh (T.30.1579.0302c) says:

Hell beings are endowed with initial inquiry and investigation accompanied with dissatisfaction (*vitarka-vicāra-daurmanasya* 尋伺憂俱); likewise, also, one part of the hungry ghosts (*pretas* 鬼趣) and of the animals (傍生).

[These assertions] are also a “concession” (隨轉門), [in conformity with the Mahāsāṃghikas, Sthaviras, Sautrāntikas, Mahīśāsakas]. <305>

#1632 Moreover, we observe that the (faculty of) displeasure (*duḥkha-indriya* = *duḥkhā vedanā*) of hell beings is associated with mental cognition⁵⁶⁶ (意識俱): in this respect, it is of the same kind as the (faculty of) dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) of the other destinies (gods, humans, hungry ghosts and animals of mixed sensation); thus one may, figuratively speaking (假說), call it dissatisfaction (憂).

#1633 Or else, again, among hell beings, displeasure harms the body (as does all displeasure) and also harms the mind (as does all dissatisfaction): thus, although it is included in displeasure (苦根), nevertheless, it is loosely called dissatisfaction (憂).

Likewise, the satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜) of the two preliminary (*sāmantaka* 近分) meditations (*dhyāna*)—comforting body and mind (益身心)—is called pleasure (*sukha* 樂) although it is satisfaction (喜根). This is the doctrine of the *Vikhyāpana* (顯揚論, T.31.1602.0486c) and of YBh (T.30.1579.0615a).

[Question: – Why is it wrong to state that the first two preliminary meditations possess pleasure?]

[Reply:] – It is certain that the not-yet-arrived or preparatory stage (*anāgamyā-*

⁵⁶⁶ Editors: LVP has “*manas*” but the Chinese has “*mano-viññāna*”.

bhūmi 未至地)⁵⁶⁷ does not possess (the faculty of) pleasure (樂根), for it involves only eleven faculties (*indriyas* 根) (YBh, 57) [namely, the five of which the first is faith (*śraddhā*), the three pure ones, as well as the mental sense-faculty (*manas*), satisfaction and neutral sensation (*upekṣā*)].

#1634 It is thus established that the painful sensation (感受) of the domain of mind (*manas*) (意地) of the places with exclusive suffering (感受純受苦處) {5/26r.} is included in displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦根).

#1635 (For fear of undue elaboration (恐文增廣),) we will not explain any further what the noble teachings say (under many different topics) on this subject: [i.e., which faculties (*indriyas*) are retribution (*vipāka*);⁵⁶⁸ the realm (*dhātu*), the stage (*bhūmi*), the abandonment of faculties].

E.D.B.2. *Simultaneity of the sensations (vedanās)*

#1637 [Above, #1544, we have examined whether the six cognitions (*viññānas*) could—at the same time—be good, bad, non-defined.] Now we will examine an analogous problem, whether the six cognitions can—at the same time—be associated with three sensations (*vedanās*).

a. According to one opinion, this is impossible: (1) for there would be a contradiction in case they function—at the same time—(in relation to external objects) (外門轉); (2) for the mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), which accompanies the first five cognitions and which has the same object as the five (同五所緣), would, when the five being associated with three sensations (五三受俱), also occur with three <306> sensations, which would (contradict reason). Thus, the six cognitions (must) not—at the same time—be associated with three sensations.

It is true that YBh (T.30.1579.0580c01) (and other texts) say that the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna* 藏識) of one time period (一時) arises with the three sensations being associated (三受俱起) with the six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-viññānas* 轉識相應): but, in fact, this *śāstra* has a multiplicity of moments (多念) of the store-cognition in mind, for example, when one says (‘‘one mind’’ (一心) but does not refer to a single arising and ceasing (一生滅)).⁵⁶⁹ The statement of YBh does thus not present any difficulty.

⁵⁶⁷ AKB viii, F 179.

⁵⁶⁸ AKB ii, F 10.

⁵⁶⁹ Editors: LVP translates: ‘‘just as when [YBh] says: ‘One mind with many arisings and ceasings’.’’

#1638 b. According to another opinion (Dharmapāla), the three sensations (*vedanās* 三受) of the six cognitions (*viññānas*) can be simultaneous (俱):

1. for it is possible that the sensations sense (受)—at the same time—favorable, unfavorable and neutral objects (順違中境);

2. for mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意) does not necessarily have the same sensation as the five [cognitions]: {5/26v.} (the concentrated mental cognition is associated with pleasure [*sukha*]; an automatic auditory cognition occurs which is associated with neutral sensation [*upekṣā*]). If [mental cognition] is applied specifically to an object (偏注境) to which one of the five [sensory] cognitions is directed, then it possesses the sensation of this cognition; if not, (無偏注) it is associated with neutral sensation (捨).

Consequently, the three sensations can be simultaneous (俱) (in the six cognitions).

#1639 When the state of mastery (自在位) is attained, the six cognitions are associated only with pleasure (*sukha* 樂), satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜), neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨), for the *buddhas* have abandoned (斷) everything that is displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦) and dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂).

E.D.C. Universal (*sarvatraga*) and special (*vinīyata*) mental factors (*caittas*)

C.1. Universal (*sarvatraga*) mental factors (*caittas*) (遍行心所); #1649

C.2. Special (*vinīyata*) mental factors (別境心所); #1668

#1641 We have summarily explained the six categories of mental factors (*caittas*); now it is appropriate to determine (in detail the distinctness of) their particular characteristics (差別相).

#1645 What are the first two categories (二位) (and what are their characteristics)?

#1646 [Vasubandhu's] stanza 10a–c (Chin. 10) says:

ādyāḥ sparsādayaḥ chandādhimokṣa-smṛtayaḥ saha | 10ab

samādhi-dhībhyāṃ niyatāḥ | 10c

初遍行觸等 · 次別境 · 謂欲 · |

勝解念定慧 · 所緣事不同 · || 10

10. First, the universal ones (遍行), [namely,] contact (*sparsā* 觸), etc. Next, the special ones (別境)—the (thing that is their) object (所緣事) is special

(*asādhāraṇa* 不同)—namely, predilection (*chanda* 欲), resolve (*adhi-mokṣa* 勝解), memory (*smṛti* 念), concentration (*samādhi* 定) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧). <307>

E.D.C.1. *Universal (sarvatraga) mental factors (caittas)*

#1649 The Treatise:

⟨Among the six categories of mental factors, FIRST (初),⟩ we know the characteristic of universality of the UNIVERSAL (遍行) [mental factors], ⟨i.e., CONTACT, ETC. (觸等),⟩ which have been defined ⟨in detail⟩ above (#0587). <#1651> ⟨How do we know the characteristics of these universal [mental factors]?⟩ <#1653> From ⟨the definitive authority (定量) of⟩ the teachings (教) and of reasoning (理). {5/27r.}

#1656 a. As for the teachings:

1. The *sūtra* (契經) (in the canonical scriptures [*āgama*]) says:

caḥṣuḥ praṭītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate caḥsur-vijñānaṃ | trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātaḥ sparśaḥ | sparśa-sahajātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā ...

⟨Visual cognition (眼識) arises with eyes (眼) and material objects (色) as its conditions (緣), and the coming together of these three (三和合) is called contact (*sparśa* 觸). Along with contact are sensation, ideation, volition ...⁵⁷⁰⟩

This shows that the four—of which contact (*sparśa*) is the first—are universal [mental factors].

#1657 2. Moreover, the *sūtra* (契經)⁵⁷¹ says:

indriyaṃ ced aparibhinnaṃ bhavati viśayaś cāpātham āgacchati⁵⁷² manas-kāraś ca samuttiṣṭhati vijñānaṃ tadā prādurbhavati.

⟨If the sense-faculty (根) has not deteriorated (壞) and objects (境界) manifest (現前), then, when mental application (作意) properly occurs, cognition arises (生識)⟩.

#1658 Another *sūtra* says:

⁵⁷⁰ Compare AKB iii, F 105; ix, F 245, variants; *Samyutta*, iv, 67–69; YBh, 56.

⁵⁷¹ *Hastipadopama*, compare *Majjhima*, i, p. 190; *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 567.

⁵⁷² *xianqian* 現前: “is manifest”.

yan manasikaroti tad eva vijānāti, yad vijānāti tad eva manasikaroti, tasmād ubhāv etau nityaṃ saṃsṛṣṭau ...

⟨If there is mental application (作意) directed at [an object], then there is cognizing (了別) [of the object]. If there is cognizing, then there will be mental application. Thus these two are always united (共和合) ...⁵⁷³⟩

Thus, mental application (*manaskāra*) is also a universal (遍行) [mental factor]. There are numerous scriptural arguments that one could quote.

#1660 b. As for reasoning (理):

1. In order for cognition (*viññāna*) to take place, the “coming together of the three” (*trika-saṃnipāta* 三和) {5/27v.} is necessary. This [coming together] definitively engenders contact (*sparśa* 觸).⁵⁷⁴ Contact is necessary for the coming together of the three, because if contact were absent, the mind (*citta*) and the “mental factors” *dharmas* (*caitta-dharmas* 心所法) would not come together to contact one and the same object (一境).

#1661 2. Mental application (*manaskāra* 作意)⁵⁷⁵ “pulls” (引; variant: 警, stimulates) the mind and makes it go (趣) to its object. If mental application were absent, the mind would not occur. <308>

#1662 3. Sensation (*vedanā* 受) experiences (領納) the agreeable, disagreeable, neutral object (順違中境); it makes the mind generate the marks (*nimittas* 相) of pleasure, displeasure, neutrality (歡感捨). It does not happen that the mind occurs without one of these three marks being present. (See #1572.)

#1663 4. Ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) is the ⟨establishing or⟩ distinguishing (*vyavasthāna* 安立⁵⁷⁶) of its object (*ālambana* or *āyatana* 自境) [for example: seizing it as blue, not

⁵⁷³ Compare *Majjhima*, i, p. 293, and the *sūtra*, AKB iii, F 106.

⁵⁷⁴ AKB ii, verse 24 (F 154) [WOG.127.25–27]:

sparśa indriya-viṣaya-saṃnipāta-jā sprṣṭir iti | indriya-viṣaya-viññānānāṃ saṃnipātajā jātā sprṣṭiḥ. sprṣṭir iva sprṣṭiḥ | yad-yogād indriya-viṣaya-viññānāny anyonyaṃ sprṣantīva sa sparśaḥ.

Contact (*sparśa*) is the state of contact (*sprṣṭi*) arisen from the coming together (*saṃnipāta*) of (a) the sense-faculty [*indriya*], (b) the object-field [*viṣaya*] and (c) the consciousness (*viññāna*); in other words, it is that factor by virtue of which (*yadyogāt*) the sense-faculty, the object-field and the consciousness are as if touching one another.

⁵⁷⁵ AKB vii, F 23.

⁵⁷⁶ *Trimsikā* (Lévi, 1925), F 21, line 3.

non-blue], [the distinguishing] in terms of “part-totality” (分齊) [for example, seizing the object as numerous, not numerous, large, small]. (This is, thus, the qualitative and quantitative determination of the object). If, when the mind occurs (心起), ideation would be absent, the mind would not seize (取) the “part-totality-*nimitta*” (分齊相) (i.e., the mark and the quantity) of the object (境).

- #1664 5. Volition (*cetanā* 思) seizes (取) the marks of correct causes, etc., [of action] (*samyag-hetu-ādi-nimittas* 正因等相); it “constellates” a good, etc., mind (*kuśala-ādy abhisamkaroti* 造作善等). There would be no occurrence of a mind when one of these three marks (*nimittas*; i.e., correct, wrong or neutral causes) were not present. Thus, volition is necessary.
- #1665 We take it as established that the five *dharma*s, i.e., contact, mental application, etc., {5/28r.} necessarily have to exist in order for the mind to occur. Thus, they are universal (遍行) [mental factors]. The other mental factors are not like that, as we shall see.

E.D.C.2. *Special (viniyata) mental factors (caittas)*⁵⁷⁷

- 2.1. Predilection (*chanda*); #1672
- 2.2. Resolve (*adhimokṣa*); #1691
- 2.3. Memory (*smṛti*); #1699
- 2.4. Concentration (*saṃādhi*); #1707
- 2.5. Understanding (*prajñā*); #1723
- 2.6. Relationships among the five special mental factors (*caittas*); #1728
- 2.7. Sensation (*vedanā*) of the five special mental factors; #1758

- #1668 Among the six categories of mental factors (*caittas*), the special ones are expounded after the first, i.e., the universal ones: this is why the stanza (*kārikā*) says: NEXT (次), (THE SPECIAL ONES (別境)). These are the mental factors the object of which is specific (*pratiniyata-viṣaya* 別境), NAMELY, (1) PREDILECTION (*chanda* 欲), (2) RESOLVE (*adhimokṣa* 勝解), (3) MEMORY (*smṛti* 念), (4) CONCENTRATION (*saṃādhi* 定) and (5) UNDERSTANDING (*prajñā* 慧). THE THING THAT IS THEIR OBJECT (*ālambana viṣaya-vastu* 所緣境事) IS, (in the majority of cases (多分)), “SPECIAL” (不同).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandha* (cited in *Vyākhyā* ad AKB ii, verse 24 [F 154]):

⁵⁷⁷ See #0633, #0745.

chandaḥ katamaḥ | abhiprete vastuny abhilāṣaḥ |

What is predilection? – It is the desire-aspiring relative to a considered thing.

adhimokṣaḥ katamaḥ | niścite vastuny avadhāraṇam.

What is resolve? – It is the ascertainment with regard to a determined object.

AKB (*Vyākhyā*; WOG.128.2–4; WOG.127.32–33):

*adhimuktis tad-ālambanasya guṇato 'vadhāraṇam | rucir ity anye | yathāniś-
cayaṃ dhāraṇeti Yogācārācittāḥ.*

Resolution is the consideration of the cognitive object in terms of qualities; according to others, it is the preference or inclination; according to the practitioners, it is the holding of the object in conformity with the decision taken.

*smṛtir ālambanāsaṃpramoṣa iti yad-yogād ālambanaṃ na mano vismarati.
tac cābhilaṣatīva sā smṛtiḥ*

Mindfulness is the not-letting-drop of the cognitive object; a factor by virtue of which the mind does not forget the cognitive object, by virtue of which the mind cherishes the cognitive object so to speak (or clearly notes the cognitive object). (see also AKB ii, F 162; vi, F 258). <309>

Pañca-skandhaka of Vasubandhu (transl. Engle):

smṛtiḥ katamā | saṃstute vastuny asaṃpramoṣaḥ | cetaso 'bhilapanatā

What is recollection? The avoidance of inattentiveness toward a familiar object; a state of mental discourse.

Cited in *Vyākhyā* ad AKB ii, verse 24 [F 154]).

The definitions of Sthiramati in the commentary on the *Trentaine* (Lévi, F 25) in the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0697a). They come from Asaṅga's *Samuccaya-sāstra* (T.31.1605.0664a).

E.D.C.2.1. *Predilection (chanda)*

#1672 1. 〈What is PREDILECTION (*chanda* 欲)?〉

#1674 It is defined as *abhiprete vastuny abhilāṣa-svabhāvaḥ | vīrya-ārambha-saṃniśraya-karmakāḥ*:

Predilection has for its nature (性) the desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望) relative to a considered (*abhipreta* 所樂) thing (or object) (境).

[Predilection] has for its activity (業) to be the support for diligence (勤依).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 25 (10a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

tatra chando 'bhiprete vastuny abhilāṣaḥ |

Predilection (*chanda*) is the desire-aspiring for a wanted or considered (*abhipreta*) thing (*vastu*).

abhiprete vastuny abhilāṣa, iti, pratīniyata-viśayatvaṃ jñāpitaṃ bhavaty, anabhiprete chandābhāvāt | darśana-śravaṇādi-kriyā-viśayatvena yad abhimataṃ vastu, tad abhipretam | tatra darśana-śravaṇādi-prārthanā chandaḥ |

By this definition, i.e., “desire-aspiring for a wanted or considered thing”, it is pointed out that in each specific case, the object-field of predilection is specific (*pratīniyata*) since predilection is not directed towards a non-wanted or non-considered object-field. The “wanted or considered” thing here is a thing that, as the object-field of seeing, hearing, etc., is dear (*abhimata*). The desire (*prārthanā*) to see, hear, etc., such a thing is predilection.

sa ca vīryārambha-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

The activity of predilection consists in providing a support for virtuous vigor or striving (*vīrya*) (as well as for) mundane undertakings (*ārambha*).

#1677 [What should be understood by “considered” (*abhipreta* 所樂) thing?]

a. According to one opinion, it is the lovable thing (or object) (*rañjanīya* 可欣境), for, with regard to this thing, there is an aspiration (*prārthanā*, *abhimati*; 欲) to see it, to hear it, etc.; there is thus desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望).

#1678 Someone will say. – But is there not desire (希) for non-union (*asaṃsarga* 不合), desire (望) for separation (*viyogecchā* 別離) with regard to a detestable thing (*doṣaṇīya* 可厭事⁵⁷⁸)? Thus, there is aspiration relative to this thing.

#1679 Answer. – This aspiration (*prārthanā*) aims only at non-union, at separation, relative to a detestable thing: that which is aimed at is, (itself,) a lovable thing and not something detestable.

#1680 Thus, the detestable or neutral thing {5/28v.} is absolutely not of the domain of predilection (*chanda*). Furthermore, if desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望) is absent with regard to the lovable thing, there is no predilection.

#1681 b. According to another opinion, “considered” (*abhipreta* 所樂) [thing] means the object aimed at (*mārgita*, *prekṣita*, *prārthita* 所求境⁵⁷⁹), for there is desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望) when union (合) with the lovable (可欣) thing or sep-

⁵⁷⁸ *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 463, 2.

⁵⁷⁹ AKB 20/7v.7 [v, F 62].

aration (離) from the detestable (可厭) thing is aimed at (求). – But predilection is completely absent with regard to the neutral object (中容境); and, when there is no desire-aspiring (希求) with regard to the lovable or the detestable thing (緣欣厭事), predilection is absent.

#1683 c. According to a third opinion, which is the correct one, <310> “considered” (*abhipreta* 所樂) thing means the object (境) with regard to which there is curiosity (欲觀), i.e., aspiration (or predilection) (欲) to discern and examine (觀察, *parīkṣā*, *vicaya*) (everything (一切事)), for there is desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望) with regard to such a thing. If curiosity (欲觀) is absent—due to the weakness of the cause (i.e., *bīja*) or of the object (隨因境勢)—[then] perception (緣者) takes place spontaneously (任運) without there being a predilection.

#1684 Thus, (from this reasoning (理趣), we can conclude that) predilection (欲) is not a universal (遍行) [mental factor].

#1686 2. The Sarvāstivādins think that predilection (*chanda*) is a universal [mental factor]. Saṃghabhadra⁵⁸⁰ says that “it is by the power of desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望) (for an object) that mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) seize their object (取所緣), for the *sūtra* (經) says that all *dharma*s have predilection for their root (*chanda-mūlakāḥ sarve dharmāḥ*)”.⁵⁸¹ {5/29r.}

#1687 [Reply:] – This opinion is incorrect, for it is by the power of mental application (*manaskāra* 作意) that mind (*citta*), etc., seize their object (取境) (see #0601). (Various) noble teachings say that mental application in action (*saṃmukhī-bhāva* 現前) engenders cognition (*vijñāna*); nowhere is it said that predilection possesses this power (i.e., to engender mind and mental factors).

#1688 The *sūtra* [also] says that “all *dharma*s have thirst (*trṣṇā* 愛) for their root”. Do you uphold the view that mind and mental factors arise by the power of thirst?

Thus, the phrase: “All *dharma*s have predilection for their root”, means: “All good, etc., works (or actions) (事業) are generated by predilection”, or else, it means: “(Good predilection or) predilection for good [factors] (*kuśala-dharma-cchanda* 善欲) brings forth good activity (or correct effort) (*samyag-vyāyāma* 正勤) and, with the aid of that, all good things are ‘accomplished’ (助成)”.

That is why the present Treatise says “predilection has for its activity (業) to be the support for vigor” (*vīrya-ārambha-saṃniśraya* 勤依).

⁵⁸⁰ *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0388b27).

⁵⁸¹ AKB vii, F 34; *Majjhima*, iii, p. 16.

E.D.C.2.2. *Resolve (adhimokṣa)*#1691 1. What is RESOLVE (*adhimokṣa* 勝解)?

It is defined as *niścīte vastuni [tathaiṣa] avadhāraṇam asaṃhāryatā-karmakaḥ*:⁵⁸²
 <“Resolve has for its nature (性) the ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印持) with regard to a determined object or thing (*niścīte vastuni* 於決定境).

[Resolve] has for its activity (業) to not allow to become swayed (*asaṃhāryatā* 不可引轉)”).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 25 (10b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

adhimokṣo niścīte vastuni tathaiṣavadhāraṇam |

Resolve (*adhimokṣa*) consists in the fact that when one has determined a thing (*niścīte vastuni*), that one likewise ascertains (*avadhāraṇa*) it.

niścīta-grahaṇam aniścīta-pratiṣedhārtham | yuktita āptopadeśato vā, yad vastu asaṃdigdham, tan niścītam |

“Determined” (*niścīta*) is said in order to exclude (*pratiṣedha*) the undetermined (*aniścīta*). When—based on reasonings (*yukti*) and on teachings by an authority (*āptopadeśa*)—a thing (*vastu*) is beyond doubt (*asaṃdigdha*), this is called “determined”.

yenaivākāreṇa tan niścītam, anitya-duḥkhādy-ākāreṇa, tenaivākāreṇa tasya vastunaś cetasy abhiniveśanam | evam etannānyathety, avadhāraṇam adhimokṣaḥ |

If—in just the same form in which one has determined something as being impermanent (*anitya*), painful (*duḥkhā*), etc.—one adheres (*abhiniveśana*) to it in the mind (*citta*): “it is thus and not otherwise”, then this ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa*) is resolve (*adhimokṣa*).

sa cāsaṃhāryatā-dāna-karmakaḥ | adhimukti-pradhāno hi sva-siddhāntāt para-pravādinibhir apahartum na śakyate |

The activity of resolve consists in the fact that it grants steadfastness (*asaṃhāryatā*), for the one who exerts himself resolutely (*adhimuktīpradhāna*) cannot be turned away (*apahartum*) from an established view (*svasiddhāntāt*) by one with different convictions (*para-pravādin*).

#1692 That is, by the power of <311> true or false teachings (教), {5/29v.} of reasoning (理), of realization or experience (證) (through meditation or direct perception

⁵⁸² *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 25.

[*pratyakṣa*]), one arrives at a decision (審決, see #1285, #1748) and ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印持) with regard to the object seized with certitude (於所取境). [One says: “This determined thing is in this way, not otherwise’.] Due to this decision, one cannot become swayed (不能引轉) by some other reason (or condition 異緣)).

#1693 Thus, there is no resolve with regard to a thing that is not determined (*nīścita* 決定), that is doubtful (*saṁdigdha* 猶豫). [But see #1301.]

If the mind is not decided (審決) with regard to a particular thing, there is no resolve either.

Thus, resolve is not a universal [mental factor].

#1695 2. [Saṃghabhadra⁵⁸³ sets out the opinion of the diverging Sarvāstivādins:] “When the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) seize their object (取自境), all are accompanied by resolve (*adhimokṣa*) due to the absence of obstacles (*avighna-bhāva* 無拘礙)”.

#1696 This thesis is not reasonable. (What are the reasons?)

If you call resolve that which does not make an obstacle (能不礙者) to the mind and mental factors, we will say that all *dharma*s, with the exception of the mind and mental factors, do not make an obstacle.

If [resolve] refers to that in regard to which there is no obstacle (所不礙者), the mind and mental factors will be resolve itself.

[If you reply: “It is by the dominant power of resolve that the generation of the mind and mental factors is not prevented”,] we will say: “The dominant cause for the generation (*faqi* 發起, *samutthāna* ?) of the mind and mental factors is the sense-faculty (*indriya* 根) and mental application (*manaskāra* 作意). [What would be the use of resolve?]”

If you reply: “It is due to resolve that the sense-faculty and mental application have this dominant power, and not due to themselves”, we will say: “Your resolve, which is a mental factor, would, just as well as mental application, depend on another *dharma* (待餘), and that would result in the problem of an infinite regress (無窮失)”.

E.D.C.2.3. Memory (*smṛti*)

#1699 1. What is MEMORY (*smṛti* 念)?

⁵⁸³ Shun zhengli lun (T.29.1562.0384b).

Memory is the *dharma* that, (in its nature (性),) brings it about that the mind clearly recalls (*abhilapanatā*; 明記) an ⟨already⟩ experienced thing (曾習境) and does not forget or is without blurring (*asaṃpramoṣa* 不忘). {5/30r.} <312>

[Memory] has for its activity (業) to be the support of concentration (*samādhi* 定依; non-distraction [*avikṣepa*]).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 25 (10b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

smṛtiḥ saṃstute vastuny asaṃpramoṣaś, cetaso 'bhilapanatā |

Memory (*smṛti*) is, in regard to a familiar (*saṃstuta*) thing, the non-blurring (*asaṃpramoṣa*) of the mind, its ability to clearly recall (*abhilapanatā*).

saṃstutam vastu pūrvānubhūtam |

A “familiar thing” (*saṃstuta-vastu*) is a previously experienced thing (*pūrvānubhūta*).

ālambana-grahaṇāvipraṇāśa-kāraṇatvād, asaṃpramoṣaḥ |

Since it is the cause for the not completely disappearing (*avipraṇāśa*) of the conceiving (*grahaṇa*) of the cognitive object, it is “non-blurring” (*asaṃpramoṣa*).

pūrvagr̥hītasya vastunaḥ punaḥ punar ālambanākāra-smaraṇam, abhilapanatā |

“Ability to clearly recall” (*abhilapanatā*) is the repeated recollecting of the form (*ākāra*) or cognitive object (*ālambana*) in regard to a previously conceived thing.

abhilapanam evābhilapanatā |

“Clearly recalling” (*abhilapana*) is the ability to clearly recall (*abhilapanatā*).

sā punar avikṣepa-karmikā |

The activity of memory, however, is non-distraction (*avikṣepa*).

ālambanābhilapane sati, cittasyālambanāntara ākārāntare vā vikṣepābhāvād, avikṣepa-karmikā |

“Non-distraction” consists in the fact that—when the cognitive object is clearly recalled—the mind (*citta*) is not distracted by another cognitive object (*ālambana*) or another form (*ākāra*).

#1700 [This is so,] for it unceasingly retains and holds (憶持) the ⟨already⟩ experienced thing (曾所受境) in such a way that there occurs no failing to remember ⟨or forgetting⟩ (忘失), and, thereby, it induces (引) concentration (定).

There can be no memory of what has not ⟨already⟩ been experienced (曾未受); neither can there be any memory of the ⟨already⟩ experienced thing (曾所受) if there is no ⟨clear⟩ recalling (*abhilapana* 明記).

Thus, memory is not a universal mental factor (*caitta*).

- #1702 2. According to the Sarvāstivādins (Saṃghabhadra⁵⁸⁴) every generation of mind ⟨must⟩ be accompanied by memory-mindfulness (念), i.e., the memory-mindfulness which—in the future—is the cause of recollection (*smaraṇa* 憶念因).
- #1703 ⟨This argument is not reasonable because⟩ then, according to this theory, one could, [for example,] say that future doubt, ⟨delusion⟩ (癡), faith (信), etc., would exist prior. Now, the future ⟨cause of⟩ recollection is sufficiently explained by the power of the previous mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) ⟨or⟩ by the power of ideation (*saṃjñā* 想勢力). [When the mind and mental factors seize the object, they imprint, in the root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna*), efficacies that will be the cause of recollection. There is no need to assume a memory—contemporaneous with the experience—i.e., the cause of future recollection.⁵⁸⁵]

E.D.C.2.4. Concentration (*samādhi*)

- #1707 1. What is CONCENTRATION (*samādhi* 定)?

It has for its nature (性) to make the mind to apply itself focusedly (*samavadhāna* ?; 專注) on the object to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀境) and {5/30v.} to not become distracted (*vikṣip* 不散).

[Concentration] has for its activity (業) to be the support for knowledge (*jñāna*) (智依).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 26 (10b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

samādhir upaparīkṣye vastuni cittasyaikāgratā |

Concentration (*samādhi*) is the one-pointed orientation of the mind (*cittasyaikāgratā*) toward the thing (*vastu*) to be examined (*upaparīkṣya*).

upaparīkṣyaṃ vastu guṇato doṣato vā | *ekāgratā ekālabhanatā* |

The thing (*vastu*) is to be examined in regard to its qualities (*guṇa*) and faults (*doṣa*).

“One-pointed orientation of the mind” consists in the fact that the mind has always one and the same (*ekāgratā*) cognitive object (*ālambana*).

jñāna-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ, samāhite citte, yathā-bhūta-parijñānāt |

The activity of concentration consists in providing the support for knowledge

⁵⁸⁴ *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0389b).

⁵⁸⁵ See AKB ix, F 273f.

(*jñāna*), for when the mind (*citta*) meditates or is concentrated (*samāhita*), one completely knows something as for what it really is.

#1708 Indeed, in the qualitative examination (觀) (i.e., virtue [德], defect [失], neither [俱非]) of the object, concentration makes the mind to apply itself focusedly (專注) and not become distracted (不散). With this concentration as support, knowledge—the ascertained cognition (決擇智, *vinīścaya*) [that seizes the virtues, etc., of the object]—can arise.

#1709 The expression “the mind applies itself focusedly” (心專注) means that the mind focuses (能住) on [a] what it wants (to focus on) (所欲住), not only on [b] a single object. To understand concentration or focused application of the mind in this latter sense, <313> one would have to say that concentration (等持) is absent in the “path of insight” (見道) where the practitioner discerns the truths successively (歷觀諸諦) and where, consequently, the object changes (境別) from moment to moment.

#1710 Concentration is absent in the state of distraction (*vikṣepa*), when numerous minds do not apply themselves focusedly (專注) to the object.

Thus, concentration is not a universal [mental factor].

#1713 2. However, according to Saṃghabhadra,⁵⁸⁶ even in the state of distraction, concentration (*samādhi*) occurs; but it is then subtle and hidden (微隱).

Saṃghabhadra should explain himself without ambiguity!

#1715 If by concentration he means that which makes the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) together be directed at a single object (和合同趣一境), and if he, consequently, claims that concentration is a universal [mental factor], [the answer is,] no, (i.e., this is not reasonable) for that is the activity (用) of contact (*sparśa* 觸). {5/31r.}

#1716 If he thinks that concentration brings it about that one moment of mind (剎那頃心) does not change its object (不易緣) and is, consequently, a universal [mental factor], no, (this is also not reasonable) for, in its nature, one moment of mind does not change (易) its object (所緣).

#1717 If he thinks that concentration makes the mind seize the object (取所緣) and is, therefore, a universal [mental factor], no, (this is also not reasonable) for it is mental application (*manaskāra* 作意) that makes the mind seize the object.

#1719 3. On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas think that this concentration itself (體)

⁵⁸⁶ *Shun zhengli lun* (T.29.1562.0390); compare AKB viii, F 128–130.

is just simply the mind (心), for the *sūtra* says that, among the three trainings (*śikṣās*),⁵⁸⁷ training in the higher mind (*adhi-cittaṃ śikṣā* 心學) is *citta-ekāgratā*, i.e., “the mind focused on a single object” (一境性).⁵⁸⁸

This text is not demonstrative. The *sūtra* means to say that concentration envelops (*parigrah* 攝) the mind in such a way that it is focused on a single object (一境).

#1720 Concentration, which is named among the five (praxis-oriented) faculties (*indriya* 根), the five (praxis-oriented) powers (*balas* 力), the seven members of *bodhi* (*bodhyaṅgas* 覺支) and the eight members of the noble path (*mārga-aṅgas* 道支), is not mind (心), just as memory (*smṛti* 念), understanding (*prajñā* 慧), etc., are not mind.

E.D.C.2.5. *Understanding (prajñā)*

#1723 1. What is UNDERSTANDING (*prajñā* 慧)?

Understanding is, in its nature (性), the discernment (*pravicaya* 簡擇) of an object to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀境). {5/31v.}

[Understanding] has for its activity (業) to abandon doubt (*saṃśaya-vyāvartana* 斷疑).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 26 (10b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

dhīḥ prajñā | sāpy upaparīkṣya eva vastuni pravicaḥ yoga-vihito 'nyathā veti |
Understanding (*dhī* = *prajñā*) is also oriented on a thing (*vastu*) to be examined (*upaparīkṣya*) (and is) the—by a (1) correct method (*yoga*) or (2) incorrect method (*ayoga*) applied (*vihita*) or (3) otherwise come about—discernment (*pravicaḥ*) (of *dharma*s).

pravicinotīti, pravicaḥ | yaḥ samyaṅ mithyā vā saṃkīrṇa-sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇesv iḥ dharmeṣu vivekābodhaḥ |

“Discernment” (*pravicaḥ*) means to examine or discern (*pravicinoti*). Discernment is the correct (*samyak*) or incorrect (*mithyā*) understanding (*avabodha*) of the discrimination (*viveka*) of *dharma*s the common and specific characteristics of which have, so to speak, been mixed up.

yuktir yogaḥ | sa punar āptopadeśo, 'numānaṃ, pratyakṣaṇ ca |

1. “Correct method” (*yoga*) is the correct means (*yukti*). Correct method is

⁵⁸⁷ Editors; AKB, vi, F 225: “The three trainings or practices (*śikṣā*) are higher morality (*adhi-sīlam*), higher thought (*adhi-cittaṃ*), higher understanding (*adhi-prajñam*) ...”.

⁵⁸⁸ See AKB viii, F 129.

(a) the teachings by an authority (*āptopadeśa*), (b) inference (*anumāna*) and (c) direct perception (*pratyakṣa*).

tena tri-prakāreṇa yogena yo janitaḥ, sa yoga-vihitaḥ | sa punaḥ śruta-mayaś, cintā-mayo, bhāvanā-mayaś ca |

The discernment brought about by this threefold correct means is the “by a correct method applied” (*yoga-vihita*) discernment. It consists of (a) hearing (*śruta*), (b) reflection (*cintā*) and (c) cultivation (*bhāvanā*).

tatrāpta-vacana-pramāṇyād, yo 'vabodhaḥ, sa śruta-mayaḥ | yukti-nidhyāna-jaś cintā-mayaḥ | samādhi-jo bhāvanā-mayaḥ |

- a. The understanding (*avabodha*) consisting of hearing (*śruta-maya*) is based on the authority (*prāmāṇya*) of the instructions by an authority (*āptavacana*).
- b. The understanding consisting of reflection (*cintā-maya*) arises from seeing (*nidhyānaja*) (i.e., understanding by correct means [*yukti*]).
- c. The understanding consisting of cultivation (*bhāvanā*) arises from meditation (*samādhi*).

ayogo 'nāptopadeśo, 'numānābhāso, mithyā-praṇihitaś ca samādhiḥ | tenāyogena janito 'yoga-vihitaḥ |

2. “Incorrect method” (*ayoga*) is (a) the teachings by a non-authority (*āpta-upadeśa*), (b) fallacious inference (*anumānābhāsa*) and (c) falsely applied meditation (*samādhi*).

The discernment brought about by this incorrect method is the “by an incorrect method applied” (*ayoga-vihita*) discernment.

upapatti-prātilambhiko laukika-vyavahārāvabodhaś ca, na yoga-vihito, nāyoga-vihitaḥ |

3. The “neither by a correct nor incorrect method applied” discernment is the innately acquired (*upapatti-pratilambhika*) understanding (*avabodha*) of mundane conventions (*laukika-vyavahāra*) that allows something to appear as being well-founded.

eṣā ca saṃśaya-vyāvartana-karmikā | saṃśaya-vyāvartanaṃ, prajñayā dharmān pravacinvato niścaya-lābhād iti |

The activity of understanding is the excluding (*vyāvartana*) of doubt (*saṃśaya*) which occurs because the one who discerns the *dharma*s with understanding (*prajñā*) acquires certitude (*niścaya*).

[俱非]) of the object—by means of perquisition or thought-out judgment (*nitīraṇa* 推求) <314> of understanding (*prajñā*)—one attains certitude (*nirṇaya* ?; 決定).

Discernment (簡擇) is absent when an object to be examined is absent (非觀境), when the mind is blind <or deluded> (*mūḍha* 愚) and dull-witted (*manda* 昧). [(Understanding) may accompany the blind <or deluded> mind: when there is false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi*).]

Thus, understanding is not a universal [mental factor].

- #1725 2. Saṃghabhadra maintains that, even then, there is understanding (*prajñā*), but it is a subtle and hidden (微隱) understanding.

[Reply:] – How do you know that, my good friend (*devānām-priya* [“beloved to the gods”])?

[Saṃghabhadra:] – By the testimony of the Abhidharma, which makes understanding a universal *dharma* (i.e., generally permeating factor [*mahā-bhūmika* 大地法]⁵⁸⁹).

[Reply:] – But the Abhidharmas of the different schools (諸部對法) contradict one another (展轉相違). How can you assume that they are authoritative (定量)? [They are not the original words of the Buddha (*mūla-buddha-vacana*).⁵⁹⁰]

- #1726 It is the five [mental factors], i.e., contact (*sparsa* 觸), etc., that the *sūtra* (經) says are universal (*sarvatraga*) [mental factors]. To maintain that there are ten universal [mental factors], that is not a doctrine in conformity with the *sūtras*. One should not stubbornly attach (固執) oneself to that [doctrine]. – Indeed, the five, i.e., predilection (*chanda*), etc.—not being the five, i.e., contact, etc.—are not universal [mental factors], no more so than faith (*śraddhā* 信) or attachment (*rāga* 貪).

E.D.C.2.6. *Relationships among the five special mental factors (caittas)*

- #1728 According to Sthiramati, these five [special mental factors] condition one another (互相資). When one of them is present, {5/32r.} the other <four must> be present. When one of them is absent, the other <four must be> absent.
- #1730 According to another opinion, this is not so:

⁵⁸⁹ AKB ii, F 152; iii, F 104.

⁵⁹⁰ See AKB i, F 5; iii, F 104; vii, F 22.

1. for YBh says that, among the four “alls” (*sarvas*;⁵⁹¹ see #1580), [the five special mental factors] do not have the last two;

2. for we know, moreover, that the five [special mental factors] arise by being directed at the four kinds of objects (緣四境生): the four objects (所緣) (see below) and the five [special mental factors] (能緣) are not necessarily simultaneous (非定俱).

#1733 a. It may be that, among the five, only one occurs:

i. Only desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望, i.e., predilection [*chanda*]), with regard to the considered (*abhipreta* 所樂) object.

ii. Only ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印解, i.e., resolve [*adhimokṣa*]), with regard to a determined (*niścita* 決定) object.

iii. Only recall (*abhilāpana* 憶念; i.e., memory [*smṛti*]), with regard to the object experienced (*saṁstuta* 曾習) [in the past].

#1735 iv. Only focused application (*samavadhāna* 專注, i.e., concentration [*samādhi*]), with regard to the object to be examined (*upaparīkṣya*). <315>

When blind and dull-witted (*mūḍha*, *manda* 愚昧) people, with a view to stopping (止) the distracted mind (*vikṣipta-citta* 散心), [focus their mind by considering the location between their eyebrows and] attain focused application (*samavadhāna*) of the mind to the object, then they are, because of that, [nevertheless,] not capable of discernment (*pravīcayā* 簡擇). The world recognizes that they have concentration (*samādhi*) but not understanding (*prajñā*) (有定無慧).

#1736 [Someone might ask: – How can the object on which their mind is focused be qualified as “to be examined” (*upaparīkṣya*)?]

[Reply:] – These people, in the preparatory state (加行位) to their concentration, have received a certain amount of instruction (*śruta*) and are capable of a certain amount of reflection (*cintā*) (少有聞思): this is why it is said that concentration (等持) is directed at an object “to be examined” (緣所觀境). {5/32v.}

Or else, this definition is directed at the majority of cases (多分). For example, <the gods who are spoiled by amusements> (*krīḍā-pradūṣikas* 戲忘天; #1204),⁵⁹² although they apply themselves focusedly to an object (專注一境), they generate attachment (*rāga* 貪), hostility (*pratigha* 瞋), etc.: they have concentration, but not

⁵⁹¹ (1) Occurring in all natures of mind; (2) occurring in all stages (*bhūmis*); (3) occurring at all times; (4) occurring all together. See #1580.

⁵⁹² AKB ii, F 219.

understanding (有定無慧). There are numerous similar cases.

- #1737 v. Only discernment (*pravicaya* 簡擇, i.e., understanding [*prajñā*]), with regard to the object to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀).

When focused application (*samavadhāna* 專注, i.e., concentration [*samādhi*]) is absent then perquisition or thought-out judgment (*nitīraṇa* 推求) is at the level of distraction (馳散).⁵⁹³

- #1738 b. It may be that, among the five [special mental factors], two occur at the same time:

Predilection (*chanda* 欲) and resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解) occur with regard to an object that is at once considered (*abhipreta* 所樂) and determined (*niścita* 決定境).

Or, predilection (*chanda* 欲) and memory (*smṛti* 念) occur with regard to an object that is at once considered (所樂) and experienced [in the past] (*saṁstuta* 曾習境).

And so on up to:

Concentration (*samādhi* 定) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧) occur with regard to an object that is to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀境).

Altogether ten pairs.

- #1739 c. It may be that, among the five [special mental factors], three occur at the same time:

Predilection (*chanda* 欲), resolve (*adhimokṣa* 解) and memory (*smṛti* 念) occur with regard to an object that is at once considered (*abhipreta* 所樂), determined (*niścita* 決定) and experienced [in the past] (*saṁstuta* 曾習).

And so on up to:

Memory (*smṛti* 念), concentration (*samādhi* 定) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧) occur with regard to the object that is at once experienced [in the past] (曾) and to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀).

Altogether ten triads. {5/33r.}

- #1740 d. It may be that, among the five [special mental factors], four occur at the same time:

The first four occur with regard to the object (境) that presents all four <316>

⁵⁹³ AKB 26/6r.6.

characteristics, [i.e., (i) considered (*abhipreta* 所樂), (ii) determined (*niścita* 決定), (iii) experienced (in the past) (*saṃstuta* 曾習) and (iv) to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀)].

And so on up to:

The last four occur with regard to the object that presents the last three characteristics, [i.e., (i) determined, (ii) experienced (in the past) and (iii) to be examined].

Altogether five tetrads.

#1741 e. It may be that all five [special mental factors] occur at the same time: with regard to the object that presents all four characteristics, (i.e., (i) considered (*abhipreta* 所樂), (ii) determined (*niścita* 決定), (iii) experienced (in the past) (*saṃstuta* 曾習) and (iv) to be examined (*upaparīkṣya* 所觀)).

#1742 Thus, (the five special mental factors may arise—either individually or collectively or in groups (總別合)—with regard to the object that presents four characteristics, making) a total of thirty-one cases (三十一句).

#1743 But there are also states of mind (*citta-avasthā* 心位) where all five [special mental factors] are absent: when the object does not present any of the four characteristics; when the mind (i.e., one of the six cognitions) is of the “automatic (dropping into) mind” category (率爾墮心) (see #1193, #1553); when it is a question of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識). [This enumeration is not complete:] numerous are the minds that are not associated with the five [special mental factors]. [Not only the “automatic” minds, but also the minds of equal outflow.]

#1745 The seventh and the eighth cognition either are or are not associated with the five [special mental factors (別境)], according to whether they are in the state of cause (non-*buddhas*) or of fruit (*buddhas*). We have seen this above (#0745, #1360). {5/33v.}

#1746 The sixth, i.e., mental cognition, can be associated with the five [special mental factors] (in both states), whether or not it is “transmuted” (依轉未轉).

#1748 [Concerning the first five cognitions (*vijñānas*):]

According to Sthiramati, they are never accompanied by (any of the five (special mental factors)), i.e., predilection, etc.

Predilection (*chanda*) is absent in them for, being directed at an already-obtained (present) object (緣已得境), they are not accompanied by desire-aspiring (*abhi-*

lāṣa 希望).

Resolve (*adhimokṣa*) is absent in them for, being spontaneously directed at the object, they are not accompanied by ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印持) since they are incapable of making a decision (*vyavasāya*; 審決).

Memory (*smṛti*) is absent in them (for they are not accompanied by recollection (追憶)) since they (always) seize a new object (取新境) (i.e., *pratyakṣa* object).

Concentration (*samādhi*) is absent in them for, being distracted-moving (散動, *vikṣipta*, *cañcala*) in its nature, they do not apply themselves focusedly (*sam-avadhāna* 專注).

Understanding (*prajñā*) is absent in them (for they are not accompanied by discernment (簡擇)) since they are incapable of perquisition or thought-out judgement (*nitīraṇa*; *tuiduo* 推度).⁵⁹⁴

#1751 According to Dharmapāla, [the first five cognitions] can (容) be accompanied by (the five (special mental factors)), i.e., predilection (*chanda*), etc. – Indeed:

1. Although [the first five cognitions] do not have extreme (*adhimātra* 增上) desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 希望) with regard to the object (as this is the case for the sixth cognition), nevertheless, <317> being led by the sixth cognition, they can have, with regard to the object, a weak (微劣) intention (*abhiprāya* 樂).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

When mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) desires (*abhilaṣ*) a future object ..., the five cognitions that are led by mental cognition also generate a weak desire and have a weak intention (*abhiprāya*) with regard to the present object; thus they can have predilection (*chanda*). The eighth cognition, not being led by mental cognition, arises spontaneously, does not have intention with regard to the object; thus it cannot have predilection.

2. Although they do not make an extreme (增上) decision (審決) (with regard to the object), nevertheless, they can have, with regard to the object, a weak (微劣) ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印).

3. Although they do not have (a clear) recall (*abhiḥapana* 明記) of the previously experienced object itself (曾習境體), nevertheless, they can have a weak (微劣) memory (念) of the type of object (境類). [When the present object is of the same type as the past object, there is a memory in relation to the present object.] {5/34r.}

⁵⁹⁴ AKB 19/9r.1 [v, F 22].

- #1752 4. Although they do not have [the kind of] mental application (*manaskāra*) that binds the moment of mind (繫念) to one object, nevertheless, they can have, (with regard to the object,) a weak (微劣) focused application (*samavadhāna* 專注). The five cognitions (*vijñānas*) are said to be “distracted-moving” (*sandong* 散動) (in their nature) in order to reject (遮) the idea that they are concentrated (*samāhita*; *dengyin* 等引), but not in order to reject the idea that they may be in concentration (*dengchi* 等持). Thus, they can be associated with concentration (*samādhi*; *ding* 定). (See #1896.)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji (*Shuji* 6A1/26r./T.43.1830.0433a01): The Sanskrit says:

1. *samāhita* (*sanmoxiduo* 三摩呬多 [“equal pull”]), i.e., *dengyin* 等引;
2. *samādhi* (*sanmodi* 三摩地), i.e., *dengchi* 等持;
3. *samāpatti* (*sanmobodi* 三摩鉢底), i.e., *dengzhi* 等至.

YBh (T.30.1579.0328c02), etc. – *sanmoxiduo* is *dengyin* 等引; the ancient masters said *sanmoti* 三摩提.

1. There are two kinds of *dengyin* 等引 (*samāhita* = concentrated):
 - a. “with mind” (*sacittaka*);
 - b. “without mind” (*acittaka*).

Dengyin 等引 is:

- i. always *ding* 定 (= concentration [*samādhi*]);
 - ii. never *san* 散 (i.e., never distracted) (= always “concentrated” [*samāhita* ?], never “distracted” [*vikṣipta*]).
2. *Dengchi* 等持 (*samādhi* = concentration) is always “with mind” (*sacittaka*).

It is an application to the object of two types:

- i. either *ding* 定 (= concentration [*samādhi*]);
- ii. or *san* 散 (= distracted [*vikṣipta*]).

- #1753 5. Although they are incapable of perquisition or thought-out judgment (*nitīraṇa* 推度) regarding the object, nevertheless, they can have a weak (微劣) discernment (*pravacaya* 簡擇). This is why the noble teachings (YBh, T.30.1579.0681c) say that the two superknowledges (*abhiññās*) of seeing and of hearing (*caḥṣuḥ-śrotra-abhiññe* 眼耳通) are knowledges (*jñāna*) associated with the visual and auditory cognitions (*vijñānas*).⁵⁹⁵ – The same applies to the other (three) cognitions, i.e.,

⁵⁹⁵ AKB vii, F 107.

olfactory, etc. – Thus, there is no problem in attributing understanding (*prajñā*) to the five cognitions. <318>

- #1755 In the state of non-mastery (*hetu-avasthā*; non-*buddhas*) (未自在位; #1526), the five cognitions (*viññānas*) cannot be accompanied by the five [special mental factors]. [This is the most frequent case; on the contrary, the rule is that mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*) is accompanied by the five.]

When mastery is obtained (*phala-avasthā*, *buddhas*, 得自在時), [the five cognitions] are always accompanied by the five:

- #1756 1. for predilection (*chanda* 欲), i.e., the desire to contemplate (樂觀) the objects, does not decrease (減);
2. for resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解), which ascertains (*avadhar* 印) the object, never decreases;
3. <for memory (*smṛti* 念) does not decrease,> since <there is the recollection (憶習) of> all the objects that have been previously experienced (曾受); <also,> the five cognitions of the *buddha* {5/34v} are directed at the three times (緣三世);
4. for the *tathāgata* does not have a mind that is not concentrated <or in concentration> (不定心);
5. for all the five cognitions of the *buddha* have the knowledge of accomplishing action (*kṛtya-anuṣṭhāna-jñāna* 作事智) (see #3262). (See #0742.)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The *buddhas* are always concentrated, AKB iv, F 41.

In one of the lists of unique factors (*āveṇika-dharmas*) (see AKB vii, F 67), *Mahāvīyutpatti*, 9: *nāsty asamāhitacittam ... nāsti chandasya hāniḥ ... nāsti prajñāyā hāniḥ ...* – Our text does not have *hāni* = *mie* 滅 (“cease”), but it has *jian* 減, i.e., “diminution” (*apacaya*) (AKB 15/3r.8 [iv, F 90]), *ūna*, *atinyūna* (AKB 6/13v.2 [vi, F 274]; 12/8r.8 [iii, F 192]). [Compare AKB iv, F 40.]

E.D.C.2.7. *Sensation (vedanā) of the five special mental factors (caittas)*

- #1758 With which sensation (*vedanā* 受) are the five special mental factors (*caittas*) associated?
- #1760 1. According to one opinion, predilection (*chanda* 欲) is associated with three sensations, excluding dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) and displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦), because the objects that provoke dissatisfaction or displeasure are not “con-

sidered” (*abhipreta* 所樂).

The other four [special mental factors], i.e., resolve (*adhimokṣa*), etc., are associated with four sensations excluding only displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦) (which is “bodily sensation” = associated with five cognitions [*viññānas*]), because the five cognitions are without “deliberation” (*upanidhyāna* 審), “judgment” (決), etc.

#1762 2. According to another opinion, all ⟨special mental factors⟩ are associated (相應) with five sensations (*vedanās* 五受).

a. With regard to predilection (*chanda* 欲):

YBh (T.30.1579.0618c) (cf. *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, 10) says:

⟨As for the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂根), ardent predilection (求欲) ⟨when longing⟩ for the realization of the higher *dharma*s (*anuttara-dharma*s) (無上法思慕) includes sorrow (*śoka-saṃtāpa* 愁感) [of not acquiring them].

Predilection (*chanda*) is thus accompanied by the faculty of dissatisfaction.

In the places of exclusive suffering (純受苦處) (i.e., hells and, partly, animals <319> and hungry ghosts), liberation from this suffering is yearned for (*abhilaṣ* 希求). **Manas* (意), as we have seen (#1611, 1632, 1634), is associated with displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦根).

YBh (T.30.1579.0627c29) (compare *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* [T.31.1606.0726a13]) says that greed (*lobha* 貪) and thirst (*tṛṣṇā* 愛) are associated with dissatisfaction and displeasure (*daurmanasya-duḥkha* 憂苦): now, predilection (欲) necessarily accompanies [greed and thirst].

b. With regard to the other four special [mental factors]:

Since, as we have seen, ⟨the faculty of⟩ displeasure (苦根) {5/35r.} is associated with mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), then what is the problem (咎) in displeasure accompanying the ⟨four special mental factors, that is,⟩ deliberation (*upanidhyāna* 審, i.e., resolve [*adhimokṣa*]), ⟨judgment (決), etc.?

Furthermore, ⟨the four [special mental factors]⟩, i.e., subtle ascertainment (*avadhāraṇa* 印, i.e., resolve), etc., are associated with the [first] five cognitions, as we have seen, #1748.

#1763 Thus, the five special [mental factors, i.e., predilection (*chanda*), etc.,] can be associated with five sensations (*vedanās*).

#1764 These five special [mental factors] should also be examined (思), ⟨in accordance

with reason, (如理)) from other points of view: their ethical nature (性) (i.e., good [*kuśala*], etc.); their realm (界) (i.e., the realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*], etc.); their quality of pertaining to the trainee (*śaikṣa* 學), etc.; their abandonment (*prahāṇa*); their quality of being impure (*sāsrava*), etc.; their retribution (*vipāka*). {6/1r.}

E.D.D. *Good (kuśala) mental factors (caittas)*

D.1. Definitions; #1773

D.2. Issues in relation to good mental factors (*caittas*); #1855

#1766 We have explained the universal [mental factors] (遍行) and the special [mental factors] (別境). What are (the characteristics of) the good mental factors (*caittas*)?

#1767 The author replies to this question. [Vasubandhu's] stanza 10d–11c1 (Chin. 11) says:

śraddhā-atha hrīr apatrapā || 10d
alobha-ādi-trayaṃ vīryaṃ praśrabdhiḥ sāpramādikā | 11ab
ahiṃsā kuśalāḥ | 11c

善謂信慚愧・無貪等三根・|
 勤安不放逸・行捨及不害・|| 11

11. Faith (*śraddhā* 信); modesty (*hrī* 慚); shame (*apatrapā* 愧); the three roots (三根) of good: non-greed (*alobha* 無貪), etc.; vigor (*vīrya* 勤); ease (*praśrabdhi* 安); with heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸), [i.e., equanimity (*upekṣa* 行捨)]; non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害): these are the good ones (善).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Equanimity (*upekṣā*), indicated by its name in the Chinese edition, is apparently omitted in the original [Sanskrit edition] and in the Tibetan edition. The Sanskrit verse would be too long if the word *upekṣā* were placed in it. Thus, Vasubandhu takes recourse to an artifice: he writes *sāpramādikā*, i.e., “accompanying heedfulness”, an adjective referring to equanimity as being implied. Sthiramati explains:

sāpramādikā saha apramādena vartata iti sāpramādikā | kā punar asau | upekṣā ...

sāpramādikā (in the text of the stanza) means: it is together with heedfulness. What is meant by “it”? Equanimity (*upekṣā*) ...

[It cannot reasonably be understood as *praśrabdhiḥ sāpramādikā* or *sāpramādikā ahiṃsā*, for there are particularly strict links between equanimity (*upekṣā*) and heedfulness (*apramāda*), as explained below.] <320>

The Chinese edition has: formation “equanimity” (*saṃskāra-upekṣa*), see #1839.

The AKB, like *Aṣṭadaśaśūnyatā-śāstra* (T.31.1616), does not list eleven good ones, for it omits one of the roots of good, i.e., non-delusion (*amoha*), which would be a double usage of “understanding” (*prajñā*) which was already mentioned as a “special mental factor”, see #1806–#1812 and AKB ii, F 156, note, for additional details. On the good ones not listed here, see #1855.

#1769 The Treatise:

The mental factors associated with only a good mind are called “GOOD (善) mental factors”. They are eleven in number, (consisting of faith, modesty, etc.).

E.D.D.1. Definitions

#1773 1. What is FAITH (*śraddhā* 信)?

It (has for its nature (性)) the clarification (or purification) of the mind (心淨, *citta-prasāda* or *cetasah prasādaḥ*) which causes profound (深) [a] firm conviction (忍),⁵⁹⁶ [b] delighting (樂),⁵⁹⁷ [c] aspiration-desire (欲)⁵⁹⁸ relative, respectively, [a] to what is real (實), [b] to what is endowed with qualities (*guṇavant* 德), [c] to what is endowed with efficacy (能, *śaktivant* ?).

[Faith] has for its activity (業) to counteract non-faith (*āśraddhya*) (對治不信) and to make delighting in the good (樂善; *kuśala-dharma-cchanda*) arise.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati reads: ... *prāptum śakye* ... “aspiration relative to that which is susceptible to being obtained, to being realized”. And that is better this way, at least with

⁵⁹⁶ *abhisampratya* (firm conviction), *ren* 忍, *kṣānti* (receptivity) in the intellectual sense of the word, and even *renke* 忍可.

⁵⁹⁷ *le* 樂 [joy, appreciation], probably *ārāmatā* [taking delight], as in AKB vi, F 147. – Sthiramati has here *prasāda* [which Jacobi translates as “Geklärtheit” (“clarity”) and which LVP translates (see *Siddhi* F 323) as “complaisance”, which is likewise LVP’s translation of *ārāmatā*, here].

⁵⁹⁸ Sanskrit ? *yu* 欲.

regard to the usage of the word *yu* 欲 (i.e., desire-aspiring [*abhilāṣa*] or predilection [*chanda*]).

#1775 The varieties (*viśeṣa*) of faith (*śraddhā*) can be reduced to three: {6/1v.}

a. faith with regard to what is real (實有):

profound faith qua firm conviction (信忍) with regard to really existent *dharma*s, i.e., things or principles (truths) (諸法實事理);

b. faith with regard to what is endowed with qualities (有德):

profound faith qua delighting (信樂) with regard to the completely pure qualities (真淨德) of the three jewels (三寶);

c. faith with regard to what is endowed with efficacy (有能):

profound faith—relative to the good mundane and supramundane *dharma*s—that [oneself and others] have the power (有力), respectively, to obtain the ones (能得) and to realize the others (能成), and to generate desire-aspiring (希望, *āśamsā*, *abhilāṣa*) for these *dharma*s.

#1776 From this it follows that faith counteracts non-faith (*āśraddhya*) on these three <321> points. And from this it follows that it generates delighted desire (愛樂, sometimes *abhirāma*) to realize (*sākṣātkar* 證) the supramundane *dharma*s and to cultivate (*bhāv* 修) the mundane *dharma*s.

#1778 [a] Firm conviction (*abhisampratya* 忍) is resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解), “ascertainment as to the object, certitude relative to the object” (see #1301); [b–c] delighting (*ārāmatā* 樂) and desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa* 欲) are predilection (*chanda* 欲) (see #1301).

Now [a] firm conviction is the cause of faith (*śraddhā*) (信因); [b–c] delighting and desire-aspiring (樂欲) are its fruits (信果).

[Question:] – The cause and the fruit of faith are thus explained. Its nature (or specific characteristic) (*svalakṣaṇa* 自相) remains to be discussed: What does faith consist of?

#1779 [Reply:] – Have we not just said that faith is, in its nature, *citta-prasāda* [or *cetasah prasādaḥ*⁵⁹⁹] (心淨)?

#1780 [Question:] – Without a doubt, but you have not given the meaning of this expression:

[For example,] is it necessary to accept that *citta-prasāda* means “mind that is

⁵⁹⁹ Like Sthiramati, *Mahā-vyutpatti*, 245, 885, etc.

clear [or pure] (淨即心)”? In this hypothesis, faith is mind (*citta*) and not a mental factor (*caitta*), an associate of mind. {6/2r.}

Or, should it be accepted that *citta-prasāda* means “clarification [or purification] of the mind” (心淨), i.e., that which makes the mind clear [or pure]? In this hypothesis, what would be the difference between (1) faith (*śraddhā*) and (2) modesty (*hrī* 慚) and the other good mental factors?

There is the same problem if it is said that faith is a clear or pure *dharma* associated with mind.

- #1781 [Reply:] – The nature of faith is clarity-purity (澄清), i.e., the ability to make the mind and the mental factors pure-clear (淨). Faith is defined as “clarification of the mind” (*citta-prasāda* 心淨)—and not as “clarification of the mind and of the mental factors” (*citta-caitta-prasādaḥ*)—in view of the major importance of mind (心勝), just as the jewel that clarifies-purifies “water” (*udaka-prasādaka* 水清珠) clarifies-purifies (清) “muddy water” (濁水). – Modesty (*hrī* 慚) and other good *dharma*s, although good, do not have this ⟨clarifying-purifying⟩ efficacy.

Faith thus has as its specific characteristic (相) to clarify-purify (淨) the mind and the mental factors, and is not to be confused with the other good *dharma*s.

Moreover, each of the defiled *dharma*s (染法) possesses its specific characteristic. Only non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信) is, ⟨in its specific characteristic,⟩ polluted and pollutes (渾濁) the mind and <322> the mental factors, just as a very polluted thing (極穢物) is polluted itself and pollutes things. Faith is just the opposite of that: it has thus clarification-purification for its nature ⟨or characteristic⟩.

- #1783 According to certain scholars (i.e., the Sthaviras or divergent masters of the Great Vehicle): – Faith has delighted desire (愛樂; *abhirāma*) for its nature ⟨or characteristic (相)⟩.

[Reply:] – But then it would be the same as predilection (*chanda* 欲): Why would it always be good? Why would it not be ⟨of three natures⟩ (應通三性), i.e., good, bad, non-defined? Moreover how could both suffering (*duḥkha* 苦) and the origin of suffering (*samudaya* 集), which are unfavorable, be the objects of faith (信所緣)? {6/2v.}

- #1784 According to others (i.e., the divergent masters of the Great Vehicle or Mahā-sāṃghikas): – Faith has adaptation (隨順, *anukūlatā* ?) for its nature ⟨or characteristic (相)⟩.

[Reply:] – In this hypothesis, it would be of three natures (good, etc.) accord-

ing to the nature of the object to which one adapts oneself; it would be the same as resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解) or predilection (*chanda* 欲). If it is the adaptation of ascertainment (印順), it is the same as resolve; if it is the adaptation of delighting (樂順), it is the same as predilection. Besides resolve and predilection, there is no other adaptation (順).

Consequently, faith is indeed the clarification or purification of the mind (*citta-prasāda*).⁶⁰⁰

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Some extracts from various treatises:

a. *Attha-sālinī*, § 304 (pp. 119–120). Faith (*śraddhā*) is *sampasādanalakkhaṇā* and *saṃpakkhandanalakkhaṇā*. As the *udakappasādaka maṇi* of the wheel-turning king (*cakravartin*) purifies water, faith purifies the mind (*Milinda*, p. 33); just as a warrior crosses the river by repelling the water-monsters [i.e., crocodiles, etc.], faith clears the path for those who give gifts, [observe precepts,] etc. – Elsewhere, faith is *saddahanalakkhaṇā*, etc.

Devout faith is expressed by the word *pasanna* [confidence], e.g., *Āṅguttara*, ii, p. 34: *ye Buddhhe pasannā* ... [“Those who have confidence in the Buddha ...].

Prasāda is sometimes translated into Tibetan as *dad* (faith), sometimes as *dga'*, delighting (Feer, *Avadānaśataka*, p. 414). – Phrases such as *sa kāyikaṃ praśrabdhisukhaṃ labdhvā bhagavato 'ntike cittaṃ prasādayāmāsa* ... (Speyer, i, p. 32) proceed from old documents and indicate the relationship between ease (*praśrabdhi*) of the body and ease of the mind.

For the definition of the [subtle] physical sense-faculties as *rūpa-pasāda* or, better, as *pasāda-rūpa* in the early Abhidhamma, see *Compendium of Philosophy*, 1910: 15, etc.; AKB i, F 15; *Vyutpatti*, 101, 22; *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, 250, 14 and Wogihara, *Muséon*, 1904: 214.

b. AKB ii, verse 25 (F 156). Faith (*śraddhā*) is the clarification of the mind (*cetasah* <323> *prasādah*). Indeed (*Vyākhyā* [WOG.128.16]): *kleśopakleśakuśaluṣitaṃ cetaḥ śraddhāyogāt prasīdati | udakaprasādakamaṇīyogād ivodakam*. But there is another definition, a definition based on the mode of operation (*ākāra*) which is “firm conviction” [WOG.128.17ff.]: *satyaratnakarmaphalābhisampratīyaya ity apare ity ākāreṇa śraddhānirdeśaḥ | satyeṣu caturṣu ratneṣu ca triṣu karmasu ca śubhāśubheṣu tat-phaleṣu ceṣṭāniṣṭeṣu santy evaitānīty abhisampratīyayo 'bhisampratīpattiḥ śraddheti*.

⁶⁰⁰ Kuiji, *Shuji* 6A2/7v.

For the threefold confidence (*prasāda*; *avetya-prasāda*), see *Āṅguttara* cited above, Bairat edict with commentary by Minayeff, *Recherches*, p. 85, and especially AKB vi, F 292–295.

For personal serenity (*adhyātma-saṃprasāda*), see AKB viii, F 158.

c. Saṃghabhadra's definition (*Shun zhengli lun* T.29.1562.0391a) contains elements that occur in Sthiramati. Faith (*śraddhā*) is defined there as *cittakāluṣyavairodhako 'bhisampratyayaḥ* (this last word more fully spelled out: *xianqian renxu* 現前忍許, as in AKB 4/4r.8 [ii, F 156]) ... *chandasamṇiśrayaḥ*.

d. *Samuccaya-sāstra* (T.31.1605.0664b06) and *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0697b19):
śraddhā katamā | astivaguṇavattvaśakyatveṣvabhisampratyayaḥ prasādo 'bhilāṣaḥ |
cchandasamṇiśrayadānakarmikā |

Faith (*śraddhā*) is, in itself (體), firm conviction (*saṃpratyaya*; *renke* 忍可), devotion-confidence (*prasāda*; *qingjing* 清淨), confidence-aspiring (*abhilāṣa*; *xiwang* 希望), with regard to that which has reality (*astitva* 有體), qualities (*guṇavattva* 有德), efficacy (*śakyatva* 有能). It has for its activity to serve as support for predilection (*chanda* 樂欲).

astitve 'bhisampratyayākārā śraddhā | guṇatve prasādākārā | śakyatve 'bhilāṣa-
ākārā, śakyam mayā prāptum niṣpādayitum veti |

With regard to what has reality (*astitva* 有體), one generates faith (信) having firm conviction (*saṃpratyaya* 忍可) for its mode of operation (行); with regard to what has qualities (*guṇatva* 有德), [one generates faith] having devotion-confidence (*prasāda* 清淨) for its mode of operation; (with regard to what has efficacy (*śakyatva* 有能), [one generates faith] having confidence-aspiring (*abhi-lāṣa* 希望) for its mode of operation,) saying: “I have the power (力) to obtain (能得) [the good *dharma*s of the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛta*) class], to realize (能成) [the good *dharma*s of the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛta*) class].”

e. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 26 (11a) (transl. based on LVP and Jacobi):

tatra śraddhā karma-phala-satya-ratneṣv abhisampratyayaḥ, prasādaś cetaso,
'bhilāṣaḥ |

Faith (*śraddhā*) is:

- firm conviction (*abhisampratyaya*) about the fruit of action (*karmaphala*) and the noble jewels (*ārya-ratna*) = noble truths (*ārya-satyas*);
- achieved clarity [LVP: “complaisance”] (*prasāda*) in the mind;
- desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa*).

śraddhā hi tridhā pravartate | sati vastuni, guṇavatī-aguṇavati vā, sampratīyaya-ākārā | sati guṇavati ca prasādākārā | sati guṇavati ca prāptum utpādayitum vā śakye, 'bhilāṣākārā |

Faith, indeed, proceeds in three modes of operation (*ākāras*):

- a. if there exists something that is endowed with good qualities (*guṇa*) or without good qualities (*aguṇa*), then faith proceeds in the mode of operation of firm conviction (*sampratīyaya*) in regard to it;
- b. if there exists something that is endowed with good qualities, then faith proceeds in the mode of operation (*ākāra*) of achieved clarity (*prasāda*) in regard to it;
- c. if there exists something that is endowed with good qualities, and which can be achieved and brought forth, then faith proceeds in the mode of operation of desire-aspiring (*abhilāṣa*).

cetasah prasāda iti, śraddhā hi citta-kāluṣya-vairodhikī, atas tat-samprayoge kleśopakleśa-mala-kāluṣya-vigamāc, cittam śraddhām āgamyā prasīdatīti, cetasah prasāda ucyate |

As for “achieved clarity [LVP: purification] in the mind” (*cetasah prasāda*): since faith is incompatible with the turbidness or pollution (*kāluṣya*) of the mind, therefore the mind achieves clarity after having gained faith, because in the accompanying presence of faith, the impurity and turbidness of the defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) disappear: this is called “achieved clarity in the mind” (*cetasah prasāda*).

sā punaś chanda-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmikā |

The activity of faith consists in the fact that it provides the support for predilection [for good *dharma*s] (i.e., *kuśala-dharma-cchanda*).

#1787 2. What is MODESTY (*hrī* 慚)?⁶⁰¹

It has for its nature (性) the veneration (*sapratīṣatā* 崇) <324> of those who are virtuous (*guṇavant* 賢, i.e., ordinary worldlings [*prthagjanas*] or saints [*āryas*]) and the respect (*gaurava* 重) for good *dharma*s (善, whether impure [*sāsrava*] or pure [*anāsrava*]), and this regarding the power (力) of oneself (自) and regarding the power of the Dharma (法).

[Modesty] has for its activity (業) to counteract non-modesty (*āhrikyā*) (對治無慚) and to stop (*saṃyama* 止息) all bad conduct of body, speech and mind

⁶⁰¹ Editors: LVP comments on modesty (*hrī*) and shame (*apatrāpya*) conjointly (see below).

(*duścārita* 惡行⁶⁰²).

That is to say, being dominated (*adhipati* 增上) by affection (尊 = 尊愛) for oneself and by consideration (貴 = 貴重) for the Dharma, one venerates those who are virtuous and one respects good *dharma*s: one is embarrassed (*lajjā* 羞恥) about transgressions (*avadya* 過惡).

Non-modesty (*āhrīkya*) is counteracted; bad conduct is stopped.

#1788 3. What is SHAME (*apatrāpya*, *apatrapā* 愧)?

It has for its nature (性) the disregarding (輕拒) of what is wicked (暴) [hence there is no associating with what is wicked], and the resisting (拒) of what is bad (惡), i.e., of defiled *dharma*s, [hence, the not committing of what is bad], and this due to the <power of the> world (世間力).

[Shame] has for its activity (業) to counteract (對治) shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*, *atrapā* 無愧) and to stop all bad conduct (止息惡行). {6/3r.}

That is to say, being dominated [by fear of] the world's blame and reprobation (訶厭增上), <one disregards and resists (輕拒)> what is wicked (暴) and what is bad (惡), one is embarrassed (羞恥) about transgressions (過罪; *avadya*)?⁶⁰³

Shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*) is counteracted; bad conduct is stopped.

#1790 2–3. Embarrassment about transgressions (*avadyena lajjā* 羞恥過惡) is the shared characteristic (通相) of these two *dharma*s. This is why the noble teachings,⁶⁰⁴ figuratively speaking, say (假說) that they have embarrassment for their substance (體). [Adding, however: “regarding oneself, regarding others”; but this difference in their origin does not constitute a difference in substance.]

#1791 Whoever claims that embarrassment is the particular characteristic (別相) of the two <325> would have to accept that the two, <i.e., modesty and shame> (慚, 愧), are not of different natures. That being the case, they, <i.e., these two *dharma*s,> could certainly not be associated (相應), for sensations (*vedanās*), ideations (*saṃjñās*), etc., which are associated, are of different natures.

If the difference between the two is established in the sense that the first is dependent (待) on oneself (自) while the second is dependent on others (他), then the

⁶⁰² AKB iv, F 135.

⁶⁰³ *avadya* is translated literally in *Vyutpatti* (*sāvadya* = which is with blame, ... 245, 831, 832). *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, i.e. *Sthiramati*, has *guo'e* 過惡, undoubtedly *avadya*, since *Sthiramati* uses this term.

⁶⁰⁴ *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0697), *Vikhyāpana* (T.31.1602.0481), etc.

two could not arise at the same time; they could not be real things (*dravyasat* 實有), [being relative, like the long and the short]. The noble teachings are opposed to these opinions.

If it is claimed that the two are truly real but arise in turn: this contradicts YBh (T.30.1579.0684a10) which says that ten *dharma*s occur in every good mind.

#1792 But someone replies: – If veneration-respect (崇重) and disregarding-resisting (輕拒) are, respectively, the particular characteristic of the two—the objects of veneration-respect and disregarding-resisting being different—the {6/3v.} two would not be able to arise together. Then you are as wrong as I am: why should I be the only one to be blamed (責)?

[Answer:] – Useless objection, for who says that the object of the two *dharma*s is not identical?

[Reply:] – (If the object is not different, then how do you explain the situation?)

[Answer:] – In fact, when a good mind arises, whatever its object (four truths, three jewels, etc.), it always involves respect for what is good (崇重善), disregarding of what is bad (輕拒惡). Thus, the two *dharma*s, i.e., modesty and shame (慚, 愧), occur together in every good mind without the good mind having to take a certain object with regard to which it has modesty (*hrī* 慚) and another object with regard to which it has shame (*apatrāpya* 愧).

Reply. – But I can answer in the same terms.

[Answer:] – Unacceptable, for you claim that modesty and shame have the same specific characteristic (自相). It is thus impossible for you to discard the afore-said objections (i.e., that the two would not be able to arise together ...).

#1793 In fact, when the noble teachings use the expression “regarding (*apekṣya*) oneself, regarding others” (or “being concerned (顧) about oneself (自), being concerned about other (他)”), one understands [a] “oneself” to refer to both oneself and the Dharma (自法), and [b] “other(s)” to refer to the world (世間).

Or else:

a. “regarding oneself” means “out of esteem (or veneration) for what is good” (崇善) (which is beneficial for oneself 己益);

b. “regarding others”⁶⁰⁵ means “out of disregarding (or resisting) of what is bad”

⁶⁰⁵ Editors: LVP translates: ... “en raison d’autrui” signifie “par mépris du mal” (qui nuit à autrui [... “regarding others” means “out of disregarding of what is bad” (which is harmful to others)]).

(拒惡) (which is harmful to oneself 己損).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

a. AKB ii, F 170–171 examines the true nature of non-modesty and non-shame.

Modesty (*hrī*) is respect, more precisely, [it is fourfold]:

1. respect (*gauravatā*; 敬) <326> for qualities;
2. veneration (*sapraśata*; 崇) for those who are virtuous;
3. fearful submission (*sabhaya-vaśavartitā*), i.e., *sabhaya*[*tā*] (忌難);
4. submission (*vaśavartitā* 隨屬).

[My rendition does not distinguish the two latter varieties.]

As for shame (*apatrāpya*), it is the awareness of the consequences of offenses.

Or else, modesty (*hrī*) is the embarrassment about transgressions (committed or not committed) with regard to oneself, a sense of modesty; shame (*apatrāpya*) is the embarrassment about transgressions with regard to others, a sense of shame.

b. *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0664b08):

hrīḥ katamā | svayamavadyena lajjanā | duścarita-saṃyama-sanniśraya-dāna-karmikā ||

apatrāpyaṃ katamat | parato'vadyena lajjanā | tatkarṃmakam eva

What is modesty (慚)? [In itself (體),] it is, with regard to oneself (自), embarrassment (羞) about transgressions (*avadya* 過惡).

It has for its activity (業) to provide the support for stopping (*saṃyama* 止息) bad conduct (*duścarita* 惡行).

What is shame (愧)? [In itself (體),] it is, with regard to others (他), embarrassment about transgressions.

It has for its activity [to provide the support for stopping bad conduct].

Samuccaya-vyākhyā (T.31.1606.0697b23):

With regard to transgressions (過惡), modesty (*hrī*) is, in itself, embarrassment with regard to oneself (*zixiu* 自羞).

It has for its activity (業) to be the support (所依) of stopping (止息) bad conduct (*duścarita* 惡行).

With regard to transgressions, shame (*apatrāpya*) is, in itself, embarrassment with regard to others (*xiuta* 羞他).

It has the same activity as modesty.

- c. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 26 (11b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

hrīḥ, ātmānaṃ, dharmam vādhipatiṃ kṛtvāvadyena lajjā |

Modesty (*hrī*) is a sense of shame (*lajjā*) in regard to that which is blamable (*avadya*), in which one takes oneself or the Dharma as the relevant factor (*adhipati*).

sadbhir garhitatvād, aniṣṭa-vipākatvāc ca, pāpam evāvadyam | tenāvadyena, kṛtenākṛtena vā, yā cittasyāvalīnatā, lajjā, sā hrīḥ |

Since it is reprimanded (*garhita*) by virtuous people and since it has undesired consequences (*aniṣṭa-vipāka*), that which is blamable (*avadya*) is a sin (*pāpa*). Due to that which is blamable, whether one has committed (*kṛta*) it or not, the mind becomes depressed (*avalīna*), feels a sense of shame (*lajjā*), and that is modesty.

iyañ ca duṣcarita-saṃyama-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmikā |

Modesty has for its activity to provide the support for stopping (*saṃyama*) bad conduct (*duṣcarita*).

apatrāpyaṃ lokam adhipatiṃ kṛtvāvadyena lajjā | loke hy etad garhitaṃ, mām caivaṃ karmāṇaṃ viditvā garhiṣyatīti, aślokādi-bhayād, avadyena lajjate |

Shame or fear of a bad reputation (*apatrāpya*) is a sense of shame (*lajjā*) in regard to that which is blamable (*avadya*), if one takes people (*loka*) as the relevant factor (*adhipati*). “People reprimand (*garhita*) this kind of thing, and when people will get to know that I do such and such things, I will be reprimanded”: out of fear for a bad reputation (*aśloka*), etc., one feels a sense of shame in regard to that which is blamable.

idam api duṣcarita-saṃyama-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakam |

Shame has for its activity to provide the support for stopping (*saṃyama*) bad conduct (*duṣcarita*).]

- d. There is good reason to compare (1) the old data of the Abhidhamma (*Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, 30 and 31) and the explanations of Buddhaghosa (*Attha-sālinī*, translated in *The Expositor* by Maung-Tin/Rhys-Davids, p. 165, and summarized in *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 20, note), with (2) AKB and the texts of our School. – *Avatrāpya* = *ottappa*, a form explained in the *Mahā-vastu*, i, 463, in reference to *otrāpin*. Stede gives a good bibliography (Müller, Kern, etc.); but his etymology is unacceptable.

By “NON-GREED (*alobha* 無貪), ETC. (等)”, the stanza (*kārikā*) means non-greed (*alobha*), non-hatred (*adveṣa* 無瞋) and non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡). {6/4r.}

These THREE (三) are defined as ROOTS (根) because they are the main element in the generation of what is good and because they directly (近) counteract (對治) the three roots of bad, i.e., greed (*lobha*), etc. (see #1912).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The three roots, as well as modesty (*hrī*) and shame (*apatrāpya*) are good “in and of themselves”, see AKB iv, F 34. – Definition of good and of bad, see AKB iv, F 137 (*Morale Bouddhique*, F 143). – Abandoning and taking up again of the roots of good, AKB ii, F 294; iv, F 92, 102, 170f. – For the roots of bad and of the non-defined, see AKB v, F 41–43.

#1799 a–b. What is non-greed (*alobha* 無貪)?

It has for its nature (性) non-attaching (*anāsakti* 無著) (= detachment) with regard to the threefold existence (*bhava* 有 of the three realms [*dhātus*]) and with regard to the causes of threefold existence (*bhava-upakaraṇeṣu*; 有具). <327>

[Non-greed] has for its activity (業) to counteract greed (*lobha* 貪著) and to accomplish every good action.

#1800 What is non-hatred (*adveṣa* 無瞋)?

It has for its nature (性) non-irritation (*anāghāta* 無恚) with regard to the threefold suffering (*duḥkha* 苦⁶⁰⁶) and with regard to the causes of threefold suffering (*duḥkha-upakaraṇeṣu* 苦具) (including the truth of cessation [*nirōdha-satya*]).

[Non-hatred] has for its activity (業) to counteract hatred (*dveṣa* 瞋恚) and to accomplish every good action.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

1. According to *Pañca-skandhaka*, non-greed (*alobha*), opposed to greed (*lobha*), is weariness (*udvega*) (or *nirvid*) and non-attaching (*anāsakti*); non-hatred (*adveṣa*), opposed to hatred (*dveṣa*), is loving kindness (*maitrī*) (AKB viii, verse 29 [F 197]).

2. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 27 (11b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

alobho lobha-pratipakṣaḥ |

Non-greed (*alobha*) is the counter-agent of greed.

lobho nāma, bhavē bhavopakaraṇeṣu ca yāsaktiḥ, prārthanā ca |

⁶⁰⁶ AKB vi, F 125.

“Greed” (*lobha*) consists in the fact that one is attached to existence (*bhava*) and to what is related to existence (*upakaraṇa*).

tat-pratipakṣo 'lobho, bhava bhavopakaraṇeṣu vānāsaktir, vaimukhyañ ca |

Its counter-agent (*pratipakṣa*), i.e., non-greed, consists in the fact that one is not attached to existence and to what is related to existence, and that one turns away (*vaimukhya*) from that.

ayañ ca duṣcaritāpravṛtti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Non-greed has for its activity to provide the support so that one does not give oneself over to bad conduct (*duṣcarita*).

adveṣo dveṣa-pratipakṣo maitrī |

Non-hatred (*adveṣa*) is the counter-agent to hatred, i.e., is loving kindness (*maitrī*).

dveṣo hi, sattveṣu, duḥkhe duḥkha-sthānīyeṣu ca dharmeṣu, āghātaḥ |

Hatred is enmity or irritation (*āghāta*) against sentient beings (*sattva*) in terms of suffering (*duḥkha*) and the *dharma*s involving suffering.

adveṣo dveṣa-pratipakṣatvāt, sattveṣu, duḥkhe duḥkha-sthānīyeṣu ca dharmeṣu anāghātaḥ |

Since non-hatred (*adveṣa*) is the counter-agent (*pratipakṣa*) of hatred, it thus consists in non-enmity or non-irritation (*anāghāta*) against sentient beings in terms of suffering and the *dharma*s involving suffering.

ayam api duṣcaritāpravṛtti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Non-hatred has for its activity to provide the support so that one does not give oneself over to bad conduct (*duṣcarita*).

When a good mind arises, whatever its object, it always involves (1) absence of attachment (無著) (better, non-attaching) (established) in relation to existence and (2) absence of irritation (無恚) (better, non-irritation) (established) in relation to suffering, without it thereby being necessary that the mind considers existence or suffering.

Likewise, above, modesty (*hrī* 慚) and shame (*apatrāpya* 愧) [are established] in relation to what is good and to what is bad.

Consequently, these two, i.e., non-greed (*alobha*) and non-hatred (*adveṣa*), occur in every good mind.

#1803 c. What is non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡)?

It has for its nature (性) the clear understanding (*avabodha* 明解) of principles

and things (理事, i.e., *satya* and *vastu*).

[Non-delusion] has for activity (業) to counteract delusion (*moha* 愚癡 which causes error [*bhrānti*] about the principles, hence afflicted views [*dr̥ṣṭis*] regarding things, hence attachment [*rāga*], etc.) and to accomplish every good action.

#1806 According to one opinion,⁶⁰⁷ {6/4v.} non-delusion (*amoha*) is, in its nature, (identical with (即)) understanding (*prajñā* 慧), which can be a defiled understanding (i.e., the “special” mental factor of #1723), for the *Samuccaya-śāstra* (集論) (T.31.1605.0664b13) says:

amohaḥ katamaḥ | vipākato vā āgamato vādhigamato vā jñānaṃ prati-
saṃkhyā |

Non-delusion is, in itself, the certitudes (*vinīścaya* 決擇, i.e., deliberations [*pratisaṃkhyās*]) that derive (1) from retribution (*vipāka* 報), <328> (2) from teachings (*āgama* 教), (3) from demonstration (*adhigama* 證), (4) from intuition (or knowledge) (*jñāna* 智).

[Sthiramati's *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0697c02), the commentary on Asaṅga's *Samuccaya-śāstra*, says:]

These are, respectively:

1. innate (*upapatti-prātilambhikā* 生得) understanding (慧);
2. understanding derived from hearing (*śruta-mayī prajñā* 聞慧);
3. understanding derived from reflection (*cintā-mayī prajñā* 思慧);
4. understanding derived from cultivation (*bhāvanā-mayī prajñā* 修慧),⁶⁰⁸

which all are, in their nature, certitude (決擇性).

[If that is so, why is non-delusion (*amoha*) classified as a good mental factor (*caitta*)?]

#1807 [Answer:] – Even though non-delusion is understanding (*prajñā*) in its nature, nevertheless, in order to indicate that understanding possesses a superior efficacy (勝功能) in regards to what is good (*kuśala-pakṣa*), it is listed again as a “good *dharma*”, although it has already been listed as a special mental factor.

Likewise, afflicted view (*dr̥ṣṭi* 煩惱見), which is also understanding in its nature, is (separately) named (again) as a defiled *dharma* (*kleśa*, see #1931).

⁶⁰⁷ Compare AKB ii, F 160, etc.

⁶⁰⁸ AKB i, F 61.

- #1809 According to another opinion (Dharmapāla), non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡) is not understanding (*prajñā* 慧); non-delusion has a separate (intrinsic) nature for it is directly opposed to ignorance (*avidyā* 無明), for it is included among the roots of good (善根) like non-greed (*alobha* 無貪) and non-hatred (*adveṣa* 無瞋).
- #1810 For YBh (T.30.1579.0619b20) says that great compassion (*mahā-karuṇā*) is included in non-hatred and non-delusion (*adveṣa-amoha* 無瞋無癡),⁶⁰⁹ but not included in the twenty-two faculties (*indriyas* 根):⁶¹⁰ now if non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡) had for its nature understanding (*prajñā* 慧), then great compassion (*mahā-karuṇā* 大悲), like the ten powers (*balas* 力), etc.,⁶¹¹ would be included in the faculties (根) of understanding, i.e., the faculty of coming to know [what has not been known] (*ājñāsyāmi*), etc.⁶¹²

Moreover, if non-delusion did not have a separate (intrinsic) nature, it would not be a real thing (*vastu-sat* 實物), just as non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害) (which is non-hatred [*adveṣa*] in its nature), etc., are not real things. {6/5r.} Now, (that would contradict) YBh (T.30.1579.0602b23) which says that—among the eleven good mental factors (*caittas*)—only three have conventional existence (世俗有) (namely, heedfulness [*apramāda*], equanimity [*upekṣā*] and non-harmfulness [*avihiṃsā*]), and that the others are real.

- #1811 It is true that the *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0664a) says that non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡) is, in itself, understanding (*prajñā* 慧); but this text explains the intrinsic nature of delusion according to its cause and to its fruit: just as it explains the nature of faith (*śraddhā*) according to its cause (namely, *saṃpratyaḥ*, i.e., firm conviction, which is resolve [*adhimokṣa*]) and its fruit (namely, delighting, which is predilection [*chanda*]). (Thus the principle must be like this).
- #1812 Greed (*lobha* 貪), hatred (*dveṣa* 瞋) and delusion (*moha* 癡)—associated with six cognitions (*vijñānas*) (六識相應) and included among the root defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) (i.e., unlike non-faith [*āśraddhya*], etc.)—are <329> of utmost importance for the generation of what is bad (*akuśala*): they are thus the roots of bad (*akuśala-mūlas* 不善根). In order to abandon (斷) them, it is necessary to have a general (通) counteragent (*pratipakṣa* 對治), which is the good understanding (*prajñā* 善慧), and specific (別) counteragents, which are the three roots of good (三根), i.e., non-greed (*alobha*), non-hatred (*adveṣa*) and non-delusion

⁶⁰⁹ Cf. AKB vii, F 78.

⁶¹⁰ AKB ii, F 101.

⁶¹¹ AKB vii, F 66.

⁶¹² AKB ii, F 116.

(*amoha*). Thus, non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡) is a separate thing, distinct from understanding (*prajñā*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

1. AKB suppresses non-delusion (*amoha*) from the list of good *dharma*s (see #1767), ii, F 160. – The *Vyākhyā* [WOG.130.6ff.] says:

amohaḥ ... sa tu prajñātmaka iti | sa tu amohaḥ prajñāsvabhāvaḥ | prajñā ca mahābhūmikā matiḥ smṛtir iti vacanāt (AKB ii, F 453) | *nāsau kuśalamahābhūmika evocyate kiṃ tarhy akuśalādibhūmiko 'pīti*.

2. *Pañca-skandhaka*: non-delusion (*amoha*), in contrast to delusion (*moha*), is correct thinking (*saṃyak-saṃkalpa*) (AKB vi, F 284).

3. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 27 (11b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

amoho moha-pratipakṣo,

Non-delusion (*amoha*) is the counter-agent (*pratipakṣa*) of delusion (*moha*).

yathā-bhūta-saṃpratipattiḥ | mohaḥ karma-phala-satya-ratneṣv ajñānam |

A conviction (*saṃpratipatti*) that does not accord with truth is called delusion; it is a not-knowing in regard to the fruits (*phala*) of action (*karma*), the [four noble] truths (*satya*), the [three] jewels (*ratna*).

moha-pratipakṣatvād amohas, teṣv eva karma-phala-satya-ratneṣu saṃpratipattiḥ |

Because non-delusion is the counter-agent of delusion, it is thus correct conviction (*saṃpratipatti*) in regard to the fruits of action, the [four noble] truths, the [three] jewels.

ayam api duṣcaritāpravṛtti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Non-delusion has for its activity to provide the support so that one does not give oneself over to bad conduct (*duṣcarita*).

Sthiramati deviates here from his *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0696b29), where he follows the *Samuccaya-śāstra* of Asaṅga (T.31.1605.0664b13):

amohaḥ katamaḥ | vipākato vā āgamato vā 'dhigamato vā jñānam pratisaṃkhyā | duṣcaritāpravṛtti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ ||

Non-delusion (無癡) is, in itself, the certitudes or deliberations (決擇; *vinīścayas* = *pratisaṃkhyās*) that derive (1) from retribution (*vipāka* 報), (2) from teachings (*deśanā* = *āgama* 教), (3) from demonstration (*pratipatti* = *adhigama* 證) and (4) from knowledge (*jñāna* 智).

[Non-delusion] has for its activity (to provide a support for) the non-processing (*apravṛtti* 不轉, stopping) of bad conduct (惡行).

The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* adds the explanation which our author cites: he recognizes the four kinds of understanding (*prajñās*) in the four certitudes (*vinīścayas*); he adds in addition a gloss on *vinīścaya* “which is understanding accompanied by courageous diligence” (慧勇勤俱).

- #1814 7. VIGOR (*vīrya*; *jingjin* 精進), “vir-tue” = manly striving, (L.) *virtus*. (See #2857, #3025.)

By the term *qin* 勤 (*utsāha*, *ārambha*), the stanza (*kārikā* 11) means *jingjin* 精進 i.e., vigor.

It has for its nature (性) [a] courage (*yong* 勇, *parā-krama* ?) and [b] tenacity (*han* 悍, *dārdhya* ?) in the cultivation of what is good (*kuśala-pakṣa*) and in the abandoning of what is bad. [Consequently, it is [a] *jin* 進 (advancing) and [b] *jing* 精 (essential).]

[Vigor] has for its activity (業) to counteract slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠) and to complete what is good (*kuśala-paripūraṇa* 滿善: to become a *buddha*, etc.).

- #1816 a. The term “courage” (*yong* 勇) indicates “(eminent) advancing (勝進)” (i.e., ascending from moment to moment); {6/5v.} thus, it does not refer to the practice of defiled *dharmas*.
- b. The term “tenacity” (*han* 悍) indicates “absolute (or essential) purity” (精純); <330> thus, it does not refer to the practice of the non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta*⁶¹³) *dharmas*. Vigor (*vīrya* 精進) is thus exclusively good (in its nature).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji, *Shuji* (6B/18r.6):

“Eminent advancing”, translation for *shengjin* 勝進. – *Sheng* 勝 is the reading adopted in the Taishō edition; other editions have *jing* 精.

The author explains the Chinese equivalent of vigor (*vīrya*), namely, *jingjin* 精進:

- a. *jin* (or *shengjin* 勝進), i.e., “eminent entry, advancement”, has the sense of “courage” (*yong* 勇), and it shows that vigor is not vigor with regard to defiled *dharmas*, i.e., the particular kind of vigor that is retrogressing (*tui* 退) with regard to what is good;

⁶¹³ AKB ii, F 320.

- b. *jing* (or *jingchun* 精純), i.e., “essential purity”, has the sense of “tenacity” (*han* 悍 = *jianlao* 堅牢), and it shows that vigor is not vigor with regard to non-obscured-non-defined *dharma*s, i.e., the particular kind of vigor that is not *jing*.

#1818 The varieties or phases of vigor (*vīrya*) can be reduced to five kinds:

- a. covering with armor (被甲, compare *saṃnaddha-saṃnāha*), [in order to first generate a strong desire (for *bodhi*)];
- b. preparatory practice (*prayoga* 加行), [in order to generate firm “vigor” as a skillful means (*vīrya-upāya*)];
- c. non-depression <or undauntedness> (無下), [in order to not underestimate oneself, to not fear the *dharma*];
- d. non-retrogression (無退), [enduring cold, heat, etc., in order to search for superior qualities];
- e. insatiability (*analaṃtā* 無足), [in order to enter into higher and higher paths].

#1819 That is, these various kinds of vigor are designated, respectively, by the following expressions of the *sūtra* (經):

- a. *sthānavān* (有勢; being powerful)
- b. *utsāhavān* (有勤; being diligent)
- c. *ātāpī* (有勇; being courageous)
- d. *ḍṛḍha-parākramo* (堅猛; being resolute and fierce)
- e. *anikṣipta-dhuraḥ kuśaleṣu dharmeṣu* (不捨善軛; not discarding the good harness).

⟨These five [phases]⟩ can be explained (別) in various ways:

#1820 i. [First explanation:⁶¹⁴]

- a. first generation of the mind [of *bodhi*] (*citta-utpāda* 初發心);
- b. <eminent> advancing (勝進) according to one’s stage (自分);
- c–d. three grades of practice (行) according to one’s stage (自分).

⁶¹⁴ Editors: LVP translates:

- a. first generation of the mind [of *bodhi*] (*citta-utpāda* 初發心);
- b–d. weak, middling and strong vigor (*vīrya* 勝進) with regard to the stage (*bhūmi*) on which one is (自分);
- e. special (*viśeṣa*) vigor: for passage to a higher stage.

ii. [Second explanation:]

- a. first generation of the mind [of *bodhi*];

and then due to the variety of application (修), four varieties:

- b. application for long periods of time (*dīrgha-kāla-abhyāsa* 長時修);
- c. uninterrupted application (*nirantara-abhyāsa* 無間修);
- d. zealous application (*satkr̥tya-abhyāsa*; *bahumāna-abhyāsa* ? 慍重修);
- e. final application (*aśeṣa-abhyāsa* 無餘修).⁶¹⁵

iii. [Third explanation:]

Vigor in relation to the five paths (五道):

- a. path of provision (*sambhāra* 資糧);
- b. path of preparation (*prayoga*);
- c. path of insight (*darśana*);
- d. path of cultivation (*bhāvanā*);
- e. path of the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*) (see #2857).

[Indeed, the highest path, i.e., the path of the non-trainee, involves insatiability or non-abandoning <331> of the harness (*anikṣipta-dhuratā*):]

- a. (“undetermined”) saints of the first two vehicles (二乘), in their ultimate path (究竟道), aspire to great *bodhi* (欣大菩提);
- b. *buddhas* (諸佛), in their ultimate path (究竟道), delight {6/6r.} themselves in bringing benefit and happiness to sentient beings (樂利樂他).

iv. [Fourth explanation:]

Vigor in relation to:

- a–b. two kinds of preparatory path (*prayoga* 二加行), i.e., the distant and close one;
- c. unhindered path (*ānantarya-mārga* 無間);
- d. path of liberation (*vimukti-mārga* 解脫);
- e. path of advancement (*viśeṣa-mārga* 勝進). (AKB vi, F 277.)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

- i. *Majjhima*, i, p. 128, *Samyutta*, v, p. 198: *thāmaṇā dalhaparikkamo anikkhitta-dhuro kusalesu dhammesu*. – *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, p. 11.

⁶¹⁵ Compare AKB vii, F 82.

ii. *Pañca-skandhaka: vīryaṃ kuśale cetaso 'bhyutsāhaḥ | kausīdyapratipakṣaḥ.*

iii. AKB ii, F 160:

vīryaṃ cetaso 'bhyutsāhaḥ.

Vigor is the enduring energeticness of mind.

Vyākhyā (WOG.130.11ff.):

kuśalakriyāyāṃ yaś cetaso 'bhyutsāhas tad vīryaṃ | yas tv akuśalādikriyāyāṃ
cetaso 'bhyutsāho naitad vīryaṃ kausīdyam eva tat pravacane paṭhyate | sīdan-
ātmakatvāt | tathā hy uktaṃ bhagavatā | ito bāhyakānāṃ yad vīryaṃ kausīdyam
eva tad iti |

iv. *Sthiramati, Trentaine* (Lévi), F 27 (12a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

vīryaṃ kausīdyapratipakṣaḥ

Vigor (*vīrya*) is the counter-agent of moral slackness (*kausīdyā*).

*kuśale cetaso 'bhyutsāhaḥ | na tu kliṣṭe | kliṣṭe tūtsāhaḥ, kutsitatvāt, kausīdyam
eva |*

It is the will (drive) (*abhyutsāha*) for the good (*kuśala*), not for the morally defiled (*kliṣṭa*); the will (*utsāha*) for the morally defiled is called slackness (*kausīdyā*) because it is a vile thing (*kutsita*).

etac ca kuśala-pakṣa-paripūraṇa-pariniśraya-karmakam.

Vigor has for its activity to be a support so that the number of favorable moments (*kuśala-pakṣa*) becomes quite large (*paripūraṇa*).

v. *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, xvi, 23–24: *utsāhaḥ kuśale ...*

#1822 8. EASE (*praśrabdhi*; *qing'an* 輕安) [see #1879, #1884].

By the word *an* 安, the stanza (*kārikā*) means *qing'an* 輕安 (lightness [*qing* 輕] and ease [*an* 安]).

Ease has for its nature aptitude (*karmaṇyatā* 堪任; AKB ii, F 157: a plasticity which makes something easy to handle); [it is *qing* 輕 (lightness), for] it frees (遠離 = *viveka*, *virati*, *vigama*) from incapacity (*dausṭhulya* 羸重: coarse heaviness) of body and of mind; [it is *an* 安 (ease), for] it regulates and puts at ease (*diaochang* 調暢) body and mind.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Qing 輕 = light; ease (*praśrabdhi*) is thus *citta-lāghava*, *kāya-lāghava*, in the Abhi-dhamma, *lahutā*.

Diaochang 調暢 is perhaps *āhlādana*.

[Ease] has for its activity (業) to counteract languor (*sthyāna* 昏沈), to realize the transmutation of the support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 轉依) (by suppressing incapacities [*dauṣṭhulyas*], hindrances [*āvaraṇas*]). (See #3180.) <332>

#1823 <It tames and expels (伏除) that which hinders concentration (*samādhi*) (能障定法) by turning the support (所依止) toward ease and comfort (轉安適)>.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Ease (*praśrabdhi*) is of two kinds:

- a. pure (*anāsrava*), expelling every impure incapacity (*dauṣṭhulya*) [which is of three kinds: (1) good, (2) bad (= incapacity of the defilements [*kleśa-daṣṭhulya*]), (3) non-defined];
 - b. impure (*sāsrava*), expelling the incapacity of the defilements.
1. *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi* §§ 40, 41 foll. *cittapassaddhi*, *lahutā*, *mudutā*, *kammaññatā* ..., *kāyapassaddhi* ...
 2. *Pañca-skandhaka*:

kāya-cittayor karmāṇyatā dauṣṭhulya-pratipakṣo dharmah.

The counter-agent of incapacity, i.e., aptitude of body and of mind.

3. AKB ii, F 157. – Ease (*praśrabdhi*) is defined as aptitude of the mind (*citta-karmāṇyatā*), i.e., *yadyogāc cittaṃ karmāṇyam bhavati sā cittakarmāṇyatā cittalāghavam ity arthaḥ* (*Vyākhyā*).

Vyākhyā (WOG.576.33): *dauṣṭhulyaṃ kāya-cittayor akarmāṇyatā kleśānukūlatety arthaḥ* (*Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, p. 29).

[a] On the ease of the body (*kāya-praśrabdhi*), see AKB ii, F 157–159; [b] on the ease of the first two meditations (*dhyānas*), see AKB viii, F 150; [c] on the ease as “tangible” (*spraṣṭavya*), *Dārṣṭāntika* theory, see AKB viii, F 155.

4. Asaṅga’s *Samuccaya-sāstra* (T.31.1605.0664b16).

praśrabdhiḥ katamā | kāya-citta-daṣṭhulyānāṃ pratipraśrabdheḥ kāya citta-karmāṇyatā | sarvāvaraṇa-niṣkarṣaṇa-karmikā

Ease (*praśrabdhi* 安) is, in itself, aptitude (*diaochang* 調暢) of body (身) and of mind (心) which stops (止息) the incapacity (*dauṣṭhulya* 羸重) of body and of mind.

Ease has for its activity the expelling (除遣) of all hindrances (*āvaraṇas* 障礙), [for by its power (勢力)]—as Sthiramati, in his *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.

697c11), adds—the transmutation of the support (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 依止轉) is realized].

5. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 27 (17a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

praśrabdhir dauṣṭhulya-pratipakṣaḥ, kāya-citta-karmaṇyatā |

Ease (*praśrabdhi*), the counter-agent of incapacity (*dauṣṭhulya*), is the aptitude (*karmaṇyatā*) of the body and of the mind.

dauṣṭhulyaṃ kāya-cittayor akarmaṇyatā, saṃkleśika-dharma-bījāni ca | tad-apagame praśrabdhi-sadbhāvāt |

“Incapacity” (*dauṣṭhulya*) refers to the inability to act (*akarmaṇyatā*) of the body (*kāya*) and of the mind (*citta*), as well as the seeds (*bīja*) of the polluted (*saṃkleśika*) *dharma*s, since, when they disappear (*apagama*), ease (*praśrabdhi*) arises.

tatra kāya-karmaṇyatā kāyasya svakāryeṣu laghu-samutthānatā yato bhavati |

“Aptitude of the body” (*kāyakarmaṇyatā*) refers, hereby, to that whereby the body operates quickly (*laghusamutthānatā*) when performing its tasks (*svakārya*).

citta-karmaṇyatā saṃyañ manasikāra-saṃprayuktasya cittasyāhlāda-lāghava-nimittam yac caitasikaṃ dharmāntaram, yad yogāc, cittam ālambane pravartate, 'as tac citta-karmaṇyatety, ucyate |

“Aptitude of the mind” (*cittakarmaṇyatā*) means that the mind operates in regard to the cognitive object (*ālambana*) due to its connection with another *dharma* which is caused by the joy (*āhlāda*) and lightness (*lāghava*) of the mind accompanied (*saṃprayukta*) by correct mental application (*samyagmanasikāra*). Hence this is called aptitude of the mind.

kāyasya punaḥ spraṣṭavya-viśeṣa eva prītyāhṛtaḥ kāya-praśrabdhir veditavyā | prīta-manasaḥ kāyaḥ praśrabhyata iti, sūtre vacanāt |

Ease of the body (*kāyapraśrabdhi*)—one should know—is possessed by someone whose **manas* is in the grip of the joy (*prīta*) of the body regarding a particular tangible object (*spraṣṭavyaviśeṣa*). Thus it is said in the *sūtra*: “The body of a joyful inner mental sense-faculty (*manas*) is at ease”.⁶¹⁶

iyam tad-vaśenāśraya-parāvṛtṭito, 'śeṣa-kleśāvaraṇa-niṣkarṣaṇa-karmikā |

⁶¹⁶ *Aṅguttara*, v. p. 3 (transl. Bhikkhu Bodhi): *dhammatā eṣā bhikkhave yaṃ pūṭimanassa kāyo passambhati ...*: “It is natural that the body of one with a rapturous mind is tranquil ...”.]

Ease has for its activity the remainderless (*aśeṣa*) annihilation (*niṣkarṣaṇa*) of the hindrance of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*) due to the dissolution (transmutation) (*parāvṛtti*) of the support or substrate (*āśraya* = *ālayaviññāna*) arising due to this (ease).

#1825 9. HEEDFULNESS (*apramāda* 不放逸).

Heedfulness is vigor (*vīrya* 精進) and the three roots of good (三根): [a] non-greed (*alobha*), [b] non-hatred (*adveṣa*), [c] non-delusion (*amoha*).

It has for its nature (性) the warding off (防) of *dharma*s to be abandoned (所斷) (namely, all impure factors [*sāsravas*]) and the cultivating (修) of *dharma*s to be cultivated (所修).

[Heedfulness] has for its activity (業) to counteract heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸) and to realize-achieve (*sampatti-paripūraṇa* 成滿) all good mundane and supra-mundane *dharma*s (善事).

#1827 What is called heedfulness (*apramāda*) is these four—i.e., vigor (*vīrya*) and the three roots—which possess the efficacy (能) of warding off (防) and of cultivating (修) <333> the *dharma*s to be abandoned (斷) and to be cultivated (修). Heedfulness is in itself (體) not separate from these four, because it does not have a characteristic (相) different from the four; because, separate from the efficacy (功能) of the four, it does not have an activity (用) of its own in the warding off of bad things and the cultivating of good things. {6/6v.}

Although faith (*śraddhā* 信), modesty (*hrī* 慚) and the other good *dharma*s possess this same efficacy (能) for what is good, against what is bad, nevertheless, in comparison with the four, <the power of> their activity (勢用) is weak (微劣); they are not the root of good *dharma*s (like the three roots of good); they do not universally stimulate (遍策) good *dharma*s (like vigor [*vīrya*]); thus they are not the support (依) of heedfulness, i.e., the *dharma* that is designated by the name heedfulness (*apramāda*).

#1829 Objection. – Are warding off (防) and cultivating (修) not the characteristic (相) and the activity (用) belonging to heedfulness? The latter having thus its own nature, how can it be said to have for its nature the four *dharma*s?

#1830 Answer. – What is the difference between the warding off and cultivating of heedfulness and the warding off and cultivating of the four, <i.e., vigor and the three roots>?

#1831 Reply. – It is by relying on heedfulness that the four have this activity (作用) of

warding off and cultivating.

#1832 Answer. – In this case, one could say, (in return,) that heedfulness must rely on some other *dharma*, and that would result in the problem of an infinite regress (有無窮失).

#1833 Objection. – Vigor is solely the universal stimulator (遍策) of good *dharma*s; the three roots of good are solely the support (*āśraya* 依) of good *dharma*s. How can one say that these four have warding off and cultivating for their activity?

#1835 Answer. – Thus, according to you, what is the characteristic of the activity of warding off and cultivating?

#1836 If by warding off and cultivating one understands that which, in general, serves as support (依持) for good *dharma*s and that which nourishes good *dharma*s, then it would refer to non-greed (*alobha* 無貪), etc.

If [by warding off and cultivating] one understands that which universally stimulates (遍策) good *dharma*s, [then] warding off and cultivating would not differ from vigor (*vīrya* 精進).

Thus, that which wards off what is bad (止惡) and cultivates what is good (進善) is these four *dharma*s.

If by warding off and cultivating one understands that which makes the mind unscattered (不散亂) {6/7r.}, it would refer to concentration (*samādhi* 等持).

If one understands that which makes the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) seize their object (取境), [it would refer] to contact (*sparsa* 觸). <334>

If one understands that which hinders forgetfulness (不忘失), [it would refer] to memory (*smṛti* 念).

#1837 Having examined the issue (推尋), we do not see that heedfulness could have any activity apart from non-greed (*alobha*), etc., (i.e., the four *dharma*s). Thus, heedfulness is certainly not a thing by itself and is, in itself, not separate [from them] (無別體).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The doctrine of AKB (which mentions the Mahāsāṃghika definition) differs, see AKB ii, F 157.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 27 (17a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

tatrāpramādaḥ pramāda-pratipakṣaḥ |

Heedfulness (*apramāda*) is the counter-agent of heedlessness (*pramāda*).

ālōbhād yāvad vīryam apramādaḥ | yān alobhādīn niśrityākuśalān dharmān prajahāti, tat pratipakṣāṃś ca kuśalān dharmān bhāvayati, te 'lobhādayo 'pramādaḥ | ata eva pramāda-pratipakṣaḥ, pramādasyāto viparītatvāt |

From non-greed (*alobha*) up to vigor (*vīrya*), all that is heedfulness. Heedfulness is like non-greed, etc., relying on which the bad (*akuśala*) *dharmas* are abandoned and their counter-agent, i.e., the good *dharmas*, are brought into existence. Therefore, it is the counter-agent to heedlessness, because it is the opposite of it.

sa punar laukika-lokottara-saṃpatti-paripūraṇa-karmakaḥ |

Heedfulness has for its activity the succeeding (*saṃpatti*) and completing (*paripūraṇa*) of the mundane (*laukika*) and the supramundane (*lokottara*).

#1839 10. Equanimity (*upekṣā* 行捨).

〈What is EQUANIMITY?〉

Equanimity⁶¹⁷ has for its nature (性) (1) vigor (*vīrya* 精進) and (2–4) the three roots (根) of good which make the mind to be [a] even (*sama* 心平等), [b] straight (*praśaṭha* 正直), [c] free from tilting (*anābhoga* 無功用住).

[Equanimity] has for its activity (業) to counteract restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉) and to generate calm abiding (*śamatha* 靜住).

#1841 In other words, these four *dharmas*—making the mind (心) to abide calmly (靜住) by removing (遠離: distancing-separating) it from the hindrances (*nīvaraṇas* 障),⁶¹⁸ i.e., restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), etc.—are given the name equanimity (*upekṣā*).

The qualities of [a] evenness (平等), [b] straightness (正直) and [c] non-tilting (無功用住) correspond to the three states of equanimity (捨), (i.e., beginning, middle and later states (初中後),) and indicate its types.

Heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸) precedes and first expels pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染), [it plays the role of the unhindered path (*ānantarya-mārga*)]. Equanimity (捨) follows—[like the path of liberation (*vimukti-mārga*)]—and makes the mind calm (寂靜而住) (AKB vi, F 190, etc.). {6/7v.}

⁶¹⁷ Precisely, the formation “equanimity” (*saṃskāra-upekṣā* 行捨), i.e., the equanimity that is part of the formations (*saṃskāras*) as opposed to the neutral sensation or the sensation called “equanimity” (*vedanā-upekṣā* 受捨). – AKB ii, F 159, note.

⁶¹⁸ AKB v, F 98, [listing five hindrances].

- #1842 Like heedfulness (*apramāda*), this equanimity is not itself a (distinct) thing, for it has neither a characteristic nor activity that is separate from the four *dharma*s, i.e., vigor (*vīrya*) and the three roots of good; for, if by equanimity one understands that which generates calm (寂靜), [then] equanimity is the four *dharma*s; for if by equanimity one understands that which must be upgraded to calm, then equanimity would be the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) with the exception of the four *dharma*s. <335>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

- a. *Visuddhimagga*, pp. 161, 659, on the *saṃkhārupekkha*, etc.
- b. AKB ii, F 159: *upekṣā cittasamateti yadyogāc cittaṃ samam anābhogaṃ vartate*. – Discussion of the relationships of mental application (*mānaskāra*) and of equanimity (*upekṣā*).
- c. *Sthiramati, Trentaine* (Lévi), F 27 (17b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

upekṣā citta-samatā, citta-praśaṭhatā, cittānābhogatā |

Equanimity (*upekṣā*) is (1) evenness of the mind (*citta-samatā*), (2) tranquil flow of the mind (*citta-praśaṭhatā*) and (3) the being without an object of the mind (*cittānābhogatā*).

ebhis tribhiḥ padair upekṣāyā ādi-madhyāvasānāvasthā dyotitā |

With these three terms, the beginning, middle and end states of equanimity are emphasized.

tatra layauddhatyaṃ vā, cetaso vaiṣamyam |

Dullness (*laya*) or restlessness (*auddhatya*) are considered to be unevenness (*vaiṣamyā*) of the mind.

tasyābhāvād ādau citta-samatā |

1. If unevenness is absent, there occurs first the “evenness of the mind” (*citta-samatā*).

tato 'nabhisamskāreṇāprayatnena samāhitasya cetaso yathāyogaṃ samasyaiva yā pravṛttiḥ, sā citta-praśaṭhatā |

2. If the mind is concentrated (*samāhita*) without any particular preparation (*abhisamskāra*) and effort (*prayatna*) being needed for that, and then operates in accordance with its aims while remaining even throughout, then this is “agility of the mind” (*citta-praśaṭhatā*).

sā punar avasthā layauddhatyāśaṅkānugatācira-bhāvitvāt | *tato bhāvanā-pra-*

karṣa-gamanāt, tad-vipakṣa-dūrī-bhāvāt, tac chaṅkābhāve, layauddhatya-prati-pakṣa-nimitteṣv ābhogam akurvato, 'nābhogāvasthā, cittasyānābhogatā |

3. But this state (*avastha*) is, due to its brief duration, always accompanied by the fear (*śaṅka*) of (retrogressing into) dullness (*laya*) or restlessness (*auddhatya*). If, after this, the concentration (*bhāvanā*) of the highest degree (*prakarṣa*) is attained and, what is ill-disposed to it (*vipakṣa*), is eliminated (*dūribhāva*), then this fear falls away and the mind—being no longer focused on something that is meant to be the counter-part of dullness or restlessness—is then in a state where it no longer turns towards any object; then this is the being without an object of the mind (*cittasya-anabhogatā*).

iyāñ ca sarva-kleśopakkleśānavakāśa-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmikā |

Equanimity has for its activity to provide the support so that all defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) no longer find any opportunity (to become manifest) (*anavakāśa*).

The rendering *praśaṭhatā* seems certain. – Kern, repeated by Monier-Williams, translates *praśaṭhatā* as “very wicked”. – *Mahā-vyūṭpatti*, 109, 19, and the notes of Wogihara who thinks it is *praśāntatā*. – The Chinese equivalent of our sources (*Samuccaya-vyākhyā; Siddhi; Treatise of the hundred dharmas*) is *zhengzhi* 正直, “straight”, which is contrasted with the wrong and twisted mind (*Bukkyō Daijiten*, 785c).

#1845 11. Non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害).

⟨What is NON-HARMFULNESS?⟩

Non-harmfulness, which is “not harming, (i.e., not causing injury (損) and anguish (惱) to) sentient beings” (*aviheṭhanā* 損惱), has for its nature non-hatred (*adveṣa* 無瞋).

#1847 [Non-harmfulness] has for its activity to counteract harmfulness (*vihiṃsā* 害) and to generate compassion (*karuṇā* 悲愍). – In other words, non-hatred, insofar as it does not harm (—cause injury and anguish—) to sentient beings, receives conventionally the name (假名) *avihiṃsā* (non-harmfulness).

#1849 Non-hatred (*adveṣa* 無瞋) is opposed to hatred (*dveṣa* 瞋) which abandons the life of sentient beings (斷物命); non-harmfulness (不害) is opposed to harmfulness (*vihiṃsā* 害) which causes harm (i.e., injury and anguish) to sentient beings (損惱物).

Non-hatred provides comfort (與樂) (i.e., it is loving kindness [*maitrī*]); non-

harmfulness removes suffering (拔苦) (i.e., it is compassion [*karuṇā*]).

This is the difference in their apparent characteristics (麤相).

#1850 In fact, non-hatred is a thing possessing a substance of its own (實有自體), whereas non-harmfulness is only a name designating (假立) one part of non-hatred, (i.e., the part that removes suffering). {6/8r.} These two *dharmas* are distinguished in order to indicate the distinct characteristics of loving kindness (慈) and of compassion (悲), because loving kindness and compassion are the essential (勝) elements in the service (for the benefit and happiness) (利樂) of sentient beings.

#1851 According to one opinion (i.e., Sarvāstivādin), non-harmfulness is not non-hatred <336> but possesses a separate substance (of its own (別有自體)), namely, goodness (*xianshanxing* 賢善性).⁶¹⁹

What does this goodness consist of?

It is answered: – “It consists of not harming (損惱), (i.e., not causing injury and anguish to) sentient beings (*aviheṭhana*)”.

[Reply:] – But non-hatred too is non-harming (*aviheṭhana* 不損惱). Why would non-harmfulness be of a separate nature (別有性)? The not harming of sentient beings, the goodness of loving kindness (*maitrī* 慈) and of compassion (*karuṇā* 悲), this is indeed non-hatred (無瞋).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 28 (12b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

avihiṃsā vihiṃsā-pratipakṣaḥ |

Non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā*) is the counter-agent of harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*).

*vadha-bandhanādibhiḥ sattvānām aviheṭhanam avihiṃsā, sattveṣu karuṇā |
kaṃ ruṇaddhīti, karuṇā | kaṃ iti, sukhasyākhyā, sukhaṃ ruṇaddhīti, arthaḥ |
kāruṇiko hi para-duḥkha-duḥkhī bhavatīti* |

Not injuring (*aviheṭhana*) sentient beings (*sattva*) by killing (*vadha*), tying up (*bandhana*), etc., is non-harmfulness; compassion (*karuṇā*) for sentient beings (*sattva*). (Etymology of *karuṇā* as *kaṃ ruṇaddhī*; *kaṃ* is a name for *sukha*, “it hinders happiness”.) For the one who is compassionate suffers with regard to the suffering of others.

⁶¹⁹ The person who possesses non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā*) is called *xianshan* 賢善, noble and good; he is truly a saint (*ārya*).

iyiyañ cāviheṭhana-karmikā |

Non-harmfulness has for its activity non-injuring.

AKB ii, F 160: non-harmfulness is non-harming (*avihiṃsā aviheṭhanā*). – *Vyākhyā* [WOG130.10]: *aviheṭhaneti yadyogāt paro na viheṭhyate*. – On harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*), see AKB v, F 89–90; viii, F 196.

Pañca-skandhaka: *avihiṃsā* = *karuṇā*, *vihiṃsāpratipakṣaḥ*.

E.D.D.2.° *Issues in relation to good mental factors (caittas)*

1. *Good mental factors (caittas) not appearing among the eleven:*

- #1855 The word AND (及) in the Chinese translation of the stanza (*kārikā* 11) (“... and non-harmfulness [*avihiṃsā* 及不害]”, #1767) shows that there are good mental factors distinct in meaning (*artha* 義) from those of the eleven, namely, delight (*xin* 欣), weariness (厭), etc. Although they have a meaning of their own (雖義有別), and thus are given particular names, nevertheless, they do not possess a substance that is separate (體無異) from the eleven; and thus they are not classed as good *dharma*s outside of the eleven.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Our author is about to list the good mental factors (*caittas*) that are “parts” of non-hatred (*adveṣa*), of non-greed (*alobha*), etc. We know how these good mental factors are established: by way of opposition. – The *Kṣudra-vastuka*⁶²⁰ cites, according to the *sūtra*, and defines numerous bad or defiled mental factors, [a fragment of which is referred to in the commentary of AKB v, F 89, note]. Our author uses the analogous list in YBh.⁶²¹ The latter screens these defiled mental factors in order to put together its chart of good mental factors that are opposed to them. – See below the definition of defilements (*kleśas*), etc.

- #1857 [For instance,] delight (*xin* 欣) is one part of non-hatred (*adveṣa*) which is associated with predilection (*yu* 欲), for it is non-irritation (*anāghāta* 不憎恚) with regard to objects with which one should be delighted. <337>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

I have not yet completely decided on the Sanskrit terms that are translated into Chinese as (a) *xin* 欣 and (b) *yu* 欲.

⁶²⁰ A chapter of the *Dharma-skandhaka* (Abhidharma text, T.26.1537.0494, of the Sarvāstivādiṇs).

⁶²¹ Chap. 89, Japanese edition, p. 295.

- a. Kuiji, cited below, says that *xin* is synonymous with greed (*lobha*), and he speaks of non-*xin*. Thus, one can dismiss the terms *muditā* (sympathetic joy) (= *xi* 喜, *Vyutpatti*, 82), *prīti* (joy), *saṃtuṣṭi* (satisfaction). One can think of *rati* (contentment) being opposed to *arati* (discontentment), (but *arati* is *bule* 不樂, *Dharma-skandhaka*, T.26.1537.0497b).
- b. As for *yu* 欲, it is neither greed (*lobha*) nor attachment (*rāga*): one has the choice between predilection (*chanda*) and desire (*kāma*): predilection (#1672) is more likely.

Kuiji, *Shuji* (6A2/30; T.43.1830.0439c23):

Xin is not *yu*, i.e., predilection (*chanda*), in its nature; *xin* is a *dharma* accompanied by predilection (欲俱法也). [Our text says that *xin* is part of non-hatred (*adveṣa*).] In truth, YBh, 86—explaining the names of the roots of bad—does not say that hatred (*dveṣa*) receives the name *xin*. It is greed that is called *xin*. By reversing the names, non-*xin* will be one part of non-greed (不欣應無貪一分). Greed means attachment: defiled greed will be called *xin* (貪是著義。染貪名欣). Non-greed has the sense of weariness (*nirveda*): non-hatred will be called *xin* (無貪厭義。無瞋名欣).

[Discontentment (*arati*) is a bad thing; contentment (*rati*) will thus be good, being opposed to discontentment, being opposed to hatred, being one part of non-hatred. But it can also be said that discontentment (*arati*) is one part of non-greed]

- #1858 Likewise, the mental factors opposed to anger (*krodha*), etc.—non-anger (*akrodha* 不忿), non-enmity (*anupanāha* 不恨), non-furiousness (*apradāśa* 不惱), non-envy (*anīrṣyā* 不嫉) {6/8v.} and the others—are each directly opposed to one part of hatred (*dveṣa* 瞋) and, consequently, are parts of non-hatred (*adveṣa*), however, without being associated with predilection (*yu* 欲).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The others are:

- a. absence of malevolence (non-*fenfa* 不憤發; absence of irritation (*āghāta*), *Vyutpatti*, 109, 22; AKB v, F 90; but absence of excessive anger (*apradoṣa*) according to AKB 16/16v.9; *Dharma-skandhaka* (T.26.1537.0496a);
- b. absence of bad speech (*eshuo* 不惡說);
- c. absence of non-receptivity (*ren* 非不忍), *akṣānti*;
- d. absence of aggressiveness (*ditu* 不觚突);
- e. absence of slandering (*bizi* 不譁訾);

- f. absence of malice and initial inquiry (*vyāpāda-vitarka chenxun* 無瞋尋);
- g. absence of harmfulness and initial inquiry (*vihiṃsā-vitarka*) (*haixun* 無害尋) (AKB v, F 89–90).

Thus, eleven good mental factors (*caittas*) that depend on non-hatred (*adveṣa*) (Kuiji, *Shuji* 6A2/30) [plus *xin* 欣].

- #1859 Weariness (*nirvid*, *nirveda*; *yan* 厭) is one part of non-greed (*alobha*), associated with understanding (*prajñā*) (i.e., the fifth special mental factor), for it is non-attaching (*āsakti* 著) to wearisome objects.
- #1860 Non-avarice (*amātsarya* 不慳), non-pride (*amada* 不憍) (see below, the subsidiary defilements [*upakleśas*]) and the others are, likewise, parts of non-greed (*alobha*). Each of these *dharma*s opposes one part of greed (*lobha*), without being associated with understanding (*prajñā*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The others (i.e., eighteen in all) are the good *dharma*s opposed to the bad *dharma*s, deriving from attachment (*rāga*), enumerated in YBh, 89. <338>

The list ends with initial inquiries (*vitarkas*): *kāma-vitarka*, *jñāti-vitarka*, *janapada-vitarka*, *amara-vitarka*, *apamanyānā-saṃprayukta-vitarka* (*apamanyānā* = *qingmie* 輕蔑), *kulodayatā-pratisaṃyukta-vitarka*.⁶²²

The first is *yanqiu* 研求; the second, *lābhena lābhaniścikīrṣā* (*Vyutpatti*, 127, 15 and 56).

- #1862 Non-concealment (*amrakṣa* 不覆), (non-deceit (*amāyā* 不誑) and non-dissimulation (*aśāṭhya* 不諂))⁶²³ (see #2056–#2064) are one part of non-greed (*alobha* 無貪) and of non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡), for they oppose one part of attachment (*rāga* 貪) and of delusion (*moha* 癡).
- #1863 According to another opinion, non-concealment is merely one part of non-delusion (無癡), for nowhere is it said that concealment (*mrakṣa*) is one part of attachment.

⁶²² See AKB v, F 89, note.

⁶²³ *Editors:* Notice that throughout the *Siddhi*, IVP renders 誑 as *śāṭhya* and 諂 as *māyā*, and even comments himself (*Siddhi* F 367) that he mixed up *māyā* and *śāṭhya* in AKB v, F 91–92, and then corrects a few passages in AKB. But according to Pradhan's later discovered Sanskrit edition, LVP's renderings in AKB were actually correct. We think that this then also implies that his renderings in the *Siddhi* are mixed up. We have thus adjusted the terms throughout the *Siddhi*, i.e., we identify 誑 as *māyā* and 諂 as *śāṭhya*.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Compare AKB v, F 91: “There is no agreement as to the origin of concealment (*mrakṣa*), i.e., whether it proceeds from attachment (*rāga*), from ignorance (*avidyā* = delusion [*moha*]) or from both”. – Deceit (*māyā*), like pride (*mada*), proceeds from attachment; dissimulation (*śāṭhya*) proceeds from afflicted view (*drṣṭi* = delusion [*moha*]), AKB v, F 92.

#1864 There are different opinions about non-conceit (*amāna* 不慢):

- a. it is included in one part of faith (*śraddhā* 信), for there is no conceit (*māna* 慢) with regard to those (彼) (i.e., ordinary worldlings [*prthagjanas*] and saints [*āryas*]) in whom one has faith;
- b. it is one part of equanimity (*saṃskāra-upekṣā* 捨), for—when the mind is even (*sama* 平等), etc. (see #1839)—[the mind] is not elevated (in a conceited way) (不高慢);
- c. it is one part of modesty (*hrī* 慚), {6/9r.} for there is no conceit (慢) with regard to those (彼) (master, etc.) whom one esteems and respects (崇重).

#1865 There are different opinions about non-doubt (*avikitsā* 不疑):

- a. it is included in faith (*śraddhā* 信), for there is no doubt (*vicikitsā* 猶豫) regarding that (彼) towards which one has faith;
- b. it is correct resolve (*samyag-adhimokṣa* 正勝解), for the person (者) who is determined (決定) does not doubt;
- c. it is included in correct understanding (*samyak-prajñā* 正慧), for the person (者) who sees correctly (*samyag-drṣṭi* 正見) does not doubt.

#1866 Non-distraction (*avikṣepa* 不散亂), or non-dispersion is, in terms of its substance, (included in) “correct concentration” (*samyak samādhi*), for correct view (*samyag-drṣṭi*) and proper discernment (*saṃprajanya* 正知) are included in good (*kuśala*) understanding (*prajñā*).

Non-failing of memory (*amuṣita-smṛtitā* 不忘念) is “correct memory” (*samyak-smṛti*).

#1867 As for the “undetermined” mental factors, (that is, regret [*kaukrtya*], drowsiness [*middha*], initial inquiry [*vitarka*] and investigation [*vicāra*] [悔眠尋伺], see #2156), they can be defiled or non-defiled, just like the universal [mental factors, i.e., contact (*sparsa* 觸), etc.,] <339> or the special [mental factors] (predilection [*chanda* 欲], etc.). There are no good mental factors that are opposed to them.

#1869 2. *The reason why there is a list of eleven:*

Among the good mental factors (*caittas*) that oppose defiled mental factors (i.e., six defilements [*kleśas*] and twenty subsidiary defilements [*upakleśas*], twenty-six in all), why set aside some in a list of eleven, (while others are not)?

#1870 The good *dharma*s that have a special characteristic (相) and a special activity (用) {6/9v.} are listed separately; (this is not so for) the others, (thus, it is not necessary).

Furthermore, the defiled *dharma*s that extend throughout the six cognitions (*vijñānas*) are of major importance: hence, what is established as good *dharma*s are the *dharma*s that oppose them.

Now the seven, of which conceit (*māna* 慢) is the first, and the nine (excluding harmfulness [*vihiṃsā*]), of which anger (*krodha*) is the first, belong to mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) (alone). Although this is also the case for harmfulness (害), nevertheless—as the latter manifests (現起) frequently, as it harms (損惱) oneself and others, as it hinders compassion (*karuṇā* 悲) which is the predominant cause of the higher vehicle (上乘勝因)—non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害) is established as a good *dharma*, with the view of showing the extreme fault (*adhimātra-ādīnava* 增上過失) of harmfulness.

Impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā*), distraction (*vikṣepa*) and lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya*) oppose the special mental factors (i.e., memory [*smṛti*], concentration [*samādhi*] and understanding [*prajñā*]); consequently, their antagonists, i.e., non-impaired memory (*amuṣita-smṛtitā*), etc., are not placed among the eleven good *dharma*s. (See #2095.)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 162:

smṛtir eva hi kliṣṭā muṣitasmr̥titā | samādhir eva kliṣṭo vikṣepaḥ | prajñāiva kliṣṭā asamprajanyam | manaskāra eva kliṣṭo 'yoniso manaskāraḥ | adhimuktir eva kliṣṭā mithyādhimokṣaḥ.

Impaired memory, in fact, is none other than defiled mindfulness. Distraction is defiled concentration. Lack of proper discernment is defiled understanding. Incorrect mental application is defiled mental application.

#1872 3. *Comparison of the numbers of good and bad mental factors (caittas):*

The pure (淨) and defiled (染) *dharma*s oppose one another. Why are the pure ones less numerous than the defiled ones?

- #1873 The pure *dharma*s are strong; the defiled *dharma*s are weak (淨勝染劣): a small number of pure ones is sufficient as “enemies” (敵) of a large number of defiled ones.

⟨Moreover, in explaining principles,⟩ the numerous *dharma*s, i.e., non-conceit (*amāna*), etc., which oppose defiled *dharma*s, are all of the same substance (同體) as the eleven [good mental factors]; whereas the defiled *dharma*s are multiplied (分多) according to the particular characteristic <340> of the objects that provoke pollution (in sentient beings) (迷情事局). Thus, there is no grounds for criticizing our tenet by requiring an equal number of defiled *dharma*s and pure *dharma*s.⁶²⁴ {6/10r.}

4. Real existence and existence as designation:

- #1874 Among these eleven good *dharma*s, three have “existence as designation” (*prajñapti-sat* 假有), namely, heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸), equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨) and non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害), as we have explained it above (#1825–#1854). The other eight are “real (existence)” (實有), possessing their own characteristic (相) and own activity (用).

5. Universality:

- #1877 a. According to one opinion, four of the eleven are universals, i.e., occur in every good mind (遍善心): vigor (*vīrya* 精進) and the three roots (三根) of good, because they universally occur in every category of good (遍善品). The other seven do not necessarily occur in every good mind.

#1878 Indeed:

- i. when (時) one examines a thing or a principle (推尋事理), and before one has come to a decision (決定), one does not generate faith (*śraddhā* 信);
- ii. modesty (*hrī* 慚) and shame (*apatrāpya* 愧) are of the same type (類), but have a different support (*āśraya* 依) and occur in different contexts (*āyatana* 處), so that when the one occurs, the second does not occur;
- iii. there is ease (*prasrabdhi* 輕安) when one abandons the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) by the mundane path (世間道);
- iv. heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸) and equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨) arise only when being on the supramundane path, i.e., pure path (*anāsrava-mārga*) (無漏道);

⁶²⁴ Kuiji, *Shuji* 6A2/36r.

- v. there is non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害) only when one has compassion (悲愍) for sentient beings.

#1879 YBh (T.30.1579.0602b13) says that the eleven occur in six circumstances (六位): {6/10v.}

- i. in the state of decision (*niścaya* 決定), there is faith (*śraddhā* 信);
- ii. when the defiled *dharma*s are stopped (止息染), there is modesty (*hrī* 慚) or shame (*apatrāpya* 愧), regarding oneself or others, [respectively];
- iii. in the state where the category of good rules (*kuśala-pakṣa-avasthā* 善品位), there is vigor (*vīrya* 精進) and the three roots (三根) [of good];
- iv. in the mundane path (世間道), there is ease (*praśrabdhi* 輕安);
- v. in the supramundane path (出世道), there is equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨) and heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸);
- vi. when one reconciles or brings together sentient beings (*sattva-saṃgraha* 衆生衆生), there is non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害).

#1882 b. But according to other teachers, the preceding theory is inaccurate (or not in harmony with reason) (未為應理).

Indeed:

- i. If faith (*śraddhā*) were absent in the state when—examining a thing or a principle (推尋事理)—one has not arrived at a decision (決定), this state would not be good, <341> as the defiled or non-defined mind is not good, since *praśāda* (“pure faith”, *jingxin* 淨信) is absent.
- #1883 ii. Modesty (*hrī* 慚) and shame (*apatrāpya* 愧) are of different natures (類), of different supports (*āśraya* 依), but have the same object (境): thus, both occur in every good mind (遍善心), as we have seen, #1790.
- #1884 iii. If ease (*praśrabdhi* 輕安) would not arise in the supramundane path (出世道), it would not be a “member of *bodhi* (覺支)”, not being pure (*anāsrava* 無漏).⁶²⁵ {6/11r.}
- #1885 iv. If heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸) and equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨) were absent in the mundane path (世間道), this path would not be calm (*śānta* 寂靜) for the role of these two *dharma*s is to ward off what is bad and to cultivate what is good (防惡修善); for this path would not “tame” (伏) restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉) and heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸). But the good impure (*sāsrava* 有漏) mind is endowed with four *dharma*s (i.e., vigor [*vīrya*] and the three roots [of good]) and

⁶²⁵ AKB ii, F 158; vi, F 283.

thus, just like the supramundane path (出世道), the mundane path is endowed with heedfulness and equanimity.

- #1886 v. When a good mind, whatever it may be, occurs, this good mind—contrary to *dharma*s that harm (*upaghāta* 損) others—does not do harm to others; thus it is accompanied by non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害).
- #1887 When the *sāstra* (YBh) enumerates the six states where the eleven good *dharma*s occur, it claims only to indicate the states where such and such good *dharma* particularly flourishes (增). – Thus, the theory which we criticize is ⟨not in harmony with reason (非應理)⟩.
- #1888 Indeed, ⟨it should be stated that⟩ among the eleven good mental factors, ⟨i.e., faith, etc.⟩ ten occur in every good mind (遍善心). But the state of concentration (定) is necessary in order that there be “ease” (*praśrabdhi* 輕安), for the putting at ease (*āhlādana* 調暢)⁶²⁶ of body and of mind, i.e., the essential element of “ease” (see #1822), is absent in the other states.
- #1889 Also YBh (i.e., *Viniścaya*, T.30.1579.0684a), in the chapter on *nirvedha*, says: {6/11v.}

In the stages of concentration (定地) and of non-concentration, ten good mental factors (*caittas*) accompany every good mind (遍善心), but, in the stages of concentration, “ease” (*praśrabdhi* 輕安) is to be added (增).

- #1891 Opinions differ on what should be understood by “stage of concentration” (定地). According to one opinion, this expression extends also to the preparatory state for concentration (*samādhi-prayoga* 定加行).⁶²⁷ <342> There is then a certain subtle putting at ease (*āhlādana* 調暢). Thus, the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界) can also include “ease” (*praśrabdhi* 輕安). – In the contrary hypothesis, how could YBh⁶²⁸ claim that eleven good *dharma*s, i.e., faith (*śraddhā*), etc., could occur “in all stages”?⁶²⁹
- #1892 According to another opinion—which is the correct one—“ease” (*praśrabdhi*) belongs only to the “existences of concentration” (*samādhi-bhava* 定有). Indeed, it is through the development or nourishment (滋養) of concentration (定) that

⁶²⁶ Note that *diao* 調 = *sama* in *bhakte śamatā*, and that, followed by *rou* 柔, i.e., flexible, it means *mārdavatā* (pliancy).

⁶²⁷ States of hearing (*śruta*) and of reflection (*cintā*), when one is preparing the concentration: see the three understandings (*prajñās*), AKB vi, F 143.

⁶²⁸ Chapter “*Mūla-bhūmi*” 本地分 (T.30.1579.0291a).

⁶²⁹ See #1707, #1748.

putting at ease (*āhlādana* 調暢) takes place. – Likewise, YBh (T.30.1579.0560c) says that, due to the absence (闕) of “ease”, the mind and mental factors (*cittas-caittas*) of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) are called “stages of non-concentration (不定地)”. Thus, when YBh says that eleven good *dharma*s occur “in all stages”, it refers to the three stages: (1) with initial inquiry (*savitarka* 有尋), with investigation (*savicāra* 有伺), (2–3) etc.,⁶³⁰ but not to the realm of desire, etc.

6–8. Association:

- #1894 6. We have explained in what cases these eleven good *dharma*s {6/12r.} are associated or non-associated with the eighth and seventh cognitions (*vijñānas*) (see #0745, #1360).

As for the sixth cognition, when being in the state of concentration (定位), it is accompanied by the eleven, but when not being in the state of concentration, then “ease” (*praśrabdhi*) is necessarily absent (闕).

- #1896 As for the five cognitions, there are two opinions (see #1752).

a. <According to one opinion, since the five cognitions> are, in their nature, distracted (*vikṣipta* 散動), they are never associated with ease (*praśrabdhi*): thus, [they are associated with only] ten good *dharma*s.

- #1897 b. According to the other opinion, [the five cognitions] can be associated with “ease”, for when they are good, caused (所引) by concentration, [then] they include putting at ease (*āhlādana* 調暢); for knowledge of accomplishing action (*kr̥tya-anuṣṭhāna-jñāna* 成所作智) (see #3268) is necessarily associated with ease.

- #1898 7. With which sensations (*vedanās* 受) are the eleven good *dharma*s associated? Ten can be associated with five sensations. Ease (*praśrabdhi*) is not associated with displeasure (*duḥkha*) and with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*), for painful (逼迫) sensation is incompatible with putting at ease (*āhlādana*).

- #1899 8. All [eleven good *dharma*s], i.e., pure or impure, can be associated with the five special mental factors (別境) <343> (i.e., predilection [*chanda* 欲], etc., #1668), for there is no contradiction between faith (*śraddhā* 信), etc., and predilection, etc.

- #1900 9–12. *Ethical nature, realms (dhātu), etc.:*

9. All eleven [good *dharma*s] are exclusively good (唯善).

- #1901 10. “Ease” (*praśrabdhi* 輕安) is absent in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界); the others occur in the three realms (*dhātus* 三界). {6/12v.}

⁶³⁰ AKB viii, F 183.

- #1902 11. All [eleven good *dharma*s] can be (of three kinds, that is,) pertaining to the trainee (*śaikṣa* 學), pertaining to the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*), pertaining to neither the trainee nor the non-trainee (*naiva-śaikṣa-na-aśaikṣa*) (AKB vi, F 231.).
- #1903 12. [All eleven good *dharma*s] are not “to be abandoned by insight” (*ḍṛgheya* 見所斷), for YBh (T.30.1579.0616b) states that the six kinds of faculties (*indriyas* 根, i.e., *śraddhā-ādāni*: [i] faith [*śraddhā*], [ii] vigor [*vīrya*], [iii] memory [*smṛti*], [iv] concentration [*samādhi*], [v] understanding [*prajñā*] and [vi] coming to know what has not been known [*anājñātam-ājñāsyāmi*]⁶³¹) are only “to be abandoned by cultivation” (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷) or “not to be abandoned” (*aheya* 非所斷) (#2487).
- #1904 The other topics—“do they involve retribution?”, etc.—are to be considered in accordance with reason.

E.D.E. Defilements (*kleśas*)

- #1906 We have already explained the good mental factors (*kuśala-avasthā-caittas* 善位心). What are (the characteristics of the mental factors that are) defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱心所)?
- #1907 Vasubandhu replies. The stanzas 11c2–12a (Chin. 12ab) say:

kleśa rāga-pratigha-mūḍhayaḥ || 11c2d

māna-ḍṛg-vicikitsāś ca | 12a

煩惱謂貪瞋・癡慢疑惡見・ | 12ab

- 12ab. The defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) are attachment (*rāga* 貪), hostility (*prati-gha* 瞋), delusion (*moha* 癡; *mūḍhi*, metrical equivalent), doubt (*vi-cikitsā* 疑), conceit (*māna* 慢), bad view (*ḍṛg* 惡見).

#1909 The Treatise:

These six (natures, i.e., attachment, etc.) receive the name DEFILEMENTS (*kleśa* 煩惱) because they constitute the root defilements (*mūla-kleśas* 根本煩惱), (or roots of subsidiary defilements [*upakleśas* 隨煩惱]). [The defilements are subsidiary defilements which can arise following other defiled *dharma*s; but there are subsidiary defilements, i.e., anger (*krodha*), etc., which, not being roots, are not defilement.⁶³²] (See #2045.)

⁶³¹ AKB i, F 101; ii, F 109, 118.

⁶³² *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0714a); another explanation, AKB v, F 88.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Xuanzang, [in contrast to the Sanskrit, has the order]: doubt (*vicikitsā*), conceit (*māna*), bad view (*ku-dṛṣṭi*), [but discusses these terms in the order: conceit, doubt and bad view].

The *Śatadharma-śāstra*, *Samuccaya-śāstra*, etc., arrange the defilements (*kleśas*) in the following order: (1) attachment (*rāga*), (2) hostility (*pratigha*), (3) conceit (*māna*), (4) ignorance (*avidyā*) (= delusion [*moha*], *mūḍhi*), (5) doubt (*vicikitsā*), (6) incorrect view (*asamyag-dṛṣṭi*). <344>

An Abhidharma treatise not otherwise named (AKB v, F 41, note):

māna-dṛg-vicikitsās ca rāga-pratigha-mūḍhayaḥ.

AKB v, F 2:

(1) attachment (*rāga*), (2) hostility (*pratigha*), (3) conceit (*māna*), (4) ignorance (*avidyā*), (5) afflicted view (*dṛṣṭi*), (6) *vimatī* (= doubt [*vicikitsā*]).

Our list has the advantage that it names the three “roots of bad” together and first; AKB v, F 41:

kāme 'kuśalamūlāni rāgapratighamūḍhaḥ.

#1912 1. What is ATTACHMENT (*rāga* 貪)?

It has for its nature defiled attaching (*kliṣṭā āsakti* 染著) to existence (*bhava* 有) and to the causes of existence (*bhava-upakaraṇas* 有具) (see #1799).

Its activity (業) is to hinder (障) non-greed (*alobha* 無貪) {6/13r.} and to engender suffering, <#1913> for it is by the power of thirst (*tṛṣṇā* 愛) that the “aggregates of attachment” (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊) arise.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

By “existence” (*bhava*), we may understand the new existence (*punar-bhava*), i.e., the existence to come, the threefold existence, which is retribution alone.

By “causes of existence” (*bhava-upakaraṇa*), [we may understand] the intermediary existence, with the defilements (*kleśas*), actions, the material world, and even pure *dharma*s, for bad view can arise towards these [pure] *dharma*s.

The Sarvāstivādins teach that attachment (*rāga*) towards pure *dharma*s is “predilection for good *dharma*s” (*kuśala-dharma-cchanda*), i.e., not a defilement (see AKB v, F 36, 39). On the other hand, for the Great Vehicle, desire (or thirst) towards the Buddha, attachment toward cessation (*nirodha*) (or *nirvāṇa*): these are “defiled” (*kliṣṭa*) mental factors (*caittas*), for they arise together with bad view. Thus, the pure

dharmas can nourish and prolong existence (*bhava*): they are thus included among the causes of existence (*bhava-upakaraṇas*). – Truthfully, YBh, 58, does not say that attachment can take the pure *dharmas* for its object.

The role of “thirst” (*trṣṇā*) is twofold: [a] to generate action; [b] “to moisten birth”, #2625 (Kuiji, *Shuji* 6B/2v.1.).

“Attachment” (*rāga*), i.e., a root of bad, opposes “non-greed” (*alobha*), i.e., a root of good (in *Kāma*, with the restrictions indicated by AKB v, F 41 and below, #1989). Attachment and greed are translated by *tan* 貪.

By “greed” (*lobha*), our text means attaching (*āsakti*); by attachment (*rāga*), defiled attaching.

Asaṅga’s *Samuccaya-sāstra* (T.31.1605.0664b24):

Attachment (貪) is, in itself, thirst (*trṣṇā* 愛) for the three realms (*dhātus* 三界) (*trāidhātukī-trṣṇā-svabhāvaḥ*); it has for its activity to bring forth all suffering (生眾苦).

Sthiramati’s *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0697c28) adds:

duḥkha-abhinirvṛttiḥ: trṣṇāvaśāt pañcopādānaskandhābhinirvṛtteḥ

“Bring forth all suffering” (生眾苦) means that, due the power of thirst (愛力), there occurs the bringing forth (生) of the five aggregates of attachment (五取蘊).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 28 (12c) (transl. based on Jacobi):

tatra rāgo bhava-bhogayor adhyavasānam, prārthanā ca | <345>

Attachment (*rāga*) is the appreciation (*adhyavasāna*) of existence (*bhava*) and of enjoyments (*bhoga*), and the attaching (to them).

sa punar duḥkha-saṃjanana-karmakaḥ |

Attachment has for its activity the bringing one in connection (*saṃyojana*) with suffering (*duḥkha*) again and again.

duḥkham atropādāna-skandhās | *teṣāṃ kāma-rūpārūpya-trṣṇā-vaśād abhinirvṛtteḥ* | (Ms. *abhinirvṛttiḥ*). *ato rāgasya duḥkha-saṃjananam karma nirdiśyate* |

“Suffering” refers here to the aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas*); these appear in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*), the realm of fine-materiality and the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*) due to thirst (*trṣṇā*; will to live). Thus, the activity of attachment is defined as the bringing one in connection with suffering.

#1915 2. What is HOSTILITY (*pratigha* 瞋 = hatred [*dveṣa*])?

It has for its nature irritation (*āghāta* 憎恚) with regard to suffering (*duḥkha* 苦, threefold) and the causes of suffering (*duḥkha-upakaraṇa* 苦具) (including the pure *dharma*s).

Its activity (業) is to hinder non-hatred (*adveṣa* 無瞋) and to cause discomfort (*asparśa-vihāra* 不安隱) and (to be the support for) all bad conduct (*duṣcarita* 惡行), <#1916> for, due to hostility (*pratigha*), one is necessarily tormented (*tap* 熱惱) in body and mind, and one commits bad actions (惡業). Hostility is, indeed, bad by nature (不善性).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 28 (13a), differs (transl. based on Jacobi):

pratighaḥ sattveṣv āghātaḥ, sattveṣu rūkṣa-cittatā, yenāviṣṭaḥ sattvānāṃ vadha-bandhanādīkam anarthaṃ cintayati |

Hostility (*pratigha*) is enmity (or irritation) (*āghāta*) regarding sentient beings (*sattva*), hardheartedness (*rūkṣa-cittatā*) against them; the one who is filled with hostility ponders about how to bring about detriment for sentient beings, such as killing (*vadha*), tying up (*bandhana*), etc.

sa punar asparśa-vihāra-duṣcarita-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Hostility has for its activity to provide the support for unpleasant behavior (*asparśa-vihāra*) and for evil deeds (*duṣcarita*).

sparśaḥ sukhaṃ | tena sahito vihāraḥ, sparśa-vihāraḥ | na sparśa-vihāro 'sparśa-vihāraḥ | duḥkha-sahita ity, arthaḥ |

Etymological explanation for *asparśa-vihāra*: *sparśa* = *sukha*; *sparśa-vihāra* means “with happiness connected abiding (*vihāra*)”; the negation of which is *asparśa*, i.e., “with suffering connected”.

āghāta-cittasyāvaśyaṃ daurmanasya-samudācārāc, cittam tapyate | cittānu-vidhānāc ca, kāyo 'pi tapyata eveti, sarveryā-patheṣu sa-duḥkha-sa-vighāto 'sparśa-vihāro bhavati |

Since in the one with an irritated mind (*āghāta-citta*), there necessarily arises a bad mood, i.e., dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*), his mind becomes tormented (*tapyata*): and because the body orients itself (*anuvīdhāna*) to the mind, the body too becomes tormented. Therefore, one displays everywhere—whenever careful deportment (*īryāpatha*)⁶³³ would be needed—unpleasant behavior (*asparśa-*

⁶³³ Jacobi footnotes: walking, standing, sitting, lying.

vihāra), full of suffering (*saduḥkha*) and offensiveness (*saviḥāta*).

pratihata-cittasya ca na kiñcid duṣcaritaṃ vidūra iti, pratigho 'sparśa-vihāra-duṣcarita-saṃnīśraya-dāna-karmaka uktaḥ |

And since for one with a hostile mind (*pratihata-citta*) no bad deed (*duṣcarita*) is excluded (*vidūra*), therefore the activity of hostility is to provide the support for unpleasant behavior (*asparśa-vihāra*) and for evil deeds (*duṣcarita*).

The *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0664b25) and *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0697c29) have a complex phrase:

*sattveṣu bhavopakaraneṣu ca cittasya āghātaḥ*⁶³⁴

Hostility (瞋) is, in itself (體), irritation (*āghāta* 心憎恚) of the mind with regard to sentient beings (*sattva* 有情), existence/suffering (*bhava/duḥkha* 苦) and the causes of existence/suffering (*bhava/duḥkha-upakarana* 苦具).

I am translating *zenghui* 憎恚, *hui* 恚, as *āghāta* [irritation], according to the *Tren-taine*; but (*cittasya*) *āghāta* (心憎恚) is represented by *fenfa* 憤發 in AKB v, F 90 (21/5r.4).

#1918 3. What is DELUSION (*moha*; in stanza: *mūḍhi*) (癡)?

It has for its nature being erroneous-obscured (*mī'an* 迷闇; Ch. *mi* = *vipratipatti*, *bhrama*; Ch. *an* = *tamas*) about the “principles” (理, the truths) and things (*vastu*) (理事).⁶³⁵ [When isolated, delusion involves an error about the principle (*li* 理); associated with attachment (*rāga*), etc., error about things.]

Its activity (業) is to hinder non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡) and to be the *raison d'être* (or support) (*āśraya* 所依) for pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜染) as a whole (which is threefold, #1082), <#1919> for, due to ignorance (*avidyā* 無明), one necessarily generates doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑), false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見), defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) (i.e., attachment [*rāga* 貪], etc.), actions (*karma* 業), all the *dharma*s of pollution (雜染法) that cause rebirth (後生).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Asaṅga's *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0664b28):

avidyā katamā | traidhātukamajñānam | dharmeṣu mithyāniścayavicikitsātsaṃkleśotpattisanniśrayadānakarmikā ||

⁶³⁴ Editors: *Samuccaya-śāstra* has: *sattveṣu duḥkhe duḥkhashānīyeṣu ca dharmeṣvāghātaḥ* (有情苦及苦具心恚).

⁶³⁵ Compare AKB vi, F 257.

What is ignorance (*avidyā* 無明)? – In itself, it is non-knowledge (*ajñāna* 無知) of the three realms (*dhātus* 三界); its activity is to provide the support of false certainties (邪決定 = *viparīta-jñāna*), of doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑), of the generation of pollution (*saṃkleśa* 雜生起 = *rāga-ādi-kleśa-prādurbhāva*) (of *dharma*s (法)).

See Sthiramati's glosses in the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0698a08).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 28 (13a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

moho 'pāyeṣu, sugatau, nirvāṇe, tat-pratiṣṭhāpakeṣu hetuṣu, teṣāṃ cāviparīte hetu-phala-saṃbandhe yad ajñānam |

Delusion (*moha*) is the non-knowledge (*ajñāna*) regarding [a] skillful means (*upāya*), [b] the Buddha (*sugata*), [c] *nirvāna*, [d] the causes (*hetu*) that determine (*pratiṣṭhāpa*) the latter, and the truthful connection with their consequences.

ayaṃ ca saṃkleśotpatti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Delusion has for its activity to be the support for the arising (*utpatti*) of pollution (*saṃkleśa*) by the defilements (*kleśa*).

tatra kleśa-karma-janmātmakas tri-vidhaḥ saṃkleśaḥ | tasyotpattiḥ pūrva-pūrva-saṃkleśa-nimittād uttarottarasya saṃkleśasyātma-lābhaḥ | tasyotpatteḥ saṃniśraya-dānaṃ karma |

This pollution (*saṃkleśa*) is threefold, i.e., as (1) defilement (*kleśa*), (2) action (*karma*) and (3) birth (*janma*):

a. “arising” (*utpatti*) (of pollution) refers to the appearing of the pollution by defilements (*kleśa*) brought about by the immediately preceding pollution by defilements;

b. “activity” (*karma*) refers to that which provides the support (*saṃniśraya*) for this arising (*utpatti*).

mūḍhasyaiva hi mithyā-jñāna-saṃśaya-rāgādi-kleśa-paunarbhavika-karma-janmanām pravṛttir, nāmūḍhasyeti |

This is so because for the ignorant (*mūḍha*) there appear (1) the defilements (*kleśas*) of false knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), attachment (*rāga*), etc., (2) the actions (*karma*) that lead to rebirth, and (3) birth (*janma*). But this is not so for the one who is not ignorant.

On *avidyā*, see #1445; #2617; AKB iii, F 88–94. <346>

#1921 4. What is CONCEIT (*māna*) (慢)?

It has for its nature “to put oneself above someone else” (恃己於他高舉) [literally: elevation (*unnati*) of oneself relative to another].

Its activity (業) is to hinder non-conceit (*amāna* 不慢) and to engender suffering. {6/13v.}

#1922 In other words, when there is conceit toward the qualities (*guṇa* 德) and people endowed with qualities (*guṇavat* 有德), the mind is not humble (*praśṛta* 謙下). Through that, the cycle of existence (生死輪轉) continues to turn endlessly and suffering (of all kinds) is experienced.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Samuccaya-śāstra (T.31.1605.0664b28):

*mānaḥ kaṭamaḥ | satkāyadr̥ṣṭisannīśrayeṇa cittasyonnatiḥ | agauravaduḥkha-
utpatti sannīśrayadānakarmakāḥ ||*

Conceit (慢) is, in itself, the exaltation of the mind (*cittasyonnati* 心高舉) which supports (依止) the afflicted view of self (*satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi* 薩迦耶見).

Its activity consists in providing the support (*sannīśraya* 所依) for the arising of disrespect (*agaurava* 不敬) and of suffering (*duḥkha* 苦).

Definition developed in the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0698a03) and in *Sthiramati's Trentaine* (transl. based on Jacobi):

*mānaḥ | māno hi nāma sarva eva sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi-samāśrayeṇa pravartate | sa
punaś cittasyonnati-lakṣaṇaḥ |*

Conceit (*māna*), i.e., any conceit, rests, indeed, on the false belief in a permanent self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) and is characterized (*lakṣaṇa*) by an elevated self-esteem (*unnati*).

*tathā hy ātmātmīya-bhāvaṃ skandheṣu adhyāropyāyam aham, idaṃ mamety,
ātmānaṃ tena tena viśeṣeṇonnamayati, anyebhyo 'dhikaṃ manyate |*

And this in the following way: by identifying one's own existence—through transference (*adhyāropya*)—with the aggregates (*skandhas*): “This is me, that is mine”, one elevates oneself in this or that way and considers oneself to be superior to others.

*sa cāgaurava-duḥkhotpatti-sannīśraya-dāna-karmakāḥ | agauravaṃ guruṣu,
guṇavatsu ca pudgaleṣu, stābdhatā, kāya-vācor apraśṛitā | duḥkhotpattiḥ
punar atra punar-bhavotpattiḥ |*

(Conceit) has for its activity to provide the support for disrespect (*agaurava*) and the arising of suffering (*duḥkhotpatti*).

“Disrespect” (*agaurava*) is (demonstrated) arrogance (*aprasāritatā*) in regard to persons held in respect (*guru*) and persons endowed with high qualities (*guṇa*), impertinence (*stabdhatā*) in speech (*vāc*) and bodily (*kāya*) conduct.

“Arising of suffering”, on the other hand, is here rebirth (*punarbhava*).

sa ca punaś, cittonnati-svarūpābhede 'pi, cittasyonnati-nimitta-bhedāt, saptadhā bhidyate, māno 'timāna ity, evam ādi |

Although the elevated self-esteem (*unnati*) of the mind is everywhere the same, nevertheless, due to the different occasions for the arising of this self-esteem (*unnati*), seven kinds of conceit are distinguished:

(1) conceit (*māna*), (2) overweening conceit (*ati-māna*), [(3) extreme conceit (*mānātimānaḥ*), (4) conceit of egoism (*asmi-mānaḥ*), (5) exaggerating conceit (*abhimānaḥ*), (6) diminishing conceit (*ūna-mānaḥ*), (7) false conceit (*mithyā-mānaḥ*) (see below)].

[In *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 29, line 2 (13b), the reading *guruṣu guṇavatsu ca* is correct, for the *Samuccāya-vyākhyā* has *shizhang* 師長. But our text has *guṇeṣu guṇavatsu ca*, which seems preferable.]

AKB ii, F 176 (*māna unnatiḥ*); v, F 26–31.

#1923 Types (差別) of conceit (*māna*): – There are seven or nine kinds (*vidhāḥ*) of conceit. – As for the seven kinds, four are relative to three categories (品) (i.e., inferior, equal, superior), one relative to aggregates (*skandhas*), (i.e., the self (我)), two relative to qualities (德).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

In Kuiji, as in the AKB (at v, F 26, read *atimāna* in place of *adhimāna*, wrong reading in the *Vyutpatti*) and other sources, the order is as follows:

- i. conceit (*māna*), (that is—in relation to someone who is inferior and someone who is equal—to elevate the mind and to say: “I am superior, I am equal”);
- ii. overweening conceit (*ati-māna*), (that is—in relation to someone who is equal and someone who is superior—to say: “I am superior; I am equal”);
- iii. extreme conceit (*mānātimāna*), (that is—in relation to someone who is superior—to say: “I am superior”);
- iv. conceit of egoism (*asmi-māna*), (that is—in relation to the aggregates

- [*skandhas*—to say: “I am these aggregates”];
- v. exaggerating conceit (*abhi-māna*), (that is, to attribute to oneself qualities that one has not realized);
 - vi. diminishing conceit (*ūna-māna*), (that is—in relation to someone who is greatly superior—to say: “I am slightly inferior”);
 - vii. false conceit (*mithyā-māna*), (that is, to attribute to oneself qualities that one does not possess).

[The list in Saeki Kyokuga’s edition places *asmi-māna* in seventh place.]

The nine kinds (*vidhās*) of conceit, AKB v, F 27; *Saṃyutta*, sub. voc. (?) *vidhā*; *Sutta-nipāta*, 842; *Niddesa*, p. 195.

- #1924 All conceits are “to be abandoned by insight (*darśana* 見所斷) and cultivation (*bhāvanā* 修所斷)”.⁶³⁶ [Since] (innate [*sahaja*]) conceit of egoism (*asmi-māna* 我慢) manifests (現行) even among saints (*āryas*), it must be accepted that various kinds of conceit (*māna-vidhās* 慢類) (also) occur in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to the Little Vehicle, the conceit of egoism (*asmi-māna*) does not manifest (*samudācarati*) in saints (*āryas*); thus, there is no conceit of egoism in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*) (Kuiji, *Shuji* 6B/6v). – See AKB v, verse 10b [F 28 and note]. <347>

- #1926 5. What is DOUBT (*vicikitsā* 疑)?

It has for its nature uncertainty (猶豫, *vimati*, *saṃdeha*, etc.) towards all (諸) truths and principles (*dīli* 諦理).

Its activity (業) is to hinder (障) non-doubt (*avicikitsā* 不疑) and every category of good (*kuśala-pakṣa* 善品), for the good mind never arises in the person who is in doubt (or experiences uncertainty (猶豫)).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The author does not say “towards ‘principles’ (*li* 理) and ‘things’ (*vastu*; *shi* 事)”, because having doubt whether one is seeing a post or a man is not the defilement (*kleśa*) of doubt (*vicikitsā*). On the other hand, the word *zhu* 諸 (“all”) shows that by *dīli* 諦理 one should understand “the other world, etc.”. According to YBh, 58, *vicikitsā* is doubt about the other world (*para-loka*), activity (*kriyā*), cause and effect (*hetu-phala*), the truths (*satyas*) and the jewels (*ratnas*).

⁶³⁶ AKB v, verse 10b (F 28).

Samuccaya-vyākhyā (T.31.1606.0698a10):

vicikitsā katamā | satyeṣu vimatiḥ | kuśalapakṣāpravṛtti sannīśrayadānakarmikā ||

Doubt is, in itself, uncertainty (猶豫; *saṁdeha*; *vimati*) with regard to the truths (諦).

Its activity consists in providing the support for the non-arising (or non-functioning [*apravṛtti*]) (不生) on the part of the good (善).

Sthiramati, in the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0698a11), glosses the expression *satyeṣu saṁdehaḥ* (諦猶豫): “This includes also the doubt about the jewels (*ba* 寶, *ratna*) [or, according to the reading adopted by the Chinese text, about the “realities”, *shi* 實] which are included—according to the case—either in the truths of cessation (*nirodha*) or of the path (*mārga*) (滅道諦)”. (On this point, cf. AKB vi, F 292–293).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 28 (13a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

vicikitsā karma-phala-satya-ratneṣu vimatiḥ |

Doubt (*vicikitsā*) is the undecided opinion (*vimati*) in regard to action (*karma*), its fruits (*phala*), the (four) truths (*satya*) and the (three) jewels (*ratna*).

vividhā matir vimatiḥ, syān na syād iti |

Vimati is the varied opinion (*mati*), whether something is or is not.

prajñātaś ceyaṁ jāty-antaram evoktā |

Doubt is a kind (*jāti*) other than understanding (*prajñā*).

#1928 According to divergent masters of the Great Vehicle, doubt (*vicikitsā*) is, in itself (體), understanding (*prajñā* 慧):

1. for YBh says that doubt is an uncertain discernment (*saṁdigdha pravacaya* 猶豫簡擇: now, understanding is defined as discernment [*pravacaya*]);

2. for the meaning of *vicikitsā* is *vimati* (doubt), whereby the prefix (助) *vi* (毘) denotes diversity, and the word *mati* (末底) is synonymous (義無異) {6/14r.} with understanding (*prajñā* 般若). [Thus, one has *vicikitsā* = *vimati* = *vividhā matiḥ*: *syān na syād iti*, “perhaps it is, perhaps it is not”, says Sthiramati.]

#1929 According to another opinion, this doubt is a thing in itself (別有自體), i.e., that which causes that “understanding” (*prajñā* 慧) is not certain (不決); it is not “understanding”.

Indeed, YBh (T.30.1579.0603a28) says that, (of the six defilements,) “view” (*drṣṭi* 見) has only “conventional” existence (世俗有), being part of understanding (慧分),

whereas the other five defilements (*kleśas*) are real things (實有), having separate (natures) (別有性).

If it is maintained (執) that *vimati* (毘助末底, or *vicikitsā* 疑) is “understanding” because the word *vimati* is formed from *mati* and from the prefix *vi*, then it could also be said that *vijñāna* (識) is knowledge (*jñāna* 智) because we have *vi-jñāna* (毘助若南). The meaning (義) of a root (*dhātu* 界) is modified (轉變) by the prefix (助).⁶³⁷ – Thus, doubt is, (in itself (體)), not understanding (*prajñā* 慧). <348>

#1931 6. What is “BAD VIEW” (*ku-dṛṣṭi* 惡見)⁶³⁸ [or afflicted view (見)]?

[“Bad” can mean only bad (*akuśala*) but also all the obscured (*nivṛta*): a certain part of “bad view”—any innate (*sahaja*, see #0062 and #1952) bad view—is not “bad” (*akuśala*), as it does not generate actions ripening as suffering.]

[Bad view] has for its nature defiled understanding (*prajñā* 染慧) (i.e., a “special mental factor”, #1723), that is, upside-down judgment (*viparīta nitīraṇa* 顛倒推求) about the truths and principles (諦理).

Its activity is to hinder “good view” (*kuśala dṛṣṭi* 善見), to generate suffering (招苦).

#1932 This is so, for the person with bad view (惡見) experiences suffering very often. [In the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*), due to the “figured (*vikalpa*)” bad view, actions are carried out that ripen in suffering.]

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 29 (14a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

dṛṣṭi itī, sāmānya-nirdeśe 'pi, kleśādhikārāt, pañcaiva kleśātmikāḥ sat-kāya-dṛṣṭy-ādikā dṛṣṭayaḥ sambadhyante | na laukikī samyag-dṛṣṭir, anāsravā vā | āsām tu, kliṣṭa-nitīraṇākāratvād aviśeṣe 'py, ālambanākāra-bhedāt, parasparato bhedaḥ |

Although the general (*sāmānya*) rendering (*nirdeśa*) “view” (*dṛṣṭi*) is found (in the stanza), nevertheless, since here the defilements (*kleśas*) are discussed, therefore only such views (i.e., afflicted views) the nature of which are defilements (*kleśa*), such as the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*), etc., are considered, but not the transcendent, i.e., not mundane (*laukika*), correct view (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*) that is not “infected” by defilements (*anāsrava*). These (afflicted views), although being of the same kind insofar as their mode of operation is a defiled (*kliṣṭa*) judgment (*nitīraṇa*), are, however, distinguished from each

⁶³⁷ Compare *Mudhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 5.

⁶³⁸ *Vyutpatti*, 205, 9, 惡見.

other in accordance with the form or aspect (*ākāra*) of their cognitive object (*ālambana*).

tatra sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭir, yat pañcasūpādāna-skandheṣv ātmātmīya-darśanam |

The afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) consists in seeing a self (*ātman*) and what belongs to a self (“mine”) (*ātmīya*) in the aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas*).

anta-grāha-dr̥ṣṭis, teṣv eva pañcasūpādāna-skandheṣv ātmātmīyatvena gr̥hīteṣu, yad ucchedataḥ śāśvataḥ vā darśanam |

When the five aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas*) have been conceived as one’s self and as what belongs to a self, then the false seeing (*darśana*) regarding the definitive annihilation (*ucchedata*) or eternity (*śāśvata*) (of the self and what belongs to the self) is the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*anta-grāha-dr̥ṣṭi*).

mithyā-dr̥ṣṭiḥ | yayā mithyā-dr̥ṣṭyā hetuṃ vāpavadati, phalaṃ, kriyāṃ vā, sad vā vastu nāśayati, sā sarva-darśana-pāpatvān mithyā-dr̥ṣṭir ity, ucyate |

False view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*): when, due to a false view, one denies the cause (*hetu*), the fruit (*phala*) or the (respective) activity (*kriyā*), or prevents a positive thing, then this is called false view, since it is of all false seeing (*mithyā-darśana*) the worst.

dr̥ṣṭi-parāmarśaḥ pañcasūpādāna-skandheṣv agrato viśiṣṭataḥ śreṣṭhataḥ paramataś ca, yad darśanam |

Esteeming of bad views (*dr̥ṣṭi-parāmarśa*): when one weighs which of the five aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandha*) is the first (*agra*), the most excellent (*viśiṣṭa*), the best (*śreṣṭha*), the highest (*parama*).

śīla-vrata-parāmarśaḥ pañcasūpādāna-skandheṣu śuddhito muktito nairyaṇika-taś ca, yad darśanam |

Overesteeming of morality and vows (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*): when one weighs which of the five aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas*) serve to obtain purification (*śuddhi*), liberation (*mukti*) and the path of liberation (*nairyaṇika*).

#1934 The different modes of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of (this) afflicted view (見) are five in number [AKB v, F 15f.]. {6/14v.}

#1937 a. Afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi* 薩迦耶見):^a

[The afflicted view of self is] to take (執) the five aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊) as “me and mine” (我我所).

This afflicted view has for its activity to be the support (所依) for all false opinions (*dr̥ṣṭi-gata* 見趣).

#1938

Varieties (差別). – This afflicted view entails twenty kinds (句) and sixty-five kinds^b included in the category “originating from figurating” (*vikalpa* 分別起).^c

^a The Sanskrit is *sat-kāya*; *kāya* means “accumulation”; *sat* means “existent” (you 有), “false” (wei 偽), “changing” (*yizhuan* 移轉) (AKB v, F 15–17).

We say afflicted view of the body (*kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) because this afflicted view is directed at the body; we also say afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭi*) (the afflicted view of the person [*pudgala-dr̥ṣṭi*]).

The Sautrāntikas call it “false-*kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*” because the supposed body (*kāya*) is false; the Vaibhāṣikas call it “existent-*kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*” because the body that serves as object (*sāśrava dharmas*) is existent. By using the first expression, the second meaning fails to be indicated, and vice versa. We will indicate both meanings by saying *sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*.

^b (1–5) Five afflicted views of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭis*): conceiving matter (*rūpa*) as a self (*ātman*), conceiving sensation (*vedanā*) as a self ... – (6–20) Fifteen afflicted views of mine (*ātmīya-dr̥ṣṭis*), i.e., three for each aggregate (*skandha*), that is to say:

- i. *rūpavān ātmā alaṃkāravat*: “the self (*ātman*) endowed with matter (*rūpa*) like an ornament”;
- ii. *ātmīyaṃ rūpaṃ bhr̥tyavat*: “matter belongs to the self like a servant”;
- iii. *rūpe ātmā bhājanavat*: “the self resides in matter like in a receptacle”.

This is the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dr̥ṣṭi*) with twenty branches and the text of *Vyutpatti*, 208.

(1–5) Five afflicted views of a self (*ātma-dr̥ṣṭis*) as above. – (6–65) Sixty afflicted views of mine (*ātmīya-dr̥ṣṭis*): conceiving matter (*rūpa*) <349> as a self (*ātman*), one conceives each of the other aggregates (*skandhas*) like:

- i. an ornament of the self;
- ii. a servant of the self;
- iii. a receptacle of the self.

Three ways of considering each of the four aggregates (excluding matter [*rūpa*]) as mine (*ātmīya*): thus, 3 x 4 = twelve afflicted views of mine when one conceives matter (*rūpa*) as a self. Likewise for the other aggregates, thus, 12 x 5 = sixty.

I am keeping the term that I have adopted on #0062, note: *fenbie* 分別 = figurated (*vikalpita*), which was opposed to innate (*sahaja*). – I noted that *Lankāvatāra* uses

the term *parikalpita* (conceptually constructed); I should have said that this is also the reading of *Vyutpatti*, 109, 36–37. – Here we have (as in the *Vikhyāpana*, #1948) *fenbie qi* 分別起 which is the “originating from conceptual construction” (*parikalpa-samutthita*) of *Vyutpatti*, 245, 1016: “which are included in the category of afflicted view (*drṣṭi*) proceeding from conceptual construction (*parikalpa*)”.

#1940 b. Afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antaḥgrāha-drṣṭi* 邊執見):

[The afflicted view of holding to an extreme is] to conceive (執) the alleged self (*ātman*)—postulated by the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*)—as being eternal (*śāśvatatas* 常), as being annihilable (*ucchedato darśanam* 斷).

This afflicted view has for its activity to hinder either (1) the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratipad* = truth of the path [*mārga-satya*]) which is between the extremes (*anta*) (處中行) of eternalism and of annihilation, or (2) the escape (*niryāṇa* 出離, *nirvāṇa*, the truth of cessation [*nirodha-satya*]).

#1941 Varieties (差別). – [Among the sixty-two (false) opinions (*drṣṭis*) (見趣), forty-seven pertain to afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antaḥgrāha-drṣṭi*), which are divided up as follows:]

- i. directed at the past (*pūrvānta-grāha* 前際), i.e., four theories of general eternality (遍常論), four of partial eternality (分常論);
- ii. directed at the future (後際), i.e., sixteen theories of existence with ideation (有想), eight of existence without ideation (無想), eight of existence neither with ideation nor without ideation (俱非), seven of annihilation (斷滅論), etc.⁶³⁹

⟨They are all categorized as originating from figurating (分別趣攝)⟩.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

All of this is according to the *Brahmajāla*, compare *Dīgha*, i, pp. 12–22, the four “eternalists” and the four “eternalist-non-eternalists”; p. 31, the sixteen existences with ideation, etc. . . .

As for the “etc.” in our text, it refers to eternal, non-eternal, etc., in the list of the non-obscured things (*avyākṛta-vastus*).

#1943 c. False view (*mithyā-drṣṭi* 邪見):

“False view” is the negation of cause (“There is no almsgiving ...”), of fruit (“There is no retribution ...”) (因果), of activity (*kriyā* 作用) (“This world does

⁶³⁹ AKB v, F 14.

not exist ...”), of realities (*vastusat* 實事) (“There is no *arhat*”), and, in addition, with the exception of the other four views (四見),⁶⁴⁰ all the false kinds of conceiving (*mithyā-grāha* 邪執). {6/15r.} This is just as when all the conditions (*pratyayas*) that are not the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*), the condition qua object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) and the condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya*) <350> are placed in the condition qua dominance (*adhipati-pratyaya* 增上緣) (#2481).

#1944 Varieties. – [Among the sixty-two <false> opinions (見趣), there are those pertaining to false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi*), which are divided up as follows:]

- i. directed at the past (前際): two theories of non-causality (無因論),⁶⁴¹ four theories on the world (有邊) as being limited, etc.,⁶⁴² four evasive statements to the questions of the immortals (*amara-vikṣepas* 不死矯亂);
- ii. directed at the future (後際): five theories of *nirvāṇa* in this life (現涅槃)⁶⁴³ which make up part of false view, for they do not proceed from the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-drṣṭi*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Dīgha, i, p. 24: *amarāvikkhepikā ... āpajjanti amarāvikkhepaṃ catuhi vatthūhi ... Sumaṅgala-vilāsini*, i, p. 115, Rhys-Davids and Stede. Kern, *Additions to Childers*, Amsterdam, 1916. – For the Chinese translators and Kuiji, it does not refer to eels,⁶⁴⁴ but to gods, whom the unfaithful believe to be eternal and who are therefore called *amara* (immortal). By answering—without beating about the bush (non-*luan*)—the questions of the immortals, one obtains rebirth among them. The expression *vikṣepa* designates the words by means of which one evades the questions. (See #2063.)

Or else, [this afflicted view is] to believe <or speculate> (計) that *Īśvara* (*īśvara-deva* 自在), the lord of the world (世主, *mahā-īśvara-deva*), Śakra (釋), *Brahmā*

⁶⁴⁰ (1) Afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*), (2) afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-drṣṭi*) and (3–4) the two esteemings (*parāmarśas*).

⁶⁴¹ *Dīgha*, i, pp. 28–29.

⁶⁴² “Extensionists” of *Dīgha*, p. 22; the text cited by Kuiji differs.

⁶⁴³ *Dīgha*, i, p. 36.

⁶⁴⁴ Editors: Maurice Walshe (*The Long Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya*, p. 541, comments to his translation “Eel-Wrigglers”: “*Amarā-vikheppikā* can be interpreted as either ‘eel-wriggling’ (Rhys Davids) or ‘endless equivocation’ (Bhikkhu Bodhi): *amarā* (lit. ‘deathless’) is the name of a slippery fish, perhaps an eel, which escapes capture by wriggling (*Dīgha* Commentary). A deliberate pun may well be intended.”

(梵) and other sentient beings of this kind are eternal and immutable (常恆不易, see #0115, #1944).

Or else, to believe ⟨or speculate⟩ that Īśvara (自在), etc., are the universal cause (一切物因).

Or else, to ⟨unreasonably⟩ accept ⟨or speculate about⟩ (計) false liberations (邪解脱).

⟨Or else,⟩ to ⟨falsely⟩ consider as being the path that which is not the path (非道為道).

These afflicted views and others (i.e., the four afflicted views about the limit of the world in the list of non-obscured things [*avyākṛtas*]) are included in false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見).⁶⁴⁵

#1945 d. *Esteeming of bad views* (*dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa* 見取):

[This afflicted view is] to consider ⟨various⟩ other false views (見) and the aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊) that serve them as their support (所依) as being excellent (*paramatas* 最勝) and as being capable to obtain purity (= *nirvāṇa*) (*śuddhitas* 清淨).

This afflicted view has for its activity (業) the providing of an occasion ⟨or support⟩ (所依) for disputes ⟨and struggles⟩ (鬥諍). {6/15v.}

#1947 e. *Overesteeming of morality and vows* (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa* 戒禁取):

[This afflicted view is] to consider ⟨morality (戒) and the⟩ vows and exercises (禁)—adopted due to these false views and the aggregates (*skandhas*) that serve them as their support—as being excellent and as being capable to obtain purity.

This view has for its activity the providing of an occasion ⟨or support⟩ (所依) for fruitless efforts and sufferings (無利勤苦). <351>

#1948 Several texts, e.g., *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0698), YBh and *Pañca-skandhaka*, say that “to consider as being excellent” is an esteeming of bad views (*dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa* 見取); “to consider as being capable to obtain purity” is overesteeming of morality and vows (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa* 戒取).

These texts are expressed in an ambiguous and laconic way (影略),⁶⁴⁶ or they follow the theory of the Little Vehicle ⟨as a concession⟩ (隨轉門).⁶⁴⁷ If their defi-

⁶⁴⁵ AKB differs, see v, F 18.

⁶⁴⁶ *yinglue shuo* 影略說. – Same expression, #2104.

⁶⁴⁷ AKB v, F 18. – ⟨As for 隨轉門, see also #1129, #1510, #1628, #1629, #1631, #2009, #2444.⟩

nitions were correct, why does YBh (T.30.1579.0624b) say that “to consider non-*nirodha* as cessation (*nirodha*), the non-path as path” is part of false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi* 邪見) and not of the two esteemings (*parāmarśas* 取)?

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Vikhyāpana (T.31.1602.0482): “The esteeming of bad views (*drṣṭi-parāmarśa*) is, in its nature, a defiled ‘understanding’ (*prajñā*) that takes the first three afflicted views (*drṣṭis*) and the aggregates (*skandhas*) that support these afflicted views to be excellent and superior (*paramatas, agratas*); it is merely originating from conceptual construction (*parikalpa-samutthita*); it has for its activity the hindering of the non-upside-down knowledge (*aviparīta-bodha*) of suffering (*duḥkha*) and of the impure (*aśuci*) ...”.

“The overesteeming of morality and vows (*śīla-vrata-parāmarśa*) is, in its nature, an ‘understanding’ (*prajñā*) that takes as pure, as liberation, as escape (*śuddhitas, vimuktitas, niḥsaraṇatas*), the first four afflicted views and the aggregates (*skandhas*) that are their support; it is merely figured; it has for its activity the hindering of non-upside-down knowledge of the aforesaid [i.e., of suffering and of the impure]”.

[According to the same source, the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*) hinders the understanding of non-self (*anātman*), and the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-drṣṭi*) hinders the understanding of impermanence (*anitya*): this is, down to the last detail, the theory of the four upside-down views (*viparyāsas*) as explained in AKB v, F 21f.]

E.D.E.1. *Issues in relation with the defilements (kleśas)*

1. *Innate (sahaja) defilements (kleśas) and figured defilements (vikalpita or parikalpita*, see #1938, also #0062, etc.).

#1952 Of the ten defilements, six are either innate (俱生) or (originating from) figurating (分別起), because they arise either spontaneously (任運) or from reflection (思察). Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and the last three afflicted views (*drṣṭis* 見) (i.e., false view [*mithyā-drṣṭi*] and the two esteemings [*parāmarśas*]) are only (originating from) figurating {6/16r.} for their arising presupposes reflection (*siccha* 思察) by way of the power of bad friends (惡友) and of false teaching (邪教) or by pondering and speculating oneself (unsupported by proper authorities) (自審思察). <352>

#1954 It is said that the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-drṣṭi* 邊執

見) is innate (俱生) or figurated.

According to one opinion, only afflicted view of annihilation (*uccheda-dṛṣṭi* 斷見) can be innate or figurated; as for (the characteristics of) the afflicted view of eternality (*sāśvata-dṛṣṭi* 常見) being coarse (麤), it arises only by the power of bad friends, etc.

YBh, 86, fol. 7 (in agreement with other sources, i.e., *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, 3 and 7), says:

Which of the afflicted views of holding to an extreme (邊執見) is innate?
– That which is included in afflicted view of annihilation (斷見). He who practices the direct realization of the truth (*satya-abhisamaya* 現觀)⁶⁴⁸ generates fear (怖) such as: “Now, where am I?”⁶⁴⁹ In the presence of hostile causes (違緣), animals (禽獸), etc., are afraid (遇) of the annihilation of the self (我斷) and give themselves over to fear (驚怖).

#1955 According to another opinion, this theory (論) of YBh is referring to the coarse characteristics (麤相) of the afflicted view (*dṛṣṭi*). Indeed, the afflicted view of eternality (*sāśvata-dṛṣṭi* 常見) can also be innate (俱生). – Conceiving the self as eternal, animals, etc., feverishly accumulate (聚集) provisions (資具) for a long period of time. {6/16v.} – Hence, the *Vikhyāpana* (顯揚 T.31.1602.0482a18) (and other treatises) (in agreement with YBh, T.30.1579.0621b11) say that “taking the five aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas* 取蘊) as being eternal or supposing that they are annihilable (執斷計常) is afflicted view that is either innate (俱生) or originating from figurating” (分別起).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Vikhyāpana (T.31.1602.0482a18) states: “The afflicted view of holding on to an extreme (*antagrāha-dṛṣṭi*) is, in its nature, a defiled “understanding” (*prajñā*) that takes the aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandhas*) as eternal, as annihilable, either innate or “originating from conceptual construction” (*parikalpa-samutthita*); it has for its activity the hindering of the correct knowledge of impermanence ...”. – On

⁶⁴⁸ AKB vi, F 185.

⁶⁴⁹ It seems that the meaning is: “Where is my self?”, wowo 我我: *me attā* (cf. the story of Vacchagotta: *ahū vā me nūna pubbe attā | so etarahi natthīti*, *Samyutta*, iv, p. 401). – Kuiji, *Shuji* 6B/31r.: “Seeing the abandoning of the self (*ātman*), they know that the body will cease to exist”. – According to the interlinear gloss of Saeki Kyokuga, the first wo 我 is the innate self (*sahaja-ātman*), the second is the figurated self (*vikalpita-ātman*).

the other hand, the last two afflicted views (*dr̥ṣṭis*) are only “originating from conceptual construction” (*parikalpa-samutthita*).

#1957 2. Association of the ten defilements (*kleśas*) amongst each other (*Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0723a23):

#1957 〈Which and how many of these ten defilements are associated?〉

#1960 a. Attachment (*rāga* 貪) certainly does not occur 〈simultaneously〉 with hostility (*pratigha* 瞋), with doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑), for the objects loved and hated (愛憎) are certainly not the same (不同), for there can be no defiled attachment (染著) toward an object that is not “certain” (*niścita*).

#1961 Attachment can be associated (相應) [i] with conceit (*māna* 慢) and [ii] with the five afflicted views (*dr̥ṣṭis* 見).

i. The loved object (所愛) is not the same (非一) as the despised object (所陵). [If one loves another, <353> one does not despise another.] Thus, it is said that attachment does not occur simultaneously (俱起) with conceit.

〈The defiled object (所染)〉, i.e., the loved object can, however, be the same (同) as the esteemed object (所恃): thus, it is said that attachment can be associated with conceit.

ii. There is no difficulty in attachment being associated with the five afflicted views, for one can love the object of the five afflicted views.

#1963 b. Hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) can occur simultaneously (俱起) [i] with conceit (*māna* 慢) and [ii] with doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑).

i. The hated object (所瞋) is not the same (非一) as the esteemed object (所恃): {6/17r.} thus, it is said that hostility is not associated (相應) with conceit.

The despised object (所蔑) can, however, be the same (同) as the hated object (所憎): thus, it is said that hostility can occur simultaneously with conceit.

ii. At the beginning, one has no hate (憎) for the object about which one is uncertain (猶豫); thus, it is said that hostility does not occur simultaneously with doubt.

But when one’s examination 〈or thought-process〉 (思) continues without arriving at certainty, one gets irritated (憤發): thus, it is said that hostility can be associated with doubt.

And again, hostility is or is not associated with doubt according to whether the uncertain object is favorable or unfavorable (順違事).

#1964 Hostility is certainly not associated with the two esteemings (*parāmarśas* 取), for one does not at all hate (憎) the object that is considered as excellent (勝) and as making up part of the path (道).

#1965 Hostility can be associated with the first three afflicted views (*drṣṭis*).

One does not arouse hate (憎) when, with reference to the aggregates (*skandhas*) of happiness (樂蘊), one conceives the views of a self (*ātman*) and of eternity; thus, in this case, it is said that hostility is not associated (相應) with the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi* 身見) and with the afflicted views of eternity (*śāśvata-drṣṭi* 常見).

The opposite when the reference is to the aggregates (*skandhas*) of suffering (苦蘊), (i.e., one does arouse hate (憎恚) when—with reference to the aggregates of suffering—one conceives the views of a self and of eternity; thus, in this case, it is said that hostility can occur simultaneously with the afflicted view of self, with the afflicted of eternity).

As for the afflicted view of annihilation (*uccheda-drṣṭi* 斷見), the reverse, (i.e., it is said that hostility may or may not occur simultaneously with it,) [for one rejoices at the thought of the annihilation of the aggregates of suffering, and one is distressed and irritated at the thought of the annihilation of the aggregates of happiness].

As for false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi* 邪見)—according to whether it denies disagreeable or agreeable things {6/17v.}—hostility (*pratigha*) is not or is, respectively, accompanied by it.

#1967 c. Conceit (*māna* 慢) is not associated with doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑), for the object [of conceit] must be certain.

#1968 Conceit can occur simultaneously with the five afflicted views (*drṣṭis*), for the modes of operation (*ākāra* 行相) of these mental factors (*caittas*) are not contradictory.

Nevertheless, conceit does certainly not arise simultaneously with the afflicted view of annihilation (*uccheda-drṣṭi* 斷見), for, when one believes in the annihilation of self (我斷), one neither despises others nor esteems oneself (陵恃).

#1969 Likewise, conceit is not associated with one part of the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-drṣṭi* 身見) and of false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi* 邪見). <354> [Conceit, as a general rule, has the aggregates (*skandhas*) of happiness for its object; the afflicted view of self of the damned has the aggregates of suffering for its object:

conceit is not associated with this latter afflicted view of self]⁶⁵⁰

#1970 d. Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑), being uncertainty (不審決), is contradictory to afflicted view (*drṣṭi* 見); thus, it does definitively not occur simultaneously with the five afflicted views.

#1971 e. The five afflicted views (*drṣṭis*) are certainly not associated amongst each other, for two ⟨or many⟩ understandings (*prajñās* 慧) cannot be associated with a single mind.

#1972 f. Delusion (*moha* 癡) is definitively associated with the [other] nine kinds (*vidhās*) [of defilements], for all defilements certainly arise due to delusion. {6/18r.}

#1973 3. Association of the ten defilements (*kleśas*) and the eight cognitions (*vijñānas*):
⟨How are these ten defilements associated with the cognitions?⟩

The eighth cognition (藏識) is not associated with any of the ten defilements.

The seventh cognition (末那) is associated with four defilements (see #1278).

The mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) can be associated with all ten [defilements].

The five cognitions (五識) [can] only be associated with three [defilements]: [a] attachment (*rāga* 貪), [b] hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) and [c] delusion (*moha* 癡), because they are without figurating (*vikalpa* 分別), [i.e., the figurating consisting of recollecting (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*) and the figurating consisting of examining (*nirūpaṇā-vikalpa*) (see #2200) are absent in them]: thus, they necessarily lack conceit (*māna*), etc., which arise from comparison (稱量, *tulanā* ?), etc.

#1975 4. Defilements (*kleśas*) and sensations (*vedanās* 受) [AKB v, F 95]:

⟨How are the ten defilements associated with the sensations?⟩

#1978 Three, i.e., attachment (*rāga* 貪), hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) and delusion (*moha* 癡), being innate or figured, can be associated with five sensations, for attachment (貪), in the presence of a hostile object (違緣), is simultaneous with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) (in the realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*]) and with displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦), for hostility (瞋), in the presence of a favorable object (順境) (“to see his enemy dead ...”), is associated with satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜) and with pleasure (*sukha* 樂).

#1980 According to one opinion, conceit (*māna* 慢), being innate (俱生) or originating

⁶⁵⁰ Kuiji, *Shuji* 6B/36v.

from figurating (分別起), can be associated with four sensations (*vedanās* 受) with the exception of displeasure (*duḥkha*), for when one relies on (恃) something that is suffering or vile (苦劣蘊) (one's own "me"), one experiences or is associated with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂).

#1981 According to another opinion, innate conceit (*māna*) can also occur simultaneously with displeasure (*duḥkha*), for we have seen that mind (*manas* 意) can have the sensation (*vedanā*) of displeasure (#1594, #1611).

#1982 The figured (分別) conceit (*māna* 慢), attachment (*rāga*), hostility (*pratigha*), delusion (*moha*), doubt (*vicikitsā*) and false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi*) {6/18v} are absent in the destinies <355> of pure suffering (純苦趣), for the false teacher (邪師), the false teaching (邪教), false personal reasoning, etc., are absent there. Also, in these destinies one does not perform any action that generates a bad destiny (引惡趣業), for [defilements] "⟨originating from⟩ figurating (*vikalpa*)" (分別起) are needed for the accomplishment of such actions.

#1983 Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and the last three afflicted views (*drṣṭis*) can be associated with four sensations (*vedanās*), with the exception of displeasure (*duḥkha*) (because, in hell, there is no figured defilement), for, in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲), uncertainty ⟨or doubt⟩ about the existence of suffering (*duḥkha* 苦), of the origin (*samudaya*), etc., can be associated with satisfaction (*saumanasya*) (喜受俱).

The two esteemings (*parāmarśas* 取) are associated with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) when they are directed at afflicted views (and the adjoining aggregates [*skandhas*]) that are associated with dissatisfaction (緣憂俱見).

#1985 According to one opinion, the afflicted views (*drṣṭis*) of the self (*sat-kāya* 身見) and of holding to an extreme (*anta-grāha* 邊見), when being innate (俱生), are associated only with satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜受), pleasure (*sukha* 樂受) and neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨受), for they are not associated with the five cognitions (*vijñānas*) (thus, displeasure [*duḥkha*] is absent), for they are exclusively non-defined (無記) (thus, dissatisfaction [*daurmanasya*] is absent).

When they are figured (分別), these two afflicted views can be associated with four sensations (*vedanās*), by adding dissatisfaction, for conceiving the aggregates (*skandhas*) of suffering as self (*ātman*), as mine (*ātmīya*) (i.e., afflicted view of self [*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*]), as eternal (i.e., *śāśvata-drṣṭi* 常見), includes dissatisfaction (憂); whereas conceiving them as annihilable (i.e., *uccheda-drṣṭi* 斷見) includes satisfaction.

- #1986 According to another opinion, these two afflicted views (*dr̥ṣṭis*), when being innate, {6/19r.} can also be associated with displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦受), for, in places of pure suffering (純受苦處), being directed at the very painful aggregates (*skandhas*) (緣極苦蘊), they are associated with displeasure (苦).

YBh (T.30.1579.0627c18) says:

All the innate defilements (*kleśas*) can manifest (現行) in company with three sensations (*vedanās*), i.e., displeasure (*duḥkha*), pleasure (*sukha*), neutral sensation (*upekṣā*),

and the rest [of YBh], as above, #1594, #1612.

For the rest [of the explanation regarding the two afflicted views, see the explanation of] the first masters.

- #1988 All the preceding is the correct doctrine (or meaning) (實義). By considering coarse characteristics (麤相):

- attachment (*rāga* 貪), conceit (*māna* 慢) and four afflicted views (*dr̥ṣṭis* 見) (except false view [*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi*]) are associated with pleasure (*sukha* 樂), satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜) and neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨);
- hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) occurs simultaneously only with displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦), dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) and neutral sensation (捨);
- delusion (*moha* 癡) <356> can be associated with all five sensations (*vedanās*);
- false view (*mithyā-dr̥ṣṭi* 邪見) and doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) are associated with four sensations, excluding displeasure.

- #1989 Pleasure (*sukha* 樂) associated with attachment (*rāga* 貪) and delusion (*moha* 癡) occurs (throughout (通)) the four lower stages (下四地) (i.e., realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*] and three meditations [*dhyānas*]).

Pleasure associated with the other seven defilements (*kleśas*) occurs in three meditations (*dhyānas*) (but not in the realm of desire) (for these defilements are of the domain of mind; for mental cognition [*mano-vijñāna* 意識], in the realm of desire, does not have “pleasure” [*sukha* 樂受; T.43.1830.0452b18; #1602]).

Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and isolated delusion (*moha*) (i.e., *kevala-cārīṇī avidyā*, 獨行癡, #1445), in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲), are associated (only) with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) and neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨).

The other cases of simultaneous occurrence of defilements and of sensations

(*vedanās*) should be solved according to the same principles (理應知).

5. Association of the ten defilements (*kleśas*) and of the five mental factors (*caittas*) called “special” (別境) (see #1668):

#1991 <How {6/19v.} are these [defilements] associated with the special mental factors?>

#1992 Attachment (*rāga* 貪), hostility (*pratigha* 瞋), delusion (*moha* 癡) and conceit (*māna* 慢) can occur simultaneously with the <five> special mental factors, for, when they “apply themselves focusedly” (專注, cf. #1708) to an object, they include concentration (*samādhi* 定).

Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and the five afflicted views (*drṣṭis* 五見) can <each> be associated with four special mental factors:

a. as for doubt (疑), one has to exclude resolve (*adhimokṣa* 勝解) because doubt is uncertain;

b. as for afflicted views (見), one has to exclude understanding (*prajñā* 慧), <i.e., it is not associated with understanding>, for <[afflicted view] is not different from understanding, and> two understandings cannot occur simultaneously.

6. Ethical nature (性) of the ten defilements (*kleśas*):⁶⁵¹

#1994 <To what ethical nature do these ten defilements belong?>

#1996 a. Hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) is exclusively bad (*akuśala*) because it harms oneself and others.

b. The other <nine> are bad or obscured-non-defined (*nivṛta-avyākṛta*).

#1997 In the two higher realms (*dhātus* 界), [the other nine defilements] are just non-defined (無記), whether they are innate or figured, because they are “tamed” (伏) by concentration.

In the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界):

i. when they are originating from figuring (分別起), they are merely bad because they generate bad conduct (*duṣcarita* 惡行);

ii. when they are innate (俱生), they are also bad in the case where they generate bad conduct because they harm oneself and others (損自他);

iii. when this is not the case (—i.e., afflicted view of self [*sat-kāya-drṣṭi*]; afflicted view of holding to an extreme [*antagrāha-drṣṭi*]; one part of attachment [*rāga*], delusion [*moha*], conceit [*māna*]—), they are non-defined (無記) because

⁶⁵¹ AKB v, F 40.

they are subtle, because they do not hinder the good and because they do not greatly torment <357> oneself and others (非極損惱自他處). {6/20r.}

When being innate (俱生), the two afflicted views, i.e., the afflicted view of self (身見) and the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (邊見), are both exclusively non-defined (無記): they do not provoke bad action (惡業); even though they manifest (現起) frequently, they do not hinder the good.

#1999 7. The ten defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) and the realms (*dhātus* 界) (see #2654):

⟨In what realms do these ten defilements belong?⟩

a. Hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) ⟨exists⟩ only in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲);⁶⁵² the others, in the three realms.

#2002 b. The defilements of the higher stage (上地煩惱) do not manifest (現) in the person who has been born in and resides in (*viḥar*) a lower stage (下地), who has not abandoned the lower defilement (下染). In order for them to manifest in that person, it is necessary for him to have obtained the “root” concentration (*mūla-samādhi* 根本定) of the higher stage.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Every stage of concentration includes a preliminary stage (preparatory meditation [*anāgamyā*], or rather, preliminary concentration [*sāmantaka*]), AKB viii, F 179; vi, F 135–136.

#2003 Although the “impure” or “mundane” (*sāsrava* 有漏, *laukika*, #2667) paths are not capable to “tame” (伏) (1) the proclivities (*anuśayas*) (or defilements [*kleśas*]) originating from figurating (*parikalpa-samutthita*) (分別起惑) [i.e., defilements to be abandoned by insight into the truths (*darśana-heyā-kleśas*)], nor (2) the innate subtle proclivities (細俱生惑) [i.e., defilements to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-kleśas*)] [i.e., the afflicted view of self [*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*]] and the afflicted view of holding to an extreme [*antaṅgrāha-dṛṣṭi*]], nevertheless, they are capable of taming (伏除) the innate coarse proclivities (俱生麤惑) in such a way that gradually (by successively attacking the nine degrees of defilements) the fundamental higher concentration is obtained, (i.e., realized) (證得).

#2004 Those coarse proclivities (*anuśayas*) (i.e., attachment [*rāga*], hatred [*dveṣa*], delusion [*moha*]) involve only error about “things” (迷事) (*vastu*; see “defilements having a real object” [*savastuka-kleśas*], #2040), not about “principles” (or truths).

⁶⁵² AKB v, F 12.

They function outwardly (in contrast to attachments, etc., which function inwardly [依外門轉], taking the afflicted views [*dr̥ṣṭis*], etc., for their object, and which are of the “defilements abandoned by insight” [*darśana-kleśa*] category).

They are of the order of “distraction” (*vikṣipta*), coarse and unstable (*audārika, cañcala*). Thus, they hinder concentration (障定) directly. [Thus, it is by “taming” them that the practitioner obtains concentration.] {6/20v.}

#2005 When the person who has been born in and resides in a lower stage has obtained <358> the concentration of the higher stage, all the innate and figured proclivities (*anusāyas*) of that stage (分別俱生諸惑) come into play (現前).

#2007 c. The innate or figured defilements (*kleśas*) of a lower stage can manifest (現起) in a person born in and residing in a higher stage.

#2008 Indeed, (1) an individual born in the intermediate existence (*antarā-bhava* 中有) of the fourth meditation (*dhyāna* 第四定) is reborn in hell if the individual denies liberation (*vimukti* 解脫); (2) the individual residing in a higher stage generates—when the time comes for that particular individual to be reborn below—an innate thirst (*tṛṣṇā* 俱生愛) for a lower stage which “moistens” the birth (潤生) (#2623).

#2009 The texts say that an individual born above does not generate the defilement of below, but this statement is directed at the majority of cases (多分); or else, it is given in conformity with (or as a concession to) the views of the Little Vehicle (隨轉門) (AKB viii, F 164f.).

#2012 d. The defilements (*kleśas*) of a lower stage can also take (緣) a higher stage⁶⁵³ for their object. Indeed:

i. YBh (T.30.1789.0645c), in agreement with other texts, says:

Attachment (*rāga* 貪) of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界)—of both classes (i.e., to be abandoned by insight [*darśana-heya*], to be abandoned by cultivation [*bhāvanā-heya*])—aspires to a rebirth in a higher stage (求上地生) in order to savor the delights in the higher concentration (味上定).

ii. Since it says (T.30.1789.0624b) that hostility (*pratigha* 瞋恚) hates and envies (憎嫉) cessation (*nirodha* 滅) and the path (*mārga* 道),⁶⁵⁴ thus, all the more so does it also hate and envy (憎嫉) {6/21r.} the stages of detachment (*vītarāga* 離欲地).

⁶⁵³ Compare AKB v, F 33.

⁶⁵⁴ AKB v, F 36 differs.

iii. The afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*) which, in general, conceives (執) all conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas* 諸行) as a self (*ātman*) and as mine (*ātmīya*), the afflicted view of eternity (*śāśvata-dṛṣṭi* 常), the afflicted view of annihilation (*uccheda-dṛṣṭi* 斷) and conceit (*māna* 慢) are ⟨all⟩ directed at the higher stage (緣上).

iv. As for the other five defilements, i.e., delusion (*moha*), doubt (*vicikitsā*), false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*) and two esteemings (*parāmarśas*), it is well established that they are directed at the higher stage (緣上).

#2013 However, it is said⁶⁵⁵ that attachment (*rāga* 貪), hostility (*pratigha* 瞋), conceit (*māna* 慢) and afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*) are not directed at the higher stage. But these statements refer to the defilements that consider the coarse characteristics (麤相)⁶⁵⁶ or refer to the afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) which, being directed in particular (別緣) at the individual itself, is not directed at the higher stage: one does not observe that people (世間) seize (執) the *dharma*s of another stage (他地法) as a self (*ātman*), etc.; and the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-dṛṣṭi* 邊見) necessarily arises by relying on the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi* 身見) (the afflicted view of a self [*ātma-dṛṣṭi*]). <359>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Vibhāṣā (T.27.1545.0093a05): “The afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*) and the afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antagrāha-dṛṣṭi*) seize only their own realm (*dhātu*) for their object. Why do these two afflicted views (*dṛṣṭis*) not seize another realm for their object (緣他界)? ...

They consider only the coarse *dharma*s (麤法). It is only the coarse and apparent aggregates (*skandhas*), immediately perceived (現見, same expression above, #0374), which are seized as a self (*ātman*), which are seized to be eternal. Born in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界), one does not immediately perceive the aggregates of the higher realms which are subtle ...

#2015 e. The defilements (*kleśas*) of a higher stage are also directed at the lower stage:

i. YBh (T.30.1579.0629b) says that the individual born above esteems his own eminent qualities (恃己勝德) by comparison with the lower sentient beings, and despises (陵) the lower sentient beings.

#2016 ii. The afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*) that considers the conditioning forces

⁶⁵⁵ *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0723a; YBh, 58, fol. 9.

⁶⁵⁶ *Vibhāṣā*, 18, fol. 18.

(*saṃskāras* 行), in general, as a self (*ātman*) and as mine (*ātmīya*), [and, following it,] the afflicted view of annihilation (*uccheda-dṛṣṭi* 斷), the afflicted view of eternality (*śāśvata-dṛṣṭi* 常) and “thirst” (*trṣṇā* 愛) are all) directed at the lower stage. Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and the last three afflicted views (*dṛṣṭis* 見), which are only figured, should be solved in accordance with the same principles.

#2017 However, YBh (¶30.1579.0622a) {6/21v.} says that the higher proclivities (*anuśayas* 上) are not directed at the lower stage (下): this statement is aimed at the majority of cases (多分); or else, it is aimed at the afflicted view of self (*sat-kāya-dṛṣṭi*), etc., that have a limited object (別緣).

#2018 8. Defilements (*kleśas*) and the categories of the trainee (*śaikṣa* 學), etc.:

⟨To what categories of the trainee, etc., do the ten defilements belong?⟩

The defilements are only of the “neither trainee nor non-trainee” (*naiva-śaikṣa-na-aśaikṣa* 非學無學) category, for the two other categories are exclusively good.

#2020 9. Abandoning (所斷) the defilements (*kleśas*):

⟨How are these ten defilements to be abandoned?⟩

#2022 The defilements are not “not to be abandoned” (*aheya* 非所斷), because the category “not to be abandoned” is non-defiled (非染).

#2024 Defilements originating from figuring (分別起) are only “to be abandoned by insight” (*darśana-heya* 見所斷), because they are coarse (麤) and easy to abandon (易斷).

Innate (俱生) defilements are only “to be abandoned by cultivation” (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷), because they are subtle (細) and difficult to abandon (難斷).

#2027 The ten defilements to be abandoned by insight (見所斷) are abandoned all at once (頓斷) because the path of insight into reality (*bhūta-darśana-mārga* 真見道) (#2929) is directed at the truths as a whole (總緣諦) (precisely, at the suchness of the four truths [*catuḥ-satya-tathatā*]).⁶⁵⁷ <360>

#2029 However, error in regard to the “characteristics of the truths” (*satya-lakṣaṇa-bhṛānti* 迷諦相) is either [a] general (總) or [b] particular (別):

a. General (總): in the sense that the ten defilements include every error in regard to the four truths (四諦) and do not arise without this error; suffering (*duḥkha* 苦) and its origin (*samudaya* 集) are the cause (*hetu* 因) and the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna* 依處) of the defilements; cessation (*nirodha* 滅) and the path (*mārga*

⁶⁵⁷ Kuiji, *Shuji* 6B/56v.4.

道) are the danger (*bhaya-sthāna* 怖畏處) for the defilements.

#2031 b. Particular (別): {6/22x.} in the sense that the defilements include, in particular ways (別), an error in regard to the “characteristics of the truths”. Two [defilements] (i.e., afflicted view of self [*sāt-kāya-dṛṣṭi* 身見] and afflicted view of holding on to an extreme [*antaḡrāha-dṛṣṭi* 邊見]) include an error only in regard to suffering (*duḥkha* 苦);⁶⁵⁸ eight [defilements] include an error in regard to all four truths. Indeed, these two afflicted views (*dṛṣṭis*) are solely directed at the fruit (果處) (which is suffering); and the modes of operation (*ākāra*) of emptiness (空) and non-self (非我)⁶⁵⁹ refer to suffering (苦諦).

#2034 Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and three afflicted views (見) (i.e., afflicted view of self [*sāt-kāya-dṛṣṭi*], afflicted view of holding on to an extreme [*antaḡrāha-dṛṣṭi*] and false view [*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*]) [include] a direct error (親迷) in regard to suffering (*duḥkha* 苦理).

The two esteemings (*parāmarśas* 二取)—i.e., considering the above three afflicted views (*dṛṣṭis* 三見), morality and vows (*śīla-vratas* 戒禁) and the concomitant aggregates (*skandhas* 蘊) as excellent and as purifiers (*paramatas*, *śuddhitas* 勝能淨)—generate, respectively, (1) attachment (*rāga* 貪), (2) hostility (*pratigha* 恚) and (3) conceit (*māna* 慢) (1) toward the views belonging to the individual in question (於自), (2) toward the views of another (於他), (3) toward the aggregates (*skandhas*) that accompany the first and the second (於彼眷屬).

“Associated” (*saṃprayuktā* 相應) ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) [includes] the same error (迷) as the nine defilements with which it occurs associated.

“Isolated” (*āveṇikī* 不共) ignorance (see #1445) [includes] a direct error (親迷) in regard to suffering (*duḥkha* 苦理).

Doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見) [include] a direct error (親迷) in regard to the origin (*samudaya* 集), cessation (*nirodha*) and the path (*mārga*).

The two esteemings (*parāmarśas* 二取), attachment (*rāga* 貪), etc., should be understood as above, (i.e., in regard to suffering (苦)).

However, hostility (*pratigha* 瞋), seizing the pure (*anāsrava*) as its object, [includes] a direct error (親迷) in regard to cessation (*nirodha* 滅) and the path (*mārga* 道), for, out of fear (怖畏) for the one or the other, irritation (and envy)

⁶⁵⁸ AKB v, F 11.

⁶⁵⁹ AKB vii, F 31.

(憎嫉) are generated.

#2035 Such is the direct (親) or indirect (疏) error in regard to the truths (迷諦), {6/22v}, when considering the coarse characteristics (麤相).

#2036 When examining in a subtle way (委細), attachment (*rāga* 貪) and conceit (*māna* 慢) associated with the first three afflicted views (*dr̥ṣṭis* 見) and hostility (*pratigha* 瞋) associated with doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) include, as the case may be, directly or indirectly an error in regard to the truths. <361>

#2038 Two innate afflicted views (俱生二見) (i.e., of a self [*sat-kāya*] and of holding to an extreme [*antagrāha*]), and thirst (*tr̥ṣṇā* 愛), conceit (*māna* 慢) and ignorance (*avidyā* 無明) which are associated with them, even though they include an error in regard to suffering (*duḥkha* 苦諦), are nevertheless—being subtle and difficult to abandon (細難斷)—abandoned by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga* 修道).

#2039 Hostility (*pratigha*) and thirst (*tr̥ṣṇā*), etc., that are different from the preceding ones (i.e., thirst [*tr̥ṣṇā*] and conceit [*māna*] “not” associated with the two afflicted views [*dr̥ṣṭis*], along with the ignorance [*avidyā*] associated with them), include an error in regard to various objects and do not contradict the understanding of the truths: they are thus to be abandoned by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*).

#2040 10. Defilements (*kleśas*) called *savastuka* (having a real object) and *avastuka* (not having a real object):

Although all the defilements have an image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分), nevertheless, the archetype (質) of this image (*nimitta*) may either exist or not (*Siddhi* F 18f., #2468), whence the distinction between the defilements (煩惱) “having a real object” (*savastuka* 緣有事) and the defilements “not having a real object” (*avastuka* 緣無事).⁶⁶⁰

#2041 11. Defilements with impure (*sāsrava*) or pure (*anāsrava*) object:

Although the immediate (親) object (*nimitta* 所緣) is always impure (有漏), nevertheless, the archetype (質) of this object can also be pure (無漏), whence the distinction between the defilements “with pure object” (緣無漏煩惱) and the defilements “with impure object” (緣有漏煩惱).

#2042 12. Defilements related to a real object (*vastu*) and to a name (*nāman*):

When the defilement is directed at *dharma*s of the stage to which a certain per-

⁶⁶⁰ Compare AKB vi, F 257; vii, F 87; *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0723a).

son belongs, the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) of this defilement is similar to (似) the archetype: {6/23r.} this defilement is then called *parikalpa-samutthita-vastu-viṣaya-pratyaya* (緣分別所起事境), that is, “being directed at an object that is a thing originating from figurating”.

When the defilement is directed at cessation (*nirodha* 滅諦), path (*mārga* 道諦), i.e., the *dharma*s of another stage (他地), the image-part (相分) is not similar to the archetype (質): this defilement is thus called *parikalpa-samutthita-nāma-viṣaya-pratyaya* (緣分別所起名境), “being directed at an object that is a name originating from figurating”.

- #2043 13. The other topics (餘門分別) (i.e., retribution, fluxes [*āsravas*], envelopments [*pariyavasthānas*], etc.) are to be considered in accordance with reason. <362>

E.D.F. *Subsidiary defilements (upakleśas)*⁶⁶¹

- #2045 We have studied (the characteristics of) the six root (根本) defilements (*kleśas*). What are (the characteristics of) the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱)?

- #2046 Vasubandhu lists them. The stanzas 12b–14d (Chin. 12c–14b) say:

krodha-upanahane punaḥ | 12b
mrakṣaḥ pradāśa īrṣyā-atha mātsaryaṃ saha māyayā || 12cd
śāṭhyaṃ mado vihiṃsā-hrīr atrapā styānam uddhavaḥ |
āśraddhyaṃ atha kauśīdyaṃ pramādo muṣitā smṛtiḥ || 13
vikṣepo 'saṃprajanyam ca ... | 14a
... upakleśāḥ || 14d

隨煩惱謂忿・恨覆惱嫉慳・ || 12cd

誑諂與害憍・無慚及無愧・ |

掉舉與昏沈・不信并懈怠・ || 13

放逸及失念・散亂不正知・ | 14ab

- 12cd. The subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) are called: (1) anger (*krodha* 忿), (2) enmity (*upanāha* or *upanahana* 恨), (3) concealment (*mrakṣa* 覆), (4) furiousness (*pradāśa* 惱), (5) envy (*īrṣyā* 嫉), (6) avarice (*mātsarya* 慳),

13. (7) <deceit (*māyā* 誑), (8) dissimulation (*śāṭhya* 諂)>, along with (與) (9) harmfulness (*vihiṃsā* 害), (10) pride (*mada* 憍), (11) non-modesty

⁶⁶¹ See *Siddhi* F 259–263; *kārikās* 12c–14a.

(*ahrī* or *āhrīkya* 無慚) and (及) (12) shamelessness (*atrapā* or *anapa-trāpya* 無愧), (13) restlessness (*uddhava* or *auddharya* 掉舉), along with (與) (14) languor (*styāna* 惛沈), (15) non-faith (*āsraddhā* or *āsradhya* 不信) and (并) (16) slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠),

- 14ab. (17) heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸) and (及) (18) impaired memory (*muṣitā smṛti* or *muṣita-smṛtitā*, *smṛti-moṣa* 失念), (19) distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂), (20) lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya* 不正知).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

We are following the edition of Xuanzang who places [dissimulation (*śāṭhya*) before deceit (*māyā*)], and who lists twenty subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*). But he departs from Vasubandhu who, indeed, says [in stanza 14 of his *Thirty Stanzas*]:

*vikṣepo 'samprajanyaṃ ca kaukrtyaṃ middham eva ca |
vitarkaś ca vicāraś cety upakleśā dvaye dvidhā ||*

... distraction (*vikṣepa*), lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya*), regret (*kaukrtya*) and drowsiness (*middha*), initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*): these are the subsidiary defilements [i.e., the twenty-four subsidiary defilements of the *Dharma-saṃgrāha*, 69]; however, the two pairs (i.e., regret and drowsiness, initial inquiry and investigation) are or are not subsidiary defilements.

See #1303 and #2156.

[The *Abhidharma* does not have very clear theories. The list of *Vibhaṅga*, p. 357, begins with the eight subsidiary defilements of the *Abhidharma*.]

#2049 The Treatise:

The SUBSIDIARY DEFILEMENTS (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) are called <so>, i.e., *upakleśas*:

a. because they are only particular states (i.e., particular modalities [*avasthā-viśeṣa* 分位差別]) of the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱); these are the ten that begin with anger (*krodha*) (1–10), impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā*) (18), lack of proper discernment (*asamprajanya*) (20), heedlessness (*pramāda*) (17);

b. because they are, <in their nature,> <363> the outflow (*niṣyanda* 等流性) of the defilements; [these are the other subsidiary defilements that have a nature separate from the defilements but which arise due to the defilements]. {6/23v.} (See #1303, #1907.)

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB v, F 88. – The subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) are thus called *citta-upakleśanāt* (= *citta-kliṣṭa-karaṇāt*). – They are neighbors of the defilement (*kleśa*), or the defilement is their neighbor (*kleśasamīparūpāḥ | kleśo vā samīpavarty eṣām*). – See #2112.

#2050 These twenty [subsidiary defilements] are divided into three categories (種類):

- i. “small subsidiary defilements” (*parūta-upakleśa* 小隨煩惱), namely, the ten that begin with anger (*krodha* 忿), for they each arise separately (別起);
- ii. “medium subsidiary defilements” (*madhya-upakleśa* 中隨煩惱), namely, non-modesty (*āhṛīkya* 無慚) and shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*), which occur in every bad (*akuśala* 不善) mind;
- iii. “great subsidiary defilements” (*mahā-upakleśa* 大隨煩惱), namely, the other eight which indeed occur in every defiled (*kliṣṭa*) mind (遍染心). [See #1306, #2116.]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See above, #1306–#1349. – Compare the factors of defilement of restricted scope (*parūta-kleśa-bhūmikas*) of AKB ii, F 164:

krodhopanāhaśāṭhyerṣyāpradāśamrakṣamatsarāḥ |
māyāmadavihiṃsāś ca

- (1) Anger (*krodha*), (2) enmity (*upanāha*), (3) dissimulation (*śāṭhya*), (4) envy (*īrṣya*), (5) depraved opinionatedness (*pradāśa*), (6) concealment (*mrakṣa*), (7) avarice (*mātsārya*), (8) deceit (*māyā*), (9) pride (*mada*), (10) harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*), etc.

#2053 1. What is ANGER (*krodha*; 忿)?

It is, in its nature (性), irritation (*āghāta* 憤發) based on an actual offensive object (*anupakāra* 不饒益) [i.e., a thing seen or heard; a living being, another's opinion].

It has for its activity (業) to hinder non-anger (*akrodha* 不忿 which is non-hatred [*adveṣa*]), to cause one to “take up the stick” (*daṇḍa-ādāna* 執仗). [Example of moderate physical violence: also generating vocal violence; see #2060.]

Indeed, the person who is angry (懷忿者) generates many wicked (暴) and bad (惡) physical actions (*kāya-vijñapti-karman* 身表業).

Anger is, thus, in itself (體), (one) part (*aṃśa*) of hostility (*pratigha* 瞋恚: also hatred [*dveṣa*], malice [*vyāpada*], hostility [*pradveṣa*]), for, outside of this defilement (*kleśa*), anger has no characteristic (相) or activity (用) of its own.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

On anger (*krodha*), etc., see *Vyākhyā* (WOG.494.14ff.) in AKB v, F 90 (in footnote: English summary):

vyāpādavihiṃsāvarjitaḥ sattvāsattvayor āghātaḥ krodhaḥ. <364>

[Anger, the irritation of thought concerned with living beings and non-living things; an irritation distinct from malice and harmfulness".]

sattvaviṣaye āghātaviśeṣo vyāpādaḥ | amī bhavantaḥ sattvā haryantām (haryati, to threaten, Dhātupāṭha) vā badhyantām vā śīryantām vā anayena vyasanaṃ āpadyantām ityākārapravṛtto vyāpādaḥ.

sattvākarṣaṇasaṃtrāsatarjanādikarmapravṛttā vihiṃsā.

tābhyām anyañ sattvāsattvayor āghātaḥ krodhaḥ | tadyathā śikṣakamasya bhikṣoḥ ciitprakopaḥ kaṇṭakādiṣu ca prakopa iti.

["Malice" (*vyāpāda*) manifests through curses or malediction: "May they perish, may they die at a bad hour!"]

"Harmfulness" (*vihiṃsā*) manifests through bad treatment, threat, etc.

"Anger" (*krodha*) differs from the preceding ones: this is an irritation against people and things, for example, the discontent of a *bhikṣu* who wishes that one would instruct him (?) or the discontent toward thorns, etc.]

Distinction between anger (*krodha*) and enmity (*upanāha*), in *Samghabhadra*, 54, fol. 16. – Clearly indicated in the *Samuccaya-śāstra*, the *Trentaine*, and the AKB v, F 92, where one can read that enmity is, "the repeated initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*), the 'being tied up with animosity' (*vaira-anubandha*: perseverance in aversion), the non-abandonment (= non-forgiveness) with regard to the object of anger".

In AKB, harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*) and enmity (*upanāha*) are defilement taints (*kleśa-malas*), i.e., "taints coming from the defilement (*kleśa*) (here, hostility [*pratigha*]), like impure things (*mala*) coming out of the body".

Sthiramati, Trentaine F 30 (14b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

tatra krodho, vartamānam apakāram āgamyā, yaś cetasa āghātaḥ |

Anger (*krodha*) is irritation or fury (*āghāta*) of the mind, when one has experienced a present (*vartamāna*) insult (*apakāra*).

ayañ cāghāta-svarūpatvāt pratighāṃ na bhidyate | kiṃ tv asya pratighasyāvasthā-viśeṣe prajñaptatvāt pratighāṃśikāḥ |

Since it is irritation in its nature (*āghāta-svarūpatva*), it is not different (*aviśeṣa*) from hostility (*pratigha*), but since a particular state of hostility is named in such a way, it is thus part of hostility.

vartamānam apakāram āgamya, yaś cetasa āghātaḥ sattvāsattva-viśayo, daṇḍa-dānādi-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaś ca, sa krodha iti, prajñapyate |

Irritation or fury (*āghāta*) of the mind, when one has experienced a present (*vartamāna*) insult (*apakāra*), is directed against sentient beings (*sattva*) and non-sentient things (*asattva*), and its activity consists in providing a support for fighting (*daṇḍa-ādāna*), etc.: this is called anger.

#2054 2. What is ENMITY (*upanāha* 恨)?

It is—as a result of anger (忿) (regarding some prior occurrence (為先))—in its nature (性), the non-discarding (不捨) of bad sentiments (懷惡) and the continuation of, or being tied up with, animosity (*vaira-anubandha* 結怨).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder non-enmity (不恨), {6/24r.} and to provoke and intensify furiousness (*pradāśa* 熱惱).

Indeed, the person holding on to enmity (結恨者) is incapable of forgiveness (含忍, *marṣaṇa*, *kṣānti*) and always provokes and intensifies furiousness (*pradāśa* 熱惱).

Like anger (*krodha*), enmity (*upanāha*) is also, in itself, one part of hostility (*pratigha* 瞋恚), for, outside of this defilement (*kleśa*), enmity has no characteristic (相) or activity (用) of its own.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* F 30 (14b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

upanāho vairānubandhaḥ, krodhād ūrdhvaṃ, mamānenedam apakṛtam ity, asya vairātmakasyānuśayasyānutsargaḥ, prabandhena pravartanam, upanāhaḥ |

Enmity (*upanāha*) is the continuation (*anubandha*) of animosity (*vaira*) after anger (*krodha*) has occurred: The animosity occurring when thinking about an insult (*apakṛta*) that one has experienced leaves behind (*utsarga*) a residue or proclivity (*anuśaya*); if this residue is not given up, if it continues to affect oneself, then this is enmity.

ayañ cākṣānti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Its activity consists in providing the support for not being able to be lenient or be forgiving (*akṣānti*).

akṣāntir apakārāmarṣaṇaṃ, pratyapakāra-cikīrṣā ca | ayam api, krodhavat, pradeṣāvasthā-viśeṣe prajñapyate | ataḥ prajñapti-sann eva veditavyaḥ |

This consists in the non-tolerating (*amarṣaṇa*) of an insult (*apakāra*) and in the wish (*cikīrṣā*) for retaliation (*pratyapakāra*). Enmity too is, like anger (*krodha*), a designation for a particular state (*avasthā-viśeṣa*) of hatred (*pradveṣa*). Thus, it only has existence as designation (*prajñapti-sat*).

#2056 3. What is CONCEALMENT (*mrakṣa* 覆: to cover, to hide)?

It is, in its nature, to hide (隱藏) one's offenses (自作罪) out of fear of losing benefits or reputation (恐失利譽): such is the nature of this subsidiary defilement (*upakleśa*).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder (障) non-concealment (*amrakṣa* 不覆) and to provoke and intensify the affliction of regret (悔惱).

Indeed, the person who conceals (覆罪者) his offenses (覆罪) will necessarily be afflicted (with regret) (悔惱) later and will be in discomfort (*asparśa-vihāra* 不安隱).

#2058 According to one opinion (i.e., *Samuccaya-sāstra*, *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, Sthiramati's *Trentaine*), this subsidiary defilement (*upakleśa*) is included in (one part of) delusion (*moha* 癡), for YBh (T.30.1579.0604b) says that it is one part of delusion: one conceals (覆) one's offense because one does not (fear) (懼) the suffering to come (當苦).

#2059 According to another opinion, which is correct, (this concealment) is one part of attachment (*rāga* 貪) and of delusion (*moha* 癡), for if <365> one conceals one's offense, it is also out of fear of losing benefits and reputation (恐失利譽). YBh (論) considers the coarse and manifest (麤顯) characteristic; this is why it only says that concealment (*mrakṣa*) is part of delusion (癡分). {6/24v.} Likewise, it says that restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉) is part of attachment (貪分): now, as it also says that restlessness pervades (遍) every defiled mind (染心), then obviously it cannot be accepted that restlessness is part of attachment alone.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Concealment (*mrakṣa*), according to Sthiramati's *Trentaine*: not to confess offenses to the well-intentioned questioner (*codaka*) who says: "Did you do that?" (See #2063.)

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* F 30 (14b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

mrakṣa ātmano vadya-pracchādanā |

Concealment (*mrakṣa*) is the hiding (*pracchādana*) of one's own sins (*avadya*):
chanda-dveṣa-bhayādīn nirākṛtya, kāle taddhitaiṣiṇā codakena, tat tvam evam-
kārīty, anuyuktasya mohāṃśiky-avadya-pracchādanā, mrakṣaḥ | mohāṃśikatvaṃ

tu mraṁśasya, praechādanākāratvāt |

If someone gets confronted, at the right time, by someone who has his welfare in mind, while setting aside (*nirākṛtya*) his own predilection (*chanda*), hatred (*dveṣa*), fear (*bhaya*), etc., pointing out that he did such and such a thing, then to hide one's sins (*avadya*), which is part of delusion (*moha*), is concealment. (This concealment) is part of delusion because it has the mode (*ākāra*) of hiding (*pracchādana*).

ayañ ca kaukrtyāsparśa-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Its activity consists in providing the support for regret (*kaukrtya*) and for unpleasant behavior (*asparśa-vihāra*).

dharmataiṣā, yad avadyaṃ pracchādayataḥ, kaukrtyam utpadyate | kaukrtyāc cāvaśyaṃ, daurmanasyena saṃprayogād, asparśa-vihāra iti |

This activity results from the fact that when someone hides (*pracchādaya*) a sin (*avadya*), he will experience regret later. Unpleasant behavior follows from the fact that, due to regret, there necessarily follows a bad mood or dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*).

On confession and its benefits: *Morale Bouddhique*, F 205–206.

#2060 4. What is FURIOUSNESS (OR DEPRAVED OPINIONATEDNESS) (*pradāśa* 惱)?

It is—as a result of anger (忿) and enmity (*upanāha* 恨) (regarding some prior occurrence (為先))—(in its nature (性),) a burning (*caṇḍa* 暴熱) fury (? 佷戾): whether in pursuit of the earlier object of anger-enmity (追往惡) or on meeting a new antipathetic object (觸現違緣).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder non-furiousness and to provoke “biting” [speech] (*dāśitā* 蛆螫).

Indeed, whether the antipathetic object is old or new, when the mind is furious, one utters many fierce, violent, cruel, injurious, etc., words (多發囂暴凶鄙羸言) and, in this way, one “bites” (蛆螫) others, [whereas anger causes one only “to take up the stick”. Nevertheless, anger also provokes harm, and furiousness also provokes bodily actions].

⟨Furiousness is, also, in itself, one part of hostility (*pratigha* 瞋恚), for, outside of this defilement, furiousness has no characteristic or activity of its own).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

- a. Stede. – *Palāsa*: “Buddhist Sanskrit *pradāśa* points to *pa* + *dāśa* = *dāśa* ‘enemy’, this form evidently a Sanskritization”. – Often combined with *macchera* and

makḥha.

The Sanskrit sources hesitate between *pradāśa* and *pradāsa* (*Dharma-saṃgraha*, *Vyutpatti*). The Tibetan edition gives 'tshig pa for *pradāha*.

- b. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 30 (14b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

pradāśaś caṇḍa-vaco-dāśītā |

Furiousness or viciousness (*praśada*) is the “biting” (*dāśītā*) with fierce (*caṇḍa*) words (*vaca*).

caṇḍam vacaḥ pragāḍham pāruṣyam, marma-ghaṭṭana-yogena | daśana-śīlo dāśī | tad-bhāvo dāśītā | ayañ ca bhāva-pratyayaḥ svārthikaḥ | caṇḍena vacasā pradaśatīti, caṇḍa-vaco-dāśītā |

“Fierce words” (*caṇḍam vacaḥ*) are very (*pragāḍha*) coarse (*pāruṣya*) speech.

The one who tends to “bite” (*daśanaśīla*) in order to hurt (*ghaṭṭana*) someone's sentiments (*marma*) is called *dāśin* (vicious tongue), and his state of being is called *dāśītā*: (the word is formed with) the *svārthika*-suffix (-*tā*), which indicates the state of being (*bhāva*). The abstract *caṇḍa-vaco-dāśītā* has thus the meaning of “biting with fierce words” (*caṇḍena vacasā pradaśati*).

ayañ ca krodhopanāha-pūrvakaś cetasa āghāta-svabhāva iti, pratighāṃsika eva, na dravyato vidyate |

Furiousness or viciousness consists of the irritation or fury (*āghāta*) of the mind, which is preceded by anger (*krodha*) and enmity (*upanāha*), thus, it is part of hostility (*pratigha*) and is, in terms of being a real entity (*dravya*), not distinguished from hostility.

ayañ ca vāg-duścarita-prasava-karmakaḥ | asparśa-vihāra-karmakaś ca | tad-vataḥ pudgalasya duḥkha-saṃvāsativāt |

Its activity consists of bringing forth (*prasava*), on the one hand, evil deeds (*duścarita*) in terms of words (*vāg*), and, on the other hand, unpleasant behavior (*asparśa-vihāra*), since a person affected by furiousness and viciousness is a place of suffering (*duḥkha-saṃvāsa*).

- c. First of all, it is hard to see why furiousness (*pradāśa*) (which seems to be closely connected with anger [*krodha*] and enmity [*upanāha*]) is listed after concealment (*mrakṣa*).

The definitions of the *Dharma-skandhaka* and of the *Vikhyāpana* (T31.1602, Asaṅga's work) are clear. – It is a question of the behavior of the monk: through concealment, the monk hides his offenses, whether or not he is admonished (*avavāda*) by

another about his failings; <366> through depraved opinionatedness, he bursts out in invectives when he is admonished (*Vikhyāpana*). – Hence, the interpretation of AKB (v, F 92):

Depraved opinionatedness (*pradāśa*) is the [firm] esteeming (*parāmarśa*) of reproachable things, esteeming which brings it about that one does not accept —as would be appropriate—admonition.

#2061 5. What is ENVY (*īrṣyā* 嫉)?

It has for its nature being envious-jealous (or being angry) (? *vyāroṣa*; 妒忌) due to desiring one's own fame and benefit (名利), and due to not being able to bear (*marṣ* 耐) the fame (榮) of another.

It has for its activity (業) to hinder non-envy (*an-īrṣya*) and to provoke dissatisfaction and despondency (*daurmanasya*, *dainya* 憂感).

Indeed, the envious (or jealous) person (嫉妒者), hearing of and seeing the glory (or thriving) (榮) of another, {6/25r.} gives himself up to dissatisfaction and despondency (憂感), and is not comfortable or tranquil (*yoga-kṣema*, *sparśa-vihāratā*; *Vyutpatti*, 244, 139) (不安隱).

Envy is, also, (in itself, one) part of hostility (*pratigha*), for, outside of this defilement, envy has no characteristic or activity of its own.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 30 (15a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

īrṣyā para-sampattau cetaso vyāroṣaḥ |

Envy or jealousy (*īrṣyā*) is the mind being angry (*vyāroṣa*) about the good fortune of another (*para-saṃpatti*).

lābha-satkārādhyavasitasya lābha-satkāra-kula-śīla-śrutādīn guṇa-viśeṣān parasyopalabhyā dveṣāṃśiko 'marṣa-kṛtaś, cetaso vyāroṣa, īrṣyā | svam āśrayaṃ vyāpya roṣo, vyāroṣaḥ |

If someone who strives for gain (*lābha*) and honor (*satkāra*) notices that someone is endowed with gain (*lābha*), honor (*satkāra*), noble birth (*kula*), morality (*śīla*), understanding (*śruta*) and similar special (*viśeṣa*) qualities (*guṇa*), then there arises out of the annoyance (*amarṣa*) about it, as part of hatred (*dveṣa*), the being angry (*vyāroṣa*) about it, and this is called envy or jealousy.

When one is angry (*roṣa*) in such a way that the person (*āśraya*) is completely occupied with it, this is called “being angry” (*vyāroṣa*).

daurmanasya-saṃprayogāt tat-pūrvakaś cāsparśa-vihāra iti, daurmanasya-asparśa-vihāra-karmikocyate |

Since being angry is connected with a bad mood (or dissatisfaction) (*daur-manasya*), it is followed by “unpleasant behavior” (*asparśa-vihāra*); therefore, it is said of envy or jealousy that it has for its activity a bad mood (or dissatisfaction) and unpleasant behavior.

Attha-sālinī, p. 373, describes envy as a *khiyyana* (“grumbling”) provoked by another’s prosperity.

#2062 6. What is AVARICE (*mātsarya* 慳)?

It is, in its nature, to be attached (耽著) to (material) goods (財) or to the Dharma (法)—instead of (wisely) giving (慧捨) them away—to hide them (祕) and to save them (吝).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder non-avarice and to provoke hardheartedness and amassing (鄙畜).

Indeed, the avaricious person (慳吝) cannot give things away (不能捨), for his mind has become “hard” (and rough) (鄙澀), for he amasses (material) goods and the teachings (Dharma).

Avarice is, (thus, in itself,) one part of attachment and thirst (*rāga-trṣṇā* 貪愛), for, outside of these defilements, avarice has no characteristic or activity of its own.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB v, F 90: *dharmasyāmiṣasya kauśalasya ca pradāne virodhī cittasyāgraha mātsaryam*. – To correct the translation: “Avarice (*mātsarya*), tenacity (*āgraha*) of mind, which opposes the giving (施) of the teachings (*dharma* 法), [the giving] of material goods (*āmiṣa* 財), [the giving of] “skillfulness (*kauśala* 巧) in favor of others”. – *Āgraha*, *linzhuo* 慳著, in AKB, must be the original of *danzhuo* 耽著 of our text.

Etymology: *mā mattaḥ saratv iti*.

The five *macchhariya*, *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, 1122, and note; *Attha-sālinī*, pp. 373–375.

Two kinds of avarice (*mātsaryas*), i.e., material (*āmiṣa*) and spiritual (*dharma*), *Dharma-skandha*, p. 495, col. 2 and 3.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 30 (15a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

mātsaryam dāna-virodhī, cetasa āgrahaḥ |

Avarice (*mātsarya*) is the clutching (*āgraha*) of the mind that prevents (*virodha*) giving (*dāna*).

upāttaṃ vastu dharmāmiṣa-kauśalātmakaṃ, yena pūjānugraha-kāmyayārthine 'narthine vā dīyate, tad dānam |

“Giving” (*dāna*) is that due to which one gives something which one possesses—in the form of a religious donation or gifts (*dharmā-miṣa*)—in the attempt to demonstrate one’s veneration (*pūjā*) or support (*anugraha*) to someone, be it that he had requested (*arthin*) it or not.

tasmin sati, dānābhāvāt, tad-virodhīty, ucyate |

If such a case presents itself, but if the giving does not occur, then it is (the clutching of the mind) which prevents the giving.

lābha-satkārādhyavasitasya jīvitopakaraṇeṣu rāgāmsīkaś cetasa āgraho 'parityāgecchā, mātsaryam |

If someone who strives for gain (*lābha*) and honor (*satkāra*) experiences, in regard to life’s necessary things (*jīvitopakaraṇa*), a clutching of the mind, which is part of attachment (*rāga*), the desire (*āgraha*) to not let go (*aparityāga*) of anything, then this is avarice.

idañ cāsaṃlekha-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakam |

Its activity consists in providing the support for stinginess (*asaṃlekha*).

asaṃlekhaḥ punar, mātsaryeṇānupayujyamānānām apy upakaraṇānām saṃnicayād, veditavyaḥ |

By “stinginess” one understands the amassing (*saṃnicaya*) of such things (*upakaraṇa*) which, due to avarice (*mātsarya*), are not used.

#2063 7. What is DECEIT (*māyā* 誑)?

It is, in its nature, cheating (詭詐) by means of which one falsely presents (矯現) oneself as being endowed with qualities (有德) in order to obtain benefits or praise (為獲利譽).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder <367> <non-deceit (*amāyā* 不誑)> and to provoke a “false way of life” (*mithyā-jīva* 邪命).⁶⁶²

Indeed, the <deceiving> person or the hypocrite (矯誑者) is scheming (? 異謀) and <often> feigns qualities (現不實) which he actually does not possess, {6/25v.} and practices a false way of life (邪命事).

<Deceit> is, thus, in itself, one part of attachment (*rāga* 貪) and of delusion (*moha* 癡), for, apart from these two, <deceit> has no characteristic or activity of its own.

⁶⁶² AKB iv, F 165, 189.

*La Vallée Poussin comments:*⁶⁶³

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 30 (15a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

māyā para-vañcanāyābhūtārtha-saṃdarśanatā |

Deceit (*māyā*) is leading someone to believe (*saṃdarśana*) in an untrue thing (*abhūtārtha*) in order to deceive (*vañcana*) the other.

lābha-satkārādhyavasitasya para-vañcanābhiprāyeṇānyathāvasthitasya śīlāder arthasyānyathā prakāśanā |

⁶⁶³ *Editors:* LVP comments here:

In the edition of AKB v, F 91–92, I have mixed up *māyā* and *śāṭhya*, and I have not shown the order of the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) as presented by Xuanzang.

LVP then continues to present his adjusted renderings of AKB, v, verses 49c–51b.

But according to Pradhan's later discovered Sanskrit edition, LVP did, actually, not mix up *māyā* and *śāṭhya* in his AKB translation.

Based on this non-justified adjustment and on the definitions given in Vasubandhu's AKB, in Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñapti-bhāṣya* and Xuanzang's *Siddhi* here, based also on the assumption that Xuanzang would use 詔 and 誑 uniformly in the AKB and in the *Siddhi*, as well as basing ourselves on Wogihara and Nakamura, we think that this implies that LVP's renderings in the *Siddhi* are mixed up since, in his French translation of the *Siddhi*, he renders 詔 as *māyā* and 誑 as *śāṭhya*.

LVP might have been influenced by Oda's *Bukkyō daijiten* (734-2-10, 806-2-1) and *Mahā-vyutpatti* (key: 1967 and 1968) which likewise render 誑 as *śāṭhya* and 詔 as *māyā*, and *Foguang da cidian* 佛光大辭典 [= FG] (ed. by Xingyun fashi 星雲法師 and Ciyi fashi 慈怡法師, Taipei, 1988) also follows that, but Wogihara [Ōgihara Unrai 萩原雲來, 1869–1937] (*Bon-Kan taiyaku Bukkyō jiten/Fan-Han duiyi fojiao cidian* 梵漢對譯佛教辭典; Taipei: *Xin wenfeng* 新文豐, Minguo 65 [1976]) and Nakamura Hajime (中村元 = NM, *Bukkyōgo daijiten* 佛教語大辭典 [= BGDJ], Tōkyō, 1981) have it the other way round.

CWSL #2063 誑	FG 5919b: <i>śāṭhya</i>	NM (129b): <i>māyā</i>
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CWSL #2064 詔	FG 6167b: <i>māyā</i>	NM (986d): <i>śāṭhya</i>
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Wogihara (1321a) gives for *śāṭhya* as first equivalent 詔 and 詔曲.

Wogihara (1033b) gives for *māyā* as first equivalent 誑, 誑詔.

Thus we have adjusted the terms throughout the *Siddhi*, i.e., we render 誑 as *māyā* and 詔 as *śāṭhya*.

We therefore also readjusted LVP's non-justified adjustments of the mentioned AKB passage and moved it together with Sthiramati's *śāṭhya* quote (which LVP both rendered here in his commentarial notes to the seventh subsidiary defilement) to their proper place, i.e., the discussion of dissimulation (*śāṭhya*) (just below).

Deceit consists in the fact that someone who strives for gain (*lābha*) and honor (*satkāra*), in order to deceive (*vañcana*) someone, presents (*prakāśana*) something, e.g., morality (*śīla*), etc., differently than it really is.

īyañ ca sahitābhyāṃ rāga-mohābhyāṃ abhūtān guṇān prakāśayatas, tayoh samuditayoh prajñāpyata iti,

If someone pretends (*prakāśa*) to have qualities (*guṇa*) that one does not have due to the combined attachment (*rāga*) and delusion (*moha*), then “deceit” is a designation for attachment and delusion combined.

krodhādivat prajñāptita eva, na dravyata iti,

This is why deceit, like anger (*krodha*), etc., has only a nominal existence (*prajñāpti*) and not a real existence (*dravya*).

mithyājīva-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmikā |

The activity of deceit consists in providing the support for a false way of life (*mithyā-jīva*).

#2064 8. What is DISSIMULATION (*śāṭhya* 諂[曲])?

It is, in its nature, the “crookedness” (險曲) by which one falsely takes up counterfeit attitudes (矯設異儀) with the view of (ensnaring) (i.e., seducing and deceiving) (網[帽]) another.

It has for its activity to hinder sincerity (or non-dissimulation (*aśāṭhya* 不諂)) and admonishment (*avavāda* 教誨).

Indeed, the dissimulating person (諂曲者)—with the view of seducing and deceiving (網帽) another—crookedly, according to circumstances (曲順時宜), devises certain tricks (矯設方便) in order to lay hold of another’s mind (取他意) or to hide one’s own faults (藏己失); thus he fails to accept (不任) the admonishments (教誨) of teachers and friends.

⟨Dissimulation (*śāṭhya*)⟩ is ⟨also, in itself (體), one⟩ part of attachment (*rāga* 貪) and of delusion (*moha* 癡), ⟨for, outside of these two, dissimulation has no characteristic or activity of its own⟩.

a. AKB, v, verses 49c–51b [F 91]:

anye ca śatkleśa-malāḥ māyā śāṭhyam madas tathā || 49

pradāśa upanāhaś ca vihiṃsā ceti

rāgaḥ | māyāmadau pratighaje upanāha-vihiṃsane || 50

drṣṭyamarasāt pradāśas tu śāṭhyam drṣṭi-samutthitam

Xuanzang (T.29.1558.0109c06):

煩惱垢六惱 · 害恨諂誑僞 · |
 誑僞從貪生 · 害恨從瞋起 · |
 惱從見取起 · 諂從諸見生 · |

The defilement taints (*kleśa-malas*) are depraved opinionatedness (*pradāśa* 惱) harmfulness (*vihiṃsā* 害), enmity (*upanāha* 恨), (dissimulation (*śāṭhya* 諂), deceit (*māyā* 誑)), pride (*mada* 僞).

⟨Deceit (*māyā*)⟩ and pride (*mada*) proceed from attachment (*rāga*); harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*) and enmity (*upanāha*) proceed from hatred (*pratigha*; *dveṣa*); depraved opinionatedness (*pradāśa*) proceeds from the esteeming of bad views (*dṛṣṭi-parāmarṣa*); ⟨dissimulation (*śāṭhya*)⟩ proceeds from the [five] afflicted views (*dṛṣṭis*).

AKB iv, F 92: ⟨Dissimulation (*śāṭhya*)⟩ is defined as “the crookedness of the mind which brings it about that one does not show oneself as one is, that one does not deny something when one should deny it (variant: that one does not deny something out of pride: for example *Brahmā*); that one devises certain skills so that one’s words are not clear [so that the person one is talking to is deceived without one formally having lied]”. – On ⟨dissimulation (*śāṭhya*)⟩, see also AKB ii, F 169; iv, F 32.

b. Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (15b), explains the difference between concealment (*mraṁśa*) and dissimulation (*śāṭhya*) (transl. based on Jacobi):

śāṭhyaṃ svadoṣa-pracchādanopāya-saṃgrhītaṃ cetasaḥ kauṭilyam |

Dissimulation (*śāṭhya*) is the non-straightness or crookedness (*kauṭilya*) of the mind which is included in the means (*upāya*) for covering up (*pracchādana*) one’s own faults (*doṣa*).

svadoṣa-pracchādanopāyaḥ para-vyāmohanam |

“Means for covering up one’s own faults” (*svadoṣa-pracchādana-upāya*) is the bewitching (*vyāmoha*) of others.

tat punar anyenānyat pratisaran vikṣipati, aparispṛṇam vā pratipadyate |

Dissimulation consists in the fact that one diverts or bypasses something by putting forward something else or that one admits it in an unclear way (*apari-sṛṇa*).

ata eva śāṭhyaṃ mraṁśād bhidyate | sa hi sṛṇam eva pracchādayati, na kākā | idam api lābha-satkārādhyavasitau pāyābhyāṃ rāga-mohābhyāṃ svadoṣa-pracchādanārthaṃ para-vyāmohanāya pravartate |

This is why dissimulation (*śāṭhya*) is distinguished from concealment (*mrakṣa*). The latter covers up (*pracchādana*) something in a very direct way (*pari-sphuṭa*), i.e., not with a false pretense (*kākvā*),⁶⁶⁴ while the first, in order to cover up his own fault (*svadoṣa-pracchādana*), engages in the bewitching of others with the help of attachment (*rāga*) and delusion (*moha*), i.e., the means of someone who strives for gain (*lābha*) and honor (*satkāra*).

tayor eva sahitayoḥ prajñāpyate |

Dissimulation is only a designation for (attachment and delusion) combined.

idañ ca samyag-avavāda-lābha-paripantha-karmakam | samyag-avavādasya yo lābho yoniśo-manasikāras, tasyāntarāyaṃ karoti |

Its activity is to be the opponent (*paripantha*) for obtaining (*labha*) correct instruction (*samyag-avavāda*). Dissimulation makes an obstacle for the obtaining of correct instruction and for correct mental application.

#2065 9. What is HARMFULNESS (*vihiṃsā* 害)?

It is, in its nature, insensitivity (*citta-nirghṛnatā* 心無悲愍: ⟨an uncompassionate mind⟩) ⟨toward sentient beings⟩ and the harming of them, ⟨i.e., causing them injury and anguish⟩ <368> (*viheṭhanā* 損惱; *Vyutpatti*, 109, 32).

It has for its activity to hinder non-harmfulness (*avihiṃsā* 不害) and to torment (逼惱).

Indeed, the harmer (*vihiṃsin* 有害者) torments others. {6/26r.}

Harmfulness is also, in itself, one part of hostility (*pratigha* 瞋恚), for, apart from this defilement (瞋), harmfulness has no characteristic or activity of its own.

The difference between hostility (*chen* 瞋, i.e. hatred [*dveṣa*]) and harmfulness (*hai* 害; *vihiṃsā*) is established according to the good which these vices oppose [hostility directly opposes loving kindness (*maitrī*); harmfulness opposes compassion (*karuṇā*)].

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 30 (15a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

vihiṃsā sattva-viheṭhanā |

Harmfulness (*vihiṃsā*) is the harming (*viheṭhanā*) of all sentient beings (*sattva*).

⁶⁶⁴ *Editors*: Jacobi comments: “*kākvā* means actually: by stressing the non-correct word. The meaning is obvious, i.e., the one who conceals denies his fault straight-out; the one who dissimulates expresses himself deliberately in such a way that the listener does not recognize the truth in his words.”

vividhair vadha-bandhana-tāḍana-tarjanādibhiḥ sattvānāṃ hiṃsā vihiṃsā |
Harmfulness is the harming (*hiṃsā*) of sentient beings by different (*vividha*) kinds of killing (*vadha*), tying up (*bandhana*), beating (*tāḍana*), threatening (*tarjana*), etc.

viheṭhyante 'nayā sattvā vadha-bandhanādibhir duḥkha-daurmanasyotpādanāḍ iti, sattva-viheṭhanā |

“Harming of all sentient beings” means that sentient beings are harmed (*hiṃsā*) by harmfulness because, by killing, tying up, etc., they are made to suffer (*duḥkha*) and become dissatisfied (*daurmanasya*).

sā punaḥ pratighāṃsīkī nirghṛṇatā sattveṣu citta-rūkṣatā sattva-viheṭhana-karmikā vihiṃsety, ucyate |

Harmfulness, however, being part of hostility (*pratigha*), is called cruelty (*nirghṛṇatā*), hardheartedness (*citta-rūkṣatā*) against sentient beings, and its activity is the harming (*viheṭhana*) of sentient beings.

#2066 10. What is PRIDE (*mada* 憍)?

It is, (in its nature,) prideful elation or intoxication (*uddharṣa* ? 醉傲) in the person who is (deeply) generating defiled attaching (*kliṣṭā-āśakti* 染著) toward his own accomplishments (or assets) (*svasampattau* 自盛事).

It has for its activity to hinder (障) humility (or non-pride) (? *amada* 不憍) and to provide the support (依) for pollution (*saṃkleśa* 染).

Indeed, the prideful person (憍醉) generates and nourishes (生長) all the *dharma*s of pollution (雜染法, i.e., defilements [*kleśas*], etc.).

Pride is also, in itself, one part of greed (*lobha* = attachment-thirst [*rāga-trṣṇā* 貪愛]), for, outside of this defilement, pride has no characteristic or activity of its own.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

On pride (*mada*), AKB ii, F 176, v, F 91 and 94:

madaḥ svadharmaraktasya paryādānaṃ tu cetasaḥ

Pride is the exhausting oneself of the mind of those who are enamored with their own qualities.

[On the contrary, conceit (*māna*) is the elevation of mind (*cetasa unnatiḥ*).] – Commentary (*Vyākhyā* WOG.140.32ff.): *yena svadharmeṣv eva rūpādiṣu raktaṃ cetaḥ paryādīyate saṃnirudhyate sa rāgaṇiṣyando madaḥ*.

Thus, Vasubandhu demonstrates (AKB ii, F 176 and footnote) that pride (*mada*) is not, [in its nature,] a distinctive joyous excitement (*saṃpraharṣa-viśeṣa*) [called intoxication].

Samghabhadra: *yaḥ svadharmeṣv eva raktasya darpaś cetasaḥ paryādānaṃ kuśala-anyakriyābhyupapattisaṃhāro mada iti.*

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (15b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

madaḥ sva-sampattau raktasyoddharṣaś, cetasaḥ paryādānam |

Pride (*mada*) is the elation (*uddharṣa*) of someone who is very fond (*raktasya*) of his own accomplishments or assets (*svasampattau*), a take-over (*paryādāna*) of the mind.

kulārogya-yauvana-bala-rūpaiśvarya-buddhi-medhā-prakarṣaḥ sva-sampattiḥ |

“Own accomplishments or assets” (*svasampatti*) means a high degree (*prakarṣa*) of noble birth (*kula*), health (*ārogya*), youth (*yauvana*), power (*bala*), sovereignty (*rūpaiśvarya*), intellect (*buddhi*) and wisdom (*medhā*).

uddharṣo harṣa-viśeṣaḥ |

“Elation” (*uddharṣa*) means a special kind of joy (*harṣa-viśeṣa*).

yena harṣa-viśeṣeṇa cittam asvatantrī-kriyate, tena tad-ātma-tantrī-karaṇāt paryāttam bhaviṣyatīti, etad uktaṃ cetasaḥ paryādānam iti |

Since this special joy makes the mind lose its autonomy (*svatantra*), the mind is taken over by it, because it makes the mind dependent on it: this is called “take-over” (*paryādāna*) of the mind.

ayaṃ ca sarva-kleśopakleśa-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

The activity of pride is to provide the support for all defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*).

#2068 11. What is NON-MODESTY (*āhrīkya* 無慚)? <369>

It has for its nature to be unconcerned about oneself and the *dharma* (*ātmānaṃ dharmam anapekṣamānasya* 不顧自法), and to disregard (輕拒) the virtuous (賢) and what is good (善).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder (障礙) modesty (*hrī* 慚) and to generate and nourish (生長) bad conduct (*duṣcarita* 惡行).

Indeed, the person who is unconcerned (顧) about himself and the *dharma* disregards the virtuous and what is good, has no embarrassment (不恥) about his transgressions (過惡), {6/26v.} hinders modesty, generates and nourishes (生長)

⟨various kinds of⟩ bad conduct.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 170:

*guṇeṣu guṇavatsu cāgauravatā apratīṣatā abhayavaśavartitā tad evāhrīkyam
gauravapratidvandvo dharmah.*

Lack of respect (*agauravatā*), i.e., lack of veneration (*apratīṣatā*), lack of fearful submission (*abhayavaśavartitā*) (1) with regard to the qualities [*guṇa*] (loving-kindness, compassion, etc.) of oneself and others, and (2) with regard to the persons endowed with these qualities (*guṇavant*), is what is meant by *āhrīkyā*, *ahrī*, a mental factor opposed to respect (*gaurava*).

Our author follows this doctrine. But Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (16a) (transl. based on Jacobi) states:

āhrīkyam svayam avadyenālajjā |

Non-modesty (*āhrīkyā*) means that, as for oneself, one is not embarrassed (*lajjā*) about a transgression (*avadya*) (one has committed).

*tasmin karmany ātmānam ayogyam manyamānasyāpi yāvad yenālajjā sāhrīkyam,
hrī-vīpakṣa-bhūtam |*

If someone, without feeling guilty (*ayogyā*) about an action, is not embarrassed about the transgression (one has committed), then this is non-modesty, the opposite of modesty (*hrī*).

#2070 12. What is SHAMELESSNESS (*anapatrāpya* 無愧)?

It has for its nature to be unconcerned (不顧) about the world and to respect (*sapratīṣatā* 崇, and *gaurava* 重) the wicked and what is bad (暴惡).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder (障礙) shame (*apatrāpya* 愧) and to generate and nourish (生長) bad conduct.

Indeed, the person who is unconcerned about the world respects the wicked and what is bad, has no shame about his transgressions, hinders shame, generates and nourishes ⟨various kinds of⟩ bad conduct.

#2072 Non-embarrassment (*alajjā* 不恥), absence of embarrassment about transgressions (*avadyena alajjā*), is the characteristic shared by non-modesty (*āhrīkyā*) and shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*). This is why the noble teachings, (figuratively speaking,) say (假説) that they themselves (體) are both non-embarrassment.

#2073 But that is an incorrect way of speaking. for, if these two *dharma*s would have

non-embarrassment (不恥) for their particular characteristic (別相), <then these two> would be identical in themselves (體). Thus, <these two *dharma*s> would not be simultaneous (俱生). [Indeed, in themselves, sensation (*vedanā* 受), ideation (*saṃjñā* 想), etc., which are simultaneous, differ.]

If it is said that these two *dharma*s differ in that the first is “non-embarrassment with regard to <or dependent on> (*apekṣya* 待) oneself” (自) and that the second is “non-embarrassment with regard to <or dependent on> others” (他), then these two *dharma*s are not real things (實有)—contrary to the assertions of the noble teachings. {6/27r.}

If it is said that these two *dharma*s are real but arise in turn (別起), this contradicts YBh (T.30.1579.0622b) according to which they both occur in every bad mind (俱遍惡心). <370>

#2074 In fact, when a bad (*akuśala*) mind occurs, whatever its object (i.e., the four truths, the three jewels), it is always accompanied by disregarding (輕拒) of what is good and by respect (崇重) for what is bad. Thus, these two *dharma*s occur in every bad mind (俱遍惡心); the object (所緣) being the same (i.e., the four truths ...), it cannot be objected that they must arise in turn.

#2075 It is true that the noble teaching say: “being unconcerned about oneself and other” (不顧自他). – By “oneself” (自), we should understand “oneself and the Dharma” (自法名自); by “other” (他), we should understand “the world” (including the rules of the world, the *rāja-dharma*) (世間名他).

Or else, “being unconcerned about oneself” [不顧自] means “disregarding of what is good (拒善) which is beneficial (益) to oneself”; “being unconcerned about other” [不顧他] means “respecting of what is bad (崇惡) which is harmful (損) to oneself”.⁶⁶⁵ (Hence, it says “oneself and other” (名自他故).)

YBh (T.30.1579.0623a) also says that [non-modesty and shamelessness] are part of attachment (*rāga* 貪), hatred (*dveṣa*), delusion (*moha*), etc. More correctly, they are their outflow (*niṣyanda* 等流); they do not consist of attachment, etc.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (16a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

anapatrāpyaṃ parato vadyenālajjā |

Shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*) means that, as for others, one is not embarrassed (*lajjā*) about a transgression (*avadya*) (one has committed).

⁶⁶⁵ *Editors*: Similar to #1793, LVP translates: ... signifie “honorer le mal qui est nuisible à autrui” [... means “respecting of what is bad (崇惡) which is harmful (損) to others”].

loka-sāstra-viruddham etan mayā kriyata ity, evam avagacchato 'pi, yā tayā pāpa-kriyayālajjā, sāpatrāpya-vipakṣa-bhūtam anapatrāpyam |

If someone indeed understands that he is committing something that is against (*viruddha*) common morality (*loka*) and the treatises (*śāstras*) but, nevertheless, is not embarrassed (*lajjā*) to commit the sin (*pāpa-kriya*), then this is shamelessness, the opposite of shame or fear for a bad reputation (*apatrāpya*).

etac ca dvayam api sarva-kleśopakleśa-sāhāyika-karmakam |

These two (i.e., non-modesty and shamelessness) have for their activity to be in company with all defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*).

rāga-dveṣa-moha-prakāreṣu sarvāsatkārya-prabhava-hetuṣu rāga-dveṣayor ayaugapadyād, yathāsaṃbhavaṃ, prajñāpyate, na tu svatantram asti |

Since, in regard to the subcategories (*prakāra*) of attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*), attachment and hatred, which are the causes of the origination of all bad occupation, cannot occur together at the same time (*ayaugapadya*)—and thus, according to the case, only two [subcategories]—then non-modesty and shamelessness are, for these two, only a designation, but not something autonomous (*svatantra*).

#2078 13. What is RESTLESSNESS (*auddhatya* 掉舉)? (See #1314.)

It is, in its nature, “that which makes the mind not to be calm” (寂靜) (with regard to objects). [But not, says Kuiji, “non-calmness” of the mind.]

It has for its activity (業) to hinder (障) “equanimity” as formation (*saṃskāra-upekṣā* 行捨) (see #1839) and calm abiding (*śamatha* 奢摩他), [and, according to Kuiji again, not simply to hinder calm abiding, as the *Samuccaya-śāstra* says]. {6/27v.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

It seems that the original says: *auddhatyaṃ viṣaye cittasyāvyupāśamasvabhāvaṃ*. But the expression *cittasya-avyupāśama* can mean (a) “non-calmness of the mind” or (b) “that which generates non-calmness”. The Chinese distinguishes between the two interpretations.

The equivalence “calmness”, “calm” is used for the convenience of translation. – More precisely, restlessness (*auddhatya*) makes the mind unable to rest on its object; this is an unrest that causes one to change one’s opinion. – Languor (*styāna*), which is the next [subsidiary defilement], is a stupor of the mind and of the body which makes the mind unable to seize the object.

[Sthiramati's] *Trentaine* identifies calmness (*vyupaśama*) and calm abiding (*śamatha*). The two notions are, however, distinct, since the activity of non-calmness (*avyupaśama*) is to prevent calm abiding. – Kuiji comments briefly on the difference between calm abiding (*śamatha*) and “equanimity” as formation (*saṃskāra-upekṣā*).

#2080 [Opinions differ on the relationship between restlessness (*auddhatya*) and the defilements (*kleśas*).]

a. ⟨According to one opinion,⟩ restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉) is included in ⟨one part of⟩ attachment (*rāga* 貪), for the treatises⁶⁶⁶ <371> only say that it is part of attachment, for it arises by way of remembering earlier pleasant things.⁶⁶⁷

#2081 b. ⟨According to another opinion,⟩ restlessness is not included in attachment (*rāga* 貪) alone, for the treatise (YBh, T.30.1579.0622b) says that it pervades every defiled mind (遍染心). [Every defiled mind is excited (*uddhata*).⁶⁶⁸] – Moreover, it has for its characteristic non-calmness (*avyupaśama* 不寂靜), and non-calmness is the common characteristic (共相) of all the defilements. Restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉) does not have a particular characteristic (別相) distinct from this common characteristic.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0722c21) says that non-calmness (*avyupaśama* 不寂靜) is the common characteristic of all defilements (*kleśas*); six kinds are distinguished:

1. qua distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂);
2. qua upside-down view (*viparyāsa* 顛倒);
3. qua restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉);
4. qua languor (*styāna* 昏沈);
5. qua heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸);
6. qua non-embarrassment (*alajjā* 無恥).

Although, if restlessness (*auddhatya*) is defined as part of attachment (*rāga* 貪), it is because it increases (增) in the state of attachment, nevertheless, in reality, restlessness is a conventional designation (假立) [for a certain aspect] of all the defilements.

#2082 c. According to a further opinion, restlessness has its own intrinsic nature,

⁶⁶⁶ YBh (T.30.1579.0604b); *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0699).

⁶⁶⁷ *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31.

⁶⁶⁸ AKB vii, F 22.

apart from attachment (*rāga*), etc. (別有自性) – It pervades every defiled mind, as does non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信), slackness (*kausīdya*); but the texts do not say that restlessness is part of a defilement. In this hypothesis, it would not be real (實) but merely a designation (假有), and the same conclusion would then also have to be imperative for non-faith, etc.

If YBh (T.30.1579.0604b) states {6/28r.} that restlessness (*auddhatya*) has conventional existence (*saṃvṛti-sat* 世俗有), as it states it about drowsiness (*middha* 睡眠) and about regret (*kaukrīya*), this is said “in accordance with the characteristic of another *dharma*” (隨他相).⁶⁶⁹

Restlessness (*auddhatya*) has a particular characteristic (別相), namely, agitation (*xiaodong* 囂動, clamoring and moving), which makes the *dharma*s that are simultaneous with it, i.e., mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*), to be not calm (寂靜). If restlessness would not have this particular characteristic distinct from other defiled *dharma*s, why do the texts specify that it hinders calm abiding (*śamatha* 奢摩他)? <372> Thus, non-calmness (*avyupaśama* 不寂靜) is not the particular characteristic (別相) of restlessness.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

On restlessness (*auddhatya*), AKB ii, F 161 (*auddhatyam cetaso vyupaśamaḥ*) [i.e., a “mental factor” that causes restlessness of the body (*kāya-auddhatya*)]; AKB v, F 90, 93, 94, 98–101, vii, F 22–24, the excited (*uddhata*) mind.

Dhamma-saṅgaṇi, 429: *yaṃ tasmim samaye cittassa uddhaccaṃ avūpasamo cetaso vikkhepo bhantattaṃ cittassa idaṃ tasmim samaye uddhaccaṃ hoti*. – It is by means of *vikkhepa-uddhacca* that one does not see things as transitory ... (*Visuddhimagga*, p. 633).

See #2105 as for the difference between restlessness (*auddhatya*) and distraction (*vikṣepa*).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (16a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

auddhatyañ cittasyāvyupaśamaḥ |

Restlessness (*auddhatya*) is the non-calmness (*vyupaśama*) of the mind (*citta*).

⁶⁶⁹ The text has simply: “this is to mean *sui ta xiang* 隨他相”. [The meaning must be: because, in practice, it is mixed up with another *dharma*.] Kuiji explains: “In the state of restlessness (*auddhatya*), one part of attachment (*rāga*) increases. According to (*cong* 從) the characteristic of attachment, we say that it has conventional existence (*saṃvṛti-sat*). *Samvṛti-sat*: but not as a designation (*prajñapti*).” (See footnote to #2088; #2105, #2170.)

vyupaśamo hi śamathas, tad viruddho 'vyupaśamaḥ |

“Calmness” is calming or calm abiding (*śamatha*), which is opposed to non-calmness (*avyupaśama*).

sa punar eṣa rāgānukūlaṃ pūrva-hasita-ramita-kṛīḍitādy-anusmaratāś cetaso 'vyupaśama-hetuḥ, śamatha-paripantha-karmakaḥ |

[Restlessness] has for its activity to be the opposite of calming (*śamatha*), to be the cause (*hetu*) for non-calmness (*avyupaśama*) in the person who thinks about previous laughing (*hasita*), singing (*rasita*), playing (*kṛīḍita*), etc., which corresponds to attachment (*rāga*).

#2084 14. What is *LANGUOR* (*styāna* 惛沈)?

It is, in its nature, that which causes the incapacity (inaptitude [*akarmaṇyatā* 無堪任]) of mind with regard to the object.

It has for its activity to hinder ease (*praśrabdhi* 輕安) (see #1822) and insight (*vipaśyanā* 毘鉢舍那).

#2086 [Opinions differ:]

a. According to one opinion, languor (*styāna*) is included in (one part of) delusion (*moha* 癡), for YBh (T.30.1579.0604b) says only that it is part of delusion; for *hunmei* 昏昧 (*nidrā* ?, #0980) (i.e., stupefaction) and *chenzhong* 沈重 (*laya* ?) (i.e., sinking heaviness), [i.e., the two things integrated into languor (惛沈),] are characteristics of delusion.

#2087 b. According to another opinion, languor is not included in delusion (*moha* 癡) alone. – (This means that) the characteristic of languor (*styāna* 惛沈) is “inaptitude” (*akarmaṇyatā* 無堪任); {6/28v.} and inaptitude is the common characteristic of all defilements. Apart from inaptitude, languor has no characteristic of its own. Thus, if YBh says only that languor is part of delusion (癡分), it is because languor increases (增) in the state of delusion (癡相), although, in fact, languor is a designation (假立) of a feature common to all defilements.

#2088 c. (According to a further opinion,) languor has its own intrinsic nature (別有自性). Although one can say that it is part of delusion (*moha* 癡), nevertheless, it is only its outflow (*niṣyanda* 等流); like non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信) and slackness (*kausīdya*), it is not included in delusion. – Taking into account the fact that it increases another *dharma*, namely, delusion (*moha*),⁶⁷⁰ a text says that it

⁶⁷⁰ Same phrase as above, *Siddhi* F 371, note: “this is to mean *sui ta xiang* 隨他相”.
Kuiji, *Shuji* 6B/82r.

has conventional (*saṃvṛti*) existence (世俗有), like drowsiness (*middha*) and regret (*kaukr̥tya*); but, in fact, it is a separate, (i.e., real,) thing (實有). <373>

Its particular characteristic (別相) is a "blindness-heaviness" (瞽重, *staimitya* ?) that makes the *dharma*s (i.e., mind and mental factors) that accompany languor (*styāna*) to be inapt (*akarmaṇya* 無堪任故). If languor does not have a characteristic of its own separate from the defilements in general, as the second master would have it, why specify that it hinders insight (*vipaśyanā* 毘鉢舍那)? Inaptitude is not the particular characteristic (別相) of languor: this characteristic is "blindness-heaviness".

What is the difference between delusion (*moha* 癡) and languor (*styāna* 惛沈)? {6/29r.}

Delusion has, for its characteristic, "error-darkness" (迷闇; *mi* = *bhrānti*; *an* = *tamas* = *ajñāna*) with regard to the object; among the good *dharma*s, it hinders non-delusion (*amoha*) directly; it is not "blindness-heaviness" (瞽重).

Languor has for its characteristic blindness-heaviness with regard to the object; among the good *dharma*s, it hinders ease (*praśrabdhi* 輕安) directly; it is not error-darkness.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (16a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

styānañ cittasyākarmaṇyatā staimityam |

Rigidifying languor (*styāna*) is the inaptitude (*akarmaṇyatā*) of the mind, its immobility or rigidity (*staimitya*).

stimitasya bhāvaḥ staimityaṃ, yad yogāc cittaṃ jaḍī-bhavati, stimitaṃ bhavati, nālambanaṃ pratipattuṃ samutsahate |

Immobility (*stimitasya*) means becoming immobile (*stimitasya bhāva*), in connection with which the mind becomes stiff (*jaḍī*), becomes immobile (*stimita*) and cannot conceive the cognitive object.

etac ca sarva-kleśopakleśa-sāhāyya-dāna-karmakam |

It has for its activity to be in company with all defilements (*kleśas*) and subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*).

mohāṃśe prajñaptatvāc ca, mohāṃśīkam eva, na prthag vidyate |

Because it is a designation (*prajñapti*) for part of delusion (*moha*), it is only part of delusion and does not exist separately (*prthag*).

AKB ii, F 161, cites the definition of the *Jñāna-prasthāna*: “heaviness (*gurutā*) and inaptitude (*akarmaṇyatā*) of body and of mind”. – In the edition of AKB vii, F 18–20, I have translated] *styāna* = “torpeur” (torpor), *middha* = “langueur” (languor): I now think that *styāna*, always defiled, is best translated as languor. We will see that *middha* (new transl.: drowsiness), when very strong, generates unconsciousness.

Samuccaya-vyākhyā (T.31.1606.0699a):

Part of delusion (*moha*), consisting of inaptitude (*akarmaṇyatā*) of the mind, having for its activity to hinder insight (*vipaśyanā*).

The definition of *Vikhyāpana* (T.31.1602.0482c09) is difficult:

Due to bodily incapacity (*daṣṭhulya*) ... that which makes the mind to be slack (*līna*) (? *chenmo* 沈沒).

#2090 15. What is NON-FAITH (*āśraddhya* 不信)?

It is, (in its nature,) the contamination (穢, *kāluṣya* ?) of the mind (心) which causes [a] non-conviction (不忍), [b] non-delighting (不樂), [c] non-aspiration-desire (不欲) relative, [respectively,] [a] to what is real (實), [b] to what is endowed with qualities (德), [c] to what is endowed with efficacy (能).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder “pure faith” (淨信) and to provide the support for indolence (i.e., slackness [*kausīdya*]) (惰依). Indeed, the person lacking belief is often slack (懈怠).

#2091 The three characteristics of non-faith (*āśraddhya*) are opposed to the three characteristics of faith (*śraddhā*). (See above, #1773.)

Every defiled *dharma* has a particular characteristic (別相) of its own. Non-faith has <374> for its characteristic being “polluted” (渾濁). Furthermore, it “pollutes” (渾濁) others, i.e., their mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*), like a very contaminated thing (極穢物) is itself contaminated and contaminates other things (自穢穢他). Thus, it has contamination (穢) of the mind for its nature.

Due to non-faith (*āśraddhyā*):{6/29v.}

- one does not have firm conviction in what is real (實),
- one does not delight in what is endowed with qualities (德),
- one does not have aspiration-desire for what is endowed with efficacy (能),

but this (a) non-conviction (不忍), (b) non-delighting (不樂), (c) non-aspiration-desire (不欲) is not the very nature of non-faith.

[i] False conviction (*mithyā-abhisampratyaya* 邪忍) [i.e., conviction in defiled *dharmas*] and [ii] false delighting (*mithyā-prasāda* 邪樂) and false desire-aspiring (*mithyā-abhilāṣa* 邪欲), [i.e., delighting in and aspiration-desire for defiled *dharmas*,] are, respectively, [i] the cause and [ii] the fruit of non-faith; but they are not the very nature of non-faith.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (16a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

āśraddhyaṃ karma-phala-satya-ratneṣv anabhisampratyayaḥ śraddhā-vipakṣaḥ |
Non-faith (*āśraddhya*) is not having firm conviction (*abhisampratyaya*) about the fruit of action (*karma-phala*), the (four noble) truths (*satya*) and the (three) jewels (*ratna*), and is the opposite of faith (*śraddha*).

śraddhā hy astitva-guṇavattva-śakyatveṣv abhisampratyayaḥ prasādo 'bhi-lāṣaś ca yathā-kramam |

“Faith” is, indeed, in regard to something that is [a] real (*astitva*), [b] good (*guṇavattva*) and [c] possible (*śakyatva*), respectively (*yathākrama*):

- a. firm conviction (*abhisampratyaya*) (about it);
- b. achieved clarity (*prasāda*) in the mind (in regard to it);
- c. desire-aspiring (*abhi-lāṣa*) (for it).

aśraddhā tad-viparyayeṇāstitva-guṇavattva-śakyatveṣv anabhisampratyayo 'prasādo 'nabhi-lāṣaś ca |

“Non-faith” is the reverse in regard to the same points, i.e., it is in regard to something that is [a] real (*astitva*), [b] good (*guṇavattva*) and [c] possible (*śakyatva*), respectively:

- a. non-conviction (about it);
- b. non-achieved clarity in the mind (in regard to it);
- c. lack of desire-aspiring (for it).

kausīdya-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakam | *aśraddadhānasya prayoga-cchandābhāvāt kausīdya-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakatvam* |

The activity of faith consists in providing the support for slackness (*kausīdya*) because being without faith, one does not have the predilection (*chanda*) to engage in good *dharmas* (*prayoga*) and one's activity provides the support for laziness.

#2092 16. What is SLACKNESS (*kausīdya* or *kausīdya* 懈怠)?

It is, in its nature, indolence (*ālasya*, *anabhyutsāha* 懶惰) in the cultivation (修) of good *dharmas*, in the abandoning (斷) of bad *dharmas*.

It has for its activity (業) to hinder vigor (*vīrya* 精進) and to increase pollution (*saṃkleśa* 染).

Indeed, the person with slackness augments and nourishes (滋長) pollution.

⟨The person who is diligently⟩ active (策勤者) towards defiled *dharma*s is also called slack (*kausīdya* 懈怠), for this activity causes retrogressing (退) from good *dharma*s.

As for ⟨the person who is diligently⟩ active towards non-defined things (無記事), [this activity] involves neither progress (進) nor retrogress (退) in the good (*kuśala-pakṣa* 善品): it is thus simply predilection (*chanda* 欲) and resolve (*adhi-mokṣa* 勝解), and not a separate mental factor (*caitta*). Just as firm conviction, delighting and aspiration-desire (忍可樂欲) towards the non-defined (無記) are neither pure nor defiled, and are neither faith (*śraddhā*) or non-faith (*āsraddhya*).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 31 (16b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

kausīdyaṃ kuśale cetaso 'nabhyutsāho vīrya-vipakṣaḥ |

(Moral) slackness (*kausīdya*) is the indolence (*anabhyutsāha*) of the mind for the good (*kuśala*), and is the opposite of moral vigor (*vīrya*).

kuśale kāya-vāñ-manaḥ-karmaṇi, nidrā-pārśva-śayana-sukham āgamyā, yo mohāṃśikaś, cetaso 'nabhyutsāhaḥ |

It is the indolence (*anabhyutsāha*) of the mind to do good actions of body (*kāya*), speech (*vāg*) and mind (*manas*), when enjoying the pleasure (*sukha*) of sleeping (*nidrā*) or lying down on one's side (*pārśvaśayana*); it is part of ignorance (*moha*).

etac ca kuśala-pakṣa-prayoga-paripantha-karmakam |

Its activity is opposed to engaging (*prayoga*) in the good (*kuśalapakṣa*).

#2093 17. What is HEEDLESSNESS or non-diligence (*pramāda* 放逸)? {6/30r.}

It is, in its nature, the “letting go or laxity” (縱蕩)⁶⁷¹ that makes one unable to ward off (防) what is bad ⟨or defiled⟩ (*kliṣṭa-pakṣa* 染品), cultivate (修) what is good ⟨or pure⟩ (*suddha-pakṣa* 淨品).

It has for its activity (業) to hinder heedfulness (*apramāda* 不放逸) and to increase (*vrddhi* 增) what is bad (惡) and to ruin ⟨or decrease⟩ (*parihāni* 損) what is good (善).

Indeed, it is due to slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠) and due to the three, i.e., greed

⁶⁷¹ 縱蕩, presented fully, is *zongzi* 縱恣 and *dangyi* 蕩逸; something like “letting go”.

Compare distraction (*vikṣepa*), which is dispersion (*visāra*, *liudang* 流蕩).

(*lobha* 貪), hatred (*dveṣa* 瞋) and delusion (*moha* 癡), that one is unable to ward off (防) the defiled *dharma*s and to cultivate (修) the pure ones: <375> thus, these four vices are given the general name of heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸). Thus, heedlessness is not a separate substance (體).

Although conceit (*māna* 慢), doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) and the other defilements (*kleśas*) also have this efficacy (能) of non-warding-off and non-cultivating, nevertheless, compared to these four, their power (勢用) to ward off (障) the three roots of good and vigor (*vīrya*), i.e., the general stimulant (策) of good *dharma*s, is weak (微劣).

The characteristics of heedlessness (*pramāda*) [can be investigated (推究)] in the same way as those of heedfulness (*apramāda*) [see #1825].

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (16b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

pramādo yair lobha-dveṣa-moha-kausīdyaḥ kleśād rāga-dveṣa-mohādikāc cittaṃ na rakṣati, kuśalañ ca tat-pratipakṣa-bhūtaṃ na bhāvayati | teṣu lobha-dveṣa-moha-kausīdyeṣu pramādaḥ prajñāpyate |

Heedlessness (*pramāda*): when, due to greed (*lobha*), hatred (*dveṣa*), delusion (*moha*) and moral slackness (*kausīdya*), one does not guard (*rakṣati*) one's mind (*citta*) against a defilement (*kleśa*), i.e., attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), delusion (*moha*), etc., and when one does not apply oneself to the good (*kuśala*), which is the opposite of that, then this is “heedlessness”, a special designation for greed, hatred, delusion, moral slackness.

ayañ cākuśala-vṛddhi-kuśala-parihāṇi-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaḥ |

Its activity consists in providing the support for the increase (*vṛddhi*) of what is bad (*akuśala*) and of the decrease (*parihāṇi*) of what is good (*kuśala*).

#2095 18. What is IMPAIRED MEMORY (*muṣitā smṛti* or *muṣita-smṛtitā* 失念)?

It is, in its nature (性), the inability to remember (*smaraṇa*) (clearly) the object (*ālambana*) (不能明記).

It has for its activity to hinder correct memory (*samyak-smṛti* 正念) and to provide a support for distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂).

Indeed, the mind of the person with impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtiḥ*) is “distracted” (散亂).

[Opinions differ:]

- #2097 a. (According to one opinion,) impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā* 失念) is included in [one part of] memory (*smṛti* 念, #1699), {6/30v.} for the *Samuccaya*-

vyākhyā says that it is memory associated with defilements (*kleśas*).

- #2098 b. ⟨According to another opinion,⟩ impaired memory is included in [one part of] delusion (*moha* 癡), for YBh (瑜伽 T.30.1579.0604b) says that it is part of delusion, for delusion causes memory to fail (念失): delusion thus receives the name of impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā*).
- #2099 c. ⟨According to a further opinion,⟩ impaired memory is included in both, i.e., in one part of memory and of delusion, for the texts cited by the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* and YBh are ambiguous and laconic (影略), for YBh also says that it pervades (遍) all defiled ⟨minds⟩ (心).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (16b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

muṣitā smṛtiḥ kliṣṭā smṛtiḥ |

Impaired memory (*muṣita smṛti*) is defiled (*kliṣṭa*) memory (*smṛti*).

kliṣṭeti, kleśa-saṃprayuktā |

“Defiled” (*kliṣṭa*) means to be accompanied (*saṃprayukta*) by defilements (*kleśa*).

iyañ ca vikṣepa-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmikā |

Its activity consists in providing the support for distraction (*vikṣepa*).

- #2101 19. What is DISTRACTION (*vikṣepa* 散亂)?

It is, in its nature, that which makes the mind to ⟨wander⟩, i.e., slip away and become dispersed (*visarati* 流蕩), ⟨from its objects⟩.⁶⁷²

It has for its activity (業) to hinder (障) correct concentration (*samyak-samādhi* 正定) and to provide the support for bad understanding (*ku-prajñā* 惡慧).

Indeed, the distracted person generates bad understanding. <376>

[Opinions differ:]

- #2103 a. ⟨According to one opinion,⟩ distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂) is included in ⟨one part of⟩ delusion (*moha* 癡), for YBh (瑜伽) says that it is part of delusion.
- #2104 b. ⟨According to another opinion,⟩ distraction is included in attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga-dveṣa-moha*), for the *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0665b, *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0699b) says that it is part of these three (Sthiramati: *rāga-dveṣa-moha-aṃśika*). Same statement in the *Pañca-skandhaka*. {6/31r.} – If YBh says only that it is part of delusion, this is because it pervades (遍) every defiled

⁶⁷² Sthiramati: *vikṣepaḥ ... cetaso visāraḥ*.

mind. [Now, attachment and hatred do not pervade every defiled mind.] – Attachment, hatred and delusion (貪瞋癡) prevail (勝)—in terms of causing the mind to become dispersed (流蕩)—over others, i.e., conceit (*māna*), etc. This is why it is said that they constitute distraction (*vikṣepa*).

- #2105 c. 〈According to a further opinion,〉 distraction is a separate substance of its own (別有自體): the correct opinion.

If it is said that distraction is part of the three, i.e., attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga-dveṣa-moha*), this is because it is their outflow (*niṣyanda* 等流); likewise, the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* says, also incorrectly, that non-modesty (*āhrikyā* 無慚), etc., are part of the three. – A text says (隨他相) that it has conventional existence (*saṃvṛti-sat* 世俗有): same explanation as above, #2082, fn., 〈that is, this is to mean “with regard to the characteristic of another *dharma*” (隨他相)〉.

[Question:] – Thus, what is the particular characteristic (別相) of distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂)?

[Answer:] – It is agitation (躁擾),⁶⁷³ for it causes the *dharma*s that are simultaneous with it, i.e., mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*), to become dispersed (流蕩). If distraction would not have a distinct substance of its own, separate from these three, i.e., attachment, hatred and delusion (*rāga-dveṣa-moha*), why specify that it hinders concentration (*samādhi* 三摩地)?

[Question:] – What is the difference between the activity (用) of restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉) and that of distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂)?

[Answer:] – The first makes one change one’s comprehension (*buddhi* ?; 易解) (abandon the comprehension of permanence, etc.), the second makes one change the object (易緣). Although, at one given moment (刹那), there can be present only one comprehension, one object, (i.e., there can be no change in the comprehension and in the object) (解緣無易), nevertheless, change applies to the mental series (相續). {6/31v.}

When the mind is defiled (染污), the power of restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉) and of distraction (*vikṣepa* 亂) makes one, from one moment to the next (念念), change one’s comprehension and change one’s object (易解易緣).

Or else, if the mind occurs constricted (所制伏) by innate memory and concentration (*smṛti-samādhi*), it remains fixed only for a moment, like a tied-up monkey (繫猿猴). Thus, restlessness and distraction both penetrate every defiled

⁶⁷³ *zao* 躁 corresponds to *san* 散; *rao* 擾 corresponds to *luan* 亂.

mind (遍染心).⁶⁷⁴ <377>

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (16b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

vikṣepo rāga-dveṣa-mohāṃśikaś cetaso visārah |

Distraction (*vikṣepa*) is the wandering or dispersing (*visāra*) of the mind; it is part of attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) or delusion (*moha*).

vividhaṃ kṣipyate 'nena cittam iti, vikṣepaḥ |

Vikṣepa means that the mind is pulled (*kṣipyate*) in different ways (*vividham*).

yai rāga-dveṣa-mohaiś cittam samādhy-ālambanād bahiḥ kṣipyate teṣu yathā-sambhavaṃ vikṣepaḥ prajñapyate |

If, due to attachment (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*) or delusion (*moha*), the mind is pulled away from the cognitive object (*ālamhana*) of concentration (*samādhi*), then this is “distraction”, a special designation for attachment, hatred or delusion according to the specific case.

eṣa ca vairāgya-paripantha-karmakaḥ |

Its activity is opposed to detachment from the world (*vairāgya*).

#2107 20. What is LACK OF PROPER DISCERNMENT (*asaṃprajanya* 不正知)? (See #1318.)

It has for its nature the upside-down comprehension (*viparītā buddhi* 謬解) regarding the object to be examined (*upaparīkṣya vastu* 所觀境).

It has for its activity to hinder proper discernment (*saṃprajanya* 正知) and to provoke offenses (毀犯, Sthiramati's *āpatti*).

Indeed, the person without proper discernment (*asaṃprajānan*) commits many offenses.

[Opinions differ:]

#2109 a. <According to one opinion,> lack of proper discernment (*asaṃprajanya* 不正知) is included in <one part of> understanding (*prajñā* 慧) (#1723), for a text (*Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0699b11) says that it is understanding associated with defilements (*kleśas*).

#2110 b. <According to another opinion,> lack of proper discernment is included in <one part of> delusion (*moha* 癡), because YBh, 55,⁶⁷⁵ says that it is part of delusion. That which is called lack of proper discernment (不正知) is what makes

⁶⁷⁴ See AKB vii, F 20f.

⁶⁷⁵ *Editors*: Cf. YBh 55 (T.30.1579.0604b03, 05) which is however not said of *asaṃprajanya* 不正知; but cf. YBh 11 (0334a03: 不正知住。是癡行性).

one discern not properly (令知不正). {6/32r.}

- #2111 c. 〈According to a further opinion,〉 lack of proper discernment is included in 〈one part of both〉, i.e., understanding and delusion, for both texts cited are ambiguous and laconic (影略), for YBh also says that it occurs in every defiled mind.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Samuccaya-vyākhyā (T31.1606.0699b11) and *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (16b) first give the strict definition which I believe is traditional. Sthiramati (transl. based on Jacobi):

asaṃprajanyaṃ kleśa-saṃprayuktā prajñā |

Lack of proper discernment (*asaṃprajanya*) is understanding accompanied (*saṃprayukta*) by defilements (*kleśas*).

yayāsaṃviditā kāya-vāk-citta-caryā abhikrama-pratikramādiṣu vartate, karaṇīya-akaraṇīyājñānāt |

Since the conduct (*caryā*) of body (*kāya*), speech (*vāk*) and mind (*citta*) is not properly recognized (*asaṃvidita*), [this conduct] evolves in terms of transgressions (*abhikrama*), progressions (*pratikrama*), etc., because one does not know (*ajñāna*) what one should do and what one should not do.

etac cāpatti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakam |

Its activity consists in providing the support for offenses (*āpatti*).

Samuccaya-vyākhyā (T31.1606.0699b13):

... going, coming (往來) ..., improperly discerning that one goes, that one comes ... (事不正觀察).

Thus, lacking supervision of body and of mind. – But they add: “due to not knowing (不了知) what one should do (應作) and what one should not do (不應作)”.

In the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, preceded by distraction (*vikṣepa*). – See #1870.

- #2112 The words AND and WITH (*saha, atha, ca* 與并及) of [Vasubandhu’s] stanza (*kārikā* 12–14) show that the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) are not just twenty in number. The *Kṣudra-vastuka*, etc., enumerate many types of attachment (*rāga*), etc.: these are subsidiary defilements.

- #2113 The term *upakleśa* (subsidiary defilements 隨煩惱) includes also the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) which are, in their nature, the outflows (等流) of the 〈previous〉 six root defilements (煩惱). 〈The other defiled (染污) *dharma*s (法) that belong to the same category as the defilements are only (但) called “subsidiary defilements”

(隨煩惱) because they are not included in the [root] defilements (非煩惱攝)).

- #2114 If it is only said that there are twenty subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*), it is because one understands, by this term, that which is not a defilement (*kleśa*), that which is exclusively defiled and coarse (染麤).

The other defiled *dharma*s (see #1315–#1350) are either modalities (*avasthā* 分位) of the twenty subsidiary defilements or are outflows (等流) (e.g., actions of body and of speech). All are included in the twenty. How that is so is to be determined according to their particular characteristic ⟨or type⟩ (類別), ⟨as known through reason⟩. {6/32v.} <378>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Compare AKB v, F 88 (*Vyākhyā*, WOG.493.22f.):

ye 'py anye caitasās (= kleśebhyo 'nya ity arthaḥ) ta upakleśā eva ... ye Kṣudra-vastuke paṭhitāḥ (= Kṣudravastuke pravacanabhāga ye paṭhitāḥ).

The mental factors different from the defilements (*kleśas*) are subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) only ..., are enumerated in the part of scripture which is called *Kṣudra-vastuka*.

The *Kṣudra-vastuka* is the sixteenth section of the *Dharma-skandha*, “commentary of the *Kṣudravastuka-sūtra* which is part of the canonical scriptures (*āgama*)” (Kuiji). See above #1855.

We find there, indeed, the *mahā-kāma*, *varṇa-kāma*, *kliṣṭa-rāga*, *adharma-rāga*, *ku-rāga*, *kāma-rāga*, *sat-kāya-drṣṭi-rāga*

E.D.F.1. *Issues in relation with the subsidiary defilements (upakleśas)*

- #2116 1. *Existence as a real entity (實有) or existence as designation (假有):*

Among the twenty subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱), the ten small (小, #2050) and three great (大三) subsidiary defilements (i.e., [a] impaired memory [*muṣṭita-smṛtītā*], [b] heedlessness [*pramāda*] and [c] lack of proper discernment [*asaṃprajanya*]) are definitively existent as designation (*prajñapti-sat* 假有).

[Four, i.e.,] [a] non-modesty (*āhṛīkya* 無慚), [b] shamelessness (*anapatrāpya* 無愧), [c] non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信) and [d] slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠) are definitively existent as a real entity (*dravya-sat* 實有): the teachings and reasoning demonstrate this.

Opinions differ as to ⟨three kinds [of subsidiary defilements]⟩, i.e., [a] restless-

ness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), [b] languor (*styāna* 惛沈) and [c] distraction (*vikṣepa* 散亂), (i.e., according to one opinion, they are a designation, according to another opinion, they are a real entity): above, we have set out the scriptural and logical reasons.

#2117 2. *Innate* (俱生) *and figured* (分別):

All twenty subsidiary defilements may be of two categories, (i.e., [a] innate and [b] figured), and this due to the category to which the defilement (*kleśa*), by whose power (勢力) they arise, belongs.

#2119 3. *Association of the subsidiary defilements* (*upakleśas*) *amongst each other*:

Among these twenty subsidiary defilements,⁶⁷⁶ the ten small ones do definitively not occur simultaneously (俱起) because they mutually contradict (違) each other: in view of their coarse and violent characteristic (or mode of operation) (行相麤猛), they can only be “rulers” (主).

#2120 The two medium (中) [subsidiary defilements, i.e., non-modesty and shamelessness], occurring in every bad mind, can arise simultaneously (俱起) with the small or with the great subsidiary defilements, while the cases differ. [The ten small ones, excluding (dissimulation (*sāṭhya*), deceit (*māyā*)), and pride (*mada*), are exclusively bad; the eight great ones can be bad or neutral.]

YBh (T.30.1579.0622b) says that the eight great ones pervade every defiled mind. {6/33r.} Thus, these eight are associated amongst each other; they can occur simultaneously with the small ones and with the medium ones.

#2121 However, the same treatise (YBh, T.30.1579.0604a) says that six subsidiary defilements pervade (遍) every defiled mind (see #1321), excluding languor (*styāna* 惛) and restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉), for these two do not occur simultaneously when they are powerful. <379>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Here Kuiji discusses the co-existence of initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and of investigation (*vicāra*). – He also refutes the objection: “Why accept the co-existence of languor and restlessness (*styāna-auddhatya*) in the state of non-development (*avṛddhi*), and why not likewise distinguish the state of non-development of attachment (*rāga*) and of hatred (*dveṣa*)?” (On the co-existence of languor and restlessness, AKB vii, F 20).

Elsewhere (*Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0723a29), we read that only five subsi-

⁶⁷⁶ *Editors:* See #2050 for the three categories of the twenty subsidiary defilements: small (= 10), medium (= 2), great (= 8).

diary defilements pervade every defiled mind: [a] languor (*styāna* 惛沈), [b] restlessness (*auddhatya* 掉舉), [c] non-faith (*āśraddhya* 不信), [d] slackness (*kausīdya* 懈怠) and [f] heedlessness (*pramāda* 放逸), for these five *dharma*s, i.e., languor, restlessness, etc., contradict (違) only what is good (i.e., ease [*praśrabdhi*], equanimity [*upekṣā*], etc.) [in contrast to impaired memory (*muṣita-smṛtitā*), etc., which contradict what is good, what is bad and what is non-defined].

#2122 4. Association with the eight cognitions (*vijñānas*):

Being defiled only, the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) are not associated with the eighth cognition.

The eight great subsidiary defilements alone are associated with the seventh cognition. We have explained (#1303, #1310, #1321, #1332, #1347) why certain subsidiary defilements and not others are associated with it.

All can be associated with mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*).

The ten small ones (小十), being coarse and violent (麤猛), are not associated with the five cognitions, which are relatively subtle, but the medium ones and the great ones, which occur in every bad mind, in every defiled mind, can be associated with the five cognitions.

#2124 5. Sensation (*vedanā*) and the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*):

From the presence of the medium and of the great subsidiary defilements in every bad mind, in every defiled mind, it results that the medium and the great ones can be associated with the five sensations (五受).

#2127 Concerning the ten little subsidiary defilements:

According to one opinion:

a. The ten little (小十) subsidiary defilements, i.e., anger (*krodha*), etc., except for three, i.e., <dissimulation (*śāṭhya*), deceit (*māyā*)>, and pride (*mada*), can only be associated with three sensations, i.e., satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜), dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) and neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨).

b. <Dissimulation, deceit> and pride (*śāṭhya-māyā-mada* 諂誑僞) can be associated with four sensations, by adding pleasure (*sukha*), <but excluding displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦)>.

[This is the opinion of the masters who do not accept that displeasure (*duḥkha*) can be of the domain of mind (*manas*), see #1607; now, the ten are exclusively of the domain of mind in the two higher realms (*dhātus*); but the ten, except for <dissimulation, deceit> and pride (*śāṭhya-māyā-mada*), are of the realm of desire

(*kāma-dhātu*) alone.] {6/33v.} <380>

#2128 According to another opinion:

a. The ten subsidiary defilements, (i.e., anger (*krodha*), etc.,) can be associated with four sensations (*vedanās*), excluding pleasure (*sukha* 樂).

b. 〈Three subsidiary defilements〉, i.e., 〈dissimulation, deceit〉 and pride (*śāthya-māyā-mada* 諂誑), [can occur simultaneously] 〈with five sensations〉, for displeasure (*duḥkha*) can be of the domain of mind, as shown above, #1611.

#2129 [If it would be asked why anger (*krodha*) can be associated with satisfaction (*saumanasya*), avarice (*mātsarya*) with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*) ..., we would reply that] this association of the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) with the sensations is explained in the same way as the association of the defilements (*kleśas*) with the sensations (above, #1975).

#2130 Such is the true meaning (實義). But when considering the coarse characteristics (麤相), it is said that anger (*krodha* 忿), enmity (*upanāha* 恨), depraved opinionatedness (*pradaśa* 惱), envy (*īrṣyā* 嫉) and harmfulness (*vihiṃsā* 害) are associated with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) or neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨). – Concealment (*mrakṣa*) and avarice (*mātsarya*) [are associated] with satisfaction (*saumanasya*) or neutral sensation. – 〈The remaining three〉, i.e., 〈dissimulation (*śāthya*), deceit (*māyā*)〉 and pride (*mada*), increase pleasure (*sukha*).

What has been said about the medium and the great subsidiary defilements, #2124, refers also to their true meaning (如實義). One can also consider their coarse (麤) characteristics.

#2132 6. *Subsidiary defilements (upakleśas) and the five special mental factors (viniyatatas 別境)* (#1668):

The twenty subsidiary defilements can be associated with the five mental factors (*caittas*) called “special”, i.e., predilection (*chanda*), etc., for there is no contradiction between the twenty and the five.

#2133 Although defiled memory (染念) (*smṛti*, or impaired memory [*muṣita-smṛtitā*]) and defiled understanding (染慧) (*prajñā*, or lack of proper discernment [*asaṃ-prajanya*]) do not, [respectively,] occur together with [another] memory, with [another] understanding, nevertheless, being parts of delusion (癡), they are associated with each other.

[It has been said that anger (*krodha*) is directed at a present object, that memory (*smṛti*) is directed at an object already experienced. But] memory is also direc-

ted (緣) at a present object that has formerly been experienced (現曾習類境), and anger (忿) is also directed at an object that has just passed away (剎那過去). {6/34r.} Thus, anger can be associated with memory.

It is not impossible that distraction (*vikṣepa* 亂) can be associated with concentration (*samādhi* 定), for when defiled concentration (染定) occurs, the mind is “agitated” (躁擾, see #2105).

#2135 7. *Subsidiary defilements (upakleśas) and defilements (kleśas):*

The two medium (中) and the eight great (大) subsidiary defilements can be associated with ten defilements. <381>

#2136 The ten small (小) subsidiary defilements definitively cannot occur simultaneously with afflicted views (*drṣṭi* 見) and with doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) for [these subsidiary defilements] are coarse and moving (麤動) in terms of their characteristics, whereas the latter, in general, are subtle in terms of their deliberation (審細).

The five *dharma*s, i.e., anger (*krodha* 忿), enmity (*upanāha*), furiousness (*pradāśa*), envy (*īrṣyā*) and harmfulness (*vihiṃṣā*), can be associated with conceit (*māna* 慢), with delusion (*moha* 癡); but they are not associated with attachment (*rāga* 貪) or with hostility (*pratigha* 恚), because they are part of hatred (*dveṣa* 瞋).

Avarice (*mātsarya* 慳) can be associated with delusion (癡) and with conceit (慢), for there is no contradiction with regard to the object; but it cannot be associated with attachment or with hostility (貪瞋), because it is part of attachment (貪).

Pride (*mada* 憍) is associated with delusion (癡) only. It differs from conceit (慢) in such a way that it cannot be associated with it, because it is only part of attachment (貪) (considering only the self), whereas conceit (considering others) is also part of hatred.

Concealment (*mrakṣa* 覆), (deceit (*māyā* 誑) and dissimulation (*śāṭhya* 諂)) are associated with attachment, delusion and conceit (*rāga-moha-māna* 貪癡慢), for the modes of operation (*ākāra* 行相) are not contradictory, seeing that they are part of attachment and of delusion (*rāga-moha* 貪癡).

#2137 8. *Ethical nature of the subsidiary defilements (upakleśas):*

Seven small (小) and the two medium (中) [subsidiary defilements] are exclusively bad (不善) (for they belong only to the realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*] and generate bad actions). Three small (小) [subsidiary defilements], i.e., dissimulation (*śāṭhya*), deceit (*māyā*) and pride (*mada*), and the eight great ones (大八)

are also non-defined (無記) (for they exist in the realm of fine-materiality [*rūpa-dhātu*]). (AKB v, F 93). {6/34v.}

#2139 9. *Subsidiary defilements (upakleśas) and the realms (dhātus):*

Seven small and the two medium subsidiary defilements occur in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) only. – Deceit (*māyā* 誑), dissimulation (*śāṭhya* 諂) and pride (*mada*) occur in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界) and the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu* 色界). – The others occur in the three realms (*dhātus* 三界).

#2141 A sentient being born and dwelling in a lower stage (下地) can generate eleven subsidiary defilements of a higher stage, for the person who savors concentration (耽定) generates pride (*mada* 憍) and—towards other sentient beings of the realm of desire—〈deceit (*māyā* 諂) and dissimulation (*śāṭhya* 誑)〉. [There is no difficulty in his generating the eight great ones of a higher stage.]

#2142 A sentient being born in a higher stage (上地) can generate the last ten subsidiary defilements of a lower stage, for, [in the intermediate <382> existence preceding the actual birth in the higher stage]:

a. he can generate—along with false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見)—both non-modesty (*āhrikyas*) and shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*) [with the result that he is reborn in a lower stage rather than in a higher stage];

b. he can generate—along with thirst (*tṛṣṇā* 愛), i.e., the “moistener of birth” (#2623), which occurs in the last moments of the higher existence—the eight great subsidiary defilements. (See #2008.)

As for the ten small (小) subsidiary defilements of a lower stage, there is no reason for a sentient being of a higher stage to generate them, for they do not moisten birth (潤生) [since they are bad, and the thirst (*tṛṣṇā*) that moistens birth is non-defined: thus, the ten do not accompany it], for they do not deny (謗) cessation (*nirodha* 滅) (which would be a false view [*mithyā-dṛṣṭi*]), [thus, the ten do not occur in company with false view].

#2145 *Perception of the higher worlds:*

The two medium (中) and the eight great (大) subsidiary defilements of a lower stage also take a higher stage for their object for they are generated associated with attachment (*rāga* 貪), etc., which is directed at a higher stage.

#2147 According to one opinion, the ten small subsidiary defilements of a lower stage do not take a higher stage for their object, for their mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) is coarse and “close” (麤近); they do not seize what is distant (遠取).

#2148 According to another opinion, envy (*īrṣyā* 嫉), avarice (*mātsarya*) and pride (*mada*) take the higher stage for their object, for jealousy, etc., is generated toward the *dharma*s of a higher stage (勝地法).

#2149 The eight great subsidiary defilements, along with dissimulation and deceit (*śāṭhya-māyā* 諂誑), of a higher stage are also directed at the lower stage (緣下), {6/35r.} for they are associated with conceit (*māna* 慢), etc., which is directed at the lower stage (see #2015); for *Brahmā* (梵) generates dissimulation and deceit toward *Aśvajit* (釋子).⁶⁷⁷

Pride (*mada* 憍) of a higher stage is not directed at the *dharma*s of a lower stage, which cannot serve it as support ⟨or esteemed object⟩ (所持).

#2150 10. *Subsidiary defilements (upakleśas) and the categories of the trainee (śaikṣa), etc.*:⁶⁷⁸

The twenty subsidiary defilements are all included in the “neither trainee nor non-trainee” (*naiva-śaikṣa-na-aśaikṣa* 非學無學) category, for they are exclusively defiled, while the categories of the trainee (*śaikṣa*) and of the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*) are only pure.

#2152 11. *Abandonment of the subsidiary defilements (upakleśas) (#2670):*

The last ten subsidiary defilements are to be abandoned by insight (*darśana-heya* 見所斷) and to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷), for they arise in <383> association with the defilements of both sorts, i.e., innate and figured.⁶⁷⁹ {7/1r.}⁶⁸⁰

The subsidiary defilements to be abandoned by insight arise together (俱生) with the defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱) in accordance with the error (*bhrānti* 迷) regarding either the general (總) or particular (別) characteristics (相) of the [four] truths (*satyas* 諦), therefore they all pertain to the four kinds of truth (通四部), with all due qualifications (隨所應). Questions pertaining to the directness (親) or indirectness (疏), etc., of these errors about the truths (迷諦) have already been explained in the discussion of the defilements (*kleśa* 煩惱).

[Regarding the question on which stage] the first ten [subsidiary defilements are abandoned, there are two opinions]:

⁶⁷⁷ AKB iv, F 32.

⁶⁷⁸ AKB vi, F 231.

⁶⁷⁹ AKB v, F 92.

⁶⁸⁰ *Editors*: The remainder of point 11, and also point 12, was not translated by LVP.

#2153 a. According to one opinion [as in the Little Vehicle], they are abandoned by cultivation only (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷), for they only take [worldly] coarse objects (緣麤事境) and arise spontaneously (緣麤事境) [and are not originating from figurating (*vikalpa*)].

b. According to another opinion [i.e., the correct one], they are not only abandoned by cultivation, but also by insight (見修所斷), for they arise supported by the powers of both types of defilement (依二煩惱勢力) [i.e., innate (*sahaja* 俱生) and figured (*vikalpa* 分別)], as someone may give rise to anger (*krodha* 忿), etc., when encountering another's [false] views [in terms of afflicted view of a self (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*), afflicted view of holding to an extreme (*antaḡrāha-dṛṣṭi*)], etc. (緣他見等) [cf. YBh (T.30.1579.0808c05)].

The subsidiary defilements abandoned by insight (見所斷) pertain to all four truths (通四諦) by the power of the general (總) and particular (別) defilements (惑力), in accordance with their support and their object (隨所依緣).

In this matter, there is an opinion that anger (*krodha* 忿), etc., would arise (生) only under the condition of defilements in terms of erring about the truths (緣迷諦惑), not however in the way that there is direct error about the truths (非親迷諦) (cf. #2034), because the subsidiary defilements' modes of operation (行相) are coarse and superficial (麤淺), and do not seize their object in a profound manner (深取).

c. According to a further opinion, envy (*īrṣyā* 嫉), etc., are also direct errors regarding the truths (親迷諦), for one may generate envy, etc., regarding cessation and the path leading to cessation (滅道).

#2154 12. However, the ten subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) starting with anger (*krodha* 忿) take only existing things for their objects (緣有事), for they cannot arise unless rooted (託) in the archetypes (本質). [As for the arising of the subsidiary defilements when] taking objects such as impurity (緣有漏) (cf. #2041), [purity], etc., this should be understood in accordance with the above [discussion of fundamental defilements] (cf. #2040).

E.D.G. *Undetermined mental factors (aniyatas)*⁶⁸¹

#2156 We have already explained the twenty subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱). There are four undetermined mental factors (*aniyatas* 不定). What are their characteristics?

⁶⁸¹ *kārikā* 14b–d.

#2157 The stanza 14bd (Chin. 14cd) says:

kaukrtyaṃ middham eva ca | 14b
vitarkaś ca vicāraś ca ... dvaye dvidhā || 14cd
 不定謂悔眠·尋伺二各二|| 14cd

14c–d. The undetermined mental factors (*aniyatas* 不定) are regret (*kaukrtya* 悔) and drowsiness (*middha* 眠); initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺): these two pairs can be of two kinds (二各二) (see #2046).

#2160 The Treatise:

Regret (*kaukrtya* 悔), [drowsiness (*middha* 眠), initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺)] <are undetermined (不定)>, i.e., are not determinedly good (善) or <defiled (染), etc.>, that is, bad or non-defined.

They are not—like contact (*sparśa* 觸), etc.—determinedly (定) associated with every mind.

They do not—like predilection (*chanda* 欲), etc., which pervade also the two higher realms (*dhātus*)—determinedly pervade all stages (*bhūmis* 地).

Thus, they are given the name of UNDETERMINED mental factors (*aniyatas* 不定).

#2164 1. REGRET (*kaukrtya* 悔), i.e., the effect, takes its name from its cause, i.e., the “badly done” (*ku-kṛta* 惡作).

It has for its nature remorse (*vipratīṣāra* 追悔) after blaming <or detesting> (*ku* = *e* 惡) a done (*kṛta*) action (作業).

It has for its activity to hinder “calm abiding or calmness” (*śamatha* 止). {7/1v.}

We thus <figuratively> give (假立) to the result (果) the name of its cause (因): first, one blames <or detests> (惡) a done action (作業); afterwards, one has remorse about it.

The regret for not having done something falls also under regret (*kaukrtya*), <i.e., the “badly done” (惡作)>, for one has remorse, saying: “It was badly done by me for not having done that”.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 166–167, definition; v, F 31, bad, nourished by doubt (*vicikitsā*); F 89, envelopment (*paryavasthāna*); F 97, subsidiary defilement (*upakleśa*); F 99, hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*).

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (16b) (transl. based on Jacobi):

kaukr̥tyañ cetaso vipratīsārah |

Regret (*kaukr̥tya*) is the remorse (*vipratīsāra*) of the mind.

kutsitam kṛtam iti, kukṛtam | tad-bhāvaḥ kaukr̥tyam | iha tu kukṛta-viṣayaś cetaso vilekhaḥ kaukr̥tyam, caitasikādhikārāt |

A blameworthy (*kutsita*) action is called *ku-kṛta* (“badly done”), from which is derived the abstract *kaukr̥tya*. Here, however, the latter, since we are dealing here with what is mental, is the pain (*vilekha*)⁶⁸² of the mind which has for its object (*viṣaya*) a bad deed (*kukṛta*).

etac ca citta-sthiti-paripantha-karmakam |

The activity of regret is opposed to the steadiness (*sthiti*) of the mind (*citta*).

#2165 2. DROWSINESS (*middha* 眠) (is brief for 睡眠).

It is, in its nature, that which causes the body (or person (身)) to be beyond the control of the mind (*asvatantra* 不自在), that which causes the mind to be compressed (*abhisamkṣipta* 昧略),⁶⁸³ that is, be obscure (*mei* 昧) and contracted (*lūe* 略).

It has for its activity to hinder insight (*vipaśyanā* 觀). <384>

Indeed, in the state of drowsiness, [a] one is not master of one’s body (or person) (身不自在), and [b] the mind is, on the one hand, very dark (闇) and feeble (劣), and is, on the other hand, used only by one gate (一門轉) ([i.e., the mental cognition,] for the external sensory activity is being suspended).

Being obscure (*mei* 昧), drowsiness is distinct from concentration (*samādhi* 定).

Being contracted (*lūe* 略), drowsiness is distinct from “the state of being awake” (寤).

Thus, we see that drowsiness is not without its own nature (無體) and not without activity (無用).

Sometimes the word *middha* is used to designate a “mindless” state of heavy drowsiness (無心位, see #2309); but that is a conventional way of speaking (假立), for drowsiness, like the other hindrances (*nīvaraṇas* 蓋) and envelopments (*paravasthānas* 纏),⁶⁸⁴ is associated with the mind.

⁶⁸² Editors: Jacobi comments: *vilekha* means actually being wounded, “sore of the mind”.

⁶⁸³ AKB 21/5r.2 [v, F 90].

⁶⁸⁴ AKB v, F 89, 99.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 165, vii, F 21 (on compression [*abhisamkṣepa*]), v, F 90:

cittābhisamkṣepo middham

drowsiness, the compression of mind.

If one were limited to this definition, it would hold for attainment (*saṃāpatti*) where there is compression (*abhisamkṣepa*). – Thus Vasubandhu adds:

... *kāya-saṃdhāraṇāsamartha* iti.

that which makes the mind incapable of commanding the body.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (17a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

middham asvatantra-vṛtti-cetaso 'bhisamkṣepaḥ |

Drowsiness (*middha*) is the compression (*abhisamkṣepa*) of the non-autonomously (*asvatantra*) functioning (*pravṛtti*) mind.

vṛttir ālambane pravṛttiḥ | sāsvatantrā cetaso yato bhavati, tan middham |

“Functioning” (*vṛtti*) is the engagement (*pravṛtti*) in regard to the cognitive object (*ālambana*); that by which the mind does not autonomously (*asvatantra*) exercise this [engagement] is what is meant by drowsiness.

kāya-saṃdhāraṇāsamarthā vā vṛttiś cetaso 'svatantratā sā yato bhavati, tan middham |

Or else, the mind being not autonomous (*asvatantra*) is the functioning (*vṛtti*) that is incapable (*asamartha*) to regulate (*saṃdhāraṇa*) the body (*kāya*) and the mind; and that by which this occurs is drowsiness (*middha*).

abhisamkṣepaś cetasaś cakṣur-ādīndriya-dvāreṇāpravṛttiḥ |

“Compression” (*abhisamkṣepa*) is the non-engagement (*apravṛtti*) of the mind by way of the sense-faculties (*indriya*) of the eye (*cakṣus*), etc.

etac ca mohāṃśe prajñapanān mohāṃśikaṃ,

Drowsiness is a special designation for a part of delusion (*moha*), and is thus a part of delusion.

kṛtyātipatti-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakaṇ ca |

Drowsiness has for its activity to provide the support for neglecting (*atipatti*) one's duty (*kṛtyā*).

#2167 [There are different opinions on the nature of regret (*kaukrtya*) and of drowsiness (*middha*):]

- a. 〈According to one opinion,〉 regret and drowsiness are, in themselves (體), only delusion (*moha* 癡) (opinion of Sthiramati, in *Thirty Stanzas*), for YBh (T.30.1579.0604b) says that they are part of the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas* 隨煩惱) and of delusion. {72r.}
- #2168 b. 〈According to another opinion,〉 this is not correct (不然), for regret and drowsiness can also be good. Thus, these two, when they are defiled (染), are, 〈in themselves〉, delusion (*moha* 癡); when they are pure (淨), they are non-delusion (*amoha* 無癡). YBh, in the definition cited by the first masters, 〈says that they are part of the subsidiary defilements and of delusion for〉 it is concerned only with the defiled part of regret and drowsiness.
- #2169 c. 〈According to a further opinion,〉 the theory of the second masters is also not reasonable, for regret and drowsiness—when they are non-defined (*avyākṛta* 無記)—are neither delusion nor non-delusion.

Indeed, 〈it should be said〉:

i. Regret (*kaukr̥tya*; 惡作 [= the “badly done”]) is, in itself (體), two *dharma*s, i.e., (1) volition (*cetanā* 思) and (2) understanding (*prajñā* 慧), for, by the second, one cognizes clearly (明了) the actions done or not done (所作業), by the first, one reflects on them 〈and makes choices〉 (思擇, *cintanā*, *vicārya*⁶⁸⁵).

ii. Drowsiness (*middha* 睡眠) is, in itself, two *dharma*s, i.e., (1) volition (*cetanā* 思) and (2) ideation (*saṃjñā* 想), for drowsiness thinks about and names (思想), [for example,] the various characteristics of the objects in a dream (夢境相).⁶⁸⁶ <385>

This is why YBh (T.30.1579.0604b) says that [regret and drowsiness] are of conventional existence (*saṃvṛti* 世俗有, see #2826).

When they are defiled (染污), they are indeed outflows (等流) of delusion (*moha* 癡), like non-faith (*āśraddha* 不信), etc.: this is why YBh (cited by the first masters) says that they are part of delusion.

- #2170 d. 〈According to still another opinion,〉 the theory of the third masters is also not correct (不然), for that which constitutes the envelopments (*pariyavasthānas* 纏) of regret and drowsiness (*kaukr̥tya-middha*) is neither volition (*cetanā* 思), nor understanding (*prajñā* 慧), nor ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) 〈in their nature〉. {72v.} Thus, let us say that regret and drowsiness each have their own substance (體),

⁶⁸⁵ AKB 29/9r.9 [ix, F 232]; #3031.

⁶⁸⁶ According to another source, the dream is predilection (*chanda*) and ideation (*saṃjñā*).

for their mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) is different from that of other mental factors (*caittas*). – If YBh says that they have conventional existence (世俗有), it is because they are mixed up with (the characteristic of) delusion (*moha*).⁶⁸⁷

#2171 3–4. [As for the third and fourth undetermined factors:]

INITIAL INQUIRY (*vitarka* 尋) refers to inquiring (*paryeṣaṇā* 尋求, inquiring figuring [paryeṣaka *vikalpa*], see #2203).

It has for its nature to bring it about that the mind (心), which is bustling about (匆遽),⁶⁸⁸ proceeds coarsely (麤轉) with regard to the objects (境) of mental discourse (意言).

INVESTIGATION (*vicāra* 伺) refers to judgment (*pratyavekṣaṇa* 伺察, judging figuring [pratyavekṣaka-*vikalpa*]).

It has for its nature to bring it about that the mind, which is bustling about, proceeds subtly (細轉) with regard to the objects of mental discourse.⁶⁸⁹

Both have for their activity to be the cause (or support) for bodily and mental states (身心分位所依) of comfort and of discomfort (*sparsā-* and *asparśa-vihāratā* 安不安住).

Both have (用) for their substance (體) one part of volition (*cetanā* 思) and one part of understanding (*prajñā* 慧).

They differ (in terms of type) (類別) in that, in regard to the objects of mental discourse (意言), the first is not deep (深) perquisition or thought-out judgment (*nitīraṇa* 推度⁶⁹⁰), while the second is deep perquisition or thought-out judgment. <386>

⁶⁸⁷ *suichixiang* 隨癡相 = *anumoha-lakṣaṇa*; same expression above, #2082, note.

⁶⁸⁸ “Bustling about”, “hurriedly”, *congpo juji* 匆迫遽急. – Does this mean that, in the state of initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*), the mind has a movement which distinguishes it from the state of non-*vitarka-vicāra*? However, Kuiji says that when the mind and the body are comfortable (*sparsā-vihāra*), action is slowed down (or at ease) (*xuhuan* 徐緩), but that it is hurried when being uncomfortable (*asparśa-vihāra*).

⁶⁸⁹ Mental discourse (*mano-jalpa*) (compare *cetaso 'bhilāpaḥ* [expression of thought or mental speech]), AKB i, F 61). The expression “object of mental discourse” is explained in three ways, says Kuiji: it refers (1) to everything that is the object of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), (2) to all the *dharma*s, (3) to the collections of names, phrases and syllables (*nāma-pada-vyañjana-kāyas*) (AKB ii, F 238), and to the thing that they express: that is the very discourse (*jalpa*) itself.

⁶⁹⁰ AKB 19/9r.1 (v, F 22).

Apart from volition and understanding, (the two categories (種) of) initial inquiry and investigation have neither a distinct substance (體) (or type (類)) nor distinct activity of their own.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

a. *Dhamma-saṅgaṇi*, 7–8; *Attha-sālinī*, pp. 114–115; *Milinda*, pp. 62–63; *Compendium*, p. 10; (*Vyāsa ad Yogasūtras*, i, 17.42–44).

b. AKB i, F 61; ii, F 173–176; viii, F 147.

c. Vasubandhu, *Pañca-skandhaka*, cited in *Vyākhyā* of AKB i, 33 [WOG.64.27ff.] (see AKB ii, F 175):

vitarkaḥ katamaḥ | paryeṣako manojalpaś cetanāprajñāviśeṣaḥ | yā cittasyaudārikatā ||

What is initial inquiry? It is an inquiring (*paryeṣaka*) mental discourse (*manojalpa*), a special kind of volition (*cetanā*) and understanding (*prajñā*). It is that which is the coarseness (*audārikatā*) of the mind.

vicāraḥ katamaḥ | pratyavekṣako manojalpaś cetanāprajñāviśeṣaḥ | yā cittasyasūkṣmatā.

What is investigation? It is a judging (*pratyavekṣaka*) mental discourse (*manojalpa*), a special kind of volition (*cetanā*) and understanding (*prajñā*). It is that which is the subtleness (*sūkṣmatā*) of the mind.

d. Opinion of Pūrvaścāryas (= Sautrāntikas), cited by *Vyākhyā* [WOG.140.13ff.] of AKB ii, verse 33 (see ii, F 175, note):

vitarkaḥ katamaḥ. cetanām vā niśritya prajñām vā paryeṣako manojalpo 'nabhyūhābhyūhāvasthāyor yathākramam sā ca cittasy' audārikatā ||

What is initial inquiry (*vitarka*)? – A mental conversation (*manojalpa*) of examination (*paryeṣaka*) which has, for its support, volition (*cetanā*) or understanding (*prajñā*) depending on whether it does not involve or does involve deduction (*abhyūha*). This is the gross state (*audārikatā*) of mind (*citta*).

vicāraḥ katamaḥ | cetanām vā niśritya prajñām vā pratyavekṣako manojalpo 'nabhyūhābhyūhāvasthāyor yathākramam sā ca citta-sūkṣmatā ... ||

What is investigation (*vicāra*)? – A mental conversation of appreciation, of judgment (*pratyavekṣaka*), which has, for its support, volition (*cetanā*) or understanding (*prajñā*) depending on whether it does not involve or does involve deduction (*abhyūha*). This is the subtle state (*sūkṣmatā*) of mind (*citta*).

asmin pakṣe vitarka-vicārāv eka-svabhāvau samudāya-rūpau paryāya-vartināu

paryeṣaṇa-pratyavekṣaṇ'ākāra-mātreṇa bhinnāṇv iṣyete.

According to this theory (*pakṣa*), initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) constitute two almost identical psychological complexes: they differ in that the first involves “inquiry” (*paryeṣaṇa*) and the second “judgment” (*pratyavekṣaṇa*).

tatrodāharaṇaṃ kecid ācakṣate. tadyathā bahuṣu ghaṭeṣv avasthiteṣu ko 'ra dṛḍhaḥ ko jarjara iti muṣṭinā 'bhighnato ya ūhaḥ. sa vitarkaḥ. iyaṃto jarjarā dṛḍhā veti yad ante grahaṇaṃ. sa vicāra iti.

Some give an example: In the presence of numerous pots (*ghaṭa*), someone tests them in order to know which one is well-baked (*dṛḍha*) and which one is soft (*jarjara*): this inquiry (*ūha*) is initial inquiry (*vitarka*); finally, this person arrives at a conclusion, “There are such a number of each category”: this is investigation (*vicāra*).

- e. *Samuccaya-śāstra* (T.31.1605.0665b):

vitarkaḥ katamaḥ | cetanāṃ va niśritya prajñāṃ vā niśritya paryeṣako mano-jalpaḥ | yā cittasya audārikā pravṛttih:

What is initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋)? – Relying either on volition (*cetanā* 思) or on understanding (*prajñā* 慧), it is an inquiring mental (尋求意) discourse (*yan* 言) which makes the mind (心) coarse (*audārika* 麤).

- f. *Sthiramati, Trentaine* (Lévi), F 32 (17a) (transl. based on Jacobi):

vitarkaḥ paryeṣako mano-jalpaḥ, prajñā-cetanā-viśeṣaḥ |

Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) is an inquiring (*paryeṣaka*) mental discourse (*mano-jalpa*), a special kind of volition (*cetanā*) and understanding (*prajñā*).

paryeṣakaḥ, kiṃ etad iti, nirūpaṇākāra-pravṛttaḥ |

“Inquiring” (*paryeṣaka*) means: occurring in the mode (*ākāra*) of examining (*nirūpaṇa*) something in terms of what it is.

manaso jalpo mano-jalpaḥ | jalpa iva jalpaḥ | jalpo 'rtha-kathanam |

“Mental discourse” (*manojalpa*) means a discourse of the mind (*manas*), so to speak.

“Discourse” means a kind of discourse.

“Discourse” (*jalpa*) is the naming of a thing (*artha*).

cetanā-prajñā-viśeṣa iti, cetanāyās citta-parispandātmakatvāt, prajñāyās ca guṇa-doṣa-vivekākāratvāt |

“A special kind of volition and understanding” (*cetanāprajñāviśeṣa*), because “volition” (*cetanā*) consists in the movement (*parispanda*) of the mind and “understanding” (*prajñā*) has the mode of distinguishing (*viveka*) the qualities (*guṇa*) and the faults (*doṣa*).

tad-vaśena citta-pravṛtteḥ kadācic citta-cetanayor vitarkaḥ prajñaptiḥ, kadācic prajñā-cetasor, yathā-kramam anabhyūhābhyūhāvasthayaḥ |

Because the mind engages due to this (special kind of volition and understanding), then “initial inquiry” is a special designation, i.e., now as volition and mind, and now as understanding and mind, according to whether it is a matter of non-reasoning (*anabhyūha*) or of reasoning (*abhyūha*).

atha vā: cetanā-prajñayor eva vitarkaḥ prajñaptis, tad-vaśena cittasya tathā-pravṛttatvāt |

Or else: Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) is a special designation of volition and understanding (together) because the mind engages due to this (special kind of volition and understanding).

sa eva cittasyaudārikatā | audārikateti, sthūlatā, vastu-mātra-paryeṣaṇākāratvāt |

Initial inquiry is a coarseness (*audārikatā* = *sthūlatā*) of the mind because it is the mode of inquiring (*paryeṣaṇā*) about a thing in general (*vastu-mātra*).

eṣa ca nayo vicāre 'pi draṣṭavyaḥ |

The same approach is to be applied to “investigation” (*vicāra*).

vicāro 'pi hi cetanā-prajñā-viśeṣātmakaḥ |

Investigation (*vicāra*) consists indeed also of a special kind of volition (*cetanā*) and understanding (*prajñā*).

pratyaवेक्षako mano-jalpa eva | idaṃ tad iti, pūrvādhigata-nirūpaṇāt | ata eva ca citta-sūkṣmatety, ucyate |

It is a judging (*pratyaवेक्षaka*) mental discourse because it examines (*nirūpaṇa*) something previously recognized (*adhigata*), stating that is is such and such. It is thus called the subtleness (*sūkṣmatā*) of the mind.

etau ca sparśāsparśa-vihāra-saṃniśraya-dāna-karmakau |

Initial inquiry and investigation have the activity to provide the support for comfort (*sparśa-vihāra*) and discomfort (*asparśa-vihāra*).

anayoś caudārika-sūkṣmatayā vyavasthāpanāt prthak karaṇam |

They are distinguished from each other because the one is coarse (*audārika*) and the other is subtle (*sūkṣma*).

Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) both have *nirūpaṇa*, i.e., investigating or examining of the object for their mode of operation. The examining of initial inquiry is inquiring [*paryeṣakaḥ*]: “What is it?” [*kim etad*]; the examining of investigation is the conclusion or judgment [*pratyavekṣaka*]: “It is this” [*idaṃ tad*]. – The rest is obscure.

#2173 The stanza (*kārikā* 14d) says: TWO PAIRS CAN BE OF TWO KINDS (*dvaye dvidhā*). (See #2156.) [The Chinese does not clearly specify <387> the two pairs (*dvaye*); the Chinese has “two-each-two”, *er ge er* 二各二: hence the discussion that follows.] {7/3r.}

[There are various opinions.]

I. <According to one opinion,> initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) can both be of two kinds, i.e., defiled (染) or pure (淨).

#2175 II. <According to another opinion,> this first explanation is incorrect, for regret (*kaukr̥tya* 悔) and drowsiness (*middha* 眠) can also be defiled or pure.

#2176 Thus, <it should be said that> the first “two” [in the Chinese] relates to the defiled mental factors (*caittas*) listed above, namely, (1) the defilements (*kleśas*) and (2) the subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*): [each of these two] are of two kinds, namely, [a] bad (不善) or [b] non-defined (無記); or, [a] being actual, i.e., envelopments (*pariyavasthānas* 纏), or [b] being seeds, i.e., proclivities (*anuśayas* 隨眠).⁶⁹¹

#2178 III. <According to a further opinion,> this explanation is also not reasonable, for Vasubandhu—<with the words [“two pairs can be of two kinds”]>—is concerned with the last four mental factors called undetermined factors (*anīyatas* 不定).

#2180 The first “two” [in the Chinese] indicates two kinds (種) <of two>: (1) regret (*kaukr̥tya* 悔) and drowsiness (*middha* 眠), (2) initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺). <These second “two” kinds (種) are of a distinct type (種類各別)>. [(Regret and drowsiness) pervade the three realms (*dhātus*), (initial inquiry and investigation) are volition and understanding (*cetanā-prajñā*), etc.] <Thus, the first “two” [in the Chinese] refers to two kinds of two>.

#2181 Each of the four is of two natures:

- #2182 a. defiled (染) [i.e., the term “defiled” encompasses the bad (*akuśala*) and the obscured-non-defined (*nivṛta-avyākṛta* 覆無記)],
b. non-defiled (不染) [i.e., the term “non-defiled” encompasses the good (*kuśala*) and the non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 無覆無記)],

⁶⁹¹ AKB v, F 3, 79.

in contrast to the mental factors that are good or defiled (善染) by definition, 〈that are each of only one [nature]〉. {7/3v.}

Or else, the author says that the four are of two natures in order to distinguish them from the defiled (i.e., anger [*krodha*], etc.).

Or again, because—since one text (YBh, T.30.1579.0604a) says that the four are subsidiary defilements (*upkleśas*)—the author wants to indicate that they are not necessarily subsidiary defilements.

The expression TWO PAIRS CAN BE OF TWO KINDS (*dvaye dvidhā*) explains the meaning of the word *aniyata*, i.e., undetermined, and it is thus very useful 〈to establish these words in a profound way (深)〉.

E.D.G.1. *Issues in relation with the undetermined mental factors (aniyatas)*

1. Real existence (實有) and existence as designation (假有).

#2186 〈Among the four [undetermined factors],〉 initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺) are definitively (定) existence as designation since the texts say that they are constituted by volition (*cetanā* 思) and understanding (*prajñā* 慧). <388>

#2188 There are different opinions regarding regret (*kaukr̥tya* 悔) and drowsiness (*middha* 眠).

a. [According to one opinion,] they have existence as designation (假有), for YBh (T.30.1579.0604b) says that they are of conventional existence (*saṃvṛti-sat* 世俗有).

#2189 b. [According to another opinion,] they are of real existence (*dravya-sat* 實物有), for it is only initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*) which are said to be existence as designation (假有). If YBh declares that they are of conventional existence (*saṃvṛti-sat* 世俗有), it is by referring to the definition that makes them part of delusion (*moha*). [The Chinese says 隨他相 (“in accordance with the characteristic of another *dharma*”), as at #2082]: it does not mean that they have only existence as designation. Moreover, although the seeds (*bījas* 內種) are real things (實), nevertheless, YBh (T.30.1579.0589a11) says that they are also of conventional existence (世俗有). {7/4r.}

#2191 2. Association amongst each other.

〈Among the four [undetermined factors],〉 initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) are definitively (定) not associated [—counter to the *Vaibhāṣika*

doctrine⁶⁹²—], for they are of the same substance (體) (i.e., volition [*cetanā*] and understanding [*prajñā*]), of the same type (類) (perquisition or thought-out judgment [*nīṭiraṇa*]), but differ only in their coarseness and subtlety (*audārikatā* 麤, *sūkṣmatā* 細).

The difference of the three stages (*bhūmis* 地) (i.e., (1) with initial inquiry and investigation, (2) with initial inquiry, without investigation, (3) without initial inquiry and investigation⁶⁹³) is established due to detachment (*vairāgya*) and non-detachment to initial inquiry and investigation, not due to the presence or absence of initial inquiry and investigation as seeds (種) or as “in action” (現起). Thus, the three stages are not mixed up (雜亂).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to YBh (T.30.1579.0294c, 0610c). – For us, initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra* 尋伺) manifests up to among the gods of the fourth meditation (*dhyāna* 靜慮); they exist as seeds up to among the gods of the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra* 有頂): it is not their presence or absence that establishes the distinction of the three stages:

- a. with initial inquiry and with investigation (*saṃvitarka-saṃvicāra* 有尋有伺), realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) and the first meditation (*dhyāna*);
- b. without initial inquiry and with investigation (*avitaṅka-saṃvicāra* 無尋有伺), intermediate meditation (*dhyāna-antara*) (靜慮中間);
- c. without initial inquiry and without investigation (*avitaṅka-avicāra* 無尋無伺), second meditation (*dhyāna*) and above.

But when attachment to initial inquiry is tamed by entry into the intermediate meditation, there is the stage without initial investigation and with investigation. This explains the difference between the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) and the intermediate meditation (*dhyāna-antara*), for initial inquiry and investigation may be absent in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) ...

#2192 Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) can be associated (互相應) with regret (*kaukr̥tya*) and drowsiness (*middha*).

Regret and drowsiness can be associated with each other (互相應).

#2194 3. Association with the cognitions (*viññānas*).

⟨All four⟩ undetermined factors (*aniyatās*) cannot be associated with the eighth

⁶⁹² See AKB ii, F 173–176.

⁶⁹³ AKB viii, F 183.

and the seventh cognitions, as we have seen at #0634, #1304. <389>

Regret (*kaṅkṛtya*) and drowsiness (*middha*) are only associated with the sixth cognition for they are not *dharma*s that can be associated with the five cognitions.

There are various opinions regarding initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*), and the five cognitions (*viññānas*).

#2197 a. <According to one opinion,> initial inquiry and investigation are also associated with the five cognitions. Indeed, YBh (T.30.1579.0610c) says that the five cognitions have initial inquiry and investigation.

#2198 Moreover, YBh (T.30.1579.0302b) says that initial inquiry and investigation comprise seven kinds of figurating (*vikāpas* 分別):

1. [figurating of] an existing mark (*bhāva-nimitta* 有相) [i.e., present and past objects];
2. [figurating of] a non-existing mark (*abhāva-nimitta* 無相) [i.e., future objects];
3. spontaneous (*svārasika* 任運) [figurating of objects];
4. inquiring (*paryeṣaka* 尋求) [figurating];
5. judging (*pratyavekṣaka* 伺察) [figurating];
6. defiled (*kliṣṭa* 染污) [figurating];
7. non-defiled (*akliṣṭa* 不染污) [figurating].

And Sthiramati's *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0703a) says that spontaneous figurating (任運分別) is the five cognitions (*viññānas*). {74v.}

#2200 b. <According to another opinion,> initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*) are only associated with mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識). Indeed:

#2201 1. YBh (T.30.1579.0280b) says that <the *dharma*s of initial inquiry, investigation (尋求伺察)—the seven kinds of figurating (*vikāpas*)—etc., are among the <uncommon (不共)> activities (*dharma*s) belonging to mental cognition;

2. Moreover, [YBh, T.30.1579.0302c] says that initial inquiry and investigation are associated with dissatisfaction and satisfaction (*daurmanasya-saumanasya* 憂喜), but does not say that they are associated with displeasure and pleasure (*duḥkha-sukha* 苦樂: generally, physical sensations).

There is no reason to speak of neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨受) which is universal (遍), but why does the *sāstra* not speak of displeasure (*duḥkha* 苦) and

pleasure (*sukha* 樂), unless it is because initial inquiry and investigation do not belong to the five physical cognitions (*viññānas*)?

Initial inquiry and investigation are associated with satisfaction: although the first meditation (*dhyāna* 初靜慮) includes a pleasure (*sukha* 樂) of the domain of mind (*mano-bhūmi* 意地), nevertheless, as this pleasure is not separate from satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜), it is included under the general name satisfaction (*saumanasya*).

Initial inquiry and investigation are associated with dissatisfaction: although the destinies of exclusive suffering (純苦處) include a displeasure (*duḥkha*) of the domain of mind (*manas*) (意地苦), nevertheless, as this displeasure resembles dissatisfaction (憂) (i.e., being with figurating [*savikalpaka*]), it is included under the general name dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*).

3. Moreover, [YBh (T.30.1579.0302b)] says that initial inquiry and investigation have for their object (所緣) the names (*nāma-kāya* 名身), phrases (*vyāñjana-kāya*), syllables (*pada-kāya*) and the thing that they experience (義); but the five cognitions (*viññānas*) do not have ⟨the names, phrases, syllables and the thing that they experience⟩ for their object.

#2202 It is true that YBh (T.30.1579.0610c) (see #2197) says that the five cognitions have initial inquiry and investigation, {7/5r.} but this is in order to show that they arise, in a large number of cases, due to initial inquiry and investigation, not in order to teach that they are <390> associated (相應) with initial inquiry and investigation.

As for the statement of the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0703a) (see #2198) that spontaneous (*svārasika* 任運) figurating (*vikalpa* 分別) refers to the five cognitions, this contradicts YBh (T.30.1579.0280c) (see #2201): by “spontaneous figurating”, the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* means the five cognitions; as spontaneous (*svārasika*), YBh designates the figurating that occurs “with” the five cognitions (五識俱), namely, initial inquiry and investigation (尋伺) as associated (相應) with the *manas*, (i.e., the figured mental cognition (分別意識)) associated “with” the five [cognitions].

#2203 Thus the texts brought in as arguments are not demonstrative, and we conclude that the five cognitions (*viññānas*) are not associated with initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The *Vaibhāṣikas* [T.27.1545.0219b08] think that the five cognitions (*viññānas*) involve

initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*): however, they call them *avikalpaka* (without conceptual figurating). Indeed, they distinguish three kinds of figurating (*vikalpas*):

1. figurating in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vikalpa* 自性分別),⁶⁹⁴ which is initial inquiry and investigation (尋伺) (according to the author of the AKB: initial inquiry alone);
2. figurating consisting in recollecting (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa* 隨念分別), which is memory associated with mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) alone (意識相應念);
3. figurating consisting of examining (*nirūpaṇā-vikalpa* 推度分別) which is understanding (*prajñā*) (not associated with concentration [*samādhi*]), associated with mental cognition alone (意地不定).

The five cognitions (*vijñānas*) having only the first figurating are said to be “without conceptual figurating” (*avikalpaka*), as a horse is said to be “without legs” when it has only one leg (AKB i, F 60–61). [The *Dharma-saṃgraha*, Anecdota Oxoniensia, § 135, names these three kinds of figurating: the first by the name *sahaja-vikalpa* (innate figurating).]

The *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0703a15) explains how mental cognition is “with figurating” because it involves the three kinds of figurating (of the *Vaibhāṣikas*):

1. figurating in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vikalpa*) has for its domain the specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) of things (*saṃskāras*) actually experienced (於現在所受諸行自相行分別);
2. figurating consisting in recollecting (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*) has for its domain the memory of things previously experienced (於昔曾所受諸行追念行分別);
3. figurating consisting of examining (*nirūpaṇā-vikalpa*) has for its domain the pondering⁶⁹⁵ of things not directly known, whether past, future or present (於去來今不現見事思構行分別).

Furthermore, there are seven kinds of figurating (*vikalpas*):

1. *svārasika*, “spontaneous” [figurating], so called because it functions spontaneously in its object (*svaviṣaye svarasena pravṛtteḥ*) (於所緣任運分別), it is *pañca-vijñāna-kāyānām yathā lambana-lakṣaṇam aparicchinna-vikalpaḥ* (?) (五識身如所

⁶⁹⁴ See the above issue, #0607, in regard to sensation qua intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vedanā* 自性受).

⁶⁹⁵ “Pondering”, *sigou* 思構, same expression in AKB 16/16v.4 (iv, F 162), definition of *mata*: translated *bsam-pa* = *cintita*.

緣相無異分別):⁶⁹⁶ = “figurating (*vikalpa*), belonging to the five sensory cognitions, non-differentiated according to the characteristic of the object” (?);

2. *bhāva-nimitta* [(figurating) “of an existing mark”] (有相分別), which is figurating in its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vikalpa*) and figurating consisting of recollecting (*anusmaraṇa-vikalpa*) because it seizes the various characteristics (*nānā-lakṣaṇa*) of the present and past object;

3. *abhāva-nimitta* [(figurating) “of a non-existing mark”] (無相分別), which is directed at the future desired object;

4–7. *pariṣeṣaka* [“inquiring” (figurating)] (尋求分別), *pratyavekṣaka* [“judging” (figurating)], *kliṣṭa* (defiled [figurating]), *akliṣṭa* (non-defiled [figurating]): these four are figurating consisting of examining (*nirūpaṇā-vikalpa*), for the latter is (4) sometimes inquiring, i.e., initial inquiry (*vitarka*), (5) sometimes judging, i.e., investigation (*vicāra* 伺察分別), (6) sometimes defiled (染污分別), (7) sometimes non-defiled (不染污分別).

Thus, for the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, spontaneous (*svārasika*) figurating (*vikalpa*) belongs to the five cognitions (*vijñānas*). <391> According to YBh (T.30.1579.0280b27), [a] figurating of the object (*ālambana-vikalpa* 分別所緣) and [b] deliberation of the object (*ālambana-upanidhyāna* 審慮所緣) are to be distinguished. The first is divided into seven: [i] figurating of an existing mark (*bhāva-nimitta-vikalpa* 有相分別); [ii] figurating of a non-existing mark (*abhāva-nimitta-vikalpa* 無相分別); [iii] spontaneous figurating (*svārasika-vikalpa* 任運分別): “That which occurs by the power of the present object”; ...

#2206 4. Association with the sensations (*vedanās*). – Two opinions.

a. <According to one opinion, the “badly done” (惡作)>, i.e., regret (*kaukr̥tya*), is associated with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) and neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨), because it evolves (轉) as being painful (慙) and because it may be non-defined (通無記).

#2207 Drowsiness (*middha* 睡眠) occurs simultaneously with satisfaction (*saumanasya* 喜), dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya* 憂) and neutral sensation (*upekṣā* 捨受), because it can evolve as pleasant (歡), painful (慙), neutral (中庸).

#2208 Initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra* 尋伺) are associated with dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya*), satisfaction (*saumanasya*), neutral sensation (*upekṣā*) and pleasure (*sukha*), for, in the first meditation (*dhyāna* 初靜慮), mental cog-

⁶⁹⁶ See AKB i, F 19; vii, F 17?

nitition (*manas* 意) is accompanied by pleasure. {75v.}

- #2209 b. ⟨According to another opinion,⟩ the four [undetermined factors] are also associated with displeasure (*duhkha* 苦受), for, in the destinies of exclusive suffering (純苦趣), mental cognition (*manas* 意) is accompanied by displeasure.

- #2210 5. Association with the “special” mental factors (*caittas*).

The four [undetermined factors] are associated with five [special mental factors with] special objects (*pratiniyata-viṣayas* 別境), for there is no conflict between the objects and the modes of operation (*ākāra*, mode of “seizing”) of the four [undetermined factors] and the five [special mental factors].

- #2211 6. Association with good mental factors (*caittas*).

Regret (*kaukr̥tya* 悔) and drowsiness (*middha* 眠) are associated only with ten good [mental factors] (十善), for, occurring only in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲), they are not associated with ease (*praśrabdhi* 輕安).

Initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra* 尋伺) are associated with eleven good [mental factors], for, in the first meditation (*dhyāna*), they are associated with ease.

- #2213 7. Association with the ten defilements (*kleśas*).

Regret (*kaukr̥tya*) is associated only with ignorance (*avidyā* 無明 = delusion [*moha*]), for its mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相) is coarse (麤), whereas attachment (*rāga* 貪), etc., are subtle. [This definition applies for the majority of cases.]

- #2214 Drowsiness (*middha*), initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) [are associated] with the ten defilements, for there is no conflict between these three and the ten.

- #2215 8. Association with subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*).

Regret (*kaukr̥tya* 悔) is associated with the medium and the great subsidiary defilements (#2050), but not with the ten [small subsidiary defilements] of which anger (*krodha* 忿) is the first (主), <392> for each of these ten arise separately (各為主).

Drowsiness (*middha* 睡眠), {76r.} initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺) are associated with the twenty subsidiary defilements, for—in the state of drowsiness (眠), etc.—anger, etc., can be generated.

9. Ethical nature.

- #2217 The four undetermined factors (*aniyatās*) can all be of three natures (三性), i.e.,

good, etc. Indeed, non-defined action (無記業) (i.e., pertaining to deportment [*airyāpathika*], pertaining to skill in arts and crafts [*śailpasthānika*]⁶⁹⁷) can involve remorse (追悔).

- #2220 According to one opinion, regret (*kauṛṭya*) and drowsiness (*middha*) involve only the good acquired at birth (*upapatti-lābhika*⁶⁹⁸ 生得善), for the mode of operation of the first is coarse (麤鄙), the mode of operation of the second is “compressed” (*saṃkṣipta* 昧略⁶⁹⁹). Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*), on the other hand, can be “good proceeding from effort” (*prāyogika* 加行善), for they exist in the understandings (*prajñās*) derived from hearing, reflection and cultivation (聞所成等).
- #2221 According to another opinion, regret (*kauṛṭya*) and drowsiness (*middha*) are also “good proceeding from effort”, for they can occur in the said states of [understanding derived from] hearing and reflection.
- #2222 The last three [undetermined factors, i.e., drowsiness, initial inquiry and investigation,] can be obscured-non-defined (*nivṛta-avyākṛta* 染無記) and non-obscured-non-defined (*anivṛta-avyākṛta* 淨無記).

The first [undetermined factor], i.e., regret (*kauṛṭya* 惡作 [“badly done”]), is never obscured-non-defined, due to the coarseness and to the vehemence (麤猛) of its mode of operation. Being non-obscured-non-defined, [among its four [categories],] [regret] is only included in the third or in the fourth category, i.e., pertaining to deportment (*airyāpathika*) or pertaining to skill in arts and crafts (*śailpasthānika*), for, due to its coarseness and violence, it is not associated with a mind of retribution (*vipāka*) (i.e., the first category), and [regret] is, moreover, not the fruit of concentration (thus, it is not pertaining to supernormal emanations [*nairmāṇika*], i.e., the fourth category⁷⁰⁰).

Drowsiness (*middha* 眠) cannot be the fruit of concentration (定) either, {7/6v.} but a mind of retribution (異熟生心) may involve drowsiness.

Initial inquiry (*vitarka* 尋) and investigation (*vicāra* 伺) can be of the last three categories, but not of the first, i.e., retribution (*vipāka*), for the mode of operation of the mind of retribution is weak (微劣): this mind is incapable of investigating (尋) and judging (察) with respect to names, etc. (名等義).

⁶⁹⁷ AKB ii, F 320.

⁶⁹⁸ AKB *ibid*.

⁶⁹⁹ AKB vii, F 18.

⁷⁰⁰ AKB ii, F 320.

10. Realms (*dhātus*).

- #2224 a. The “badly done” (惡作), i.e., regret (*kaukr̥tya*), and drowsiness (*middha*) occur only in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界), because the other two realms (*dhātus*) are excellent (妙 = 勝). <393>

Initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) occur in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) and in the first meditation (*dhyāna* 初靜慮) because the other seven stages are calm (*jing* 靜).

- #2225 b. In the person born above, regret and drowsiness cannot manifest (現起).

The person born above can generate initial inquiry and investigation of a lower stage, and, conversely, the person born below can generate initial inquiry and investigation of a higher stage.

- #2227 Initial inquiry and investigation for those born above and below have both the inferior and the superior for their object.

- #2229 According to one opinion, regret and drowsiness cannot take a superior object due to the coarse and immediate (麤近) mode of operation (行相) of the first, the ⟨very⟩ “compressed” (昧略) mode of operation of the second.

- #2230 ⟨But, according to another opinion, these two, i.e., regret and drowsiness, can also be directed (緣) at a superior object, for⟩ the person with false view (邪見) regrets (悔) having cultivated concentration (修定); for the dream is directed at things already experienced (所更事, according to above, #0536).

- #2232 11. The “pertaining to the trainee” (*śaikṣa*), etc., categories.⁷⁰¹

Regret (*kaukr̥tya*) is not pertaining to the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa* 無學), since the detached (*vītarāga* 離欲) person has abandoned it. {77r.}

- #2233 Drowsiness (*middha*), initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) can all be of three categories (三種).⁷⁰²

All good *dharma*s of the “conditioned factors” class (*samskr̥ta*) (有為善法) of the person who is seeking liberation (求解脫者) are qualified as “trainees” (學).

All good *dharma*s of the “conditioned factors” class of the person who has reached the perfection of training (學究竟者) are qualified as “non-trainees” (無學故).

⁷⁰¹ AKB vi, F 231.

⁷⁰² *Editors*: (1) pertaining to the trainee (*śaikṣa*), (2) pertaining to the non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*) and (3) pertaining neither to the trainee nor to the non-trainee (*naiva-śaikṣa-naśaikṣa*).

#2235 12. Abandonment (*prahāṇa*, see #2670).

a. Regret (*kaukr̥tya*) and drowsiness (*middha*) are only “to be abandoned by cultivation” (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷) (this is obvious) and “to be abandoned by insight” (*darśana-heya* 見所斷); they are not “not to be abandoned” (*aheya*). [For the Little Vehicle, they are to be abandoned by cultivation only.]

They are to be abandoned by insight since—as they can arise by the power of false view (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見) (which is to be abandoned by insight), etc.—they can have this afflicted view (*dṛṣṭi*) for their object (and are, consequently, to be abandoned like this afflicted view itself is to be abandoned by insight).

They are not “not to be abandoned” (*aheya*):

i. [Objection: – Drowsiness is “not to be abandoned”, for the faculty of displeasure (*duhkha-indriya*), i.e., painful sensation, although it is impure <394> (i.e., not pure [*anāsrava*]) is called “not to be abandoned” when it belongs to a non-trainee (*aśaikṣa*). It should be the same for drowsiness.]

Reply: – No, for in contrast to the faculty of displeasure, drowsiness is not directly provoked (親所引生) by the pure path (無漏道).

ii. [Objection: – Regret is “not to be abandoned”, for the faculty of dissatisfaction (*daurmanasya-indriya*), i.e., the sensation of dissatisfaction, which is not pertaining to a non-trainee, is, nevertheless, called “not to be abandoned” when it is included in the pure faculties (*indriyas*), i.e., (the faculty) of coming to know what has not been known (*anājñātam ajñāsyāmi*) ... #2487.]

Reply: – No, for regret does not <deeply> seek liberation (求解脫) as does this dissatisfaction (憂).

iii. [Objection: – Regret and drowsiness are “not to be abandoned”, for YBh says that, for the non-trainee, all impure *dharmas* are called *aheya*, “not to be abandoned”, because the non-trainee has already abandoned them.]

Reply: – If one says that drowsiness is “not to be abandoned” (非所斷) when it is already abandoned, we agree willingly that drowsiness of the non-trainee is “not to be abandoned”.

#2237 b. Although initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra* 尋伺) are not part of the “true pure path” (真無漏道) (which is the path of insight into reality [*tattva-darśana-mārga*], the knowledge without conceptual figurating [*avikalpa-ka-jñāna*] or the root-knowledge [*mūla-jñāna*], #2918), nevertheless, they lead (引) to this path, they arise from this path [for the preparatory and the consec-

utive (—the subsequently acquired knowledge [*prṣṭha-labha-jñāna*], pure but with figurating [*savikalpaka*]—) of the root-knowledge include initial inquiry and investigation]. As a consequence, initial inquiry and investigation can be “not to be abandoned” (*aheya*). It goes without saying that they can also be abandoned by insight (*darśana-heya*) and abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*).

#2239 According to one opinion, [initial inquiry and investigation] are “not to be abandoned” (*aheya* 非所斷) because they are included in the “figurating” (*vikalpa* 分別) class of the list of the five *dharma*s (#2792):

1. name [*nāman* 名];
2. image [*nimitta* 相];
3. figurating [*vikalpa* 分別];
4. correct knowledge [*samyag-jñāna* 正知];
5. suchness [*tathatā* 真如]. {77v.}

YBh (T.30.1579.0302c) says that initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*) are figurating (*vikalpa*). [According to this interpretation, correct knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*), in this list, is the “root-knowledge”, and figurating (*vikalpa*) is the “subsequently acquired knowledge”.]

#2240 According to another opinion, [initial inquiry and investigation] fall also under the “correct knowledge” (*samyag-jñāna* 正智) of this list. [Correct knowledge would include the root-knowledge and the subsequently acquired knowledge; figurating (*vikalpa*) would mean the impure minds.] Indeed, in the *Vikhyāpana* (T.31.1602.0492b), correct thinking (*samyak-saṃkalpa* 正思惟)⁷⁰³ is pure; now it makes the mind to be inquiring (*paryeṣaka* 尋求), etc. (as YBh, T.30.1579.0445b, says); moreover, now it is the cause of speech (*abhilāpa* 言說, as the *Daśa-bhūmi-sāstra*, T.26.1522.0127c, says). [Thus, initial inquiry (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*) can be pure.] <395>

Prior to the state of perfection (究竟位) (i.e., this refers to the saints of the two vehicles and the *bodhisattvas* of the ten stages [*bhūmis*]), there is not yet absolute knowledge (*parijñā* 遍知) as to the medicine (*pratipakṣa* 藥), the illness (*pratipakṣya* 病), etc. Thus, in the course of the subsequently acquired knowledge (後得智), initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*) are necessary in order to teach the Dharma (to others). It is not the same in the *buddhas* (i.e., state of perfection) whose speech is generated without “mental effort” (*ābhoga* 功用).

⁷⁰³ AKB vi, F 283.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

There are two kinds of effort (*ābhoga*): effort for personal benefit (自利), which disappears at the eighth stage (*bhūmi*); effort for the benefit of others (利他), which continues up to the state of buddhahood (not included), but which, from the eighth stage on, takes place spontaneously (*anabhisamṣkāreṇa* 任運功用).

Although YBh says that initial inquiry and investigation are figurating (*vikalpa* 分別), nevertheless, it does not definitively specify that they belong only to the third *dharma* of the list of five. “Subsequent knowledge” (後得) is a correct knowledge (*samyag-jñāna* 正智) and involves figurating.

- #2241 The other issues relating to the undetermined factors (*aniyatas*) (i.e.: do they have the impure (*sāsrava*) for their object? ...) should be considered ⟨in accordance with reason,⟩ according to the principles we have indicated. {78r.}

E.D.H. *Relationship of the mind (citta) and the mental factors (caittas)*

- #2243 A. Do the six categories of ⟨*dharma*s or⟩ mental factors (*caittas*), i.e., (1) universal ones, (2) special ones, (3) good ones, (4) defilements (*kleśas*), (5) subsidiary defilements (*upakleśas*) and (6) the undetermined ones have—separate from mind (*citta*) itself (離心體)—a separate (別) intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 自性) by themselves?

B. Or, are they just particular modes of mind (*citta-avasthā-viśeṣa* 心分位差別)?

La Vallée Poussin comments:

See above, *Siddhi* F 5. – The second theory claims to represent Buddhadeva, and the Sautrāntikas, maybe wrongly, says Kuiji. – *Vibhāṣā*, 137, 142; AKB ii, F 150; viii, F 158; ix, F 262: it seems that the Dārṣṭāntikas differ, on this point, from the Sautrāntikas. – *Samgraha*, T.31.1594.0139a; *Asvabhāva*, T.31.1598.0402a: “According to certain teachers, only the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) exists ...”.

- #2244 ⟨What is the fault in assuming so?⟩

- #2246 Someone will say that these two theses are unacceptable.

- #2249 [A. As for the first thesis:] – If the mental factors (*caittas*) have—separate from mind (*citta*) itself (離心體)—a separate (別) intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 自性) by themselves, then several noble teachings cannot be explained:

1. It is said⁷⁰⁴ that only *vijñāna* exists (唯有識).⁷⁰⁵ <396>

⁷⁰⁴ *Daśabhūmika-sāstra* (T.26.1522.0169a).

2. Moreover, it is said⁷⁰⁶ that “mind alone goes far into the distance” (*ekacaram dūramgamam* 遠獨行⁷⁰⁷).
3. Or it is said: “through the pollution of the mind, through the purification of the mind” (染淨由心) (#1077).
4. The human being (士夫) is of the six elements (*dhātus* 六界): the four fundamental material elements (*maha-bhūtas*), space (*ākāśa*) and cognition (*vijñāna*);⁷⁰⁸ [the mental factors are not named].

#2250 5. *Sūtrālaṃkāra-śāstra* (T.31.1604.0613b12), xi, 34, is very clear:⁷⁰⁹

cittam dvaya-prabhāsaṃ rāga-ādyābhāsaṃ iṣyate tadvat |
śraddhā-ādyābhāsaṃ na tadanyo dharmah kliṣṭa-kuśalo 'sti ||

We affirm that the mind, alone, appears twofold, i.e., as object and subject (*grāhya*, *grāhaka*) or as image (i.e., image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) and seeing (seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*], above, #0530); in the same way, it appears as attachment (*rāga*), etc., <or else, it appears> as faith (*śraddha*), etc.: there is no defiled or good *dharma* separate from (別) mind (*citta*).

#2251 B. As for the second thesis, if the mental factors (*caittas*) are only particular modes of mind (*citta*), it is impossible to explain other noble teachings, [that is]:

1. Those that speak of the “associates of the mind” (心相應),⁷¹⁰ for, assuredly, {7/8v.} there can be association only between things of different nature (他性相應)⁷¹¹ <and not between things of the [same] intrinsic nature>.
2. Moreover, those who say that “the mind arises together with the mental factors, like the sun with its light” (如日與光).⁷¹²
3. YBh,⁷¹³ which states that mental factors (心所) are not the mind (心), and which cites the following stanza:

⁷⁰⁵ Cf. *Daśa-bhūmaka*: *citta-mātram yad idaṃ trai-dhātukam*.

⁷⁰⁶ *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0139a02).

⁷⁰⁷ Compare *Dhammapada*, 37.

⁷⁰⁸ *Majjhima*, iii, 239; AKB i, F 49.

⁷⁰⁹ Editors: Xuanzang's rendering is different from Prabhākaramitra's translation, which has: 能取及所取。此二唯心光。貪光及信光。二光無二法。

⁷¹⁰ *Lankāvatāra*, T.16.0671.0571b06.

⁷¹¹ *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0718b01; YBh, T.30.1579.0609a01.

⁷¹² *Lankāvatāra*, T.16.0671.0557c27.

⁷¹³ YBh, T.30.1579.0609a01.

The five families (*gotras* 種性), i.e., the five aggregates (*skandhas*), cannot be established (if cognition [*viññāna*] alone exists). [Buddhadeva, who claims that mental factors (i.e., sensation, ideation and formations) are only cognition, is unable to distinguish the five aggregates.

Buddhadeva answers: – But the five aggregates are established by way of the diversity of the successive modes (*avasthā*) of cognition.]

[We say:] – The theory of the particular modes (分位差) is faulty. [Indeed, if these modes correspond to diverse activities, the diversity of the characteristics (of the activities) implies diversity in nature; if they do not correspond to the diverse activities, how could the five aggregates be established by the diversity of the modes?]

Besides, one cannot conceive any variety (別) of causes and conditions [that would be the reason for the variety of the modes: how could the cognition, being single, <397> seize many aspects, since the mental factors that would diversify the cognition are absent?]

This tenet, moreover, is contradicted by the noble teaching, [i.e., attachment (*rāga*) defiles the mind, etc.].⁷¹⁴

#2253 The truth is that, separate from mind (*citta*) [itself], the mental factors (*caittas*) <have a separate intrinsic nature [by themselves]> (離心有別自性). Without a doubt, the texts say: “only *viññāna*” (唯識), etc.; but they express themselves in this way because the mind is fundamental <or preeminent> (勝). They say that the mind appears as mental factor (*caitta-ābhāsa* 似彼現), and this for the reason that the mental factors rely (依) on the mind and arise by the power of the mind; but that does not mean that the mental factors are mind.

Moreover, by the words *viññāna* or *citta* (識心), the texts mean “cognition (*viññāna*) or mind (*citta*) with the mental factors (*caittas* 心所)”, because the mental factors are always associated (恒相應) with cognition or mind. The expressions “nothing but *viññāna*” (唯識), etc., and “appears as mental factor” (現似彼) {79r.} are all not faulty.

#2254 All of this is from the point of view of the conventional truth (*samvṛtitas* 世俗): from the point of view of the absolute truth (*paramārthatas* 勝義), mind and mental factors are neither different nor identical (非離非即). The same is true for [the relationship of] the cognitions (*viññānas*) among themselves. (See #2332.)

⁷¹⁴ According to Kuiji, *Shuji* 7A/40v.–42v., who follows YBh, 56, i.e., p. 78 in the Japanese edition.

In the Great Vehicle, this is the excellent nature (妙理) of the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti* 俗) and of the absolute truth (*paramārtha* = *tattva*; 真).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

We will see (#2828) that there are four conventional truths (*saṃvṛtis*) and four absolute truths (*paramārthas*).

From the point of view of the second conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*), the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caittas*) are distinct; the same for the cognitions (*viññānas*) amongst each other. This second conventional truth is mixed up with the first absolute truth [*paramārtha*].

From the point of view of the second, third and fourth absolute truths [*paramārthas*], the second and the third [absolute truths] correspond to the third and fourth conventional truths (*saṃvṛtis*)—the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caittas*) are neither the same nor different:

1. for they are cause and fruit, and it is the nature-of-things (*dharmatā*, 法爾) of the cause and of the fruit to be neither the same nor different: this is the point of view of the second ultimate truth (*paramārtha*);
2. for they are both selfless (*anātmaka*), i.e., devoid of self (*ātman*) and of *dharmas*: (this is the point of the view of the third ultimate truth);
3. for they are both inconceivable and ineffable: (this is the point of view of the fourth absolute truth);

what then could be the same or different?

This gives us at least an idea of Kuiji's explanations (*Shuji* 7A/45r.). <398>

E.E. *Conditions for the generation of the first five and the sixth cognitions*

We have studied the association (*saṃprayoga*) of the six cognitions (*vijñānas*) with the mental factors (*caittas*). Let us examine the conditions under which they manifest (*saṃbhūty-avasthā* 現起分位).

#2257 (Vasubandhu's) stanzas 15 and 16 say:

pañcānāṃ mūla-vijñāne yathā-pratyayam udbhavaḥ |
vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṅgānāṃ yathā jale || 15
mano-vijñāna-saṃbhūtiḥ sarvadā-asamjñikād ṛte |
samāpatti-dvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt || 16

依止根本識・五識隨緣現・|
 或俱或不俱・如濤波依水・|| 15
 意識常現起・除生無想天・|
 及無心二定・睡眠與悶絕・|| 16

15. Supported on the root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna* 根本識), the five cognitions (識) occur in accordance with the conditions (緣), either together (俱) or separately (不俱), like waves (濤波) supported by water (水);
16. Mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna* 意識) always manifests, except (1) in the state of the gods without ideation (生無想天), and (2–3) in the two attainments (定), (4) in [very heavy] drowsiness (睡眠) and (5) in a faint (悶絕), which are (also (*api* 及...與)) without mind (無心).

- E.A. Root-cognition (*mūla-vijñāna*); #2259
 E.B. Five cognitions (*vijñānas*); #2260
 E.C. Mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*); #2263
 E.D. Gods without ideation (*asamjñi-devas*);⁷¹⁵ #2271
 E.E. Two attainments (*samāpatti*); #2282
 E.F. Drowsiness (*middha*) and faint (*mūrchanā*); #2309
 E.G. Birth and death; #2317

E.E.A. *Root-cognition (mūla-vijñāna)*

#2259 The Treatise:

ROOT-COGNITION (*mūla-vijñāna* 根本識) means store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*) (or retaining cognition (*ādāna-vijñāna* 阿陀那識)), which, indeed, is the root of

⁷¹⁵ See #0279, #1484.

the arising of defiled and pure cognitions (*viññānas*). {79v.}

The locative case [in the Sanskrit] is translated [into Chinese] as SUPPORTED ON (*yizhi* 依止): the first six evolving cognitions (*pravr̥tti-viññānas*) (i.e., the five and the mental cognition [*mano-viññāna*]) have their shared (共) and immediate (親) support (依) in the root-cognition. [On the one hand, they all are supported on the root-cognition in action; on the other hand, they each find their particular seeds (*bījas*) in the root-cognition when considered as seed-cognition (*bīja-viññāna*).⁷¹⁶]

E.E.B. *Five cognitions (viññānas)*

#2260 The FIVE COGNITIONS (*viññānas*) (五識), of the stanza (*kārikā* 15), are the first five evolving cognitions (*pravr̥tti-viññānas* 轉識), i.e., visual cognition (*cakṣur-viññāna*), etc. They are named as a group because they are of the same type. [Indeed, they have the material sense-faculties for their support; they are directed at the material objects, at actual objects, and this in an immediate or direct manner (*pratyakṣa*); they are interrupted.] <399>

1. They OCCUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS (隨緣現; *yathā-pratyaya*), [i.e., “when the conditions are present”]. This shows that they do not always occur – The conditions (緣) are <conditions such as> mental application (*manaskāra*, #0601), the sense-faculties (*indriya* 根) (which are the condition qua dominance [*adhipati-pratyaya*]), the object (*viśaya* 境) (which is the condition qua object [*ālambana-pratyaya*]), etc. [By “etc.”, Xuanzang means space, light (i.e., condition qua dominance), the seeds (*bījas*) of the store-cognition (*ālaya-viññāna*) (that is, condition qua cause, i.e., *hetu-pratyaya*), etc.]

This is to say that the five cognitions (*viññānas*) themselves are supported inwardly (內依) by the root-cognition (*mūla-viññāna* 本識; seeds [*bījas*]), and that, outwardly, they are a function of the concourse (*sāmagrī* 和合) of the conditions (眾緣) (i.e., mental application, sense-faculty, object); this is how they manifest.

2. Therefore, they arise EITHER TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY (或俱或不俱), because the meeting of the external conditions occurs all at once or successively (頓漸). (See #2322.)

LIKE WAVES SUPPORTED BY WATER (如水濤波隨), either numerous or few, in accordance with their conditions. This comparison—and others as well—is described at length in *Samdhi-nirmocana* (T16.0676.0692b28).

⁷¹⁶ See the theory of the seeds and that of the supports (*āśrayas*), #0411 and #1111.

E.E.C. *Mental cognition (mano-vijñāna)*

#2263 The five cognitions (*vijñānas*) are, in their mode of operation (行相), coarse (麤) [i.e., they are directed at external objects only ...] and unstable (動) [i.e., they change according to the object]; the conditions on which they depend are often incomplete. {7/10r.} Thus, it is only sometimes (少) that they occur, often they do not occur.

Although the sixth, i.e., the MENTAL COGNITION (*mano-vijñāna* 意識), is also, in its mode of operation, coarse and unstable, nevertheless, the conditions on which it depends are always complete. However, due to adverse conditions, it is sometimes not generated.

The seventh and eighth cognitions are, in their mode of operation, subtle (微細) [i.e., they are exclusively directed inwardly ...]; the conditions on which they depend are always present and no adverse condition can hinder them from becoming active.

#2264 Moreover, the five cognitions themselves are incapable of *silū* 思慮 (*cetanā* ?), i.e., of “intellectual operation”. [Same expression, #0056, Sāṃkhya theory of the “intelligent” *ātman*, #0934.] (This is so for they are free of initial inquiry and investigation [*vitarka-vicāra*]; they do not come forth by themselves, <400> being led by mental cognition; they are directed at coarse objects only).

They function only outwardly; they depend on many conditions: thus, they are frequently (*bahukāla*) interrupted and are only sometimes (少) active.

Mental cognition is by itself capable of intellectual operation (being endowed with initial inquiry and investigation).

It functions both inwardly and outwardly (for it cognizes “principles”, *li* 理, and things, *vastu*); it <does not depend on many conditions and> ALWAYS MANIFESTS (常能現起) EXCEPT (除) under five states or circumstances (五位). Thus, it is frequently active and is only sometimes (少) interrupted.

This is why the stanza (*kārikā* 16) does not say {7/10v.} that [mental cognition] occurs “in accordance with conditions”, i.e., “when the conditions are present” (隨緣現).

#2266 Question: – What are the five states or circumstances under which mental cognition is absent?

⟨Reply: – Birth (among the gods) without ideation, etc.⟩

E.E.D. *Gods without ideation (asaṃjñi-devas)*⁷¹⁷

#2271 <GODS WITHOUT IDEATION (無想天) means that,> by the power of cultivating (修) the attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*) (無想定, see #0270, #1480) and the power of weariness with all coarse ideation (*saṃjñā*) (厭羸想) (i.e., with the first six cognitions as opposed to the subtle ideation of the seventh and eighth⁷¹⁸), the practitioner is BORN AMONG (生) the gods of Br̥hatphala who are called the *asaṃjñi-devas* (gods without ideation). They are named in this way because their way of life has “the cessation of ideation” (*saṃjñā-nirodha* 想滅) as their first principle (首), a cessation contradictory to the non-continuous minds and mental factors (i.e., the first six cognitions and their mental factors).

#2272 Thus, all first six <evolving> cognitions (*vijñānas* 轉識) are “abandoned” among the gods without ideation.

There are various opinion.

#2275 a. According to the first teachers, these gods are always devoid of the six cognitions, for the noble teachings say that:

1. they do not have the six evolving cognitions;
2. they possess only the member “matter” (*rūpa-aṅga* 有色支) (instead of the member “name-and-matter” [*nāma-rūpa-aṅga*], #2614);⁷¹⁹
3. their realm is one of the six “stages without mind” (*acittaka-bhūmi*, #2314).⁷²⁰

La Vallée Poussin comments:

According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, the first text is Asaṅga’s *Samuccaya-sāstra* and indicates the doctrine of the teachers for whom the seed (*bīja*) suffices to “moisten birth” <401> (see #2008, #2142, #2306). However, the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T.31.1606.0700b) states:

That which is called *āsaṃjñika* (ideationlessness, i.e., the retribution of the attainment of non-ideation [*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*]) (無想異熟) is—among the gods without ideation, once born there (已生無想有情天)—that which destroys or hinders the non-continuous mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*) (於不恒行心心法滅).

⁷¹⁷ See #0279, #1484.

⁷¹⁸ As for ideation (*saṃjñā*), see #0617.

⁷¹⁹ YBh, T.30.1579.0327b.

⁷²⁰ YBh, T.30.1579.0345a.

#2276 b. According to the second masters, [when these gods (天) are] in the state preceding death, they necessarily generate (起) the evolving cognition (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*):

- i. for, at the end of their life, they must generate thirst (*tṛṣṇā* 愛) which moistens their lower birth (下潤生);⁷²¹
- ii. for YBh (T.30.1579.0607b) says:

Later, when ideation (*saṃjñā*) re-arises, these sentient beings {7/11r.} fall (沒) from this existence (後想生已是諸有情便從彼沒).

As for a text saying that [these gods] are without the evolving cognition, etc., this refers to the greater part of their existence (長時) and does not imply the complete absence (全無) of the evolving cognition.

#2277 c. According to the third masters,⁷²² [these gods] also have the evolving cognition at the time of their birth:

- i. for they necessarily generate—in the course of the intermediate existence (中有) (which, for the Great Vehicle, is included in the member “birth” [*jāti-aṅga*])—a defilement (*kleśa*) that moistens the birth (潤生);
- ii. for these gods—in the first state of their “primary existence” (*mūla-bhava* 本有⁷²³)—must have evolving cognition, just as the first states of the primary existence of the other gods have evolving cognition;
- iii. for YBh (T.30.1579.0340c) says:

If he is born among these gods—i.e., has merely entered (唯入⁷²⁴) [into the existence without mind (*acittaka*)]—he does not generate (起) ideation (*saṃjñā* 想); if he generates (生) ideation, he falls from this heaven (若生於彼。唯入不起其想。若生便從彼沒).

Now, if the first state of the primary existence (本有) does not include an evolving cognition, how can it be said that the sentient being has “entered” (入)? In order for him to have “entered” [into the existence without mind], it would have

⁷²¹ See the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā*, T.31.1606.0714b–c, for this thirst.

⁷²² These masters, in fact, follow the opinion of the *Vibhāṣā* and of the *Andhakas*, AKB ii, F 199.

⁷²³ Undoubtedly the “prior(-to-death) existence” [*pūrva-kāla-bhava*] of AKB iii, F 45, translated as *benyou* 本有 as in *Vyutpatti*, 245, 1274.

⁷²⁴ [In Sanskrit,] something like *praviṣṭa-mātra*.

to be that first this sentient being would have a mind, and then he no longer has a mind.

#2278 iv. YBh (T.30.1579.0592c, chapter on *nirvedha*) says:

That which is called ideationlessness (*āsaṃjñika* 無想) (i.e., the characteristic of the gods without ideation) is <402> the cessation (*nirodha* 滅) of all there is of the mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitta*) (that is, [of the mind and mental factors] acquired at birth [*upapatti-prātilambhika* 生得]) (所有生得心心所滅).⁷²⁵

This text shows that the gods without ideation, at the very start of their primary existence, generate for a short time (暫起) the evolving cognition of the *vipākaja* (異熟生, “arisen from retribution”) class; {7/11v.} then later, by the power of earlier causes and conditions (namely, the preparation for the attainment without ideation [*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*]), this evolving cognition no longer arises.

This cessation of the sixth cognition acquired at birth induces (引|起) a state without mind (*acittaka*) which is “a non-defined [state] of the retribution (*vipāka*) class” (異熟無記分位差別) and which is called “ideationlessness” (*āsaṃjñika*). – Just as the two attainments (*samāpatti*) are called “good” (*kuśala*) due to the goodness of the minds that induce (引|生) them [—the two attainments are seeds (*bījas*) induced by good minds—], so also ideationlessness (*āsaṃjñika*) is called “good” (see #0279).

If, contrary to this doctrine, the evolving cognition never becomes active (不行) among these gods, how could YBh speak of the cessation (*nirodha*) [of the mind and mental factors] which is acquired at birth (生得)? Thus, the evolving cognition occurs, for a short time (暫起), at the beginning of the existence of the gods without ideation.

#2279 These gods reside only in the fourth meditation (*dhyāna* 靜慮): below, ideation (*saṃjñā*) is so coarse and unstable (羸動) that it is hard to abandon it; above (i.e., five Śuddhāvāsikas and the realm of immateriality [*ārūpya-dhātu*]), there is no place or occasion (處) for the retribution of non-ideation (無想).

#2280 The volition (*cetanā* 思) that generates (引|發) the attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti* 無想定) is suitable for bringing forth (感) the fruit of retribution (general and particular, #0279 [note]) which is the existence of these gods of the fourth meditation (*dhyāna*).

⁷²⁵ Compare AKB ii, F 320.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Kuiji specifies and reviews the indications that he has given above (see #0278). — There are three opinions:

1. the volition (*cetanā*) that precedes and induces (*abhinirhar*, etc.) the attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñā*) generates two fruits, i.e., the general and the particular “reward”;
2. the clear volition that precedes the attainment generates the general reward; the volition that follows the period without mind (i.e., the period of the attainment) generates the particular reward;
3. the volition that precedes the attainment involves: [a] subtle mind, which brings forth the general reward, [b] subtle-subtle mind, which brings forth the particular reward. (Compare AKB viii, F 207).

Kuiji cites AKB ii, F 200, lines 6–18, on the place where the gods without ideation are reborn, i.e., always the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*), [adding several words to the original: these gods could not be reborn in the three lower meditations (*dhyānas*) because they would not possess <403> the causes for such a birth before their existence without ideation]. — The *Vibhāṣā*, T.27.1545.0783c [“Why, when falling from this heaven, is one reborn in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*)?”] says that the place of rebirth, i.e., always the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*), is not otherwise specified, i.e., as bad destinies, humans, gods. — Stories such as the one of Panthaka, *Divya*, p. 505, also show the lower, accidental, harmful characteristic of the attainment without ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*).

E.E.E. *Two attainments (samāpatti)*

#2282 The stanza (*kārikā* 16c) says: AND THE TWO ATTAINMENTS WITHOUT MIND (及無心二定). The attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti* 無想定) and the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅盡定) are called “without mind” (*acittaka* 無心), due to the absence of the six cognitions (*viññānas*). {7/12r.}

#2285 A. Attainment of non-ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti* 無想定) [see #0270, #1480].⁷²⁶

This attainment belongs to ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas* 異生) who are the detached (*vītarāgas*), who have “tamed” (伏) (i.e., not definitively abandoned) the defilement (i.e., attachment [*rāga*]) of the Śubhakarṣna (遍淨貪) domain (i.e.,

⁷²⁶ AKB ii, F 201–214. The *Vyutpatti*, 68, 10, reads *asaṃjñā-*, but the reading *asaṃjñi-* is confirmed by AKB ii, F 201: *asaṃjñināṃ samāpattiḥ*.

the highest heaven of the third meditation [*dhyāna*]), but who have not tamed the defilement above [*Śubhakṛtsna*] (上染).

This attainment has, for its antecedent (先) or motive, the ideation (想) which the ordinary worldling falsely forms of [this attainment], i.e., that it constitutes (escape) or *nirvāṇa* (*niḥsaraṇa-saṃjñā-manaskāra-pūrvaka* 出離想作意).⁷²⁷

Although this attainment generates the cessation or interruption of “all” the non-continuous minds and mental factors (不恆行心心所) (*cittas-caittas*) (i.e., the first six cognitions [*vijñānas*]), since the “cessation or interruption of ideation” (*saṃjñā-nirodha* 想滅) is the “head” or first principle (首) [of the cessation or interruption of minds and mental factors], this attainment is thus given the name *asaṃjñin* (無想, one without ideation).

As it generates calmness (安和) of the body (身), it also truly deserves the name *samāpatti* (定, attainment).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This is a question of whether the states of non-ideation can be called *samāpatti* (attainment).

Vasumitra (*Vibhāṣā*, T.271545.0775b) asks the question: “If this attainment is completely without mind, why is it then an attainment (*samāpatti*)?” The *Vaibhāṣika*’s answer will be found in AKB ii, F 213. Is the attainment (*samāpatti*) that which generates or causes to attain the evenness of the mind or evenness of the fundamental material elements (*mahābhūta-samatā-āpādāna*)⁷²⁸? The two attainments without ideation interrupt the mind, but they put the fundamental material elements in a state of evenness contrary to the generation of mind. – Our author gives the same explanation.

Compare Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 34, appearing closer to the *Sautrāntika*, AKB ii, F 214 (*āśrayasya avasthāviśeṣaḥ* ... [special state of the support ...]). <404>

#2286 1. There are three degrees (品別) in the cultivation (*bhāvanā* 修習) of this attainment:

a. (He who cultivates the) lower degree (下品) necessarily retrogresses (退) from the attainment during this life (現法), and, having retrogressed, one is

⁷²⁷ AKB ii, F 202.

⁷²⁸ *Editors:* MW gives for *āpādāna*: *n.* causing to arrive at; bringing any one to any state; producing, effecting.

unable to quickly (速疾) return (還) to it again.⁷²⁹

Later, when one is reborn among the gods without ideation, one's brilliance is not very bright and pure (不甚光淨), one's dimensions (形色) are not very broad, and one's death will definitively occur prematurely (*akāla-mṛtyu* 中夭⁷³⁰).

b. 〈He who cultivates the〉 middle degree (中品) does not necessarily retrogress from the attainment during this life; if one does retrogress, one can quickly (速疾) return to it again.

Later, when one is reborn among the gods without ideation, although one's brilliance is very pure and one's dimensions are very broad, nevertheless, they are not at their maximum (最極); furthermore, {7/12v.} although premature death is not certain, it is, nevertheless, possible.

c. 〈He who cultivates the〉 higher degree (上品) definitively does not retrogress from the attainment during this lifetime.

Later, when one is reborn among the gods without ideation, one's brilliance and one's dimensions are at their maximum, and death is not premature; one dies only after having lived fully the lifetime [of five hundred aeons (*kalpas*)].

#2287 2. This attainment (定) pertains to the fourth meditation (*dhyāna* 靜慮) alone; moreover, it is only good (善) since it is induced (所引) by this meditation. It does not belong to the higher or lower stages (下上地) for the reasons mentioned above, #2288.

#2288 3. It constitutes an action the retribution of which can be of three categories but is never of the present life (四業通三・除順現受).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The four categories:

- i. action whose retribution is to be experienced in the present life (*dr̥ṣṭa-dharma-vedanīya*);
- ii. action whose retribution is to be experienced in the immediately future life (*upapadya-vedanīya*);
- iii. action whose retribution is to be experienced later (*aparaparyāya-vedanīya*);

⁷²⁹ “To fall (*parihā*) from the attainment (*samāpatti*)” does not mean “to emerge from (*vyutthāna*) the attainment”, but “to lose the possession (*prāpti*) of the attainment”, to no longer possess it virtually, to be unable to enter into it without recapturing it as if it were for the first time.

⁷³⁰ AKB ii, F 218; iii, F 176.

- iv. action whose retribution will or will not be experienced (*aniyata*) (AKB iv, F 115f.).

The fruit of the attainment without ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*), namely, the existence of the gods without ideation, is never of the first category, “to be experienced in this very lifetime”.

The Vaibhāṣika doctrine, see AKB ii, F 201, differs from the one described here: <405> the attainment (*samāpatti*) is always [retribution] occurring in the immediately future life (*upapadya-vedanīya*); it is always of necessary retribution: even having retrogressed from the attainment (*samāpatti*), one resumes it and is reborn among the gods without ideation. [But Vasubandhu does not approve. The *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0773b) tells of the vain efforts of an *arhat* to introduce a *bhikṣu* who had obtained the attainment without ideation (*asaṃjñi-samāpatti*) into the path of liberation. However, the Dārṣṭāntikas claim that one can “retrogress definitively”.]

- #2290 4. According to some masters, [this attainment] is only practiced in the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu* 欲界), for it arises due to (the power of) the teaching of the non-Buddhist scholars (*tīrthikas*), for the understanding (慧解 = the understanding [*prajñā*] in the expression “liberated through understanding” [*prajñā-vimukta*]) is especially keen (*paṭu* 猛利) among humans.

- #2291 According to other masters, when one has first practiced [this attainment] in the realm of desire and one has been reborn in the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu* 色界), one can induce (引現) it again: however, not when one is reborn among the gods without ideation, (for that is the ultimate [state to be reached by it]). {7/13r.}

- #2292 5. [This attainment] is impure (有漏); it is never practiced (所起) by the saints (*āryas*),⁷³¹ for one enters into it by experiencing weariness toward ideation (*saṃjñā*) (厭想) and out of delight for the fruit (欣彼果) of the attainment (i.e., existence of a god without ideation conceived as *nirvāṇa*).

- #2294 B. Attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅盡定) (see #0270, #1035–#1074⁷³²).

This attainment belongs to the saints (*āryas* 聖), i.e., to the non-trainees (*aśaikṣas* 無學)⁷³³ or to the trainees (*śaikṣas* 學) who have (already (已)) tamed (伏) or rejected (離) the defilement (i.e., attachment [*rāga* 貪]) of the perception-sphere

⁷³¹ AKB: *nāryasya*, ii, F 200, 202.

⁷³² AKB ii, F 203; vii, F 207, etc.

⁷³³ I.e., to those liberated through both parts (*ubhaya-vimuktas*), AKB vi, F 275.

of nothingness (*ākimcanya-vītarāga* 無所有貪),⁷³⁴ in which the higher defilement⁷³⁵ remains or does not remain (上貪不定). [This defilement no longer exists among the *tathāgatas* who have rejected it or among the higher *bodhisattvas* who have tamed it; it does exist among the others.]

[This attainment] has, for its antecedent (先) or motive, the ideation which one forms of it, i.e., that it constitutes the “appeasement” [or stopping] (止息 *uparama*) (of ideation (*saṃjñā*)), that is, [of all coarse and defiled minds].

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Sthiramati has the same phrase as AKB ii, F 203, note: *śāntavihārasaṃjñāpūrvakeṇa manasikāreṇa*, which is explained: *tatra* (= *nirodhasamāpattau*) *śāntavihārasaṃjñīnas tathāvidhena manasikāreṇaināṃ samāpattiṃ samāpadyante*: “of the practitioners who recognize in this attainment (*samāpatti*) a certain <406> kind of peaceful concentration (*vihāra* = *samādhi-viśeṣa*) ...”. But the Chinese edition of the AKB departs from the original: after having said “in view of the peaceful abiding (*śānta-vihāra*)”, it uses the formula of our text: [*śāntavihārārtham*] *uparamasaṃjñāmanasikārapūrvaka*.

As [this attainment] causes the non-continuous (不恆行) minds and mental factors (*cittas-caittas*) (i.e., six cognitions) and the continuous (恆行) but defiled (染污) minds and mental factors (i.e., seventh cognition) (to cease or) be interrupted (*nirodha* 滅), it is given the name cessation (*nirodha* 滅盡).

As it generates calmness (安和) of the body (身), it also truly deserves the name attainment (*samāpatti* 定).

Since it includes a special (偏) weariness (厭) toward ideation (*saṃjñā* 想) and sensation (*vedanā* 受), it is also given the name attainment of cessation of ideation and sensation (*saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha-samāpatti*) [although it is cessation of all minds and mental factors (*sarva-citta-caitta-nirodha*)]. (See above #1064.)

#2295 1. There are three degrees in the development of this attainment:

a. He who cultivates the lower degree (下品) necessarily retrogresses (退) from this attainment during this lifetime and, having retrogressed, one is unable to quickly (速疾) return (還) to it again.

⁷³⁴ I.e., the third state of the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya*).

⁷³⁵ I.e., that of the perception-sphere of neither ideation nor non-ideation (*naiva-saṃjñā-na-asamjñā-āyatana*) = summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra*), that is, the fourth state of the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya*).

- b. He who cultivates the medium degree (中品) does not necessarily retrogress; if one does retrogress, one can quickly return to it again. {7/13v.}
- c. He who cultivates the higher degree (上品) does not retrogress. (YBh, 53, fol. 13).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

AKB ii, F 208. – The Vaibhāṣikas assert that one can retrogress from the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*). Different opinion of the Sautrāntikas (? conflict of opinions on that point) and of the Mahāsāṃghikas—who think that this attainment (*samāpatti*) is also of the domain of the fourth meditation (*dhyāna*). AKB ii, F 208–210.

- #2296 2. First cultivation (初修) of this attainment (定). – As preparation (*prayoga* 加行), one enters it for the first time with the pure (*anāsrava* 無漏) discursive contemplation (遊觀; see #2300) of the domain of the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra* 有頂), because it is the last (後) of the successive attainments (*anupūrvā-samāpattis* 次第定).⁷³⁶

Although it pertains to the summit of cyclic existence, nevertheless, it is included in the “pure” (無漏).

The person who has already cultivated it—when he possesses mastery (自在)—can also manifest it in other stages (地).

- #2297 Although [this attainment] pertains to the truth of the path (*mārga-satya* 道諦), nevertheless, it is of the category pertaining to neither the trainee nor the non-trainee (*naīva-śaikṣa-na-aśaikṣa* 非學非無學) because it resembles *nirvāṇa*.⁷³⁷ <407>

- #2298 It is only in the human state (人)⁷³⁸ that one is able to obtain [this attainment] for the first time,⁷³⁹ since it arises (起) by the power of the teaching (説力) of the Buddha and of his disciples; for the understanding (慧解) of humans is especially keen (猛利). – Later, having cultivated it in a human existence, one can also manifest it again in the two higher realms (*dhātus* 界). The *Udāyi-sūtra* proves that the sentient beings of the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya* 無色) also

⁷³⁶ Vyutpatti, 68, 7; *Aṅguttara*, iv, 448, etc.

⁷³⁷ AKB vi, F 232; ii, F 188; iv, F 123.

⁷³⁸ And also in the god state of the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*), it seems, despite the silence of the texts.

⁷³⁹ AKB ii, F 208.

are given the name {7/14r.} “spiritual gods” (*mano-maya-deva* 意成天).⁷⁴⁰

People who do not have faith or trust (信) in the teaching on the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 藏識) do not—when born in the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya*)—generate this attainment, fearing, indeed, that the absence of matter (*rūpa*) and of mind (*citta*) might mean annihilation (斷滅, *uccheda*)⁷⁴¹.

But those who have faith or trust in it are able to generate it, even when they are born in the realm of immateriality, for they know that this attainment is not annihilation, since there is a store-cognition.

- #2300 3. In order to generate this attainment, one must have abandoned the proclivities (*anuśayas*) of the three realms “which must be abandoned by insight” (*darśana-heya-trai-dhātuka-kleśas* 三界見所斷惑), for the ordinary worldlings (*prthagjanas*) are incapable of “taming” (伏滅) the mind and mental factors (*citta-caittas*) (to be abandoned by insight [*darśana-heya*]) of the summit of cyclic existence (*bhavāgra* 有頂); for this attainment, which is subtle and sublime (微妙), can be induced only by the subsequently acquired knowledge (*prṣṭhalabdha-jñāna* 後得, or *youguan* 遊觀) that follows the realization—by the root-knowledge (*mūla-jñāna*)—of the emptiness of the self (*ātman*) (i.e., emptiness of the person [*pudgala-sūnyatā*] with regard to the two vehicles), of the two kinds of emptiness, i.e., of the self (*ātman*) and of *dharma*s (i.e., *pudgala-* and *dharma-sūnyatā*, with regard to the *bodhisattvas*). (See #0071.)

[As for the proclivities “that must be abandoned by cultivation” (*bhāvanā-heya*), what are the ones of which the candidate for the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) must be cleared? Opinions differ:]

- #2304 a. <According to one opinion,> among the proclivities (*anuśayas*) to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heyas* 修所斷) of the eight lower stages (i.e., realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*], four meditations [*dhyānas*], first three formless meditative attainments [*ārūpyas*]), this candidate <408> must have completely abandoned those of the realm of desire (欲), must have tamed or abandoned the others; only then will he be able to generate this attainment for the first time in a human existence.

⁷⁴⁰ Saeki Kyokuga cites the *Udāyi-sūtra*, according to *Vibhāṣā* (T.27.1545.0779a10). – This *sūtra* is also cited by Vasubandhu, AKB ii, F 208, who interprets the spiritual body (*mano-maya-kāya*) as a body of the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu*). – I will not take sides in the controversy.

⁷⁴¹ AKB 5/5r.2 [ii, F204].

Indeed: (1) The proclivities of the realm of desire (欲界) are of two kinds (二性) (i.e., bad and non-defined), are many (繁) and confused (雜), {7/14v.} and have a special force in hindering this attainment (障定強). Thus, these proclivities must be abandoned. (2) [We know that people of the first two fruits do not attain the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*).] According to Asvabhāva's *Samgraha* (T.31.1598.0395b25), only five [candidates], namely, (i) the non-returner (*anāgāmin* 不還), [ii–iv] the *arhats* (or non-trainees) of the three vehicles (三乘無學) and (v) *bodhisattvas*, attain [this attainment]. These [candidates]—besides being diversely liberated from the proclivities—can, when they are reborn in the eight higher stages, generate there (anew) the attainment of cessation when they have generated it before in a human existence.

#2305 b. According to other masters, in order to generate the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*) for the first time, [the candidate] must have abandoned (the defilements (惑)) to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya* 修所斷) of the first four stages (下之四地) (i.e., the realm of desire and the first three meditations), and must have tamed or abandoned the others. Indeed, the seeds (*bījas* 種子) of the defilements (*kleśas* 煩惱) associated with sensations (*vedanās* 受) said to involve change (i.e., the sensations of pleasure [*sukha*], etc.; 變異, *vikāra*?, see #1358) have a special power in hindering this attainment (障定強): now these sensations exist in the first four stages. These [candidates]—besides being diversely liberated from the proclivities—can, when they are reborn in the five higher stages, generate there anew the attainment of cessation.

#2306 But the Sarvāstivādin objects: – A person (i.e., ordinary worldlyling or saint) who has tamed the lower proclivities can, according to you, generate the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti*). Later, without having abandoned the seeds by the pure path, without having retrogressed by way of generating a defilement, this person can be reborn in the higher stage (i.e., the summit of cyclic existence [*bhavāgra*]). Born above, would the person be able to abandon the lower proclivities (of the fourth meditation, etc.)?

The answer could be: – There is no problem in his abandoning them, in the same way that a person born in the two higher realms can abandon the lower innate (*sahaja*) proclivities of the *manas* (末那) (by means of the adamant concentration [*vajra-samādhi*]). {7/15r.} <409>

However, the correct doctrine is as follows: – In the non-returner (*anāgāmin* 不還), the counteracting power (*pratipakṣa-bala* 對治力) is intense [because all the paths that counteract the realm of desire are complete, which is not the case

for the stream-enterer (*srota-āpanna*), who has practiced only the six paths counteracting the first six categories of defilements (*kleśas*) of the realm of desire ...]. Also, at the time when he moistens (潤) his future rebirth (潤生), he does not generate the actual defilements (煩惱) of the higher realm. It is only by the seeds of the proclivities (*anuśāyas*) (惑種) of the higher realm that he moistens his rebirth in a higher realm (上地). Although a person retrogresses or does not retrogress from the domination exerted over the lower proclivities, it is, nevertheless, out of the question that—in order to have tamed these proclivities (i.e., hindered them from becoming active)—this person could be reborn in a higher stage, [for the seeds of the lower proclivities prevent the higher birth]. Thus, the objection (#2306) that “born above, one would abandon the lower [proclivities]” vanishes.

#2307

4. As for the *bodhisattvas* (菩薩) (i.e., “gradual understanding”) who, at first (先), practicing the two vehicles (二乘), have already obtained the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定) (as bodily witness [*kāya-sākṣin*]); who, next (後), turn their mind (迴心) toward great *bodhi*, they can generate, during three aeons (*kalpas*), the attainment of cessation in every *bodhisattva* stage (*bhūmi*).

For the *bodhisattvas* of another type (i.e., “sudden understanding”), the question involves several solutions:

Having reached the final mind (in contrast to the entering [*praveśa*] mind and to the abiding [*sthiti*] mind) of the seventh stage (七地滿心), being capable of completely taming (永伏) the defilements (*kleśas*) of every stage (i.e., realm of desire [*kāma-dhātu*], etc.) of the six cognitions (*vijñānas*), it may happen that, although they have not yet abandoned [the defilements] to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanā-heyā*) of the realm of desire, nevertheless, this is as though they had abandoned them, and that, thus, they can generate the attainment of cessation. – Indeed, YBh (T.30.1579.0646b) says that “having entered into the *dūram-gamā* (遠地, ‘far-going’; seventh stage), the *bodhisattva* then manifests the attainment (of cessation) (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅盡定)”. {7/15v.}

On leaving the first stage (*bhūmi*), it may also happen that the *bodhisattva* is able to completely tame all the defilements, like an *arhat*: then, in the course of the ten stages, he generates this attainment. Indeed, the *sūtra* (*Daśa-bhūmi*, etc.) says that the *bodhisattva*, in the first six stages, also manifests (現起) the attainment (of cessation) (滅盡定). <410>

E.E.F. *Drowsiness (middha) and faint (murchana)*

#2309 <DROWSINESS AND FAINT (睡眠與悶絕) (in Vasubandhu's stanza 16cd)> refer [here] to very heavy (極重) drowsiness (*middha* 睡眠; see #2165) and to very heavy faint (*murchana* 悶絕)⁷⁴² which cause the first six cognitions (*viññānas*) to be suspended, which are thus qualified as “without mind” (*acittaka* 無心).

#2311 By stupor (i.e., very heavy drowsiness, 極重睡眠) is meant a bodily state (身位) induced by (所引) <conditions such as extreme> fatigue and other causes (疲極等緣), a state incompatible (違) with the first six cognitions. <Thus, it is called very heavy drowsiness.>

Although this state is not “mental”, nevertheless, it is, <figuratively speaking,> given the name (假説彼名) drowsiness (*middha*), even though it is not, in its substance (體), drowsiness, because it proceeds from drowsiness and because it resembles drowsiness.

#2312 By black out (i.e., very heavy faint, 極重悶絕) is meant a bodily state induced by (所引) disturbance of the humors, <i.e., wind (*vāta* 風), bile (*pitta* 熱), etc.,> incantations, etc., a state incompatible with the six cognitions. <Thus, it is called very heavy drowsiness.> {7/16r.}

#2313 Or else, one can say that both, <i.e., stupor and blackout,> are small parts (少分) of <the sense-sphere of> the tangible (*spraṣṭavya* 觸).⁷⁴³

#2314 <With the exception of these five states,> (i.e., (1) gods without ideation, and (2–3) two attainments, (4) drowsiness and (5) faint, which are also without mind,) <mental cognition occurs constantly, that is, in all other states>.

E.E.G. *Birth and death*⁷⁴⁴

#2317 Since mental cognition (*mano-viññāna*) is also absent at <the time of> birth and of death (死生) (see #0977), some say that two other states, i.e., birth and death, should be added to the five states that hinder <or are without> mental cognition (無意識).

<Why is it said, then, that [mental cognition] is inactive (不行) only in five states (五位)?>

#2318 <According to one opinion, these> two other states, <i.e., birth and death (死生),>

⁷⁴² We might say stupor and blackout.

⁷⁴³ Kuiji, *Shuji* 7A/88v.

⁷⁴⁴ See AKB iii, F 118, 131.

would be indicated by the word ALSO (*api* 及...與)⁷⁴⁵ in the stanza (*kārikā* 16cd). (See #2257.)

This opinion is not reasonable. What are the reasons? For YBh (T.30.1579.0345a) teaches that six situations (時) are called “without mind” (無心), namely, the aforementioned five (states (位)) plus *nirvāṇa*-without-remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* 無餘依). Thus, let us say that the states of birth and death are included in faint (*mūrchana* 悶絕), for these are states of (the most) extreme faint (最極悶絕). The word ALSO (*api* 及...與) shows that the five states are not mixed up (雜).

#2319 Why does the author (Vasubandhu) not mention [the *nirvāṇa*-]without-remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣa*)? Because the six cognitions (*vijñānas*)—abandoned during the five states—re-emerge again (還起) <411> due to their seeds (*bījas* 種), stored in the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*). This is not the case once one has entered into the *nirvāṇa* without remainder. {7/16v.}

#2320 Of the five states, the ordinary worldlings (*pṛthagjanas*) experience four, excluding the attainment of cessation (*nirodha-samāpatti* 滅定); the saints (*āryas*) experience only the last three; (among these [three],) the *tathāgata* and the *bodhisattvas* of the eighth stage (*bhūmi*) experience the attainment of cessation alone, being beyond drowsiness (*middha* 睡) and a faint (*mūrchana* 悶).

⁷⁴⁵ Editors: Kuiji (T.43.1830.0484a28) comments:

According to the first teacher: being-born and dying are separately stated in the stanza (*gāthā*), which accounts for a total of seven types. That is to say that these are entailed in the character 及 and the character 與. Both words each indicate one and the same [thing].

E.F. *Simultaneity of the cognitions (*vijñānas*)*⁷⁴⁶

#2322 Thus, among the eight cognitions, two cognitions, i.e., the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna* 心) and *manas* (末那), evolve always simultaneously (*sahavartin* 恆俱轉) in all sentient beings. When (the sixth), i.e., mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), is generated, three are simultaneous. When, due to the coming together of conditions (隨緣合), from one up to five cognitions are generated, then four, five, six, seven or eight cognitions are simultaneous (俱轉). (The same doctrine at #1402). <This is the brief explanation of the simultaneity of the cognitions.>

#2324 a. [Objection:] – If several cognitions (*vijñānas* 識) evolve simultaneously (多識俱轉) in one single sentient being, how can it be said that this is one sentient being (一有情)? There would be as many sentient beings as there are cognitions.

To this difficulty [posed by] the Sarvāstivādins and other schools, there are several replies.

[We answer:] – If a sentient being were to be established in terms of (the number of cognitions), i.e., one or several cognitions, then for you, in the states without mind (無心位) (i.e., absence of the six cognitions), there would be no sentient being.

Moreover, in your tenet, when, [in a sentient being of a specific realm,] a mind of a higher or lower realm (*dhātu*) (他分心) is present, {7/17r.} why do you say that the sentient being belongs to his realm (自分), i.e., to the realm in which he is born?

In fact, (1) what constitutes the sentient being and its unity is the vital faculty (*jñ* 命根) (i.e., the group of seeds [*bījas*] that figuratively receive this name, #0260), or else, (2) the “cognition that is retribution” (*vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識) (i.e., the <412> active eighth cognition, #0407). These two explanations both conform to reason, for the vital faculty and the “cognition that is retribution” are continuous (俱恆時), unique.

#2325 b. [Objection:] – At a given time, there exists in a sentient being only one condition qua immediate antecedent (*samanantara-pratyaya* 無間緣) (#1187; #2446).

⁷⁴⁶ See *Siddhi* F 293. – In the ancient vehicle, it seems that the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., are the only ones to accept the simultaneity of the cognitions (*vijñānas*); Kuiji, *Commentarial Record on the Treatise on the Sects* (*Yibu zonglun lun shu shuji* 異部宗輪論疏述記 [X.53.0844.0567]), third branch thesis. – The *Vibhāṣā* mentions this doctrine without indicating the sect, T.27.1545.0719c: “It is said that two minds (*cittas*) are simultaneous, for there is seeing, hearing, etc., at the same time”.

How could several cognitions (*viññānas*) (evolve (轉) or) enter into activity at the same time (俱時)?

Answer: – You yourself indeed accept that the mind (*citta*), which is this single condition qua immediate antecedent at a given time, induces (引) several mental factors (*caittas*) (多心所), i.e., the associates of the subsequent mind-moment (*citta*), so why not also accept that it induces (引) several types of mind-moments (多心)? [Besides, your reasoning is circular. Indeed,] who does definitively affirm the condition qua immediate antecedent to be only single (緣唯一)? Whoever accepts the simultaneity of several cognitions has to maintain that the condition qua immediate antecedent is manifold (多).

Moreover, we think that one perceives (取), at the same time, several objects (境), i.e., colors, sounds, etc., so why would not the various cognitions perceive several objects all at once (頓取) when several objects are given at the same time? If the conditions of several cognitions, i.e., faculty, object, etc., are powerfully complete at the same time (和合力齊), it is not reasonable to assert that these cognitions arise only successively.

Moreover, since you accept that mental factors (*caittas*) which do not differ in terms of nature (性) {7/17v.} but only in terms of type (類別) arise simultaneously (俱生), so why not also acknowledge that several minds (*cittas*), different in terms of type, can occur simultaneously?

Moreover, do we not generally assume that several waves (浪), dependent on one single body of water, or several reflections (像), dependent on a single mirror, arise together (依一起多)? So why should it be that several cognitions, dependent on the same root-cognition (*mūla-viññāna* 一心), cannot evolve simultaneously (俱轉)?⁷⁴⁷

Finally, if you deny that mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意) seizes the objects of the five cognitions alongside these five, [this mental cognition] would not be clear and vivid (明了) when it seizes (取) these objects, just as, at least in the normal (i.e., non-concentrated) state (散意識), [mental cognition] does not clearly seize objects that have long disappeared (久滅).

#2326 c. [Objection:] – How could one moment of mental cognition (*mano-viññāna* 意識), alongside five cognitions, seize—amongst the colors, sounds, etc.—one or several objects? <413>

[We answer:] – This is just as the visual cognition (*cakṣur-viññāna*), etc., each

⁷⁴⁷ Copied from *Samdhi-nirmocana*, T.16.0676.0692b.

in its own domain (自境), seizes one or several objects. [For visual cognition, we have the perception of one type of matter (*rūpa*), of twenty types of matter, see AKB i, F 16.] – Here, too, there is no difficulty. The activity (*kriyā*) of mental cognition is to seize all *dharma*s: the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見) and the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相) of the cognitions show great variety of aspects (有種種相).

#2327 d. [Objection:] – Why is it not accepted that various cognitions of the same type are simultaneous?

[We answer:] – (With regard to its object (於自所緣), if it can be cognized, then) one visual cognition already cognizes (了) it, i.e., another simultaneous visual cognition would be useless. {7/18r.}

[Objection:] – But if that would be so, since the five cognitions have already cognized their objects, what use (or activity) (用) would there be for a mental cognition, cognizing the same objects, to occur simultaneously (俱起)?

[We answer:] – Mental cognition, simultaneous with the five, aids (助) them (and causes them) to arise (起): it is not solely (專) there in order to cognize the objects (of the five cognitions).

Moreover, (with regard to these objects,) [mental cognition] “clearly” (明) cognizes (and seizes) (了取) them, in contrast to the five (cognitions, i.e., visual cognition, etc.). Thus, it is not without use (or activity) (用).

⟨The noble teaching⟩, i.e., the *Samdhi-nirmocana*, says that mental cognition is called “with figurating” (*savikalpaka* 有分別), but not so the five cognitions: being endowed with initial inquiry and investigation (*vitarka-vicāra*), [mental cognition] “clearly” cognizes.

#2328 e. [Objection:] – Although (several cognitions occur) simultaneously (俱轉), why are [these] cognitions (*vijñānas*) not “associated” (*saṃprayukta* 相應)?

[Answer:] – Because they do not have the same object (同境); and when they do have the same object, they differ (異) as to the substance (體) and the number (數) of their “supports” (*āśraya* 所依, see #1111). (This is just as with the cognitions of the five sense-faculties (五根識) (#1180), which are not mutually “associated” (相應)). <414>

F. *RELATIONSHIPS OF THE EIGHT COGNITIONS (VIJÑĀNAS)*

#2330 The eight cognitions (*vijñānas*) are definitively not identical in their (intrinsic) nature (*svabhāva* 自性), for their mode of operation (*ākāra* 行相, i.e., their mode of cognition, their seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]), their support (*āśraya* 所依, i.e., their faculty, #1134), their object (*ālambana* 所緣, i.e., their image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]), their associated (相應) factors (*caittas*) are different. Moreover, we may add {7/18v.} that one of them may cease without the others ceasing, and that their characteristics differ: seven are perfuming (能熏), the eighth is perfumed (所熏) (#0487), etc.

But can it be said that the eight cognitions are definitively (定) different? – No, for the *sūtra*⁷⁴⁸ says that the eight cognitions are not differentiated, just as waves

⁷⁴⁸ *Laṅkāvatāra*, X, p. 314, stanza 386. – Suzuki translates stanzas 386–396 as follows:

386. They are neither different nor not-different: the relation is like that between the ocean and its waves. So are the seven Vijñānas joined with the Citta (mind).
387. As the waves in their variety are stirred on the ocean, so in the Ālaya is produced the variety of what is known as the Vijñānas.
388. The Citta, Manas, and Vijñānas are discriminated as regards their form; [but in substance] the eight are not to be separated one from another, for there is neither qualified nor qualifying.
389. As there is no distinction between the ocean and its waves, so in the Citta there is no evolution of the Vijñānas.
390. Karma is accumulated by the Citta, reflected upon by the Manas, and recognised by the Manovijñāna, and the visible world is discriminated by the five Vijñānas.
391. Varieties of colour such as dark-blue, etc., are presented to our Vijñāna. Tell me, Great Muni, how there are these varieties of colour like waves [on the ocean]?
392. There are no such varieties of colour in the waves; it is for the sake of the simple-minded that the Citta is said to be evolving as regards form.
393. There is no such evolving in the Citta itself, which is beyond comprehension. Where there is comprehension there is that which comprehends as in the case of waves [and ocean].
394. Body, property, and abode are presented as such to our Vijñānas, and thus they are seen as evolving in the same way as are the waves.
395. The ocean is manifestly seen dancing in the state of waveness; how is it that the evolving of the Ālaya is not recognised by the intellect even as the ocean is?

(波) are not differentiated from the ocean (水波) (*nāsti viśeṣaṇam*); for, if they were definitively different, they could, among themselves, not be cause and fruit (因果); for, like illusions (幻事), etc. (*māyā-ādi*), one cannot assert them (to have a definitive nature (定性), i.e.) to be identical or different.

#2332 Thus, the preceding description of the particular characteristics (別相) of the cognitions is based on the conventional truth qua reason (*yukti-saṃvṛti* 理世俗, i.e., the second conventional truth, see #2828), not on the absolute truth of the absolute [*paramārtha-paramārtha* 真勝義] (i.e., the fourth absolute truth, see #2848); from this last point of view, the cognitions are beyond mind and speech (心言絕). (See #2254.)

#2333 This is what a stanza (*gāthā*) of the *Laṅkāvatāra* says:

The *citta*, the *manas* and the *viññānas*, i.e., eight kinds, have different characteristics (*bhinna-lakṣaṇa*) from the point of view of the conventional (*saṃvṛti* 俗).

From the point of view of reality (*tattva* 真), they do not have different [nor non-different] characteristics, for neither the “characteristic” (*lakṣaṇa* 相) nor the “characterized” (*lakṣya* 所相) do really exist (無).

a. The characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the cognition (*viññāna*) is its activity (*yong* 用; *vṛtti*, *vyāpāra*, *kāritra*), i.e., the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) and the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*).

The characterized (*lakṣya*) is the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the cognition, i.e., the very cognition, namely, the third “part” (*bhāga*), above #0530.

For the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) and the characterized (*lakṣya*), one may profitably study the *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, chap. 1, transl. Stecherbatski, *Nirvāṇa*, 1927, and his *Central Conception*, 1923. <415>

b. The translation of the stanza from the *Laṅkāvatāra* given here by Xuanzang is, according to Kuiji, a new translation. [Let us add: but not very literal translation.] – Kuiji cites the old translation which can be found in the edition in ten *juan*, Bodhiruci (T16.0671.0574b), and which corresponds quite closely to stanza 388 in the Nanjio edition, p. 314:

cittaṃ manaś ca viññānaṃ lakṣaṇārthaṃ prakalpyate |

396. That the Ālaya is compared to the ocean is [only] for the sake of the discriminating intellect of the ignorant; the likeness of the waves in motion is [only] brought out by way of illustration.

abhinmalakṣaṇāny aṣṭau na ca lakṣyaṃ na lakṣaṇam |

[Same stanza (p. 46, stanza 104) with variants:

abhinmalakṣaṇā hy aṣṭau na ca lakṣyā na lakṣaṇam |

See T.16.0671.0523b, which differs from 0574b: *lakṣaṇa-arthaṃ* is rendered in two very different ways. – In the edition in seven *juan*, *Śikṣānanda*, the text T.16.0672.0594c is very close to 0523b; the passage corresponding to 0574b is absent at T.16.0672.0631c, where it should occur (and where stanzas 380–413 are skipped).] – See notes by G. Tucci, *Indian Historical Quarterly* 1928: 545. <416>



Master Kuji

G. *Vijñapti-mātratā*

G.A. Various explanations of the stanza (*kārikā*); #2341

G.B. Demonstration of *vijñapti-mātratā*; #2353

#2335 We have ⟨already extensively⟩ examined ⟨the characteristics (相) of⟩ the three developing (能變) *vijñānas*, i.e., (1) the root (*mūla*), (2) the cogitation (*manas*) and (3) the six cognitions (*vijñānas*) (defined briefly at #0012), whereby each of the eight cognitions (i.e., awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*] or “substantial”-part [*svābhāvika-bhāga*], #0535) is the support (*āśraya* 所依) of a twofold development (i.e., image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*] and seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*], #0530) (自所變二分). [These two parts (*bhāgas*) are the development of the awareness-part and its activity, *yong* 用 (#2333: *vṛtti*, *vyāpāra*, *kāritra*).] {7|19r.}

We have said that the self (我 *ātman*) (or person [*pudgala*]) and *dharmas* (法) are only designations (假說) ⟨based on⟩ the development of *vijñāna* (依識所變), i.e., on the image-part and on the seeing-part; that [the self and *dharmas*] are not separate real things (非別實有) (see #0040–#0340); and that, consequently, “everything is nothing but *vijñāna*” (一切唯有識). How is this thesis to be understood?

#2336 This is explained by the stanza (*kārikā* 17). The stanza says:

vijñāna-pariṇāmo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate |
tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñapti-mātrakam || 17

是諸識轉變・分別所分別・|
由此彼皆無・故一切唯識・|| 17

17. This development (轉變) of the various *vijñānas* (識) is the figurating (*vikalpa* 分別) and that which is figured (*vikalpyate* 所分別), that which thinks (L. *cogitar*) and the thing that is thought about (L. *cogitatur*). On account of this (*tena* 此), that (*tad* 彼 = self [*ātman*] and *dharmas*) does ⟨all⟩ not exist (無). Consequently, everything is nothing but *vijñapti* (一切唯識).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This translation follows the edition of Xuanzang who punctuates after *vikalpyate*. In other words: “The development (i.e., a development which is also fruit [*phala*], #0387) is the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) (= *vikalpa* [figurating]) and the image-part

(*nimitta-bhāga*) (= *yad vikalpyate* [that which is figured]) ...”. The image-part is as real as the seeing-part.

Sthiramati, *Trentaine* (Lévi), F 35–36, differs. In agreement with the Tibetan edition and closer to the original, he understands (stanza 17):

*vijñāna-pariṇāmo 'yaṃ vikalpaḥ | yad vikalpyate tena [vikalpena] tan nāsti |
tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñapti-mātrakam ||*

The development of *vijñapti* is figurating (*vikalpa*): that which is figured by this figurating, that does not exist; thus, everything is nothing but *vijñapti*.

Sthiramati's commentary, *Trentaine* (transl. based on LVP and Jacobi):

*iti | yo 'yaṃ vijñāna-pariṇāmas trividho 'nantaram abhihiṭaḥ, so 'yaṃ vikalpaḥ |
adhyāropitārthākārās traidhātukāś citta-caittā vikalpa ucyate | yathoktam |
abhūta-parikalpas tu citta-caittās tri-dhātukā iti |*

The threefold development of *vijñapti* (or *vijñāna*) which has just been explained is figurating (*vikalpa*). Indeed, the name figurating (*vikalpa*) is given to the minds and mental factors (*cittas-caittas*) of the domain of the three realms (*dhātus*) (in opposition to the pure [*anāsrava*] mind and mental factors) which take the aspect of a falsely imputed object (*adhyāropita-artha-ākāra*): as the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*, chap. 1, *kārikā* 10 says: <417>

The minds and mental factors of the domain of the three realms are false imagination or “imagination of the non-existent” (*abhūta-parikalpa*).

*tena tri-vidhena vikalpenālaya-vijñāna-kliṣṭa-manah-pravṛtti-vijñāna-sva-
bhāvena sasamprayogeṇa yad vikalpyate, bhājanam, ātmā, skandha-dhātv-
āyatana-rūpa-śabdādikaṃ vastu,*

That which is “figured” (*yad vikalpyate*) by the threefold figurating (*vikalpa*), which consists of (1) the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*), (2) the defiled cogitation (*kliṣṭa-manas*) and (3) the six evolving cognitions (*pravṛtti-vijñānas*), together with what is associated with it—namely, the receptacle-world (*bhājana*), the self (*ātman*) and things (*vastu*) like the aggregates (*skandhas*), sense-elements (*dhātus*), sense-spheres (*āyatanas*), visible forms (*rūpa*), sounds (*śabda*), etc.—all of that does not exist.

tan nāstīti, ataḥ sa vijñāna-pariṇāmo vikalpa ucyate, asad-ālambanatvāt |

This is why the development of *vijñapti* (or *vijñāna*) is called figurating (*vikalpa*), because it has no real cognitive object (*ālambana*).

kathaṃ punar etad vijñāyate, tad ālambanam asad iti |

⟨How do we know that the cognitive object (*ālambana*) of figurating (*vikalpa*) is unreal, non-existent (*asat*)?⟩

yad dhi yasya kāraṇaṃ tasmīn samagre cāviruddhe ca, tad utpadyate, nānyathā |
 ⟨For if the cause (*kāraṇa*) for something is complete (*samagra*) and unhindered (*aviruddha*), then it arises [from this cause], and not from something other.⟩

vijñānaṃ ca, māyā-gandharva-nagara-svapna-timirādāv asaty apy ālambane, jāyate |

From the fact that *vijñāna* does also arise without having a cognitive object, as in the case of an illusion (*māyā*), ⟨a *gandharva*-city (*gandharva-nagara*), a dream (*svapna*), an eye-disease (*timira*), etc.

yadi ca vijñānasyālambana-pratibaddha utpādaḥ syād, evaṃ sati, māyādiṣv, arthābhāvān, na vijñānam utpadyeta |

If, however, the arising of *vijñāna* would be dependent on a cognitive object, then *vijñāna* would not arise in the case of an illusion, etc., since the respective object-referent (*artha*) does not exist.⟩

tasmāt, pūrvakān niruddhāt taj-jātīya-vijñānād vijñānam utpadyate, na bāhyād arthāt, tasmīn asaty api bhāvāt |

⟨Therefore, a (particular) cognition (*vijñāna*) arises due to a previous (*pūrvaka*) and ceased (*niruddha*) object that is of the same kind [as the *vijñāna*] (*tajjātīya-vijñāna*), but not due to an external object, for even if such an object does not exist, *vijñāna* occurs.⟩

drṣṭā cābhinne 'py arthe pratipattīṇāṃ paraspara-viruddhā pratipattiḥ | *na caikasya paraspara-viruddhānekātmakatvaṃ yujoyate* |

⟨And, as we know, even in regard to one and the same (*abhinna*) object, different persons acquire perceptions that are contradictory with each other; but the same thing cannot itself have characteristics that are contradictory with each other.⟩

tasmād, adhyāropita-rūpatvād, vikalpasyālambanam asat iti, pratipattavyam |

⟨Therefore, one has to accept that the cognitive object of figurating does not exist because, in terms of its nature, it is a false imputation (*adhyāropa*).⟩

anena tāvat samāropāntaṃ parihṛtyāpavādānta-parijihīṣayā āha |

tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñāpti-mātrakam (17cd)

Having thus refuted (*parihṛtya*) the extreme thesis of “imputation” (“affirmation”, *adhyāropa*; *samāropa*), the author, in order to refute (*parijihīṛṣa*) the extreme thesis of “negation” (*apavāda*), says:

Consequently, everything is nothing but *vijñapti*.

iti | teneti, tasmāt | yasmāt pariṇāmātmakena vikalpena yad vikalpyate, tena tan nāsti, tasmād viṣayābhāvāt sarvaṃ vijñapti-mātrakam |

“Consequently” (*tena*), since that which is figured (*vikalpyate*) by figuring (*vikalpa*)—which is development (*pariṇāma*) in its nature—does not exist, therefore, in the absence of the object (*viṣaya*), all this is “*vijñapti*-only” or “nothing but *vijñapti*” (*sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam*).

sarvaṃ iti, trai-dhātukam, asaṃskṛtañ ca |

“Everything” (*sarvaṃ*), i.e., everything that is of the three realms (*dhātus*) and the unconditioned factors (*asaṃskṛta*).

mātra-śabdā tad-adhika-viṣaya-vyavacchedārthaḥ |

The word “only” (*mātra*), in order to deny an object of mind (*viṣaya*) that might be beyond *vijñāna*.

ka-kāraḥ pāda-pūraṇārthaḥ |

“-ka”, in *mātraka*, serves to complete the quarter-verse (*pāda*).

Sthiramati’s tenet according to Kuiji, *Shuji* (7B/2r):

The intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of *vijñāna* develops as two parts (*bhāgas*), i.e., seeing[-part] (*darśana*) and image[-part] (*nimitta*). The nature of the “part” (*bhāga*) (i.e., “substantial”-part [*svābhāvika-bhāga*] = awareness-part [*saṃvitti-bhāga*]) is what is called *pariṇāma*.

This word has the meaning of “manifesting”. The nature of *vijñāna* manifests as two types of characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) (i.e., “seeing” [*darśana*] and “image” [*nimitta*]); but, indeed, these two characteristics do not exist: they are imagined (*parikalpita*) (see #2723). [They do not exist outside of the two erroneous kinds of conceiving (*grāha*) of that which seizes (*grāhaka*) and of that which is seized (*grāhya*).]

Or else, *pariṇāma* has the meaning of “developing”: the single nature of *vijñāna* develops as two parts (*bhāgas*).

G.A. *Various explanations of the stanza (kārikā)*

The Treatise:

1. Dharmapāla.⁷⁴⁹

#2341 By this [development of] THE VARIOUS *VIJÑĀNAS* (是諸識), we must understand the three developing *vijñānas* (三能變識) and their mental factors (*caittas* 心所), studied above.

It is said that they are DEVELOPMENT (轉變) (precisely: they are called *vijñāna-parināma* [development of *vijñāna*]) because they develop (變) under the aspect (*ābhāsa* 似) of ⟨the two parts, i.e.,⟩ the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga* 見分) and the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分).

#2342 The first part, i.e., the seeing part (*bhāga* 見分), developed (所變) [by *vijñāna*], is given the name of FIGURATING (*vikalpa* 分別) because it “seizes” (取) the second part (相).

The second part, i.e., the image part (相分), developed [by *vijñāna*], is given the name THAT WHICH IS FIGURATED (*yad vikalpyate* 所分別), (i.e., the object of figuring), because it is seized by the first part (見所取).

The two “parts” are dependent (*paratantra*) (see #0031, #2719).

#2343 ON ACCOUNT OF THIS (由此) ⟨correct principle (正理)⟩, THAT (彼), i.e., a real self (*ātman*) and *dharma*s, ALL (皆) definitively do not exist separately from the two “parts” (*bhāgas*) developed (所變) by *vijñāna*, {719v.} <418> for separate from the “seizing” and of the “seized” (離能所取), of figuring and of “that which is figured”, ⟨a separate thing DOES NOT EXIST (無)⟩; no real thing (*bhūta-dravya* 實物) exists separate from the two “parts” ⟨or characteristics (相)⟩.

#2344 CONSEQUENTLY, ALL (故一切) *dharma*s, i.e., the conditioned (*saṃskṛta* 有為) (which develops from *vijñāna*), the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta* 無為) (which is the very nature of *vijñāna*), the real (實) (i.e., matter [*rūpa*], etc.), the fictive (假) (i.e., existence as designation [*prajñapti-sat*], formations dissociated from mind [*viprayuktas*], pitchers, etc.), none of all that exists separate from *vijñāna* (皆不離識).

The word NOTHING BUT (*mātra* 唯), in “everything is nothing but (唯) *vijñapti*”, is used in order to deny (遮) any real thing (實物) that could be separate (離) from *VIJÑĀNA* (識), namely, the imagined (*parikalpita*) (i.e., the self [*ātman*] and *dharma*s existing as such), but not in order to deny the mental factors (*caittas*),

⁷⁴⁹ Editors: The Kepan has here: “Sthiramati and Dharmapāla”.

the two “parts” (*bhāgas*), matter (*rūpa*) and suchness (*tathatā*) which are not separate from *vijñāna*.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Suobian 所變 = *pariṇata*. The two parts (*bhāgas*) are developed from *vijñāna* (*vijñāna-pariṇata*). – This expression *pariṇata* (“developed from”) is familiar in the literature of the *sādhana*s of which A. Foucher, *Iconographie bouddhique*, has explained a number of specimens. – Maitreya is developed from the syllable “*maim*” written in yellow on the appropriate *maṇḍala*: the practitioner imagines himself as developed from the knife of Tāriṇī ... (*Iconographie*, 1905, ii, pp. 48, 75.)

2. Nanda, who divides the stanza (*kārikā*) as does Sthiramati.

#2346 Or else, DEVELOPMENT (*pariṇāma* 轉變) means that the internal *vijñāna* (i.e. the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]) (develops (轉)) appearing (現) as the various kinds of external objects (外境相) resembling a self (我 *ātman*) and *dharmas* (法) (i.e., the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]), which is dependent [*paratantra*]).

#2347 The expression FIGURATING (*vikalpa* 分別; imagination) designates the developing *vijñāna* (能轉變) because it is, in its nature (自性), imagination or figurating of unreal things (*abhūta-parikalpa* 虛妄分別). It is the minds (*cittas*) and mental factors (*caittas*) of the three realms (*dhātus*).

The expression THAT WHICH IS FIGURATED (*yad vikalpyate* 所分別; that which is imagined) designates the object (所執境) which is conceived by that which figurates (*vikalpa*), i.e., the natures of a self (*ātman*) and of *dharmas* that are falsely conceived (所妄執) as real.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

For Nanda only two parts (*bhāgas*) exist, see *Siddhi* F 9. The seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) develops as an image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) which is dependent (*paratantra*), which appears as external object. There is no external object (i.e., subject [*grāhaka*] and object [*grāhya*]) that is developing from *vijñāna* ... – Nanda’s scriptural source is the *Samgraha*: “only two” (see #2753). Nanda does not accept the awareness-part (*saṃvitti-bhāga*), in contrast to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati. For him, the *parikalpa* (*vikalpa* [imagination or figurating]) and the *parikalpita* (the imagined or figured), i.e., subject (*grāhaka*) and object (*grāhya*), are false kinds of conceiving (*grāha*) of duality related to the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) developed by the mind. Indeed, when the seeing-part (*darśana-bhāga*) is considered as a self (*ātman*) <419> or as *dharmas*, this also is a conceiving related to the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*), to what is developed by the mind; thus this conceiving is not without object (*ālambana*).

#2348 <ON ACCOUNT OF THIS (由此),> since figurating (*vikalpa* 分別) seizes <or develops> (變) the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) (which is dependent [*paratantra*]) as (似) being an external self (*ātman*) and external *dharmas*, {7/20r.} <THAT (彼)>, i.e., the natures of the self (*ātman*) and of the *dharmas* thus “seized <or developed>”, thus “figurated” (*yad vikalpyate* 所分別), definitively DOES ALL NOT EXIST (皆無). We have sufficiently refuted—by the teachings and reasoning—the self (*ātman*) and the *dharmas* [to be separate from *vijñāna*] (#0040–#0340).

#2349 CONSEQUENTLY, EVERYTHING (conditioned factors [*saṃskṛta*], etc., see #2344) IS NOTHING BUT *VIJÑĀPTI* (唯有識), for the existence itself of the false imaginations or false figurating (*abhūta-parikalpa* 虛妄分別), leaving aside their content or object, is well established by the twenty schools.

[But the objection is made: – “Suchness (*tathatā*), the mental factors (*caittas*), etc., are not the mind that imagines or figurates (*vikalpa*), are not the *dharmas* imagined or figurated as external: will you say that all of that exists or does not exist?”]

Answer: – The expression “nothing but” (*mātraka* 唯) does not deny *dharmas* that are not separate (*avyatirikta*) from *vijñāna* (see #2359, #2413). Thus, suchness <or true emptiness> (真空), the mental factors, etc., really do exist (亦是有性).

#2350 Therefore, these masters—the three masters Dharmapāla, Nanda, Sthiramati—avoid the two extreme theses (邊) (1) of affirmation (*adhyāropa-anta* 增, “to add”. – Little Vehicle) or superimposition, and (2) of negation (*apavāda-anta* 減, “to decrease”. – Tenet of Bhāvaviveka, p. 4). The *vijñapti-mātratā* doctrine is thus in harmony (契會) with the Middle Way (中道).

G.B. *Demonstration of vijñapti-mātratā*

#2353 [Question:] – By which teachings, by what reasonings is *vijñapti-mātratā* (唯識) demonstrated (成)?

#2354 [Answer:] – Have we not already said it?

#2355 [Reply:] – You have said it, but in an incomplete way; you have refuted my thesis, but only to refute another's thesis does not suffice to establish one's own thesis. Thus, it is necessary to explain (陳) again, and with precision, the teachings (教) and reasonings (理) that demonstrate (成) this. <420>

B.A. Teachings; #2359

B.B Reasoning; #2369

B.C. Conclusion: reasoning and teachings combined; #2372

B.D. Reply to objections; #2377

G.B.A. *Teachings*

There are many noble texts that affirm *vijñapti-mātratā*. We will cite only a few.

#2359 1. *Daśa-bhūmaka*:

citta-mātram idaṃ yad idaṃ trai-dhātukam

This here, i.e., the three realms, is nothing but mind (三界唯心).⁷⁵⁰

2. *Samdhi-nirmocana*:

The object (所緣) of cognition (*vijñāna*) is only a manifestation of cognition (*vijñāna-pratibhāsa-mātram* 唯識所現).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

a. Compare *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0138a; commentary of Asvabhāva, T.31.1598.0400a):

[Question:] – How can the person who has not yet attained supreme knowledge cognize *vijñapti-mātratā* indirectly?

By the teachings and reasoning. The Bhagavat says in the *Daśabhūmaka-sūtra*: *cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*; he says the same thing in *Samdhi-nirmocana-sūtra*, 3 (T.16.0675.0674 and T.16.0676.0698a28, several variants). In this *sūtra*, the *bodhisattva* Maitreya asks the Bhagavat:

⁷⁵⁰ Sixth stage (*bhūmi*), Rahder, 1926: 49.

Interpretation of the Mādhyamikas, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 181 (LVP transl. F 238).

“Are the images (*bimba*; *yǐngxiàng* 影像) that are perceived in concentration (*samādhi-gocāra*) different or not different from the mind?”

The Bhagavat answers: – “They are not different. Why? Because these images are merely *vijñāna*. I say that the object (*ālambana*) of cognition is merely a manifestation (*pratibhāsa-mātra*) of *vijñāna*.”

Maitreya asks: – “If the images that are perceived in concentration are not different from the mind, how will the mind turn inwards to seize the mind itself?”

The Bhagavat answers: – “Maitreya, no *dharma* seizes another *dharma* ..., but, when cognition arises, it arises similar to that thing, and we say that it seizes that thing”. (*Samgraha*, T.31.1594.0138b; compare *Siddhi*, F 129–130, #2405, #2470.)

On the non-activity of *dharma*s, AKB ix, F 280; *Vibhāṣā*, 93 at beginning.

- b. Kuiji (*Shuji*, T.43.1830.0488b02) cites the commentary on the *Samgraha* by Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0400b06) (he cites the same text in the commentary on the *Viṃśatikā*, *Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1834.0981c28):

The word *mātra* denies the existence of the object (*grāhya*); since the object does not exist, then the subject, i.e., “that which seizes” (*grāhaka*), does not exist either.

The word *mātra* does not deny the mental factors that are not dissociated from the mind. As it is said: “If the mental factors are absent, then the mind also is absent”

The text says that the “threefold realm” (*dhātu*), “that which belongs to the three realms”, the *trai-dhātuka* is merely mind (*citta-mātra*).

[Question:] – What should be understood by *trai-dhātuka*?

[Answer:] – That which is associated with thirst (*trṣṇā*) [better, attachment (*rāga*), AKB iii, F 8] (*kāma-ādi*-) is included in the three realms.

The expression *citta-mātra* thus establishes that only mind and mental factors exist, that the falsely imputed objects (*ālambana*) of the three realms do not exist. It does not deny that (1) suchness (*tathatā*) and (2) the dependent (*paratantra*) are objects of the mind and mental factors: for these two are part of the truth of the path (*mārga-satya*), are the object of the root-knowledge (*mūla-jñāna*) and of the subsequently acquired knowledge (*prṣṭha-labdha-jñāna*), are not <421> “seized” by thirst (*trṣṇā*) (i.e., attachment [*rāga*]), are not to be counteracted, are not erroneous, are not included in the three realms, are not separate (*vyatirikta*) from mind (*citta*). – Therefore, the text does not deny them.

Objection: – You say that the realm of desire (*kāma-dhātu*) and the realm of fine-materiality (*rūpa-dhātu*) are merely mind (*citta-mātra*). But why say that the realm of immateriality (*ārūpya-dhātu*) is merely mind? The Little Vehicle accepts that the third realm is merely mind. Your text demonstrates that which already has been accepted (*siddha-sādhana*).

[Answer:] – You misunderstand the meaning of the expression *citta-mātra*. It does not refer only (1) to the non-existence (*abhāva*) of matter (*rūpa*), but also (2) to the non-existence of mind and mental factors (i.e., attachment [*rāga*], etc.) insofar as they seize an object, (3) to the non-existence of the objects seized by the mind, including infinite space (*ākāśa-anantya*), etc. (objects of the mind of the realm of immateriality, according to the Sarvāstivādins). On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas think that space (*ākāśa*), i.e., the simple absence of matter, has no reality; indeed, space is a manifestation of the mind; it is merely mind (*citta-mātra*). Fearing that the Sautrāntikas would say: “Being separate from the mind and mental factors, space should be called a *dharma*-that-is-not-mind”; or that they would say: “The mind that is directed at space—not having an object—does not exist”, the text says that the three realms (*dhātu*) are merely mind [For space (*ākāśa*) according to the Sautrāntikas, see AKB i, F 8; ii, F 279.]

For *vijñapti-mātra*, see #2412.

- #2360 3. *Laṅkāvatāra*: {7/20v.}

All *dharma*s are not separate from mind (*citta-vyatirikta* 不離心).

- #2361 4. *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (T14.0476.0563b28):

Sentient beings are defiled and purified due to the defilement and purification of the mind (隨心垢淨) (above, #1077).

- #2363 5. The *sūtra* also teaches:⁷⁵¹

Endowed with four knowledges (*jñānas* 智), the *bodhisattvas* penetrate

⁷⁵¹ This paragraph is according to the *Samuccaya-vyākhyā* (T31.1606.0715b13), and the *Samgraha* (T31.1594.0139a14, Asvabhāva, T31.1598.0402b28). – Several variants in the name of the knowledges (*jñānas*) and in the explanation.

According to the gloss of the Japanese editor, i.e., Saeki Kyokuga, it refers to the *Mahāyānābhīdharma-sūtra*. – But Kuiji, *Shuji* (7B/10v.): The name of *Jñāna-catuṣka-sūtra* is given to the text that explains the four knowledges (*jñānas*). In truth, the *Samgraha* does not cite the name of the *sūtra*; it simply says: “As the Bhagavat says ...”.

(*anupraskandha* 隨悟入⁷⁵²) *vijñapti-mātratā* and the absolute absence of object (*viṣaya, artha*) (唯識無境).

These four knowledges are:

#2364

a. Knowledge of the cause of contradictory cognitions (*viruddha-vijñāna-nimitta-jñāna* (相違識相智):

This means, in regard to the same thing (一處), that the object which the hungry ghosts (*pretas* 鬼), humans (人), gods (天), etc., perceive differs according to the difference <422> in their former actions (業): how could this diversity be explained if this thing <or object> (境) were real?⁷⁵³

b. Knowledge that apperceives that the cognition (*vijñāna*) without [real] object includes direct perception (*anālambana-vijñāna-pratyakṣa-upalabdhī-jñāna* 無所緣識智):

This is as in the case of the past and the future (過未), the images in a dream (夢境), the reflection [in a mirror] (像). They are not real things. Nevertheless, <manifestations of *vijñāna*> are perceivable (識現可得) and cognition <can> seize them for its object. Such objects (境) do not exist and the same should also apply to other perceptions of external things.

c. Knowledge that cognizes, without effort, in a non-upside-down way (*anabhisamṣkāra-aviparīta[va-]jñāna* 自應無倒智):

This means that if the knowledge of the foolish (*bāla* 愚夫) would obtain reality <or a real object> (得實境), one would have to conclude that they would spontaneously (自然) realize non-upside-down cognition (無顛倒) and that, without effort (功用) and practice, they would attain liberation (解脫).⁷⁵⁴ {721r.}

d. knowledge that accompanies <and evolves in accordance with> the threefold knowledge (*trividha-jñāna-anuvartaka-jñāna* 隨三智轉智):

⁷⁵² AKB 19/16r.3.

⁷⁵³ Hungry ghosts (*pretas*) see water as pus and as blood; fish see it as a dwelling-place and as a path; some contemplatives see it as space ... – *Madhyamakāvatāra*, p. 164 (LVP transl. F 348). – The example of the hungry ghosts and of water is classical. – Another classical example is the woman, the practitioner, the lover and the dog, *Sam-graha* (Asvabhāva, T.31.1598.0402c17), and *Sarva-darśana*, p. 15.

⁷⁵⁴ This recalls the stanza of the *Acintya-stotra* (*Bstod*, i, fol. 85b), cited in Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, ix, 6: *indriyair upalabdhām yat tat tattvena bhaved yadi | ātās tattvavido bālās tattvajñānena kim tadā ||*

i. Knowledge that accompanies (and evolves with) the knowledge of one who has mastery (自在) [of the mind] (*vaśitā-jñāna-anuvartaka-jñāna* 隨自在者智轉智).

This means that those (i.e., *bodhisattvas* of the eighth stage [*bhūmi* 地]) who have already obtained “mastery of the mind” (*ceto-vaśitā* 已證得心自在)⁷⁵⁵ transform things at will (隨欲轉變) (i.e., change earth into gold, etc.).

If things really existed, how could this (transforming) be possible?

ii. Knowledge that accompanies (and evolves in accordance with) the knowledge of individuals who have [correct] discernment (*pravicaya-jñāna-anuvartaka-jñāna* (*pravicaya* ?; 隨觀察者智轉智)).

This means that individuals (i.e., hearers [*śrāvakas*] and self-enlightened ones [*pratyekabuddhas*]) who have obtained excellent concentration (勝定 = *samāpatti*⁷⁵⁶) and who practice the contemplation of the *dharma*s (得勝定修法觀) (in the subsequently acquired [*prṣṭha-labdha*] knowledge [*jñāna*]), that when they contemplate one thing, that then the whole <423> of its characteristics appears to them (隨觀一境眾相現前), i.e., impermanence, suffering, etc.

If things really existed, how could the modes [of the contemplated thing] evolve (轉) in accordance with the mind?

iii. Knowledge that accompanies (and evolves in accordance with) the knowledge without conceptual figurating (*nirvikalpaka-jñāna-anuvartaka-jñāna* 隨無分別智轉智).

This means that when the knowledge of pure intuition—(i.e., the knowledge without conceptual figurating (無分別智 *nirvikalpaka-jñāna*)) (i.e., the root-knowledge [*mūla-jñāna*], #2918), which realizes the true nature of things (證實)—is generated (起), all the characteristics of things cease to appear (一切境相皆不現前). If things really existed, how could it be possible (for them not to appear)?

#2365

The *bodhisattvas* endowed with these (four) knowledges definitively penetrate (悟入) (the principle of) *vijñapti-mātratā* (唯識理).

⁷⁵⁵ The second of the ten masteries (*vaśitas*), *Daśa-bhūmi*, Rahder, p. 70 (T.26.1522.0183), *Daśabhūmi-śāstra*, 10, fol. 18, *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0149), Asvabhāva (T.31.1598.0436b), *Vyutpatti*, 27, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, F 347.

⁷⁵⁶ AKB 15/8v.7 [iv, F 100], 25/8r.7 [vi, F 269], but see #2405. – According to *Samgraha*: “those who have achieved calm abiding (*śamatha*)”.

#2366 6. *Ghanavyūha* {7/21b.}:

The object (*ālambana* 所緣) of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñānas* (i.e., first six cognitions) is not distinct from their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva* 自性). This is why I say that everything (i.e., the conditioned [*saṃskṛtas*] and unconditioned [*asaṃskṛtas*]) is nothing but *vijñāna*, (and there is nothing else (無餘)), i.e., not a real thing separate from *vijñāna*.

[Indeed, the object of the mind is its image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*).]

#2367 〈Numerous are the noble teachings that truly prove *vijñapti-mātratā*.〉

G.B.B. *Reasoning*

#2369 1. Each of the five “well-established” (極成)⁷⁵⁷ cognitions (*vijñānas*), (i.e., visual cognition, etc.,)—because [each] is one of the five, like the others (餘)—does not directly (*sākṣāt*) attain an object (親緣) (i.e., visible form, etc. [*rūpa-ādī*]) separate from itself. [It perceives indirectly the archetype (本質) of which its image (*nimitta*) is a reflection, #2470.]

2. The other (餘) “well established” cognition (識), i.e., the sixth or the mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*), accepted by the Little Vehicle, but which is not the case for cogitation (*manas*) and the eighth cognition—because it is a cognition (*vijñāna*), like the five, (i.e., visual cognition, etc.)—also does not directly attain (親緣) *dharma*s separate from itself.

3. The immediate or direct object (*sākṣād-ālambana* 親所緣) of the six cognitions is definitively not separate from the six cognitions—because it is one of the two parts (*bhāgas*) (namely, the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) of these cognitions, just like the part of *vijñāna* that cognizes (能緣) (namely, the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]) is not separate from *vijñāna* since it is cognition in its nature (#2470). <424>

4. The immediate or direct object of cognition—because it is an object (所緣法), like the associated (*saṃprayuktas* 相應法) *dharmas* (which are objects of “the knowledge of another’s mind”)—is definitively not separate from mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caittas*).

⁷⁵⁷ *prasiddha* = on which we all agree; which is not the case for the visual cognition of the Buddha (which, according to the Little Vehicle, is not pure), for the visual cognition of the *bodhisattva* in his last rebirth (which, according to the Little Vehicle, is not “good”) ...

- #2370 Numerous are the proper reasonings (正理) ⟨that truly prove (誠證) *vijñapti-mātratā*⟩. Thus, *vijñapti-mātratā* should be accepted ⟨in good faith⟩. {7/22r.}

G.B.C. *Conclusion: reasoning and teachings combined*

- #2372 The self (*ātman* 我) and the *dharma*s (法) are not existent (非有); emptiness (空) (*tathatā* = the perfected nature [*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*], #2719) and *vijñāna* (識) (i.e., dependent nature [*paratantra-svabhāva*]) are not non-existent (非無). Self and *dharma*s are separate from existence (離有); emptiness and *vijñāna* (空識) are separate from non-existence (離無). Thus, in this doctrine, we are in harmony with (契) the Middle Way (中道).

- #2374 This is what Maitreya says in two stanzas of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*:⁷⁵⁸

False imagination (*abhūta-parikalpa* 虛妄分別 = the mind that imagines falsely) exists (see #2723); the duality that is manifested in it does not exist absolutely; in this false imagination, there is only emptiness; in ⟨that⟩ emptiness, there is also this false imagination.

Thus, I say that ⟨all⟩ *dharma*s are neither empty nor non-empty. There is existence, indeed, non-existence, existence. This is in harmony with the Middle Way.

- #2375 Maitreya considers here, ⟨in these stanzas,⟩ only the defiled dependent (染依他) (*paratantra*). But, ⟨in reality,⟩ there is also a pure dependent (淨分依他).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

a. The impure mind or mind of the three realms (*dhātus*) (—in contrast with the pure knowledges (*jñānas*): the pure dependent [*paratantra*]—) which is false imagination, really exists: but duality, i.e., subject and object, the self (*ātman*) and *dharma*s, which is “added or imputed” (*samāropita*), does not exist there. In the impure mind, there is emptiness, i.e., in this mind, there is “the absence of duality”. In emptiness, there is the impure mind: duality being “added or imputed” to that which is without duality.

The *dharma*s are not empty since they are emptiness and false imagination; they are not non-empty since duality (i.e., subject and object, the self [*ātman*] and *dharma*s) is non-existent there. Given that false imagination exists, that duality does not

exist, that emptiness (*sūnyatā*) exists in false imagination and that false imagination exists in emptiness; there is the Middle Way between the absolute emptiness of Bhāvaviveka and the absolute existence of the Little Vehicle; for, counter to Bhāvaviveka, we accept the two truths (that is, the conventional [*saṃvṛti*] and the absolute [*paramārtha*]), and counter to the Little Vehicle, we deny subject and object. <425>

b. One may think that this doctrine is not mixed up with that of the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (T14.0476.0573b), cited by the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*: “What is the root of false imagination (*abhūta-parikalpa*)? ...”. See #2389.

c. One may attempt to restore the first stanza [of the above two stanzas from the *Madhyānta-vibhāga*] according to the Chinese editions, the Tibetan edition (kindly provided by Mlle Lalou). The second [stanza] is cited in the *Madhyamaka-vṛtti*, p. 445, in a summary of the *vijñāna-vāda* doctrine (“The *kalpita-svabhāva* is empty, because it is not generated by causes, like the second moon ...”), and partially in the *Śukla-vidarśanā*.

[*abhūtaparikalpo* 'sti *tasmin dvayaṃ na vidyate* |
sūnyatā vidyate tasmin tasyām api sa vidyate ||2||
na sūnyaṃ nāpi cāsūnyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhīyate |
sattvād asattvā[*t sattvāc*] *ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā* ||3||

There is:

yang dag ma yin kun rtog yod || *de la gnyis po yod ma yin* |
ston pa nyid ni 'di la yod || *de la yang ni de yod do* |

But to the Tib. *de la ... de* corresponds, in *Paramārtha*, *yu ci ... bi* 於此...彼, and, in Xuanzang, *yu bi yi you ci* 於彼亦有此. *Paramārtha's bichu* 彼處, for *tasmin* in the second quarter-verse (*pāda*), is indeed a locative.

Sarvaṃ = (1) false imagination or false figurating (*abhūta-parikalpa*), which is the conditioned factors (*saṃskṛtas*), and (2) emptiness, which is the unconditioned factor (*asaṃskṛta*).

See #2719, the chapter on the three natures (*svabhāvas*).

G.B.D. *Reply to objections*

- #2377 1. [Objection:] – If external objects are only the internal cognition (*vijñāna* 內識) manifested (起) in the appearance (似) of outer objects (外境), how can one explain:

- i. the spatial (處) and temporal (時) determination (定) of the objects, (i.e., of sentient and non-sentient things of the world (世間情非情物), which we perceive (見)) (for example: “it is at a certain place that the mountain appears”),
- ii. the non-individual (or non-determined) (不定) characteristic of the perceptions (of an individual (身)), (for example: “everybody sees the same thing”) and of the efficacies of things (用), (for example: “water quenches everyone’s thirst”)?

#2378 [Reply:] – This difficulty (or doubt (疑)) is easily explained by the comparisons of the visions in a dream (夢境), etc.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

This is a summary of the first stanza (*kārikā*) of the *Viṃśatikā* (*Twenty Stanzas*) and of its commentary (second stanza in Sylvain Lévi’s edition: Kuiji explains why the *Viṃśatikā* has 20, 21, 22 and 23 stanzas). – Kuiji notes the variants of the three translations of this stanza. The *Siddhi* differs also, reading: “There would be no determination of the efficacies of things (*kr̥tya-kriyā-aniyama*)” in place of: “There would be no efficacy”.

Taking advantage of the conjectures of S. Lévi and, for what they are worth, of the observations of the *paṇḍit* who signs himself by the name Dignāga, see *Indian Historical Quarterly*, 1928: 189, I propose: <426>

vijñaptiś ced anarthā na niyamaḥ kāladeśayoḥ |
na saṃtānāsyāniyamaḥ kr̥tyakriyāpi yujyate ||

The Tibetan edition gives *kr̥tyakriyāpi na yujyate*.

#2380 2. [Objection:] – If *vijñāna* alone exists, {7/22v.} why does the Bhagavat teach the existence of twelve sense-spheres (*āyatana*s 處), i.e., eye and color, etc. (visual cognition [*caḥsur-āyatana*], etc.)?⁷⁵⁹

#2381 [Reply:] – In terms of the mind of the Bhagavat, the sense-spheres (*āyatana*s) are only the development (*pariṇāma* 所變) of *vijñāna*, not real entities separate from *vijñāna* (非別實有).

If the Bhagavat establishes the six pairs of *dharma*s, i.e., eye and color, etc., it is in order to introduce his disciples to the knowledge of “the emptiness of the self (*ātman*) (我空)” (*pudgala-sūnyatā*); just as he teaches the continuity (*saṃtāna* 續) of sentient beings in order to remove the theory of annihilation (*ucchedanta*) (斷見).

⁷⁵⁹ Compare *Viṃśatikā*, *kārikās* 8 foll.; above, #1135.

But, in order to introduce his disciples to the knowledge of the “emptiness of *dharma*s” (*dharma-sūnyatā* 法空), he gives the second teaching: he also teaches *vijñapti-mātratā* in order that one can recognize also the non-existence of *dharma*s external to the mind.

3. [The Bhagavat teaches *vijñapti-mātratā* in order to remove the concept of *dharma*s (i.e., the belief in *dharma*s [*dharma-grāha*]) and to show that *dharma*s are empty.]

#2383 [Objection:] – But is not ⟨the nature of this⟩ *vijñapti-mātratā* itself also empty?

#2384 [Reply:] – No.

[Objection:] – Why?

#2387 [Reply:] – Because it is not something that can be “conceived” ⟨or “grasped”⟩ (*agrāhyatvāt* 非所執故).⁷⁶⁰

#2388 By “emptiness of *dharma*s” (*dharma-sūnyatā* 法空), we mean non-existence, such as [the non-existence of] the assumed real *dharma*s (實法) that are falsely conceived (妄執) within the development (變) (seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*], image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]) of *vijñāna*, i.e., of *dharma*s that are, ⟨in truth,⟩ not apperceived (*anupalabdha*) (理不可得).

By “emptiness of *dharma*s”, we do, however, not mean non-existence of *vijñapti-mātratā*, which is ineffable (離言), free of the imagined (*parikalpita*) and to be “realized” by the two pure ⟨correct⟩ knowledges (正智所證), that is, the principal and the secondary (namely, the pure root-knowledge [*mūla-anāsrava-jñāna*] and the pure subsequently acquired knowledge [*prṣṭha-labdha-anāsrava-jñāna*]). [*Vijñapti-mātratā* is called emptiness of *dharma*s because it is not imagined.]

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Compare *Viṃśatikā*, stanza 10 (*Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.31.1590.0075b16):

One enters into the insubstantiality of *dharma*s (i.e., the non-self of *dharma*s [*dharma-nairātmya*] = emptiness of *dharma*s [*dharma-sūnyatā*]) when one understands: “It is *vijñapti* alone that appears as *dharma*s, i.e., matter (*rūpa*), etc.; no *dharma* exists that possesses the characteristic of matter (*rūpa*)”.

[Objection:] – But if, absolutely, no *dharma* exists, <427> then does *vijñapti-mātra* itself (which is that what these *dharma*s really are) [also] not exist?

[Reply:] – We do not say that one enters into the emptiness of *dharma*s (*dharma-*

⁷⁶⁰ Asvabhāva, *Samgraha* (T.31.1598.0400b15).

śūnyatā) by affirming the absolute non-existence of *dharma*s, but rather by denying their existence in terms of how they are imagined. [As for the *dharma*s,] the nature which ignorant people attribute to them, i.e., the nature of subject and object (*grāhaka*, *grāhya*): [the *dharma*s] are insubstantial inasmuch as they do not have this nature (*tena ātmanā teṣāṃ nairātmyam*); but [they are] not insubstantial in terms of the ineffable nature that is perceived by the *buddha*s. (See #2836.)

#2389 If this *vijñapti* did not exist, then the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya* 俗諦) (= *vijñāna*, the dependent [*paratantra*]) would not exist; and from the non-existence of the conventional truth, there would also result the non-existence of the absolute truth (*paramārtha-satya* 真諦), for the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) and the absolute (*paramārtha*) mutually support one another, (i.e., are established as interdependent (相依而建立)). (See #2832.) {7/23r.}

La Vallée Poussin comments:

On the various kinds of the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) and of the absolute (*paramārtha*); see #2828.

The texts that clearly show the conflict between [a] the pure Mādhyamikas and [b] the Vijñaptimātratāvādins should be mentioned.

a. For the first, the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) is *anadhiṣṭhānā*, i.e., without basis, without cause (*Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā*, ix):

śūnyebhya eva śūnyā dharmāḥ prabhavanti dharmebhyaḥ

Empty *dharma*s proceed from empty *dharma*s, as their sole cause.

b. For the second, the *dharma*s of the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) exist due to a certain kind of nature-of-things (*dharmatā*) or suchness (*tathatā*); they are empty (*śūnya*) due to a certain kind of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), (i.e., the non-existence of the imagined [*parikalpita*]).

Śikṣā-samuccaya, p. 264:

katham anadhiṣṭhānā saṃvṛtir yuktā |

katham punar ayuktā | yathāśati sthānau puruṣabhrāntiḥ | kasya punaḥ śūnyatā-vādināḥ paramārthatāḥ sthānuḥ siddho yadāśrayāt puruṣabhrāntiḥ syād | amūlāiva ca sarvadharmās tatvato mūlānupapatteḥ ||

How could there be the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) if the conventional did not have a basis (*anadhiṣṭhānā*); [this is the objection of the Vijñaptimātratāvādin]?

[Reply:] – Why not? Just as in the absence of a post, one can falsely imagine that one sees a man. And who is the Śūnyatāvādin who accepts, as absolute truth (*paramārthataḥ*), the existence of a post that would be the basis of the illusion that one is seeing a man (*puruṣa-bhrānti*)? *Dharmas* are absolutely without “root” (*amūla*), for no root exists in truth.

tathā cōktam āryavimalakīrtinirdeśe |
abhūtaparikalpasya kiṃ mūlaṃ |
āha | viparyastā saṃjñā mūlaṃ |
āha | viparyastāyāḥ saṃjñāyāḥ kiṃ mūlaṃ | apratiṣṭhānaṃ mūlaṃ |
āha | apratiṣṭhāyāḥ kiṃ mūlaṃ |
āha | yan mañjuśrīr apratiṣṭhānaṃ na tasya kiñcin mūlaṃ iti hy aprati-
ṣṭhānamūlapratiṣṭhitāḥ sarvadharmēti ||

As the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* (T.14.0476.0573b) teaches:

What is the root of false imagination (*abhūta-parikalpa*)?

He said: Its root is erroneous ideation (*viparyastā saṃjñā*).

He said: And what is the root of erroneous ideation? The root is not relying on anything (*apraṭiṣṭhāna*).

(He said: What is the root of this non-relying?

He said: This non-relying, Mañjuśrī, has no root at all. So all things are supported on roots that have no support.)

[Compare the ancient text: “The earth rests on water ...”, *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, p. 16, *Dīgha*, ii, 107, *Milinda*, 68.]

#2390 The Buddha declares the person who denies (撥) the two truths (諦), [such as Bhāvaviveka,] who understands emptiness badly (*śūnyatā*) (惡取空), to be incurable (不可治).

We conclude that *dharmas* are both empty and non-empty (諸法有空不空). This is the teaching that Maitreya gives in the two stanzas that we have cited, #2374.

La Vallée Poussin comments:

On emptiness (*śūnyatā*) as being badly understood, like a snake, *Madhyamaka-sūtras*, xiii, 8 (*Vṛtti*, pp. 247–248). [*Ratna-kūṭa*, cited here and in *Madhyamaka-avatāra*, p. 118, is in T.11.0310.0634a] <428>

On the two truths as being badly distinguished, *ibid.* xxiv, 9 (*Vṛtti*, pp. 494–497). The Mādhyamikas think that they understand emptiness (*śūnyatā*) well and that

the Vijñaptimātratāvādins understand it badly. But the Vijñaptimātratāvādins have a contrary opinion; see the sources cited in my “Notes on *Śūnyatā* and the Middle Path”, *Indian Historical Quarterly*, March, 1928: 161–168, (*Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, fol. 21a, *Kāśyapa-parivarta*, Bhāvaviveka, etc.).

#2392 4. [Objection:] – If the various material sense-spheres (*rūpa-āyatana* 諸色處) are, in themselves (體), also *vijñāna*, then why does *vijñāna* appear (顯現) in (the semblance of) the characteristics of matter (*rūpa*) (似色相) and constitute [various kinds of] homogeneous (一類), firm (堅) and (stable (住)) series (相續), i.e., mountains, etc.⁷⁶¹

#2394 [Reply:] – Because matter is generated by the power of the seeds (*bījas* 熏習) of “speech” (or names and words) (名言) (see #2600).

#2395 Because matter is the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna* 依處⁷⁶²) (or principle/cause) of the *dharma*s of defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and of purification (*vyavadāna*) (染淨法). If matter were lacking, then “what is upside-down” (顛倒) would be absent, [for it is by taking matter for its object that cognition (*vijñāna*) generates upside-down kinds of conceiving that are called “what is upside-down” (*viparyāsa*)]; thus, pollution (雜染; *saṃkleśa* = defilement [*kleśa*], action [*karma*], existence [*bhāva*]) would be absent. Thus, in the absence of *dharma*s to be abandoned, there would also be no *dharma*s of purification (淨法). This is why *vijñāna* also appears as (the semblance (似) of) matter. – See *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0138c03):⁷⁶³

The cause (*nimitta* 相) of illusion (*bhrānti* 亂) and illusion itself (亂體) are, respectively, material cognition (*rūpa-vijñāna* 色識) and immaterial cognition (*arūpa-vijñāna* 非色識). If the first is absent, the second is also absent. {7/23v.}

⁷⁶¹ This entire paragraph follows very closely *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0138b); Vasubandhu's commentary (T.31.1597.0339), Asvabhāva's commentary (T.31.1598.0401). – However, the first explanation: “because matter (*rūpa*) proceeds from the trace (*vāsanā*) of speech” is absent in the *Samgraha*.

Our text speaks of the material sense-sphere (*rūpa-āyatana*), but it refers to all the material sense-spheres (*āyatanas*), i.e., of color, sound, etc.

⁷⁶² AKB 2/3v.6 [i, F 55].

⁷⁶³ *Sūtrālamkāra* (xi, 24):

bhrānter nimittam bhrāntīś ca rūpavijñaptir iṣyate |
arūpinī ca vijñaptir abhāvāt syān na cetarā ||

亂相及亂體・應許為色識・
及與非色識・若無餘亦無・

La Vallée Poussin comments:

That is to say, illusion (or mind) which is immaterial cognition (*arūpa-vijñāna*) (that is, the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]) has, for its cause, the material cognition (*rūpa-vijñāna*), i.e., the cognition appearing as matter (the image-part [*nimitta-bhāga*]). There is no *viṣayin* (subject), if there is no *viṣaya* (object).

#2397 5. [Objection:] – The five external things ⟨or objects⟩ (外境), i.e., visible form, sound, etc., are clearly present and realized (分明現證) by the five cognitions (*vijñānas*), i.e., eye, ear, etc. Do you deny the existence of what is cognized by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) (現量所得)? <429>

#2399 [Reply:] – When this ⟨direct⟩ perception (現量) realizes [its object] (證), visible form is not [actually] conceived (執) as external (for direct perception [*pratyakṣa*] knows the intrinsic nature [*svabhāva*], see #0378). It is later that mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) (i.e., the reflecting or figurating of mind [*manas*): *mano-vikalpa* 意分別) falsely generates (妄生) the notion of exteriority (*bāhya-saṃjñām* or *bāhya-buddhiṃ janayati* (外想)).

Consequently, that which is seized by direct perception (現量境) is, for each of the cognitions, their ⟨respective⟩ image-part (*nimitta-bhāga* 相分). The image-part, i.e., the directly perceived object, is only a development (*pariṇāma* 所變) of *vijñāna*, and as such it is also (亦) said to exist (有), and the same applies to the cognition (*vijñāna*) (i.e., the seeing-part [*darśana-bhāga*]) that perceives it.

As for visible form (色), etc., conceived by mental cognition (意識所執) as being external (外) and real (實), it is said that they do not exist (無), for mental cognition wrongly construes (妄計) them to exist (有).

#2400 Moreover, objects (境) ⟨such as visible form, etc., (色等)⟩ are not matter (*rūpa*), but appear only as if they were matter (*rūpa-ābhāsa* 似色), are not external but appear as if they were external (*bāhya-ābhāsa* 似外); this is just as with objects (所緣) in a dream (夢), i.e., one cannot maintain (執) them to be real and external matter (實外色).

La Vallée Poussin comments:

Compare *Vingtaine* (Lévi), F 8 (*Weishi ershi lun*, T.31.1590.0076b15; *Weishi ershi lun shu*ji, T.43.1843.0998c19):

*pramāṇavaśād astitvaṃ nāstitvaṃ vā nirdhāryate sarveṣāṃ ca pramāṇānām
pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ gariṣṭaṃ ity asaṭy arthe katham iyaṃ buddhir bhavati
pratyakṣaṃ iti | pratyakṣabuddhiḥ svapnādau yathā ...*

It is by the power of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) that existence or non-existence is established; and, of all the means of knowledge, direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the most important. In the absence of an object, how is the awareness of direct perception (*pratyakṣa-buddhi*) generated? – Just like in the dream ...

[At the bottom of the page, read: *yadā ... pratyakṣabuddhir bhavati ...*.]

#2402 6. [Objection:] – You say that the visible form seen while awake (覺時) is not separate (離) from cognition (*vijñāna*), like the visible form seen while dreaming (夢境). But once awake, one recognizes that the visible form in the dream was only mind (唯心): why then, when awake, does one not also recognize that the visible form seen while awake is nothing but mind (唯識)?⁷⁶⁴ {7/24r.}

#2403 [Reply:] – As long as one is dreaming (夢), (i.e., prior to awakening), one is incapable of recognizing it (by oneself (自知)): but at the time of waking up, one remembers (追) the dream and understands (覺) its nature.

The same applies also for the visible forms seen while awake:

If one has not yet obtained the true awakening (真覺位), one is incapable of recognizing (by oneself).

If one has obtained true awakening, one (also is capable to) remember this dream, i.e., the objects of transmigration, and one understands their true nature. Previously, (not having obtained true awakening,) one remained constantly in the dream (恒處夢).

This is why the Bhagavat (or Buddha (佛)) speaks of the long night of transmigration (生死長夜).⁷⁶⁵ (Such are the reasons why it has not been understood that the objects of visible form (*rūpa-viṣayas*) are nothing but mind.) <430>

#2405 7. [Objection:] – So be it; external matter (*rūpa*) does not exist and (it may be granted that it) is not the object of the internal cognition (*vijñāna*). But the mind of another (他心), which does exist, can it not be the object of the knowledge (自所緣) called “knowledge of another’s mind” (*para-citta-jñāna*)?

La Vallée Poussin comments:

⁷⁶⁴ See Śaṅkara, *Brahma-sūtras*, ii, 2, 29: *vaidharmyāccha na svapnādivat*: “And on account of the difference in nature (in consciousness between the waking and the dreaming state, the experience of the waking state) is not like dreams, etc.” (translated by Swami Sivananda).

⁷⁶⁵ Summary of *Viṃśatikā*, stanza 17b–c (*Weishi ershi lun*, T. 31.1590.0076c07; *Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T.43.1843.1001b07).

This point has been discussed (#0364). – There are two possibilities: Either the mind of the practitioner who possesses the knowledge of another's mind (*para-citta-jñāna*) (AKB vii, F 11) cognizes another's mind, or it does not cognize it. In the first hypothesis, the mind is cognizing an object external to itself; in the second hypothesis, why do the teachings speak of the knowledge of another's mind?

Kuiji, *Vimśatikā* (*Weishi'ershi lun shuji*, 4/26v.; T43.1834.1007b), explains the views of Sthiramati and of Dharmapāla on the parts (*bhāgas*) of the knowledge of another's mind (see #2957).

#2407 [Reply:] – We do not maintain that the mind of another (他心) is not the object (*ālambana*) of one's own knowledge (or cognition) (自識境): we only say that it is not the direct (*sākṣāt* 親, see #2468) object (所緣).

#2408 This is to say, when a cognition (*vijñāna*) arises, this cognition is not really active (無實作用); it does not directly seize an outer thing (親執外物) in the way that the hand grasps or pliers grasp, or in the way that the sun, etc., spreads its light (日等舒光) (7/24v.) and directly lights up external things (親照外境).

Rather, it is like a mirror (鏡), etc., on which appears what seems to be external objects (似外境現). It is in this way that *vijñāna* is said to “cognize another's mind” (了他心): in fact, it does not directly cognize it (親能了); what it directly cognizes (親所了) is its own development (自所變).

#2409 This is why the *Samdhi-nirmocana* (T16.0676.0698b04) says:

There is not any slightest *dharma* that would seize (取) another *dharma* (= a *dharma* external to the mind).⁷⁶⁶ But, when cognition (*vijñāna*) arises, it appears similar to that (似彼相現) [i.e., in this particular case, similar to the mind of another]: thus, we say that it seizes (取) that [*dharma*, i.e., another's mind] (see above, #2359).

#2410 What is true for the mind that is directed (緣) (*ālambaka*) at the mind of another applies also for the mind that cognizes visible form (*rūpa*), etc.,

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The visible form (*rūpa*) that is the image-part (*nimitta-bhāga*) of another's mind (that is, another's body, the development of another's cognition [*vijñāna*]) and also the visible form that is the development of another cognition of the same individual. [That is to say, visual cognition (*caṅsur-vijñāna*) (namely, the seeing-part) has, for

⁷⁶⁶ Editors: YBh (T.30.1579.0724a08), *Samgraha* (T.31.1594.0138b11) and Vasubandhu's *Bhāṣya* (T.31.1597.0338c08). Kuiji (T.43.1830.0494a05): 解深密言。無有少法。無少實法能取餘法。

its immediate object (*ālambana*), its own image (*nimitta*), which is a reproduction of the developed visible form of the store-cognition (*ālaya-vijñāna*).] (See #2470.)

- #2412 8. [Objection:] – But how is the doctrine of *vijñapti*-only (*vijñapti-mātratā*) to be reconciled with the existence of an object of the mind—namely, the mind of another—distinct from the mind? <431>

La Vallée Poussin comments:

The same difficulty is discussed in *Vingtaine* (*Vimśatikā*; Lévi; *Weishi ershi lun*, T31.1590.0077a19; *Weishi ershi lun shuji*, T43.1843.1006b02), F 10. – According to Xuan-zang's translation:

If everything is only *vijñapti*, would the “knowledge of another's mind” cognize or not cognize this mind?

[Question:] – What is wrong in accepting one or the other hypothesis?

[Answer:] – If it does not cognize it, why is it called knowledge of another's mind? If it does cognize it, [then *vijñapti-mātratā* is not established].

[Reply:] – It does cognize it, but not as it is.

[Question:] – Why does the knowledge of another's mind not cognize this mind as it is?

[Answer:] – Exactly in the way that the knowledge of one's own mind does not cognize this mind as it is.

[Question:] – Why is not the knowledge of one's own mind an awareness of its object as it is?

[Answer:] – Due to ignorance (*ajñānāt*). These two knowledges, veiled or hindered by ignorance, do not cognize their object in its ineffability, as it is known by the *buddhas*, for this object appears other than what it is (*vitatha-pratibhāsātā*), because the ways of conceiving a subject and an object are not yet abandoned.

Kuiji has interesting explanations on that.

- #2413 [Reply:] – Stop there, persistent skeptic! 〈You doubt everything you touch〉. The doctrine of *vijñapti*-only does not only speak of the existence of a singular *vijñāna* (一識), of my *vijñāna*.⁷⁶⁷

- #2414 〈[Question:] – If not, what else should it be?〉

⁷⁶⁷ See Stcherbatski, *Dharmakīrti, Saṃtānāntarasiddhi. Tibetan and Russian*, 1916, 1922; see my note, *Bulletin School Oriental Studies*, 1918: 130.

#2415 <[Reply:] – You should listen carefully>. If there were only <one single *vijñāna*>, i.e., my *vijñāna*, then the differences (別) between ordinary people and saints (*āryas*) (凡聖), the noble and the base (尊卑), causes and fruits (因果), etc., in the ten directions, all would disappear. What *buddha* would teach me? To whom would the *buddha* teach? What *dharma* would he teach and what fruit <would be sought> (何法何求)?

Thus, the expression *vijñapti-mātratā* {725r.} sums up a profound doctrine <and has a profound significance> (深意趣).

A. The word *vijñapti* should, <in general,> be understood as:

1. the eight cognitions (*vijñānas* 八識)—of each of the sentient beings—which are *vijñāna* in their nature;
2. the six classes of mental factors (*caittas*) (六位心所) which are associated with cognition (*vijñāna*);
3. the two parts (*bhāgas*) of the image (*nimitta* 相) and of seeing (*darśana* 見) which are developed (所變相見) from cognition (*vijñāna*) and from the mental factors;
4. the formations dissociated from mind (*viprayuktas*) which are various modalities of cognition (*vijñāna*) (分位差別), of the mental factors (*caittas*) and of matter (*rūpa*);
5. true suchness (*tathatā* 如) which <the principle of> emptiness (*śūnyatā*) reveals (#0337) and which is the true nature of the four preceding categories (四實性), <i.e., (1) the specific characteristic of *vijñāna* (識自相) (2) the associates of cognition (識相應), (3) the two developments (二所變), (4) the three modalities (三分位)>.

Thus, these *dharma*s, such as they are, are not separate from *vijñāna* (不離識); we say that all *dharma*s are *vijñapti* (識).

B. The word *mātra* (唯) is added in order to preclude (遮)—as being separate from *vijñāna*—the existence of real matter (*rūpa*), etc., as ignorant people (including people of the two vehicles) accept (所執) them.

#2416 The person who, in that way, understands the meaning (意) of the teaching (教) <432> of *vijñapti-mātratā* will be able, without error, to work with the two provisions (*sambhāra* 資糧) (i.e., of merit [*puṇya*] and of knowledge [*jñāna*]), to quickly penetrate into the “emptiness of *dharma*s” (*dharma-śūnyatā* 法空), to realize unsurpassed awakening (證無上覺), to save sentient beings from the

whirlpool of *samsāra* (生死輪迴).

But the inflexible denier {7/25v.} who understands emptiness badly (惡取空) (i.e., Bhāvaviveka, see #0008) will act in contradiction with (*vyapakarṣ* 違背) the teachings and reason, and cannot successfully establish such a doctrine. – Thus, one definitively can trust that everything is only *vijñāna* (or *vijñapti*). <433>



VASUBANDHU (ca. 350–430 A.D.) was born in Puruṣapura in Gandhāra and is, next to Aśaṅga (ca. 330–405 A.D.), his half-brother, the most famous personage of the Yogācāra school.

He originally belonged to the Śrāvakayāna school of the Sarvāstivādins and had already made a name for himself through the composition of numerous treatises when he was won over to the Mahāyāna by Aśaṅga, sometime in his forties. He then with great enthusiasm put his talents to work in the service of the Mahāyāna, for which he wrote so many works that he received the name “master of a thousand doctrinal treatises”. Vasubandhu counts as the great systematizer of Buddhism and is one of the six great ornaments—six great commentators of the Buddha’s teaching.


Even though in the Kośa, Vasubandhu seems to be generally partisan to the “Hīnayāna”-Sautrāntikas, he too was evidently open-minded, of which fact the Kośa is a testimony, and accordingly he did not seem to have become exclusively partisan to the tenets of any group as such—be it those of Hīnayāna- or Yogācāra-Sautrāntika or Sarvāstivāda.

Vasubandhu’s personage, life and dates have been a matter of great debate in modern Buddhist scholarship.



XUANZANG (600–664 a.d.), renowned for his sixteen-year pilgrimage to India and his career as a translator of Buddhist scriptures, is one of the most illustrious figures in the history of scholastic Chinese Buddhism.

Upon his return to China in 645, Xuanzang brought back with him a great number of Sanskrit texts. In addition to his translations of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (651–654), the **Nyāyānusāra* (653–654), as well as the **Mahāvibhāṣā* (656–659), *Jñānaprasthāna* (657–660), **Abhidharmāvatāra* (658), *Prakaraṇa-pāda* (660) and other important Abhidharma texts, he also translated many Mahāyāna scriptures, e.g., the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra* (646–648) and *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (660–663), and authored the *Records of the Western Regions* (646). It is through Xuanzang and his chief disciple Kuiji that the Faxiang School was initiated in China; the most important book of the school being Xuanzang's *Cheng weishi lun* (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*; in 659).




LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (1869–1938), born in Liège (Belgium), was an indologist and specialist in Buddhist philosophy. Educated in Liège, Louvain, Paris (S. Lévy) and Leiden (H. Kern), he was a master in many languages, including Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, Tibetan, Greek, Latin, etc., and became professor at the University of Ghent (Belgium) in 1893, a position he held until his retirement in 1929.

Hubert Durt (in *Encyclopedia of Religion*) elaborates:

La Vallée Poussin dedicated all the strength of his philological genius to his field and contributed to a reorientation of Buddhist studies toward the languages of northern Buddhism (Sanskrit and Tibetan) and toward Buddhist philosophy considered in its historical perspective. He produced two main types of studies: (1) scholarly editions [of Tantric texts; Mādhyamika texts; etc.] and (2) translations with exegeses. These correspond roughly to the two periods of his activity, that before and that after World War I.

After World War I, La Vallée Poussin, who had in the meantime mastered the languages of the Chinese Buddhist translations, undertook the enormous enterprise of translating and critically annotating two summae of Buddhist scholastics: Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, the masterwork of the northern Hīnayāna Abhidharma school, and Hsüan-tsang's *Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi*, the best compendium of the tenets of the Yogācāra, or Idealist, current of the Mahāyāna.

Besides these two main types of studies, La Vallée Poussin produced many other writings. Sylvain Lévi wrote: "His work is of unrivalled magnitude."



GELONG LODRÖ SANGPO (Jürgen Balzer)—the co-translator—is a student of the late Ven. Trungpa Rinpoche and of Dzogchen Pönlop Rinpoche. Born 1952 in Germany, he received his first ordination in the Karma Kagyü Sangha in 1984, France, and then moved to Gampo Abbey, Canada. From 1985–2002 he served as Secretary of *International Kagyü Sangha Association of Buddhist Monks and Nuns* and published its magazine *The Profound Path of Peace*.

He completed the traditional three year retreat in 1996 and a four year study retreat in 2003. He also served for a few years as Acting Director of Gampo Abbey, was one of the co-founders of Nitārtha Institute and served as chair of Vidyadhara Institute, the monastic college of Gampo Abbey, since its inception.

His focus of study is in the systematic traditions of Buddhist Abhidharma. He has translated and published—under the supervision of Prof. Ernst Steinkellner—Erich Frauwallner's *The Philosophy of Buddhism* (Motilal).


He is the general editor and main translator of *The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin*, of which Volume I: *Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu*, was published in 2012. He was also engaged for several years in translating the Collected Works of Prof. Lambert Schmithausen. As President of Karma Changchub Ling, he is presently engaged in establishing it as a monastic centre of the Karma Kagyü lineage in Fall River, Nova Scotia.



GELONGMA MIGME CHÖDRÖN—the co-translator of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*—was a student of the late Ven. Trungpa Rinpoche and of the V.V. Khenchen Thrangu Rinpoche. She was born in 1924 in Ottawa, Canada. After receiving her Ph.D. in Chemistry, she spent many years in chemistry research and in palynology. She received *bhikṣuṇī* ordination in 1994 and completed the traditional three year retreat in 1996.

As a translator from French, she translated Étienne Lamotte's translation from the Chinese of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra* and his translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, as well as Walpola Rahula's translation of the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*, André Bareau's *Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, José van den Broeck's translation of Ghoṣaka's *Amṛtarasa*. Before passing away in October 2016, she finished the draft translations of all the works of La Vallée Poussin to be published in the future volumes of *The Collected Works of Louis de La Vallée Poussin*.

Migme Chödrön was a member and Vice-President of Karma Changchub Ling, a monastic center within the Karma Kagyü lineage, in Fall River, Nova Scotia, Canada.



ALEXANDER LEONHARD MAYER studied Chinese at the Universities of Berlin, Bonn and Tübingen (Germany), at Fu-jen ta-hsüeh and Shi-fan ta-hsüeh (Taiwan), Sanskrit at the Universities of Tübingen and Tribhuvan (Kathmandu), and Chinese history at the Shi-fan ta-hsüeh li-shih yen-chiu suo.

In 1985 he earned a double M.A. in Chinese and Indian Studies (University of Tübingen) for a thesis on the Ming Dynasty Salt Monopoly, in 1989 a PhD (University of Tübingen) on the Xuanzang Biographies and in 1999 a Habilitation (University of Heidelberg) on Chinese Buddhist Commentarial Literature.

He has published on Xuanzang and his biographies (Wiesbaden, 1992–2001) and on various aspects of the Chinese Buddhist tradition.

His unpublished projects include a translation of Sthiramati's *Triṃśikābhāṣya*, a translation cum study of Kuiji's *Jingang jing Zanshu* (on the *Vajracchedikā-sūtra*), a translation of the *Dacheng qixin lun* in Fazang's and Xufa's interpretation and a study on Shihui's sub-commentary on Fazang's commentary on the Heart Sūtra.

Alexander Mayer has been teaching at the University of Heidelberg (1990–1999) and at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign since 2000.